Treaty Double Jeopardy: the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention and the FCPA

Authors

Michael P. Van Alstine, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of LawFollow

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

2012

Keywords

bribery, dual sovereignty, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act

Abstract

This article explores the possibility of "double jeopardy" protection arising from an international treaty. In specific, it examines whether, either as a matter of general principle or from the treaty's express provisions, the OECD Convention on Combatting Bribery of Foreign Public Officials protects a defendant from multiple or successive prosecutions under our domestic Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.

Publication Citation

73 Ohio State Law Journal 1321 (2012).

Disciplines

International Law

Digital Commons Citation

73 Ohio State Law Journal 1321 (2012).