Deconstructing the Slums of Baltimore

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Deconstructing the Slums of Baltimore

During the nineteenth century, Baltimore and other American port cities became centers of commerce and industry. Enterprise attracted workers from afar. Many of the newcomers were unable to demand a living wage. They huddled on the edge of the marketplaces picking up scraps.¹

Close encounters with the poor left the comfortable majority with a mixed sense of guilt and anxiety. Guilt sprang from the conflict between charitable inclination and the desire to protect privilege. Disquiet came from the concern that proximity to the poor might increase the incidence of crime and contagion.²

Baltimore’s nineteenth-century leaders responded by blaming the “undeserving poor” for their own social problems. In the 1820s, the historian Thomas Griffith opined that “in this country, [the poor] cannot suffer for a scarcity of bread or work” and that “inebriety” was a well-known cause of pauperism.³ In 1832, Dr. Jameson, the city’s consulting physician, blamed dirtiness, intemperance, and gluttony for the plight of the “lower class” residents.⁴ Mayor Jerome, in his 1850 message, saw the city’s foreign-born as “beggars” and “filthy vagabonds” who were unproductive and violent.⁵ The board of health, in 1858, attributed the “miserable existence” of the “idle and dissolute” to their “loss of ordinary sensibilities and humanity.”⁶

Only when the poor posed a threat to the larger community need there be a public response. On such occasions, pockets of disease and dens of

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inequity would be cleared away to make room for a new street or market. The dispossessed could then again be overlooked, out of sight, out of mind.

It was not until the end of the century that photo-journalist Jacob Riis in his best-selling book *How the Other Half Lives* reminded the American public of the plight of the urban poor. His photographs of children in squalor and privation proved unforgettable. Just two years later, the United States Congress responded by directing the Commissioner of Labor to make "a full investigation relative to what is known as the slums of the city."4

The term "slum" had been used on the back streets of Dickensian London in slang reference to the squalid sleeping quarters of the urban poor, but Congress's directive represents the first known official occasion upon which city shacks and shanties had been referred to as "slums." Rather than directly dealing with the "problem of poverty," the focus on slums diverted attention to one its troublesome side effects—the substandard living conditions of the poor.10

Substandard housing seemed more susceptible of solution than the problem of poverty. Shacks and shanties could be cordoned off into segregated neighborhoods thereby buffering affluent communities from crime and contagion. Better yet, if poor houses were cleared away the locus of poverty could then be eliminated. Since slum dwellers had only themselves to blame, city leaders felt no moral imperative to improve the living conditions of the poor.11

The labor commissioner returned in 1894 with a report on *The Slums of Baltimore, Chicago, New York and Philadelphia.*16 This essay takes a second look at the nineteenth-century housing conditions in one of those cities, the "slums of Baltimore." It argues that the characterization of these impoverished neighborhoods as "slums" served to justify the community's response to poverty and racial inequality.13 Focus on these public choices may shed light on the dark shadows of anti-poverty and racial policies yet today.

Baltimore was selected for study by the Commissioner of Labor as the "most typical business southern city in the Union . . . [with] all elements of a great metropolis."14 The report reached two surprising conclusions. First, its statistics demonstrated "no greater sickness prevailing in the [slum] district than in other parts of the cities involved." And second, it determined that:

White people . . . represent the great mass of people residing in the

slum districts . . . [In] Baltimore . . . it is shown that 95.85 per cent of the residents of the slum district are white [and] 4.12 per cent black. The conclusion drawn . . . are briefly, that in Baltimore the proportion of blacks, mulattoes, etc. in the slum district canvassed is much less than that found in the whole city.15

Both of these conclusions seem inaccurate.

**Disease Rate**

The first conclusion took the Commission investigators (and city authorities) by surprise. Since Baltimore's beginning, "crowds, poverty and filth, [were] everywhere regarded as among the most destructive combinations for the development of disease with all its dire attendant." For one hundred years, the conventional medical wisdom had been that the foul air associated with overcrowding was a primary cause of disease. Now the statistical evidence showed no greater sickness prevailing in the slums than elsewhere.16

Original Baltimore had encircled the tidal basin of the Patapsco River from Federal Hill on the southwest, past the docks to the north, and thence a mile and a half east along the edge of a swampy cove to Fell's Point. It was cut in half by the Jones Falls, a freshwater stream flowing into the basin from the northwest. The first encampments of Baltimore's poor were at the water's edge. Small crude dwellings sprang up at the foot of Federal Hill, landward of the waterfront docks, on the sodden banks of the Jones Falls and, along the cove at Fell's Point.17

Disease plagued nineteenth century Baltimore. Time and again, outbreaks of yellow fever, malaria, cholera, and typhoid fever swept the town. These epidemics seemed peculiarly associated with the low-lying encampments of the poor. The yellow fever epidemic of 1797, for example, was said to have begun in the stagnant waters of the Falls Point cove and to have been spread by a strong easterly wind to the huts and hovels on the banks of the Jones Falls, and thence on to the shacks and shanties at the foot of Federal Hill. Recurrent disease on Fell's Point eventually convinced those residents who could afford to do so to relocate on the higher ground to the west of the Jones Falls.18

Nineteenth-century medical opinions differed as to whether blame for
the "malignant effects of fever" should be placed on "miasmatic poison," or on "stagnant water" or on the "idle and wandering poor, who have ... infested our City," themselves. But in any case, the appropriate response seemed clear enough. The city fathers adopted measures designed to fill in the "low and sunken situations" and to remove the "great hordes of ... the depraved." Examples abound. In 1797 a "market-space canal" drained the marsh and displaced many of the huts and shacks along the west bank of the Jones Falls. The exceptionally high death rate from 1818 to 1822 gave impetus to diking, filling and draining operations that gradually filled the shallow twenty-acre cove between the Jones Falls and Fells Point converting this "foul core in the heart of the city" into twenty new "city blocks." After the cholera epidemic of 1832 decimated the gambling dens and whorehouses along the downtown waterfront, they were cleared away for an extension of Lombard Street. During the cholera epidemic of 1866, one infected block was forcibly emptied and fumigated and, the Baltimore Health Department explained why:

In Elbow Lane, in one square, 20 cases occurred in 2 days: the crowded conditions of the houses, the filth of the houses and the people (negroes) we thought justified extreme measures. Every person, both sick and well, was removed to the quarantine grounds, the sick in the hospital and the others in barracks.

Now to the surprise of all, in 1894 the statistical evidence showed the rate of disease prevailing in the slum districts no greater than in other parts of the city. Looking back, the parity in sickness statistics can be in part explained. Nuisance diseases (those associated with environmental conditions) were for the most part either insect-borne (malaria, yellow fever, and typhus fever) or water-borne (cholera and typhoid fever). Historically, the high morbidity rate in poor neighborhoods was primarily attributable to their location on wet lands near the breeding grounds of mosquitoes. Public works draining and filling marsh land had reduced the mosquito habitat so that during the decades 1860-90 the rate of death from malaria and yellow fever was on the wane. By 1890 such insect-borne diseases accounted for a scant 1 percent of the total deaths in the city. Pathogen pollution, on the other hand, was no respecter of neighborhood. Rich and poor alike shared the risk of contracting cholera or typhoid fever from Baltimore's tainted water supply.

With respect to the incidence of tuberculosis, however, the commission's conclusion seemed off the mark. Public health data compiled elsewhere showed that the death rate from tuberculosis among Negroes was much higher than for whites. In 1890, for example, the tuberculosis death rate among "colored inhabitants" was twice that of white inhabitants. The Commissioner of Labor statistics would not have reflected this, however, since the "slums of Baltimore" that he had selected as representative, categorically excluded poor black neighborhoods.
For the whole of Baltimore's population the death rate from tuberculosis in the years after 1875 was undergoing a remarkable drop with the rate of decline for whites strikingly more acute than for Negroes. This left public health officials who associated tuberculosis with overcrowding and poverty unable to explain why declines were taking place "under sanitary conditions of the worst kind" in Polish and Russian Jewish neighborhoods.31

Racial and Ethnic Composition

By 1890 Baltimore inhabitants numbered 440,000. The black population, swollen by migration from the South following the Civil War, counted 67,000. The foreign-born population was almost as large. Successive waves of immigration from Ireland, Germany, Poland, Russia, and Italy had resulted in as many as 60,000 to 65,000 newcomers. The foreign newcomers found themselves in competition with the largely impoverished Negro population for cheap dwelling space. Most of the Negroes, and approximately 15,000 of the newest immigrants (primarily Poles, Russian Jews and Italians) lived in substandard dwellings clustered according to race, religion and nationality.32

Substandard houses in other great American cities (Chicago and New York, for example) typically took the form of tenement houses containing four or more families. Nineteenth-century Baltimore, on the other hand, was built in blocks of single family brick houses, and its leaders boasted "there are no tenements in Baltimore."33

But this proposition proved too much. Baltimore landlords met the demand for low income housing by in-filling. Back buildings were constructed along the alleys and back-to-back at right angles to the street. Passageways through the front houses gave access to interior courts.34 Profit-maximizing landlords filled every nook and cranny with living spaces. Baltimore had developed its own architecturally distinctive "haunts of misery" populated by the town "undesirables."35

The commissioner of labor had defined the "slums of the cities" as "dirty back streets, especially such streets as are inhabited by a squalid and criminal population; they are low and dangerous neighborhoods."36 So defined, the term had a double meaning—physically "slums" consisted of defective dwellings, socially "slums" were the habitat of inferior residents. It was the foreign-born and the Negroes who bore the badge of social inferiority.

Using later data it is evident that in 1890 Baltimore had five neighbor-

DECONSTRUCTING THE SLUMS OF BALTIMORE
Fells Point

After losing its rivalry with the west side of town for economic and social dominance, Fells Point continued as the point of entry for immigrants. The Point's first poor residents had been Negroes who worked on the waterfront and lived along its alleys, but, by 1830, massive immigration found the Irish and Germans in competition with established African Americans for jobs and dwelling spaces.38

European newcomers displaced the Negroes in both the workplace and the neighborhood. By the 1890s, Polish immigrants had supplanted the Irish and Germans, creating a ghetto of a new dimension. Single dwellings housed from six to eight families, one to a room. Water supply was from yard hydrants, and outdoor privies served as toilets.39 Fells Point was described by a health official as "an augean stable... a mass of nuisance."40

East Bank of the Jones Falls

Early in the nineteenth century, city leaders filled in the marshy cove between Town and Point to create twenty new "city blocks" on the east bank of the Jones Falls. Projectors built 120 new houses along the newly created President, Albemarle, Eden, and Caroline Streets.41 The first owners were native-born Americans, but, after a single generation the houses were repopulated by Russian Jews and Italians, who converted them into apartments housing three and more families. The area became the center of the city's garment district. Butchering of livestock sometimes took place on the premises, and water and sewerage were inadequate. Overcrowding left the living quarters ill-ventilated and unsanitary.42

Hughes Street District

Since Baltimore's beginning, Negroes had lived on interior lowlands to the west of the harbor basin and had worked in the nearby factories and brickyards. In 1852 the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad tore down the five blocks in the heart of this district to make way for its Camden Station. This clearance scattered Baltimore's black population. Some of the displaced persons crowded into the already established Hughes Street district at the foot of Federal Hill, a block to the east; others moved several blocks west of the station to establish a black presence nearby in Pigtown; and, some moved to the Biddle Alley neighborhood twenty-five blocks to the north.43

By 1890 most of the original wooden houses at the foot of Federal Hill had been replaced. Hughes Street [nee Honey Alley] lay at the center of a interconnected labyrinth of courtyards. Meyer Court, Brannan Court, Redmon Court, Butler Alley, Hess Court, and Hughes Court created a district consisting of 120 houses occupied exclusively by Negroes. Most of the dwellings were small, with four or five rooms, and many were built back-to-back with a house to the rear, so as to be without any ventilation. The occupants were forced to use a public privy on vacant land, and many had no water supply.44

Pigtown

Following the Civil War, rural blacks moving to Baltimore from the South joined Negroes displaced by the construction of Camden Station and clusters of white immigrants, to create a pocket of poverty to the west of the station.45 The Baltimore News described the conditions there in 1892 as follows:

Open drains, great lots filled with high weeds, ashes and garbage accumulated in the alleyways, cellars filled with filthy black water, houses that are total strangers to the touch of whitewash or scrubbing brush, human bodies that have been strangers for months to soap and water, villainous looking negroes who loiter and sleep around street corners and never work... That's Pigtown.46

Biddle Alley District

On the northwest outskirts of the city there had been a black presence since the 1830s, when Negroes in domestic service to the wealthy families on the nearby hill had located there. Following the Civil War, the area became the preferred dwelling place of the black middle class. At the north end of the district, Baltimore's 250 Negro professionals acquired substantial three-story townhouses along the main streets, but on its southern edge lay a labyrinth of back streets. The so-called Biddle Alley district comprised over two hundred dwellings housing poor black families in damp and dilapidated alley houses with bad sanitation and insufficient water supply.47

"Representative" Slums

The commissioner of labor's conclusion that "white persons... repre-
sent the great mass of persons residing in slum districts" seems to have been intentionally misleading. When he reported back to Congress in 1894, the commissioner made no effort to investigate Baltimore's entire slum population. He instead selected a "representative" district said to be the center of the slum population. Based upon his study of that district he concluded that white people represented 95 percent of the persons residing in Baltimore's slums.

The report's conclusion was arrived at through the simple stratagem of omitting from the "representative" slum district any black neighborhoods. "In consultation with city authorities" the investigators denominated as the center of the slum population the all-white eastside neighborhoods and categorically excluded from their sample the westside Negro districts of Hughes Street, Pigtown and Biddle Alley.

The facts point to the conclusion that the Negro slum population was larger than that of the white slum population. The black population of Baltimore, 67,000, was slightly more than the foreign-born population, and the poverty rate among the blacks was almost certainly higher.

This sampling error was not likely one of oversight. The existence of black slums was in the news. A 1892 series of articles in the Baltimore News had described slum conditions among both immigrants and Negroes. Black Pigtown was characterized as the "worst slum in town." Circumstances suggest that the city authorities purposefully prevailed upon the labor commissioner to draw district lines that would dramatically discount the Negro presence.

Authority in Baltimore City was then exercised by Boss Isaac Freeman Ras in. Under his leadership the Democratic Party had controlled the city for twenty years. He dominated the city council and retained the electoral support of the foreign-born through patronage. Negroes voted Republican, and the Democrat machine ignored them. An 1884 editorial by the Democratic Baltimore Sun displayed the prevailing party attitude toward the Negro:

The best thing that can be done for the colored people is to let them alone. If they are treated kindly, the fears that beset them will soon be dissipated and they will be put in the best condition for working out their own deliverance, politically and otherwise.

Discounting the Negro slums supported the position of the Democratic Party. Perhaps, the poor Negro, if ignored, would go away.

The commissioner of labor statistically surveyed the race, nationality, literacy, occupations, income, and health of the inhabitants of the slums of Baltimore, Chicago, New York, and Philadelphia without making any recommendation as to corrective action. That he left to the city authorities.

And authority in Baltimore City was changing. "Good government" Republicans ousted the entrenched Democrat machine in 1895. Thereafter, during the first decade of the twentieth century, Reform Democrats took over the administration of Baltimore. The city had fallen into the hands of Progressives.

The reformed city governments responded to the commissioner of labor's report on the slums of Baltimore not at all. Finally, in 1904 several private charitable organizations sponsored a study designed to improve housing conditions in Baltimore. The field inquiry (delayed by the fire of 1904) was conducted by Janet Kemp and completed in 1907. It was anecdotal rather than statistical. It focused its attention on both east side (foreign-born) and west side (Negro) slums. It assumed, without any additional quantitative evidence, that slum neighborhoods posed a significant health risk to the slum-dwellers and a threat to the larger community of contagion. It made recommendations for remedial legislation.

Kemp's recommendations discriminated between immigrant tenements and the Negro alley houses. By 1900, Baltimore's leadership had come to recognize the inevitability of a large foreign-born population. Immigrants counted 70,000 of the city's 500,000 inhabitants and continued on the rapid rise. Kemp proposed a number of reforms intended to assimilate the Poles, Russian Jews and Italian newcomers into the mainstream of American society. To improve their living conditions she called for various building restrictions (e.g., height, light, ventilation, water, and sewer service, etc.) land-use regulations, licensing requirements, and frequent inspections.

Kemp showed a less accommodating attitude towards Baltimore's Negro population, which by 1900 counted 77,000. She observed that "low standards and the absence of ideals" were partly to blame for the conditions among the "negro race," and held "shiftless, irresponsible," Negro alley dwellers "in some degree accountable for the squalor and wretchedness" of their neighborhoods. She suggested that some of the defective black alley houses
be condemned and destroyed by municipal authority and evidenced no concern as to where the dispossessed would relocate.\textsuperscript{38}

Since the birth rate of Negroes in Baltimore had never approached the death rate,\textsuperscript{40} Kemp may have thought that if in-migration could be discouraged, the colored population would shrink away. The historian George Frederickson described the nationwide acceptance of this viewpoint among the reformers:

If blacks were a degenerating race with no future, the problem ceased to be one of how to prepare them for citizenship or even how to make them more productive and useful members of the community. The new prognosis pointed rather to the need to segregate or quarantine a race liable to be a source of contamination and social danger to the white community, as it sank even deeper into the slough of disease, vice and criminality.\textsuperscript{\textendash}31

In order to protect the white community from invasion, crime, and contagion additional policies could be put in place to isolate the Negro neighborhoods. According to the credo of Social Darwinism, Negro slums, if left alone, would dwindle away.\textsuperscript{\textendash}41

Deconstructing Slums

According to the political linguist David Bell "language shapes perception and thought." Words serve as a sort of perceptual lens through which decision-makers see their community and justify their policies. At the turn of the twentieth century, "slums" served city leaders as a useful linguistic category when they came to justify their choices as to what to do about the paupers in their midst.\textsuperscript{\textendash}63

When urban poverty proved to be an endemic side effect of nineteenth-century capitalism, an obvious solution suggested itself. Philanthropists or governments might share their wealth so that everyone could afford adequate food, housing, clothing, and health care.\textsuperscript{\textendash}64 The plutocracy, however, dismissed this strategy as both too expensive, and too risky. Alms might be provided to impoverished widows and children, but a dole for the unworthy poor would only serve to "encourage idleness and extravagance" among the lumpenproletariat.\textsuperscript{\textendash}65

Rather than dealing with poverty, the powers-that-be focused on one of its troublesome side effects—the substandard living conditions of the impoverished. The characterization of poor neighborhoods as slums "inhabited by a squalid and criminal population" relieved the better elements of humanitarian concern for the suffering of the poor, and re-enforced the notion that slums should be cordoned off, or cleared away.

Nineteenth-century truths proved false and trends did not continue, but policies persisted into the twentieth century. Modern medical science dismissed the fears that miasmas from poor houses were infecting the larger community. Baltimore’s poor black population rather than dwindling away, doubled and re-doubled. But the ruling hegemony remained too cheap to provide relief from poverty, and the reform rhetoricians continued to blame the slums for the city’s problems.

The twentieth-century discourse on slums presented several new turns of phrase. With tens of thousands of poor families unable to pay the rent on standard housing, Baltimore City kept its housing stock affordable by allowing defective dwellings to be rented to poor tenants at cheaper rents. Landlords of the units with severe problems were typically a disreputable lot of small-time entrepreneurs who bottom-fed on the capitalist food-chain. They came to be called "slumlords"\textsuperscript{\textendash}46 and shared the blame with "slumdwellers" for the privation among the city’s poor.

"Blighted" housing conditions were also blamed for urban decay. The word "blight" played off on the historical association between poor houses and poor health, but here the blight affected not the human stock but the housing stock. A good example of this way of thinking (and talking) is found in the words of U.S. Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas, in his 1953 opinion apologizing for the governmental sponsored demolition of urban neighborhoods:

Miserable and disreputable housing conditions may do more than spread disease and crime and immorality. They may also suffocate the spirit by reducing the people who live there to the status of cattle. They may indeed make living an almost Insufferable burden. They may also be an ugly sore, a blight on the community which robs it of charm, which makes it a place from which men turn. The...
misery of housing may despoil a community as an open sewer may ruin a river.  

To hear Justice Douglas talk one would think that slums cause poverty (rather than poverty causing slums).

There is a certain historical resonance in this mode of thinking and talking. Since substandard dwellings infect neighborhoods with crime and addiction, then the answer is to remove the source of the contagion. Just as filling the marshes eliminated yellow fever and malaria, the turning of poor houses and high-rise projects into rubble may be thought to cure the community’s ills. The blight metaphor suggests a simple solution to the problem of urban poverty.

By talking about slums and blight community leaders have avoided talking about poverty. Embarrassing questions as to the redistribution of wealth in a market economy are left unaddressed and the slum dwellers and slumlords are blamed for the squalor. Moreover, since the slums are held responsible for sickness and crime, they deserve to be cordoned off or cleared away (without regard for what becomes of those segregated or dispossessed). Hence public policies respecting the “slums of Baltimore” have served to divert attention from the problems of poverty, to perpetuate racial segregation, and to make the “poorest of the poor” worse off, not better off.

Notes


5 Ibid., 139.


showed Baltimore as having 26,100 units (21,400 rental units) with physical problems, with 19,500 being reported as moderate and with 6,600 as severe. Sixty thousand substandard units are owner-occupied. Lead paint renders many owner-occupied units problematic even though they are otherwise in good condition. Baltimore City Department of Housing and Community Development, Consolidated Plan, July 2000–June 2005, 10–15, 34–35.