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A WAR ON DRUGS OR A WAR ON IMMIGRANTS?
EXPANDING THE DEFINITION OF "DRUG TRAFFICKING"
IN DETERMINING AGGRAVATED FELON
STATUS FOR NONCITIZENS

JEFF YATES*
TODD A. COLLINS**
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ABSTRACT

In this Article we assess competing interpretations of the Immigration and Nationality Act's aggravated felony provisions, specifically the determination of what state drug offenses properly constitute aggravated felonies, thus subjecting noncitizens to deleterious collateral immigration consequences, including deportation. This issue is considered within the broader political and social context of the nation's "war on drugs" and wide-ranging trends in American immigration policy. We argue that state drug offenses should be analogous to the traditional federal characterizations of a felony (i.e., yielding more than a year of imprisonment) in order to be appropriately considered aggravated felonies. We conclude that interpretations of the aggravated felony provisions that allow offenses falling below this threshold to be considered aggravated felonies are misguided, lead to unwarranted collateral immigration consequences for noncitizens, and fit within a broader pattern of inordinate burden sharing by historically disempowered groups in the war on drugs.

INTRODUCTION

While Richard Nixon was the first President to employ the phrase "war on drugs,"1 the phrase is most commonly associated with the politics and policies that emanated from the administrations of Presidents Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush and continue to domi-
nate U.S. crime policy. Exemplifying this political crusade were the remarks of President Bush at a 1990 anti-drug rally:

To win the war on drugs, we must have a united effort. This isn’t Republican or Democrat or liberal or conservative: it’s got to be bipartisan. But now, it’s time for Congress to act. Our children, our communities, and our cops have waited long enough.

However, the war on drugs campaign was not merely one of rhetoric, as both federal and state enforcement priorities and policies were adjusted to focus on narcotics infractions.

At about this same period of time, the nation experienced an escalation in public concern over perceived developments in American immigration, most notably the perception that immigrant criminal involvement was rampant and posed a significant threat to the public’s well-being. Congress responded to these concerns by taking unprecedented steps toward revising immigration laws to deal with criminal aliens. While this legislation dealt with a myriad of concerns, particularly prominent in these revisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) were provisions designed to combat drug trafficking through the development of a new category of criminal alien, the “aggravated felon.” Congressional initiatives in 1988 amended the INA to place aliens convicted of certain drug offenses alongside those convicted of murder, in the newly created category of aggravated felons, a novel classification that provided an entirely distinctive basis for imposing immigration-based disabilities, including deportation, under the INA for noncitizens convicted of drug offenses. Not too long


6. Id. at 424-31.


thereafter, the Immigration Act of 1990\(^\text{10}\) greatly expanded the number of crimes that were considered to be aggravated felonies\(^\text{11}\) and, with regard to drug trafficking offenses, made clear Congress’s position that the aggravated felony provisions applied to those convicted of either federal or state drug offenses.\(^\text{12}\)

It is within the political and historical context of the federal government’s colossal campaign against drugs and its renewed fervor in immigration regulation that a noncitizen might find himself in severe trouble for a relatively minor narcotics infraction, depending upon


\(^{11}\) Id. § 501, 104 Stat. at 5048 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)). Section 501(a)(3) of the 1990 amendments expanded the definition of “aggravated felony” to include “any crime of violence” as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 16, which includes an offense that “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another,” or any felony that “involves a substantial risk that physical force” will be used against the property or person of another. 18 U.S.C. § 16 (2000). The 1990 amendments also expanded the definition of “aggravated felony” to include crimes related to money laundering as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1956, and any “illicit trafficking in any controlled substance (as defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act),” which included drug trafficking under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2). Immigration Act of 1990, § 501(a)(2)-(3), 104 Stat. at 5048.


his circumstances. Under the INA's aggravated felony provisions, an immigrant might be deported by virtue of being convicted of an offense that would not, in fact, be considered a felony under federal law. While felonies under federal law are traditionally understood as offenses that are punishable by more than a year in prison, some states rather arbitrarily label minor possession offenses as felonies, even though these infractions typically are punishable by a sentence requiring less than a year's imprisonment.

For instance, consider the relative predicaments of two noncitizens under the aggravated felony provisions, each convicted of minor drug possession offenses—one in North Dakota, and one in Montana. While neither offense would constitute a felony or subject a noncitizen to deportation under federal law, the first noncitizen could be deported because simple possession of thirty grams or less of marijuana is punishable as a felony in North Dakota, whereas the second noncitizen would not face deportation for the same offense in Montana because such a possession charge is only punishable as a misdemeanor. This confusing and disconcerting state of affairs has evolved due to a tenuous reading of the INA's aggravated felony provisions by a number of circuits of the United States Court of Appeals, in which an expansive definition of the term "felony" has been adopted. This view holds that for purposes of determining aggravated felony status under INA § 1101(a)(43), "felony" means all offenses labeled or classified by states as felonies, whether they are analogous to traditional understandings of what constitutes a felony under federal law or not.

In this Article, we assess competing interpretations of the INA's aggravated felony provisions pertaining to drug trafficking by the respective United States courts of appeals and the Board of Immigration Appeals. We also consider the placement of this debate within the larger political context of the war on drugs and American immigration policymaking. In Part I, we examine the political backdrop to the immediate debate over the proper interpretation of the INA aggravated felony drug trafficking provisions by evaluating the broader policy implications of the government's war on drugs for minorities and

13. See 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a) (2000) (classifying criminal offenses as felonies if the authorized imprisonment is more than one year); see also infra note 144 and accompanying text (noting federal courts' recognition of Congress's definition of a felony being a crime punishable by more than one year).


15. Id. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 19-03.1-23(6) (2000); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-9-102(2) (2001)).
immigrants. In Part II, we examine the history and development of the laws relating to the current discord over the INA’s drug-related aggravated felony rules. We then discuss the three primary competing theories concerning what offenses appropriately constitute a drug trafficking felony under the aggravated felony rules and argue that state felony offenses should be analogous to their federal felony counterparts in order to subject noncitizens to the immigration disabilities associated with aggravated felony status. In Part III, we suggest that interpretations of the aggravated felony provisions that allow offenses falling below this threshold to be considered aggravated felonies are misguided and lead to unwarranted collateral immigration consequences for noncitizens. Finally, we conclude that this development fits within a larger pattern of inordinate burden sharing in the war on drugs by historically disempowered groups.

I. THE WAR ON DRUGS AS A WAR OF POLITICS AND INEQUITIES

The economic costs of the war on drugs are staggering. One estimate of the war’s fiscal burden indicates that the effort exacts more than $75 billion a year from the public coffers and another $70 billion a year from consumers.\(^{16}\) This expense is exacerbated by the rising costs of incarcerating those caught in the net of the war on drugs, as imprisonment rates have skyrocketed in recent decades due in large part to the war on drugs.\(^{17}\) For example, the percent of the federal prison population incarcerated for drug offenses (as opposed to all other offenses) rose dramatically during the height of the war on drugs, from 24.9% in 1980 to 59.5% in 1992.\(^{18}\) Another way of considering the impact of the war on drugs on prison populations is to examine the prison population in relation to the number of “index” crimes (serious, nondrug crimes). In 1980, the rate of state and fed-


18. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS—2000, at 526 tbl.6.51 (Kathleen Maguire & Ann L. Pastore eds., 2001) [hereinafter 2000 SOURCEBOOK]. Certainly, the increase in incarceration per serious crime might represent more than just drug-based imprisonment (e.g., harsher sentences for serious crimes); however, coupled with what we know about federal imprisonment rates for drug offenses, it provides an interesting insight into the relationship between serious crime and incarceration trends over time.
eral prisoners per 1000 index crimes was 23.\textsuperscript{19} In 1990, it was 49, and in 1998, it was 94.\textsuperscript{20} Given the operating costs of holding a prisoner, estimated at between $20,000 to $30,000 per year, along with the expenditures incurred in building new prison facilities, the war on drugs has proven to be a very costly method for politicians to prove to voters that they are serious about public safety.\textsuperscript{21}

A. Disparate Enforcement for Immigrants and Minorities

The monetary costs of the war on drugs pale in comparison to the nonfinancial toll of the drug crusade, specifically the confinement of thousands of people and the detrimental consequences of this government action on affected families and communities.\textsuperscript{22} It is these costs that are inequitably borne by minorities and immigrants. For example, while African Americans represent approximately 12.8% of the population, they constituted 35.2% of all persons charged on drug abuse offenses in 1999.\textsuperscript{23} Moreover, in 2000, more African American federal prisoners were incarcerated for drug violations than for all other crimes committed by African Americans combined (64.4% of African American male federal prisoners and 66.3% of African American female federal prisoners).\textsuperscript{24} These disparities in enforcement and imprisonment persist despite the fact that studies indicate that, generally, minorities are no more likely to abuse narcotics than nonminorities and are less apt to abuse certain drugs than whites.\textsuperscript{25}

Noncitizens have also emerged as a target in the war on drugs. In 1997, drug offenses were the foremost bases for criminal removal by the INS, leading to more removals than all other categories of crimes combined.\textsuperscript{26} In the broader war on crime, the INS greatly expanded

\textsuperscript{19} Id. at 523 tbl.6.46. “Index crimes include the violent crimes of murder and non-negligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault; and the property crimes of burglary, larceny-theft, and motor vehicle theft.” Id.
\textsuperscript{20} Id.
\textsuperscript{21} MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT: RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 82 (1995).
\textsuperscript{22} John Hagan & Juleigh Petty Coleman, Returning Captives of the American War on Drugs: Issues of Community and Family Reentry, 47 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 352 (2001); see also Clarence Lusane, In Perpetual Motion: The Continuing Significance of Race and America's Drug Crises, 1994 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 83, 101-02 (arguing that long, mandatory sentences for nonviolent crimes destabilize the communities in which the incarcerated formerly lived).
\textsuperscript{23} 2000 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 18, at 366 tbl.4.10.
\textsuperscript{24} Id. at 526 tbl.6.50.
\textsuperscript{25} TONRY, supra note 21, at 108-10; Gabriel J. Chin, Race, the War on Drugs, and the Collateral Consequences of Criminal Conviction, 6 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 253, 262-66 (2002).
\textsuperscript{26} IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 1997 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 167 (1997) [hereinafter 1997 INS YEARBOOK]. Other offenses that serve as common bases for deportation are immigra-
its net of deportation during the Reagan-Bush era, with the number of aliens deported for criminal or narcotics convictions jumping from 310 in 1981 to 8,183 in 1990.\textsuperscript{27} By 1997, over fifty thousand convicted aliens were removed, with 61\% of these removals based on aggravated felonies.\textsuperscript{28} In the federal courts, approximately one-third of all drug offenses involve noncitizens, while noncitizens account for only one-tenth of all other types of offenses.\textsuperscript{29} There is also reason to believe that immigrants face disparate treatment further along in the criminal justice process. A study of incarceration outcomes in drug offense cases demonstrated that, while statistically controlling for a litany of alternative explanatory factors, a defendant's status as a noncitizen significantly increased his length of imprisonment.\textsuperscript{30} Such unequal enforcement and adjudication of drug offenses is especially problematic for immigrants because, unlike violent crimes or white-collar offenses, drug crimes are inordinately associated with numerous and severe collateral sanctions,\textsuperscript{31} such as immigration disabilities and occupational restrictions, which can undermine a noncitizen's ability to remain in the country or reintegrate into his community when released.

\textbf{B. Assaying the Costs and Benefits of the War}

The economic and social costs of the war on drugs bring to bear the question of what has been gained in the crusade. While proponents of the war might point to statistics evincing a downward trend in the use of some narcotics in the 1980s and early 1990s, Michael Tonry makes a persuasive case that such changes in use were part of a long-term downward trend in drug usage that preceded the drug war efforts.\textsuperscript{32} His analysis of data from time-series studies indicates that reported drug usage reached an all-time high in the late seventies and was already on a downward trend when the policies and rhetoric of the war on drugs began several years after Ronald Reagan took office.

\textsuperscript{27} Id. at 187 tbl.68. The INS definition of which aliens count as criminal aliens changed in 1990, making comparisons after that year problematic. \textit{Id.} Proportionally, aliens deported on criminal or narcotics grounds were approximately 1.9\% of all removals in 1981 and 31.1\% of all removals in 1990. \textit{See id.}

\textsuperscript{28} Kristin F. Butcher & Anne Morrison Piehl, \textit{The Role of Deportation in the Incarceration of Immigrants, in Issues in the Economics of Immigration} 351, 368 (George J. Borjas ed., 2000).

\textsuperscript{29} Demleitner, \textit{supra} note 17, at 1043 (citing Stephen Demuth, \textit{The Effect of Citizenship Status on Sentencing Outcomes in Drug Cases}, 14 \textit{Fed. Sentencing Rep.} 271, 272 (2002)).

\textsuperscript{30} Butcher & Piehl, \textit{supra} note 28, at 370-78.

\textsuperscript{31} Chin, \textit{supra} note 25, at 259-62.

\textsuperscript{32} Tonry, \textit{supra} note 21, at 83-91.
as President.33 Certainly, public opinion on drug usage changed during this time frame. One national level time-series survey indicates that in 1978, 30% of respondents felt that marijuana should be legalized, whereas only 16% of respondents in 1990 favored legalization.34 Similar time-series studies reveal an increase in respondents' perceptions of the harmfulness of drug use over a similar time frame.35 However, it is not entirely clear if these trends in the public's view towards drug use were a product of cyclical patterns in public attitudes towards vices generally36 or politicians' entrepreneurial activities.37 Given the aforementioned downward turn in drug usage during this period of time, it is highly unlikely that this swell in public opinion was an authentic response to reported trends in narcotics use.

Beckett and Sasson suggest that the war on drugs is largely a product of political manipulation of the policy agenda by conservatives, asserting:

Conservative politicians have worked for decades to alter popular perceptions of problems such as crime, delinquency, addiction, and poverty and to promote policies that involve "getting tough" and "cracking down." Their claim-making activities have been part of a larger effort both to realign the electorate and to define social control rather than social welfare as the primary responsibility of the state.38

However, the crime and drug control agenda has evolved into a campaign that enjoys the support of both Republicans and Democrats, as

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33. Id.
35. Id. at 227 tbl.2.89. The survey of high school seniors revealed that in 1981 only 19.1% perceived that smoking marijuana occasionally put one at great risk, whereas in 1991 more than 40% of respondents felt that such behavior put one at great risk. Id. Analysis of Gallup Poll results indicates an upward trend in the public's perception of drug usage as the nation's most important problem. In 1985, only 2% of respondents chose it as the nation's most important problem, but by 1989, 27% of respondents identified it as the most important problem facing the nation. 2000 Sourcebook, supra note 18, at 100 tbl.2.1.
36. See Tonry, supra note 21, at 91-94 (describing the theory of David Musto, a leading historian of U.S. drug policies, that Americans' tolerance of alcohol and drugs is cyclical).
37. See Katherine Beckett, Making Crime Pay: Law and Order in Contemporary American Politics 52-59 (1997). Beckett argues that, "[i]n sum, there is no evidence of an upsurge in concern about drugs prior to Reagan's declaration of war. The erroneous identification of public opinion as the primary impetus for the government's campaigns against crime and drugs obscures the political nature of those efforts." Id. at 55 (footnote omitted).
backing for the war continued and expanded during the Clinton presidency.\textsuperscript{39}

Whether the nation has derived a net benefit or not from the war on drugs will remain a controversial question. However, it is clear that any progress that has been made on this matter, either for political gain or in actual policy impact, has been inordinately paid for by minorities, immigrants, and other traditionally disempowered groups.\textsuperscript{40} Hence, any beneficial aspects of this policy have come with a "tax" burden\textsuperscript{41} that has been inequitably levied on those who are the least able to protect their interests through ordinary political channels.

II. Drug Trafficking as an Aggravated Felony Under the INA

Since its overhaul in 1952, the INA had received only intermittent review and revision by Congress until the 1980s.\textsuperscript{42} Prior to this time, the Act's primary criminal provisions involved specific drug offenses and crimes involving moral turpitude, with the latter being the domi-

\textsuperscript{39} Id. at 69-73. \textit{But see} William J. Bennett et al., \textit{Body Count: Moral Poverty . . . And How to Win America's War Against Crime and Drugs} 152 (1996). As Bennett et al. argue:

When President Clinton took office the problem of illegal drugs had undergone a sea change in just a little more than a decade. Instead of directing measured steps to address the residual aspects of the drug problem, the president and members of his administration immediately began undermining anti-drug efforts on a variety of fronts.

\textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{40} E.g., Tonry, supra note 21, at 104-15. As Tonry argues:

The War on Drugs and the set of harsh crime-control policies in which it was enmeshed were launched to achieve political, not policy, objectives, and it is the adoption for political purposes of policies with foreseeable disparate impacts, the use of disadvantaged black Americans as a means to the achievement of politicians' electoral ends, that must in the end be justified, and cannot.

\textit{Id.} at 123.

\textsuperscript{41} Cf. Randall Kennedy, \textit{Suspect Policy}, \textit{The New Republic}, Sept. 13 & 20, 1999, at 30, 34 (making a similar argument concerning the special "tax" minorities pay in the context of racial profiling). Kennedy argues that while the benefits of effective policing via frequent (and sometimes unjustified) traffic stops pass to the general population, the personal costs of such stops are inordinately suffered by minorities, who are often unjustifiably accosted due to racial profiling. \textit{Id.; see also} Randall Kennedy, \textit{Race, Crime, and the Law} 159 (1997). Kennedy remarks:

[A] young black man selected for questioning by police as he alights from an airplane or drives a car is being made to pay a type of racial tax for the war against drugs that whites and other groups escape. That tax is the cost of being subjected to greater scrutiny than others.

\textit{Id.}

nant grounds for deportation. This relative change in the attention paid by Congress to the issue of noncitizen criminal activity is consistent with general trends in national immigration enforcement policy focus. From 1908 to 1980, approximately forty-eight thousand aliens were deported for criminal violations, but during just the decade of the 1980s, over thirty thousand alien removals were made on the basis of criminal or narcotics violations. During this period, a swell of public concern over alien criminal activity developed, with both the media and politicians stressing the importance of the "criminal-alien problem" and arguing that the INS was not satisfactorily handling the situation, in part, due to lack of resources. In the mid-1980s, Congress solicited a series of reports on criminal aliens and, based on this information, began to pass legislation to address the issue.

A. Development of the "Aggravated Felon"

In 1986, Congress passed the Immigration Reform and Control Act, which provided for expedited deportation of criminal aliens by the Attorney General, along with the Anti-Drug Abuse Act, which required the INS to begin pilot programs designed to coordinate the efforts of the INS and local enforcement entities on drug offense cases involving noncitizens. However, it was the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 (the 1988 Act) that introduced the aggravated felony nomenclature to the INA and had the biggest impact on criminal-alien enforcement, affecting the deportation, detention, and readmission of

44. Id. at 1063 (citing 1997 INS YEARBOOK, supra note 26, at 187 tbl.67-68).
45. Shuck & Williams, supra note 5, at 425-27.
46. See id. at 427-33 (explaining that the "immigration provisions of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 foreshadowed five years of legislative and administrative concern with the criminal-alien problem"); see also Feldman, supra note 8, at 204-05 & nn.21-22 (detailing the substance and impact of the report of the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy).
48. Id. § 701, 100 Stat. at 3445 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1254(i)).
50. Id. § 1751(d), 100 Stat. at 3207-48 to 3207-49 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1357(e)).
noncitizens convicted of offenses falling into the new classification of aggravated felonies. The 1988 Act stated:

The term "aggravated felony" means murder, any drug trafficking crime as defined in section 924(c)(2) of title 18, United States Code, or any illicit trafficking in any firearms or destructive devices as defined in section 921 of such title, or any attempt or conspiracy to commit any such act, committed within the United States.


For purposes of this subsection, the term "drug trafficking crime" means any felony punishable under the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 801 et seq.), the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act (21 U.S.C. 951 et seq.), or the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (46 U.S.C. App. 1901 et seq.).

The implementation of the 1988 Act immediately yielded confusion over whether its aggravated felony provisions applied to state drug offenses committed by noncitizens. In 1990, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) addressed this issue. In In re Barrett the BIA held that the definition of "drug trafficking crime" in § 924(c)(2), as incorporated into the INA by § 1101(a)(43), encompasses state as well as federal crimes if the state conviction is analogous to a felony offense under federal law.

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52. Id. §§ 7341-7349, 102 Stat. at 4469-73; see also Paxton v. INS, 745 F. Supp. 1261, 1265 (E.D. Mich. 1990) ("Within the past few years, Congress has mounted a tremendous assault on the prevalence of drugs in today's society. The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 ... provides stricter mechanisms for attacking the country's drug problem, including the classification of drug trafficking as an aggravated felony.").


54. Id. § 6212, 102 Stat. at 4360. Before the 1988 Act, the definition under § 924(c)(2) provided the following: "[f]or purposes of this subsection, the term 'drug trafficking crime' means any felony violation of Federal law involving the distribution, manufacture, or importation of any controlled substance (as defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 802))." Firearms Owners' Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 99-308, § 104(a)(2)(F), 100 Stat. 449, 457 (1986).

55. See, e.g., Leader v. Blackman, 744 F. Supp. 500, 502, 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (considering one of the first challenges to § 924(c)(2) concerning its applicability to state convictions).


57. Id. at 177-78.
In the Immigration Act of 1990 (the 1990 Act),\textsuperscript{58} Congress attempted to clarify its position by passing legislation intended to codify the BIA's holding in \textit{Barrett}. The House Judiciary Committee Report provides insight on the proposed function of the amendment:

Current law clearly renders an alien convicted of a \textit{Federal} drug trafficking offense an aggravated felon. It has been less clear whether a \textit{state} drug trafficking conviction brings the same result, although the Board of Immigration Appeals in \textit{Matter of Barrett} (March 6, 1990) has recently ruled that it does. Because the Committee concurs with the recent decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals and wishes to end further litigation on this issue, section 1501 of H.R. 5269 specifies that drug trafficking (and firearms/destructive device trafficking) is an aggravated felony whether or not the conviction occurred in state or Federal Court.\textsuperscript{59}

The 1990 Act's addendum to the aggravated felon provisions of 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(43) explicitly stated that the "term [aggravated felony] applies to offenses described in the previous sentence whether in violation of Federal or State law."\textsuperscript{60}

In 1992, the BIA shored up any remaining confusion concerning the applicability of the aggravated felony provisions to state drug offenses, holding in \textit{In re Davis}\textsuperscript{61} that a state drug conviction is an aggravated felony if it: (1) is a felony under state law and involves illicit trafficking (i.e., unlawful trading or dealing) in any controlled substance, or (2) is a drug trafficking crime that is analogous to a felony offense under one of the three statutes enumerated in § 924(c)(2).\textsuperscript{62} It is the latter portion of the \textit{Davis} holding, concerning the applicability of aggravated felony treatment to drug trafficking crimes (which do not actually require an unlawful trading or dealing element—mere possession will suffice),\textsuperscript{63} that has proven to be controversial. While the BIA in \textit{Davis} was careful to emphasize its position that analogous felonies (for § 924(c)(2) purposes) involved only offenses where the maximum term of imprisonment exceeds one year (citing 18 U.S.C. §3559),\textsuperscript{64} not all of the federal courts have agreed with this interpretation.

\textsuperscript{60} Immigration Act of 1990, § 501, 104 Stat. at 5048.
\textsuperscript{62} Id. at 543.
\textsuperscript{63} Id. at 543-44.
\textsuperscript{64} Id. at 543.
In creating this new classification scheme of aggravated felonies under INA § 1101(a)(43), subsequent implementation and interpretation has triggered contention concerning three discrete legal contexts. The first context involves a substantive legal classification of the types of crimes defined as aggravated felonies, which grants certain criminal activity special status and creates a distinctive subset of offenses. The other two contexts involve sentencing enhancement for noncitizens under the federal sentencing guidelines and immigration consequences for drug trafficking offenses under the INA.

1. Substantive Context.—In the substantive legal context, INA §1101(a)(43) includes twenty-one subcategories of possible aggravated felony offenses. In a few of these subcategories the statute lists specific offenses, such as “murder, rape, or sexual abuse of a minor” and “owning, controlling, managing, or supervising of a prostitution business,” without reference to any other statutory authority. However, most of the offenses refer to other provisions of the U.S. Code and require the examination and interpretation of other chapters to find the meaning of “aggravated felony” in a particular instance. For example, in order to determine if an offense is a “crime of violence” under §1101(a)(43)(F) and thus an aggravated felony for immigration purposes, a court must examine 18 U.S.C. § 16, which defines a “crime of violence” as an offense that involves “the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another” and any other felony offense that “involves a substantial risk

65. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A)-(U). These offenses include: murder, rape, or sexual abuse of a minor; illicit trafficking in controlled substances, including drug trafficking crimes; trafficking in firearms, destructive devices, or explosive materials; money laundering or unlawful property transactions over $10,000; other explosive material and firearm offenses; crimes of violence punishable by at least one year’s imprisonment; theft or burglary punishable by at least one year’s imprisonment; offenses relating to demanding or receiving ransom; child pornography; racketeering and gambling offenses punishable by at least one year’s imprisonment; offenses relating to prostitution, involuntary servitude, and trafficking in persons; disclosing classified information, sabotage, treason, and disclosing undercover intelligence agent information; offenses involving fraud where loss exceeds $10,000, and tax evasion involving over $10,000; offenses involved in alien smuggling; certain offenses described in 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a) or § 1326 committed by aliens previously deported on the basis of an aggravated felony; document and passport fraud; failure to appear by a defendant for an offense punishable by at least five years’ imprisonment; offenses relating to commercial bribery, counterfeiting, forgery or trafficking in vehicles; offenses involving obstruction of justice, perjury, or bribery of a witness punishable by at least one year’s imprisonment; failure to appear in court on a criminal felony for which the possible punishment is at least two years; and attempt or conspiracies to commit any of the aforementioned crimes. Id.

66. Id. § 1101(a)(43)(A).

67. Id. § 1101(a)(43)(K)(i).
that physical force... may be used.”

However, § 1101(a)(43) (F) further confines this category by requiring that the crime of violence carry a minimum prison term at least of one year.

In determining whether a criminal act achieves the status of aggravated felony, in the substantive context, courts have looked at several sources. Some courts have referenced common-law meanings, the plain language of the underlying criminal statutes, and the Model Penal Code to define the offense. They may also look to guidance from the state laws when the crime arises from state convictions. At other times, courts have looked to the language of § 1101 itself, regardless of state law, to determine if an action constitutes an aggravated felony. However, the classification of a conviction as an aggravated felony has created considerable disagreement among the circuits, leading to significantly different outcomes regarding some types of crimes. For instance, a split has developed over whether or not driving-while-impaired convictions constitute aggravated felonies as crimes of violence under § 1101(a)(43) (F).

2. Sentencing Context.—In the sentencing context, the federal sentencing guidelines incorporate the INA § 1101(a)(43) definition of “aggravated felony” (which, in turn, incorporates the § 924(c)(2) definition of “drug trafficking”), in the determination of offense-level enhancement for noncitizens convicted of unlawfully entering or remaining in the United States. In instances in which the offense at issue is a felony under both state and federal law, it is clear that the offense constitutes a drug trafficking crime under § 924(c)(2), and hence, an aggravated felony under INA § 1101(a)(43), for sentence enhancement purposes. There is support from at least two circuits for the proposition that a state drug misdemeanor can qualify as an

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69. Id.
70. See, e.g., United States v. Corona-Sanchez, 291 F.3d 1201, 1204-08 (9th Cir. 2002) (examining the methodologies available to determine whether the theft of a twelve-pack of beer and a pack of cigarettes is an aggravated felony under § 1101(a)(43) (G)).
71. See, e.g., id. at 1206-08.
72. See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez-Tamariz, 310 F.3d 1168, 1170-71 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding a battery offense to be an aggravated felony under § 1101(a)(43) (F) because it warranted at least a year of imprisonment, even though the offense was classified as a “gross misdemeanor” under state law).
73. See Rah, supra note 11, at 2126-35 (discussing the varying approaches employed by the circuits to determine whether DWI convictions are aggravated felonies within the purview of § 1101(a)(43) (F)).
aggravated felony if it would also be a federal felony.\textsuperscript{76} There is also support, from a majority of the circuits that have ruled on the issue, for the proposition that state \textit{felony} drug offenses that would be only \textit{misdemeanors} under federal law qualify as drug trafficking offenses and, thus, are aggregated felonies for sentencing purposes.\textsuperscript{77}

3. \textit{Immigration Context}.—In the immigration context, a determination of aggravated felon status under \textsc{ina} \textsection 1101 (a) (43) can trigger a litany of adverse collateral consequences, including mandatory deportation,\textsuperscript{78} detention without bond,\textsuperscript{79} and ineligibility for discretionary relief from deportation,\textsuperscript{80} among others. As in the sentencing context, there is consensus favoring aggravated felony status in situations in which the offense at hand is a felony under both state and federal law. The BIA suggested early on, in \textit{In re Davis}, that a state misdemeanor that is analogous to a federal felony could constitute an aggravated felony in the immigration context,\textsuperscript{81} and there is some authority supporting this position.\textsuperscript{82} The primary point of contention,

\textsuperscript{76} \textit{Id.} at 795 n.69 (citing \textit{United States v. Ramos-Garcia}, 95 F.3d 369 (5th Cir. 1996); \textit{United States v. Vasquez-Balandran}, 76 F.3d 648 (5th Cir. 1996); \textit{United States v. Diaz-Bonilla}, 65 F.3d 875 (10th Cir. 1995)); \textit{see also} \textit{United States v. Simpson}, 319 F.3d 81, 85-86 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding that a state misdemeanor could be a hypothetical federal felony for sentence enhancement purposes). \textit{But see} \textit{United States v. Gomez-Ortiz}, 62 F. Supp. 2d 508, 509 (D.R.I. 1999) (holding that a state misdemeanor cannot be an aggregated felony although it would have been a felony under federal law).

\textsuperscript{77} \textit{See Hutchison ET AL., supra note 75, at 795 n.70 (citing \textit{United States v. Ibarra-Galindo}, 206 F.3d 1337 (9th Cir. 2000); \textit{United States v. Simon}, 168 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir. 1999); \textit{United States v. Hinojosa-Lopez}, 130 F.3d 691 (5th Cir. 1997); \textit{United States v. Briones-Mata}, 116 F.3d 308 (8th Cir. 1997); \textit{United States v. Restrepo-Aguilar}, 74 F.3d 361 (1st Cir. 1996); \textit{United States v. Cuevas}, 75 F.3d 778 (1st Cir. 1996); \textit{United States v. Olvera-Cervantes}, 960 F.2d 101 (9th Cir. 1992)); \textit{see also} \textit{United States v. Pornes-Garcia}, 171 F.3d 142, 143-44 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that a state felony that would only be a federal misdemeanor is an aggravated felony); \textit{United States v. Cabrera-Sosa}, 81 F.3d 998, 1000 (10th Cir. 1996) (adopting the state classification rule, although the classification at issue defined felonies as being punishable by more than a year of imprisonment). \textit{But cf.} \textit{United States v. Robles-Rodriguez}, 281 F.3d 900, 905 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that courts must look at the penalty authorized for a particular crime, as opposed to the state's classification of the offense, in determining whether an offense is a felony).

\textsuperscript{78} \textsc{usc} \textsection 1227(a) (2) (A) (iii).
\textsuperscript{79} \textit{Id.} \textsection 1226(c).
\textsuperscript{80} \textit{Id.} \textsection 1182(h).
\textsuperscript{82} \textit{See} \textit{Gerbier v. Holmes}, 280 F.3d 297, 311 n.12 (3d Cir. 2002) (cautioning that appropriate formalities and procedural protections must be followed before misdemeanors can stand as hypothetical federal felonies); \textit{Steele v. Blackman}, 236 F.3d 130, 136-37 (3d Cir. 2001) (analyzing the state misdemeanor in question under the hypothetical federal felony analysis but expressing doubts about the validity of such an analysis); \textit{see also} \textit{Cope-land v. Ashcroft}, 246 F. Supp. 2d 183, 189 (W.D.N.Y. 2003) (holding that state misdemeanors could stand as hypothetical federal felonies and yield an aggregated felony finding); \textit{United States v. Graham}, 927 F. Supp. 619, 621 (W.D.N.Y. 1996), \textit{aff'd}, 169 F.3d 787 (3d
however, is whether drug offenses that are classified by the state as felonies, but would not be felonies under federal law, are appropriately considered as felonies for purposes of determining aggravated felony status under the INA. In the immigration context, a majority position has not been reached on this issue and most of the circuits have not yet established authoritative precedent adopting any rule or interpretation on what constitutes a felony for determining aggravated felony status. As we discuss in more detail, infra, the BIA has recently changed its position on this issue, now holding that state drug offenses classified by the state as felonies can qualify as aggravated felonies under the INA even when the offense is not analogous to a federal felony.

B. Competing Perspectives on the Meaning of "Felony" in State Drug Offense Cases Under § 924(c)(2)

Three primary competing perspectives on the application of the aggravated felony provisions, by way of § 924(c)(2), to state drug offenses have emerged in the federal courts: the hypothetical federal felony approach, the state labeling or classification approach, and the state substantive felony approach. In evaluating these three approaches, we are careful to identify the context (sentencing vs. immigration) of the holdings of the cases examined. However, we have observed a certain degree of confluence between the sentencing and immigration contexts in courts' analyses of competing interpretations of the aggravated felony provisions. It is likely that courts assessing

Cir. 1999) (holding that the defendant's misdemeanor state drug possession conviction qualified as a hypothetical federal felony in determining defendant's status as an aggravated felon). But see In re Santos-Lopez, 23 I. & N. Dec. 419, 421-22 (B.I.A. 2002) (holding that a state's classification of a criminal conviction as a misdemeanor or felony is the relevant inquiry in deciding whether the crime is a felony resulting in aggravated felon status); In re Elgendi, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 519, 519-20 (B.I.A. 2002) (finding that state misdemeanors are not felonies for determining aggravated felony status).

83. By "authoritative precedent" we mean a published decision by a U.S. court of appeals deciding a case dealing with immigration consequences under the INA (as opposed to dealing with interpretations INA § 1101(a)(43) for sentencing enhancement purposes), in which an interpretation of the aggravated felony provisions of INA § 1101(a)(43) as applied to state felonies that would not be federal felonies is offered. While a number of circuits have published U.S. district court decisions and unpublished court of appeals decisions dealing with this matter, our review of the case law indicates that only the Second, Third, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits have established authoritative precedent on this matter. Some circuits have effectively dodged answering the question by deciding cases on alternative or multiple grounds. See, e.g., United States v. Haggerty, 85 F.3d 403, 406 (8th Cir. 1996) (finding that defendant's offense was an aggravated felony because it was a felony under both state and federal law).

the competing perspectives will continue to intersperse both lines of precedent in formulating a doctrinal matrix and deciding cases, regardless of the legal context (sentencing vs. immigration) of the case at bar.

1. Hypothetical Federal Felony Perspective.—The first view follows the lead of the BIA’s Davis/Barrett rule and holds that state drug offenses that are delineated as felonies under state law must be analogous to a federal felony offense under the Controlled Substances Act, the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act, or the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act in order to qualify as an aggravated felony.85 The Second,86 Third,87 and Ninth88 Circuit Courts of Appeals have adopted this interpretation for the immigration context,89 however, no circuit has yet chosen this path for sentencing enhancement. This view emphasizes the need for national uniformity in the application of immigration laws90 and argues that, in light of its legislative history and statutory context, § 924(c)(2)’s use of the term “felony” is properly understood as meaning an offense that is punishable as a felony under federal law.91

2. State Classification or Label Perspective.—The second approach holds that state drug offenses that are classified or labeled as felonies by the relevant state properly qualify as drug trafficking crimes under § 924(c)(2) and, therefore, aggravated felonies under INA § 1101(a)(43). In the sentencing context, this view arguably com-

86. Aguirre v. INS, 79 F.3d 315 (2d Cir. 1996). In Aguirre, in deference to the BIA’s decision in In re L-G, 21 I. & N. Dec. 89 (B.I.A. 1995) and citing the need for “nationwide uniformity” on such cases, the Second Circuit overruled its prior decision in Jenkins v. INS, 32 F.3d 11 (2d Cir. 1994), which had used the state classification rule. Aguirre, 79 F.3d at 317-18.
87. Gerbier, 280 F.3d 297. The Third Circuit has not yet addressed the aggravated felony issue in the sentencing context. Id. at 299.
88. Cazarez-Gutierrez v. Ashcroft, 382 F.3d 905 (9th Cir. 2004). The Ninth Circuit followed the reasoning of the Second and Third Circuits with regard to aggravated felonies in the immigration context, based largely on the need for uniformity in immigration law. Id. at 912-14; see also United States v. Ortiz-Lopez, 385 F.3d 1202, 1205 (9th Cir. 2004) (reaffirming the court’s holding in Cazarez-Gutierrez).
89. The Sixth Circuit has also utilized this analysis in at least one case, although it was clear not to establish the hypothetical felony rationale as the binding scheme for analysis. Without specifically deciding which rationale to use, in Garcia-Echaurren v. United States, the court found that, in the immigration context, the petitioner failed to meet his burden under the more lenient approach adopted in Gerbier, and upheld the denial of the defendant’s petition for writ of habeas corpus. 376 F.3d 507, 512-14 (6th Cir. 2004).
90. E.g., Gerbier, 280 F.3d at 311-12.
91. Id. at 308-11.
mands a majority of the circuits that have ruled on the issue.\textsuperscript{92} However, few circuits have ruled on the issue in the immigration context in published opinions, and our review of the cases indicates that, of those circuits that have ruled on the issue, only the Fifth Circuit has unequivocally chosen the state classification perspective.\textsuperscript{93}

3. \textit{State Substantive Felony Perspective}.—The third perspective on the treatment of state drug offenses under the aggravated felony provisions holds that an offense qualifies as a felony, and consequently as a drug trafficking offense under § 924(c)(2), if the relevant state deems the offense as punishable by more than a year’s imprisonment. Thus, this perspective focuses on the substantive nature of the offense and the punishment designated for it. This approach was first adopted by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, and then only for sentencing enhancement purposes.\textsuperscript{94} The Ninth Circuit has reasoned that the statutory context of § 924(c)(2) and Congress’s long-standing

\textsuperscript{92} See, e.g., United States v. Ibarra-Galindo, 206 F.3d 1337, 1339 (9th Cir. 2000) (reviewing other circuits that have reviewed the issue in the sentencing context and concluding that they have all adopted the state classification perspective). However, this observation may not be as straightforward as \textit{Ibarra-Galindo} and the other courts that have decreed this to be the majority position would suggest. For instance, \textit{Ibarra-Galindo} asserts that the First, Second, Fifth, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have adopted the state classification rule. \textit{Id.} However, in a number of the cases cited by \textit{Ibarra-Galindo}, the courts had actually decided that a state felony that was punishable for more than a year qualified as an aggravated felony. \textit{See United States v. Hinojosa-Lopez, 130 F.3d 691, 694 (5th Cir. 1997)} (holding that a state drug offense yielding a five year prison sentence was an aggravated felony under § 924(c)(2)); \textit{United States v. Cabrera-Sosa, 81 F.3d 998, 1000 (10th Cir. 1996)} (finding that the defendant’s drug offense was an aggravated felony because under New York law any criminal offense punishable by more than one year is a felony); \textit{United States v. Restrepo-Aguilar, 74 F.3d 361, 365 (1st Cir. 1996)} (finding that a Rhode Island felony that was punishable by up to three years’ imprisonment was an aggravated felony).

These courts were not required to directly rule on the definition of felony, since the offenses at issue were both classified as felonies and also were punishable for more than a year. \textit{See United States v. Caicedo-Cuero, 312 F.3d 697, 702-03 n.32 (5th Cir. 2002)} (stating that the definition of “felony” in determining aggravated felony status was a case of first impression in the circuit, having not been directly decided by \textit{Hinojosa-Lopez}). The state drug offenses in these cases would also qualify as aggravated felonies under the state substantive felony perspective, discussed in more detail \textit{infra}, because they involve a sentence of over a year of incarceration. Even the hypothetical federal felony perspective typically invokes the 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a) definition of “felony,” which requires that an offense be punishable by more than a year of imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a)(5). One is left to wonder if these courts would have reached the same conclusions if the offenses at issue had involved punishments more commonly associated with misdemeanors (i.e., a year or less of imprisonment). On balance, the proposition that such courts have unequivocally adopted the state classification rule appears tenuous at best.

\textsuperscript{93} United States v. Hernandez-Avalos, 251 F.3d 505 (5th Cir. 2001).

\textsuperscript{94} United States v. Robles-Rodriguez, 281 F.3d 900, 904-05 (9th Cir. 2002). The Sixth Circuit recently followed suit. \textit{Liao v. Rabbett, 398 F.3d 389, 395-96 (6th Cir. 2005).}
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tradition of equating a felony with more than a year's imprisonment strongly suggest that state labels or classifications of drug offenses should yield to the level of punishment associated with an offense in determining whether the offense constitutes an aggravated felony.\(^9\)

While only one of the other circuits has formally adopted this perspective in a published opinion,\(^9\) there is some evidence that support for the substantive state felony approach exists in some of the circuits that have not yet authoritatively addressed the issue.\(^9\)

4. The BIA's Position.—In 2002, in *In re Yanez-Garcia*, the BIA abandoned its longstanding *Davis/Barrett* rule, which had held that state drug felonies (or misdemeanors) must be analogous to federal felonies in order to qualify as aggravated felonies under § 924(c)(2) and INA § 1101(a)(43) (i.e., the hypothetical federal felony rule).\(^9\)

The position set forth by the BIA in *Yanez-Garcia* is that it will follow the rule adopted by the relevant circuit in deciding whether a state felony constitutes an aggravated felony for collateral immigration consequences, and in those circuits that have not ruled on the issue, it will follow the position taken by the majority of the circuits in sentencing enhancement cases—the state classification perspective.\(^9\)

However, this procedure has proven to be less than straightforward in practice. In a case arising in the jurisdiction of the Second Circuit, decided just months after *Yanez-Garcia*, the BIA abandoned the Second Circuit Court of Appeals's decision in *Aguirre v. INS*, in which the court had adopted the hypothetical federal felony rule for immigration cases,\(^10\) and instead applied the Second Circuit's approach for sentencing enhancement cases—the state classification rule.\(^10\)

The BIA reasoned that the Second Circuit's rationale for

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\(^9\) United States v. Ballesteros-Ruiz, 319 F.3d 1101 (9th Cir. 2003); United States v. Arellano-Torres, 303 F.3d 1173, 1178-80 (9th Cir. 2002); Robles-Rodriguez, 281 F.3d at 904-05. *But see Cazarez-Gutierrez v. Ashcroft*, 382 F.3d 905, 913-14 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting, at least in dicta, that the power of sentencing is a state power and that uniformity is not required across states as it is in the immigration context).

\(^9\) Liao, 398 F.3d at 395-96.

\(^9\) *See Navarro-Macias v. INS*, 16 Fed. Appx. 468, 2001 WL 690504, at *2, *3 (7th Cir. 2001) (unpublished opinion emphasizing that the defendant's drug offense was punishable by more than a year of imprisonment); Shurney v. INS, 201 F. Supp. 2d 783 (N.D. Ohio 2001) (deportation case holding that a felony under § 924(c)(2) is an offense punishable by imprisonment for more than one year).


\(^9\) Id. at 396-98.


adopting different rules for the immigration and sentencing contexts—deferring to the BIA's former rule in order to attain a nationwide uniformity in the application of immigration laws—was no longer feasible, therefore, the circuit majority sentencing approach was essentially the "favored construction" in the Second Circuit. It remains to be seen if the BIA will apply similar logic in cases arising under the jurisdiction of the Third and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals—the only remaining circuits that have explicitly rejected the state classification perspective rule for immigration cases.

III. WHEN "FELONY" MEANS AN AGGRAVATED FELONY

The previously outlined escalation in federal legislative and enforcement attention to narcotics and alien criminals in recent decades essentially extends the policymaking onus to the federal judiciary. The manner in which the federal courts interpret and apply the law in the cases that are brought before them can significantly influence the direction and character of national criminal justice and immigration policy. In short, federal courts are important institutional actors in the politics of shaping national public policy and, more generally, the direction of American life. However, in shaping national immigration policy in the context of the war on drugs, the U.S. courts of appeals have reached an impasse. A parting of ways has arisen concerning an important statutory interpretation under the INA. In deciding what drug offenses are appropriately considered drug trafficking offenses, and hence, aggravated felonies under the INA, the courts of appeals define both the future of national immigration policy as well as the fortunes of thousands of immigrants. We argue below that the state classification perspective, embraced by a number of the circuits and recently adopted by the BIA in \textit{Yanez-Garcia}, fails to properly interpret the INA's aggravated felony provisions and has detrimental implications for American immigration policy.

103. There is evidence to suggest that the escalation of the war on drugs extended to judicial policymaking. During the height of the war on drugs, average sentences for drug offenses in the U.S. district courts increased from 54.6 months in 1982 to 82.2 months in 1992. See 1993 \textit{SOURCEBOOK}, supra note 34, at 495 tbl. 5.23. Of course, this increase, in part, may reflect the impact of federal legislation on sentencing, especially congressional inroads on narcotics offenses. Still, the 50% increase in sentencing length over the time frame leads us to believe that there was some change in judicial policymaking in drug cases.
A. Plain Meaning and the Statutory Context of "Felony"

In examining any statute, one must always look first to the plain or established meaning of the words used.\textsuperscript{104} If the words themselves are unambiguous, the reviewing court merely applies that plain meaning without the need for further interpretation. Although there has been conflict over the legal meaning of "aggravated felony," its plain meaning appears unambiguous from the common usage of the two words themselves. This plain meaning also contradicts the inclusion of misdemeanors or other offenses that are not commonly deemed felonies under the law. As one court of appeals judge noted:

[I]t is quite clear that "aggravated felony" defines a subset of the broader category "felony." Common sense and standard English grammar dictate that when an adjective—such as "aggravated"—modifies a noun—such as "felony"—the combination of the terms delineates a subset of the noun. One would never suggest, for example, that by adding the adjective "blue" to the noun "car," one could be attempting to define items that are not, in the first instance, cars... [W]e certainly should not presume that ["aggravated felonies"] would include offenses that are not felonies at all.\textsuperscript{105}

In interpreting the meaning of the aggravated felony provisions, it is also appropriate to consider the use of the term "felony" within the relevant statutory context. Section 1101(a)(43) of Title 8 defines "aggravated felonies" to include "illicit trafficking in a controlled substance (as defined in section 802 of title 21), including a drug trafficking crime (as defined in section 924(c) of title 18)," and adds that "[t]he term applies to an offense described... whether in violation of Federal or State law."\textsuperscript{106} In turn, "drug trafficking crime" is defined in § 924(c)(2) of title 18 as "any felony punishable under" the three referenced federal statutes.\textsuperscript{107} Hence, the point of contention lies in determining exactly what offenses qualify as a "felony" under § 924(c)(2) and, more specifically, whether "felony" includes state simple possession offenses that are classified as state felonies, but do

\textsuperscript{104} See, e.g., NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322, 329 (1981) (asserting that where Congress has employed terms with a settled meaning, a court must infer that meaning in the absence of an express indication to the contrary).

\textsuperscript{105} United States v. Pacheco, 225 F.3d 148, 157 (2d Cir. 2000) (Straub, J., dissenting) (arguing that the term "felony" is commonly understood to include crimes punishable by prison terms of more than a year).

\textsuperscript{106} 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43).

\textsuperscript{107} 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2).
not require more than a year of incarceration and would only constitute misdemeanors under federal law.

Courts adopting the state classification or label perspective have charged that the hypothetical federal felony rule essentially endeavors to rewrite § 924(c)(2) to read “any crime punishable as a felony under” the referenced federal statutes. 108 However, the hypothetical federal felony approach does not require an implicit rewriting of the statute, but merely a sensible understanding of how the term “felony” is used within § 924(c)(2). In interpreting a statute, the plain meaning of a word or phrase cannot simply be considered in isolation, but rather, meaning must be drawn from the statutory context in which it was used. 109 Analysis of the entire text of § 924 reveals that where it adopts state definitions or explanations to expand the scope of the statute, it does so explicitly. 110 In §§ 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) and § 924(g)(3), the statute deliberately incorporates state law drug offense definitions to expand the scope of penalties for drug crimes and firearm offenses. 111 However, it specifically declines to provide any such provisions in § 924(c)(2) for state felonies that could not be punishable as felonies under federal law. 112 Thus, the premise that a “felony” under § 924(c)(2) denotes an offense that is punishable as a felony under federal law reflects a well-reasoned and informed reading of the term “felony” that appropriately considers the overall structure of the statute and the relevant context of the term.

108. See Gerbier v. Holmes, 280 F.3d 297, 307 (3d Cir. 2002) (emphasis added) (summarizing the competing arguments on the interpretation of § 924(c)(2)).
109. See, e.g., Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 132 (1993) (stating that a fundamental principle of statutory construction is that the meaning of words must be derived by their use in the statute as a whole).
111. Id. Subparagraph (e) (2)(A)(ii) of § 924 states:

As used in this subsection . . . the term “serious drug offense” means . . . (ii) an offense under State law, involving manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance (as defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 802)), for which a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed by law.

18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii). Section 924(g)(3) penalizes “[w]hoever, with the intent to engage in conduct which . . . (3) violates any State law relating to any controlled substance (as defined in section 102(6) of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 802)) . . . state lines to acquire a firearm.” Id. § 924(g)(3).
B. Legislative History

The basic premise of the hypothetical federal felony perspective—that a “felony” denotes an offense that would constitute what is commonly considered to be a felony under federal law—is supported by the legislative history and purpose of the aggravated felony provisions. Section 924(c)(2) of title 18 provides sentencing enhancements for defendants in federal prosecutions who use or carry a firearm in relation to a drug trafficking crime. Prior to 1988, this section defined “drug trafficking” as “any felony violation of Federal law involving the distribution, manufacture, or importation of any controlled substance.” In the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Congress amended this section to incorporate specific federal provisions concerning narcotics offenses, with the definition of “drug trafficking” being changed to “any felony punishable under the Controlled Substances Act... or the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act.” The amendment was labeled a “clarification” and certainly does not reflect the intention of Congress to expand the definition of “drug trafficking crimes.”

Further insight on the meaning of the term “felony” can be found in the legislative history of INA § 1101(a)(43). Following the enactment of the aggravated felony provisions in 1988, the BIA’s decision in In re Barrett extended the parameters of the aggravated felony provisions to state drug offenses, holding:

If Congress had wanted only convictions under the cited federal statutes to serve as aggravated felonies with respect to drug offenses, it could have said so quite simply. Instead Congress referred to felonies “punishable under” not “convictions obtained under” those statutes. As such, we find that the definition of “drug trafficking crime” at 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2), as incorporated into the Immigration and Na-

115. The title of § 6212 is “Clarification of Definition of Drug Trafficking Crimes in Which Use or Carrying of Firearms and Armor Piercing Ammunition Is Prohibited.” Id.
116. See United States v. Contreras, 895 F.2d 1241, 1244 (9th Cir. 1990) (noting that Congress had labeled the amendment a clarification and arguing that its intent was not to broaden the definition of “drug trafficking crimes”); see also Cazarez-Gutierrez v. Ashcroft, 382 F.3d 905, 915 (9th Cir. 2004) (emphasizing that the intent behind § 6212 was to clarify the scope of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c) and 929(a), not to widen the scope of the definition); In re L-G, 21 I. & N. Dec. 89, 94 (B.I.A. 1995) (explaining that while the amended definition no longer required a clear nexus to “trafficking,” it did not signify a wholesale adoption of state felony definitions).
tionality Act by section 101(a)(43) of the Act, includes a state conviction sufficiently analogous to a felony offense under the Controlled Substances Act, the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act, or the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act.  

Congress followed up the BIA's decision later that year by providing an addendum to INA § 1101(a)(43) that specified that a drug trafficking offense is an aggravated felony whether or not the conviction occurred in state or federal court.  

As noted previously in this Article, the House Judiciary Committee Report on the proposed amendment stated that the Committee concurred with the BIA's decision in Barrett. In 1992, in In re Davis, the BIA elaborated on its interpretation of the statute, holding that:

We therefore clarify our holding in Matter of Barrett to specify that for a finding of "drug trafficking crime" the alien's offense must be a felony offense under one of the three statutes listed in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2), or it must be analogous to a felony offense under one of the three statutes in section 924(c)(2).  

This statement of the BIA's position on the interpretation of "felony" under § 924(c)(2) endured for more than a decade, and while Congress continued to amend the aggravated felony provisions during that time frame, it conspicuously declined to demonstrate its disapproval by revising the statute to specify that the aggravated felony provisions encompassed state felonies that were not punishable as federal felonies.

In determining the meaning of "felony" under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(2), the appropriate definition is found within the same title. Section 3559(a) of Title 18 sets forth the general classification of offenses (as felonies or misdemeanors) for federal crimes and defines "felony" as an offense that is punishable by more than one year in

119. H.R. REP. No. 101-681, pt. 1, at 147 (1990); see also Gerbier v. Holmes, 280 F.3d 297, 305 (3d Cir. 2002) (asserting that the legislative history of the amendment indicates that Congress essentially codified the BIA's decision in Barrett).
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prison.\textsuperscript{122} Under this definition, state drug offenses would not constitute aggravated felonies unless they were punishable under the relevant federal law and would yield a term of imprisonment in excess of one year. However, courts espousing the state classification or label perspective do not use the definition provided by Title 18, but rather make a strained reference to a definition provided within the Controlled Substances Act of Title 21.\textsuperscript{123} Section 802(13) of the Controlled Substances Act states that within the subchapter, "[t]he term 'felony' means any Federal or State offense classified by applicable Federal or State law as a felony."\textsuperscript{124}

The courts of appeals may embrace this definition in order to provide a viable rationalization for using state classifications to determine federal aggravated felon status; however, by its own terms, § 802 limits the application of its definition of "felony" to that which is "used in this subchapter."\textsuperscript{125} Hence, it is important to assess the use of this definition within its own statutory parameters. Section 802(13)'s definition of "felony" is primarily used to activate sentence enhancements for repeat offenders under Title 21 rather than to define substantive crimes—the pertinent inquiry with regard to § 924(c)(2).\textsuperscript{126}

\textbf{C. Proper Interpretation of Statutory Definitions}

If § 802(13) of the Controlled Substances Act is indeed the proper authority for defining aggravated felonies in the drug offense context, as the state classification perspective contends, using that statute in this manner conflicts with standard rules of statutory construction concerning intra-statutory conflict and inconsistency. First, utilizing this meaning conflicts with a later part of the same section, § 802(44), which defines "felony drug offense" as "an offense that is punishable by imprisonment for more than one year under any law of the United States or of a State or foreign country."\textsuperscript{127} Thus, the result

\textsuperscript{122} 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a).
\textsuperscript{124} Id.
\textsuperscript{125} Id.

Indeed, there is only one instance under the Controlled Substances Act where the term "felony" is used to describe a punishable offense, see 21 U.S.C. § 843(b) (1999) (making it unlawful to use a communication facility "in committing or causing or facilitating the commission of any act or acts constituting a felony under any provision of this subchapter"), and case law makes clear that only a felony under federal law satisfies the felony element of this offense.

\textit{Id.} at 310.
\textsuperscript{127} 21 U.S.C. § 802(44).
under the state classification perspective that a drug offense could be a felony even if it was punishable by less than a year's incarceration is plainly at odds with § 802's definition of "felony drug offense." This conflict violates the well-established interpretive canon favoring statutory consistency:

A statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant, and so that one section will not destroy another unless the provision is the result of obvious mistake or error.

To apply § 802(13) and define state felony drug offenses punishable by a year or less as aggravated felonies would make superfluous § 802(44), which includes the more-than-one-year imprisonment requisite. Proper interpretation of the entire section involves the reasonable inference that Congress intended to separate drug offenses from other felonious criminal actions. A reading of § 802(13) to include drug crimes as felonies merely by way of a state's delineation and without regard to minimum punishments would ignore the congressional language unambiguously written in the statute. At least one circuit has arrived at a similar conclusion concerning the interpretation of § 802. In United States v. Robles-Rodriguez, the Ninth Circuit rejected the state classification perspective within the context of sentencing enhancement. The Court held:

If the [state classification] position were correct, a drug offense could be a felony (and therefore a "felony drug offense") even if punishable by less than one year's imprisonment—a result clearly inconsistent with the statute's definition of "felony drug offense." Reading both definitions together, we conclude that Congress intended the word "felony" to describe offenses punishable by more than one year's imprisonment under applicable state or federal law.

128. See United States v. Robles-Rodriguez, 281 F.3d 900, 904 (9th Cir. 2002).
129. 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46:06, at 181-90 (6th ed. 2000) (footnotes omitted). Singer cites over 150 cases in support of this statutory canon, including cases at both federal and state levels. Id. at 181-92.
130. See 2A id. § 46:06, at 194 ("[W]hen the legislature uses certain language in one part of the statute and different language in another, the court assumes different meanings were intended.").
131. See Robles-Rodriguez, 281 F.3d at 904; see also United States v. Rios-Beltran, 361 F.3d 1204, 1207 (9th Cir. 2004) (following the interpretation of "aggravated felony" as adopted in Robles-Rodriguez).
132. Robles-Rodriguez, 281 F.3d at 904.
133. Id. The court rested its conclusion on the principle that "[n]o provision of a statute should not be interpreted in a manner that renders other sections of the same
As the Ninth Circuit found in the sentencing enhancement context and as proper statutory interpretation dictates, the provisions in § 802 should be understood within the framework of the entire section, requiring § 802(13) to be read in conjunction with § 802(44). This requires the prerequisite of more than one year as the minimum punishment for drug crimes to be defined as "aggravated felonies" as used in the INA and as interpreted through the Controlled Substances Act.

Another interpretive canon is violated by ignoring § 802(44). When specific definitions apply to specific terms within a statute, the specific, rather than the general definitions, apply in those particular situations. As has been noted, "[w]here there is inescapable conflict between general and specific terms or provisions of a statute, the specific will prevail." Thus, in dealing with aggravated felonies concerning drug crimes, such as INA § 1101(a)(43)(B), the proper interpretation of "felony" would be the more specific definition regarding "felony drug offense" found in §802(44), rather than the more general definition of "felony" written in §802(13). Therefore, even if § 802 is the proper section to refer to for INA definitions, the state classification perspective remains at odds with the proper interpretation of the statute. In order to comply with the presumption that a more specific provision controls a provision that is more general, the latter, and more specific definition found in § 802(44) applies when defining aggravated drug felonies.

D. Additional Considerations

The appropriate interpretation and implementation of the aggravated felony provisions of the INA involve not only the standard statutory construction concerns outlined above, but also entail consideration of broader matters of importance in immigration policy and legal rights.

1. Lenity in the Interpretation of Laws Affecting Deportation.—The state classification perspective also conflicts with the traditional Supreme Court precedent of resolving ambiguities in deportation statutes in favor of the alien. The Court has held that:

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statute inconsistent, meaningless or superfluous." Id. (quoting United States v. Fiorillo, 186 F.3d 1156, 1153 (9th Cir. 1999)).
135. 2A Singer, supra note 129, § 46:05, at 177.
136. See 2A id. § 46:05, at 178-79.
[D]eportation is a drastic measure and at times the equivalent of banishment or exile. It is the forfeiture for misconduct of a residence in this country. Such a forfeiture is a penalty. To construe this statutory provision less generously to the alien might find support in logic. But since the stakes are considerable for the individual, we will not assume that Congress meant to trench on his freedom beyond that which is required by the narrowest of several possible meanings of the words used.\textsuperscript{138}

This principle has been followed in recent contexts,\textsuperscript{139} although some contemporary cases may limit this approach.\textsuperscript{140} Favoring aliens in ambiguous statutes also follows the longstanding rule of lenity toward criminal defendants under which the Court decides uncertainty in criminal statutes in favor of the defendant.\textsuperscript{141} Several of the circuits have applied this rule of lenity in the immigration context.\textsuperscript{142}

\textsuperscript{138} Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948) (citation omitted). This case dealt with the INS's ability to deport an alien convicted of two murders. \textit{Id}. at 8. The deportation statute in force at that time called for the deportation of an alien who was sentenced more than once to a prison term of over one year for a crime involving moral turpitude, but was not specific as to the time frame of when the two convictions or sentences had to occur. \textit{Id}. at 7. Deportation procedures were initiated under the premise that the defendant-alien was convicted and sentenced to two crimes of moral turpitude. \textit{Id}. at 7-8. The Court noted that the petitioner was convicted under two counts of one indictment, and held that the two convictions could not for purposes of deportation occur within the same trial, thus allowing the defendant-alien to avoid deportation. \textit{Id}. at 8, 10.

\textsuperscript{139} E.g., INS v. Errico, 385 U.S. 214, 225 (1966); Costello v. INS, 376 U.S. 120, 128 (1964); \textit{see also Cardoza-Fonseca}, 480 U.S. at 449 (noting, but not relying on, the "longstanding principle of construing any lingering ambiguities in deportation statutes in favor of the alien").

\textsuperscript{140} \textit{See}, e.g., INS v. Yueh-Shaio Yang, 519 U.S. 26, 30-31 (1996) (distinguishing \textit{Errico} and finding a different result based on a subsequent statutory change by Congress); INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 487-88 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority's "narrow, grudging construction" of the INA's provisions on political asylum, and citing \textit{Errico, Costello, Fong Haw Tan}, and \textit{Cardoza-Fonseca} for the principle that ambiguities should be resolved in favor of the alien).

\textsuperscript{141} \textit{See} United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347-48 (1971); \textit{see also} United States v. Kozlinski, 487 U.S. 931, 952 (1988) ("The purposes underlying the rule of lenity [are] to promote fair notice to those subject to the criminal laws, to minimize the risk of selective or arbitrary enforcement, and to maintain the proper balance between Congress, prosecutors, and courts . . . ."). \textit{But see} Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 463 (1991) (holding that the rule of lenity is not applicable when the statute is clear).

\textsuperscript{142} \textit{See}, e.g., United States v. Simpson, 319 F.3d 81, 86-87 (2d Cir. 2002). In \textit{Simpson}, the Second Circuit held that the rule of lenity applies when interpreting the Sentencing Guidelines for sentencing enhancements, even though in the particular case the court held that the specific provision in question was not ambiguous and thus did not require the application of the rule of lenity. \textit{Id}. The court also noted that the Ninth, Eighth, and Fourth Circuits have held that the rule of lenity applies to sentencing enhancement cases, although the Seventh and Fifth Circuits have found the rule of lenity inapplicable to these cases. \textit{Id}. at 86.
the harsh collateral immigration consequences that noncitizens face in such situations, the rule of lenity is especially appropriate in these cases. The state classification perspective, however, fails to fulfill the spirit of this principle, allowing noncitizens to be deported under state criminal statutes for crimes for which they could not be deported if living in other states or if prosecuted under federal authority. As the United States Supreme Court has previously noted, a statute that trenches on this freedom should be construed narrowly, as opposed to the more expansive interpretation dictated by the state classification position. Following this historic principle leads to the conclusion that a narrow interpretation of “aggravated felony” that favors the noncitizen should apply.

2. Favoring Substance over Form in Defining Felonies.—The state classification perspective further ignores the importance of the potential punishment of the crime rather than the mere labeling of the offense. In numerous recent court of appeals cases, even in those circuits adopting the state classification perspective, courts have recognized the traditional congressional definition of a “felony” as being a crime punishable by more than one year. Examining a crime’s punishment, rather than its classification, conforms to the principle that the crime’s seriousness is defined by its sanctions, rather than its name alone. As one judge noted:

While Congress clearly intended to broaden the aggravated felony category to include more criminal offenses, there is no evidence to suggest that in doing so, Congress intended to “break[] the time-honored line between felonies and misdemeanors” by including offenses punishable by one year’s imprisonment within that definition.

143. Fong Haw Tan, 333 U.S. at 10.
144. See United States v. Robles-Rodriguez, 281 F.3d 900, 904-05 (9th Cir. 2002) ("Congress has a longstanding practice of equating the term ‘felony’ with offenses punishable by more than one year’s imprisonment."); United States v. Urias-Escobar, 281 F.3d 165, 167-68 (5th Cir. 2002) ("[F]ederal law traditionally defines a felony as a crime punishable by over one year’s imprisonment . . . ."); United States v. Graham, 169 F.3d 787, 792 (3d Cir. 1999) ("The one-year mark was used by Congress as early as 1865."); United States v. Page, 84 F.3d 38, 41 (1st Cir. 1996) (inferring an intent to incorporate the historical statutory definition of a felony to define the term “felonious” as a crime punishable by imprisonment of over one year where it is left undefined in the Sentencing Guidelines).
An analogous instance demonstrating the importance of the punishment rather than the statutory label can be found in the Supreme Court’s decisions concerning the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury. In *Duncan v. Louisiana*, the State of Louisiana denied the defendant a jury trial based on the fact that the crimes alleged were only classified as misdemeanors. At the time, federal “petty offenses,” where no jury trial was required, were classified as crimes with punishments of less than six months imprisonment. In determining whether Louisiana was required to grant the defendant a jury trial, the Supreme Court did not look at the label or classification of the crime committed. Rather, the Court assessed the possible punishment for the crime, which in Duncan’s case was two years’ imprisonment. Justice White, writing for the majority, asserted that “the penalty authorized for a particular crime is of major relevance in determining whether it is serious or not and may in itself, if severe enough, subject the trial to the mandates of the Sixth Amendment.”

The current debate over aggravated felonies for drug convictions does not involve civil liberties as granted to citizens under the Bill of Rights. However, the results of classifying a crime as an aggravated felony may involve consequences for immigrants that are just as serious to them as violations of those rights granted in the Bill of Rights. The Supreme Court’s traditional emphasis on punishment, rather than labels, coupled with its principle of deciding ambiguities in favor of aliens, discussed supra, demonstrates that the state classification perspective is inconsistent with historical jurisprudence.

3. Need for Uniformity.—Beyond the factors outlined above, the state classification perspective further negates the longstanding goal of uniformity within national immigration policy. The need for uniformity was stressed by Alexander Hamilton in *The Federalist*, when he argued that “the power over naturalization must ‘necessarily be exclusive; because if each State had power to prescribe a Distinct Rule

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147. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
149. Id. at 161.
150. Id. at 162.
151. Id. at 159 (citing District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617 (1937)).
152. See Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948) (noting that deportation is a severe measure that infringes on the freedoms of aliens and that at times is akin to banishment or exile).
153. See Gerbier v. Holmes, 280 F.3d 297, 311-12 (3d Cir. 2002) (noting that the Constitution and notions of “fundamental fairness” support the policy of uniformity in the immigration context); see also Cazarez-Gutierrez v. Ashcroft, 382 F.3d 905, 913 (9th Cir. 2004).
there could be no Uniform Rule.'" As demonstrated in the example between the laws of North Dakota and Montana provided at the beginning of this Article, the current state classification regime over aggravated felonies brings Hamilton's prophetic statement to life. The goal of uniformity serves as an important factor in those circuits that adopt the hypothetical felony rule in the deportation context. In *Aguirre*, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals explicitly expressed its "concern to avoid disparate treatment of similarly situated aliens under the immigration laws." In *Gerbier*, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals emphasized the need for uniformity in immigration law, noting:

> [A]liens convicted of drug offenses in different states... would be treated differently with respect to deportation and cancellation of removal...

> ... This cannot be what Congress intended in establishing a "uniform" immigration law....

In sum, a state drug conviction, for deportation purposes, constitutes an "aggravated felony" if it is either a felony under state law and contains a trafficking element, or would be punishable as a felony under the federal Controlled Substances Act.

The United States Supreme Court has been inclined to favor uniformity in instances in which varying state criminal law definitions may

154. *See Gerbier*, 280 F.3d at 311 (quoting *The Federalist* No. 32 (Alexander Hamilton)).

155. *See supra* notes 14-15 and accompanying text; *see also* Iris Bennett, *Note, The Unconstitutionality of Nonuniform Immigration Consequences of "Aggravated Felony" Convictions*, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1696, 1720-26 (1999). Discussing a number of inconsistencies in state criminal laws, Bennett proposes a hypothetical case, based on actual facts, of a nineteen-year-old male who has consensual sex with his fifteen-year-old girlfriend. *Id.* at 1721. In various states, including New York, where the actual events took place, the nineteen-year-old could be convicted of "sexual misconduct," which would constitute an aggravated felony. *Id.* at 1722. However, in other states with lower ages of consent, such as Maryland, the nineteen-year-old would not face state prosecution and thus could not be deported as an aggravated felon. *Id.*

156. *See, e.g., Gerbier*, 280 F.3d at 311-12; *Aguirre v. INS*, 79 F.3d 315, 317 (2d Cir. 1996) (overruling the Second Circuit's prior precedent applying the state classification perspective and applying the hypothetical felony perspective because "the interests of nationwide uniformity outweigh our adherence to Circuit precedent"). *But see* United States v. Pornes-Garcia, 171 F.3d 142, 147-48 (2d Cir. 1999) (distinguishing *Aguirre*, limiting the use of the hypothetical felony rule to deportation cases, and holding that sentence enhancement cases will continue to be decided under the state classification approach because the concerns about uniformity do not exist in these cases).


158. *Gerbier*, 280 F.3d at 312 (footnote omitted). The *Gerbier* Court further determined that "punishable as a felony under the Controlled Substances Act" required the state conviction to be punishable by more than one year's imprisonment. *Id.* at 316.
have federal sentencing consequences. In Taylor v. United States, the Court had to determine the impact of prior state burglary convictions for federal sentencing enhancements under the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). The Court reviewed the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals’s determination that burglary, for sentencing enhancement purposes, was defined “however a state chooses to define it.” In rejecting the Eighth Circuit’s approach, the Court noted the difficulties that occur when federal sentencing statutes must rely on dissimilar state statutes, including the possibility of unequal punishments for identical criminal conduct. Instead of allowing lower courts to merely rely on state law labeling of the prior convictions as “burglaries,” the Court provided a “generic definition” of burglary and held that lower courts must look not only at the fact of a prior conviction but also the statutory definition of the offense that was the basis of prior conviction. If the definition of the state offense does not include the elements of the generic definition of burglary as provided by the Supreme Court, the sentencing court may need to examine other facts of the conviction, such as the charging papers and jury instructions, to ensure that the necessary elements of generic burglary are proven. These measures appear necessary to avoid unequal sentencing outcomes “based on exactly the same conduct, depending on whether the State of his prior conviction happened to call that conduct ‘burglary.’”

159. Bennett, supra note 155, at 1731-32.
161. Id. at 577-78.
162. Id. at 579 (quoting Taylor v. United States, 864 F.2d 625, 627 (8th Cir. 1989)).
163. Id. at 590-91. The Court noted one example of the problem between the Michigan and California burglary statutes. Id. at 591. The California law includes such things as “shoplifting” and taking items out of an automobile in a broad offense of “burglary,” while the Michigan statute classifies burglaries under several narrow categories. Id. This led the Court to note that a person imprudent enough to shoplift or steal from an automobile in California would be found, under the Ninth Circuit’s view, to have committed a burglary constituting a “violent felony” for enhancement purposes—yet a person who did so in Michigan might not. Without a clear indication that with the 1986 amendment Congress intended to abandon its general approach of using uniform categorical definitions to identify predicate offenses, we do not interpret Congress’s omission of a definition of “burglary” in a way that leads to odd results of this kind.

Id.
164. Id. at 599.
165. Id. at 602.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 591.
Thus, it is evident that a reading of the aggravated felony provisions within the state classification context adds significant sanctions to some immigrants for merely committing the wrong crime in the wrong state. While the violation of any criminal law may be deplorable and indeed deserving of punishment, the immigration ramifications should be uniform and comply with a national policy that treats all immigrants similarly in like situations. The hypothetical federal felony perspective, whereby state criminal convictions must meet uniform standards to be considered aggravated felonies, is the best method for assuring that immigrants are treated equally under a national immigration policy.

**CONCLUSION**

The war on drugs stands as one of the most ambitious government policy campaigns in recent American history. Government efforts to curtail the use and sale of illegal narcotics have been manifested through public rhetoric by elite political actors, legislation, and law enforcement and prosecutorial priorities. The courts have also played an important role in the war on drugs. Both trial and appellate courts have an important influence on the direction of American public policy through their interpretation and application of statutes and case precedent. In this Article, we have outlined how government policymaking in the war on drugs has negatively and inordinately impacted immigrants and, more specifically, how judicial policymaking via statutory interpretation of the aggravated felony provisions of the INA can have unwarranted and onerous collateral consequences for noncitizen defendants in relatively minor narcotics cases. The policy decisions of a number of the circuits and the BIA have lead to an injudicious interpretation and implementa-
tion of the aggravated felony provisions of the INA, and will continue to yield unfair and inconsistent treatment of noncitizens in such cases.

If we consider the government's policy crusade against the illegal use and sale of narcotics as a "war," then we may gain some valuable policy insight by assessing the role of immigrants, minorities, and lower socioeconomic classes in American wars more broadly. On the home front, wars typically have both benefits and costs, and such benefits and costs are not often distributed equally. For example, during the Civil War, the Union's conscription policies, which allowed those with enough money to "buy out" of the draft by paying a fee, unduly favored the wealthy and disproportionately targeted immigrants. 174 Discontent with the patent unfairness of these discriminatory draft laws led members of New York City's working poor and immigrant populations to engage in one of the most violent riots in American history. 175 By the final year of the Civil War, one out of every three Union soldiers who enlisted was foreign born. 176

Such inequitable burden sharing by immigrants, ethnic minorities, and the poor has been evident throughout American involvement in wars. 177 In the American war on drugs, the general

174. See HERBERT ASBURY, THE GANGS OF NEW YORK: AN INFORMAL HISTORY OF THE UNDERWORLD 113 (1998); see also WILLIAM L. BURTON, MELTING POT SOLDIERS: THE UNION'S ETHNIC REGIMENTS (1998) (chronicling Union attempts to recruit new immigrants). Burton provides a contemporary sketch of a scene in New York in which Union officials attempt to enlist immigrants who have just arrived from the other side of the Atlantic. Id. at 198. His caption for the sketch reads "ENLISTING IRISH AND GERMAN IMMIGRANTS. Union recruiters enticed immigrants literally right off the docks at New York's Castle Garden, a practice that led to confederate charges that the Union employed foreign mercenaries." Id.

175. ASBURY, supra note 174, at 113-57.

176. Peter Blanck & Chen Song, "With Malice Toward None; With Charity Toward All": Civil War Pensions for Native and Foreign-Born Union Army Veterans, 11 TRANSNATIONAL L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 32 fig.5 (2001).

177. See, e.g., Jeanette Keith, The Politics of Southern Draft Resistan, 1917-1918: Class, Race, and Conscription in the Rural South, 87 J. AM. HIST. 1335 (2001) (chronicling elitist draft policies in World War I and the concomitant resistance to such conscription practices by Southern minorities and poor whites); see also KENNEDY, supra note 41, at 138-39 (recounting the mistreatment of people of Japanese ancestry during World War II in the name of national security); cf. DAVID CARD & THOMAS LEMIEUX, GOING TO COLLEGE TO AVOID THE DRAFT: THE UNINTENDED LEGACY OF THE VIETNAM WAR, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 97 (2001) (describing the ability of college students to avoid the draft through college deferment). The recent War in Iraq has led to charges that the present "all volunteer" military system has disproportionately drawn from historically disempowered groups. See KEVIN HORTIGAN, HIRED GUNS, ST. LOUIS DISPATCH, May 11, 2003, at B3 (noting that only one in fourteen military recruits has a college degree), available at 2003 WL 76666618; see also RICHARD COHEN, SPREAD THE THREAT, WASH. POST, Oct. 7, 2004, at A39 (outlining the controversy surrounding a proposed bill to reinstate the draft and noting that African Americans' representation in the military is nearly twice that of their representation in the general population), available at 2004 WL 93181824.
population may have derived a benefit from governmental actions to reduce the consumption and sale of illegal narcotics; however, it is clear that traditionally disempowered groups (i.e., immigrants, ethnic minorities, and the poor) have paid the “fee.”\textsuperscript{178} Within the specific context of the INA’s aggravated felony provisions, the current position of some circuits, imposing aggravated felon status on noncitizens whose offenses are not equivalent to traditional federal standards for felonies, distorts the underlying purpose and meaning of INA § 1101(a) and stands to continue to cause unfair collateral immigration consequences for noncitizens who have been convicted of relatively minor drug offenses.

\textsuperscript{178} See Tonry, \textit{supra} note 21, at 123; see also Kennedy, \textit{supra} note 41. Kennedy posits that one compelling theory of inordinate burden sharing in the drug war suggests:

\textit{[T]he war on drugs, although truly aimed against illicit narcotics, is conducted in a fashion that is negligently indifferent to the war’s collateral damage to blacks. According to this theory, if the war on drugs did to white communities what it is doing to black communities, white policymakers would long ago have called a truce in order to pursue some other, less destructive course.}

\textit{Id.} at 351.