Kiobel, Unilateralism, and the Retreat from Extraterritoriality

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**INTRODUCTION**

With the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in *Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.*, the general mood among those in the human rights community is pessimistic. Because it curtails use of the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), a law that has been on the books for more than
Tort Statute (ATS), viewing Kiobel as a loss in an ongoing ideological struggle is tempting. From this perspective, Kiobel is another indication that the Court continues to reinvent itself with a particular brand of conservative activism, the United States remains deeply hostile to international law and its institutions, and corporate interests have yet again won out over the protection of individuals. For some, the Court’s finding that the Alien Tort Statute does not redress claims of human rights violations by foreigners against foreigners on foreign soil can be scratched up as a win on the side of those pushing for tort reform, for those who believe there is too much litigation in the United States, and for those who courts, as unelected institutions, need to be carefully watched and constrained.

The first reaction of many academics concerned with protecting 200 years and for the last 30 years has been a critical avenue to hold serious human rights violators accountable.


4. See Geoffrey R. Stone, When is Judicial Activism Appropriate?, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 13, 2012, at 19 (“[W]e have now entered a troubling era of conservative constitutional jurisprudence [that] is best characterized as ‘conservative activism.’

5. For a recent discussion in the popular press, see John B. Bellinger III, Op-Ed, Obama’s Weakness on Treaties, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2012, at A35 (noting “Republican opposition to international agreements, which certainly has risen among the party’s senators in recent years,” and that the Obama Administration has secured Senate approval of the fewest number of treaties in any four-year presidential term since World War II).

6. See Geoffrey Pariza, Student Article, Genocide, Inc.: Corporate Immunity to Violations of International Law After Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 8 LOY. U. CHI. INT’L L. REV. 229, 253 (2011) (“If allowed to stand, Kiobel will have a tremendous impact on the future of ATS litigation concerning corporate defendants. . . . The decision has already had a negative impact on ATS plaintiffs complaining of human rights violations, child labor, and environmental contamination . . . .”)


8. See infra notes 104–108 and accompanying text; see, e.g., Anton Fagan, Determining the Stakes: Binding and Non-Binding Bills of Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN PRIVATE LAW 73, 84 (Daniel Friedmann & Daphne Barak-Erez eds., 2001) (describing an academic’s opinion of judges as “a group of unelected individuals” whose ability to change private law is potentially “anti-democratic” and “must be subjected to constitutional constraint”).
human rights will be to decry the result and paint the case as a setback.

But, in many ways, this particular narrative misconstrues what’s at stake. While the Kiobel decision may reflect the U.S. Supreme Court’s turn to the right, international and human rights lawyers should find some solace in the decision. Viewed through a different lens, Kiobel is a case about whether the United States should privilege unilateralism over multilateralism, and whether it prefers international over pluralistic approaches to global governance. In this way, those concerned about the advancement of human rights should spend little time (and for academics, little ink) decrying the Kiobel result. Instead, the case may signal the beginning of a modest, and welcome, retreat from a failed strategy of aggressive American

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unilateralism—viewed by other countries as legal imperialism\textsuperscript{10}—that has taken root in a number of public and private law contexts. The case could mark an opportunity to renew efforts to return to more vigorous international lawmaker based on multilateral consensus. In this way, to the extent \textit{Kiobel} is a step to interring unilateral regulation of foreigners for conduct occurring abroad, the case is not a setback for international law or human rights, but rather a vindication of them.

This Article recasts \textit{Kiobel} as one case in a line of cases involving unilateral, extraterritorial regulation. It unfolds in three parts. Part I begins by describing the rise of extraterritoriality and how extraterritoriality, in both the public and private law contexts, became a uniquely American way to build empire. Innovations in legal theory from both the right and left of the political spectrum aided and spurred the prevalence of extraterritorial laws. As right-leaning academics attacked international law and its institutions, left-leaning academics began to exalt sub-state mechanisms and transnational networks, as a way to operationalize pluralistic as well as liberal theories of international law and relations. Those pressures from both sides of the academic spectrum created an intellectual environment where unilateral use of domestic law became perceived by many academics and policymakers as a more preferable way to address global challenges and as a substitute for more robust international lawmaker.

After describing extraterritoriality’s rise, the Article sketches its decline. Part II describes how extraterritorial approaches eventually came under sustained attack. Those attacks, however, rarely reflected debates about international law and global governance. Rather the attacks replicated domestic political and culture war debates—squabbles over tort reform, over separation of powers and federalism, and over the role of courts. Finally, Part III explains why \textit{Kiobel} has a brighter side for those committed to advancing human rights. \textit{Kiobel}’s curtailing of extraterritorial regulation of foreigners may be a setback for those promoting pluralistic and certain kinds of liberal

international relations theories, but it should not be a setback for human rights.

Understanding the focus and limits of this critique is important. The perspective advanced is supportive of efforts to aggressively prevent atrocities, like those present in *Kiobel*, from re-occurring. Respect for human dignity is a key component of an effective and legitimate global governance regime. It’s a perspective that embraces national courts as appropriate places to use and enforce international law, and that those courts can play a critical role in promoting international human rights. Concerns about extraterritoriality do not arise if we hold our own citizens and corporations liable for human rights abuses, whether occurring in the United States or abroad. It rejects, however, the notion that meaningful, sustainable change can occur through unilateral regulation of foreign conduct, divorced from international agreement even when addressing so-called universal norms. The costs of extraterritorial regulation, whereby each nation defines their own version of international norms and then applies them to foreigners for conduct occurring abroad—whether in public law cases like *Kiobel*, or in the private, commercial law context—are significant. Most problematically, unilateral, extraterritorial regulation can undermine other longer-lasting, multilateral efforts to advance respect for human rights.

I. EXTRATERRITORIALITY AS GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

Extraterritoriality has been defined in varying ways. Generally though, extraterritorial laws are understood to refer to national laws—enacted unilaterally and untethered from international agreement—that regulate conduct abroad. Extraterritoriality can also be understood in terms of jurisdiction, when a legislative body

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uses a basis of prescriptive jurisdiction other than a territorial one. While extraterritorial jurisdiction has innocuous forms (for example, jurisdiction over one’s own nationals or jurisdiction to punish offenses directed at state security), it becomes contentious when one state purports to tell foreigners what they can or cannot do on foreign soil. Despite its contentiousness, unilaterally-imposed extraterritorial laws have recently become prominent fixtures in global governance.

A. Early Beginnings

Until recently, extraterritorial laws were exceptional in the international system; if they were not prohibited, they were at least strongly disfavored. Long-established public international law principles of territorial integrity, sovereign equality, nonintervention, and self-determination meant that power ended at the border.


15. Developments in the Law, supra note 13, at 1228 (“The exceptionality of extraterritoriality reflects the foundational ideals of the international state system.”).


17. See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7 (providing that “matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state” are excluded from UN jurisdiction); Corfu Channel
state’s domestic laws, with rare exceptions, only applied to peoples within the state’s borders. The reason for the limitation was largely pragmatic: it sought to reduce conflict between nations and ensure international peace and stability. But there was also a moral imperative against extraterritorial regulation. Each nation, it was believed, should have the right to choose its own path, without interference from others. The international system did not foreclose domestic courts from being involved in global governance, nor did the system presume regulatory free-zones. But cross-border regulation was primarily the purview of international law and international institutions, not domestic law. To the extent domestic law and courts were used to decide foreign, extraterritorial disputes, it was through international agreement.


18. See S.S. “Lotus” (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18 (Sept. 7) (“[T]he first and foremost restriction imposed by international law upon a State is that – failing the existence of a permissive rule to the contrary – it may not exercise its power in any form in the territory of another State. In this sense jurisdiction is certainly territorial . . . .”); id. at 56 (dissenting opinion of Lord Finlay) (“A country is no more entitled to assume jurisdiction over foreigners than it would be to annex a bit of territory which happened to be very convenient for it.”).

19. See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 (describing how each state has territorial integrity and political independence and prohibiting the use of force or threat of the use of force).


21. The famous Trail Smelter arbitration is a good example of this. The 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty was drafted precisely because at the time there existed “no remedies or redress” for transboundary harms. Robert Day Scott, The Canadian-American Boundary Waters Treaty: Why Article II?, 36 CAN. B. REV. 511, 518 n.15 (1958) (quoting the Draft Press Release, prepared for Secretary Knox, in Chandler P. Anderson Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress) (“[T]he treaty proceeds to establish a new rule for the benefit and protection of those interests, on either side of the boundary . . . there being, under existing conditions no remedies or redress in such cases.”); Stephen C. McCaffrey, Transboundary Pollution Injuries: Jurisdictional Considerations in Private Litigation Between Canada and the United States, 3 CAL. W. INT’L’L J. 191, 196 (1973) (discussing reasons for the drafting of the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty). See generally TRANSBOUNDARY HARMs IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LESSONS FROM THE TRAIL SMELTER
Among other restrictions, two complimentary procedural doctrines worked together to render extraterritorial regulation extraordinary. One was prescriptive jurisdiction, which limited states from enacting laws that regulated foreign conduct. The other was adjudicatory jurisdiction, which prevented courts from asserting power over foreign defendants outside a state’s borders with which the state had no contact. As Justice Story famously declared, “every nation possesses an exclusive sovereignty and jurisdiction within its own territory,” and “it would be wholly incompatible with equality and exclusiveness of the sovereignty of any nation, that other nations should be at liberty to regulate either persons or things not within its
own territories.” Justice Holmes similarly explained the “general and almost universal” rule: “the character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be determined wholly by the law of the country where the act is done.” This basic understanding was unassailable.

The United States, for much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, strongly promoted these foundational tenets to the international system. In the nineteenth century, when the United States was not yet a World Power, the prohibition on extraterritorial regulation was particularly aligned with U.S. interests. Extraterritorial laws were synonymous with empire-building and the unseemly bullying of smaller nations by great powers. Extraterritoriality also closely resembled—and was a variation on—the “taxation without representation” that the early colonists decried. Put simply, the United States didn’t want European powers meddling in its internal affairs. This was true in the human rights context too after World War II, where human rights were enforced on a state-to-state level and strong territorial states were seen as essential to securing respect for those rights. Rather than ignoring the

27. Am. Banana Co., 213 U.S. at 356; see also 1 JOSEPH BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 311–12 (1935) (“Since the power of a state is supreme within its own territory, no other state can exercise power there, . . . . It follows generally that no statute has force to affect any person, thing, or act, outside the territory of the state that passed it.”).
28. Cf. 2 JOHN BASSETT MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 236 (1906) (“There is no principle better settled than that the penal laws of a country have no extraterritorial force”); Harvard Research in International Law, supra note 12, at 480–84 (describing the settled tenets of territorial jurisdiction).
30. See RAUSTIALA, supra note 29, at 57.
terrestrial limits of international law, leaders in the human rights movement sought to harness the power of the territorial state to protect against genocide and other atrocities that had occurred with Nazi Germany.

This is not to say that law was always strictly territorially confined; exceptions existed. And even aside from these exceptions, there were times when territorial limits were honored in the breach, particularly when the United States was dealing with so-called “less-civilized” nations. But the exceptions were narrow and limited, and more often than not viewed as highly contentious, if not illegal. The antitrust area provides one example, where the United States tendentiously reinterpreted the “objective territoriality” principle to justify its regulation of foreign conduct. The rest of the world, however, viewed the projection of U.S. commercial law abroad as American exceptionalism in its worst form. In the context of “less-civilized” nations, the disparate treatment was, in hindsight, a source


34. See DANIEL S. MARGOLIES, SPACES OF LAW IN AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS 140–75 (2011) (describing U.S. extraterritorial activity on the southern border); Daniel S. Margolies, The “Ill-Defined Fiction” of Extraterritoriality and Sovereign Exception in Late Nineteenth Century U.S. Foreign Relations, 40 SW. L. REV. 575 (2011) (describing the use of extraterritoriality by the United States in the late nineteenth century). Territorial integrity was also not respected when dealing with indigenous tribes. S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 23–26 (2d ed. 2004) (explaining that “[t]o see indigenous peoples as ‘states’ would in the end prove all too difficult for Western eyes”).

35. See ANAYA, supra note 34 (explaining how an exception allowed Westerners to disavow indigenous people from statehood).

36. S.S. “Lotus” (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 30 (Sept. 7) (describing the objective territoriality principle as situations where a crime’s effects were so much a part of the act that produced them and the effect was a constituent element of the crime). For a discussion of the objective territoriality principle, see Austen L. Parrish, Evading Legislative Jurisdiction, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1673, 1680–81 (2012).


38. Cf. Developments in the Law, supra note 13, at 1270–71 (“[A]pplying U.S. antitrust law overseas poses potential conflicts with other countries’ laws and can prompt international political disputes. Similarly, when other countries exercise jurisdiction in a manner that affects American interests, policymakers and affected parties in the United States face challenges in either confronting or complying with foreign antitrust principles.” (footnote omitted)).
of embarrassment. Extraterritorial regulation thus sat in the shadow of the law: something to be tolerated on occasion, but rarely embraced.

B. Extraterritoriality’s Rise

Academics studying the Alien Tort Statute are familiar with its commonly told history. For many years, the statute lay dormant. In 1980, however, with the landmark *Filártiga v. Peña-Irala* case, the Second Circuit catapulted the statute to the forefront as a tool to remedy human rights abuses. Through cases such as *Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic*, *Kadic v. Karadžić*, *Doe v. Unocal Corp.*, and *Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain*, among others, domestic human rights litigation evolved.

This doctrinal story while not inaccurate is far from complete. Changes in application of the Alien Tort Statute represent just one example of much broader transformations that were occurring. Beginning in the 1980s and then in full force in the 1990s, extraterritoriality began to take on a new significance in a wide range of contexts. While commercial laws, like antitrust and securities, had been long applied abroad, non-commercial laws had been more

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39. A good example exists with indigenous peoples. See generally **Anaya**, supra note 34, at 26–28 (explaining how territorial sovereignty was initially associated only with the “civilized” European nations).
40. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
42. 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
43. 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995).
44. 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005).
47. See generally **Paul B. Stephan**, A Becoming Modesty – U.S. Litigation in the Mirror of International Law, 52 DePAUL L. REV. 627 (2002) (describing the globalization of U.S. civil justice). For a recent discussion, see **Donald Earl Childress III**, The Alien Tort Statute, Federalism, and the Next Wave of Transnational Litigation, 100 GEO. L.J. 709, 715 (2012) (“In looking at ATS cases, therefore, one confronts many of the questions related to transnational litigation in U.S. courts.”).
constrained. The 1990s saw this change (some would say dramatically) as extraterritoriality became widespread in all areas of U.S. law.

The trend was not limited to the United States, however. In response to American unwillingness to limit the reach of its laws, other countries began to embrace unilateral extraterritorial regulation too. Some even hoped that greater unilateral regulation would paradoxically spur eventual international regulation and harmonization. National courts began to play a more prominent role in global governance. The development of universal jurisdiction and the increase of Alien Tort Statute cases were representative of this trend.

48. See Jonathan Turley, “When in Rome”: Multinational Misconduct and the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 598 (1990) (describing how market and non-market cases were treated differently by courts).


In some ways, the rise of extraterritoriality was a matter of convenience. Extraterritorial laws were politically more expedient than traditional international law making, as treaties increasingly became viewed as overly difficult and time consuming. After the Cold War, domestic regulation applied to foreign conduct also became a more palatable (albeit surreptitious way) for the United States to exert global influence than traditional overt empire building. At the very least, it became a way to expand the sphere of American influence without having to worry about the constraints that international treaties impose.

A number of changes explain the trend towards extraterritorial regulation. Globalization played a role, although its role is often overstated. Changes in domestic procedural rules also encouraged the trend. The doctrines of prescriptive and adjudicatory jurisdiction


55. See id. at 156, 162–63 (explaining how from a “U.S. perspective, law is an important device for the regulation of international society – as long as it is not applied to itself”). For a description of some of the possible reasons for U.S. unilateralism in human rights, see Andrew Moravcsik, Why Is U.S. Human Rights Policy So Unilateral?, in THE COST OF ACTING ALONE: MULTILATERALISM AND US FOREIGN POLICY 345 (Shepard Forman & Stewart Patrick eds., 2001).


57. For a general discussion, see Austen Parrish, Domestic Responses to Transnational Crime: The Limits of National Law, 23 CRIM. L.F. 275, 285 (2012) (explaining how globalization and extraterritoriality are not twinned concepts); see also RAUSTIALA, supra note 29, at 118–19 (noting how in early periods of globalization domestic law remained strictly territorially prescribed and that “history presents a puzzle for accounts that link extraterritoriality to economic interdependence”).

drifted away from their territorial orientations, and courts and academics adopted the doctrines wholesale into the international arena without much contemplation as to whether such adoption was appropriate.\textsuperscript{59} The legislature was also incentivized to regulate extraterritorially as Congress grew generally indifferent to foreign concerns.\textsuperscript{60} The general growth of domestic regulation post-New Deal may also have made extraterritorial regulation more likely.\textsuperscript{61} Lastly, changes in legal theory created a new legal orthodoxy that disfavored international law and promoted unilateral domestic regulation. This last change, while it has not received as much attention, may have had the biggest impact.

C. The Impact of Legal Theory

Innovations in intellectual thought—both from the left and right of the political spectrums—have had a particular influence in the area of extraterritorial regulation.\textsuperscript{62} The first came in the form of a


\textsuperscript{62}. For a recent discussion of the trends in the Alien Tort Statute context, see Childress, \textit{supra} note 47, at 710–12 (discussing how “two primary camps in this debate” have “elicited such pronounced, rich, cross-disciplinary, and wide-ranging perspectives”). For a detailed
sustained attack on multilateralism from scholars who are hostile to international law and institutions. These scholars—sometimes referred to as nationalists, revisionists, or Sovereigntists—are usually associated with right-leaning groups. For them, international law poses a threat to democratic sovereignty. International law, they contend, amounts to no more than “a mere set of rhetorical statements that are obeyed only when convenient” and “international law essentially doesn’t matter (or doesn’t matter very much).” American exceptionalism—the idea that the United States is different from the rest of the world and unbound by the rules it promotes—drives this worldview.

This is not to say that anti-internationalism is something new. A long American legal tradition has promoted isolationist positions. But in the 1990s and 2000s, the nature of these attacks became more pronounced and sustained. In the past, right-leaning academics had supported international laws that promoted free trade and neo-liberal

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64. For two stark examples, see Bob Barr, Protecting National Sovereignty in an Era of International Meddling: An Increasingly Difficult Task, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 299 (2002) (arguing that international law and particularly international organizations are a threat to U.S. democratic sovereignty); Jed Rubenfeld, The Two World Orders, WILSON Q., Autumn 2003, at 22, 34 (“[I]nternational law is a threat to democracy and to the hopes of democratic politics all over the world.”).


66. Greenberg, supra note 63, at 1791 (describing realist and liberal internationalist scholarship).


69. See Nico Krisch, International Law in Times of Hegemony: Unequal Power and the Shaping of the International Legal Order, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 369, 389 (2005) (“US reluctance to international treaties has strong cultural roots, goes back to the late 18th century when the country was still weak, and finds expression in the high hurdles erected by the US Constitution for treaty ratification.”).
policies. But in the 1990s that subsided too. Even innocuous bilateral agreements that sought to preserve American sovereignty and security were viewed as conspiracies to create world governments. The mere mention of foreign or international law in a judicial decision spurred radical reactions. In the political realm, “an increasing number of Republicans had come to view treaties in general (especially multilateral ones) as liberal conspiracies to hand over American sovereignty to international authorities.”

The second innovation came from the political left. Traditionally, those supportive of international law sought to use multilateral treaties and international institutions as a way to promote human and environmental rights and to secure global peace and stability. But this changed, as internationalists began to focus on sub-state mechanisms and non-governmental actors, and attacked


72. The most radical included calls for mass impeachment and death threats. See Carl Hulse & David D. Kirkpatrick, DeLay Says Federal Judiciary Has ‘Run Amok,’ Adding Congress is Partly to Blame, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2005, at A21 (describing how Senator Coburn’s chief of staff, Michael Schwartz, has called for “mass impeachment” of federal judges); Tony Mauro, Ginsburg Discloses Threats on Her Life: In Speeches, Justice Says She and Sandra Day O’Connor Were Targeted Because of Use of Foreign Law in Cases, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 20, 2006, at 8. See generally Austen L. Parrish, Storm in a Teacup: The U.S. Supreme Court’s Use of Foreign Law, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 637 (describing the debate over the use of foreign and international law).

73. Bellinger, supra note 5. Opposition to the Rome Statute and the International Criminal Court is also a common example of this. See Mariano-Florentino Cuellar, The International Criminal Court and the Political Economy of Anti-treaty Discourse, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1597, 1605 (2003) (“[O]ne might say that the ICC impinges on American sovereignty because criminal jurisdiction has long been primarily based on territoriality and nationality.”).

traditional treaty law.\textsuperscript{75} Some of the change was driven by a tendency of some legal academics to take descriptive theories from other disciplines and turn them into prescriptive or normative theories. So while anthropologists and sociologists were content to note that international relations were disaggregating, legal scholars argued that international law normatively should disaggregate.\textsuperscript{76} The old theories of territoriality, which promoted multilateral agreement, were also viewed as outdated.\textsuperscript{77} Some even argued that the growth in the extraterritorial application of national laws, regardless of legality, was not only desirable, but also inevitable.\textsuperscript{78}

These intellectual trends had their impact. The United States slowly withdrew and disengaged from international law and many of its institutions.\textsuperscript{79} The enthusiasm that once existed for international

\textsuperscript{75} See Jose E. Alvarez, \textit{Interliberal Law: Comment}, 94 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 249, 250 (2000) (describing the central assumption of liberal theory that “the future of effective international regulation lies not with traditional treaties . . . but with transnational networks”); Anne-Marie Slaughter, \textit{A Liberal Theory of International Law}, 94 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 240, 246 (2000) (criticizing traditional public international law, particularly how it “assumes its own pride of place in the rules contributing to international order” and the resulting “unmistakable message is that international order is created from the top down”).

\textsuperscript{76} \textit{Anne-Marie Slaughter}, \textit{A New World Order} 5–6 (2004).

\textsuperscript{77} See Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth, \textit{Legitimating the New Legal Orthodoxy, in Global Prescriptions: The Production, Exportation, and Importation of a New Legal Orthodoxy} 306, 316 (Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth eds., 2002) (describing how “[a]n earlier [male] WASP establishment” was largely responsible for crafting international law in the immediate post-World War II period); Anne-Marie Slaughter, \textit{Breaking Out: The Proliferation of Actions in the International System, in Global Prescriptions: The Production, Exportation, and Importation of a New Legal Orthodoxy} 25 (Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth eds., 2002) (describing how a new generation of scholars, which included women and minorities, sought to distinguish themselves from the earlier architects of international law).

\textsuperscript{78} See Stephen Coughlan et al., \textit{Global Reach, Local Grasp: Constructing Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in the Age of Globalization}, 6 CAN. J.L. & TECH. 29, 29 (2006) (initially prepared as a Report to the Law Commission of Canada) (arguing that globalization “ensure[s] that the extraterritorial application of national legal powers cannot be avoided”).\textit{ But see Rausti\,l\,a, supra note 29, at 118 (describing, but disagreeing with, the commonly held view that, as economic and social activity globalizes, the law must inevitably follow suit and become less territorially bounded).}

law and institutions as the Cold War came to an end was soon replaced with a general skepticism. The United States declined to become a party to a number of key conventions, \(^\text{80}\) and attempted to limit its obligations under existing treaties. \(^\text{81}\) At the same time, a dramatic expansion in unilateralism occurred. \(^\text{82}\) Sovereignists were much less concerned about unilateral domestic laws (initially believing them to not threaten sovereignty), and the new internationalists overlooked the unilateral and imperial aspects of extraterritorial laws, viewing those laws as at least some progress in addressing global challenges. In the Alien Tort Statute context, the cases seemed a logical extension of public law litigation that had

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been embraced as part of the U.S. civil rights movement. As activists turned to courts, the U.S. legal system began to export its particular brand of justice. And then—more recently and less noticed in the United States—other countries began to follow suit.

II. DOMESTIC DEBATES TAKE THEIR TOLL

The above has briefly described a rise of extraterritorial domestic laws, often as a substitute for more traditional international lawmaking. In the last few years, however, transnationalism in the United States has come under attack. Ironically, these attacks have had little to do with international law or theory.

A. Transnational Litigation in the Supreme Court

*Kiobel* is by no means unique. In a number of other contexts, U.S. courts have begun to display a nervousness about being a battleground for foreign disputes. *Kiobel* may have called into doubt the applicability of the Alien Tort Statute to corporations, but recently courts have also decided that corporations cannot be sued under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act, that the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act does not apply to


extraterritorial corporate activities, and that the principal antifraud provision of the federal securities laws does not apply extraterritorially to foreign transactions. In a host of contexts, U.S. courts have refused to be the primary venue for global litigation.

The U.S. Supreme Court has led the retreat. The clearest recent example was the unanimous decision in *Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd.* *Morrison* was a product of the U.S. housing bubble and mortgage crisis. The case involved three Australian investors who had bought stock in Australia’s largest bank. The investors claimed that the bank’s Florida-based subsidiaries had miscalculated interest rates on mortgages it was servicing, causing the value of the parent bank’s stock to plummet. Seeking a class action remedy, the investors brought suit in the United States, claiming that the subsidiary had made false and misleading statements to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. The critical issue focused on extraterritoriality: whether the anti-fraud provisions of the American securities laws applied when foreign plaintiffs sued “foreign and American defendants for misconduct in connection with securities traded on foreign exchanges.”

The Court concluded that the American Securities laws did not apply. The decision put an end to so-called “foreign-cubed” cases, or cases brought by foreign claimants against a foreign company in relation to shares bought on a foreign exchange. The decision was striking in that both the Court’s liberal and conservative members were in general agreement. While they disagreed over the doctrinal tests to be used—reflecting the same division in *Kiobel*—the Justices uniformly found some meaningful connection with the United States necessary. The message was clear: U.S. courts are not the world’s courts.

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86. See, e.g., Norex Petroleum Ltd. v. Access Indus., Inc., 631 F.3d 29, 33 (2d Cir. 2010).
88. *Id.*
89. *Id.* at 2875–76.
90. *Id.* at 2876.
91. *Id.*
92. *Id.* at 2875.
A second line of cases arose in the adjudicatory jurisdiction area, with *J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro* 94 and *Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown* 95—the Court’s first foray into personal jurisdiction in almost twenty years. In *McIntyre*, a plaintiff had suffered serious injuries while operating a shearing machine in New Jersey, at the company where he worked. 96 The plaintiff filed a lawsuit in New Jersey state court against the British manufacturer of the shearing machine. 97 The question was whether the New Jersey court had personal jurisdiction over the British corporation. In *Goodyear*, the parents of two boys, who were killed in a bus accident in France, brought a lawsuit in North Carolina. 98 The lawsuit alleged that the accident resulted from a defective tire manufactured in Turkey at the plant of a foreign subsidiary of Goodyear. 99 The lawsuit named Goodyear as a defendant as well as three of its subsidiaries organized and separately incorporated in Turkey, France, and Luxembourg. The foreign corporate defendants moved to dismiss on the ground that the North Carolina court had no personal jurisdiction over them. 100

In both cases, the Court strongly reaffirmed that territorial sovereignty is critical to a court’s personal jurisdiction analysis—that borders matter. 101 The Court in *Goodyear* explained that defendants are not subject to general jurisdiction unless they are “essentially at home” in the forum. 102

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95. 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011).

96. *McIntyre*, 131 S. Ct. at 2786.

97. Id.

98. *Goodyear*, 131 S. Ct. at 2850.

99. Id.

100. Id.


B. Domestic Debates and U.S. Culture Wars

Ironically, the attack on domestic courts unilaterally resolving international challenges through extraterritorial laws have benefited little from the serious debate about the role of courts in global governance, but instead mostly reflect recurring domestic debates largely untethered from international concerns.103

Much of the criticism of transnational litigation mirrors debates raised in the tort reform movement.104 For a number of scholars, transnational litigation is just another battle between the plaintiff and defense bars. For them, the Alien Tort Statute encourages the filing of “frivolous lawsuits that only serve to fill the coffers of contingency-fee law firms.”105 Echoing the long-standing debate of whether too much litigation exists in the United States,106 much of the attack is based on the idea of litigation out-of-control.107 From this perspective, Alien Tort litigation only serves the interests of “avaricious class-action lawyers” and the “latter day pirates of the plaintiffs’ bar” seeking “gargantuan remedies for domestic torts.”108

When the focus is not on a so-called litigation crisis, the debate pivots to one over the role of courts, and whether the courts are somehow usurping the prerogatives of other branches when it


107. See Finnerty & Merrigan, supra note 105, at A15 (“[I]t ultimately will be impractical for U.S. courts to police these monster ATS class actions if they are allowed to proliferate; they dwarf in size the asbestos cases that currently plague the U.S. courts.”).

addresses foreign matters. The Morrison case and the debates over prescriptive jurisdiction provide a good example. One is struck how the Justices are much less concerned about the effect of a particular rule, and much more concerned with legislative primacy and the spectre of judicial creativity or policy-making. And if separation of powers is not the concern, then the attack on extraterritoriality often focuses on defending a particular kind of federalism, rather than offering any sort of plausible conception of international law.

This focus on the domestic is not surprising. American scholars regularly rely on domestic theory, without any serious consideration as to whether the domestic can be so easily grafted onto the international, or whether the two situations are comparable at all.

III. REBUILDING INTERNATIONAL LAW

Most of the discussion surrounding Kiobel, both before and after the decision, has focused on doctrinal issues. Did the Court correctly apply the presumption against extraterritoriality? Does the presumption against extraterritoriality apply in cases involving common law tort litigation? Does international law permit domestic


courts to adjudicate foreign-cubed cases? But regardless of the doctrinal answers—and whether such cases are legally permitted—extraterritorial and unilateral approaches to global governance have significant costs. It’s not clear that these kinds of laws are helpful in advancing and protecting human rights.

A. The Costs of Extraterritorial Regulation

Unilateral extraterritorial regulation of foreigners is problematic for several reasons. Legitimacy is a primary concern. Extraterritorial laws are in tension with democratic principles because they impose obligations on individuals who have had no formal voice in the political process.\textsuperscript{113} Even when the underlying norm is universally agreed upon, rarely do foreigners view those norms as being appropriately adjudicated world wide—the “mere enforcement” of international law does not exist. Indeed, American-style litigation has its unique procedural aspects.\textsuperscript{114} Seldom do foreigners view themselves as getting a fair shake in our courts,\textsuperscript{115} just as Americans

\textsuperscript{113} See Parrish, supra note 14, at 859–60 (describing how extraterritorial laws are undemocratic because they regulate foreigners who have no say in the enactment of those laws); see also Mark P. Gibney, The Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Law: The Perversion of Democratic Governance, the Reversal of Institutional Roles, and the Imperative of Establishing Normative Principles, 19 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 297, 312–13 (describing the unfairness and undemocratic nature of extraterritorial laws).


\textsuperscript{115} See, e.g., Elmer J. Stone & Kenneth H. Slade, Special Considerations in International Licensing Agreements, 1 TRANS. L. 161, 169 (1988) (explaining how both U.S. and foreign parties fear discrimination in each other’s respective court systems); Kevin R. Johnson, Why Alienage Jurisdiction? Historical Foundation and Modern Justifications for Federal Jurisdiction over Disputes Involving Noncitizens, 21 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 22–25 (1996) (describing the fear and perception of bias against foreign citizens); cf. Chandra Lekha Sripriam, Human Rights Claims v. the State: Is Sovereignty Really Eroding?, 1 INTERDISC. J. HUM. RTS. 107, 117 (2006) (“To the degree the proceedings take place in the courts of powerful Western states, and often in those of former colonizers, the argument that cases are selective, and even driven by imperialistic agendas, can be and has been raised.”).
often view foreign systems skeptically. This perception of bias may be misplaced and empirically wrong, but it is widespread. The legitimacy point is pronounced in the human rights context where the United States appears to promote a double standard by frustrating efforts to hold its own citizens and officials liable for foreign human rights abuses. The lack of perceived legitimacy

116. See Eric Posner, The Perils of Global Legalism 228 (2009) (noting that “American legalism does not extend very far from its shores” and that Americans do not support decisions unless made by “American courts, which are staffed by Americans who share American values and interests”).


118. See Smith Kline & French Laboratories, Ltd. v. Bloch [1983] 2 All E.R. 72 (A.C.) 74 (Lord Denning M.R.) (“As a moth is drawn to the light, so is a litigant drawn to the United States. If he can only get his case into their courts, he stands to win a fortune.”); Utpal Bhattacharya et al., The Home Court Advantage in International Corporate Litigation, 50 J.L. & Econ. 625, 629 (2007) (“Our article supports the conclusion . . . [that] foreign firms are disadvantaged in U.S. courts.”); Kimberly A. Moore, Xenophobia in American Courts, 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1497, 1503 (2003) (“Whether the xenophobic bias exists in fact, there can be no controversy about the reality of the perception that bias exists in American courts and American juries.”); John S. Willems, Shutting the U.S. Courthouse Door?: Forum Non Conveniens in International Arbitration, 58 Disp. Resol. J. 54, 56 (2003) (“Litigants are attracted to the high quality of U.S. courts, the willingness of U.S. courts to exercise jurisdiction over international disputes, and, rightly or wrongly, the belief that U.S. courts are ready to award large sums of damages.”); see also Parrish, supra note 59, at 44–47 (citing sources and describing the perception of bias in U.S. courts). The perception that U.S. courts are plaintiff friendly is long-standing.

calls into serious question the long-term sustainability of enforcing human rights norms unilaterally.

Aside from the legitimacy concern, whether extraterritorial laws actually work is unclear. Scant evidence exists to support claims that unilateral extraterritorial laws deter future human rights abuses or provide remedies for past violations.\textsuperscript{120} In the criminal and human rights context, despite the explosion of extraterritorial laws, “prosecutions have been few.”\textsuperscript{121} Human rights civil claims are often unenforceable and remain symbolic at best.\textsuperscript{122}

Unilateral regulation, applied extraterritorially, also runs the risk of being counter-productive.\textsuperscript{123} As an initial matter, because universal jurisdiction is controversial, its use risks turning the focus away from the victims and the perpetrators of human rights abuses, and instead redirects global attention to the methods of enforcement.\textsuperscript{124} The contentiousness also risks eroding international cooperation in other areas\textsuperscript{125} and creating an unnecessary level of confusion. The result of

\textsuperscript{120} See Michael D. Goldhaber, \textit{The Life and Death of the Corporate Alien Tort}, \textsc{The AM. LAW.}, Oct. 12, 2010 (describing how most Alien Tort Statute cases have resulted in favorable rulings to corporate defendants).

\textsuperscript{121} See Doyle, supra note 49, at 1 (noting how successful prosecutions are rare and the “practical and legal complications” of exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction); Catherine Beaulieu, \textit{Extraterritorial Laws: Why They Are Not Really Working and How They Can Be Strengthened}, ECPAT INT’L COMPENDIUM OF ARTICLES, Sept. 2008, at 8–9, 16 (noting the “very low number of prosecutions and convictions achieved under extraterritorial laws,” at least in relation to offences against children); Benjamin Perrin, \textit{Taking a Vacation from the Law? Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction and Section 7(4.1) of the Criminal Code}. 13 CAN. CRIM. L. REV. 175, 176 (2009) (“In the decade following the adoption of Canada’s extraterritorial child sex crime provisions . . . only a single conviction was entered.”).

\textsuperscript{122} See Julian Ku, \textit{The Alien Tort Statute as a Species of Extraterritorial U.S. Law}, SCOTUSBLOG (July 16, 2012), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/07/online-kiobel-symposium-the-alien-tort-statute-as-a-species-of-extraterritorial-u-s-law/ (“[A]s very few ATS cases amounted to enforceable judgments or significant settlements, the ATS seemed a largely symbolic tool. The ATS fascinated academics, especially international law professors, but it seemed to have little practical significance.”); Anne-Marie Slaughter & David Bosco, \textit{Plaintiff’s Diplomacy}, FOREIGN AFF., Sept.–Oct. 2000, at 102, 106 (stating that the principal benefit in human rights litigation under the Alien Tort Claims Act may be “the public attention they generate”); cf. Randall S. Abate, \textit{Kyoto or Not, Here We Come: The Promise and Perils of the Piecemeal Approach to Climate Change Regulation in the United States}, 15 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 369, 398 (noting that private environmental citizen suits “were often more symbolic than substantive”).

\textsuperscript{123} See Paul R. Dubinsky, \textit{Human Rights Law Meets Private Law Harmonization: The Coming Conflict}, 30 YALE J. INT’L L. 211, 303 (2005) (“[T]o date the human rights community has offered little outward reflection on whether an aggressive agenda focused on domestic courts may harm the very institutions to which these advocates have turned.”).

\textsuperscript{124} For a more developed analysis, see Parrish, supra note 57.

\textsuperscript{125} See, e.g., Christopher L. Blakesley, \textit{Extraterritorial Jurisdiction}, in \textsc{2 International Criminal Law: Procedural and Enforcement Mechanisms} 96 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed.,
aggressive foreign regulation is increased uncertainty, overlapping concurrent jurisdiction, and an increased likelihood of parallel proceedings. This piecemeal approach to a shared challenge increases the fragmentation of international law that has become a standing concern. Most importantly, extraterritorial domestic laws give the illusion that serious steps are being taken, when in actuality little progress has been made.

Lastly, there is the reciprocity concern. We should be concerned with how other countries will define and develop human rights laws.126 Creating an international free-for-all where any nation has the authority to unilaterally prosecute international human rights abuses requires that we be comfortable with other countries prosecuting Americans for activity taking place within our borders,127 even when that activity might be considered legal and not a human rights abuse by U.S. standards.128 The United States has promoted a particular vision of human rights. As law migration occurs,129 it’s

126. A number of commentators have noted the increase of human rights litigation in other parts of the world. See Cassandra Burke Robertson, Transnational Litigation and Institutional Choice, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1081, 1130 (2010) (describing how the threat of liability that defendants face in foreign courts has increased); see also Eugene Gulland, All the World’s a Forum, NAT’L L.J., Feb. 11, 2002, at B13 (“Recent foreign court decisions . . . suggest a more aggressive tendency to prefer non-U.S. forums and apply non-U.S. law to disputes involving U.S. companies.”).

127. For concerns of this kind of reciprocity, see Curtis A. Bradley, The Costs of International Human Rights Litigation, 2 CHI. INT’L L. 457, 461 (2001) (explaining how “other nations may retaliate by allowing suits against U.S. government actors.”).

128. See Alfred P. Rubin, Can the United States Police the World, 13 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 371, 374 (1989) (explaining how imposing U.S. law “creates a defensive reaction in even our allies . . . It creates a precedent and a sense of righteousness in others who would apply their laws and their versions of international law to Americans whose actions they do not like”); see also Posner, supra note 116, at 228 (arguing that “before long” China, Russia, India, and Brazil “will be able to advance their views about international law – views that no doubt will serve their interests” and noting that “Russia has quickly learned that pliable human rights language and the precedents of Kosovo and Iraq can be turned to its advantage”).

unclear whether other courts in other nations will develop human rights in the same way, or whether those conceptions will be more illiberal and non-western, or at least different.\textsuperscript{130} The spread of U.S.-style litigation may make this possibility even more pronounced.\textsuperscript{131}

B. The Benefits of Multilateralism

To meaningfully advance human rights, re-embracing multilateral\textsuperscript{132} solutions would be wise. Multilateral approaches are longer-lasting. They also avoid fragmentation and piece-meal approaches to solving a common problem and are more consistent with other international law principles and mechanisms.\textsuperscript{133}

First, treaties are usually more durable than unilateral forms of governance. Because multilateral agreements are a product of consent and negotiation,\textsuperscript{134} they are less likely to be viewed as imperialistically imposed and more easily enforced.\textsuperscript{135} Because of


\textsuperscript{130} See Paul B. Stephan, \textit{A Becoming Modesty – U.S. Litigation in the Mirror of International Law}, 52 DePaul L. Rev. 627, 655 (2002) ("The problem lies in the unwillingness of foreign states, including their judiciary, to go along with our project and their ability to sabotage it."). For a description of the competition, conflicts, and contestation that take place between international actors who have different normative and regulatory agendas, see \textit{LAWYERS AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF TRANSNATIONAL JUSTICE} (Yves Dezalay & Bryant Garth eds., 2011).


\textsuperscript{133} For a discussion of the benefits of multilateralism, see John W. Head, \textit{What Has Not Changed Since September 11 – The Benefits of Multilateralism}, 12 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 1, 9 (2002) ("Multilateralism has been a key feature of U.S. policy for more than fifty years. Despite some temporary departures, the United States has taken a leadership role in creating an extensive network of global treaty rules and international institutions, on grounds that multilateral action promises greater rewards than does a policy of going it alone.").

\textsuperscript{134} Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties arts. 2(b), 11, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (noting that treaties only create obligations and rights through consent); \textit{Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States} pt. 1, ch. 1, intro. note (1987) ("Modern international law is rooted in acceptance by states which constitute the system.").

\textsuperscript{135} See Hathaway, \textit{supra} note 67, at 129 (criticizing unilateralism and noting that the costs of multilateralism are “more than compensated for by gains in both political legitimacy
this characteristic, multilateral agreements make “fundamental transformations legitimate and peaceful.” They also contain a degree of legitimacy that unilateral approaches lack because multilateral agreements are more egalitarian and democracy re-enforcing. Others agree. An increasing body of literature suggests that without multilateral cooperation and the creation of multilateral institutions, progress in human rights and other related areas will fail; that the global challenges are too great without attempts to achieve wide-spread cooperation and consensus.

Second, developing international treaty law and international institutions is to harmonize standards by definition, thereby avoiding the risks of piece-meal and hodge-podge approaches. This fragmentation point is particularly important in the human rights context because human rights are often not easy to define, and they represent contested ideals. Human rights become “universal” not through some sort of predetermined inevitability, but only through careful building of coalitions with different groups allied in purpose. Re-embracing multilateralism also provides an opportunity for those supportive of human right goals to “lock-in” a particular vision of global governance. Multilateral institutions are more likely to preserve, for some time, an order that reflects existing preferences.

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139. See LAWYERS AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF TRANSNATIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 130 (describing successful and not so successful strategies to build institutions and credibility for the transnational legal field).

140. See Krisch, supra note 69, at 373 (noting how multilateral regimes are “less vulnerable to later shifts in power” and are “relatively stable”); Pierre Klein, The Effects of U.S. Predominance on the Elaboration of Treaty Regimes and on the Evolution of the Law of Treaties, in UNITED STATES HEGEMONY AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 363, 363–65 (Michael Byers & Georg Nolte eds., 2003) (explaining how “[t]he influence exerted by a particularly powerful State on the treaty-making process may therefore have an important impact on the shaping of international law”).

and meaningful enforceability that accrue from an understanding of international law as a system of consent-based rules and operations”).
increases, international human rights groups should be particularly concerned that human rights concerns will be drowned out by the concerns of other competing groups.\textsuperscript{141}

Third, multilateral approaches are more consistent with common understandings of international law and institutions.\textsuperscript{142} The international system was structured to encourage cooperation, reduce conflict, and promote democratic self-government. Unilateral extraterritorial regulation is in tension with these basic goals. Also, to the extent that unilateralism imposes national, rather than universal, approaches, it is in inherent tension with the broader goals of human rights, which depend on universalism.

The Court’s more liberal members appear to agree. The opinion of Chief Justice Roberts in \textit{Kiobel}, joined by the Court’s more conservative members, was unsurprising. It tracked the \textit{Morrison} decision to find that Congress would not be assumed to have used a contentious form of jurisdiction (i.e., an extraterritorial one) without clear indication of its intent.\textsuperscript{143} In many ways, this is consistent with how other jurisdictional statutes have previously been interpreted. Rarely has the Court found that Congress intended to use all the power granted to it under international law or the U.S. Constitution.\textsuperscript{144} Regardless of whether commentators agree with how

\textsuperscript{141} See David Chandler, \textit{From Kosovo to Kabul and Beyond: Human Rights and International Intervention} 59 (new ed. 2006) (“[W]ith neither a membership capable of influencing elections, nor the financial capacity to make donations or influence election campaigns, human rights NGOs lack the powers of traditional interest groups in the domestic political sphere.”); Franz von Benda-Beckmann, \textit{Human Rights, Cultural Relativism and Legal Pluralism: Towards a Two-Dimensional Debate, in The Power of Law in a Transnational World: Anthropological Enquiries} 115, 116 (Franz von Benda-Beckmann et al. eds. 2009) (“[A]nthropologists and nongovernmental organizations have also shown and defended the relativity and variability of social organizations and their cultural values, which often were not in conformity with the ideal notions expressed in many human rights”); cf. Bryant G. Garth, \textit{Rebuilding International Law After the September 11th Attack: Contrasting Agendas of High Priests and Legal Realists}, 4 Loy. U. Chi. Int’l L. Rev. 3, 3 (2006) (“[T]here is competition to be a relevant voice in international relations . . . .”)

\textsuperscript{142} José E. Alvarez, \textit{Multilateralism and Its Discontents}, 11 Eur. J. Int’l L. 393, 394 (2000) (“Multilateralism is our shared secular religion. Despite all of our disappointments with its functioning, we still worship at the shrine of global institutions like the UN.”)

\textsuperscript{143} Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013) (“We therefore conclude the presumption against extraterritoriality applies to claims under the ATS, and that nothing in the statute rebuts that presumption. . . . If Congress were to determine [it wishes to reach foreign corporate activities], a statute more specific than the ATS would be required.”).

\textsuperscript{144} See, e.g., Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152–53 (1908) (interpreting the statutory grant of federal question jurisdiction to be narrower than what is constitutionally permitted); Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 267 (1806)
the presumption against extraterritoriality was applied in Kiobel, the Roberts decision was expected.

The Breyer concurrence—joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan—however, has much greater implications for international law. Breyer would not have imposed any presumption against extraterritorial regulation and instead would have “looked to established international jurisdictional norms to help determine the statute’s substantive reach.”145 In finding then that the Alien Tort Statute would not apply to foreign-cubed cases, the Breyer concurrence underscored that the broadest forms of universal civil jurisdiction are not permitted under international jurisdictional law. Instead, American courts may exercise “jurisdiction only where distinct American interests are at issue.”146 While Breyer recognizes that international norms have long imposed a duty for nations “not to provide safe harbors for their own nationals who commit such serious crimes abroad,”147 the concurrence rejects the idea that human rights claims because of their universal nature can be raised in any court. As the concurrence explains, the facts of Kiobel do not support providing such broad extraterritorial jurisdiction under international law.148 In this way, Breyer respects traditional concepts of international law that would find broad assertions of extraterritorial power problematic.149

One final point: scholars often assert, without explanation, that in a globalized world, extraterritorial domestic regulation is necessary.150 But why this is so is unclear. We have seen periods

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145. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1673 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (citation omitted).
146. Id. at 1674.
147. Id. at 1675.
148. Id. at 1677 (“Applying these jurisdictional principles to this case, however, I agree with the Court that jurisdiction does not lie.”).
150. See Kirshner, supra note 84, at 262, 266 (describing how as corporations become increasingly transnational that “extraterritorial jurisdiction is necessary”); Slaughter & Zaring, supra note 61, at 2–4 (arguing that a “third shift [in extraterritoriality] is imminent, as a necessary response to the forces of globalization” and that with globalization the “tide circles demarcating national jurisdiction, even based on an expanded conception of territoriality, became either impossible or meaningless”). But see RAUSTIAAL, supra note 29, at 118 (describing, but disagreeing with, the commonly held view that as economic and
where the world’s economy was highly integrated, and yet domestic law remained strictly territorially prescribed.\textsuperscript{151} And conversely, we have seen nations use extraterritorial laws aggressively, even during times of isolation.\textsuperscript{152} No clear reason exists why global regulation cannot be achieved through multilateral means. At the very least, there should be some burden to demonstrate that multilateral agreement is unavailable before jumping to unilateral enforcement.

CONCLUSION

In the near term, human rights advocates may view the \textit{Kiobel} decision as an unraveling of progress made. But that initial pessimism should quickly give way. While the broadest promise of \textit{Filártiga} that the Alien Tort Statute should be treated as a kind of global cause of action is now gone, the most important parts of Alien Tort Statute litigation remain. Claims against U.S. citizens, including corporations, or foreign citizens living in the United States should still be viable. More importantly, while the human rights community may initially moan the loss, in the longer term the rejection of unilateral regulation of foreigners for conduct abroad is a positive development for international law. As described above, the growth of global, unilateral regulation of the kind pluralists embrace is no friend to human rights.

Let me end on a different note. A recent surge of commentary invites the human rights community into a similar, or perhaps greater, folly—to double-down and promote foreign-cubed cases under state law and in state courts.\textsuperscript{153} With luck, this invitation will be declined.

\textsuperscript{151} For an overview, see Parrish, supra note 57, at 285. \textit{See also RAUSTIALA, supra} note 29, at 118–19 (“As economic historians often point out, in the years preceding the First World War the international system was in fact highly globalized . . . [which] presents a puzzle for accounts that link extraterritoriality to economic interdependence.”).

\textsuperscript{152} \textit{See RAUSTIALA, supra} note 29, at 119; \textit{see also Margolies, supra} note 34, at 576 (noting how the United States used extraterritorial laws as a particularly important tool of foreign policy even in the nineteenth century).

\textsuperscript{153} \textit{See} Christopher A. Whytock et al., \textit{Foreword: After Kiobel – International Human Rights Litigation in State Courts and Under State Law}, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1, 8 (2013) (“We may be on the verge of a new world of transnational human rights litigation where U.S. state courts and courts outside the United States will increasingly overshadow U.S. federal courts as forums for the adjudication of human rights claims.”); \textit{see also} Paul Hoffman & Beth Stephens, \textit{International Human Rights Cases under State Law and in State Courts}, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 9, 10 (2013) (predicting that, regardless of the \textit{Kiobel} decision, human rights cases will continue in both federal and state courts). This strategy has
While individual litigants may have few choices, employing a state law strategy is unlikely to meaningfully advance human rights. These cases face tremendous hurdles to success.\textsuperscript{154} While the presumption against extraterritoriality may not apply, courts will rightly be reluctant to adjudicate foreign claims for abuses occurring abroad to which the state has no interest. The same root concerns that motivated the \textit{Kiobel} court to decide the way it did, will cause state court judges to decline to hear these cases too. The cost of lost time and energy to this kind of strategy could be significant.

The human rights community has a different option: to re-embrace multilateral engagement. Global human rights challenges are too daunting and complex for any nation, no matter how powerful, to effectively manage on its own. Progress can be made if human rights groups refocus energies to press the United States, its citizens, and corporations to respect human rights and the rule of law, and to promote international agreements with other nations. That respect includes avoiding unilateral imposition of U.S. law (even those laws purporting to incorporate international norms) on foreigners for conduct occurring abroad.