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Article

“WHIMSY LITTLE CONTRACTS” WITH UNEXPECTED CONSEQUENCES: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSUMER UNDERSTANDING OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS

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ABSTRACT

Arbitration clauses have become ubiquitous in consumer contracts. These arbitration clauses require consumers to waive the constitutional right to a civil jury, access to court, and, increasingly, the procedural remedy of class representation. Because those rights cannot be divested without consent, the validity of arbitration agreements rests on the premise of consent. Consumers who do not want to arbitrate or waive their class rights can simply decline to purchase the products or services covered by an arbitration agreement. But the premise of consent is undermined if consumers do not understand the effect on their procedural rights of clicking a box or accepting a product.

This Article reports on an empirical study exploring the extent to which consumers are aware of and understand the effect of arbitration clauses in consumer contracts. We conducted an online survey of 668 consumers, approximately reflecting the population of adult Americans with respect to race/ethnicity, level of education, amount of family income, and age. Respondents were shown a typical credit card contract with an arbitration clause containing a class action waiver printed in bold and with portions in italics and ALLCAPS. Respondents were then asked questions about the sample contract as well as about a hypothetical contract containing what was described as a “properly-worded” arbitration clause. Finally, respondents were asked about their own experiences with actual consumer contracts.

The survey results suggest a profound lack of understanding about the existence and effect of arbitration agreements among consumers. While 43% of the respondents recognized that the sample contract included an arbitration clause, 61% of those believed that consumers would, nevertheless, have a right to have a court decide a dispute too large for a small claims court. Less than 9% realized that the contract had both an arbitration clause and that it would prevent consumers from proceeding in court. With respect to the class waiver, four times as many respondents thought the contract did not block them from participating in a class action as realized that it did, even though the class action waiver was printed twice, in bold, in the sample contract, including one time in italics and ALLCAPS. Overall, of the more than 5000 answers we
recorded to questions offering right and wrong answers, only a quarter were correct.

Turning to respondents’ own lives, the survey asked if they had ever entered into contracts with arbitration clauses. Three hundred and three respondents claimed never to have done so. In fact, 264, or 87%, had at least one account subject to an arbitration clause.

These and other findings reported in this Article should cause concern among judges and policymakers considering mandatory pre-dispute consumer arbitration agreements. Our results suggest that many citizens assume that they have a right to judicial process that they cannot lose as a result of their acquiescence in a form consumer contract. They believe that this right to judicial process will outweigh what one respondent referred to as a “whimsy little contract.” Our results suggest further that citizens are giving up these rights unknowingly, either because they do not realize they have entered into an arbitration agreement or because they do not understand the legal consequences of doing so. Given the degree of misunderstanding the results demonstrate, we question whether meaningful consent is possible in the consumer arbitration context.

I. INTRODUCTION

The default mechanism for resolving civil disputes in the United States is the court system. The Federal Constitution, and the constitutions of all fifty states and the District of Columbia, guarantee a right to a jury trial in civil cases. Through news stories about lawsuits and TV dramas about courtroom lawyers, popular culture conveys the message that people with grievances—legitimate or otherwise—can and do pursue those grievances through litigation in the court system. But parties to civil disputes have the option of waiving their rights to adjudicative process by agreeing to have an arbitrator decide their disputes. Under the Federal Arbitration Act, parties can agree by contract to arbitrate disputes before those disputes arise, and courts must enforce those agreements even if one of the parties wishes to proceed in court.¹

Many companies include arbitration clauses in their consumer contracts. Consumers who agree to these contracts waive their rights to proceed in court, to a jury trial, and to appeal. Often, these arbitration agreements also provide that the parties waive their right to participate

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in class actions, either in court or in arbitration. The contracts themselves can be quite lengthy.

The legal regime supporting arbitration—and justifying the waiver of constitutionally protected procedural rights implicit in it—rests on the principle of consent. Parties to an arbitration agreement are held to their bargain because they have consented to forego the procedural rights they would otherwise have.² Given the complexity of arbitration clauses and the burgeoning literature about consumer understanding of consumer contracts, however, it is not clear to what extent consumers actually know they are agreeing to arbitrate and understand what that arbitration agreement entails—a matter that has not been studied until now. If consumers—citizens—are unwittingly being stripped of procedural rights that they value and believe they retain, serious questions arise about the assumptions underlying the law of arbitration.

To test consumer awareness and understanding of arbitration in consumer contracts, we conducted an online survey of 668 consumers using a pool reflecting the demographics of American society as a whole. We displayed a credit card contract with an arbitration clause and then asked respondents eight questions about the sample contract and an imaginary contract containing a “properly-worded” arbitration clause. Our findings suggest that consumers lack awareness of arbitration agreements and do not understand those agreements when they are aware of them. Many expect to have access to the judicial system and class actions regardless of what they sign. To give just two examples of the many ways consumers misapprehend arbitration agreements, we found that only 43% of the respondents recognized that the sample contract included an arbitration clause. Similarly, less than 9% realized both that the contract had an arbitration clause and that it would prevent consumers from suing in court.

Even when they were told they entered into enforceable arbitration agreements, many respondents did not believe the agreements would be enforceable. For example, even when the question said that the arbitrator’s decision was final, far more respondents believed that an arbitrator’s decision was not final than thought it was. Similarly, many consumers were not convinced that contract terms would be enforced as written. Thus, when the question stated that they could not participate in a class action, more than 70% of the respondents failed to realize that they could not.

Overall, only two respondents, or less than 1%, answered all eight questions correctly out of the 663 who responded to all eight, while 117,


or 18%, did not answer any of the questions correctly—more than answered at least half the questions right. Respondents gave 44% more incorrect answers than correct ones. Not one of the eight questions elicited a majority of correct answers, though on one question a majority of the respondents gave wrong answers.3 Put another way, almost none of the respondents understood the effect of the arbitration clause and many who thought they did were simply wrong.

These and other findings in the survey raise troubling issues about whether consumer consent to arbitration is informed in any sense of the word. These issues, in turn, call into question whether consumers should be bound by agreements they cannot comprehend but that strip them of constitutional rights.

The remainder of this Article reports more fully on these and other findings. Part II describes the use of arbitration in consumer contracts. Part III reviews previous studies on consumer understanding of disclosures and contract terms. Part IV describes the study methodology and the limits to that methodology. Part V presents and analyzes the survey results. Part VI offers some brief comments on the findings. Part VII concludes.

II. THE LANDSCAPE OF ARBITRATION IN CONSUMER CONTRACTS

A. The Legal Regime Supporting Arbitration of Consumer Disputes

Arbitration has existed in various forms for centuries. At the time of America’s founding, arbitration was widespread among the colonies, often fed by anti-lawyer sentiment.4 Merchants routinely used arbitration to avoid the costs and delays of common-law litigation,5 with the most important merchants in the colonies making arbitration a key function of the New York Chamber of Commerce, formed in 1768.6

3. Overall, more respondents gave correct answers than incorrect answers on only two of the questions. On two questions the percentage of correct and incorrect answers was within the survey’s margin of error. On four of the questions more respondents gave wrong answers than right, sometimes by margins of three or four to one.
Even George Washington famously included a provision in his will requiring arbitration of disputes among his heirs.\(^7\)

Prior to the twentieth century, however, courts viewed arbitration with skepticism, taking the position that an agreement to arbitrate could not “oust” a court of its jurisdiction.\(^8\) Pre-dispute arbitration agreements were widely understood to be revocable at will by either party.\(^9\) With courts refusing specific enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration agreements, a party to an arbitration agreement could, at most, sue at law for breach of the agreement.\(^10\) But damages were too small and speculative for breach of contract to provide a meaningful enforcement mechanism, severely curtailing the utility of arbitration agreements.\(^11\)

In the first decades of the twentieth century, the business community, led by the New York Chamber of Commerce, began a sustained legislative effort to overcome the judicial hostility to arbitration.\(^12\) That effort—part of a broader initiative to reform the nation’s fragmented and sclerotic system of court procedure\(^13\)—led first to the passage of the New York Arbitration Act and ultimately, in 1925, to the enactment of the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"), the statute that governs arbitration at both the state and federal level today.\(^14\)

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8. See Meacham v. Jamestown, F. & C. R. Co., 211 N.Y. 346, 354 (1914) (Cardozo, J., concurring) (“If jurisdiction is to be ousted by contract, we must submit to the failure of justice that may result from these and like causes. It is true that some judges have expressed the belief that parties ought to be free to contract about such matters as they please. In this state the law has long been settled to the contrary.”); Hurst v. Litchfield, 39 N.Y. 377, 379 (1868); Thompson v. Charnock, (1799) 101 Eng. Rep. 1310 (K.B) (“[I]t is not necessary now to say how this point ought to be determined if it were res integra, it having been decided again and again that an agreement to refer all matters in difference to arbitration is not sufficient to oust the Courts of Law or Equity of their jurisdiction.”); Vynior’s Case, (1609) 77 Eng. Rep. 595 (K.B.).
9. See Tobey v. Cnty. of Bristol, 23 F. Cas. 1313, 1321 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (Story, J.) (“It is certainly the policy of the common law, not to compel men to submit their rights and interests to arbitration, or to enforce agreements for such a purpose. Nay, the common law goes farther, and even if a submission has been made to arbitrators, who are named, by deed or otherwise, with an express stipulation, that the submission shall be irrevocable, it still is revocable and countermandable, by either party, before the award is actually made, although not afterwards.”).
11. *Id.* at 74.
The core of the FAA is Section 2, which provides that “a written provision . . . in a contract evidencing a transaction involving interstate commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction . . . shall be valid, irrevocable and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” This provision abrogated the “revocability” doctrine created by courts that had to that point stymied the enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration agreements. Section 2 is given teeth by Sections 3 and 4. Section 3 requires any federal court to stay litigation and refer the parties to arbitration where the subject of a lawsuit is covered by an arbitration agreement. Section 4 requires federal courts to compel arbitration where one party to an arbitration agreement has failed to comply with it.

For the first half-century of the FAA’s existence, courts interpreted it narrowly. The most prominent example of that understanding was the Supreme Court’s 1953 decision in Wilko v. Swan, in which the Court refused to compel arbitration of claims arising under the Securities Act of 1933. Focusing on the inadequacy of arbitration as a substitute for formal adjudication, the Court emphasized that the arbitrators would not have a judge to instruct them on the law and, even conceding their obligation to apply the law, would be under no obligation to produce a reasoned opinion allowing for meaningful judicial review.

Wilko was widely understood to bar the enforcement of arbitration agreements involving claims arising under federal statutory law. Over the next three decades, courts repeatedly refused to enforce arbitration agreements with respect to statutory claims, including claims arising under federal laws addressing antitrust, securities, RICO, patent, copyright, bankruptcy, discrimination, and ERISA.

Beginning in the 1980s, however, the Supreme Court shifted course and began to promote the use of arbitration by reading the FAA more expansively. In Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury

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19. See WARE, supra note 14, at 72–73 nn.327–34 (citing cases); see also Judith Resnik, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78, 115 (2011) (“Between 1953 and 1983, the Court heard fifteen cases in which arbitration was at issue, and in the four in which an individual (as contrasted with a corporation) objected, the Court declined to require arbitration.” (footnote omitted)).
Construction Corp., the Court declared that Section 2 of the FAA “is a congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any state substantive or procedural policies to the contrary.” It relied on that policy rationale to then announce that “[t]he effect of the section is to create a body of federal substantive law of arbitrability, applicable to any arbitration agreement within the coverage of the Act.”

The following year, in Southland Corp. v. Keating, the Court affirmed the preemptive effect of the FAA, holding that state laws prohibiting enforcement of arbitration agreements with respect to certain claims violate the Supremacy Clause. “In enacting § 2 of the [F]ederal Act, Congress declared a national policy favoring arbitration and withdrew the power of the states to require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration.” Then, in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, the Court opened the door to mandatory arbitration of statutory claims by enforcing an arbitration agreement in a dispute arising under U.S. antitrust law.

After Mitsubishi, the Court rapidly expanded the reach of the FAA and the availability of mandatory arbitration. Two years later, in Shearson/American Express v. McMahon, the Court enforced an arbitration clause in a case alleging garden-variety fraud claims against a securities broker under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and RICO. Two years after that, in Rodriguez de Quijas v.

21. Id. at 24.
22. Id.
24. Id. at 16. The state law at issue was the California Franchise Investment Law, which had been held by the California Supreme Court to require judicial consideration of claims arising under it. Id. at 10.
25. Id.
30. Id. at 238. The aggrieved investors alleged “fraudulent, excessive trading on respondents’ accounts and . . . making false statements and omitting material facts from the advice given to respondents.” Id. at 223.
Shearson/American Express, Inc., the Court overruled Wilko by holding claims under the Securities Act of 1933 arbitrable. And in 1991, in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., the Court enforced an arbitration clause in a dispute involving employment discrimination claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967. Since then, whenever the issue of arbitrability has been presented, the Court has found the claim subject to arbitration, regardless of its legal basis.

Businesses responded to the Supreme Court’s expansive arbitration jurisprudence by adding arbitration clauses to their contracts with consumers. Many of the clauses included “class waivers”—provisions in the arbitration agreement purporting to waive the right to seek collective or class relief. A lopsided split developed in the federal circuit courts, with the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh upholding arbitral class waivers and the First and Ninth refusing to enforce them, typically on grounds of state law unconscionability.

In 2011, in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, the Supreme Court resolved the split in favor of allowing class waivers. The Court in Concepcion held that the FAA preempted a California rule nullifying class waivers in contracts of adhesion where consumers seek small amounts of individual damages and allege a scheme to defraud large numbers of consumers out of such small amounts. The Court concluded that Congress intended to promote arbitration in a form designed to achieve the traditional arbitral goals of efficiency.

32. Id. at 485.
34. Id. at 26.
35. See CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 670 (2012) (holding that language in Credit Repair Organizations Act providing consumers with a “right” to bring an action in court and using terms “action,” “class action,” and “court” do not indicate congressional intent to require judicial enforcement of claims arising under the Act).
36. See Jean R. Sternlight, As Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the Class Action, Will the Class Action Survive?, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 6 (2000) (“Increasingly, potential defendants are drafting arbitration clauses that explicitly bar class actions, hoping that these will facilitate favorable court rulings.”).
confidentiality, decisional expertise, and procedural flexibility. Class arbitration would frustrate these goals. Because the California rule effectively required either class arbitration or no arbitration at all, the California rule could not stand.

In sum, the Supreme Court’s arbitration jurisprudence establishes that any claim is potentially subject to arbitration absent an express congressional declaration that arbitration is prohibited. A disparity in bargaining power—such as the one between consumers and businesses—does not change that result. Arbitration agreements in contracts of adhesion are enforceable. Further, an arbitration agreement in a contract of adhesion can require a waiver of the right to join with others in pursuing aggregate claims.

Once in arbitration, parties are subject to the normal rules of arbitration, including rules of finality that allow for judicial review of arbitral awards only upon a narrow set of grounds tied to arbitrator misconduct. The Supreme Court has held that the statutory grounds for vacatur of arbitral awards in the FAA are exclusive, effectively precluding judicial attempts to intervene in the arbitration process to correct legally erroneous awards. Regardless of their relative positions, circumstances, and claims, parties who agree to arbitration forfeit the right to judicial process; if that agreement includes a class

41. Id. at 1750–51.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1753.
44. See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2012). The FAA permits a court to vacate an arbitral award only on the following grounds:
   (1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means; (2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them; (3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced; or (4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.

45. Hall St. Ass’n v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1405 (2007). The Court in Hall Street suggested in dicta that judge-made grounds for vacatur, most notably “manifest disregard of the law,” were inconsistent with the FAA. Id. at 1403–04; see Richard C. Reuben, Personal Autonomy and Vacatur After Hall Street, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 1103, 1140 (2009) (“By holding that the statutory grounds are ‘exclusive,’ the Supreme Court appears to have precluded the lower courts from considering arguments that an arbitral award may be vacated on non-statutory grounds.”); cf. Michael H. LeRoy, Are Arbitrators Above the Law? The “Manifest Disregard of the Law” Standard, 52 B.C. L. REV. 137, 180 (2011) (finding splits within the federal circuits and among the states on the issue of whether manifest disregard survives as an independent grounds of review after Hall Street).
waiver, they forfeit their right to join with others similarly situated and they have no recourse to a court if they are unhappy with the results.

B. The Prevalence of Business-Consumer Arbitration Agreements and Class Waivers

The business community has responded to the Supreme Court’s expansive arbitration jurisprudence by adding arbitration clauses to many common consumer contracts. With prominent companies including AT&T Wireless, Verizon, Sprint, and PayPal all incorporating arbitration agreements into their standard contracts, American consumers routinely agree to arbitrate product-related disputes. Often, when consumers agree to arbitrate with a company, they are also agreeing to forego the right to join in a class action with other consumers against that company. These trends are especially pronounced in the financial services industry. The following research provides empirical support for those propositions.

1. Prevalence of Arbitration Agreements in Consumer Contracts

In a 2004 study, Linda Demaine and Deborah Hensler researched the arbitration policies of the major businesses in thirty-seven industries. They found that more than 35% of the 161 businesses they surveyed included arbitration clauses in their consumer contracts. Unsurprisingly, the numbers were highest in industries, such as financial services, in which businesses and consumers interact in ongoing relationships governed by written contracts. Demaine and Hensler found that almost 70% of the businesses in the financial sector required consumers to arbitrate. In contrast, none of the businesses in

48. Id. at 62.
49. Id.
50. Id.
the food and entertainment industry provided for arbitration with consumers.\textsuperscript{51}

A 2008 study by Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey Miller and Emily Sherwin confirmed the prevalence of arbitration in industries where written contracts with large numbers of consumers are the norm.\textsuperscript{52} Eisenberg and his colleagues analyzed twenty-six consumer contracts drafted by twenty-one major companies in the telecommunications and finance industries.\textsuperscript{53} They found that over 75% of those contracts included an arbitration clause.\textsuperscript{54} Amy Schmitz reached similar results in her analysis of credit card and mobile phone contracts, finding that ten of thirteen credit card contracts and all nine mobile phone contracts she analyzed included arbitration clauses.\textsuperscript{55}

In a more comprehensive study of the extent of arbitration in the credit card industry, Peter Rutledge and Chris Drahozal found that, by 2009, over 95% of outstanding credit card loans were covered by an arbitration agreement.\textsuperscript{56} In 2009, however, two events caused a dramatic reduction in the use of arbitration agreements in credit card contracts. First, the National Arbitration Forum (“NAF”), which at the time was the largest provider of consumer credit arbitrations nationwide, ceased administering new consumer credit arbitrations as part of its settlement of a consumer fraud lawsuit filed by the Minnesota Attorney General.\textsuperscript{57} Second, four of the largest issuers of credit cards agreed to remove the arbitration provisions from their credit card agreements for three and a half years as part of the settlement of an antitrust lawsuit alleging that the banks conspired to force consumers

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{51} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{53} Id. at 881.
\item \textsuperscript{54} Id. at 882–83. In contrast to the high prevalence of arbitration in their consumer contracts, less than 10% of those companies non-consumer negotiated contracts contained an arbitration clause. Id.
\item \textsuperscript{57} Id. at 18–19. The lawsuit alleged that the NAF, a for-profit entity with financial ties to attorneys who represented banks in the arbitrations NAF conducted, had systematically rubber-stamped the demands of banks in debt collection arbitrations; see also Ameet Sachdev, Consumer Arbitration Firm No Longer to Settle Disputes, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (July 21, 2009), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2009-07-21/news/0907200461_1_national-arbitration-forum-arbitration-clauses-consumer-arbitration.
to accept arbitration agreements containing class waivers. As a consequence, by the end of 2010, the percentage of outstanding credit card loans subject to an arbitration agreement had dropped to 48%.

That figure had increased only slightly as of 2012, when the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”), the agency created by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act to oversee the financial services industry, undertook a large-scale study of arbitration agreements in credit card contracts, checking account contracts, and general purpose reloadable (“GPR”) prepaid cards. The CFPB found that just over half of outstanding credit card loans were covered by an arbitration agreement, while just under half of insured deposits at banks were similarly covered. In contrast, more than 68% of the dollar amount loaded on prepaid cards was covered by an arbitration agreement. The wide disparity between credit cards and prepaid cards seems to be explained by the antitrust settlement. The four issuers that agreed to remove their arbitration clauses account for almost 87% of the outstanding credit card debt not covered by an arbitration clause. The CFPB estimates that if those issuers had not removed their arbitration clauses, more than 94% of outstanding credit card debt would be covered by an arbitration agreement.

2. The Incorporation of Class Waivers in Arbitration Agreements

Eisenberg, Miller, and Sherwin found that three quarters of the consumer contracts they studied included an arbitration agreement, and that every one of the consumer contracts mandating arbitration included


59. See Rutledge & Drahozal, supra note 56, at 18.


61. CFPB PRELIMINARY STUDY, supra note 46, at 9–10.

62. Id. at 19.

63. Id. at 27.

64. Id. at 23.

65. Id.
a class waiver. Drahozal and Rutledge found that 99.9% of credit card loans subject to an arbitration agreement were also covered by a class waiver. The CFPB, looking only at consumer contracts, identified class waivers in 99.9% of the arbitration agreements covering outstanding credit card loans, 97.1% of the agreements covering insured deposits, and 100% of the agreements covering dollar amounts loaded on prepaid cards.

Businesses that offer similar products to large numbers of consumers have powerful incentives to limit their exposure to aggregate claims. Especially now that the Supreme Court has validated the inclusion of class waivers in arbitration agreements, arbitration provides a mechanism to do that. As prime targets for class litigation, credit card issuers are among the businesses most likely to favor arbitral class waivers. Indeed, but for the 2009 antitrust settlement, all but a small percentage of outstanding credit card debt would be covered by an arbitration agreement containing a class waiver. Absent legislation, regulation, or further litigation, class arbitration waivers will likely return to their former ubiquity in credit card agreements as the effects of the settlement wear off.

III. REVIEW OF EXISTING LITERATURE

Some research has been conducted into consumers’ understanding of contract terms generally; more limited research has studied consumers’ understanding of arbitration agreements. In this Section, we survey the existing literature on these subjects.

66. Eisenberg et al., supra note 52, at 876 (comparing the contracts businesses impose on consumers with the same businesses’ negotiated, non-consumer, non-employee contracts). Less than 10% of the other contracts provided for arbitration of disputes. Id.
68. CFPB PRELIMINARY STUDY, supra note 46, at 37.
69. See Eisenberg et al., supra note 52, at 891–92 (suggesting that variations in the use of arbitration can be explained by industrial concentration and corresponding exposure to high volume, low value claims).
70. See Myriam Gilles, Killing Them with Kindness: Examining “Consumer-Friendly” Arbitration Clauses After AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 825, 853 (2012). Professor Gilles examined thirty-seven arbitration clauses from major companies in a range of industries, including telecommunications, consumer banking and credit cards, e-commerce, and entertainment, and found that each one included a class waiver. Id. at 850–53.
A. Research into Consumer Understanding of Contract Terms Generally

Consumers may not understand the terms they accept for two reasons. First, consumers may not read contracts at all. Second, even when they read contracts, consumers may not understand the terms contained in those contracts. Here we take up each of those issues in turn.

1. The Likelihood That Consumers Read Contracts

Several studies have found that most consumers do not read or barely read contracts. For example, a study of 45,091 households visiting the websites of sixty-six online software companies found that “only one or two out of every 1,000 retail software shoppers access the license agreement and that most of those who do access read no more than a small portion” of the license text. The authors also reported that “shoppers are more likely to access [End User License Agreements] of smaller companies or companies that offer potentially suspicious products, such as freeware.” Because arbitration clauses appear in the contracts of many large well-known companies, such as Citibank and Verizon Wireless, it may be that consumers are less likely to read and notice such arbitration clauses. Of particular relevance to

71 Yannis Bakos, Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, & David R. Trossen, Does Anyone Read the Fine Print? Consumer Attention to Standard-Form Contracts, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 2 (2014) (“All sides in this debate realize that, in many circumstances, a majority of buyers do not read the fine print. For many buyers, too much time is required to read and give meaningful assent, and fine print can be too difficult to understand or may seem unimportant.”); id. at 32 (“[W]e estimate that the fraction of retail software shoppers who access [End User License Agreements (“EULAs”)] is between .05 percent and .22 percent, and most of the few shoppers who do access EULAs do not spend enough time doing so to have digested more than a fraction of their content. . . . Even under generous assumptions, it is difficult to envision the probability that EULAs are read (and understood) growing even to 1 percent.”); see also Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Does Disclosure Matter? 4 (N.Y.U. Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 10-54, 2010), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1713860 (finding that less than .5% of consumers read EULAs for at least one second); 7,500 Online Shoppers Unknowingly Sold Their Souls, FOX NEWS (Apr. 15, 2010), http://www.foxnews.com/scitech/2010/04/15/online-shoppers-unknowingly-sold-souls/ (reporting that consumers who agreed to a computer game company’s EULA promised to surrender their “immortal soul” upon demand; as many as 88% of consumers shown the contract agreed to it even though they were offered the option of clicking on a box which would have enabled them to retain their souls, as well as receive a voucher for five British pounds); Victoria C. Plaut & Robert P. Bartlett III, Blind Consent? A Social Psychological Investigation of Non-Readership of Click-Through Agreements, LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 15 (2011) (finding that 80% of consumers surveyed said they either did not read click-through contracts at all or did not really read anything; 16.5% said they skimmed such agreements; 89.4% described themselves as non-readers of such agreements).

72 Bakos et al., supra note 71, at 4.
this Article is that a survey of ninety-two law students produced fifty-four respondents, or 59%, who reported that under some circumstances they might read an e-purchase contract beyond the price and description of the goods.\textsuperscript{73} Of these, sixteen said that the nature of a term might prompt them to read the contract, and of these sixteen, only one said that an arbitration or choice of law clause would cause them to read the contract.\textsuperscript{74}

Consumer financial contracts fare little better. A study commissioned by the Federal Reserve reported that “When shown a sample cardholder agreement, few of the [focus group] participants said they would read the entire document if they received it. . . . In each group about half of participants said that they would not look at the cardholder agreement at all.”\textsuperscript{75} The study also noted that “[p]articipants

\textsuperscript{73} Robert A. Hillman, On-Line Consumer Standard-Form Contracting Practices: A Survey and Discussion of Legal Implications 1, 8 (Cornell Legal Studies Research Paper, Working Paper No. 05-012), \textcolor{red}{http://ssrn.com/abstract=686817.} Hillman’s survey of ninety-two law students found:

\textquote[only 4%] they read their e-standard forms beyond price and description of the goods or services “as a general matter.” Further, beyond price and description, a large minority of respondents do not read their forms at all. However, more than a third of the respondents read their forms when the value of the contract is high and more than a third read when the vendor is unknown. Further, a small cadre of respondents read particular terms beyond price and description, primarily warranties and product information warnings.

\textit{Id.} at 2, 7 (footnotes omitted).

\textsuperscript{74} \textit{Id.} at 11–12. Of course, law students should be expected to pay more attention to contracts than others, something the author of the study pointed out, but the survey results did not support this assumption. \textit{Id.} at 5.

\textsuperscript{75} MACRO INT’L INC., DESIGN AND TESTING OF EFFECTIVE TRUTH IN LENDING DISCLOSURES 6, 11 (2007), \textcolor{red}{http://www.federalreserve.gov/dcca/regulationz/20070523/execsummary.pdf} (report submitted to Federal Reserve Board) (“Participants paid very little attention to the cardholder agreement; only a few participants looked at it at all, and these only skimmed it briefly. When asked, a vast majority of participants indicated that they generally do not look at their cardholder agreements.”); see also Amy J. Schmitz, \textit{Pizza-Box Contracts: True Tales of Consumer Contracting Culture}, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 863, 886–87 (2010) (“[O]nly 90 of the 264 survey respondents who recalled signing up for a credit card indicated that they read credit card terms and found them important. . . . [T]hese responses should be viewed in light of individuals’ propensity to overstate their competence or socially desirable behavior. . . . [T]he percentages of those who truly read their contracts is likely lower than the results indicated.”); Debra Pograndt Stark & Jessica M. Choplin, \textit{A License to Deceive: Enforcing Contractual Myths Despite Consumer Psychological Realities}, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 617, 694–700 (2009) (reporting that more than a fifth of consumers in survey acknowledged not reading a contract to purchase a home; 71% stated they did not read all the terms in car rental contracts; 95% reported not reading all the terms when downloading software; 43% acknowledged not reading all the terms in an apartment rental agreement; 6% said they did not read any of the terms in their mortgage loan documents while 77% stated that they had not read all the terms); Shmuel I. Becher & Esther Unger-Aviram, The Law of Standard Form Contracts: Misguided Intuitions and Suggestions for Reconstruction 12 (Aug. 4 2009) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with DePaul Business &
indicated that they would be unlikely to read a change-in-terms insert that was included with their periodic statement, and would probably throw it away . . . .”76 A survey of mortgage brokers found that about half stated that less than 10% of consumers receiving the final Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”) mortgage disclosures—which are the only TILA forms required to disclose the actual loan terms—devoted more than a minute to the disclosures; more than two-thirds of the brokers reported that less than 30% of the borrowers spent more than a minute on the disclosures.77

Some consumers seem unwilling to read standard forms even after being given a lesson in the dangers of not reading them. In one experiment, test subjects were given a dummy consent form that counseled against signing the form as against the subjects’ best interests; the forms obliged subjects to administer electric shocks to people, among other discomforting tasks.78 Over 95% of the subjects agreed to the dummy consent, after which they were told about the deception.79 Upon being asked to sign a genuine consent, the average subject then spent only sixteen seconds reading it; only a fifth read the form through; and more than a third did not bother to read any of it.80

Commercial Law Journal), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1443908 (finding that many consumers report not reading standard form contracts for car rentals, laundry services, or bank accounts, but more stated they would read a nursery school placement contract; many consumers said they would skim the contracts before signing them).

76. MACRO INT’L INC., supra note 75, at 6.

77. Jeff Sovern, Preventing Future Economic Crises Through Consumer Protection Law or How the Truth in Lending Act Failed the Subprime Borrowers, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 761, 783–84 (2010); see also Thomas A. Durkin & Gregory Elliehausen, Disclosure as a Consumer Protection, in THE IMPACT OF PUBLIC POLICY ON CONSUMER CREDIT 109, 129 (Thomas A. Durkin & Michael E. Staten eds., 2002) (reporting on surveys of consumers over different years finding that 33% to 38% of respondents somewhat disagree with the statement “Most People Read Their Truth-in-Lending Statements Carefully,” and 27% to 34% of respondents disagree strongly with it).

78. Stark & Choplin, supra note 75, at 679.

79. Id. at 681.

80. Id. at 680–82. Some people evidently believe that they would be more likely to read contract terms printed in bold or highlighted in other ways. See Hillman, supra note 73, at 13 (finding that in a survey of ninety-two law students “more respondents thought that they would read bold or otherwise highlighted text (42% or 39/92) than either when the terms appear in a pop-up window (24% or 22/92) or when the terms appear on the screen as a series of individual windows that must be clicked (23% or 21/92)”). Still others were influenced by being given certain statements before being shown a click-through agreement. Plaut & Bartlett, supra note 71, at 28. In one study, consumers spent an average of fourteen seconds more reading such contracts after being told that the contract was relevant to them; sixty-two seconds more when told that the contract had different terms from other such contracts; and twenty-four seconds more when told that they could modify the contract. Id. at 28. In contrast, telling consumers that most people read the agreement or that the agreement was offered by a reputable vendor did not produce a difference in reading time that was statistically
Many disclosure critics argue that it is rational for consumers not to read disclosures. The quantity of fine print alone is a barrier. For example, the iTunes contract is reportedly thirty-two feet long, even when printed in 8 font type. And that is only one contract. Consumers significant. Id. at 28–29. Giving consumers a version of the click-through contract with the suggestion that it was short and skimmable also increased the time they spent reading. Id. at 33.

81. See, e.g., OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO KNOW: THE FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE 10 (2014) ("[E]xperience teaches people how little they may gain from studying disclosures and how little they may lose by ignoring them. In short, people often calculate that a well-informed decision’s benefits poorly justify its costs."). Ben-Shahar and Schneider add:

In [the disclosure] world, people (1) recognize that unfamiliar and complex decisions matter and depend on their own interests and circumstances and (2) learn enough to make informed and considered decisions that promote their interests and preferences. In the real world, however, people in surprising numbers and circumstances (1) resist making even significant decisions and (2) make them with incomplete information and inconsiderable effort. People are, loosely and broadly, decision averse. They are therefore unlikely to seek out or study disclosures.

Id. at 61; Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Text Anxiety, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 305, 305 (1986) ("[C]onsumers who are faced with . . . form contracts . . . refus[e] to read, and . . . it is reasonable for them to do so."); Lee Goldman, My Way and the Highway: The Law and Economics of Choice of Forum Clauses in Consumer Form Contracts, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 700, 717 (1992) ("[P]urchasers would be acting irrationally if they incurred the costs required to fully comprehend all contract terms."); Michael I. Meyerson, The Efficient Consumer Form Contract: Law and Economics Meets the Real World, 24 GA. L. REV. 583, 600 (1990) ("It is, therefore, rational for even a conscientious consumer to pay little, if any, attention to subordinate contract terms.").

82. See Hillman, supra note 73, at 2 ("[I]mpatience accounts most often for the failure of respondents to read their forms."); Becher & Unger-Aviram, supra note 75, at 12 (noting that a majority of study participants would either not read or merely skim standard form contracts).

83. BEN-SHAHAR & SCHNEIDER, supra note 81, at 24. Ben-Shahar and Schneider compiled a list of reasons why consumers ignore disclosures, including: (1) "[T]hey think they know what they say," Id. at 75. (2) "[T]hey look irrelevant." Id. (3) "[T]hey think that what they get and how they are treated depend more on the person or place they’re dealing with than any disclosure." Id. (4) "[T]hey think transactions are safe." Id. (5) They’ve “got to have this no matter what the disclosure says.” Id. at 76. (6) "[C]ompanies use fine print to protect themselves." Id. (7) “Disclosees soon learn (to paraphrase Thurber) that disclosure[s] tell them more about penguins than they want to know, but incomprehensibly.” Id. (8) “Disclosees do not always recognize that they are being given information they are supposed to study and use.” Id. at 77. (9) “Boring!” Id. See also Plaut & Bartlett, supra note 71, at 35 (finding that consumers report they do not read standard form contracts because they all say the same thing and offer no choice); Warren Mueller, Residential Tenants and Their Leases: An Empirical Study, 69 MICH. L. REV. 247, 256–57 (1970) ("When questioned about the reasons for not reading leases, thirty-three per cent of those tenants who did not read leases particularly carefully before signing them pointed to the lease being a ‘take it or leave it’ proposition . . . ; twenty-six per cent admitted finding the very length of the lease contract form to be discouraging and confusing; twenty per cent said they thought they would
choosing among credit cards by examining the associated contracts may need to read dozens of pages of fine print. Even then, the task is not finished because, scholars argue, contract terms frequently change and so must be periodically re-read.

One reason contracts are so long is that they include terms addressing improbable contingencies, such as provisions for resolution of disputes. Consumers who read contracts may find provisions dealing with unlikely events particularly valueless and therefore skip over them.

In addition to their sheer length, consumer contracts are typically drafted in dense language, discouraging all but the most intrepid from reading the fine print. In Tess Wilkinson-Ryan’s words, “[n]ot only are form contracts unread, they are functionally unreadable (or at least indigestible) for consumers with bounded cognitive capacity—i.e., everyone.” Anecdotal reports suggest that even the brightest legal minds do not read boilerplate. Both Chief Justice John Roberts and Judge Posner have acknowledged signing contracts without perusing the fine print.

be unable to understand all the ‘legal language’; and only three per cent said they could not be bothered to take the time and trouble . . . .” (footnote omitted).

84. See, e.g., BEN-SHAHAR & SCHNEIDER, supra note 81, at 73 (noting that “disclosures can change rapidly”). For example, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau reported that some credit card issuers filed new contracts every quarter, implying frequent alterations in contract terms. See CFPB PRELIMINARY STUDY, supra note 46, at 132.

85. See Goldman, supra note 81, at 717 (“The costs of obtaining and understanding information about contract terms are especially daunting when the form terms involve risks that are unlikely to occur.”); Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 1173, 1226 (1983) (“[M]any of the terms [in standard form contracts] concern risks that in any individual transaction are unlikely to eventuate. It is notoriously difficult for most people, who lack legal advice and broad experience concerning the particular transaction type, to appraise these sorts of contingencies.”).

86. See Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, A Psychological Account of Consent to Fine Print, 99 Iowa L. Rev. 1745, 1749 (2014); see also Eisenberg, supra note 81, at 309 (“The average consumer knows that he probably will be unable to fully understand the dense text of a form contract . . . .”); Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 429, 436 (2002) (“[T]he consumer would not understand much of the language of the boilerplate even if she took the time to read it.”).

2. Consumers' Comprehension of Contract Terms

Many contract terms are subject to disclosure laws mandating that some terms be disclosed clearly and conspicuously in specified formats. Businesses also frequently wish to include in their contracts additional terms not subject to these disclosure mandates. Depending on the particular contract, these documents—disclosures and other terms—may be provided separately or combined into a single contract. The credit card contract we provided to consumers was an example of the latter: it opened with the so-called Schumer Box—that is, a set of credit card disclosures mandated by the Federal Truth in Lending Act and its implementing regulations—followed by other contract terms.

Strictly speaking, arbitration clauses fit into the “other terms” category, because the United States Supreme Court has turned back state attempts to mandate conspicuous disclosure of arbitration clauses and the FAA does not mandate disclosure requirements for arbitration clauses. Nevertheless, in many consumer contracts, arbitration clauses are more conspicuous than other contract terms. Thus, the arbitration clause in the contract we used was printed in bold type and portions appeared in italics and ALLCAPS. In addition, at the beginning of the textual portion appearing on page two (the first page was devoted entirely to the Schumer Box disclosures), the contract included a boldface reference to the arbitration clause. Accordingly, the arbitration clause in our contract, as is true of many such clauses, is a hybrid, more conspicuous than conventional terms, but perhaps less so than required disclosures. As a result, our review of the literature includes studies of both mandated disclosures and other terms.

Numerous commentators have noted the linguistic and legal complexity of typical consumer contracts. Alan M. White and Cathy


89. See 15 U.S.C. § 1637 (2012); 12 C.F.R. § 1026.6(b) (2013). The Schumer Box is named after then-representative Charles Schumer. As can be seen from the sample contract appended to this Article, it includes a variety of disclosures lawmakers thought would be of the greatest concern to the typical consumer shopping for a credit card, such as the APR, annual fee, penalty fees, and the like.

90. Doctor’s Assoc., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 683 (1996) (holding that state law requiring arbitration terms to be conspicuous was preempted by FAA).

91. The reference read, in bold type: “This Agreement contains an arbitration provision (including a class action arbitration waiver). It is important that you read the entire Arbitration Provision section carefully.”
Lesser Mansfield have written that “[t]he degree of literacy required to comprehend the average disclosure form and key contract terms simply is not within reach of the majority of American adults.” 92 Judge Posner has explained “not all persons are capable of being careful readers.” 93 Former Federal Reserve Chair Ben S. Bernanke, whose agency was responsible for administering the Truth in Lending disclosures, among others, has said that “not even the best disclosures are always adequate. . . . [S]ome aspects of increasingly complex products simply cannot be adequately understood or evaluated by most consumers, no matter how clear the disclosure.” 94 And noted scholar and now-Senator Elizabeth Warren, who conceived the idea of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, has been quoted as saying about a credit card contract: “I teach contract law at Harvard, and I can’t understand half of what it says.” 95

Those observations have been confirmed by empirical research. Debra Pogrund Stark and Jessica M. Choplin have identified fourteen “cognitive and social psychological factors that cause disclosure forms to be ineffective.” 96 In a landmark 2007 study of Truth in Lending mortgage disclosures, the Federal Trade Commission found that many consumers could not understand key loan terms even while reading the forms. 97 Mortgage borrowers have a significant incentive to master

92. Alan M. White & Cathy Lesser Mansfield, Literacy and Contract, 13 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 233, 237–39 (2002) (“[L]arge numbers of adults have limited quantitative literacy skills. . . . [Ninety-six percent] of American adults cannot extract and compute credit cost information from contract and disclosure documents.”); see also BEN-SHAHAR & SCHNEIDER, supra note 81, at 79 (“Many people cannot read many disclosures because they are not literate or numerate enough to decipher them with reasonable effort.”).


95. BEN-SHAHAR & SCHNEIDER, supra note 81, at 8; see Durkin & Elliehausen, supra note 77, at 145–46 (discussant Joan Warrington, an attorney for Citigroup stating, “[c]even with a law degree and a career in consumer credit, I still have problems understanding many of the disclosures that I see.”).


About a fifth of the respondents viewing the current disclosure forms could not correctly identify the APR of the loan, the amount of the case due at closing, or the monthly payment . . . . About a third could not identify the interest rate or
their loan terms because for most a mortgage is the largest financial obligation they will ever assume. Yet other reports confirm that many consumers did not understand their mortgage terms—presumably disclosed via the TILA forms.98

A 1977 study sheds some light on consumer awareness of arbitration clauses in particular, albeit clauses that, unlike the arbitration clauses frequently in use today and employed in our study, were not binding.99 The researcher showed consumers two versions of a consumer-credit contract for the purchase of a refrigerator, one simpler than the other, and then a warranty on the sale of the refrigerator that included an arbitration clause.100 The “long” credit contract was about four pages in length while the short version was less than two; the warranty spanned a page, meaning that consumers in the long contract condition read approximately five pages and those in the short contract

which of two loans was less expensive, and a third did not recognize that the loan included a large balloon payment . . . . Half could not correctly identify the loan amount. Two-thirds did not recognize that they would be charged a prepayment penalty if in two years they refinanced with another lender . . . . Three-quarters did not recognize that substantial charges for optional credit insurance were included in the loan . . . [N]early nine-tenths could not identify the total amount of up-front charges in the loan.

Id. The disclosures have since been revised. See Integrated Mortgage Disclosures Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation X) and the Truth In Lending Act (Regulation Z), 78 Fed. Reg. 79,730 (Dec. 31, 2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 1024, 1026). 98. See, e.g., IRA J. GOLDSTEIN, THE REINVESTMENT FUND, LOST VALUES: A STUDY OF PREDATORY LENDING IN PHILADELPHIA 17 (2007), http://www.trfund.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/Lost_Values.pdf (“Several borrowers interviewed . . . reported thinking that they have one loan when they have two.”); Brian Bucks & Karen Pence, Do Homeowners Know Their House Values and Mortgage Terms 2 (FEDS, Working Paper No. 2006-03, 2006), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=899152 (“[A] sizable number of adjustable-rate borrowers report that they do not know the terms of their contracts.”); see also Plaut & Bartlett, supra note 71, at 19 (finding that surveyed consumers “have little comprehension of the terms to which they have agreed”).


100. Id. at 856, 867 n.87. Professor Davis reported that he did not try to secure a sample that represented the nation’s demographics but simply visited a suburban grocery store and an urban one. Id. at 868. The arbitration clause said:

In the Event of a Dispute—XYZ is a subscriber to an arbitration agreement which is made available for all consumers who are unable to have their warranty claims satisfactorily settled through us. You are obligated to submit to this arbitration procedure after unsuccessful attempts to settle any warranty claim before attempting to satisfy your claim through litigation.

Id. at 914 app. C.
condition read less than three.  The survey then asked a series of questions about the documents, including one which tested awareness and understanding of the arbitration clause. More than 60% of the consumers who had seen the simplified credit card contract answered the arbitration question correctly, while nearly half of those who had seen the more complex credit card contract were able to choose the correct response.

A more recent study surveyed thirty-seven employees of a company that required the employees to sign a mandatory arbitration agreement. While 67% of the employees recalled signing the agreement, only three of the employees remembered that the agreement required arbitration. Nearly a third believed that the provision blocking them from suing in court would not be enforced by a court. When the same researcher surveyed 115 MBA students at a prestigious East Coast business school, more than half believed that an arbitration clause barring them from suing in court would not be enforceable.

101. Id. at 908–14. Today’s credit card contracts that include arbitration clauses are usually longer, see supra notes 82–83 and accompanying text.

102. The question read:
   If the refrigerator fails during the warranty period, and XYZ refuses to fix it, claiming that the damage was your fault:
   (a) There is nothing you can do to force XYZ to honor its warranty.
   (b) Your only hope is to try to force XYZ to honor its warranty by such action as calling the Better Business Bureau, complaining to local officials, writing to newspapers, picketing, etc.
   (c) You can bring suit immediately to force XYZ to honor its warranty.
   (d) You may bring suit, but only after you have first submitted to an arbitration procedure.
   (e) Don’t know/unsure.
Id. at 916–17 app. D.

103. Id. at 876 tbl. IV. Professor Davis observed that lower-income shoppers showed a more dramatic improvement from the long contract to the short contract, with a 17% increase in correct responses to the arbitration question while high-income shoppers improved only about 8% from the complex contract to the simple. Id. at 877. On all questions, consumers seeing the shorter contract answered an average of 56% of the questions correctly, while those who were shown the longer version scored 45% on average, a difference of 11%. Id. at 876. Again, the improvement from the complex contract to the simple was more pronounced among low-income shoppers (18.5% improvement) versus high-income shoppers (6.5%). Id. at 877.


105. Id. at 418.

106. Id. at 401.

107. Id. at 418.

108. Id. at 419.

109. Id. at 421.
Nor are consumers necessarily aware of their confusion. One survey found that the median consumer who acknowledged not having read click-through agreements nevertheless rated his or her understanding of those contracts as a three on a six point scale. In fact, those who claimed to read such contracts fared no better in answering questions about the contract than those who confessed that they did not read the contracts.

In sum, existing research seems to confirm what the anecdotal evidence suggests: consumers struggle to read and understand consumer contracts. Length and density deter consumers from attempting to read contract terms at all, and the terms are unintelligible for most people who attempt to read them.

B. Research into Consumer Understanding of Arbitration Agreements

While substantial empirical research has been conducted into both the prevalence of arbitration clauses in consumer contracts and consumer understanding of contract terms generally, less is known about consumers’ understanding of and attitudes toward either arbitration as a process or arbitration agreements in consumer contracts.

In 2012, the Pew Charitable Trusts commissioned a national survey of checking account holders to determine their attitudes about mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreements. The survey found

110. Plaut & Bartlett, supra note 71, at 16. In fact, the study found that consumers had “little comprehension of the terms . . . .” Id. at 19. The study also found that respondents did better on a quiz when given a shorter form of the contract than a longer form. Id. at 31.

111. Id. at 16.

112. See infra Part III.A.

113. Several industry-funded studies have surveyed individuals who had participated in arbitration to assess their perceptions of the process. See Peter B. Rutledge, Whither Arbitration?, 6 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 549, 560–61 (2008) (citing and describing studies). The surveys found that solid majorities were satisfied with the arbitration process. Id. Most of the individuals surveyed, however, had voluntarily entered into arbitration. TAYLOR LINCOLN & DAVID ARKUSH, PUB. CITIZEN, THE ARBITRATION DEBATE TRAP: HOW OPPONENTS OF CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY DISTORT THE DEBATE ON ARBITRATION 19–22 (2008), http://www.citizen.org/documents/ArbitrationDebateTrap(Final).pdf . None of the studies addressed consumer understanding of pre-dispute mandatory arbitration agreements or their effects. Id.

114. PEW CHARITABLE TRUS, BANKING ON ARBITRATION: BIG BANKS, CONSUMERS, AND CHECKING ACCOUNT DISPUTE RESOLUTION 1 (2012), http://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/Assets/2012/11/27/Pew_arbitration_report.pdf . The Pew study also examined account agreements for ninety-two of the 100 largest financial institutions in the United States and found that 43% included arbitration agreements in the contracts with consumers, with 75% of those barring class claims. Id. at 3–4.
that, of 603 consumers surveyed, 68% believed they should have a choice between arbitrating and taking a dispute to court. Further, 88% of the respondents reported dissatisfaction with the lack of judicial review of arbitral awards.

In 2010, the consumer advocacy group Public Citizen and the Employee Rights Advocacy Institute for Law and Policy commissioned a national phone survey of 800 likely voters to assess attitudes toward mandatory arbitration. Fifty-nine percent of survey respondents, when given a description of mandatory binding arbitration, responded that they opposed it. Without giving respondents an agreement to read, the survey also asked respondents whether they remembered seeing an arbitration agreement in an employment or consumer contract. Approximately two-thirds of the respondents replied that they had not.

The CFPB recently conducted a national phone survey of 1007 credit card consumers to explore their awareness of and assumptions about the dispute resolution options in those agreements. The respondents were asked about the terms in the contracts covering their most recently obtained credit cards. A majority of respondents to the CFPB survey whose credit cards included arbitration clauses stated that they did not know if they could sue the credit card issuers in court, while more than a third thought they could sue in court.

115. Id. at 7.
116. Id.
118. Id. at 4. The respondents were asked the following question:
Next I’m going to read you a short description of binding mandatory arbitration. Binding mandatory arbitration requires both sides to submit any future disputes to binding arbitration as a condition of having a job or buying a product or service. Binding mandatory arbitration is written into many Terms of Employment and Terms of Agreement for goods and services that you buy, including for insurance, home-building, car loans and leases, credit cards, retirement accounts, investment accounts, and nursing facilities, to name a few. Binding mandatory arbitration means that employees and consumers waive their rights to sue, to participate in class-action lawsuits, or to appeal. Having heard that, do you favor or oppose binding mandatory arbitration, or are you unsure?

Id.
119. Id. at 15. The survey did not attempt to determine whether the respondents had in fact entered into any specific agreements containing arbitration clauses.
121. Id. at § 3 at 3.
IV. METHODOLOGY

Our goal in this study was to assess the extent to which consumers both read and understand arbitration agreements in credit card contracts. We hoped to recreate a typical business-consumer exchange, both in terms of the type of agreement respondents were given and the circumstances in which they received the contract. In addition, we sought to assess consumers’ understanding of arbitration agreements generally and their awareness of arbitration agreements in their existing business-consumer relationships. Here we describe the methodology we used to achieve those goals.

A. Survey Design and Structure

We concluded that attempting to survey consumers in person would be impracticable. Among other things, it would have been prohibitively expensive to get a sufficiently large and representative sample either by going door-to-door or surveying people in public. Because we wanted respondents to see and answer questions about a written contract, a phone survey would also have been impracticable. An online survey would complement the CFPB’s telephone survey. Consequently, we chose to conduct a web-based survey using the Qualtrics platform.

After survey respondents completed the required consent form to participate, they were shown a representative sample consumer contract and then asked a series of questions about the contract and about arbitration more generally. The survey questions fell into four types: questions about awareness and understanding of the arbitration clause in the sample consumer contract participants were shown; questions about respondents’ awareness and understanding of arbitration clauses in consumer contracts generally; questions about respondents’ experiences with contracts; and questions about participants’ demographics.

While many consumer contracts include an arbitration clause, we chose a credit card contract for our sample contract for two reasons. First, the survey results have more value if based on a contract that is a

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122. See CFPB PRELIMINARY STUDY, supra note 46.
123. Qualtrics is a private company, accessible at Qualtrics.com, that provides software for creating and administering surveys and also supplies survey respondents if needed.
124. A copy of one version of the survey appears in the Appendix.
125. Arbitration clauses are also used in many other contracts. Companies that have worked their way into the tissues of contemporary American life and whose non-credit card contracts contain arbitration clauses include Verizon Wireless, AT&T Mobility, Sprint, Skype, and PayPal. See infra notes 195–199 and accompanying text.
commonplace in contemporary life. Estimates of the number of Americans with credit cards in recent years vary from 156 million to 226 million. Second, a publicly-accessible database maintained by the CFPB includes credit card contracts in use by more than 300 issuers. The database not only provided us access to an actual contract to use in the survey, but also enabled us to determine how the contract compared with other credit card contracts.

We chose our sample credit card contract for several reasons. First, its arbitration clause is typical of arbitration clauses commonly found in credit card contracts with arbitration clauses. The arbitration clause included a small claims court exclusion, class

126. Credit cards have been used in the United States since the 1950s. See Tom Brown & Lacey Plache, Paying with Plastic: Maybe Not So Crazy, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 63, 68–70 (2006) (detailing the history of credit cards in the United States).


129. As for the prevalence of arbitration clauses in credit card contracts, the CFPB found that half of all credit card loans outstanding as of the end of 2012 were on credit cards subject to arbitration clauses. CFPB PRELIMINARY STUDY, supra note 46. The number might have been higher but for consent decrees entered into by certain banks which had collectively issued 86.8% of the credit cards without arbitration clauses. Id. at 55. The consent decrees blocked signatory credit card issuers from inserting arbitration clauses in their credit card contracts. See supra notes 58 & 59 and accompanying text. The relevant portions of the consent decrees have since expired and we do not know if the banks involved have added arbitration clauses to their credit card contracts. The CFPB also reported that 17% of credit card issuers include arbitration clauses while 83% did not; the disparity between the number of issuers using arbitration clauses and the percentage of credit card loans subject to arbitration clauses is accounted for by the fact that larger credit card issuers are more likely to use arbitration clauses. CFPB PRELIMINARY STUDY, supra note 46, at 21.

130. The CFPB study found that 66.7% of the credit card arbitration clauses it examined included small claims carve-outs. CFPB PRELIMINARY STUDY, supra note 46, at 32.
action waiver,\textsuperscript{131} jury trial waiver,\textsuperscript{132} choice of the American Arbitration Association ("AAA") or JAMS as the arbitration provider,\textsuperscript{133} and designation of the FAA as the governing law.

Second, we wanted to use both an arbitration agreement and a survey instrument that were not unduly difficult to read. In particular, we wanted an arbitration clause that would be no harder for consumers to read than the typical credit card arbitration clause. The CFPB study of credit card arbitration clauses found their mean length to be 1098 words and their median length to be 1074 words.\textsuperscript{134} The arbitration clause in our contract contained 615 words and therefore required less reading time than the average credit card arbitration clause. We also tested the contract using the Flesch Reading Ease Formula\textsuperscript{135} and the Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level Score,\textsuperscript{136} two widely used tests of readability. On each scale, the arbitration clause in the contract we selected was slightly more readable than both the mean and median credit card arbitration clause, according to the CFPB data.\textsuperscript{137}

We also wanted to use a contract that was not excessively lengthy. The agreement we selected covered seven pages. In comparison, a Boeing Employees Credit Union contract runs nineteen to twenty-one

\textsuperscript{131} The CFPB study found that 93.9% of the credit card arbitration clauses included class action waivers. \textit{Id.} at 37.

\textsuperscript{132} The CFPB study found that 92.5% of credit card arbitration clauses stated that arbitration precluded jury trials. \textit{Id.} at 52.

\textsuperscript{133} The CFPB study found that 83.3% of the credit card arbitration clauses listed AAA as a provider and 40.9% listed JAMS as a provider. \textit{Id.} at 34.

\textsuperscript{134} \textit{Id.} at 28.

\textsuperscript{135} See Rudolf Flesch, \textit{A New Readability Yardstick}, 32 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 221, 230 (1948). The Flesch Formula produces a score based on such factors as the average number of words per sentence and the average number of syllables per word. A Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level Score below fifty is considered difficult reading; 50 to 60 is regarded as fairly difficult while scores in the sixties are labeled standard. \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{136} See generally J. PETER KINCAID ET AL., NAVAL TECHNICAL TRAINING COMMAND, DERIVATION OF NEW READABILITY FORMULAS (AUTOMATED READABILITY INDEX, FOG COUNT AND FLESCH READING EASE FORMULA) FOR NAVY ENLISTED PERSONNEL 4–5, 14 (1975), http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a006655.pdf (explaining how the different readability indexes are calculated); Norman E. Plate, \textit{Do as I Say, Not as I Do: A Report Card on Plain Language in the United States Supreme Court}, 13 T.M. COOLEY J. PRAC. & CLINICAL L. 80, 93–94 (2010). The Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level Score uses the same inputs as the Flesch Formula but assigns texts a grade level based on difficulty. \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{137} The CFPB found that the mean Flesch readability test score for arbitration clauses was 34.5 and the median was 33.7. CFPB PRELIMINARY STUDY, supra note 46, at 28–29. Our arbitration clause came in at 35.4, meaning that it is slightly more readable than both the mean and median credit card arbitration clause. The CFPB also reported that the mean Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level score for credit card arbitration clauses was 14.2 and the median grade level was 14.7. \textit{Id.} at 29. Our arbitration clause’s Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level Score was 14.0, again indicating that it is slightly more readable than both the mean and median credit card contract arbitration clause.
To determine if our contract was of a typical length, we asked two research assistants to record the length of credit card contracts that included arbitration clauses in the CFPB database. For issuers with multiple contracts in the database, we asked the research assistants to use only the first contract in the database. According to their research, the mean length of the contracts with arbitration clauses was 9.15 pages while the median was seven.

We sought a contract in which the arbitration clause was at least as conspicuous as that in a typical credit card contract. The clause in our contract was printed in bold, and the provisions informing consumers that they waive the rights to sue in court, participate in a class action, have a jury trial, and appeal the arbitrator’s decision appeared in italics and ALLCAPS. The second page of our contract (the first page of text after the so-called Schumer Box disclosures) also included a bold face reference to the arbitration clause and class action waiver and urged consumers to read the arbitration clause carefully. Our research assistants’ survey of arbitration clauses found that only 14% had such a statement early in the contract. The arbitration clause in our contract began on page six, as compared to a mean beginning page in the credit card contracts checked of 5.8 and a median beginning page of four. The research assistants reported that in 37% of the contracts, the arbitration clause began after page six.

We were also concerned with the readability of the survey itself, as well as of the consent form. Both the consent form and survey


140. We tested the portion of the contract other than the arbitration agreement for readability as well. The CFPB found the mean Flesch readability score for the non-arbitration clause portion of credit card contracts with arbitration clauses to be 52.2 and the median 51.6. CFPB PRELIMINARY STUDY, supra note 46, at 29. Ours was 46.5, signaling it was somewhat harder to read. The CFPB reported that the mean Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level Score for the non-arbitration term portions of credit card contracts with arbitration clauses was 10.8 with a median of 11.0. Id. Ours was 12.6, again meaning that it was somewhat harder to read. We judged these differences to be acceptable because we were concerned with the arbitration clause rather than the rest of the contract and also because the balance of the sample contract was still easier going than arbitration clauses.

141. We found it necessary to make some formatting changes in the sample contract. We replaced the name of the issuing bank with ABC Bank, and redacted the issuing bank’s contact information. To accommodate the limitations of the survey software, we had to change the pagination of certain sections of the contract. None of the formatting changes altered the arbitration clause or its placement within the contract.
questions had readability scores indicating that they should be easily comprehensible by tenth graders and seventh graders, respectively.\textsuperscript{142} They were considerably more readable than credit card contracts with arbitration clauses.\textsuperscript{143} We also put the survey through two rounds of tests before deploying it broadly. In the first phase, we administered the survey to eighty-five friends, family members, and acquaintances to whom we had not previously mentioned that we were studying arbitration clauses.\textsuperscript{144} We were particularly concerned about the length of the questions, which were longer than we would have preferred, despite our collective decades of experience drafting examination questions for law students.\textsuperscript{145} Nevertheless, no respondents indicated that they found the survey questions confusing or that they did not understand them.

Most of the respondents in the first phase had taken at least some college courses. That left us concerned that we had not adequately tested whether less educated consumers might have difficulty understanding the survey questions. Accordingly, for phase two we asked Qualtrics to supply a panel of respondents who had not gone beyond completing high school. Qualtrics found twenty-six respondents to take the survey in phase two, of whom three had not graduated from high school; the remainder had not progressed beyond a high school diploma. Again, the respondents did not indicate difficulty understanding the questions.

Finally, we had concerns about the appearance of the contract. The process of reproducing the contract in the survey necessarily made the appearance of the printed text marginally less “crisp” than it appears on the printed page, though we note that we found it completely readable. While the font on the screen when not zoomed in was small, it was slightly larger than the font of the actual contract in the CFPB database when printed out. We dealt with this by instructing respondents to enlarge the text on their monitor if they had difficulty

\textsuperscript{142} The consent form’s Flesch readability score was 48.2, while the survey’s was 67.5. The Flesch–Kincaid Grade Level Scores were 10.1 and 7.1, respectively.

\textsuperscript{143} See supra note 137 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{144} We offered to compensate phase one respondents by paying them $5 for their responses, though not all of the respondents took us up on the offer.

\textsuperscript{145} In the first phase, the survey included the following instruction: “We are still perfecting the survey, so if you see anything that confuses you or you don’t understand, please indicate that in the places for comments.”
In any event, of the 668 respondents, only 34, or 5%, complained about the print.\footnote{We are not sure how seriously to take those complaints. Some may reflect a certain tedium respondents felt in responding to the survey rather than a genuine difficulty reading the font. For example, one respondent noted: “Too many pages, small print, found my mind wondering about other things while I was trying to read, [j]ust started to [sic] things so I could hurry and finish.” Another respondent wrote: “Font size made it more challenging to see details,” but also claimed to have read and understood most of the contract; when asked to identify five items from the contract, that respondent recalled ten, including the arbitration clause and several other terms that appeared in the text, as opposed to the Schumer Box. We were not present to see the contract on the monitors of the respondents and so cannot be certain how it appeared. Thus, it is possible that some responses were affected by the print quality.}

\bf{B. Survey Implementation}

We obtained a sample of survey participants that was demographically representative of the approximately 246,513,378 people over the age of eighteen residing in the United States\footnote{See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATE AND COUNTY QUICK FACTS, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/00000.html (last visited June 24, 2014).} with respect to age,\footnote{See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AGE AND SEX COMPOSITION IN THE UNITED STATES: 2012, https://www.census.gov/population/age/data/2012comp.html (last visited June 18, 2014).} education,\footnote{See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: 2013 DETAILED TABLES, http://www.census.gov/hhes/socdemo/education/data/cps2013/tables.html (last visited June 18, 2014).} income\footnote{See LINDA LEVINE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLD INCOME AND THE MIDDLE CLASS 2 (2012), http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RS20811_20121113.pdf (listing the distribution of household income by income class for 2011).} and ethnicity.\footnote{See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATE & COUNTY QUICKFACTS, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/00000.html (last visited June 18, 2014).} Figures 1 through 4 provide additional information about the demographics of the respondents. Because our goal was to determine consumers’ understanding of arbitration clauses generally, rather than their understanding of credit card agreements only, we did not attempt to obtain a sample that reflects credit card holders specifically. Ultimately, we obtained 668 responses, though not all respondents answered every multiple choice question. If our sample was truly

\footnote{Specifically, the instructions stated: “If you need to make the print size bigger, please use your browser’s controls to do so (in Explorer, click “View” and then use “Zoom” to make your selection).”}
random, that number of respondents should give us a 95% confidence level of a 4% margin of error.\footnote{See Glenn D. Israel, Determining Sample Size 4 (1992), https://edis.ifas.ufl.edu/pdffiles/PD/PD00600.pdf (using Simplified Formula for Proportions results in sample size of 625 to produce 95% confidence level of 4% margin of error).}

We know, of course, that our sample was not truly random. Any survey necessarily excludes people who refuse to answer surveys. In addition, as with most web-based surveys, selection bias in the sample population of survey participants might distort the results.\footnote{Jelke Bethlehem, Selection Bias in Web Surveys, 78 Int’l Stat. Rev. 161, 162 (2010).} A web-based survey excludes the 15% of adults who do not use the Internet at all.\footnote{Kathryn Zickuhr, Pew Research Ctr., Who’s Not Online and Why 2 (2013), http://www.pewInternet.org/2013/09/25/whos-not-online-and-why/.} That population is skewed towards older Americans because 44% of those over the age of sixty-five do not use the Internet.\footnote{Id. at 3.} While our respondents include approximately the same percentage of elderly people as the general population, we cannot be certain that non-Internet users would respond in the same way as Internet users. Nevertheless, because Internet users represent such an enormous share of the general population, even in the event that those who do not use the Internet understand arbitration clauses better than Internet users, the level of understanding of Internet users is worth studying and may itself serve as a basis for formulating public policy.\footnote{To the extent that Internet users may be more sophisticated than non-Internet users, our respondents may also have been more sophisticated than the population as a whole, suggesting a greater likelihood of comprehension of the contract than would be seen in the general population.}

Another concern is that the 583 respondents supplied by Qualtrics—87% of the total—had previously expressed a willingness to answer online surveys for compensation. We do not know what percentage of American adults have made such a declaration, but it is surely a much smaller proportion than 87%. Nor do we know how the people who have stated that they are available to respond to surveys for remuneration might differ from the general population. We were reassured when we tested for differences between the answers of the respondents we found and the Qualtrics respondents’ answers. On the eight questions that had right and wrong answers, a t-test indicated that the differences were not statistically significant at the .05 level.\footnote{The average percent of correct answers for our respondents was 27% while for the Qualtrics respondents it was 25%.}

Because the survey put respondents in an artificial situation—they were not actually making a financial commitment based on the contract we gave them, among other things—we cannot be certain whether they
gave the contract the same degree of scrutiny they would give a similar contract they received as part of a real-world transaction. The survey provided the following instructions immediately before the contract:

Imagine that you obtained a credit card and the credit card company has provided you with the credit card contract we are about to show you, perhaps online or through the mail. If you have a credit card, you have been given a contract like this for your credit card in the past. Some consumers read contracts like this while others may not, and still others may read some parts and not other parts. Please give this contract the exact same amount of attention you would if it had just been provided to you, along with your new credit card. This is not a test. Rather, we want to learn what you and other consumers take away from consumer contracts in your everyday life.

Despite those instructions, respondents may have read the contract with more or less care than they would have read a real credit card contract. They might have read it with greater care because the survey called their attention to the contract in a way that does not typically occur when consumers receive a credit card. Or they might have read it with less care because this was a simulation and did not directly impact them. And, of course, consumers may not accurately assess how carefully they read credit card contracts in their daily lives.

We also feared that the Qualtrics respondents might rush through the survey in an attempt to collect their compensation—Qualtrics compensated each of its respondents who completed the survey out of the $7 we paid them—with a minimal time investment. The version of the survey administered to the Qualtrics respondents had two main safeguards to insure that the respondents gave honest answers. First, at Qualtrics’ recommendation, we included two “dummy” questions within that version of the survey to verify that respondents were giving the survey appropriate attention. The first, asked shortly after

159. See MACRO INT’L INC., supra note 75 (reporting that few consumers reported that they read credit card contracts in their entirety and about half stated that they did not read them at all).

160. See Davis, supra note 99, at 895. Similar to our study, the Davis study asked respondents to read the contract “as carefully as they would have read it under actual . . . circumstances.” Id. The author later asked the respondents whether they had read the contract more or less carefully than they would have done in an actual transaction. He reported that 49% claimed to have read it more carefully while 13% said they read it less carefully. Id. The answers find some support in that those who claimed to have read the contract more carefully also understood the contract better than those who acknowledged reading it with less care. We cannot say whether Davis’s results are generalizable to our population. If a similar pattern held with our respondents, however, we would expect that the responses to our survey overstate consumer understanding of the contract.
respondents saw the credit card contract, inquired what kind of document the respondent had reviewed; possible answers besides “credit card contract” included “non-compete form,” “non-disclosure agreement,” and “cell phone contract.” The 928 respondents who failed to provide the correct answer were excluded from the survey. By so doing, it is possible that we eliminated some respondents who might have skipped over the contract because they do not read such contracts and were complying with the instruction to give the contract the same level of attention they would have had it been a real contract. As a consequence of excluding these respondents, our results may overstate comprehension of the contract. Nevertheless, we felt it best to follow Qualtrics’s advice given their greater experience with their respondents.

The second question, displayed much further along in the survey, directed respondents to select “No” among the answers “Yes,” “No,” and “Sometimes.” Only thirty-four respondents failed to click “No,” suggesting that the first attention check question caught most of those who were answering questions without reading them.

In addition, we identified five criteria that we believe raised questions about whether the respondent had taken the survey seriously: The five criteria were that the respondent:

- Spent less than 4.5 minutes on the survey
- Entered gibberish
- Finished Question 11 in less than three seconds.
- Finished Question 19 in less than seven seconds
- Finished Question 21 in less than twelve seconds

The time thresholds were calculated based on reading speed. They were intended to catch responses given too quickly to have allowed the respondent to read and answer the questions with any degree of care. We discarded any responses displaying at least two of the five criteria, ultimately discarding a total of fifty-two responses.

V. ANALYSIS OF SURVEY RESULTS†

We sought to test consumer understanding of arbitration agreements in three ways. First, we gave consumers a sample credit card contract with an arbitration clause and asked them questions about the sample contract. Next, we asked consumers a series of questions about a hypothetical “properly-worded” credit card contract containing an arbitration agreement. Finally, we asked consumers about arbitration agreements in actual contracts they have entered into. At

† All data discussed in the following pages is described in greater detail in the attached Appendix.
each step, we gave respondents space to add comments. For each of those three contexts, the survey results show significant consumer misunderstandings of what consumers agreed to and what effect those agreements have on consumers’ procedural rights.

We begin our analysis by examining the extent to which our respondents read the sample contract and focused on the arbitration clause. Then we turn to the terms of the sample contract and a set of questions that explored respondents’ understanding and beliefs about the dispute resolution terms. Next, we turn to questions that asked consumers about a hypothetical contract containing a “properly-worded” arbitration clause, as opposed to the sample contract. Finally, we discuss questions asking about whether consumers had previously entered into arbitration agreements.

A. The Extent to Which Consumers Read the Agreement and Focused on the Arbitration Clause

Respondents were given the sample contract before seeing any questions and with no prompting to focus on any particular contract provisions. We asked them to spend the same amount of time reading the contract as they would any other consumer contract they might encounter in their real-world transactions.161 The results suggest most respondents did not read the contract in detail, and few focused on the arbitration clause.

1. Did Respondents Read the Contract?

The contract as a whole contained 9118 words. The average adult is reported to read less than 300 words of prose per minute.162

161. The survey provided respondents the following instructions about reading the contract:

Imagine that you obtained a credit card and the credit card company has provided you with the credit card contract we are about to show you, perhaps online or through the mail. If you have a credit card, you have been given a contract like this for your credit card in the past. Some consumers read contracts like this while others may not, and still others may read some parts and not other parts. Please give this contract the exact same amount of attention you would if it had just been provided to you, along with your new credit card. This is not a test. Rather, we want to learn what you and other consumers take away from consumer contracts in your everyday life.

Assuming a reading speed of 300 words per minute, a person should have taken more than thirty minutes to read the contract in full. But that may be misleading because a consumer reading the contract might be expected to skip over some sections after reading the caption, depending on how the consumer planned to use a credit card. For example, a consumer who rarely traveled overseas might reasonably not read the section captioned “Using Your Card for International Transactions,” while a consumer who did not expect to write checks against the account would probably see little value in perusing the section headed “Convenience Checks.” In any event, respondents spent an average of 263.2 seconds, or just over four minutes, on the pages containing the contract. Assuming a reading speed of 300 words per minute, that translates into enough time to read 1311.6 words, or 14% of the contract.\textsuperscript{163}

Four minutes may overstate the amount of time respondents spent reading the contract. While the survey platform timed how long respondents spent on each page of the contract, we cannot determine how much of that time was spent reading. Respondents could, for example, have clicked to open a page and then shifted their attention to something else. We have at least two reasons to believe some respondents were distracted. First, some respondents took hours—even a day—from the time they first opened the survey to the time they finished it.\textsuperscript{164} It seems obvious that those respondents were not devoting all that time continuously to the survey. Second, the average respondent spent more time on the last page of the contract than any other page—100 seconds, or more than four times longer than several other pages—despite the fact that the last page contained less text.\textsuperscript{165} A

\begin{itemize}
\item on an average. On the other hand, a college student reads about 300 words per minute on an average.” (alterations omitted).
\item This contrasts with the results of a survey reported in Tess Wilkinson-Ryan’s \textit{A Psychological Account of Consent to Fine Print}. Wilkinson-Ryan, \textit{supra} note 86, at 1774. In Professor Wilkinson-Ryan’s survey, respondents were asked to estimate how long they would spend reading a three-page credit card contract. It appears that they were not given a copy of the contract. The mean amount of time respondents said they would devote to reading the contract was 10.6 minutes and they would read only about two-thirds of the contract. They also estimated that the average consumer would read it for 6.1 minutes and read one-third. The average respondent also stated that he or she would spend 12.4 minutes reading a six-page computer contract and 14.2 minutes reading a twenty-page car warranty.
\item For example, some respondents took the following length of time to complete the survey: one day, four hours, twenty-five minutes; five hours, forty-nine minutes; one day, ten hours, twenty minutes; fifteen hours, five minutes; five hours, ten minutes; seven hours, twelve minutes.
\item The first page of text (page two of the contract) had 1174 words. The succeeding pages had 1574, 1705, 1583, 1617, and 1001 words, respectively. The last page told respondents “[w]hen you are finished with this page, please click the arrow at the bottom right
likely explanation is that many respondents took a break between finishing the last page and proceeding to the survey questions. In any event, we can put an outer limit on the amount of time respondents spent reading the contract, though we cannot determine how much time they actually devoted to reading it.

Figure 5 shows the breakdown of average time spent per page on the contract, how many words appeared on each page, and what percentage of the page someone reading 300 words per minute could have read in the time the average respondent spent on the page. On average, respondents spent 34.03 seconds on page two of the contract, which included a bolded reference to the arbitration clause, 19.27 seconds on page six of the contract, which contained the first part of the arbitration clause, and 100 seconds on the last page, which included the remainder of the arbitration clause, for a total of 153.3 seconds, or more than two and a half minutes, on pages referring to arbitration. Again, that number is probably inflated by respondents who took a break upon reaching the last page of the contract. Even the amount of time respondents spent on a single page of the contract compares favorably with the nominal amount of time some studies have found that consumers spend reading contracts in real transactions. For example, one study found that less than .5% of consumers spent even one second on EULAs, while another reported that about half the participants stated that they did not read credit card contracts at all. Thus, it may be that respondents spent more time with the contract than consumers normally do and that their responses actually overstate consumer understanding of arbitration clauses.

It is impossible to know how much time respondents spent specifically on the arbitration clause. The instructions did not refer to the arbitration clause, and so, just as with any arbitration term in a credit card contract, respondents would have had no special reason to pay attention to the arbitration clause—except that this contract included a boldface reference to the arbitration clause on page two of the contract. Page two also advised respondents: “It is important that you read the entire Arbitration Provision section carefully.” The arbitration clause ran 615 words. At 300 words per minute, it would have taken just over two minutes to read. Page six included 383 words of the arbitration clause and 232 more appeared on page seven. We can infer from the fact that the average respondent spent no more than 19.27 seconds reading page six that the average respondent did not read the entire

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166. Marotta-Wurgler, supra note 71.
167. See supra notes 75–76 and accompanying text.
arbitration provision, much less heed the advice to read it “carefully.” Reading the portion of the arbitration clause that appeared on page six in its entirety would have taken a 300-word-a-minute reader more than one minute and fifteen seconds, or nearly four times as much as the average respondent spent on all of page six. These calculations assume that such a respondent read nothing else on page six.

We cannot, however, determine whether the average respondent read the entire segment of the arbitration clause that appeared on page seven because the 100 seconds the average respondent devoted to that page would have been more than enough to read the page-seven portion of the arbitration clause. It seems unlikely, however, that a respondent would speed through the page-six fragment of the arbitration clause and then read the page-seven part carefully. Perhaps more importantly, the key parts of the arbitration clause—at least for purposes of this study—all appear on page six. Specifically, the text barring suit in a non-small claims court, banning class actions, prohibiting jury trials, and addressing the finality of the arbitrator’s decision appeared on page six. We would expect that if respondents spent more time on one part of the arbitration clause than another, it would be on the parts that appeared in italics and ALLCAPS, all of which were on page six.

We also asked respondents how long they would spend reading a contract like the sample contract. Figure 6 shows the distribution of responses. We found a weak, but significant, correlation (at the .05 level) between the actual time spent reading the contract and the time respondents reported (correlation coefficient = 0.25). Because respondents answered Question 15 after reading the contract, their answers might have been affected by their perception of how long they spent reading it.

168. Question 15 asked respondents the following:
Before you use a credit card, the company should provide you with a contract like the one you just saw. If the contract is the same length as the one you just saw, we would like to know how much time you would spend reading it. Which of the following is true?
I would probably not read the contract.
I would probably spend a minute or less reading the contract.
I would probably spend more than one minute but no more than three minutes reading the contract.
I would probably spend more than three minutes reading the contract.
I don’t know.
Respondents’ comments are instructive about their attitudes toward consumer contracts, suggesting several reasons why consumers do not carefully read contracts. Some examples follow, with the amount of time respondents said they would spend reading contracts of this type appearing in brackets after each quote:

- I would lose [sic] attention before I finished reading the contract. [less than one minute]
- I know it’s irresponsible not to fully read contracts, but unfortunately I assume that there would be nothing in there that would be unusual or that I would never need to think about it. [one to three minutes]
- Bunch of meaningless crap [would not read]
- I would probably ask questions to the issuer rather than reading the contract word by word. [one to three minutes]
- Focus mostly on the first page. You cannot live (really) without credit cards, and you cannot get one without agreeing—so . . . not much you can do about it anyway. [one to three minutes]
- I trust the laws of the land to not permit a business to take advantage of consumers, so I do trust that, in good faith, the contracts are not very detrimental. [one to three minutes]
I would spend time reading it but I wouldn’t necessarily know what a lot of it meant. [more than three minutes]

I feel like I know what to look for in this type of an agreement and would speak with a banker as well about it. [one to three]

I guess it really depends. I don’t have a credit card so I might feel a little more dedicated if I knew it was real. (sorry, I know you told me to pretend.) [one to three]

contract is much too long, they could probably make it shorter so people could understand it [one to three]

As noted above, the survey also asked respondents how much of the contract they had read and understood. We found a significant (at the .05 level) but very weak correlation between the actual time spent and the amount reportedly read and understood (correlation coefficient = .15).

In sum, it appears that many respondents did not spend enough time on the contract to read it carefully, and that many respondents did not read the arbitration clause carefully despite the contract’s admonition to do so.

2. Did Respondents Notice and Recall the Arbitration Clause?

Even if consumers only skim boilerplate, they might have a particular interest in arbitration or in their dispute resolution options more generally. They might pay more attention to arbitration clauses than to other provisions. Or the converse might be true: consumers may focus more on other terms than on arbitration, suggesting that dispute resolution procedures are not an important factor in consumer decisionmaking.

To test the salience of the arbitration clause within the contract, we asked an open-ended question about which terms the respondents recalled. The first question respondents saw after the contract read as follows:

The credit card contract you just saw said many things. We would like to know what you remember. Please put down a word or phrase for five items you recall. You do not need to repeat the actual words. For example, if you remember seeing the annual fee term, you can simply write “annual fee.” If you don’t remember five items, please mention as many or as few as you do remember.
Respondents collectively made 1975 entries, and recorded an average number of just under three items. That includes references to nineteen items that do not actually appear in the contract.\textsuperscript{169}

We had a research assistant tabulate and collate the responses. That task necessarily involved some interpretation, and we recognize that others might have coded the responses differently.\textsuperscript{170} In any event, we counted mentions of 263 different items from the contract, though only 119 of those were listed by more than one respondent. Figure 7 shows that only eighteen respondents explicitly referred to arbitration, though five others cited items that seem drawn from the arbitration clause: “class action info,” “you or we can’t go to jury or trial,” “federal court decisions for disputes,” “[y]ou do not have a right as a representative,” and “JAMS as a contact.”\textsuperscript{171} Including these statements with references to the arbitration clause, the arbitration clause was mentioned twenty-three times, by about 3\% of the respondents, and consisted of 1\% of the total mentions. Arbitration tied for fourteenth in frequency of the items referred to. Figure 7a lists the twenty items most often mentioned.

As might have been expected, nearly all the most frequently listed items appeared in the Schumer Box, which took up the first page of the contract. Two items that did not appear in the Schumer Box were cited as often as or more frequently than arbitration. One was cancellation, which drew 26 mentions. Its heading was bolded, though the term was not otherwise in bold print. The other item was the minimum payment, which appeared on page four; neither its heading nor the term itself appeared in bold print. Some 23 respondents mentioned it.

Taken together, these findings suggest that dispute resolution terms—including arbitration clauses and class waivers—are not among the more important provisions to consumers.\textsuperscript{172} There are several

\textsuperscript{169} Two such examples are “401k” and “ARM.”

\textsuperscript{170} For example, we coded references to “APR,” “DPR,” and “interest rates” without more as “interest rate (unspecified).” We thought that more accurate than coding them as three different items.

\textsuperscript{171} JAMS was an authorized arbitration provider under the arbitration clause. “Federal court decisions for disputes” could be a reference to the provision in the arbitration clause stating: “This Arbitration Provision shall be governed by federal law, including the Federal Arbitration Act . . . .” [previous sentence written in bold font] “You do not have a right as a representative” could be a reference to the arbitration clause statement: “YOU WILL NOT HAVE THE RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE AS A REPRESENTATIVE OR MEMBER OF ANY CLASS OF CLAIMANTS . . . .” [previous sentence written in bold font].

\textsuperscript{172} This conclusion is also supported by the CFPB Study, which found:

When asked an open-ended question regarding all the features that factored into their decision to get the credit card that they use most often for personal use,
possible explanations for these findings. Consumers may not have strong preferences among dispute resolution mechanisms because they believe the likelihood of ending up in a dispute is very small, or because they believe all dispute resolution mechanisms are basically similar. Alternatively, consumers may have preferences as to dispute resolution processes but may feel powerless to effect those preferences and so accept whatever terms are offered. Or they may mistakenly believe that their preferences will be honored regardless of the text of the agreement. We believe the results described in the next two sections suggest that consumers do have preferences, which they express in terms of expectations—consumers expect to have access to court regardless of the terms of their agreements.

Compounding the problem is the phenomenon of information overload—the tendency of consumer decisionmaking to degrade when consumers consider too many items. While the exact number of such

no consumers volunteered an answer that even implicitly referenced dispute resolutions procedures; and

When presented with a list of nine features of credit cards . . . and asked to identify those features that factored into their decision, consumers identified dispute resolution procedures as being relevant less often than any of the other eight options.

CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 120, § 3 at 3.

items varies across studies, and may even vary from consumer to consumer, the problem itself is well-documented.\textsuperscript{174} At least for credit card agreements, with the number of terms already required in the Schumer Box, consumers may simply face too much information to absorb and understand arbitration terms. The available research suggests that consumers choosing among credit cards are unlikely to consider fourteen card attributes, and so it is improbable that consumers would think about arbitration clauses in deciding which agreement to enter.

\textit{B. Consumer Understanding of the Sample Agreement}

The most important provisions in the arbitration clause of the sample contract were, first, the basic requirement that disputes be resolved in arbitration and the concomitant prohibition on litigation in court, with the exception of litigation in small claims court; and second, the preclusion of class actions and other mechanisms for pursuing multiple claims in a single proceeding. We found deep misunderstandings on both those points.


\textsuperscript{174} See, \textit{e.g.}, David M. Grether, Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, \textit{The Irrelevance of Information Overload: An Analysis of Search and Disclosure}, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 277, 300 (1986) (“Taking consumers at their word, several studies show that the number of salient or determinate product attributes—those considered at the final stage—does not exceed five, and often is less.”); Malhotra, \textit{supra} note 173, at 427 (“[I]t seems that individuals cannot optimally handle more than ten items (attributes) of information simultaneously. . . . There exists some evidence to suggest that individuals can optimally process a maximum of only six alternatives”); Lauren E. Willis, \textit{Decisionmaking and the Limits of Disclosure: The Problem of Predatory Lending: Price}, 65 Md. L. REV. 707, 767–68 (2006) (“Subjects typically consider a maximum of five attributes . . . . In marketing studies designed to determine which attributes consumers consider in making real-world product purchasing decisions, under more realistic search and information processing cost conditions, consumers consider even fewer attributes.”); Hume Winzar & Preben Savik, \textit{Measuring the Information Overload on the World Wide Web}, 13 AM. MKTG. ASS’N, 439, 439 (2002) (“Estimates of optimal number of attributes have ranged from 4 to 15 . . . .” (citations omitted)).
1. Do Consumers Understand They Will Be Precluded from Court Adjudication?

As an initial matter, we wanted to test whether consumers recognized (or assumed) that the contract they saw required them to arbitrate disputes they might have with the credit card company. The sample credit card contract provided for arbitration of all disputes arising out of the contract, and included a small-claims carve-out, allowing disputes to be heard in small claims court but not courts having jurisdiction over larger claims. Specifically, the contract provided in pertinent part:  

You agree that either you or we can choose to have binding arbitration resolve any claim, dispute or controversy between you and us that arises from or relates to this Agreement or the Account and credit issued thereunder (individually and collectively, a “Claim”). This does not apply to any Claim in which the relief sought is within the jurisdictional limits of, and is filed in, a small claims court. If arbitration is chosen by any party, the following will apply:  

(1) NEITHER YOU NOR WE WILL HAVE THE RIGHT TO LITIGATE A CLAIM IN COURT . . . .

The contract in the survey gave respondents several opportunities to notice the arbitration clause. The existence of the arbitration clause was pointed out on the contract’s second page (the first page of contract text) and the clause itself was spread over two other pages, meaning that the arbitration clause appeared on or was referred to on three of the contract’s seven pages. The arbitration clause, as well as the reference to it on page two, was printed entirely in bold print, while portions of the clause appeared in ALLCAPS and italics, as illustrated in the quote from the contract just above.

The survey’s questions about this aspect of the sample arbitration clause were intended to determine (1) if respondents understood that, under the contract, claims that could not meet the jurisdictional limits of a small claims court could be heard only in arbitration; and (2) if they understood that, under the contract, some claims could be heard in a small claims court.

175. Bold, italics, and ALLCAPS appeared in the original.

176. Such small claims carve-outs are common in arbitration clauses, perhaps because the rules of the AAA provide for such a carve-out. See AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, CONSUMER-RELATED DISPUTE: SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEDURES § C-1(d) (2005), https://www.adr.org/aaa/faces/rules/searchrules (select “View Our Archival Rules” and navigate through the alphabetic listing) (“Parties can still take their claims to a small claims court.”).
Question 11 was designed to assess whether respondents understood that they had agreed to arbitrate disputes too large for small claims court. In other words, this question went to the most basic point—whether consumers realized that they had entered into an arbitration agreement at all. Question 11 asked: “If you and the credit card company have a dispute that is too large to be brought in a small claims court, did the contract you just saw say you have agreed to arbitrate it?”

As shown in Figure 8, 43% of the respondents stated that they had agreed to arbitrate such a dispute. A majority of the respondents either thought that they had not agreed to arbitrate or did not know.

**FIGURE 8**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>42.7%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I don't know</td>
<td>48.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Question 7 addressed the existence of an arbitration requirement in a slightly different way, by asking about the procedural effect of the

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177. As discussed more fully below, see infra notes 183–184 and accompanying text, the arbitration clause included a carve-out for small claims court proceedings.

178. Our findings thus conflict with Eigen’s findings that only three of 37 employees recalled that their employment agreement included an arbitration clause. *See supra* note 218–219 and accompanying text. The different results may have several explanations, including that we asked our questions immediately after showing respondents the contract, the arbitration clause in our contract and the page-two reference to it appeared in bold print and spilled over three of the seven pages of the contract, and the small sample in the Eigen study—thirty-seven employees of a single company—may have rendered the results atypical.
agreement in the context of a specific dispute. The question read as follows:

Suppose after you paid your credit card bill, you realized the credit card company overcharged you. The credit card company, however, believes it has not overcharged you and refuses to give you your money back. The dispute is too large to be decided by a small claims court. Under the terms of the contract you just saw, if the amount of the dispute was large enough, would you have a right to have a court decide the dispute even if the credit card company didn’t want a court to decide the dispute? 179

As noted above, the credit card contract unequivocally stated that such a dispute could not be heard in court and could be decided only by an arbitrator. Yet, as shown in Figure 9, only 14% of the respondents realized that the contract banned litigation in court. 180 Nearly half—or more than three times as many as recognized they did not have a right to sue in court—wrongly believed the contract gave them a right to sue in court. When those who selected “I don’t know” are added in, consumers failed to understand that they had surrendered their right to sue in court by a margin of more than six to one. 181

179. By using the phrase, “under the terms of the contract you just saw,” we sought to focus respondents’ attention on the wording of the contract rather than questions about enforceability.

180. The CFPB Study found that “[l]ess than 7% of consumers whose credit card agreements included pre-dispute arbitration clauses stated that they could not sue their credit card issuers in court.” CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 120, § 3 at 4. The difference between the CFPB’s findings and ours, though not large, may be explained in part by the fact that in our study, respondents were shown the credit card contract only moments before being asked.

181. The CFPB Study reported an even larger margin. More than 90% of the CFPB respondents with arbitration clauses in their credit card contracts reported either not knowing if they could sue in court or believed they could do so, giving a margin of more than thirteen to one. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 120, § 3 at 19; see also Debra Pograndt Stark, Jessica M. Choplin, & Eileen Linnabery, Dysfunctional Contracts and the Laws and Practices that Enable Them: An Empirical Analysis, 46 I N D. L. REV. 797, 799 (2013) (study finds that “a very large percentage of laypersons believed they were entitled to remedies that were ‘clearly’ (at least to an attorney or judge’s eyes) excluded in the contract clause”).
In conjunction, Questions 11 and 7 show that many respondents who either realized or assumed that the contract provided for arbitration were confused about what that meant. Of the 43% who said that the contract provided for arbitration, 61% also believed that consumers would have a right to have a court decide the dispute. Nearly a fifth of those who believed that the contract mandated arbitration checked “I don’t know” when asked if consumers would have a right to sue in court by Question 7. In short, only fifty-nine respondents—less than 9% of the total—realized that the contract both provided for arbitration and precluded litigation in court. An even smaller subset of the 43%, forty-six (less than 7% of the total), recognized that the contract foreclosed participation in a class action, and that it included an arbitration clause.

Similarly, of the 43% who understood that the contract specified that disputes would be resolved through arbitration, only eighty respondents realized that they could not obtain a jury trial, meaning that only 12% of the total understood both that the contract provided for arbitration and that it precluded a jury trial of disputes.

For anecdotal evidence that consumers do not understand arbitration agreements, see Fed. Trade Comm’n, Repairing a Broken System: Protecting Consumers in Debt Collection Litigation and Arbitration 42 (2010) (“Many consumer advocates at the roundtables stated that consumers generally do not know that their contracts contain arbitration provisions… Other roundtable participants questioned whether consumers who are aware of the arbitration provisions in their contracts actually understand them…”).
The comments provided by some respondents confirm that many were confused about the right to go to court under the contract. While many reported skipping over the arbitration section of the contract, some respondents clearly suffered from misconceptions:

- It would be decided by a mediator.
- You always have a right to pursue legal action when someone has wronged you. It is not up to one party or another to decide whether or not they will take away that right.
- I did not read this information but I would expect that [suing in a non-small claims court] would be my right as a free citizen of the U.S.
- I feel it would be necessary and very legal to do so [sue in a non-small claims court].
- I believe it is your American right to sue in larger court systems.

Significantly, respondents were much more likely to believe that smaller value disputes could be peremptorily diverted to arbitration. Question 5 asked consumers about the small-claims exclusion contained in the contract:

Suppose after you paid your credit card bill, you realized the credit card company overcharged you. The credit card company, however, believes it has not overcharged you and refuses to give you your money back. Under the terms of the contract you just saw, would you have the right to sue the credit card company in small claims court?

Figure 10 shows the responses to the question. Though more respondents clicked “no” than “yes,” the difference is within the survey’s margin of error. But when the respondents who chose “I don’t know” are added to those incorrectly denying small claims court jurisdiction, the number of respondents who realized that they could sue in small claims court was outweighed by the number who did not by nearly three to one: 72% to 28%.184

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184. To clarify, those answering “I don’t know” evidently do not realize that they could sue.
Thus, the survey respondents had it exactly backward. Though the arbitration clause barred consumers from suing in a non-small claims court and allowed suit in small claims courts, many respondents seemed to believe the reverse was true. Twice as many respondents incorrectly thought they were blocked from suing in court for small claims as correctly realized they were precluded from suing in court for claims too large for small claims court. Similarly, nearly twice as many incorrectly thought they could sue in court for larger claims as believed, correctly, that they could sue in court for smaller claims. Only ten, or less than 2%, of the 667 respondents answering both questions understood correctly that the contract took away the right to sue in court for larger claims while preserving the right to sue in court for small claims.

A question we asked about the right to a jury trial further demonstrates that our respondents did not understand the effect of the arbitration agreement. The contract specified in bold, italics, and ALLCAPS that, in the event either party chose arbitration, neither party would be entitled to a jury trial: “NEITHER YOU NOR WE WILL HAVE THE RIGHT TO LITIGATE A CLAIM IN COURT OR TO HAVE A JURY TRIAL ON A CLAIM, OR TO ENGAGE IN PRE-ARBITRATION DISCOVERY, EXCEPT AS PROVIDED FOR IN THE APPLICABLE ARBITRATION RULES.”

The survey asked respondents the following question about jury trials:

**Figure 10**

Q5: Would you have the right to sue the credit card company in small claims court? (N = 667)

- Yes: 28%
- No: 30%
- I don't know: 42%
Suppose after you use the credit card, the credit card company says you owe them more than you think you owe them. Suppose also you refuse to pay the amount they say you owe, and they bring a claim against you to collect that amount. Assume the dispute is too large to be decided by a small claims court. Under the terms of the contract you just saw, would you have a right to a jury trial if the amount was large enough?

FIGURE 11

As Figure 11 illustrates, less than one in five respondents recognized that those agreeing to the contract surrendered their right to a jury trial. Nearly twice as many incorrectly answered “yes” as correctly answered “no.” Again, many respondents stated in their comments that they had not read that portion of the contract, but some of the comments suggest that respondents did not realize that they could waive their right to a jury trial: “It is your right as an American to have

185. In practice, debt collection claims against consumers are often brought in court. Since 2009, AAA has maintained a self-imposed moratorium on consumer debt collection arbitrations, removing the largest provider from the field. Press Release, Am. Arbitration Ass’n, The American Arbitration Association Calls for Reform of Debt Collection Arbitration (July 23, 2009), https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/arbitration/testimonysept09-exhibit3.pdf. Further, since most consumers default on debt claims against them, banks may prefer litigation to arbitration for debt collection even where arbitration is available. Nevertheless, consumers give up the right to a jury trial when they agree to an arbitration clause like the one in our study, and our results indicate they do so unknowingly.
2. Do Consumers Understand They Cannot Participate in Class Actions?

The supplied contract addressed class actions on two different pages. On the second page of the contract (the first page of text), the second paragraph opened with the bolded words, “This Agreement contains an arbitration provision (including a class action arbitration waiver).”

And on page six, in bold, italics, and ALLCAPS, appeared, “YOU WILL NOT HAVE THE RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE AS A REPRESENTATIVE OR MEMBER OF ANY CLASS OF CLAIMANTS, OR AS A PRIVATE ATTORNEY GENERAL.”

To test respondents’ understanding of class action waivers, we asked Question 13: “Suppose that you and many other consumers had the same kind of dispute with the credit card company. Under the terms of the contract you just saw, could you be included with the other consumers in a single lawsuit (that is, a class action) against the credit card company?”

In light of the terms reprinted above, the correct answer to Question 13 is “no.” Nevertheless, as shown in Figure 12, four times as many respondents chose “yes” as “no.” Only one out of eight respondents understood that they could not participate in a class action if they signed a contract with such a clause.

186. Respondents to the CFPB survey were slightly more likely (56.7%) than our respondents to think they could participate in a class action, despite having entered into a credit card contract barring them from doing so. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 120, § 3 at 4. Again, the slight difference may be attributable to our respondents having been presented with the contract shortly before being asked about class actions.

187. We also asked respondents about the effect of a class waiver in a “properly-worded” arbitration agreement. The responses are discussed below in Part V.C.2.
C. Consumer Understanding of a Hypothetical “Properly-Worded” Arbitration Agreement

In an effort to test not only respondents’ understanding of the sample contract, but also whether respondents thought courts would enforce a generic arbitration clause, and to obtain views from those who might not have read the arbitration clause, the survey asked consumers three questions about an arbitration clause described as “properly-worded.” The three questions dealt with whether a court would enforce an arbitration clause, the effect of a class action waiver, and the finality of an arbitral award.

1. Enforcement of Arbitration Clauses in General

After we received reports that some consumers believed clauses taking away their right to sue in court would be unenforceable, we decided to ask Question 19:

Suppose you agreed to a credit card contract that included a properly-worded clause saying that if you and the company had a dispute, you couldn’t sue them in court but that disputes could be resolved only in arbitration. You think the credit card company has overcharged you by $5,000, but the company disagrees. How likely do you think it is that a court would throw out the arbitration clause and decide your dispute?

188. In particular, David Arkush had suggested a question along the lines we posed.
The Supreme Court’s arbitration jurisprudence forecloses most attacks on properly worded arbitration agreements, including attacks based on state law doctrines such as unconscionability.\(^\text{189}\) Because the question posited a “properly-worded” arbitration clause, a court should not invalidate the clause absent evidence of fraud in the inducement of the arbitration agreement itself. Accordingly, the best answer among the choices offered was “very unlikely.” In fact, about one in six respondents chose this answer, as seen in Figure 13. Collectively, 43% of the respondents selected “very unlikely” or “unlikely,” as compared with 32% who opted for “very likely” or “likely,” making this one of only two questions that more respondents answered correctly than incorrectly. But when the respondents choosing “I don’t know” are added to those with wrong answers, a sizable 57% majority of respondents failed to recognize that a properly written arbitration clause is enforceable.\(^\text{190}\)

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\(^{189}\) See Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 493 n.9 (1987) (noting that a court may not “rely on the uniqueness of an agreement to arbitrate as a basis for a state-law holding that enforcement would be unconscionable”).

\(^{190}\) Cf. supra notes 104–108 and accompanying text.
2. Enforcement of Class Action Waivers

Question 23 asked about class actions, not in connection with the supplied contract, but with a “properly-worded” contract clause. The question read:

Again, suppose you had agreed to a credit card contract that included a properly-worded clause saying that if you and the company had a dispute, you couldn’t sue them in court but that disputes could be resolved only in arbitration. You think the credit card company has overcharged you. Many other consumers have a similar dispute against the credit card company. The company says it has not overcharged anyone. Suppose the contract said you could not join with other consumers to bring a class action. Could you be included in a class action against the credit card company, either in court or arbitration or both?

Though 8% more respondents incorrectly thought they could participate in a class action than correctly thought they could not, as demonstrated in Figure 14, that difference is just within the survey’s margin of error. But the total of those clicking “I don’t know” or “yes” add up to 71%, or more than twice as many as the 29% who correctly answered “no.”

**Figure 14**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>36.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>28.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I don’t know</td>
<td>34.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Q23: Could you be included in a class action against the credit card company, either in court or arbitration or both? (N = 665)*
Putting the responses to this question together with the responses to Question 13, which asked about the class action waiver in the sample contract, demonstrates respondents’ confusion about the effect of class action waivers. Only forty-one respondents, or 6%, correctly responded negatively to both questions. That is, only 6% of respondents understood both that the sample agreement precluded their participation in a class and that a class waiver in a generic arbitration agreement would be enforced. In contrast, 172, or more than a quarter, wrongly responded affirmatively to both questions.

Some of the written comments on those two questions shed additional light on respondents’ thinking:

- I don’t see how they could preclude us from filing a class action suit through a whimsy little contract.
- I believe that would be my rights as a citizen.
- JUST BECAUSE THE CONTRACT SAYS IT DON’T MEAN A JUDGE CAN’T OVERRULE IT ESPECIALLY A CIRCUIT COURT PANEL—BUT WHO WANTS TO GO THROUGH ALL THAT!!!
- Based on my memory of what I think I’ve read has happened. And an old cliche, “You can’t sign away your rights.”
- [N]o way they can tell me that they can screw up and then I have no recourse.

In sum, many of the respondents seemed not to realize that they could sign away their rights to join a class, and nearly 90% did not appreciate that this contract did just that, despite the repeated notice and the bolding, italics, and ALLCAPS of the class action waiver.

3. The Finality of Arbitral Awards

Arbitral awards are normally final and binding. The Supreme Court has held that the grounds listed in the FAA for vacating an arbitral award are exclusive. Those grounds are extremely limited. They do not, for example, permit a court to vacate an award on the grounds that the arbitrator made a legal error.

To test whether consumers understand that an arbitral award cannot be challenged on substantive grounds in a court of law, Question 21 described the following scenario:

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192. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
Suppose you had agreed to a credit card contract that included a properly-worded clause saying that if you and the company had a dispute, you couldn’t sue them in court but that disputes could be resolved only in arbitration and the arbitrator’s decision is final. Just as in the last question, you think the credit card company has overcharged you by $5,000, but the company disagrees. Assume also you brought an arbitration proceeding against the company and the arbitrator decided against you and ruled you had to pay the $5,000. Assume that the arbitrator had unintentionally made a mistake about the law and so ruled against you, but that otherwise the arbitrator had conducted the arbitration properly.

Which of the following options would be available to you?

The correct answer among the available choices was “Nothing. I would still have to pay the money.” More than three times as many respondents chose an incorrect answer as chose the correct answer. Nearly half of the respondents thought that they could appeal from the arbitrator’s decision to one or more arbitrators, and overall a majority of the respondents clung to their view that the arbitrator’s decision would not be final even though the question told them that the contract said it was final. Less than a fifth realized that the decision would in fact be final. Figure 15 shows the distribution of answers.

193. Some arbitration clauses do in fact provide for an appeal to a panel of arbitrators. See, e.g., YOUR GIANT EAGLE CREDIT CARD ACCOUNT AGREEMENT § 1.C.11, http://files.consumerfinance.gov/a/assets/credit-card-agreements/pdf/creditcardagreement_10261.pdf (last visited Aug. 29, 2015) (“[A]ny party can, within 30 days after the entry of the award by the arbitrator, appeal the award to a three-arbitrator panel . . . .”). The contract provided to respondents at the outset of the survey did not include such a right of appeal. Indeed, it stated in boldface: “The arbitrator’s decision will generally be final and binding, except for the limited right of appeal provided by the Federal Arbitration Act.” Accordingly, consumers should not have been confused by the sample contract. In any event, the sample contract was not relevant to the question.
The comments confirm that many respondents did not appreciate that an arbitrator’s decision can be final. For example, respondents who clicked that consumers could appeal to an arbitrator or arbitrators wrote:194

- [S]eems only fair that you could appeal.
- I will fight for my right.
- If that did not work I would take them to court.
- I would have it overlooked by another arbitrator or appeal to a higher court.
- Its [sic] my right.
- [B]ecause the arbitrator unintentionally made a mistake, I feel that my rights were not handle [sic] in the best way possible for me to retrieve [sic] my money, therefore the contract could not be binding, I feel like I was misrepresented and if I can show proof that a mistake was made the I deserve a retrial.

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194. That answer read “I could appeal to another arbitrator or arbitrators.”
Other research has found that consumers sometimes disregard disclosed information that contradicts their preconceptions.195 This may be another example of this phenomenon. Additional studies are needed to determine more conclusively whether consumers are able to comprehend the fact that an arbitrator’s decision, based on an error, cannot be appealed if a contract so provides. The responses certainly raise questions about whether this is the case.

4. Consumer Awareness of Arbitration Agreements in Their Own Contracts

We attempted to assess consumers’ awareness of arbitration agreements in their own commercial interactions by first asking respondents, in Question 25, whether they have entered into “a consumer contract with any company that said you have to arbitrate any disputes and can’t sue the company” and then asking respondents if they had an account with several businesses whose consumer contracts include arbitration clauses. Specifically, Question 27 asked if respondents had accounts with PayPal,196 Skype,197 or a cell phone account with Verizon Wireless,198 AT&T Mobility,199 or Sprint200 on which the respondent is the primary person on the account and signed the contract.201 Each of those contracts includes an arbitration clause.

195. MACRO INT’L INC., CONSUMER TESTING OF MORTGAGE BROKER DISCLOSURES: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 12–26 (2008), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20080714regzconstest.pdf; cf. Stark et al., supra note 181, at 843 (reporting on results of study stated, “most consumers, even if they carefully read the limitation-of-remedies clause in the contracts presented to them, will not understand what rights they have waived”).


201. Because many people are part of a family plan under which one person—perhaps a parent or spouse—signs the cell phone contract on behalf of other members of the family, it is possible to have a cell phone without having had an opportunity to see or agree to the contract. Hence the question’s wording.
Six hundred forty-eight respondents answered both of those questions, as shown in Figure 16. Of those, 303 respondents said they had never entered into a consumer contract with an arbitration clause. And of those, 264, or 87%, did indeed have at least one account subject to an arbitration clause, meaning that they did not realize they had agreed to an arbitration clause. In total, a minimum of 40% of respondents answering both questions mistakenly believed they had not agreed to an arbitration clause when they had in fact agreed to at least

202. Question 27 asked respondents if they had an account with one of several companies that include arbitration clauses in their consumer contracts. During phase one, Question 27 did not offer as an option “none of the above.” Instead, the survey asked respondents to click on any of the accounts they had, and if they did not click on any, that indicated they had none of the listed accounts. During phase two, Qualtrics set up that question (along with the other multiple choice questions) to compel a response. One person clicked one of the items in Question 27 but wrote in the comments that he (or she) did not actually have such an account but was required to click on an item to advance in the survey. At that point, for the remaining respondents, we added the “none of the above” option. We also went back to the Qualtrics panelists who had already answered that question and excluded the answers for those who had clicked only one account in answering Question 27 on the theory that they might not actually have had an account with that company (we did not do that for people who had clicked two or more items because they were not compelled to click two items and so must have believed they had two such accounts). As a result, we collected only 649 responses to Question 27. Six hundred forty-eight also answered Question 25.

203. Of those, 105 had two such accounts, and thirty-three had three. The PayPal contract permits consumers to opt out of arbitration if, within thirty days of accepting the PayPal agreement for the first time, they mail a written statement to PayPal containing certain information specified in the PayPal agreement. Consequently, it is theoretically possible that one or more of the respondents who stated that they had not agreed to an arbitration clause and had entered into a contract with PayPal had opted out of arbitration. However, for several reasons, it is likely that no respondent had opted out, and we view the possibility that more than one respondent opted out as remote. First, no respondents indicated that they had opted out of arbitration in response to our invitation to comment on the PayPal question. Second, available information suggests that only about one consumer in a thousand opts out of arbitration clauses by the deadline. In Ross v. Bank of America, discussed supra note 58, the Discover defendants submitted proposed findings of fact, which stated, “[s]ince Discover added its opt-out clause, at least 6,500 cardholders have successfully opted out of the arbitration provision.” Discover Defendants’ Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law ¶ 78, Ross v. Bank of Am., 524 F.3d 217 (2d Cir. 2008), (No. 05-cv-07116), https://www.arbitration.ccfsettlement.com/documents/files/Discover%20FOF%20and%20COL.PDF. Plaintiffs also submitted proposed findings of fact, which stated, “6,500 [or] some 0.1% of Discover Cardholders” had opted out. Plaintiffs’ Proposed Findings of Fact ¶ 659, Ross v. Bank of Am., 524 F.3d 217 (2d Cir. 2008), (No. 05-cv-07116) https://www.arbitration.ccfsettlement.com/documents/files/FoF-Col_.PDF. Finally, for the reasons discussed infra in Part VI.B.3, it seems consumer opt-outs are rare. In any event, if we exclude from our results the ninety-three respondents who indicated that they had agreed to a PayPal account but no other account carrying an arbitration clause, we still end up with 171 consumers, or 56% of the respondents who stated that they had not agreed to a contract with an arbitration clause but had actually entered into a contract with such a clause.
one arbitration clause.\textsuperscript{204} Furthermore, another 244 respondents, or 38\% of the total who answered both questions, did not know whether they had entered into an arbitration agreement or not. In fact, 218 of those respondents—89\%—had entered into at least one arbitration agreement.\textsuperscript{205}

\textsuperscript{204} In all likelihood, the percentage is even higher. The 13\% who said they had not entered into a consumer arbitration contract, and did not have a contract with one of the companies we asked about, may have agreed to other contracts (credit card, checking account, etc.) that included an arbitration clause.

\textsuperscript{205} We did not ask respondents when they entered into contracts with the various companies we asked about. Conceivably, some respondents entered into such contracts before those businesses adopted arbitration clauses and the businesses later amended their contracts to provide for arbitration of disputes, notifying consumers through bill-stuffers or in some other way. An issue that might be fruitfully explored in later research would be whether consumers are more aware of arbitration clauses if they appear in the original contract than if they are added by later amendment.
**FIGURE 16**

Table 2. Cross Tabulation: Q27 and Q25

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Q27. Do you have any of the accounts listed below?</th>
<th>Have an account with one or more of Skype, PayPal, Verizon Wireless, AT&amp;T Mobility, or Sprint.</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>I do not know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>648</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within Q27.</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within Q25.</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Do not have an account with an arbitration clause.</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>I do not know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within Q27.</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within Q25.</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Q25. Have you ever entered into a consumer contract with arbitration terms?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>I do not know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>577</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within Q27.</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within Q25.</td>
<td>94%</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>89%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Some of the respondents’ comments on these questions make it even clearer that they did not realize that they had signed such contracts. One respondent wrote “i would never never up my right to [sue the company].” The respondent had agreed to two of the listed contracts. Another commenter explained, “i am a person to read about this before signing anything, i have never seen or read anything like this i seen mostly read, very surprising . . . .” That respondent also had agreed to a contract with an arbitration clause. One respondent who had denied entering into a contract with an arbitration clause added “please tell me i haven’t entered into such a contract.” The respondent had.

The survey also asked respondents, “[b]efore entering into a contract, do you look to see if the contract says you have to arbitrate any disputes and can’t sue the company?” Of the 176 respondents who said they did look for an arbitration clause, ninety-eight also said they had never entered into a contract with an arbitration clause. Of those, eighty-three, or 85%, had in fact agreed to at least one contract including an arbitration clause. Of those who said they did not look to see if contracts contain an arbitration clause but also denied having entered into a contract with such a clause, 87% had actually agreed to an arbitration clause. In other words, people who think they have not agreed to arbitration and claim to check contracts for arbitration clauses are about as likely to have actually agreed to at least one arbitration clause as those who think they have not agreed to arbitration and do not check contracts for arbitration clauses.

VI. DISCUSSION

Our research suggests that typical consumers do not realize when they have agreed to arbitrate and do not understand the consequences of agreeing to arbitrate. While that finding may be unsurprising on its face, the depth of consumer misunderstanding did surprise us. Even those respondents who claimed to read and understand the contract got the most basic questions about the nature and effect of the arbitration clause wrong. A large majority of the respondents who realized that the sample contract included an arbitration clause still did not appreciate

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206. Again, we do not know whether the remaining 15% had not agreed to a contract with an arbitration clause—only that they had not entered into a contract with any of the entities listed in the survey.

207. Of the 301 people who said they did not look to see if contracts include arbitration clauses, 122 claimed never to have entered into a contract with an arbitration clause, and 106 of those had done so. Of course, if they did not look for arbitration clauses, it is hard to know the basis for their claim that they had never entered into a contract with an arbitration clause.
what arbitration entails, evoking Nobel-prize-winning physicist Richard Feynman’s observation that knowing the name of something is not the same as knowing it.\textsuperscript{208} It is not an exaggeration to say that consumers have no idea what they are agreeing to when they enter into contracts containing arbitration clauses. Beyond that basic level of misunderstanding, we believe our results also indicate an expectation on the part of many consumers that court will be available to them, if only as a last resort.

We believe that this persistent misunderstanding, coupled with the reasonable expectations for adjudicative process that our respondents demonstrated, suggest a need for Congress, the courts, and agencies to re-examine mandatory pre-dispute arbitration in the consumer context. In the remainder of this Section, we explain our reasons in more detail and then raise and respond to several possible arguments for why our findings should not provoke such a re-examination.

\textbf{A. Implications for the Regulation of Consumer Arbitration}

\textit{1. Deep Consumer Misunderstanding of Arbitration and its Effects}

To put the survey results in terms familiar to academics, our respondents would have failed miserably had this been a test of their understanding of arbitration. We asked eight questions that had clear right and wrong answers. Not one of those eight questions elicited a majority of correct responses. Only two questions garnered more correct answers than incorrect answers. On four questions, in contrast, more respondents gave incorrect answers than correct answers, in some cases by margins of three–or even four-to-one. In other words, the responses suggest that a majority of respondents did not realize what rights they give up when they agree to arbitration, and many of the respondents who did think they understood were more likely to be wrong than right.\textsuperscript{209}

\textsuperscript{208} \textit{Richard P. Feynman, “What Do You Care What Other People Think?”: Further Adventures of a Curious Character} 14 (1988) (“I learned very early the difference between knowing the name of something and knowing something.”).

\textsuperscript{209} Available anecdotal evidence offers some confirmation of these findings. See F. Paul Bland, Jr., Executive Director, Public Justice, Comments of Public Justice to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau on the Proposed New Information Collection, “Telephone Survey Exploring Consumer Awareness of and Perceptions Regarding Dispute Resolution Provisions in Credit Card Agreements,” (June 30, 2014), http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=CFPB-2014-0011-0012 (“Our experience of speaking with a large number of consumers supports the proposition that only a tiny fraction read these fine print provisions [arbitration clauses] stripping them of their rights, and
The survey illustrated this lack of understanding of arbitration clauses in other ways. Of the more than 5000 answers that respondents provided to the eight questions with right and wrong answers, only a quarter were correct, as shown in Figure 18b. Only two people—less than 1%—got all eight questions right, out of the 663 who responded to all eight questions. In contrast, 117 respondents, or 18%, did not get a single correct answer—more than got at least half the questions right. If this had been a test with a passing grade of sixty-five, as was common when we were high school students, 96% of the respondents would have failed. Only twenty-three respondents, or less than 4%, would have passed.\footnote{210}

If the number of correct answers (or lack thereof) provides a rough indication of the number of respondents who understood what the arbitration clause entailed, the level of outright misconceptions is indicated by the number of incorrect answers, as displayed in Figure 18b.\footnote{211} More than half the respondents got at least three answers wrong, demonstrating that numerous respondents suffer from multiple mistaken beliefs about arbitration clauses. Overall, respondents gave 44% more wrong answers than right answers, as shown in Figure 18b.\footnote{212}

Even respondents who believed they understood the contract fared poorly. Question 3 of the survey asked respondents, “[h]ow much of the contract did you read and understand?” Figures 18a and 19a show the responses. Using regression analysis, we found that those who reported reading and understanding more of the contract had a higher percentage of correct answers, and that the difference was significant at...
the .05 level.\textsuperscript{213} Figures 19a and b show the percentage of correct answers compared with how much the respondent claimed to have read and understood. But respondents who reported reading and understanding the entire contract still averaged correct responses to only 28\% of the questions, while those who described themselves as reading and understanding most of the contract clicked the right answer to only 30\% of the questions. This may be especially troubling because consumers who believe they understand a contract may place greater trust in that supposed understanding when making decisions—and yet the percentage of correct answers indicates that the respondents who claimed greater comprehension were only slightly less confused than the average respondent, and still were a long way from mastery of the meaning of the arbitration clause.

\textsuperscript{213} Regression analysis found several other significant predictors at the .05 level, and the t-test indicates that higher total annual household income correlates with a higher percentage of correct answers, as did spending more time on page six of the contract (the page which included the key provisions of the arbitration clause), and more time on the first six pages of the contract. In addition, the twelve respondents who identified themselves as lawyers or law students averaged correct answers 54\% of the time, as compared with the remaining respondents, who averaged correct answers 25\% of the time, as shown in Figure 17. The factors that were not significant predictors of correct answers included the amount of time spent reading the contract; highest level of education attained; whether the respondent had ever been involved in an arbitration; and whether the respondent had worked for a bank, credit union, savings and loan, or cell phone company within the previous five years.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area of comparison</th>
<th>Number of respondents</th>
<th>Average % of correct answers</th>
<th>t-test results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Annual household income</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual household income less than $81,000</td>
<td>488</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual household income of $81,000 or more</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>The average percent of correct answers by the respondents with an annual household income of $81,000 or more is significantly higher than that of those with an annual household income of less than $81,000 (29% vs. 24%) at the .05 level (effect size = 0.22).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Time spent reading page 6 of the contract (the page which included the key provisions of the arbitration clause)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bottom quarter: spending 4 seconds or less reading page 6</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>The average percent of correct answers by the top quarter spending time reading page 6 was significantly higher than the percent of correct answers by the bottom quarter (29% vs. 23%) at the .05 level (effect size = 0.31).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top quarter: spending 17 seconds or more reading page 6</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Time spent reading pages 1 - 6 of the contract</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bottom quarter: spending 25 seconds or less reading pages 1 - 6</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>The average percent of correct answers by the top quarter spending time reading pages 1 - 6 was significantly higher than the percent of correct answers by the bottom quarter (29% vs. 22%) at the .05 level (effect size = 0.35).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top quarter: spending 138 seconds or more reading pages 1 - 6</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Attorneys and law students vs. other people</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attorneys and law students</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>The average percent of correct answers by attorneys and law students was significantly higher than the percent of correct answers by other people (54% vs. 25%) at the .05 level (effect size = 0.92).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other People</td>
<td>656</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Figure 18A**

Q3: How much of the contract did you read and understand? (N = 668)

- **All of the contract**: 6%
- **Most of the contract**: 24%
- **Some of the contract**: 44%
- **Very little or none of the contract**: 26%

**Figure 18B**

Figure 18b. Total correct, incorrect, and "I don't know" answers to the eight questions? (N = 5,333)

- **Correct Answers** (N=1352): 25%
- **Incorrect Answers** (N=1950): 37%
- **I don't know** (N=2031): 38%
**Figure 19A**

**Q3: Percent of correct answers to the eight questions by how much of the contract that respondents claimed to read and understand (N=668)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage Correct</th>
<th>Very little or none of the contract</th>
<th>Some of the contract</th>
<th>Most of the contract</th>
<th>All of the contract</th>
<th>Total average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>19%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 19B**

**Q3: Percent of incorrect answers to the eight questions by how much of the contract that respondents claimed to read and understand (N=668)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage Incorrect</th>
<th>Very little or none of the contract</th>
<th>Some of the contract</th>
<th>Most of the contract</th>
<th>All of the contract</th>
<th>Total average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>26%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Furthermore, those who reported reading and understanding more of the contract were much more likely to answer the eight questions incorrectly than those who professed less understanding, as shown in Figure 19.\textsuperscript{214} For example, those who said they read and understood all of the contract were more than twice as likely to record wrong answers as those who reported reading and understanding very little of the contract. Those who claimed greater understanding were emboldened to attempt to answer more questions, rather than to select “I don’t know,” but their confidence in their understanding was misplaced. Indeed, respondents saying they read and understood the entire contract gave twice as many wrong answers as right ones.

Finally, our respondents demonstrated a lack of understanding about arbitration agreements in their real-world consumer contracts. Although the overwhelming majority of our respondents had entered into at least one consumer contract with an arbitration agreement, less than 16\% realized they had done so.\textsuperscript{215} Our results thus suggest that consumers are routinely signing away constitutional rights without knowing it.

In short, the survey raises serious questions about whether the consent consumers provide to arbitration is informed in any meaningful sense of the word, and therefore whether they consent at all.\textsuperscript{216} As a practical matter, if consumers are not aware of arbitration clauses, do not interpret them correctly, think they will not be enforced, or some combination of all three, businesses are free to draft those terms in whatever ways serve their own interests, at the consumer’s expense.\textsuperscript{217}

\textsuperscript{214} For purposes of this statement, as with all statements about right and wrong answers, an answer of “I don’t know” is scored as neither correct nor incorrect.

\textsuperscript{215} Consumer awareness of arbitration clauses in their contracts did not vary according to which contract we asked about—cell phone, PayPal, or Skype. Put another way, the differences in respondents’ answers to the questions about whether they had agreed to an arbitration clause were not statistically significant regardless of which of those contracts they had entered into. The fact that the different contracts were equally ineffective in causing consumers to realize that they had entered into agreements to arbitrate further suggests that the form of disclosure does not affect consumer understanding of arbitration clauses.

\textsuperscript{216} \textit{Cf.} \textsc{Fed. Trade Comm’n, supra} note 183, at 45 (“The Commission concludes that consumers should, but generally do not, have a meaningful choice regarding mandatory pre-dispute arbitration provisions in consumer credit contracts. To give consumers such choice, they must have: (1) a basic understanding of arbitration and its consequences . . . .”).

\textsuperscript{217} \textit{See} Jean R. Sternlight, \textit{Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court’s Preference for Binding Arbitration}, 74 WASH. U. L. Q. 637, 688–89 (1996) (“If the consumer is not aware of the existence or significance of [a] clause, the supplier is free to impose a term that benefits the supplier but significantly harms the consumer.”).
2. Consumer Expectations Regarding Access to Court

Our research suggests that many people view participation in a public adjudicative process as an option that cannot be divested through contractual boilerplate. Almost half of our respondents thought the sample agreement would allow them to pursue in court a claim too large for small claims court, and only 14% recognized that the contract banned litigation of larger claims in court. Less than 20% of respondents recognized that the contract would prevent them from defending before a jury a claim too large for small claims court. Even when told in the question that a properly-worded arbitration clause applied, almost one third of our respondents thought it likely or very likely that a court would ignore the arbitration agreement and decide a dispute with $5000 at stake.

The comments show that many survey participants believed that access to court is such a fundamental right that a judge would not enforce a consumer contract denying the right to pursue adjudication. For example, in response to Question 7, asking respondents whether they could pursue a claim for overpayments in court, we received the following comments:

- You always have a right to pursue legal action when someone has wronged you, it is not up to one party or another to determine whether or not they will take away that right.
- It depends on the amount involved and the level of fairness in the charge. If the amount overcharged is high enough to be considered predatory, I would definitely consider suing.
- I imagine that this would fall under interstate commerce laws as well and the user/cardholder would apply [sic] to take this to court.
- I believe it is your American right to sue in larger court systems.
- Doesn’t matter to them what the contract says, why should it matter to me? You get enough money on the table and I’ll always be able to find a lawyer willing to sue. If he’s any good he’ll get to court no matter what the contract says.

Similarly, in response to Question 9, which asked about survey participants’ right to a jury trial on a claim brought against them by the credit card company, we received the following comments:

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218. See supra notes 175 & 181 and accompanying text.
219. See supra Part V.C.1.
A jury trial. Hmmm. Maybe in the contract they specified I waive my right to a jury? But I’m not sure if legally they can put that in a contract. I feel like that may be pre-empted by law. But I’m speculated [sic] and not a lawyer. I don’t know the answer.

Binding arbitrators are stipulated, right? I GUESS that stipulation could be contested, THEN we’d get a jury trial. It’s also why I avoid putting very much on credit cards.

I did not read that section. I would assume I would be able to have a jury trial or go to arbitration.

Disputes are better settled in court.

I would again expect that I would have the same rights of all other citizens of the United States and that as a corporation the credit card company would have the ‘right of compensation’ for charges not able to prove were fall. [sic]

You have wright [sic] to fight for money.

Yes the dispute can be settled in court with all rights reserved. If the company was notified [t]he Fair Credit Billings Act required the company to acknowledge in 30 day and resolve the dispute in approx. 90 days. From there they violated laws explained in the Federal Trade Commission [sic] website.

To be sure, we cannot say why all or even most of our respondents gave the answers they did because so many did not give explanatory comments. Respondents who gave answers indicating that they thought they would have access to court may have been relying on a default assumption that they do not find particularly meaningful. That is, even if they expect to go to court, they may not prefer to go to court. Focusing as we were on consumer understanding, we did not ask respondents whether they prefer litigation to arbitration. We did not study consumers’ perceptions of any actual arbitration process. Our survey was not designed to shed light on whether consumers who assume they will have access to court would embrace arbitration once a real dispute arose.

Nevertheless, we find it significant that many consumers seem to expect to have access to court, even if they have agreed to arbitrate. Given the deep roots of the civil jury trial in American constitutional history, public expectations about access to judicial process deserve respect and protection. The Federal Constitution and the constitutions of all fifty states guarantee a right to a jury trial in civil cases. The
Second Continental Congress specifically noted deprivation of the right to a jury trial in the Declaration of the Causes and Necessity of Taking Up Arms.\textsuperscript{220} Thomas Jefferson also mentioned it in the Declaration of Independence.\textsuperscript{221} The failure to include a right to a civil jury in the Constitution gave Anti-Federalists some of their best ammunition in the ratification debates, as Alexander Hamilton acknowledged in The Federalist No. 83.\textsuperscript{222} The backlash ultimately resulted in the inclusion of the Seventh Amendment in the Bill of Rights. Notably, the cases that most concerned the Anti-Federalists were debt collection cases—precisely the kind of claim a credit card company is most likely to pursue against a customer.\textsuperscript{223}

Coupled with those constitutional guarantees of a jury right, we believe our findings regarding consumer expectations of judicial process shift the burden onto those who argue that no regulation of mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreements in consumer contracts is justified. We note that a variety of legislative and regulatory responses have been considered and some already enacted. Congress has enacted several laws barring the use of pre-dispute arbitration clauses in particular consumer contracts—outlawing pre-dispute arbitration clauses in mortgages and other loans secured by a consumer’s principal dwelling\textsuperscript{224}—and in certain obligations incurred by soldiers and their families.\textsuperscript{225} In the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act, Congress authorized the CFPB to bar or limit the use of arbitration clauses in consumer financial contracts if the CFPB found such regulation “in the public interest and for the protection of consumers” and “consistent with the study” of

\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{220} Declaration of the Causes and Necessity of Taking up Arms (July 6, 1775).
\item\textsuperscript{221} The Declaration of Independence para. 20 (U.S. 1776).
\item\textsuperscript{222} See The Federalist No. 83 (Alexander Hamilton) (“[The] objection to the plan of the convention, which has met with most success in this State, and perhaps in several of the other States, is THAT RELATIVE TO THE WANT OF A CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION for the trial by jury in civil cases.”).
\item\textsuperscript{223} See Matthew P. Harrington, The Economic Origins of the Seventh Amendment, 87 Iowa L. Rev. 145, 188–89 (2001).
\item\textsuperscript{224} See 15 U.S.C. § 1639c(e) (2012) (prohibiting arbitration clauses in residential mortgage loans and open end credit loans secured by the consumer’s principal dwelling, 12 C.F.R. § 1026.36(h) (2014) and implementing § 1639(e) by prohibiting mandatory arbitration clauses in consumer credit transactions secured by a dwelling “including a home equity line of credit secured by the consumer’s principal dwelling”). The ban does not apply to mortgages issued before June 1, 2013, though. Many mortgages issued earlier lack arbitration clauses because the two mammoth government-sponsored enterprises that buy mortgages in the secondary market previously refused to purchase mortgages containing arbitration clauses.
\item\textsuperscript{225} See 10 U.S.C. § 987(e)(3) (2012) (as implemented by 32 C.F.R. § 232.8(a)(3) (2010)).
\end{itemize}
arbitration the Dodd-Frank Act directed the CFPB to conduct.226 The CFPB completed that study on March 10, 2015.227 Finally, various members of Congress have sponsored the proposed Arbitration Fairness Act, which would invalidate pre-dispute arbitration clauses in consumer and employment contracts.228 We believe both legislators and regulators, as well as courts, should consider consumer understanding of arbitration agreements as an important factor in the decision whether to further limit or ban consumer arbitration agreements. In the following Section, we respond to several arguments that arbitration proponents may make in urging lawmakers not to rely on results in this study to regulate or ban consumer arbitration agreements.229

227. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 120.
229. Some have complained that we did not attempt to determine the extent of consumer understanding of other contract provisions. See Alan Kaplinsky, Mark Levin & Daniel McKenna, Consumers Fare Better with Arbitration, AM. BANKER (Dec. 23, 2014), http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/consumers-fare-better-with-arbitration-1071776-1.html?utm_medium=email&ET=americanbanker%3Ae97637%3Aa%3A&utmcampaign=dec%2023%202014&utmsource=newletter&st=email%20. The implication is that if consumers comprehend other clauses no better than arbitration clauses, consumer misunderstanding of arbitration clauses is somehow less significant. This argument has several flaws. First, some evidence suggests that arbitration clauses are, in fact, more difficult to understand than other clauses. As noted above, the CFPB’s testing found that reading a credit card arbitration clause required, on average, about three years more education than the rest of the contract. See supra notes 132 & 134. Second, when regulators adopted the current version of the Schumer Box (incorporated in our sample credit card contract), they verified that consumers could understand it. See Fed. Reserve Sys., Truth in Lending, 72 Fed. Reg. 5244 (Jan. 29, 2009); MACRO INT’L INC., DESIGN AND TESTING OF EFFECTIVE TRUTH IN LENDING DISCLOSURES: FINDINGS FROM EXPERIMENTAL STUDY 19–25 (2008), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/bcreg20081218a8.pdf (posing various questions about consumer understanding of terms; averaging the reported scores indicates that consumers correctly answered the questions asked 51% of the time). In addition other studies have suggested greater consumer understanding of some contract clauses than we found. See, e.g., Dennis P. Stolle & Andrew J. Slain, Standard Form Contracts and Contract Schemas: A Preliminary Investigation of the Effects of Exculpatory Clauses on Consumers’ Propensity to Sue, 15 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 83, 88–89 (1997) (finding that 65% of respondents identified exculpatory clause in auto-repair contract and 66% identified exculpatory clause in health-club contract). But even assuming that consumer grasp of other clauses is comparable to their confusion about arbitration clauses, and that the lack of understanding of other contract clauses should have no bearing on whether consumers are bound by them, arbitration clauses are still distinguishable from other clauses. That is because consumers agreeing to arbitration clauses waive constitutional rights, like the right to a jury trial or a day in court, and such rights should not be surrendered unknowingly. See supra notes 209–212 and accompanying text.
B. Responses to Possible Objections

We see three main objections to greater oversight or the outright banning of consumer arbitration. First, some may argue that regulation is unnecessary because market forces will ensure fairness for consumers. Second, arbitration proponents may argue that arbitration offers a superior option for consumers, and so it should be left unregulated. Finally, some may argue that increased disclosure or opt-outs are sufficient to address any problems with consumer understanding.

1. Market Forces as a Guarantor of Fairness for Consumers

In an influential law review article, Alan Schwartz and Louis L. Wilde argued that companies would not take undue advantage of consumers in drafting contract terms as long as enough consumers whose business the companies want would refuse to enter into contracts containing those terms. If businesses cannot distinguish between consumers who care about the term and consumers who do not, the theory goes, the businesses will draft their contracts to avoid alienating the consumers who care about the terms, and all consumers, whether or not they care about the term, will reap the benefits. Applied to consumer arbitration, Schwartz and Wilde’s theory predicts that market forces will ensure that consumers are not harmed by the dispute resolution processes dictated by the companies they contract with. Consequently, under this theory, regulation of consumer arbitration is unnecessary.

Whatever merit this theory may have in other contexts, its validity in the arbitration context is questionable at best. The evidence from our research suggests that consumer awareness of arbitration is too low to incentivize companies to take consumer preferences into account in drafting dispute resolution clauses. As discussed above, when we asked respondents to recall five terms from the credit card contract, only twenty-three, or about 3%, of the respondents mentioned the arbitration clause. Arbitration tied for fourteenth on the list of items recalled by the respondents. Even assuming that all twenty-three of those respondents would spurn contracts including arbitration


231. See id.


233. See supra notes 170–171 and accompanying text.
clauses, it is hard to believe that merchants would resist using arbitration clauses to attract the business of only 3% of the population at large, or, for that matter, a number three times as large.\footnote{\textit{See} Sternlight, \textit{supra} note 217, at 691 ("[With regard to arbitration] it seems likely that the ‘knowledgeable minority’ is an extremely small minority. . . . If the knowledgeable minority is sufficiently small, the supplier may well make enough money from taking advantage of the majority to more than justify losing the minority’s business."); Michael I. Meyerson, \textit{The Reunification of Contract Law: The Objective Theory of Consumer Form Contracts}, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1263, 1270–71 (1993).

Schwartz and Wilde’s assumptions are unrealistic. Although there may be some markets where sellers have generally changed their forms to please the relatively few informed and powerful buyers, Schwartz and Wilde offer no evidence to support their conclusion that such markets are typical.\footnote{Cf. Meyerson, \textit{supra} note 81, at 595 ("[T]here is no evidence that consumers do not read form contracts, or do not understand the terms, and are thus unaware of their contents.”).}

Adherents of the Schwartz and Wilde thesis might respond that the fact that consumers do not notice arbitration clauses or, by extrapolation, make purchasing decisions based on their inclusion, indicates that arbitration is working tolerably well for consumers. If the arbitration practices of a company were causing serious consumer harm, in theory, consumers would learn about it and punish the company by taking their business elsewhere. The problem is that arbitration, by its very nature, inhibits the dissemination of information about the arbitration process. One of the key features of arbitration is that it is confidential. The process is not open to the public and the results are not published. Consumers thus often have no way of learning whether a company’s dispute resolution policy is favorable to consumers or not, so the market will not function efficiently to regulate those policies.\footnote{\textit{Cf.}} Nor do businesses shunning arbitration clauses have much incentive to educate consumers about the value of court litigation. Such an effort would require the business to acknowledge that its dissatisfied consumers might sue—hardly a selling point.

Class waivers compound the problem. Class actions are an important means of publicizing information about corporate wrongdoing. They generate media interest, both when they are filed and when settlements are announced, and consumers are notified through the class action process that their rights have been affected. Cutting off class actions is, among other things, a way for companies to hide the grievances against them, making it less likely that consumers will learn about grievances at all and therefore about the fairness of the company-dictated procedures used to resolve them. Arbitration
agreements thus inhibit the very market regulation that is supposed to protect consumers from unfair arbitration agreements.236

2. Arbitration as a Superior Procedural Option for Consumers

One of the most common arguments that arbitration proponents make is that arbitration offers a superior procedural option for consumers. Arbitration proponents take the position that arbitration meets or exceeds litigation at providing effective access to justice. Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court in Concepcion rests largely on his view that Congress, in the FAA, sought to promote arbitration over litigation because arbitration offers a superior process.237

To be sure, litigation can be expensive, time-consuming, and frustrating.238 Under the right circumstances, arbitration can offer a better process. But the benefits arbitration offers for commercial actors of roughly equal power may not carry over to arbitration between business entities and their customers. Many arbitration skeptics believe that arbitrators are influenced by a repeat-player effect, either consciously or subconsciously favoring parties and lawyers they encounter in repeated proceedings.239 Relatedly, skeptics contend that, because businesses select the arbitration service when they write contracts, arbitration providers have an incentive to find for businesses so that the businesses continue to choose that arbitration service.240 The

236. Individual consumers could disclose unfavorable arbitration results, and in some cases they have done so. See, for example, Lost in the Fine Print, ALLIANCE FOR JUST. (2014), http://www.afj.org/multimedia/first-monday-films/films/lost-in-the-fine-print. It is more difficult for consumers to demonstrate that their particular case is more than an isolated problem.

237. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748 (2011) (“The overarching purpose of the FAA, evident in the text of §§ 2, 3, and 4, is to ensure the enforcement of arbitration agreements according to their terms so as to facilitate streamlined proceedings.”).


239. Attempts to study the repeat-player effect have produced mixed results. See Richard M. Alderman, Pre-Disposition Mandatory Arbitration in Consumer Contracts: A Call for Reform, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 1237, 1256–58 (2001). Alderman states:

The limited empirical data . . . suggests that arbitration favors the repeat-player. . . . Although little hard data is available to support or refute the allegation of repeat-player bias in pre-dispute mandatory arbitration, the repeat-player clearly comes out ahead by controlling the decision to arbitrate and benefiting from the processes surrounding arbitration. Additionally, even though anecdotal, the evidence seems to support the conclusion that, consciously or not, arbitrators tend to favor the repeat-player whose continued business is essential for their financial success.

Id. (footnote omitted).

240. See Joshua Frank, CENTER FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, Stacked Deck: A Statistical Analysis of Forced Arbitration (May 31, 2009), http://www.responsiblelending.org/credit-
NAF settlement gives some justification for that concern. Many banks had used NAF, and at least some evidence suggested that they chose NAF because it promised speedy decisions in their favor.  

We will not attempt to resolve the debate over the comparative advantages of arbitration and litigation in this Article. Again, we acknowledge the benefits arbitration can provide under the right circumstances. We see no objection to arbitration where the consumer is given the option of choosing it after the dispute arises. At that point, consumers are in a better position to make informed choices about the available procedural options. But our research suggests that consumers are not able to make informed choices—choices that deprive them of important procedural rights—at the pre-dispute contracting stage. They simply do not understand what arbitration entails, even when they realize they are agreeing to it. Many assume that they will have access to court regardless of what they sign.

Given the depth of misunderstanding and the expectations of access to court our research uncovered, we believe that arguments about the efficacy of arbitration miss the mark. Even if arbitration offers an unquestionably better process, if consumers are unable to make an informed decision by choosing it over litigation, then arbitration loses the legitimacy that is critical to procedural justice. Arguments about the efficacy of arbitration may provide good reason to encourage post-dispute arbitration, but they do not answer the question of whether

241. Even where outside observers conclude that an arbitration process is fair to the weaker party, the weaker party may not perceive it to be fair. That was the finding of Barbara Black and Jill Gross in their research into participant perceptions of securities arbitration conducted through the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”). See Jill I. Gross & Barbara Black, When Perception Changes Reality: An Empirical Study of Investors’ Views of the Fairness of Securities Arbitration, 2008 J. Disp. Resol. 349, 378 fig. 34 (2008). Although they both concluded that FINRA arbitration satisfied basic standards of procedural fairness at least as well as adjudication, large majorities of surveyed customers who had experienced both litigation and arbitration thought the arbitration process was unfair and expressed dissatisfaction with the outcome. Id. at 353, 379.

242. See Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. Cal. L. Rev. 181, 278 (2004). In Solum’s words:

[I]n the case of adjudication, as in the case of legislation, we regard legitimacy as a political good. The goodness of legitimacy flows from an intuitively appealing principle of political morality: each citizen who is to be bound by an official proceeding for the resolution of a civil dispute should be able to regard the procedure as a legitimate source of binding authority creating a content independent obligation of political morality for the parties to the dispute.

Id.
companies should be able to require consumers to sign pre-dispute arbitration agreements.

Of course, the question of whether individual arbitration is superior to individual litigation ignores one of the central issues in the modern arbitration debate: class actions. Companies use arbitration to divert claimants away from class litigation and into individual arbitration. Some claim arbitration provides a superior forum for the resolution of small disputes than class action litigation. For example, the Supreme Court in *Concepcion* asserted that an injured consumer might be better off with AT&T’s arbitration process than with membership in a class because a class action would likely take longer than an individual arbitration and result in an award to an individual consumer significantly less than the $7500 minimum award AT&T was obligated to pay if it lost at arbitration.\(^{243}\)

We express no opinion here about the efficacy of class actions, a subject of heated debate. But we believe that, just as our research raises serious questions about the legitimacy of consumer agreement to arbitration, it also generates doubt about the legitimacy of the class action waivers contained in arbitration clauses. Four times as many respondents believed that they could still participate in a class action after agreeing to a class action waiver than recognized that they could not. Even when the question told respondents that they could not join a class action, less than 30% understood that they could not be included in a class action. Again, we believe that evidence of arbitration’s efficacy cannot suffice to justify class waivers if those waivers rest on consent based on misconceptions.

3. Disclosure and Opt-Outs as Protection for Consumer Rights

A further possible response to our findings about consumer expectations regarding their process options is to advocate better disclosure of the existence, nature, and effect of arbitration agreements, perhaps backed by language allowing consumers to opt out of those agreements. If consumers have mistaken impressions about the legal effect of the contracts they sign, this argument might suggest that the solution is to disabuse consumers of those notions and/or give them the ability to select different processes.

We tested only one contract, and it is possible that the format and/or the language of the contract we tested could be modified in ways that would improve understanding, for example, by including dispute resolution terms in the Schumer Box. But we think our results cast doubt on the utility of disclosures regardless of how they are presented.

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First, in the sample contract we used, arbitration was arguably the most prominent term in the contract text, with more mentions than any other term and with a variety of formatting, including italics, bold, and ALLCAPS to call attention to it. Nevertheless, arbitration tied for the fourteenth most cited term in the question that asked respondents what they remembered about the agreement. Arbitration was not even the most commonly remembered term among terms not already included in the Schumer Box. One other term—involving cancellation—was noted more often than arbitration; another term—minimum payment—was cited as many times as arbitration. Neither of those terms was highlighted to the same extent as arbitration. Even when we specifically referred in our questions to common terms, such as those barring class actions, jury trials, and appeal, respondents did not recognize their effect. In light of these findings, it seems unlikely that any amount of highlighting would succeed in making consumers aware of the rights they forego by agreeing to contracts providing for arbitration.

Second, comparison of the answers of those who spent more time with the contract with those who spent less suggests that better disclosure would not solve the problem. Theoretically, enhanced disclosure should result in consumers becoming more aware of the disclosed items, just as spending more time with the contract should result in respondents developing a similar awareness. By comparing those two groups, we should arrive at a rough approximation of the effect greater disclosure would have. As to each of three categories—the amount of time spent on the entire contract, the amount of time spent on page six, and the amount of time spent on the first six pages of the contract—we compared the 25% of the respondents who spent the most time with the quarter who spent the least time. In not one of the three categories was the difference in the percentage of wrong answers statistically significant, suggesting that greater disclosure would not reduce respondent misconceptions. Respondents who spent more time did have a statistically significant increase in correct answers, at the .05 level. But, as indicated in Figure 20, in the Appendix, the mean percentage of correct answers among those who were in the top category of reading time in all three categories never reached as high as 30%. Spending more time with the

244. While it is possible that respondents who spent more time with the contract did so because they read more slowly, we think it more plausible that they read with greater care.
245. Page six contained the first part of the arbitration clause, including the italicized and capitalized portions that stated that consumers could not litigate in non-small claims courts, participate in class actions, or have jury trials.
246. We used a t-test to measure significance for all the data discussed in this paragraph.
contract only marginally improved comprehension of the arbitration terms. While we cannot definitively conclude that enhanced disclosures would have no effect—because we did not test alternative disclosures—our results suggest little reason for optimism about the efficacy of disclosures.

Our findings also cast doubt on the utility of arbitration opt-outs, another possible method for protecting consumers from unduly burdensome arbitration agreements. The CFPB arbitration study found that 27.3% of the arbitration clauses in the credit card contracts it studied included opt-out provisions, permitting card holders to opt out of arbitration of disputes arising at a later time if they submitted a signed writing, typically within thirty to sixty days of the opening of the account.247 We were not able to test in this survey consumer understanding of opt-out provisions in arbitration clauses. But, as noted earlier, available evidence suggests that about one consumer in a thousand takes advantage of the opportunity to opt out of arbitration clauses.248

From the information we were able to collect, we infer that opt-out rates are low, for two reasons. First, our study strongly suggests that consumers are not aware of the rights they waive in arbitration clauses. It thus seems unlikely that they are aware of the rights included in arbitration clauses, such as the right to opt out. If consumers do not know of their right to opt out, they are unlikely to assert it. Second, even consumers who notice that the contract permits an arbitration opt-out are unlikely to avail themselves of that option if they fail to appreciate that the arbitration clause strips them of any rights. Many of the respondents seemed to believe arbitration supplements court litigation, rather than supplanting it. Accordingly, it is difficult to see why consumers would bother to prepare and send a letter opting out of arbitration.249 But all of this is speculation on our part. Credit card companies offering opt-outs undoubtedly know how many consumers have opted out. We hope that they will make that information available.

248. See supra note 71.
249. See Fed. Trade Comm’n, supra note 183, at 43–44.

[S]ome roundtable participants stated that, for a variety of reasons, consumers rarely exercise . . . opt-out rights. Many consumer advocates asserted that, if consumers were aware of that option, they would choose to do so. In contrast, an attorney for creditors opined that few consumers would choose to opt out of arbitration because they prefer it to court litigation.

Id. (footnotes omitted).
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VII. CONCLUSION

Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl E. Schneider conclude their important book, More Than You Wanted to Know: The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, by recalling how sixteenth-century Spaniards delivered a speech in Spanish to New World audiences that did not understand Spanish. The speech threatened war if the listeners failed to follow instructions, and as the listeners did not understand the speech, the recitation was largely a waste of time, with unfortunate results. So it may be with arbitration clauses. Though the arbitration clause in our contract was written in English, it seems to have been little more effective than it would have been in a foreign language—or even nonsense.

Sizable majorities of respondents did not understand that the contract they had been given: (a) required them to arbitrate; (b) deprived them of the right to a jury trial on a claim of $5,000; (c) prevented them participating in a class; and (d) would almost certainly be enforced by a court. Leaving the sample contract aside, large majorities did not grasp that a “properly-worded” arbitration agreement foreclosing judicial process, waiving class relief, and providing that the arbitrator’s decision was final would be enforced by a court. And in their daily lives, only a small percentage correctly understood that they were already parties to at least one arbitration agreement.

250. BEN-SHAHAR & SCHNEIDER, supra note 81, at 195.
251. See LEWIS HANKE, THE SPANISH STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE IN THE CONQUEST OF AMERICA 33 (1949). Hanke writes:

Spaniards themselves, when describing this document, called “the Requirement,” have often shared the dilemma of Las Casas, who confessed on reading it he could not decide whether to laugh or to weep. He roundly denounced it on practical as well as theoretical grounds, pointing out the manifest injustice of the whole business. Others found it infinitely ridiculous and even its author, Palacios Rubios, “laughed often” when Oviedo recounted his own experiences and instances of how some captains had put the Requirement into practice, though the learned doctor still believed that it satisfied the demands of the Christian conscience when executed in the manner originally intended.

A later passage from the same volume describes how presentation of the “disclosure” evolved:

[T]he Requirement was read to trees and empty huts when no Indians were to be found. Captains muttered its theological phrases into their beards on the edge of sleeping Indian settlements, or even a league away before starting the formal attack, and at times some leather-lunged Spanish notary hurled its sonorous phrases after the Indians as they fled into the mountains. Once it was read in camp before the soldiers to the beat of the drum. Ship captains would sometimes have the document read from the deck as they approached an island . . . .

Id. at 34.
As the Supreme Court has noted, arbitration must be a creature of consent. But our study raises serious questions about whether the consent consumers provide when they enter into a contract containing an arbitration clause is a knowing consent, and therefore whether it should be considered consent at all. Those questions justify, at a minimum, greater congressional, regulatory, and judicial scrutiny of arbitration agreements in consumer contracts.

252. See supra note 2.
APPENDIX

SURVEY

Q1: St. John’s University School of Law is conducting a survey into consumer understanding of contract terms. Thank you so much for taking the time to participate in this research. First, we are going to show you a consumer contract. Then we will ask you some questions about consumer contracts, including contracts you might already have agreed to in your everyday life. [We are still perfecting the survey, so if you see anything that confuses you or you don’t understand, please indicate that in the places for comments.] If you need to make the print size bigger, please use your browser’s controls to do so (in Explorer, click “View” and then use “Zoom” to make your selection).

Before we can ask you the questions, we are required to show you a consent form and ask you to read it and click on the box that says you are willing to answer our questions.

By clicking “Yes” below, you agree to participate in this survey of your own free will. You may refuse to participate or withdraw at any time. If at any time you decide not to participate, you will not be penalized in any way, except that you will not get paid for your time. You have the right to skip a question. You have a right not to answer any question you prefer not to answer. There are no known risks associated with your participation in this research beyond the risks of everyday life. There are two benefits you will receive if you complete the survey. First, if you have a PayPal account and tell us the associated email address, we will deposit $5 into the account (you will receive the promised benefit after you complete the survey). Second, your answers may help consumers and researchers. Your identity will remain confidential. We will not make public your participation.

Is there anything about the study or your participation in it that is unclear or you do not understand? If so, please contact Professor Jeff Sovern at [phone number redacted] or [email address redacted] or through St. John’s University at 8000 Utopia Parkway, Jamaica, New York, 11349. If you have any questions about your rights as a research participant, please contact the University’s Human Subjects Review Board, [phone number redacted].

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253. The bracketed sentence appeared only during the first two phases of the survey administration.

254. The bracketed sentence appeared only during the first phase of the survey administration while the portion of the sentence in parentheses did not appear during that phase.
Do you consent to answer the questions?

○ Yes

Imagine that you obtained a credit card and the credit card company has provided you with the credit card contract we are about to show you, perhaps online or through the mail. If you have a credit card, you have been given a contract like this for your credit card in the past. Some consumers read contracts like this while others may not, and still others may read some parts and not other parts. Please give this contract the exact same amount of attention you would if it had just been provided to you, along with your new credit card. This is not a test. Rather, we want to learn what you and other consumers take away from consumer contracts in your everyday life. After you are finished with each page, please click the arrow at the bottom right of the survey to move forward.255

255. Because of formatting issues involved in converting the contract from an online survey instrument to a Word document, the contract on the following pages is in slightly smaller text and slightly less clear than it was in the survey instrument when the survey was not zoomed in (i.e., when it was viewed at 100%).
### Cardmember Agreement for ABC Bank Classic, Gold and Platinum Accounts

This credit card program is issued and administered by ABC Bank. This information is accurate as of June 30, 2013. **PLEASE NOTE** that this information is provided for general information purposes only and is not specific to your Account. See the Agreement that was provided for your Account and Card for more detailed information, including contact information.

**APR = Annual Percentage Rate**

#### Annual Percentage Rates for Purchases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>APR</th>
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| Prime + 21.74% | 24.99% | 0.06346%

#### Annual Percentage Rates for Balance Transfers

<table>
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<th>Description</th>
<th>APR</th>
<th>(APR)</th>
<th>(DPR)</th>
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| Prime + 1.90% to Prime + 21.74% | 24.99% | 0.06346%
| Prime + 5.99% to Prime + 15.99% | 24.99% | 0.06346%

#### Annual Percentage Rates for Cash Advances

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<th>Description</th>
<th>APR</th>
<th>(APR)</th>
<th>(DPR)</th>
</tr>
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</table>
| Prime + 21.99% | 25.24% | 0.06315%

#### Minimum Interest Charge

If you are charged interest, then the Minimum Interest Charge will be no less than $2.00.

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**For Credit Card Tips from the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau**

To learn more about factors to consider when applying for or using a credit card, visit the website of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau at [http://www.consumerfinance.gov/learnmore](http://www.consumerfinance.gov/learnmore)

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#### Set Up and Maintenance Fees

**Notice:** Some of these set-up and maintenance fees will be assessed before you begin using your Card and based on your Credit Limit; your initial available credit will be less.

- Annual Fee: $50
- Travel Fee: $55 annually

#### Transaction Fees

- Balance Transfer Advance Fee: $10 or 4% of the Transfer or Advance amount, whichever is greater (No Maximum)
- Convenience Check Advance Fee: $10 or 4% of the Advance amount, whichever is greater (No Maximum)
- Financial Institution Cash Advance Fee: $10 or 4% of the Advance amount, whichever is greater (No Maximum)
- Cash Equivalent Advance Fee: $35 or 5% of the Advance amount, whichever is greater (No Maximum)
- Cash Advance Overdraft Protection Fee: NONE
- Cash Advance ATM Fee: $10 or 5% of the Advance amount, whichever is greater (No Maximum)
- Foreign Transaction Fee: Up to 3%

#### Account Fees

- Late Fee: Up to $35
- Overlimit Fee: NONE
- Returned Payment Fee: $90 to $35
Cardmember Agreement

This is a creditcard agreement and disclosure statement (Agreement) between you and the issuer containing the terms that will apply to your Credit Card Account (Account). Effective June 30, 2013. In this Agreement, "you", "your", "cardmember" mean each individual account holder, and "we", "our", "us", "Issuer", "Bank", and "we" mean AMER Bank, the issuer of the Card and your Account. All definitions set forth in this Agreement shall apply equally to the singular and plural forms of the terms defined. This Agreement becomes effective as soon as you are authorized to use your Card or Account, but no later than thirty calendar days after we receive your request to use your Card or Account. This Agreement, which replaces the Agreement that was provided with your Account and Card, supersedes any prior agreements contained in the Agreement that was provided with the Account and Card.

This Agreement contains an arbitration provision (including a class action arbitration waiver). It is important that you read the entire Arbitration Protection section carefully.

ACCOUNT FEATURES AND YOUR USE OF THE ACCOUNT

1. Personal Use. You may use the Account only for personal, family, or household purposes. Federal or state consumer protection laws may not apply if you are the exclusive other than personal, family, or household purpose.

2. Purchases. You may use the Account to buy, lease, or otherwhtise obtain goods or services from cardmembers or others involved in credit transactions. You are subject to the terms and conditions of such transactions, including any fines, fees, or other charges that may be levied.

3. Purchases. You may use the Account to buy, lease, or otherwhtise obtain goods or services from cardmembers or others involved in credit transactions. You are subject to the terms and conditions of such transactions, including any fines, fees, or other charges that may be levied.

4. Advances. You may use the Account to buy, lease, or otherwhtise obtain goods or services from cardmembers or others involved in credit transactions. You are subject to the terms and conditions of such transactions, including any fines, fees, or other charges that may be levied.

5. Credit Card. You may use the Account to buy, lease, or otherwhtise obtain goods or services from cardmembers or others involved in credit transactions. You are subject to the terms and conditions of such transactions, including any fines, fees, or other charges that may be levied.

6. Payment and Statement of Credit Card. You must remit to us at least the minimum payment required on your Account. The minimum payment required is the outstanding balance as of the Statement Date. Payment of the Account in full each month will result in no finance charge being charged.

7. Balance Transfers. You may transfer balances from your Account to another credit card or revolving loan account provided the transfer is made within ninety (90) days of the Statement Date. You may not transfer balances from one Account to another unless the transfer is made within ninety (90) days of the Statement Date.
here this Account that will permit credit on your checking account. You authorize us to make Overdraft Protection Advances from the Account as provided in this Agreement. Any Overdraft Protection Advance will and will be disclosed in either a "Financial Institution Cash Advance" or as an "Overdraft Protection Advance" on your periodic statement, and will be subject to either a finance charge or other fees imposed by the terms of this Agreement, depending on how the Advance is processed. An Overdraft Protection Advance will be made only once per day, and will increase in amount determined by your financial institution, regardless of the specified overdraft amount.

**INTEREST CHARGES AND ACCOUNT FEES**

0. Interest Charges and Interest Charges affect the cost of credit. Your total INTEREST CHARGE and any applicable fees will be determined by the amount of any INTEREST CHARGE and all applicable fees for each statement period. (a) Interest on Overdraft Protection Advances. (b) Interest on Late Payment Fees. (c) Interest on overdrawn checks and overdraft credits. (d) Interest on any other fees that are considered INTEREST CHARGES.

1. The interest rate in this Agreement, we have determined the terms, rates, and fees for this Agreement, as follows:

(a) Annual Percentage Rate (APR) is 24.99%.

(b) Interest on cash advances and other services is 0.00%.

(c) Interest on other fees, such as late payment fees and other fees, is 0.00%.

2. INTEREST CHARGES may be incurred on the following transactions:

(a) Overdraft Protection Advances

(b) Late Payment Fees

(c) Other fees

3. INTEREST CHARGES may be incurred on the following transactions:

(a) Overdraft Protection Advances

(b) Late Payment Fees

(c) Other fees

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(a) Overdraft Protection Advances

(b) Late Payment Fees

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(b) Late Payment Fees

(c) Other fees

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(c) Other fees

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(c) Other fees

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(b) Late Payment Fees

(c) Other fees

50. INTEREST CHARGES may be incurred on the following transactions:

(a) Overdraft Protection Advances

(b) Late Payment Fees

(c) Other fees

Note: For Young Adult Accounts, the young adult’s name and account holder’s name must both be named in the linked checking account in order to have Overdraft Protection.
adoption to these contracts. We do not control how these merchants, ATMs, and transactions are identified for this purpose. The exchange rate in effect when the transaction is processed may differ from the rate in effect on the date of the transaction or the date of the posting of the transaction to your Account.

If you use your Card at an ATM that bears both the Visa and PLUS System logos, the transaction will be processed through the PLUS System. Other than your Card and the amount of the transaction, we do not control how these merchants, ATMs, and transactions are identified for this purpose. The exchange rate in effect when the transaction is processed may differ from the rate in effect on the date of the transaction or the date of the posting of the transaction to your Account.

If you use your Card at an ATM that bears both the Visa and PLUS System logos, the transaction will be processed through the PLUS System. Other than your Card and the amount of the transaction, we do not control how these merchants, ATMs, and transactions are identified for this purpose. The exchange rate in effect when the transaction is processed may differ from the rate in effect on the date of the transaction or the date of the posting of the transaction to your Account.

If you use your Card at an ATM that bears both the Visa and PLUS System logos, the transaction will be processed through the PLUS System. Other than your Card and the amount of the transaction, we do not control how these merchants, ATMs, and transactions are identified for this purpose. The exchange rate in effect when the transaction is processed may differ from the rate in effect on the date of the transaction or the date of the posting of the transaction to your Account.
Q2: The credit card contract you just saw said many things. We would like to know what you remember. Please put down a word or phrase for five items you recall. You do not need to repeat the actual words. For example, if you remember seeing the annual fee term, you can simply write “annual fee.” If you don’t remember five items, please mention as many or as few as you do remember.256

Q3: How much of the contract did you read and understand?

○ All of the contract.
○ Most of the contract.
○ Some of the contract.
○ Very little or none of the contract.

256 In the version of the survey given to the Qualtrics respondents, the demographics questions (Q 29-30, Q 35-39 appeared at this point, and the remaining questions appeared after the demographic questions.
Q4: If you wish to say more about your answer, you may do so here:

Q5: Suppose after you paid your credit card bill, you realized the credit card company overcharged you. The credit card company, however, believes it has not overcharged you and refuses to give you your money back. Under the terms of the contract you just saw, would you have the right to sue the credit card company in small claims court?

○ Yes
○ No
○ I don’t know.

Q6: If you wish to say more about your answer, you may do so here:

Q7: Suppose after you paid your credit card bill, you realized the credit card company overcharged you. The credit card company, however, believes it has not overcharged you and refuses to give you your money back. The dispute is too large to be decided by a small claims court. Under the terms of the contract you just saw, if the amount of the dispute was large enough, would you have a right to have a court decide the dispute even if the credit card company didn’t want a court to decide the dispute?

○ Yes
○ No
○ I don’t know

Q8: If you wish to say more about your answer, you may do so here:

Q9: Suppose after you use the credit card, the credit card company says you owe them more than you think you owe them. Suppose also you refuse to pay the amount they say you owe, and they bring a claim against you to collect that amount. Assume the dispute is too large to be decided by a small claims court. Under the terms of the contract you just saw, would you have a right to a jury trial if the amount was large enough?

○ Yes
○ No
○ I don’t know
Q10: If you wish to say more about your answer, you may do so here:

Q11: If you and the credit card company have a dispute that is too large to be brought in a small claims court, did the contract you just saw say you have agreed to arbitrate it?

○ Yes
○ No
○ I don’t know

Q12: If you wish to say more about your answer, you may do so here:

Q13: Suppose that you and many other consumers had the same kind of dispute with the credit card company. Under the terms of the contract you just saw, could you be included with the other consumers in a single lawsuit (that is, a class action) against the credit card company?

○ Yes
○ No
○ I don’t know.

Q14: If you wish to say more about your answer, you may do so here:

Q15: Before you use a credit card, the company should provide you with a contract like the one you just saw. If the contract is the same length as the one you just saw, we would like to know how much time you would spend reading it. Which of the following is true?

○ I would probably not read the contract.
○ I would probably spend a minute or less reading the contract.
○ I would probably spend more than one minute but no more than three minutes reading the contract.
○ I would probably spend more than three minutes reading the contract.
○ I don’t know.
Q16: If you wish to say more about your answer, you may do so here:

Q17: We will now ask you some general questions about your own understanding and personal preferences about consumer contracts. Before entering into a contract, do you look to see if the contract says you have to arbitrate any disputes and can’t sue the company?

○ Yes
○ No
○ Sometimes

Q18: If you wish to say more about your answer, you may do so here:

Q19: Suppose you agreed to a credit card contract that included a properly-worded clause saying that if you and the company had a dispute, you couldn’t sue them in court but that disputes could be resolved only in arbitration. You think the credit card company has overcharged you by $5,000, but the company disagrees. How likely do you think it is that a court would throw out the arbitration clause and decide your dispute?

○ Very Likely
○ Likely
○ Unlikely
○ Very Unlikely
○ I don’t know.

Q20: If you wish to say more about your answer, you may do so here:

Q21: Suppose you had agreed to a credit card contract that included a properly-worded clause saying that if you and the company had a dispute, you couldn’t sue them in court but that disputes could be resolved only in arbitration and the arbitrator’s decision is final. Just as in the last question, you think the credit card company has overcharged you by $5,000, but the company disagrees. Assume also you brought an arbitration proceeding against the company and the arbitrator decided against you and ruled you had to pay the $5,000. Assume that the arbitrator had unintentionally made a mistake about the law and so ruled against you, but that otherwise had conducted the arbitration
properly. Which of the following options would be available to you?

○ Nothing. I would still have to pay the money.
○ I could ignore what the arbitrator said and not pay.
○ I could appeal to another arbitrator or arbitrators.
○ I could ignore the arbitrator and start all over again in court.
○ I don’t know.

Q22: If you wish to say more about your answer, you may do so here:

Q23: Again, suppose you had agreed to a credit card contract that included a properly-worded clause saying that if you and the company had a dispute, you couldn’t sue them in court but that disputes could be resolved only in arbitration. You think the credit card company has overcharged you. Many other consumers have a similar dispute against the credit card company. The company says it has not overcharged anyone. Suppose the contract said you could not join with other consumers to bring a class action. Could you be included in a class action against the credit card company, either in court or arbitration or both?

○ Yes
○ No
○ I don’t know.

Q24: If you wish to say more about your answer, you may do so here:

Q25: We appreciate you taking the time to complete this survey. We would like to ask you some questions about you. Have you ever entered into a consumer contract with any company that said you have to arbitrate any disputes and can’t sue the company?

○ Yes
○ No
○ I don’t know.

Q26: If you wish to say more about your answer, you may do so here:
Q27: Please click the box for any of the following statements that are true:

☐ I have a cell phone from Verizon Wireless, AT&T Mobility, or Sprint on which I am the primary person on the account and signed the contract (as opposed to being an authorized user on somebody else’s cell phone account, as some people arrange for family members).

☐ I have a PayPal account.

☐ I have an iTunes account.

☐ I have a Skype account.

Q28: If you wish to say more about your answer, you may do so here:

Q29: Which is the highest level of education you have attained?

○ Did not graduate from high school.

○ High school graduate or GED.

○ Some college or post-secondary work.

○ College graduate.

○ Post-graduate work.

Q30: If you wish to say more about your last answer, you may do so here:

Q31: Do you work or in the last five years have you worked for a bank, credit union, savings and loan or cell phone company?

☐ Yes, a bank, credit union, or savings and loan

☐ Yes, a cell phone company.

☐ No

Q32: If you wish to say more about your answer, you may do so here:

Q33: Are you an attorney or law student?

○ Yes

○ No

Q34: If you wish to say more about your answer, you may do so here:
Q35: Please tell us your age.

Q36: Which racial or ethnic group in this list best describes you? You can select more than one. There are eight choices:

☐ White (including Middle Eastern or Arab)
☐ Black/African-American
☐ Hispanic/Latino/a
☐ Asian
☐ American Indian/Alaska Native
☐ Native Hawaiian/Other Pacific Islander
☐ Other
☐ Prefer not to answer.

Q37: If you wish to say more about your answer, you may do so here:

Q38: We will now ask about your total annual household income. There are six choices:

☐ Less than $24,000.
☐ At least $24,000 but less than $51,000.
☐ At least $51,000 but less than $81,000.
☐ At least $81,000 but less than $144,000.
☐ At least $144,000.
☐ Prefer not to answer.

Q39: If you wish to say more about your answer, you may do so here:

Q40: Have you ever been a party to or otherwise involved in an arbitration?

○ Yes
○ No
○ I don’t know

Q41: If you wish to say more about your answer, you may do so here:

Thank you again for your help in this project.
METHODOLOGY:
DEMOGRAPHIC COMPARISON OF SURVEY PARTICIPANTS COMPARED TO BROADER U.S. POPULATION - ETHNICITY

FIGURE 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Survey Participants</th>
<th>U.S. Adult Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>77.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black/African-American</td>
<td>13.5%</td>
<td>13.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic/Latino</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>17.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Indian/Alaskan</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When comparing the demographics of U.S. citizens old enough to qualify for credit cards to those of the participants in our survey for age, ethnicity, income, and level of education, we find that the participants in our survey are highly representative of the American adult population. For example, according to the U.S. Census data, 77.7% of the U.S. population identifies as White compared to 68% of the participants in our study. 13.2% of the U.S. population identifies as Black/African-American compared to 13.5% of the participants in our study. 17.1% of the U.S. population identifies as Hispanic/Latino compared to 16% of the participants in our study. 5.3% of the U.S. population identifies as Asian compared to 8.5% of the participants in our study. 1.2% of the U.S. population identifies as American Indian/Alaskan compared to 1.8% of the participants in our study. Finally, 0.2% of the U.S. population identifies as Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander compared to 0.3% of the participants in our study. Of particular mention, 2.4% of the participants in our study identified as “Other,” while the U.S. Census does not provide data for this category. Because some people identify as more than one ethnicity, the percentages exceed 100%.

METHODOLOGY:
DEMOGRAPHIC COMPARISON OF SURVEY PARTICIPANTS
COMPARSED TO BROADER U.S. POPULATION - AGE

FIGURE 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Survey Participants</th>
<th>U.S. Adult Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18 to 20 years</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 to 44 years</td>
<td>37.1%</td>
<td>31.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45 to 64 years</td>
<td>40.9%</td>
<td>26.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65 years and over</td>
<td>16.8%</td>
<td>13.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In assessing age, the U.S. Census reports that for those U.S. citizens old enough to qualify for credit cards, 4.1% are 18 to 20 years old, while in our study 5.2% of the participants were 18 to 20 years old. Further, 31.9% of U.S. citizens old enough to qualify for credit cards are 21 to 44 years old, while 37.1% of the participants in our study were 21 to 44 years old. 26.5% of U.S. citizens old enough to qualify for credit cards are 45 to 64 years old, while 40.9% of the participants in our survey were within this age range. Finally, 13.4% of U.S. citizens old enough to qualify for a credit card are 65 years old and over, while 16.8% of the participants in our survey were 65 years old and over.
METHODOLOGY:
DEMOGRAPHIC COMPARISON OF SURVEY PARTICIPANTS COMPARED TO BROADER U.S. POPULATION – INCOME

FIGURE 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income Survey Participants</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than $24,000</td>
<td>27.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At least $24,000 but less than $51,000</td>
<td>27.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At least $51,000 but less than $81,000</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At least $81,000 but less than $144,000</td>
<td>17.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At least $144,000</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>U.S. Adult Population</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than $25,000</td>
<td>24.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At least $25,000, but less than $50,000</td>
<td>24.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At least $50,000, but less than $80,000</td>
<td>20.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At least $80,000, but less than $150,000</td>
<td>21.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At least $150,000</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Next, when testing for income, 24.3% of the American adult population reports making less than $25,000 a year, while 27.1% of the participants in our survey reported making less than $24,000 a year. Additionally, 24.3% of the American adult population reports making at least $25,000 but less than $50,000 a year, while 27.1% of the participants in our survey reported making at least $24,000 but less than $51,000 a year. 20.3% of the American adult population report making at least $50,000, but less than $80,000 a year, while 22.2% of the participants in our survey reported making at least $51,000, but less than $81,000 a year. 21.3% of the American adult population reports making at least $80,000, but less than $150,000 a year, while 17.4% of the participants in our survey reported making at least $81,000, but less than $144,000 a year. Finally, 9.5% of the American adult population reports making at least $150,000 a year, while 6.2% of the participants in our survey reported making at least $144,000 a year.
METHODOLOGY:
DEMOGRAPHIC COMPARISON OF SURVEY PARTICIPANTS
COMARED TO BROADER
U.S. POPULATION – LEVEL OF EDUCATION

FIGURE 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Education</th>
<th>Survey Participants</th>
<th>U.S. Adult Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Did not graduate from high school</td>
<td>11.4%</td>
<td>12.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school graduate or GED</td>
<td>30.1%</td>
<td>29.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some college or post-secondary work</td>
<td>29.1%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College graduate</td>
<td>19.3%</td>
<td>18.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-graduate work</td>
<td>10.1%</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Lastly, when examining the highest level of education achieved, the U.S. Census finds that 12.6% of the U.S. population over the age of 18 years old did not graduate from high school compared to 11.4% of the participants in our survey. 29.5% of the U.S. population reports having graduated from high school, or getting a GED, compared to 30.1% of the participants in our survey. 29% of the U.S. population reports having done some college or post-secondary work compared to 29.1% of the participants in our study. 18.7% of the U.S. population reports having graduated from college compared to 19.3% of the participants in our study. Finally, 10.2% of the U.S. population reports having done some post-graduate work compared to 10.1% of the participants in our study.
The diagram illustrates the level of education achieved by survey participants and the U.S. adult population. The highest level of education achieved is compared across different categories:

- Did not graduate: Survey Participants 11.4%, U.S. Adult Population 10.1%
- High school: Survey Participants 12.6%, U.S. Adult Population 10.2%
- Some college or more: Survey Participants 19.3%, U.S. Adult Population 18.7%
- College graduate: Survey Participants 29.1%, U.S. Adult Population 29.5%
- Post-graduate work: Survey Participants 30.1%

The data shows a slight disparity between survey participants and the U.S. adult population, with survey participants having a slightly higher percentage in the 'some college or more' category.


CONSUMER UNDERSTANDING OF ARBITRATION:

**FIGURE 5**
Time spent reading the contract

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page of the Contract</th>
<th># of words on the page</th>
<th>Time (seconds) needed to read the page at a speed of 300 words per minute</th>
<th>Average time (actual seconds) with the page open</th>
<th>Time needed minus actual time used (seconds)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Page 1</td>
<td>464</td>
<td>92.8</td>
<td>35.56</td>
<td>57.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Page 2</td>
<td>1174</td>
<td>234.8</td>
<td>34.03</td>
<td>200.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Page 3</td>
<td>1574</td>
<td>314.8</td>
<td>23.50</td>
<td>291.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Page 4</td>
<td>1705</td>
<td>341</td>
<td>32.70</td>
<td>308.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Page 5</td>
<td>1583</td>
<td>316.6</td>
<td>17.14</td>
<td>299.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Page 6</td>
<td>1617</td>
<td>323.4</td>
<td>19.27</td>
<td>304.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Page 7</td>
<td>1001</td>
<td>200.2</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All above 7 pages</td>
<td>9118</td>
<td>1823.6</td>
<td>263.20</td>
<td>1560.40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

How Much Time Did The Survey Participants Actually Spend Reading The Contract?
How Much Time Did The Survey Participants Typically Spend Reading Similar Contracts?

FIGURE 6
Before you use a credit card, the company should provide you with a contract like the one you just saw. If the contract is the same length as the one you just saw, we would like to know how much time you would spend reading it. Which of the following is true?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>I would probably not read the contract.</th>
<th>Would not read</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>I would probably not read the contract.</td>
<td>Would not read</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>I would probably spend a minute or less reading the contract.</td>
<td>A minute or less</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>I would probably spend more than one minute but no more than three minutes reading the contract.</td>
<td>1 - 3 minutes</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>I would probably spend more than three minutes reading the contract.</td>
<td>3+ minutes</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>I don’t know.</td>
<td>I don’t know.</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>668</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

**Q15:** How much time would you spend reading the contract? (N=668)
CONSUMER RECALL OF CONTRACT TERMS:
Which Items Did Survey Participants Mention They Recalled After They Read The Contract?

FIGURE 7a
Top 20 Items Survey Respondents Mentioned Recalling from Their Sample Contract

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>TERMS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>487</td>
<td>Interest Rates (Unspecified)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>346</td>
<td>Annual Fee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>147</td>
<td>Late Fee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>88</td>
<td>Travel Fee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>Unspecified Fee(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Cash Advance Fee (Unspecified)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Balance Transfer Fee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>Overlimit Fee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Cancellation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>ATM Fee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Balance Transfer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Overdraft Fee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Foreign Fee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Minimum Payment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Billing Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Arbitration *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Credit Limit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Cash Advance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Convenience Checks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Lost/Stolen Card</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Only 18 respondents explicitly referred to arbitration, though five other cited items that seem drawn from the arbitration clause: “class action info,” “you or we can’t go to jury or trial,” “federal court decision for disputes,” “You do not have a right as a representative...,” and “JAMS as a contact.”
CONSUMER RECALL OF CONTRACT TERMS:
Which Items Did Survey Participants Mention They Recalled After They Read The Contract?

FIGURE 7b

Top 20 Items Survey Respondents Mentioned Recalling from Their Sample Contract

* Only 18 respondents explicitly referred to arbitration, though five other cited items that seem drawn from the arbitration clause: “class action info,” “you or we can’t go to jury or trial,” “federal court decision for disputes,” “You do not have a right as a representative...,” and “JAMS as a contact.”
CONSUMER UNDERSTANDING OF THE CONTRACTS:
Do Survey Participants Understand That They Have Entered Into An Arbitration Contract?

FIGURE 8

Q11: If you and the credit card company have a dispute that is too large to be brought in a small claims court, did the contract you just saw say you have agreed to arbitrate it?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>42.7%</th>
<th>285</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>I don’t know</td>
<td>48.8%</td>
<td>326</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>668</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CONSUMER UNDERSTANDING OF THE SAMPLE CONTRACT:
Do Survey Participants Understand That Under the Sample Contract, They Are Precluded From Court Adjudication?

FIGURE 9

Q7: Suppose after you paid your credit card bill, you realized the credit card company overcharged you. The credit card company, however, believes it has not overcharged you and refuses to give you your money back. The dispute is too large to be decided by a small claims court. Under the terms of the contract you just saw, if the amount of the dispute was large enough, would you have a right to have a court decide the dispute even if the credit card company didn’t want a court to decide the dispute?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>I don’t know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Q7: Would you have a right to have a court decide the dispute? (N = 667)
CONSUMER UNDERSTANDING OF THE SAMPLE CONTRACT:
Do Survey Participants Understand That They Still Have A Right To
Litigate Their Claim In Small Claims Court?

FIGURE 10

Q5: Suppose after you paid your credit card bill, you realized the credit
card company overcharged you. The credit card company, however,
believes it has not overcharged you and refuses to give you
your money back. Under the terms of the contract you just saw,
would you have the right to sue the credit card company in small
claims court?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>28%</th>
<th>184</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>I don’t know</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>667</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Q5: Would you have the right to sue the credit card company in small claims court? (N = 667)
CONSUMER UNDERSTANDING OF ARBITRATION UNDER THE SAMPLE CONTRACT:
Do Survey Participants Understand They Have Waived The Right To A Jury Trial?

FIGURE 11

Q9: Suppose after you use the credit card, the credit card company says you owe them more than you think you owe them. Suppose also you refuse to pay the amount they say you owe, and they bring a claim against you to collect that amount. Assume the dispute is too large to be decided by a small claims court. Under the terms of the contract you just saw, would you have a right to a jury trial if the amount was large enough?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>34%</th>
<th>229</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>I don’t know</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>667</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Q9: Would you have a right to a jury trial if the amount was large enough? (N = 667)
CONSUMER UNDERSTANDING OF THE SAMPLE CONTRACT: Do Survey Participants Understand They Have Waived The Right To Participate In A Class Action Suit?

FIGURE 12

Q13: Suppose that you and many other consumers had the same kind of dispute with the credit card company. Under the terms of the contract you just saw, could you be included with the other consumers in a single lawsuit (that is, a class action) against the credit card company?

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>I don’t know</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Q13: Could you be included in a class action against the credit card company? (N = 665)
CONSUMER UNDERSTANDING OF ARBITRATION
IN HYPOTHETICAL CONSUMER CONTRACT:
Do Survey Participants Understand That Arbitration Clauses Are Enforceable?

FIGURE 13

Q19: Suppose you agreed to a credit card contract that included a properly-worded clause saying that if you and the company had a dispute, you couldn’t sue them in court but that disputes could be resolved only in arbitration. You think the credit card company has overcharged you by $5,000, but the company disagrees. How likely do you think it is that a court would throw out the arbitration clause and decide your dispute?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Answer</th>
<th>Response</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Combined %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very Likely</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>9.43%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likely</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>22.31%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unlikely</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>26.50%</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very Unlikely</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>16.32%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I don’t know.</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>25.45%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>688</td>
<td>100.00%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Q19: How likely would a court throw out the arbitration clause and decide your dispute? (N = 668)
CONSUMER UNDERSTANDING OF ARBITRATION IN HYPOTHETICAL CONSUMER CONTRACT:
Do Survey Participants Understand That They Have Waived Their Right To Participate In A Class Action?

FIGURE 14

Q23: Again, suppose you had agreed to a credit card contract that included a properly-worded clause saying that if you and the company had a dispute, you couldn’t sue them in court but that disputes could be resolved only in arbitration. You think the credit card company has overcharged you. Many other consumers have a similar dispute against the credit card company. The company says it has not overcharged anyone. Suppose the contract said you could not join with other consumers to bring a class action. Could you be included in a class action against the credit card company, either in court or arbitration or both?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>36.5%</th>
<th>243</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>28.9%</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>I don’t know</td>
<td>34.6%</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>665</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Q23: Could you be included in a class action against the credit card company, either in court or arbitration or both? (N = 665)
CONSUMER UNDERSTANDING OF ARBITRATION IN HYPOTHETICAL CONSUMER CONTRACT:
Do Survey Participants Understand That An Arbitrator’s Decision is Final?

FIGURE 15
Q21: Suppose you had agreed to a credit card contract that included a properly-worded clause saying that if you and the company had a dispute, you couldn’t sue them in court but that disputes could be resolved only in arbitration and the arbitrator’s decision is final. Just as in the last question, you think the credit card company has overcharged you by $5,000, but the company disagrees. Assume also you brought an arbitration proceeding against the company and the arbitrator decided against you and ruled you had to pay the $5,000. Assume that the arbitrator had unintentionally made a mistake about the law and so ruled against you, but that otherwise had conducted the arbitration properly. Which of the following options would be available to you?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nothing, still have to pay</td>
<td>17.4%</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ignore the arbitrator and not pay</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appeal to other arbitrators</td>
<td>42.5%</td>
<td>283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ignore the arbitrator and start again in court</td>
<td>9.6%</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I don’t know</td>
<td>27.5%</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>668</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Q21: Which of the following options would be available to you regarding the court ruling against you? (N = 668)
CONSUMERS’ AWARENESS OF THEIR OWN CONSUMERS CONTRACTS:
Which Consumer Contracts Have You Entered Into?
Which of Those Contracts Have an Arbitration Clause?

FIGURE 16

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Q27. Do you have any of the accounts listed below?</th>
<th>Q25. Have you ever entered into a consumer contract with arbitration terms?</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Have an account with one or more of Skype, PayPal, Verizon Wireless, AT&amp;T Mobility, or Sprint.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within Q27</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within Q25</td>
<td>94%</td>
<td>87%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do not have an account with an arbitration clause.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within Q27</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within Q25</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within Q27</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within Q25</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
FIGURE 17 Comparing average percent of correct answers to the 8 questions
(The 8 questions are: Q5, Q7, Q9, Q11, Q13, Q19, Q21, and Q23)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area of comparison</th>
<th>Number of respondents</th>
<th>Average % of correct answers</th>
<th>t-test results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1. Annual household income</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual household income less than $81,000</td>
<td>488</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual household income of $81,000 or more</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>The average percent of correct answers by the respondents with an annual household income of $81,000 or more is significantly higher than that of those with an annual household income of less than $81,000 (29% vs. 24%) at the .05 level (effect size = 0.22).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2. Time spent reading page 6 of the contract</strong> (the page which included the key provisions of the arbitration clause)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bottom quarter: spending 4 seconds or less reading page 6</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>The average percent of correct answers by the top quarter spending time reading page 6 was significantly higher than the percent of correct answers by the bottom quarter (29% vs. 23%) at the .05 level (effect size = 0.31).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top quarter: spending 17 seconds or more reading page 6</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3. Time spent reading pages 1 - 6 of the contract</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bottom quarter: spending 2.5 seconds or less reading pages 1 - 6</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>The average percent of correct answers by the top quarter spending time reading pages 1 - 6 was significantly higher than the percent of correct answers by the bottom quarter (29% vs. 22%) at the .05 level (effect size = 0.35).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top quarter: spending 138 seconds or more reading pages 1 - 6</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>4. Attorneys and law students vs. other people</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attorneys and law students</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>The average percent of correct answers by attorneys and law students was significantly higher than the percent of correct answers by other people (54% vs. 25%) at the .05 level (effect size = 0.92).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other People</td>
<td>656</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
FIGURE 18a

How much of the contract did you read and understand?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>All of the contract.</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Most of the contract.</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Some of the contract.</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Very little or none of the contract.</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>668</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Q3: How much of the contract did you read and understand? (N = 668)
FIGURE 18b

Correct Scores
Total correct, incorrect, and “I don’t know” answers to the eight questions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Correct Answers (N=1352)</th>
<th>Incorrect Answers (N=1950)</th>
<th>I don’t know (N=2031)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1352</td>
<td>1950</td>
<td>2031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>5333</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 18c. Total correct, incorrect, and “I don’t know” answers to the eight questions? (N = 5,333)
CONSUMER UNDERSTANDING OF ARBITRATION: How Many Questions Did Survey Participants Answer Correctly?

FIGURE 19a

Correlation Between Correct Scores And Reported Understanding

Average percent of correct answers to the 8 questions: By Q3 (The 8 questions are: Q16, Q19, Q22, Q25, Q28, Q37, Q40, and Q43)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Q3. How much of the contract did you read and understand?</th>
<th>% of correct answers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4 Very little or none of the contract.</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Some of the contract.</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Most of the contract.</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 All of the contract.</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total average</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Q3: Percent of correct answers to the eight questions by how much of the contract that respondents claimed to read and understand (N=668)
CONSUMER UNDERSTANDING OF ARBITRATION:
How Many Questions Did Survey Participants Answer Incorrectly?

FIGURE 19b

Correlation Between *Incorrect* Scores And Reported Understanding

Average percent of incorrect answers to the 8 questions: By Q3
(The 8 questions are: Q16, Q19, Q22, Q25, Q28, Q37, Q40, and Q43)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Q3. How much of the contract did you read and understand?</th>
<th>% of incorrect answers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very little or none of the contract.</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some of the contract.</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most of the contract.</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All of the contract.</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total average</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Q3: Percent of incorrect answers to the eight questions by how much of the contract that respondents claimed to read and understand (N=668)*
CONSUMER UNDERSTANDING OF ARBITRATION:
How Does The Time Spent On The Contract Correlate With The Percentage Of Correct Answers To Survey Questions?

FIGURE 20  T-test: Comparing average percent of correct answers to the 8 questions (The 8 questions are: Q5, Q7, Q9, Q11, Q13, Q19, Q21, and Q23)

Note:

This table presents the results of the t-test that compares the average percents of correct answers to the 8 questions between the top and bottom quarters of survey participants spending time reading pages 1–7, pages 1–6, and page 6 of the contract.

Section 1 indicates that the average percent of correct answers by the top quarter spending time reading pages 1–7 was significantly higher than the percent of correct answers by the bottom quarter (28% vs. 22%) at the .05 level (effect size = 0.29).

Section 2 reveals that the average percent of correct answers by the top quarter spending time reading pages 1–6 was significantly higher than the percent of correct answers by the bottom quarter (29% vs. 22%) at the .05 level (effect size = 0.35).

Section 3 demonstrates that the average percent of correct answers by the top quarter spending time reading page 6 was significantly higher than the percent of correct answers by the bottom quarter (29% vs. 23%) at the .05 level (effect size = 0.31).
Section 1: Between the top and bottom quarters of those spending time reading pages 1–7 of the contract

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group Statistics</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
<th>Std. Error Mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Time spent reading pages 1–7 of the contract</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of correct answers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bottom quarter: spending 66 seconds or less reading pages 1–7</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>.2220</td>
<td>.18653</td>
<td>.01493</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top quarter: spending 280 seconds or more reading pages 1–7</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>.2757</td>
<td>.21027</td>
<td>.01678</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Independent Samples Test

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percent of correct answers</th>
<th>Levene’s Test for Equality of Variances</th>
<th>t-test for Equality of Means</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Sig.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equal variances assumed</td>
<td>1.067</td>
<td>.303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equal variances not assumed</td>
<td>-2.393</td>
<td>307.087</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effect size:</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Effect size: 0.29
CONSUMER UNDERSTANDING OF ARBITRATION:
How Does The Time Spent On The Consumer Contract Correlate With The Survey Participants’ Correct Responses About The Sample Contract?

Section 2: Between the top and bottom quarters of those spending time reading pages 1–6 of the contract

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time spent reading pages 1–6 of the contract</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
<th>Std. Error Mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bottom quarter: spending 25 seconds or less reading pages 1–6</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>.2244</td>
<td>.19402</td>
<td>.01553</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top quarter: spending 138 seconds or more reading pages 1–6</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>.2919</td>
<td>.21406</td>
<td>.01714</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Independent Samples Test

#### Levene's Test for Equality of Variances

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>F</th>
<th>Sig. (2-tailed)</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Sig. (2-tailed)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.179</td>
<td>.278</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>.004</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### t-test for Equality of Means

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mean Difference</th>
<th>Std. Error Difference</th>
<th>95% Confidence Interval of the Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-.06754</td>
<td>.02313</td>
<td>-.11305 - .02202</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

**Percent of correct answers**

- Equal variances assumed: 1.179
- Equal variances not assumed: -2.920

**Effect size:** 0.35
Section 3: Between the top and bottom quarters of those spending time reading page 6 of the contract

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percent of correct answers</th>
<th>Bottom quarter: spending 4 seconds or less reading page 6</th>
<th>Top quarter: spending 17 seconds or more reading page 6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Std. Deviation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>166</td>
<td>.2252</td>
<td>.19811</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>164</td>
<td>.2868</td>
<td>.20581</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Group Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time spent reading page 6 of the contract</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
<th>Std. Error Mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bottom quarter: spending 4 seconds or less reading page 6</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>.2252</td>
<td>.19811</td>
<td>.01538</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top quarter: spending 17 seconds or more reading page 6</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>.2868</td>
<td>.20581</td>
<td>.01607</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Independent Samples Test

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percent of correct answers</th>
<th>Levene's Test for Equality of Variances</th>
<th>t-test for Equality of Means</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>F</td>
<td>Sig.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equal variances assumed</td>
<td></td>
<td>.212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equal variances not assumed</td>
<td></td>
<td>.2772</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Effect size: 0.31
T-test: Comparing average percent of incorrect answers to the 8 questions

(The 8 questions are: Q5, Q7, Q9, Q11, Q13, Q19, Q21, and Q23)

Note:

This table presents the results of the t-test that compares the average percents of incorrect answers to the 8 questions between the top and bottom quarters of survey participants spending time reading pages 1–7, pages 1–6, and page 6 of the contract. Sections 1 to 3 indicate that there was no difference in the average percents of incorrect answers between the top and bottom quarters spending time reading pages 1 - 7, pages 1–6, and page 6 of the contract.

Section 1: Between the top and bottom quarters of those spending time reading pages 1–7 of the contract.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group Statistics</th>
<th>Time spent reading pages 1–7 of the contract</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent of incorrect answers</td>
<td>Bottom quarter: spending 66 seconds or less reading pages 1–7</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>.3574</td>
<td>.26619</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Top quarter: spending 280 seconds or more reading pages 1–7</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>.3525</td>
<td>.22273</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Independent Samples Test

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percent of incorrect answers</th>
<th>Levene's Test for Equality of Variances</th>
<th>t-test for Equality of Means</th>
<th>95% Confidence Interval of the Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Equal variances assumed</td>
<td>F 7.480, Sig. .007</td>
<td>t .176,_std. error .02774</td>
<td>Lower -0.4968, Upper 0.5947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equal variances not assumed</td>
<td>.176</td>
<td>.02775</td>
<td>Lower -0.4972, Upper 0.5950</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Section 2: Between the top and bottom quarters of those spending time reading pages 1 - 6 of the contract.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percent of incorrect answers</th>
<th>Bottom quarter: spending 25 seconds or less reading pages 1–6</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>156</td>
<td>.3534</td>
<td>.25446</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top quarter: spending 138 seconds or more reading pages 1–6</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>.3555</td>
<td>.22193</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equal variances assumed</td>
<td>Equal variances not assumed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of incorrect answers</td>
<td>-0.080</td>
<td>-0.080</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>t</td>
<td>-0.19</td>
<td>0.02703</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Std. Error</td>
<td>0.02703</td>
<td>0.02703</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Levene's Test for Equality of Variances</td>
<td>5.582</td>
<td>5.582</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sig.</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95% Confidence Interval of the Difference</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower</td>
<td>0.0537</td>
<td>0.0537</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper</td>
<td>0.05102</td>
<td>0.05102</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Independent Samples Test
Section 3: Between the top and bottom quarters of those spending time reading page 6 of the contract

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percent of incorrect answers</th>
<th>Bottom quarter: spending 4 seconds or less reading page 6</th>
<th>Top quarter: spending 17 seconds or more reading page 6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Std. Deviation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>166</td>
<td>.3622</td>
<td>.24255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Samples Test</td>
<td>95% Confidence Interval of the Difference</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Percent of incorrect answers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Levene’s Test for Equality of Variances</td>
<td>Std. Error Difference</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Equal variances assumed</td>
<td>Lower</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Equal variances not assumed</td>
<td>.044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>1.571</td>
<td>.044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sig.</td>
<td>.211</td>
<td>.211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of incorrect answers</td>
<td>.044</td>
<td>.02580</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>