Contemporary legal thinking is in the thrall of a cult of flexibility. We obsess about avoiding decisions without all possible relevant information while ignoring the costs of postponing decisions until that information becomes available. We valorize procrastination and condemn investments of decisional resources in early decisions. Both public and private law should be understood as a productive activity con¬verting information, norms, and decisional and enforcement capacity into out¬puts of social value. Optimal timing depends on changes in these inputs’ scarcity and in the value of the decision they produce. Our legal culture tends to overes¬ti¬mate the value of information that may become available in the future while discounting declines over time in decisional resources and the utility of decisions. Even where postponing some decisions is necessary, a sophisticated appreciation of discretion’s components often exposes aspects of decisions that can and should be made earlier. Disaster response illustrates the folly of legal procrastination as it shrinks the supply of decisional resources while in¬creas¬ing the demand for them. After Hurricane Katrina, programs built around flexibility failed badly through a combination of late and defective decisions. By contrast, those that appreciated the scarcity of decisional resources and had developed detailed regulatory templates in advance provided quick and effective relief.
96 Cornell Law Review (2011).
Law and Society
Digital Commons Citation
Super, David A., "Against Flexibility" (2011). Faculty Scholarship. 989.