Disaster, Disaster Relief, Financing Catastrophe, Catastrophe, Catastrophic Risk, Katrina, September 11, 9/11, public finance, flood insurance, catastrophe compensation, compensation fund, national flood insurance, securitization, insurance securitization, alternative risk transfer
The chapter argues that financing extreme catastrophic loss will become more problematic as catastrophes become more frequent and severe. An effective strategy must increase the level of participation in the spreading of risk and loss. Currently, risk spreading is done largely through insurers and government as they are the default aggregators of private and public capital. An enlargement of participation may mean the disintermediation of the traditional insurance and public compensation functions, thus allowing more direct and efficient participation between those are exposed to risk and those who are willing to bear it. This chapter also argues that tax policy should consider catastrophe risk and compensation as a way to positively influence risk-taking behavior. Currently, tax policy focuses on the equity and fairness of taxation of individual income, but these considerations are also at the heart of public financing of catastrophes.
Digital Commons Citation
Robert Rhee, Participation and Disintermediation in a Risk Society, in Law and Recovery After Disaster: Hurricane Katrina, Chapter 7, at 103-126 (Robin Paul Malloy, ed., Ashgate Press, 2008).