
Czeslaw Tubilewicz
# TAIWAN AND THE SOVIET BLOC, 1949-1991*

Czeslaw Tubilewicz**

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. Introduction</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Origins of Anti-Sovietism</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Sino-Japanese War</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. Russian and Soviet Views on Taiwan before 1949</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. Stalin and the Liberation of Taiwan</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI. Cold War Enemies</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII. Taiwan Strait Crisis, August-September 1958</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII. Emerging Ambiguity</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IX. The Soviet Card</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X. CHIANG Ching-kuo</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XI. Trade with Eastern Europe</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XII. Soviet “Taiwan Option”?</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XIII. Restrictions on Trade Lifted</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XIV. Responses from Eastern Europe</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XV. End of Taipei’s Cold War with Eastern Europe</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XVI. Responses from the Soviet Union</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XVII. Soviet-Taiwanese Rapprochement</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XVIII. China’s Reaction</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XIX. After the Coup d’Etat</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XX. Planning a Long Term Offensive</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XXI. Commercial Relations</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XXII. Conclusion</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glossary of Selected Names and Terms</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

* Earlier versions of some of the material incorporated in this study have appeared in *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 56, No. 6 (September 2004), pp. 891-906; and *Communist and Post-communist Studies*, Vol. 38 (2005), pp. 457-473.

** Czeslaw Tubilewicz is an Assistant Professor and Co-Programme Leader of China Studies at the Open University of Hong Kong. His research on Taiwan’s relations with the communist and post-communist states has appeared in *The China Quarterly, Cold War History, Communist and Post-communist Studies, East Asia, Europe-Asia Studies, Issues and Studies, Politics, The Russian Review* and *Statecraft & Diplomacy*. He is the editor of *Critical Issues in Contemporary China*, to be published by Routledge in September, 2006.
I. INTRODUCTION

In recent years, a substantial body of evidence on Cold War history examining Taiwan's contacts with the Soviet Union (USSR) and its allies has emerged in a variety of publications in English, Russian and Chinese. Some of it has leaked from archives, and the rest has come from memoirs, interviews, or journalistic investigations. Some news reported during the Cold War has withstood the test of time and complements our expanding knowledge of the topic. This study is conceived of as a synthesis. It draws most on published evidence and specialized studies in English, Russian and Chinese, presenting historical data, summarizing the conclusions reached by other researchers, and identifying debates on various themes relevant to Taiwan's Cold War ties with the Soviet bloc. The objective of this synthesis is to present newly available historical material and consider whether this material sheds new light on the topic, necessitating a novel interpretation of Cold War diplomacy between the Republic of China (ROC) and the Soviet Union and its allies.

Taking into account new evidence, this study will argue that Taipei and Moscow remained enemies throughout the Cold War. Until the late 1980s, the ROC leadership stressed ideological hostility to the Soviet Union as a way of thwarting or impeding emerging rapprochement between China and the United States (US) and winning US gratitude for being a loyal ally. Despite its short-lived flirtation with the “Soviet card” in the late 1960s to early 1970s, the ROC regime was too keenly aware of the unreliability of Soviet support and the importance of the United States for Taiwan’s political and economic survival to seriously consider rapprochement with the USSR. Ultimately, however, it could be argued that Taipei played the “East European card,” as it lifted some trade restrictions with selected Soviet allies in the late 1970s while continuing all embargos on direct trade and communication with the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union, for its part, pursued a two-line strategy. Officially, it adhered to the “one China” principle in its domestic and foreign policies. Unofficially, however, successive Soviet leaders – from Stalin to Brezhnev – considered Taiwan’s autonomy from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as advantageous, since it stalled Sino-US rapprochement. The Kremlin’s “Taiwan option” in the late 1960s was both a reflection of the policy debates on China within the Soviet leadership and an element in Soviet coercive diplomacy designed to pressure the PRC regime into normalizing relations with the USSR. For geo-strategic and ideological reasons, Moscow
never regarded relations with Taiwan as capable of compensating for the absence of good neighbourly ties with China. The Soviet allies in Europe, for their part, neither objected to, nor encouraged economic ties with the ROC. They warmed up to Taiwan in the late 1980s in order to seek Taiwanese investments and trade opportunities. They maintained, however, a consistent “one China” policy on the diplomatic front.

II. ORIGINS OF ANTI-SOVIETISM

Following his defeat in the civil war in China in 1949, CHIANG Kai-shek (JIANG Jieshi) became a vocal critic of the Soviet Union, while the truncated Republic of China on Taiwan emerged as a self-styled beachhead (or unsinkable aircraft carrier) of the anti-Soviet forces in East Asia. In Soviet Russia in China: A Summing Up at Seventy (published in 1957), Chiang traced his anti-Sovietism back to August-November 1923 when he visited the Soviet Union for the first and the last time. During his visit, Chiang studied the Soviet Communist Party, the military and political organisations, inspected various installations and listened to briefings by Soviet officials. Despite the Soviets’ manifest efforts to impress their Chinese visitor, the future leader of the ROC left the Soviet Union convinced “more than ever” that Soviet political institutions were instruments of tyranny and terror. He allegedly returned to China as an anti-communist. Chiang’s anti-Soviet prejudice was further reinforced by the Soviet “treacherous” and “aggressive” policies towards China in the mid-1940s, which revealed – in his view, conclusively – Moscow’s designs to subjugate China and rule it through the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) as a proxy.¹

While Chiang’s anticommunist credentials were useful in the context of the escalating Cold War, the emerging evidence from archives in Moscow and China indicates that Chiang’s anti-Soviet and anti-communist convictions are unlikely to have stemmed from his Soviet visit in 1923. In fact, much of the new evidence points to Chiang’s early enthusiasm for communist ideas, admiration of the Soviet Union and genuine interest in the history of the communist movement. His unpublished diary – left on the mainland – reveals that in the early 1920s (1919-1926), CHIANG Kai-shek was a vivid

reader of radical journal *Xin Qingnian* (New Youth) and many books on socialism and Marxism, including *The Communist Manifesto*, the collection of Lenin’s works and historical studies of revolutions in Germany, France and Russia. Commenting on the Bolshevik Revolution, he approvingly noted in early June 1923: “I just know that the methods and institutions of the Russian revolution were not new; nine out of ten of them imitated those of France. However, the Russians rectified the errors made by the French, which was most valuable.”² The only reason Chiang did not advocate an immediate implementation of communism in China was that, in his view, China was not ready for such a radical development. To become communist, China needed to become independent and economically developed. By the mid-1920s, his diary entry identified the British foes – not the Soviets – as China’s prime enemy. The British barbarians reportedly hated Chiang so much that they plotted his murder.

As noted earlier, CHIANG Kai-shek’s dream of visiting Soviet Russia, dating back to 1920, was fulfilled in August 1923, when SUN Yat-sen appointed him as the head of the delegation to Moscow. In Russia, he was impressed with his hosts and the Russians in general, noting their friendliness and honesty. In his speech to a group of 400 Red Army soldiers, Chiang called himself a revolutionary and claimed a similarity of purpose between the Nationalist Party (Kuomintang, KMT) and the Soviet Union: a struggle to defeat imperialism and capitalism.³ While attending sessions of the Executive Committee of the Communist International (Comintern), Chiang revealed his admiration of Soviet Russia, calling Moscow the centre of world revolution and considering the Comintern as representing the interests of the proletariat across the world. He did leave the Soviet Union disappointed but his disappointment was caused by the Comintern’s criticism of the KMT’s revolutionary strategy and the Russians’ reluctance to assist the KMT in building the northwest base in Mongolia to launch an attack on Beijing. Upon his return from Russia, in a letter to LIAO

---


Zhongkai, Chiang concluded that "the Russian Party lacks sincerity. Its only guiding principle for China is to legitimise the CCP. Its China policy from the very beginning is to encroach on China [...]. Its so-called internationalism and world revolutionaries are nothing more than Caesarean imperialism." 4 Rather than being a genuine reflection of his observations in the Soviet Union, Chiang's harsh assessment may have been prejudiced by the draft treaty on the question of Mongolia, concluded between the Soviets and the Beijing government in March 1924. Irrespective of his disappointment over the Soviet policy on Mongolia, Chiang consistently supported the KMT's alliance with the Soviet Union to facilitate the KMT's efforts to reunify China. In December 1925, for example, Chiang declared that the KMT should accept the Soviet direction of the Chinese revolution and compared Sino-Soviet relations to Entente Cordiale of World War 1. 5 Such was his pro-Soviet stand that Mikhail Borodin – the Comintern's representative in Guangzhou – singled him out as the most devoted leftist in the KMT. Other Soviet advisers regarded him as "one of the best revolutionaries," a "radical kind, after the pattern of the French Jacobins." 6 Even after the March 1926 incident, when Chiang arrested the communists, the Soviet advisers and the Comintern considered him a centrist, rather than a counter-revolutionary. 7

It was the Zhongshan Gunboat Incident (March 19-20, 1926) that marked the turning point in Chiang's policy towards the Soviet Union. 8 Following the incident, Chiang became the most powerful leader in the KMT, while the influence of the communists and the Soviet advisers was seriously diminished. In his speeches, national revolution increasingly gained prominence at the expense of world revolution. Although he still acknowledged the importance of the

---

8. The gunboat, Zhongshan, under communist command, headed to Huangpu from Canton. Chiang suspected that the boat was sent to take him forcibly to Russia. On March 20, Chiang put Guangzhou under martial law, the gunboat under guard, the Soviet advisers under house arrest and arrested individual communists. For a personal account of the incident by CHIANG K'ai-shek's private secretary, CHEN Li-fu, see Sydney H. Chang and Ramon H. Myers (eds.), The Storm Clouds Clear over China: The Memoir of Ch'en Li-fu 1900-1993, Stanford: Hoover Press, 1994, pp. 28-32.
Soviet Union in world revolution, he believed that the KMT should exercise power independently. Yet, Chiang did not give up on cooperation with the Soviet Union and strove to improve relations with Moscow. In April 1926, he declared the alliance with the Soviet Union to be as strong as ever and proclaimed that the Chinese revolution was a part of the world revolution and the KMT was ready to accept Comintern's guidance. The arrests that followed the Zhongshan Gunboat Incident were supposedly directed only against individuals who had erred. Chiang asked for the early return of Borodin (who was in Moscow on consultations) and for the return of General Blyuchner from home leave, to resume his position as the senior military adviser. He also released ZHOU Enlai and other CCP members whom he had detained and had some right wing officers arrested to strike a balance. For their part, the Soviets hoped that Chiang would eventually lean to the left. The Northern Expedition, which the Soviets initially opposed as lacking revolutionary character, underscored tensions between the left and right wings within the KMT, which were symbolised by the split of the new government to two locations: Nanchang and Wuhan. Fearful of the increasing power and influence of the communists, both in the KMT and major municipalities, Chiang launched a surprise attack on the leftist forces in Shanghai in April 1927. Still, shortly after the Shanghai Incident, CHIANG Kai-shek maintained that the expulsion of the communists from the KMT was the party's internal matter and was of no concern to the Soviet Union. His emphasis on the importance of the KMT's autonomy, however, spelt the end of the alliance with Moscow.

Chiang's anticommunism and anti-Sovietism was a gradual process, arising from his disappointment with the arrogant behaviour of the Soviet military advisers, Moscow's opposition to the Northern Expedition, and – above all – the Chinese communists' challenge to his rule of the KMT. In the aftermath of his crushing of

11. CHEN Li-fu insists that the Soviets supported the Northern Expedition because of the similarities between communist ideology and SUN Yat-sen's sanminzhu yi, the Communists and the KMT's joint opposition to imperialism and the realisation that if the KMT failed in Guangdong, the CCP would not be able to survive. Chang and Myers (eds.), The Storm Clouds Clear over China, p. 31. Jay Taylor leans towards the thesis of Soviet opposition to the Northern Expedition. Jay Taylor, The Generalissimo's Son: Chiang Ching-kuo and the Revolutions in China and Taiwan, Cambridge, Mass., London: Harvard University Press, 2000, p. 35.
the leftist movement, Chiang's split with the Soviet Union was more of a political necessity rather than an expression of his anticommunist beliefs. In early May 1927, Chiang for the first time publicly called the Soviet Union an imperialist country. At the same time, Stalin came to the conclusion that Chiang's government was the centre of Chinese counter-revolution. On June 1, 1927, Stalin sent a telegram to Borodin calling for a communist revolution in China and the takeover of the KMT leadership.

III. SINO-JAPANESE WAR

The Japanese aggression against China forced CHIANG KAI-shek to reconsider his Soviet policy. In December 1932, his government resumed diplomatic relations with Moscow (suspended in 1927) and in 1937, concluded a Treaty of Nonaggression with the Soviet Union, in order to obtain Soviet military aid and recruit the Soviet Union to China's side against Japan. Although Chiang failed to manoeuvre the Soviets into a conflict with Japan, at the very least he secured Soviet arms deliveries, which substantially reduced the superiority of firepower enjoyed by the Japanese army at the outbreak of the war. Years after the war, however, Chiang did not appear particularly grateful. He recalled that between 1939 and 1941 China obtained 849 planes, 'plus some antiaircraft artillery and field guns' from the USSR, but emphasised that 'Soviet Russia drove hard bargains regarding Chinese exports and the arms she supplied were mostly lacking enough spare parts and unavailable when they were most needed.' Notably, he failed to acknowledge that the Soviet military aid (in the form of the deliveries of military equipment and dispatch of military advisers and pilots) contrasted rather sharply with the absence of assistance from the Western powers, who adopted a wait-and-see attitude towards the Sino-Japanese conflict. Yet, it should be emphasised that the Soviet military assistance to China was motivated by Moscow's enlightened self-interest rather than alliance obligations. China's war with Japan tied

14. V. Vorontsov, Sud'ba Kitaiiskovo Bonaparta (Life of Chinese Bonaparte), Moskva: Izdatelstvo Politicheskoi Literatury, 1989, p. 82.
down nearly a million Japanese troops, which allowed the Soviet army to defeat the Japanese in a number of armed skirmishes. These clashes convinced Tokyo that war with the USSR would be too risky. Thus, as John Garver concludes, China’s war of resistance “made a direct and important contribution to keeping the Soviet Union out of a war with Japan.” In 1941, Moscow and Tokyo concluded a Neutrality Treaty, which precluded a Soviet-Japanese war and put an end to the Soviet military support to CHIANG Kai-shek.

Chiang regretted the resumption of diplomatic ties with Moscow as well as the Nonaggression Treaty, as the renewed Sino-Soviet friendship, in his view, provided the Soviets with the opportunity to set up espionage centres in China and organs for directing the activities of Chinese communists against the Nationalists. Despite being invited to meet Stalin at least twice (spring 1942-summer 1945) on the Soviet side of the border to discuss Sino-Soviet relations, Chiang summarily declined the invitations. He reportedly feared being taken hostage along the lines of the Xian incident of December 1936, when his Generals ZHANG Xueliang and YANG Hucheng (with the support of the Chinese communists) kidnapped and forced him to join a united front with the communists against the Japanese. Towards the end of the Second World War, Chiang was conclusively convinced that the power of the CCP rested primarily on the support and guidance of the Soviet communists. In his view, the CCP was not indigenous to China, but rather an outgrowth of ‘Soviet Russia and the Communist empire’. Its aim was to set up “a Soviet puppet regime and to create the first satellite in Asia.” “Politically, the Chinese Communists’ insurrection was in fact Soviet Russia’s war of aggression against China. It was the Chinese Communist forces who started this war, but the instigation had come from Moscow.” Chiang believed that Stalin’s order or pressure would be sufficient to force the CCP to relinquish their armed forces and accept a subordinate role in China’s KMT-dominated political scene. As it turned out, Chiang’s belief in Soviet influence over the CCP worked to Stalin’s benefit. In 1945, in exchange for the Soviet promise not to aid the CCP, as well as Soviet guarantees regarding Manchuria and Xinjiang, Chiang agreed to a Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance. Grateful for the

Soviets' vague promise to "render to China moral support and aid in military supplies and other material resources, such support and aid to be entirely given to the National Government as the Central Government of China," Chiang consented to sovereignty of Outer Mongolia, as well as renewing several provisions of tsarist Russia's unequal treaties with imperial China. Unfortunately, Stalin did not intend to honour the pledges contained in the Treaty. As soon as the Nationalist government formally recognised Outer Mongolia in July 1945, Stalin threw his support behind the CCP in return for MAO Zedong's agreement to grant Moscow the privileges solicited from Chiang.

Whilst CHIANG Kai-shek was betrayed by Moscow on several occasions, he displayed a similar attitude towards the Soviets, having no qualms about discarding Soviet camaraderie when he found no use for it. He did so in 1927, having firmly established his leadership in the KMT, and it is unlikely that he would have cultivated friendly ties with the Soviet Union had he won the civil war in China. In other words, prior to his 1949 defeat, CHIANG Kai-shek might have evolved into a genuine anticommunist, but he was not – however inconsistent it might seem – a sworn enemy of the Soviet Union. Despite his claims to the contrary, he was a realpolitik tactician who played a "Soviet card" to reach his goals in foreign and domestic policies as much as the Soviets used co-operation with the KMT to advance their interests in China.

IV. RUSSIAN AND SOVIET VIEWS ON TAIWAN BEFORE 1949

The first written mention of Taiwan in Russia dates back to 1670, when the Russian embassy wrote a note on Formosa, considered "not too big, but [..] quite rich." In the late 17th century, Tsarist Russia also made its first encounters with Taiwan – through

20. JIANG Nan comments on CHIANG Kai-shek's anti-Sovietism: "There's much evidence showing CHIANG Kai-shek's dislike of the Soviet Union but at different periods CHIANG Kai-shek had different opinions. In 1925, he and Borodin were on very good terms. Without the Soviet rouble and guns, the Huangpu Military Academy could not have been established. If he had not liked the Soviet Union, he could not have upheld the slogan 'follow the example of the Soviet Union'.” JIANG Nan, The Biography of Jiang Jiqing, Hong Kong: Morning Star Publishing, 2000, p. 19.
the travels of some adventurous individuals – but Russia developed a political interest in the island only in the mid-19th century. Russian historian F. Toder attributes such an interest to Russia's rising fears about its territorial integrity in the Far East. Russia had neither colonial designs on Taiwan nor any specific economic interests in the island. The opening of the Taiwanese port of Tamshui for trade with Russia by the Treaty of Tianjin (June 1858) was copied from the Sino-British treaty rather than motivated by Russia's economic interests. Finance Minister Sergei Witte's programme for the economic development of Russia's Far East (November 1892) did not even mention Taiwan.22

In the aftermath of the Sino-Japanese war (1894-1895), Russia had no choice but to consider Taiwan's role in the balance of power in East Asia. In April 1895, China and Japan signed the Treaty of Shimonoseki, which ended the war and ceded to Japan the Chinese territories of Taiwan, the Pescadore Islands, as well as Port Arthur and the Liaodong peninsula. Russia vehemently opposed the secession of the latter two territories, feeling threatened by Japan's acquisition of a foothold on Asia's mainland, so close to Russia's territory. Besides, the Russians themselves coveted the ice-free ports of Dalian and Port Arthur (located at the southern tip of Liaodong) and, thus, preferred the Japanese imperialism to expand southwards rather than northwards. St. Petersburg was relatively unconcerned over the fate of Taiwan and the Pescadore Islands, paying attention primarily to the freedom of passage for its ships through the Taiwan Straits. In June 1895, Tokyo provided Russia (and other powers) with assurances of the international status of the Taiwan Straits, clearing the main obstacle to Russian recognition of Japanese sovereignty over Taiwan. In mid-October 1895, Russia informed Japan through its ambassador that it had no objections to the transfer of Taiwan to Japanese sovereignty. Russia, however, did not give up on Liaodong. Its opposition to Japanese claims to Port Arthur and the Liaodong peninsula – supported by France and Germany in the so-called Triple Intervention – forced Japan to renounce these claims in November 1895. Given St Petersburg's limited geo-political interest in Taiwan, it is not surprising that the Russians offered no assistance to the anti-Japanese movement in Taiwan.23

22. F. Toder, "Istoria izucheniya Taivania v Rossii" (History of Taiwan Studies in Russia), Problemy Dalnego Vostoka, No. 5 (1993), p. 46.
23. In May 1895, the Russian Foreign Minister, Prince Aleksandr Lobanov-Rostovskii reported to Nicholas II that the Chinese ambassador to Russia, XU Jincheng, in-
The Russian-Japanese war in 1904 re-ignited St. Petersburg's interest in Taiwan. In late 1904 to early 1905, Russia's military attache, Major General Dessine (or Tychino), secretly established contacts with the anti-Japanese movement in Taiwan. His reports mentioned Chinese admiral Kan, who allegedly offered Taiwanese assistance to the Russian navy. However, the Russian secret service's information on Dessine's links with YUAN Shikai raised suspicions in St. Petersburg. Nicholas II ordered his Foreign Minister V. N. Lamsdorf to discourage Dessine from taking initiatives and restrict his activities to collecting information. Irrespective of Russia's cautious approach, however, the Japanese recognised the danger of Russia's potential invasion of Taiwan. Had the Russian-Japanese war expanded to encompass Taiwan, the deliveries of strategic goods to the Japanese army would have been affected and Japan's war plans complicated. As a pre-emptive measure in the face of such a potential danger, Tokyo ordered mobilisation on the island. Tsar Nicholas II, however, decided against involving Taiwan in the war.

The war with Japan increased the Russian public's interest in Far Eastern affairs in general, and Taiwan in particular. Taiwan studies in Russia in the Far East Department of the University of Petersburg were initiated in the aftermath of the war. Russian scholars, such as N.V. Kyuner, S.G. Eliseev and N.A. Nevikii, published ethnographical and historical studies of Taiwan. Following the October Revolution, the Soviet scholarship maintained its interest in Taiwan, although much of its output was coloured by the Comintern's ideology. The Great Purges halted Taiwan studies in the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union supported the establishment of the communist movement on Taiwan. During the 1920s, selected Taiwanese communist activists studied in the Soviet Union. In 1927, they founded the communist movement in Taiwan, at first, in the form of

---

24. Toder, “Istoria izucheniya Taiavnya v Rossii,” p. 47. According to Lukin, the Russian government's lack of interest in Taiwan was conditioned by the belief that intervention would have undermined Russia's attempts to secure its interests in Manchuria. Lukin, The Bear Watches the Dragon, p. 253.


the national section of the Japanese Communist Party. In April 1928, the Taiwanese Communist Party (TCP) as a Nationality Branch of the Japanese Communist Party was set up in Shanghai.27 In the aftermath of the 6th Congress in 1928, the Comintern decided on a programme of revolutionary uprisings in the colonies and semi-colonies and no longer stressed the principle of “one country-one party.” By doing so, Moscow through the Comintern acknowledged the right of the Taiwanese to independence. Following the successful suppression of the TCP – now independent of the Japanese communists – by the Japanese colonial authorities in the early 1930s, the communist movement on Taiwan ceased to exist, and with it the influence of the Comintern. Its reconstruction in late 1945 was engineered by the CCP and Moscow was not involved in this process.28

The issue of Taiwan resurfaced in Soviet foreign policy during the Second World War. Moscow did not object to the return of Taiwan to Chinese sovereignty and once Franklin Roosevelt, Winston Churchill and CHIANG Kai-shek had agreed at the Cairo Conference in November 1943 to return Taiwan to China, Stalin accepted the decision. The Potsdam Conference of July 1945 reconfirmed that the terms of the Cairo Declaration should be carried out (that is, Taiwan should return to China) and that Japanese sovereignty should be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and some minor islands.

V. STALIN AND THE LIBERATION OF TAIWAN

Stalin and the CCP might have disagreed on the question of the liberation of all of China.29 However, when the CCP won the

29. According to the Soviet diplomat and historian, A. M. Ledovskii, any Soviet move in 1949 indicating open alliance with the Chinese communists could have led to the KMT’s annulment of the Friendship Treaty and the possible revoking by the Western powers of the Yalta Agreement. Thus, to display Moscow’s loyalty to the KMT regime, Soviet ambassador Nikolai V. Roshchin followed CHIANG Kai-shek when the latter, in early February 1949 evacuated his government from Nanjing to Guangzhou. The Soviets hoped that other ambassadors to China would do the same and, thus, would be prevented from calling for Western military intervention in the name of “protecting their nationals.” The foreign missions in Nanjing, however, followed neither Chiang nor Roshchin but stayed behind. A. M. Ledovskii, SSSR i Stalin v sudbakh
civil war, Stalin immediately abandoned the KMT and officially extended his support to the communists. Yet, his support for Beijing’s attempt to “liberate” Taiwan was ambiguous to say the least. To this day, Russian scholarship is divided over Stalin’s intentions regarding Taiwan. E. Bazhanov, for example, claims that the Kremlin rejected Chinese requests for air and naval support. Such a cautious approach was supposedly caused by Stalin’s fear of a third world war.30 Aleksandr Chudodeyev expresses a similar view. During talks in Moscow in 1950, Stalin – fearing a new world war – suggested that Mao “liberate” Hong Kong from British colonial rule rather than Taiwan from the KMT.31 According to Viktor Usov, however, Stalin did not oppose a military solution of the Taiwan issue and assisted Beijing in its efforts to modernise its military. In Usov’s view, the facts speak for themselves. Of the US$300 million loan granted by Moscow to Beijing on 14 February 1950, US$150 million were appropriated for arms purchases. In addition, the Soviet Union strengthened the Chinese army with air fighters (including MiGs) and constructed arms factories in China (of the 156 factories constructed with Soviet aid, 44 were military facilities).32

Post-Cold War declassified documents in the Russian archives and memoirs shed an additional – but not conclusive – light on the

---

30. E. P. Bazhanov, 
31. Aleksandr Chudodeyev,
32. Viktor Usov,
question of Stalin’s views on the liberation of Taiwan. Historians agree that the Chinese communists expected Soviet military assistance to capture Taiwan. Mao repeatedly cabled Moscow with his requests for air and naval support for the planned invasion, but he did not receive a positive answer. LIU Shaoqi, during his talks with Stalin in July-August 1949, raised the issue of Soviet assistance to liberate Taiwan. Ivan V. Kovalev – Stalin’s envoy to the Chinese communists in the late 1940s – recalls Liu renewing the request on July 11. Stalin allegedly rejected the idea out of hand, claiming that the provision of Soviet military assistance could have provoked a world war. According to A. M. Ledovskii, on July 25, MAO Zedong sent a telegram to Liu, urging Stalin to provide Beijing with military assistance within 6 months to one year to liberate Taiwan. Specifically, he asked for 1,000 pilots and 300 technical aviation staff, 100-200 fighters, 40-80 bombers, as well as the support of the Soviet navy. Ledovskii claims that Stalin avoided the topic of Taiwan during talks with Liu’s delegation. Based on Kovalev’s memoirs, Stalin proposed to turn the matter of aid over to an expanded Politburo meeting, which would include senior military leaders and some ministers. In the meeting on July 27, Stalin repeated his earlier arguments that the Soviet Union was not ready to risk war with the United States over Taiwan. In his repost, Liu withdrew his request for support and closed the issue.

For Mao, however, the case was not closed. In July, he had ordered the Third Field Army to prepare for landing operations on the island and declared the summer of 1950 as the date of the possible liberation of Taiwan. The communists’ failure to occupy the offshore island of Quemoy (Jinmen) in October reminded Mao of the necessity of Soviet military assistance if the amphibious invasion

34. Ledovskii, SSSR i Stalin v sudbakh Kitaya, p. 126.
35. Goncharov et al., Uncertain Partners, p. 70. According to CHEN Jian, at the meeting on July 27, the Soviet leadership (including Stalin) agreed to Beijing’s request for military assistance and agreed to receive LIU Yalou, commander of China’s newly established air force. MAO and ZHU De desired a strong air force in order to liberate Taiwan. LIU arrived in Moscow on August 11. The Chinese side requested 300-350 planes within a year. The Soviets agreed to help the CCP establish six aviation schools, which could train 350 pilots within a year and to sell 434 planes. Stalin reportedly approved these details in early October 1949. The first Soviet planes were delivered in mid-October. By the end of 1949, China had received 185 planes of different types from the Soviet Union. In September, Moscow also began assisting China with navy establishment. CHEN Jian, China’s Road to the Korean War, pp. 75-77.
was to succeed. While the Chinese military continued to build up the navy and air force for an invasion, Mao attempted to utilise his face-to-face talks with Stalin during his Moscow visit in December to solicit Soviet military assistance. Archival research led Ledovskii to believe that in response to Mao’s direct request for Soviet military assistance (in the form of pilots and covert military troops), Stalin did not rule out assistance, but acknowledged that “the form of such assistance needs to be thought out. The most important thing is not to give the Americans any pretext to intervene. We can send personnel from the General Staff and instructors any time. We have to think about the rest.” He also suggested that Mao send former KMT soldiers to Taiwan and use them to stage an uprising on the island.36 Ledovskii comments that Stalin’s cautious response to the Chinese requests was motivated by the fear of the Soviet Union being driven into war with the United States, seemingly committed to the defence of the island.37

Sergei Goncharov et al. – relying primarily on memoirs – offer a different interpretation of Stalin’s stand on Taiwan during Mao’s visit to Moscow. In the aftermath of US President Harry Truman’s press conference on January 5, 1950, in which Truman bluntly stated that no military aid or advice would be provided to the Nationalists based on Taiwan, Stalin feared that any “Chinese” solution of the Taiwan question without American interference could lead to normalising Sino-US relations. Such a development could have destroyed the basis for China’s acceptance of the Soviet security zone and provided Mao with an excuse to seek better terms in the negotiated Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance. In order to stall the possibility of Sino-US rapprochement, the Soviet media began regularly publishing articles about US support for the KMT on Taiwan, intending to demonstrate that the US hands-off policy towards Taiwan was fictitious. At the same time, Stalin reversed his policy on Taiwan and supported Mao’s plans to seize the island. Moscow began to help Mao upgrade his air-force. In advance of the Soviet agreement to a Chinese request to appropriate half of a US$300 million loan for military purposes (mostly for the purchase of naval equipment), the Soviet fleet had come out in support of the PRC’s right to liberate Taiwan. In February and March,

37. Ibid., p. 126. According to Taylor, Stalin supported Mao’s plans to invade Taiwan, as evidenced by the supplying of 2,000 front-line Soviet aircraft (including the most modern MIG15s), as well as pilots, instructors, parts and ordinance. Taylor, The Generalissimo’s Son, p. 194.
the Soviets stationed one air division near Shanghai and other units in northern Jiangsu Province. According to Goncharov et al. Stalin had a lot to gain if the Chinese invasion of Taiwan provoked an American military response, as it would have made Sino-US rapprochement impossible. Furthermore, Soviet public support for action against Taiwan strengthened the KMT lobby in the US. Goncharov et al., however, fail to explain whether Stalin developed any contingency plans regarding the Chinese invasion of Taiwan and the possibility of the US military involvement in the conflict. Moscow was obliged by the Friendship Treaty to assist China in the event of invasion "with all means at its disposal." This meant a Soviet-US war (possibly including the use of nuclear weapons), a scenario Stalin sought to avoid. It cannot, however, be entirely ruled out that Stalin never intended to invoke the Treaty to support China in case of the US military involvement in Beijing's attempt to invade Taiwan. The supply of armaments was, therefore, not so much a sign of Stalin's endorsement of Mao's plans regarding Taiwan, but rather an indication of Stalin's inclination to placate Mao, whose invasion plans Moscow was unable to avert. It was the Korean War, not Stalin's reservations, that prevented Mao from launching an amphibious attack on Taiwan in the summer of 1951.

VI. COLD WAR ENEMIES

Having fled Mainland China, Chiang's scope of diplomatic manoeuvrability vis-à-vis the Soviet Union was obviously limited. Moscow readily embraced the communist regime in Beijing, becoming the first government to formally recognise the PRC on October 2 1949. In mid-November, the Kremlin launched a spirited

40. The Korean War's impact on the question of Taiwan is two-fold: first, Beijing's decision to enter the war diverted military resources from the invasion of Taiwan to Korea; second, the Korean War reminded the Americans of the strategic importance of Taiwan. President Truman ordered the Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Straits in late June 1950, thereby transforming the Taiwan issue from a Chinese domestic affair into a diplomatic and military conflict between the US and the PRC. The US intervention in the Taiwan Straits forced Mao to postpone the liberation of the island. GONG Li, "Tension across the Taiwan Strait in the 1950s: Chinese Strategy and Tactics," in Robert S. Ross and JIANG Changbin (eds), Re-examining the Cold War: US-China Diplomacy, 1954-1973, Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard University Press, 2001, pp. 143-144.
campaign to oust the Chiang regime from the United Nations (UN) and have it replaced by the PRC in the Security Council, as the sole representative for the Chinese people. As Soviet recognition of the PRC contravened the 1945 Treaty, the KMT government cut off ties with Moscow on October 3, 1949. The CHIANG Kai-shek regime was bitter about the Soviet disregard for the Friendship Treaty. Even before the suspension of diplomatic relations with Moscow, the KMT government filed a formal complaint with the United Nations General Assembly in September 1949, charging the Soviet Union with aiding the Chinese communists and violating the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance and the Charter of the UN. On December 8, 1949, the General Assembly condemned the Soviet Union for its obstruction of the Chinese government's efforts to re-establish authority in Manchuria and for providing military support to the Chinese communists. The Five Power Joint Resolution and the Latin American Resolution, adopted by the General Assembly, urged all UN members to refrain from providing the Chinese communists with military or economic assistance and from establishing diplomatic ties with Beijing.\(^{41}\) In February 1952, Taipei brought up the Soviet violation of the Friendship Treaty for discussion at the UN General Assembly, seeking not only a condemnation, but also reparations of damages that the Taipei regime claimed had resulted from the Soviet breach of the Treaty. The Assembly supported the ROC's resolution to condemn the USSR for violating the Treaty.\(^ {42}\) The KMT's moral victory predictably had no effect on Moscow's China policy. In February 1952, Taipei officially renounced the Treaty.

Meanwhile, to bolster its domestic image, the Chiang regime turned the Soviet Union into a convenient scapegoat for its defeat in the civil war and elevated anti-Sovietism – summarised in the slogan “Oppose Communism, Resist Soviet Russia” (fangong, kăng'e) – to the status of a key principle guiding ROC foreign policy. Interestingly, Chiang found domestic uses for his knowledge of the Soviet system to establish a party-state (dangguo tizhi) on Taiwan. The KMT structure resembled that of the Communist Party of

---


the Soviet Union (CPSU). It relied upon Leninist principles of dictatorship and centralism. Moreover, it adopted the Soviet methods of mass mobilisation, censorship, the organisation of counterintelligence and the political surveillance of the army (through the General Political Department of the Defence Ministry, created in 1950), and enforced a one party system on Taiwan. Although direct contact between the Chiang regime and the Soviet Union had ceased, the ROC’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) retained the Soviet section of its West Asian Affairs Department. In 1950, the Association of Former Students of SUN Yat-sen University – founded in November 1950 and grouping former students of that university, including CHIANG Kai-shek’s son, CHIANG Ching-kuo (JIANG Jingguo) – began radio broadcasting in Russian, hoping to influence the Soviet advisers dispatched to China who assisted Beijing in civilian and military construction projects. In the 1950s, Taipei also initiated Russian language studies in Taiwan.

Until the late 1960s, when Taipei was forced to reconsider its international strategy due to rising uncertainties regarding American support, the ROC maintained a staunchly anti-Soviet rhetoric. This rhetoric, however, only once translated into direct military confrontation. On July 23, 1954, the ROC Navy seized – with the help of intelligence provided by the United States – the PRC-bound, Soviet oil tanker Tuapse on the grounds that the ship contravened a UN embargo on trade with the PRC following the latter’s entry into the Korean War. Forty-nine Soviet crewmembers were arrested and the tanker was held by the ROC navy.

---

43. In 1923-1924, the Comintern, through its envoys (primarily Mikhail Borodin), reorganised the KMT. The KMT’s new structure (effective since the first congress of January 1924) resembled that of the Bolshevik party, having centralised organisation, where orders from the central executive committee had to be followed by party functionaries, who extended the KMT’s power down to small cities and towns. The centralised KMT allowed its leadership to make it into an effective tool to expand its political influence and control throughout China. Ironically, the opposition party, the Democratic Progressive Party copied the organisational structure of the KMT and became the unconscious disciple of the CPSU. Zhongyang ribao, January 20, 1998.

44. The Association included such ROC dignitaries as the Chairman of the Asian People’s Anti-Communist League, GU Zhenggang; the head of the Republic’s military aviation, WANG Shumin; and Director of the State Security Office, ZHENG Zemin. In 1986, there were about 30 surviving members of the Association.


46. WEI Jing-meng, Sulian tewu zai Taiwan: Wei Jingmeng riji zhongde Wang Ping dang’an (Soviet Special Agent in Taiwan: WANG Ping’s Files from WEI Jingmeng’s
24, 1954, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, V. A. Zorin demanded that the US Ambassador to Moscow, E. E. Bohlen, arrange an immediate release of the sailors and a return of the ship, or bear full responsibility for the consequences of the incident. In 1954, Foreign Minister, Viacheslav Molotov discussed the issue of the Tuapse with US Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, three times, demanding the release of the tanker and its crew. In the aftermath of the Tuapse incident, the United States stopped supplying reconnaissance data to the ROC, without which the Taiwanese navy could not enforce the embargo on trade with China. In May 1955, 29 crewmembers were sent to the Soviet Union via the United States. In 1957 and 1958, an additional 13 were allowed to return home via the United States and Brazil. Seven sailors were not allowed to leave Taiwan. Taipei never returned the ship to the Soviets, nor offered compensation for the ship's cargo. In January 1971, the Soviet Red Cross, through the Soviet embassy in Geneva, enquired about the whereabouts of the sailors who had remained in Taiwan. However, mediation efforts by the International Red Cross to allow the Soviet sailors to return to the USSR proved futile. While the Taiwanese public learned about the Tuapse's interception and incarceration of its crew only in March-April 1988, the incident received immediate publicity in the Soviet Union through a blockbuster movie called Chrezvychaynoye protishestvye (Emergency Case), seen by millions of Soviet viewers. On August 10, 1955, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet awarded the Tuapse's captain and his crew prestigious state medals for their courage and patriotism. Quite clearly, the Tuapse incident did not enhance the image of the ROC among Soviet citizens.

Diary), Taipei: Lianhe bao she, 1995, p. 87. Tuapse was not the only ship intercepted by the ROC. In 1949-1954, the ROC intercepted 111 vessels on their way to Communist China. These included two Polish freighters, the Praca (October 1953) and Gottwald (June 1954). The release of the crews, cargoes and vessels interned in Taiwanese ports was negotiated through third parties. Jan Rowinski, “China and Central and Eastern Europe: A New Relationship,” Issues and Studies, Vol. 30, No. 2 (February 1994), pp. 59-60.


While Taipei waged its Cold War with the Soviet Union, the Soviets threw their diplomatic, economic and military support behind Communist China. As soon as the communists won victory in China in 1949, Moscow—considering Taiwan a territory occupied by US forces—publicly stood by Beijing’s demand to reunite Taiwan with the mainland, as well as recover its permanent seat at the United Nations Security Council. Beginning in mid-December 1949, the Soviet Union repeatedly demanded the inclusion of Taiwan’s status on the agenda of the UN Security Council. In early January 1950, Soviet support for the PRC’s UN membership involved boycotting of the Security Council and other UN organs. The Soviet and PRC demands were turned down by both the United States and the representative of the ROC. Taipei continued to represent all of China at the United Nations. Superficially, the Soviet boycott of the UN organs demonstrated Moscow’s principled stand on the question of “one China.” Some Western journalists at that time observed, however, that the Soviets, in reality, expected the walkout to fail. The resulting continuation of the ROC’s UN membership made the West the enemy of China and the Soviet Union China’s indispensable ally, putting Stalin in a position to squeeze additional concessions from Mao.49

The reversal of the US policy on Taiwan—resulting from the Korean War—placed a wedge between the Americans and the Chinese communists. This development benefited Soviet diplomacy, yet Moscow could not afford to admit it openly. Instead, Moscow continued displaying a comradely solidarity with the PRC by opposing the increasing military cooperation between the United States and the Chiang regime. Thus, the Soviet Union strongly denounced the 1954 Treaty of Mutual Defence signed between the USA and the ROC, considering it a framework legalising US occupation of the island. The Soviet Foreign Ministry called the Treaty “a crude violation of international agreements and the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the People’s Republic of China and thereby a violation of the United Nations Charter,” and added: “the Soviet Union fully supported the demand by the PRC government that all American forces withdraw from Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits.”50 Beijing’s decision to shell offshore islands controlled by the ROC in September 1954—April 1955 tested the Soviet resolve to support the Chinese communists’ reunification efforts. Moscow


passed the test with flying colours, by backing the Chinese offensive. Bulganin told the Chinese ambassador in March 1955 that “the foreign policy of the [PRC as well as the Soviet Union] in the Far East has the character of an offensive, which is exemplified by our common position on the Taiwan issues.” Before the crisis ended, in January 1955, the US National Security Council released a new policy paper, NSC 5723, which reaffirmed the importance of Taiwan and the offshore islands as vital links in the US military strategy in East Asia. The Soviets could rest assured that their support for Beijing’s “just claims” to Taiwan would not interfere with American patronage of the island, which heightened the strategic value of the Soviet friendship.

VII. TAIWAN STRAIT CRISIS, AUGUST-SEPTEMBER 1958

Regardless of whether Stalin encouraged or discouraged the Chinese communists from unifying China by force, he considered the ROC’s separation from the PRC as an asset to Soviet foreign policy, as it not only reinforced but even guaranteed Sino-US hostility. It is not entirely certain whether Nikita Khrushchev favoured independence of the ROC while publicly pledging adherence to the “one China” principle. In the aftermath of the Sino-Soviet split in the early 1960s, Soviet historiography maintained that Khrushchev did not approve of the military intimidation of Taiwan in August 1958, considering it as an attempt to provoke a Soviet-American nuclear war. Khrushchev allegedly termed the Taiwan Strait Crisis the “fruit of Mao’s sick fantasy.” Soviet leading specialist on Chinese affairs Mikhail Kapitsa published several books espousing such a theme. In his celebrated monograph, KNR: Tri desyatiletiya-tri politiki (The PRC: Three Decades and Three Policies), Kapitsa explicitly attributed the Chinese decision to launch the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis to Mao’s desire to demonstrate his resolve in the


struggle against imperialism, bully the United States, incite a Soviet-American military clash, and force Washington to change its policy on Taiwan. Calling the Chinese shelling a “thoughtless action” (bessmyslenaya akcya) that increased the risk of war in the Taiwan Straits, Kapitsa believed that only the stern position taken by the Soviet Union and its allies (especially, East Germany and Czechoslovakia), who threatened that war on China meant war on the Soviet bloc, prevented the United States from launching a full-scale war on China and restrained the Chiang regime's militarism.54 Former Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in his memoirs supported the view that Mao wanted to provoke Soviet-American nuclear conflict.55

Some scholars in the West have disagreed with the thesis on Beijing's efforts to draw Moscow into the conflict with the United States. They argued that the 1958 crisis was a purely intra-Chinese issue, had nothing (or little) to do with the Soviets or, at most, was to demonstrate Beijing's foreign policy independence from Moscow.56 Other scholars, however, seemingly have followed the Soviet lead. They have claimed that the Soviets preferred to avoid any risk of involvement in war with the United States and, therefore, tried to discourage Beijing from launching an offensive against Taiwan; or argued that Nikita Khrushchev saw Mao's instigation of the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis as an attack on the Soviet policy of peaceful coexistence as well as an attempt to manoeuvre the USSR into a confrontation with the United States from which China would benefit.57 Beijing reportedly kept Moscow in the dark over its military actions in the Taiwan Straits; thus, the crisis surprised the Soviets as much as the Americans. According to others, Moscow was deeply concerned about the mounting tension between the PRC and the

United States over Taiwan. Gromyko rushed to Beijing on 6 September 1958 on a fact-finding mission. Only after Gromyko’s departure did ZHOU Enlai direct his associates to keep the Kremlin informed of how the CCP would handle the offshore islands crisis so that Moscow would not be concerned about being drawn into an unwanted conflict. 

Yet Nikita Khrushchev’s memoirs refute the avowal of principled Kremlin opposition to Beijing’s military plans to take over Taiwan. According to Khrushchev’s recollections, the Chinese side turned to Moscow in 1958 with a request for the military hardware necessary to launch an operation on Taiwan. The Soviets obliged, sending airplanes and artillery to China, even volunteering to send their own troops to assist the Chinese. The willingness to assist directly the Chinese communists’ efforts in liberating Taiwan was a dramatic reversal of Stalin’s reluctance to involve the Soviet Union in any military conflict over Taiwan. Beijing, however, declined Soviet direct assistance. Khrushchev noted that “all Soviet sympathies were on Mao’s side.” When the PRC’s shelling stopped in October and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) did not attempt to overrun the offshore islands, the Soviet leadership was rather surprised, as in its view, the capture of the islands was within the reach of the PLA. Khrushchev even questioned ZHOU Enlai, during his later visit to Moscow, about the rationale behind the decision not to invade Taiwan. Needless to say, the Soviet leader found Zhou’s explanation that Beijing had wished to keep CHIANG Kai-shek and his military machine within reach of the PLA’s artillery hardly convincing.


60. “Memuary Nikiy Sergeevicha Khrushcheva,” Voprosy Istorii, No. 2 (1993), pp. 80-81. Interestingly, during his conversation with Mao in October 1959, Khrushchev implied that he was not informed of the plans to shell the offshore islands in late August 1958. Mao repeatedly reminded Khrushchev that Moscow was informed through
Oleg Troyanovskii, a former Soviet ambassador to China and foreign policy adviser to Khrushchev who accompanied the Soviet leader during the 1958 trip to Beijing, confirmed — in an interview with Mark Kramer — Khrushchev's version of events. Although Khrushchev was not explicitly informed of the details concerning the planned military operation, he was told in general terms that an invasion of Taiwan was anticipated. The Soviet leader welcomed the news and offered both political and military support. In the first few weeks of August, the Soviet Union transferred long-range artillery, amphibious equipment, air-to-air missiles and combat aircraft to China to facilitate the offensive against Taiwan. Soviet military advisers were also dispatched to advise and, if necessary, take part in the operation. According to Kramer, both the Chinese and Soviet leaders assumed that the action would not provoke a direct military response from the United States. On August 30, Pravda published an article reiterating the Soviet Treaty obligation to defend China.

On September 7, 1958, Khrushchev wrote a strongly-worded letter to US President Eisenhower reminding Washington that attack on China would be understood as an attack on the Soviet Union. On September 19, the Soviets repeated the warning in yet
another letter to the US President, this time declaring that any use of nuclear weapons against China would be met with a Soviet nuclear response on United States soil. Numerous Western analysts believe that Khrushchev toughened his rhetoric only after the danger of war had subsided.\textsuperscript{63} According to Kramer's archival research, however, Khrushchev's support for Beijing went beyond rhetoric. A week after his initial warning, the Soviet leader met secretly with the Chinese ambassador, LIU Xiao, and gave every indication that he still expected the invasion to proceed as planned. The failure of US aircraft carriers to attack China after Chinese artillery resumed the bombardment of offshore islands made Khrushchev hopeful that US forces would not stay committed to the defence of Taiwan. In late September, the Kremlin sent a letter to Beijing, in which Khrushchev supported nuclear brinkmanship as a means of achieving China's unification by pledging the Soviet military -- including its nuclear capability -- to China's defense.\textsuperscript{64} In Kramer's view, Khrushchev felt betrayed when the Chinese suspended their military operation. From then on, he emphasised the need for a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan problem.\textsuperscript{65} In late 1959, the Soviet leadership explicitly spelt out its position for the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue.\textsuperscript{66}


During his Beijing conversation with Mao in October 1959, Khrushchev returned to the issue of the 1958 crisis, reiterating his confusion over Beijing's Taiwan policy. He explicitly cautioned Mao against launching military attacks on Taiwan if such attacks were intended only to tease CHIANG Kai-shek and the Americans:

As for the firing at the offshore islands, if you shoot, then you ought to capture these islands, and if you do not consider necessary capturing these islands, then there is no use in firing. I do not understand this policy of yours. Frankly speaking, I thought you would take the islands and was upset when I learned that you did not take them.67

During the same conversation, Khrushchev suggested to Mao that Taiwan should be handled in the same way that Lenin handled the Far Eastern Republic, the sovereignty of which Moscow recognised. Mao responded that the Far Eastern Republic had been set up by Lenin and was then controlled by Moscow and asked whether Khrushchev imagined that Taiwan was controlled by the Chinese communists.68 Although Khrushchev did not elaborate on his suggestion, it could have implied his support for Beijing’s recognition of Taiwan’s sovereignty as a temporary measure preceding eventual reunification and, by extension, his support for the two-China scenario. (It could also imply – however inconceivable it seems – Khrushchev’s lack of an in-depth understanding of the Taiwan issue.) Yet, his comment on the Far Eastern Republic notwithstanding, Khrushchev continued to support Beijing’s claims to Taiwan and considered the Taiwan issue as an internal Chinese affair, although he did not want the Taiwan crisis to escalate into a major war. By the late 1950s, Khrushchev was still convinced that “a question of relations between Chinese and Chinese, [is] a purely internal China affair. If it were not for the situation artificially created in Taiwan, resulting from the military support and defence of the rem-


nants of CHIANG Kai-shek's regime by the United States, there would have never arisen any international complications."

The new evidence is relatively conclusive regarding Khrushchev's Taiwan policy. The Soviet leader backed Mao's initiative to solve the Taiwan issue militarily and by doing so departed significantly from Stalin's cautious policy on Taiwan. Khrushchev possibly calculated that Mao's gratitude for Soviet assistance to unify China, the blow to US security strategy in the Far East and the resulting enhancement of the prestige of the communist bloc would have compensated for the demise of the Taiwan issue as an assurance of continued Sino-US hostility. Following Mao's decision not to capture the off-shore islands in 1958, Khrushchev continued to support Beijing's military option regarding Taiwan, on the condition that the PRC's future military offensive in the Taiwan Straits be coordinated with Moscow and aim at occupying the islands, rather than merely provoking CHIANG Kai-shek's forces and their American allies.

Mainland Chinese scholars echo the most recent Western scholarship and refute the idea that the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis was triggered by China in order to arrest rapprochement between Moscow and Washington. But they are divided over whether the Soviets were informed of Mao's plans. Some believe that Beijing informed Moscow through Soviet military advisers in China, but failed to raise the issue when Khrushchev visited China in late July. Others, however, reject the notion that Beijing kept Moscow

69. As quoted in Lukin, The Bear Watches the Dragon, pp. 257-258. Lukin comments that the persistent theme in the Soviet thinking of Taiwan as an occupied territory by the United States could be explained by Moscow's efforts to follow Beijing's position, the desire to rehabilitate themselves after assisting Chiang's government for a long time before and during the Second World War, and the signing of a friendship treaty with the KMT in 1945. Ibid., p. 259.

70. Li Zhisui is one of the few mainland Chinese writers who advance the thesis of Mao's decision to shell the offshore islands as motivated by the desire to arrest the emerging US-Soviet rapprochement and to demonstrate China's independence in the triangular relationship among China, the Soviet Union and the United States. Li, The Private Life of Chairman Mao, pp. 270-271.

in the dark regarding the planned Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, as well as the belief that Moscow did not support (however unofficially) China's efforts to regain Taiwan through whatever means chosen by the PRC. Viktor Usov's analysis of Chinese publications on the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis (published between 1995 and 1999) concludes that according to Chinese scholars, the Soviet leadership was fully informed about PRC preparations for bombardment of the offshore islands in August 1958. Consultations on this topic could have taken place at the highest level between Khrushchev and MAO Zedong during the former's secret visit to Beijing in late July-early August 1958. However, while the Soviets were informed about the broad plans of Chinese leaders to shell the islands, Mao allegedly did not tell the Soviet side that his real intention was only to apply psychological pressure on the Chiang regime, rather than to occupy the islands or to launch an attack on Taiwan itself. Although the mainland studies ignore the hypothesis of Beijing's alleged broader goals when initiating the crisis, they concede that, once the crisis broke out, Moscow was concerned about the possible escalation of the conflict. This concern was caused primarily by unprecedented US military buildup in East Asia in response to the Chinese bombardment. Nonetheless, Gromyko having been assured of Beijing's limited goal to scare Taiwan rather than to invade it and Beijing having taken all responsibility for the outcome of the crisis, the Soviets continued their unconditional support for China.

VIII. EMERGING AMBIGUITY

However uncompromising the official Soviet stance on the "one China" principle, Soviet foreign policy had to deal with the stark reality that the ROC, not the PRC, was represented in major inter-governmental organisations, above all, in the United Nations. While tirelessly demanding that Beijing should take over Taipei's seat in all organisations, neither the Soviet Union nor its European allies boycotted any international organisations, meetings or events where the ROC, rather that the PRC, was represented. Thus, it can be assumed that some modicum of unofficial contact between ROC

representatives and diplomats from the Soviet bloc continued well into the early 1970s. Moscow, however, categorically rejected the ROC's participation in any international meetings held in the USSR. The Soviet Foreign Ministry made it clear that "no ROC people will be granted visas to any conferences held on Soviet territory, even if this would cause the Soviet Union to lose those conferences altogether." If any conference organisers in the Soviet bloc attempted to invite delegations from both the PRC and the ROC, they did so only because of their unfamiliarity with the complexity of the Taiwan issue. Any mistakes of this sort were quickly corrected and profound apologies sent to Beijing.

Following the Sino-Soviet split in the early 1960s, any Soviet inconsistency (whether real or imagined) regarding the "one China" policy was increasingly viewed – both in China and in the West – as caused by deliberate ambiguity, designed to gradually move Moscow from a "one China" to a "two China" policy, under the guise of a simple misunderstanding. When, in 1963, the Soviets and Americans concluded the Partial Test Ban treaty, which banned nuclear testing in the atmosphere, under water and in outer space, Beijing was furious that Taipei was allowed to sign the treaty. In reality, the ROC representative in Washington signed a US copy of the treaty and the Soviets refused to recognise that signature. In September 1963, Moscow sent a note to the United States making it clear that the CHIANG Kai-shek regime had no right to act in the name of China, and accordingly, its international actions were illegal. Yet, the mainland Chinese have maintained (to this day) that Moscow allowed Taiwan to sign the treaty and, thus, implicitly acknowledged the ROC's sovereignty.


74. Share, "From Ideological Foe to Uncertain Friend," p. 11.

75. LI Jian, Taiwan yu qiansulian jiaowang milu (Secret Record of Contacts between Taiwan and the Former Soviet Union), Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui Chubanshe, 1995, Vol. 1, p. 111; YU Kejie, "Taiwan yu Sulian de mimi jiechu" (Secret Contacts between Taiwan and the Soviet Union), Bai Nian Chao, No. 2 (2000), p. 34. In 1970, the ROC signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
To conspiracy theorists in China and the West, any Soviet published reference to Taiwan as a "country," every published flag of the ROC and every reference to CHIANG Kai-shek as a "president" suggested the following: Moscow's acceptance of Taiwan as a state; proof that the Soviets considered placing Taiwan in its sphere of influence (in order to turn Taipei against Washington); or Moscow's intention to revise the "one China" policy. Soviet diplomats' unofficial contacts with ROC representatives during various functions lent further credence to suspicions. The secret and semi-secret communication between the Soviet envoys and the ROC leadership, which took place in Taipei in the late 1960s-early 1970s, seemingly vindicated those who distrusted Moscow's allegedly principled "one China" policy.

As the Sino-Soviet rift intensified during the Cultural Revolution, Beijing elevated the Soviet Union to the rank of social imperialists, while the Red Guards harassed the Soviet diplomatic staff and border incidents reached a new height. In response, the Soviets increased the size of the border guard force and its arms, as well as its military presence in Mongolia. In the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the proclamation of the Brezhnev Doctrine, Moscow's military threat against China seemed more than credible. Against this background, the Soviets launched a series of secret contacts with Taiwan. According to one Chinese publication, at least six Soviet secret agents visited Taiwan from 1965 to 1975. Of these, the most famous was Victor Louis (born Vitaly Yevgenyevich Lui), a Moscow-based freelance reporter for European newspapers, especially the London Evening News. Louis initiated the contacts via the ROC embassy in Tokyo. In Sep-

76. In 1965, the Soviet embassy in Tokyo invited ROC diplomats to a reception. In 1969, during the World Conference on Tourism, held in Bulgaria, the Soviet delegation unofficially met the Taiwanese delegates. In 1971, the Soviets met the Taiwanese during an international writers' meeting in Ireland. The Soviet writers sent greetings to the Taiwanese nation and even to President Chiang.
77. Yu, "Taiwan yu Sulian de mimi jiechu," p. 34.
78. Victor Louis (1928-1992) was a Bondesque figure of Cold War intrigue. Working as a Moscow-based freelance reporter for European newspapers, he provided news about the Soviet leadership; stories that other correspondents found inaccessible. He broke the news of the fall from power of Nikita Khrushchev in 1964 and the death of former Prime Minister Aleksei Kosygin in 1980. He reportedly played a role in smuggling Khrushchev's memoirs Khrushchev Remembers to the West. In the early 1980s, Louis correctly forecast that Konstantin Chernenko would be Andropov's successor. Due to his close official connections, some Western analysts believed that Louis functioned as an agent of official Soviet policy, relaying to the West the news that the Kremlin wished to disseminate internationally. Although Louis insisted that he was not
tember 1968, in Tokyo’s Foreign Correspondents Club, he met the press attaché of the ROC embassy, LU Wei. He introduced himself as the correspondent of the London Evening News and openly requested permission to visit Taiwan. LU Wei informed the ambassador, CHEN Zhimai, who, in turn, contacted WEI Ching-meng (Jimmy WEI Jingmeng), the head of the ROC Government Information Office (GIO). Subsequently, Louis visited the ROC at least four times (in October 1968, November 1971, December 1974 and June 1975) and conducted secret talks with ROC emissaries in Europe on six occasions.79 Louis did not act in any official capacity, yet it is hard to imagine that he acted on his own initiative. Peter Ivanov believes that Louis spoke for the “hawkish”/anti-China faction in the Soviet leadership, led by Aleksander Shelepin, a young rival of Leonid Brezhnev in the Soviet Politbureau and a former head of the KGB (Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti). Jay Taylor, in turn, identifies Louis as a KGB agent.80

Louis (using the nickname WANG Ping) arrived in Taipei for the first time on October 22, 1968 and left on October 31, 1968 – the first significant direct communication between the ROC leadership and the Soviet regime since 1949. His talks in Taipei were conducted at a fairly high level, involving the Defence Minister, CHIANG Ching-kuo (future Premier and President); WEI Ching-meng; the Chief of Intelligence, YE Xiangzi; and the Minister of Economic Affairs. CHIANG Kai-shek personally made a decision to allow Louis’s visit to take place, Ching-kuo oversaw the contacts, while Wei was entrusted with the task of arranging the meetings. According to Wei’s memoirs (made public in October 1995 by the Taipei-based daily Lianhe bao, subsequently published as a book), Louis’s major purpose was to determine Taipei’s stand on the issue of overthrowing Mao’s regime and on relations with the Soviet Union.81 While meeting the ROC Chief of Intelligence, the Soviet visitor put forward four issues:


81. Wei, Sulian tewu zai Taiwan, p. 21.
1. Would Taipei agree to the establishment of relations with the Soviet Union at the ambassadorial level?
2. Would the ROC leadership—following a successful invasion of China—allow the existence of a pro-Soviet communist party?
3. Would it be helpful to Taiwan if the Soviet Union maintained neutrality in the event of an ROC invasion of the PRC?
4. Russia would not welcome a hostile China ruled by the KMT.

Ye answered that Taipei would gladly welcome Moscow’s neutrality in the event of a war between the ROC and the PRC. He indicated a possibility of cooperation with the Soviet Union and the KMT’s consent to the existence of the communist party in China, provided that such a party had no armed forces of its own. During Louis’s second meeting, Wei presented a number of issues, which his guest was asked to convey to Moscow, namely:

1. The KMT would consult Moscow before recovering the mainland;
2. The KMT would like Russia either to remain neutral or assist its military effort in recovering the mainland;
3. The embassy in Tokyo was a good contact point;
4. The Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance should be abrogated;
5. The KMT did not support the existence of the pro-Soviet communist party in China;
6. The KMT opposed the two China scenario; and
7. Only the ROC could solve the “Mao problem,” no foreign power should interfere in China’s domestic affairs.

CHIANG Ching-kuo met Louis in Louis’s capacity as a foreign correspondent. During their conversations, held in Russian (CHIANG Ching-kuo was a fluent Russian speaker), Louis reiterated Moscow’s hope to establish direct links with Taiwan, preferably at the ambassadorial level, as well as to open reciprocal information bureaus in the capitals of both countries. He also expressed the wish that within a short time, Taipei would take action against the mainland. In the event of such a conflict, the Soviet Union would remain neutral. Ching-kuo welcomed the assurances of Soviet neutrality in the event of an ROC invasion of the mainland and called for Moscow’s cooperation. “There’s no one in
China who could succeed Mao. If the Mao regime collapses, the KMT would be the only power to succeed Mao." Furthermore, the KMT was, after all, a "socialist party (shehui zhuyi dang), should not the Soviets cooperate with us?" he asked rhetorically. Louis responded that Moscow wished to cooperate with the KMT through a pro-Soviet communist party, which in turn would also cooperate with the KMT.82

This initial exchange of ideas did not result in any concrete decisions. CHIANG Kai-shek and his son instructed Wei to prepare plans for future contacts with the Soviet emissaries and designated Tokyo as the contact venue. According to mainland Chinese sources, due to the strong opposition within the CPSU to any rapprochement with Taiwan, Moscow shelved the discussion of the Taiwan issue. However, following the Ussuri River clashes in March 1969, the Soviets reconsidered their contacts with Taiwan. In March, the CPSU allegedly convened a conference, during which some participants called for cooperation with Taiwan. The conference resulted in a five-point proposition:

1. If the Mao system collapses, Taiwan and the Soviet Union are likely to cooperate;
2. After the collapse of the Mao system, the KMT and a newly established communist party of China should form a united front government;
3. New China does not have to be called communist, but it should embrace a socialist economy and people's democracy;
4. The Soviet Union will cooperate with both the new communist party and the KMT;
5. The US Far East policy is the biggest obstacle to Soviet-Taiwanese cooperation.83

The border clashes in early March 1969 induced Moscow to take a more assertive position regarding China. At first, Soviet Defense Minister Andrei Grechko reportedly advocated a "nuclear blockbuster" against China's industrial centres, while others called for surgical strikes against Chinese nuclear facilities. Eventually, however, Moscow settled for a strategy of parallel military and diplomatic escalation, postponing a choice between the two until forced by events. Taiwan could have played a role in both strategies. Diplomatically, any hint of Soviet consideration of the two

82. Ibid., pp. 34-35.
China scenario was designed to bring Beijing to the negotiating table. Militarily, Taiwan could have played a role in a Soviet preemptive attack on China by either helping enforce a naval blockade of the Chinese coast or opening a second front on the mainland.

In mid-May 1969, Wei met Louis (this time, under the alias of Joe Smith) in Vienna to discuss ROC-USSR bilateral cooperation and the plan to overthrow Mao’s regime. Wei and Louis agreed that in the event of a civil war in China, the Soviet Union would not support the CCP and Soviet-ROC military cooperation between intelligence agencies would soon be established. In order to strengthen bilateral ties, Louis twice proposed the establishment of a Taiwanese trade office in Moscow. CHIANG Kai-shek was moderately pleased with the results of the Vienna talks. Wei’s next meeting with Louis was to take place in Rome in late September 1969, weeks after Foreign Minister Kosygin’s 190-minute conversation with ZHOU Enlai at Beijing airport. CHIANG Kai-shek informed Wei that Moscow and Taipei could cooperate and they should both discuss steps towards destroying China’s nuclear capacity. He also expressed an interest in Soviet military assistance to invade China and pledged readiness to recognise Outer Mongolia. Meanwhile, the Taiwan issue resurfaced in Soviet diplomacy. In September 1969, during the annual UN vote on the question of China, the USSR, for the first time, did not speak out in support of the PRC’s membership in the United Nations. Taiwan received 89 votes, 10 more than in the past 5 years. These extra votes came from the states that maintained diplomatic relations with the PRC, possibly including the Soviet Union. Moscow also continued to intimidate China, starting with a campaign of informal comments to European and Asian diplomats about a possible Soviet nuclear attack against Chinese targets. The Soviets probed the US reaction should the Soviet Union attack, and sounded out their Warsaw Pact allies on the possibility of a nuclear strike against China. On Sep-

85. Wei, Sulian tewu zai Taiwan, pp. 53-56
87. According to the Kissinger memoirs, on August 18, 1969, a middle-level State Department specialist in Soviet affairs was asked by a Soviet embassy official what the US reaction would be to a Soviet attack on Chinese nuclear facilities. Kissinger, White
September 16, 1969, Louis published an article in the London Evening News revealing Moscow's readiness to attack China with a "Czechoslovakia-type invasion." He did not rule out the possibility of the Soviet bombing of the PRC's nuclear installations in Lob Nor. Two days after the publication of Louis's article, PRC Foreign Minister ZHOU Enlai cabled Kosygin proposing a mutual pact not to attack each other with armed forces, including nuclear strikes. In late October, formal Sino-Soviet negotiations on border problems started in Beijing. To ensure the success of the border talks, the "dove" faction in the Soviet leadership (represented by Brezhnev-Kosygin) did not allow a Louis-Wei meeting in Rome to proceed, fearing that such a meeting – if discovered – might have derailed Sino-Soviet negotiations.

Once Sino-Soviet border tensions eased, however, Louis's communication with Taipei resumed. After a series of telephone contacts, he met WEI in Vienna in late October 1970. The talks this time focused on two issues: (1) requests of the Soviet "hawk" faction to receive Taiwan's intelligence reports confirming that Mao and his possible successors were unlikely to mend fences with Moscow, and (2) possible Soviet-ROC military and political cooperation, accelerating Taiwanese action against the mainland. Louis reiterated that Moscow would not aid the CCP in the event of the ROC's invasion of the mainland. He also made a fresh statement to the effect that Moscow hoped to cooperate with the KMT to destroy Mao's regime. His main reason for the meeting, however, was to probe whether ROC intelligence possessed information on Mao's plans to launch an attack on the Soviet Union. After the second Vienna meeting, both Chiangs agreed with the two points discussed in the meeting, requesting the relevant intelligence reports to be sent to Moscow. They also considered the release of all remaining sailors of Tuapse. CHIANG Kai-shek believed that setting free the sailors would symbolise Taipei's goodwill towards Moscow and alert the United States to the possibility of Taiwan's partnership with the Soviet Union.  

Little, if anything is known of the content of Louis's three other visits to Taiwan. Information regarding other Soviet-ROC


88. Wei, *Suian tewu zai Taiwan,* pp. 77-98.

89. Belows suggests that the November 1971 visit by Louis was arranged by Foreign Minister CHOU Shu-kai. Bellows, "Taiwan's Foreign Policy in the 1970s," p. 597.
communication channels is equally scarce. In May 1969, for example, a former ROC Deputy Minister of Education, KU Yu-shin, visited Moscow. At the same time, an ROC delegation (comprising the ROC Minister for Tourism and Minister of Communications), which participated in the Bulgarian-hosted World Inter-Governmental Conference on Tourism, passed through Moscow on its way back home.\textsuperscript{90} In June 1973, the Hong Kong-based \textit{Sing Tao Evening News (Xindao Wanbao)} revealed that the Soviet poet Yevgeni Yevtushenko met a Taiwanese delegation in Hong Kong with which he held secret talks. Moscow allegedly also made contacts with the remnants of the KMT army in northern Thailand through its Bangkok embassy. Yet, this secret and sporadic communication – whatever its form, timing and location – resulted in no significant outcome, save a short-lived revival of the collaboration between the Soviet and ROC intelligence services in 1968-1970. Shelepin's declining fortunes and the resumption of Sino-Soviet negotiations prevented Taipei from capitalising on a Moscow-Beijing rift. When the question of China's representation at the UN came up during the 24th General Assembly of the UN in 1971, Moscow stood by Beijing, or – to be faithful to the Soviet phraseology during the Cold War, which struggled to separate Mao's “adventurist regime” from the Chinese peoples – the “interests of the working nation of the PRC.” Foreign Minister Gromyko emphasised that the Soviet Union “unswervingly opposed and continues to oppose all illegal actions of the Chinese island Taiwan, all concepts of ‘two Chinas' and all ideas of two representations [of China at the UN].”\textsuperscript{91}

\section*{IX. THE SOVIET CARD}

Wei's memoirs indicate that the Chiang regime took the talks with the Soviet agents seriously, but it is unclear to what extent it truly hoped for the restoration of friendship with Moscow. There is little doubt, nonetheless, that Taipei attempted to utilise the secret talks with the Soviet Union as leverage in the ROC's relations with the United States. Given the US prospective withdrawal from Vietnam and its possible resolve to scale down its commitments to Asian security (in November 1969, Washington withdrew the Seventh Fleet from the Taiwan Straits), an allusion to Moscow's rea-


ness to step in to any vacated US shoes in Asia could have reminded Washington of Asia's – and Taiwan's – strategic importance in the Cold War context. Towards this end, Taipei purposely leaked the news of Louis's travels to the ROC.92 In early November 1968, the Washington Post broke the news with an article on Victor Louis's visit to Taiwan.93 The story also appeared in the English language Bangkok Post in January 1969. The Bangkok Post article identified CHIANG Ching-kuo – Soviet-educated and married to a Russian woman – as Moscow's “best potential asset in the Far East.” “It would make sense [for the Soviets] to sound him [Chiang] out about his views on Russia and cooperation with Russia.” The article openly admitted that the major purpose of leaking the news about Louis’s visit was to aid the ailing Taiwan lobby in Washington. The Washington Post article supposedly “was enough to bring the point home to officials and legislators in the US.”94 American ambassador to Taiwan, Walter P. McConaughy, publicly stated that in 1969 [sic], “a Soviet correspondent was allowed to visit Taiwan.”95 Following Louis's visit, derogatory references to the Soviet Union ceased in Taiwan, while political groups and organisations with names carrying anti-Soviet implications received orders to change their names. Taipei media and official speeches began to use the term “anti-Mao” instead of “anti-communist.”96

Yet, the news about the “secret” contacts between the Soviets and the Chiang regime and minor changes in Taipei's pronouncements on Soviet matters failed to affect Washington, which no longer viewed Taiwan as an indispensable Cold War ally and began to appreciate the geo-strategic value of closer relations with the PRC. The U-turn in the US China policy resulted in Washington's support for the PRC's membership in the UN and in Nixon's historic trip to China in February 1972. The Shanghai communiqué spelt out US “one China” policy and affirmed the US ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all its forces and military installations from Taiwan as tension in the area diminished.97 Having been

92. Taylor claims that it was Louis who leaked the news of his Taiwan visit to the Washington Post correspondent in Hong Kong. Taylor, The Generalissimo's Son, p. 289.
95. Bellows, "Taiwan's Foreign Policy in the 1970s," p. 597.
ousted from the UN in October 1971, Taipei found itself in the unenviable position of increasing diplomatic isolation. Within weeks of losing its UN seat, Taipei lost membership in all UN institutions, except the International Currency Foundation and the World Bank. Within a few months, some 20 countries rushed to establish diplomatic ties with the PRC and suspend relations with the ROC. By the end of 1971, of 147 states, only 42 supported the ROC, while 85 stood by the PRC. Taiwan's most important ally, the United States, still maintained diplomatic ties with the ROC, but its overtures to Beijing did not bode well for the future of US-ROC relations.

In the context of Taiwan's increasing diplomatic isolation, ties with the Soviet Union and its allies not only would constitute a step towards winning a broad international de facto recognition of the ROC's sovereignty, but also would alarm Washington to the possibility of Taipei's playing a "Soviet card," which could upset the Cold War geopolitics in East Asia. In November 1971, shortly after losing its UN membership, the ROC Foreign Minister CHOU Shukai (Zhou Shukai) hinted at the restoration of trade, economic and "other relations" with the Soviet Union. The New York Times quoted Chou as saying "There will be no political ties to our trading. We are prepared to trade with communist countries aside from the communists in China, if we feel it is to our advantage."98 Four months later, at a meeting of the KMT's Central Committee, Chou reiterated Taipei's interest in contact with communist states. While vowing to continue Taiwan's national policy of uncompromising anti-communism, Chou noted the complexity of relations between the communist states after the Sino-Soviet split. "But if our contacts with these foreign countries will not affect our national policy, and if these nations are not the puppet of Communist China, we can still find ways to develop trade and economic and other relations which will be good for both sides."99 In June 1972, Chou in yet another speech on ROC foreign policy, this time delivered in Manila, spoke of the possibility of a dramatic U-turn in Taipei's diplomatic strat-


egy. “In order to ensure our country’s survival,” he proclaimed, “we are ready to deal with the devil” (weiliào guojia shèncún, yě kěyì hé möguī dàjiàodào). In October 1972, the first Russian language publication, Russkie vesti (Russian News), appeared in Taiwan. In February 1973, the front page of the Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post reported about the KMT’s “threat” to lease one or more of Taiwan’s offshore islands, such as the Pescadores, to the Soviet Union as a naval base for a limited period, in exchange for a non-aggression pact with Moscow in the event of abrogation of the US Security Pact in line with Taiwan’s “flexible diplomacy.” The newspaper’s sources said the move would serve as a protective measure for Taiwan in time of emergency without endangering its stability as well as fulfilling the Soviet strategy of containment against Beijing from every possible angle. The transit through the Taiwan Straits for the first time since 1949 by a squadron of Soviet warships in May 1973 acted as a reminder of the genuine possibility of Soviet direct involvement in the Taiwan question.

X. CHIANG CHING-KUO

The possibility of a dramatic U-turn in Taipei’s foreign strategy seemed credible due to CHIANG Ching-kuo’s influence in the ROC. Ching-kuo (alias Nikolai Vladimirovich Elizarov) – fluent in Russian and married in 1935 to Faina Patievna Vahreva – spent 12 formative years (1925-1937) in the Soviet Union. When speculating on the “highly secret” visits of Louis to Taiwan, the Far Eastern Economic Review noted that “Premier Chiang no doubt feels quite at home with any Soviet visitor – he spent many years in the Soviet Union, and his wife is Russian.” The Americans themselves were unclear regarding Ching-kuo’s ideological allegiances. His Soviet experience and Russian wife averted to his possible pro-Soviet sympathies. Although Ching-kuo’s biographer, Jay Taylor, opines that the Americans stopped worrying about Ching-kuo’s true ideological sympathies by the early 1960s, the US embassy in Taipei felt

100. Lianhe bao, November 3, 1990. The Soviet official analysis of Taiwan’s foreign relations chose to ignore Taipei’s overtures to the communist bloc, but noted that ROC diplomacy no longer shunned the states that established official ties with the PRC. See Kapustin, Taiwan i Uzhnaya Korea v Kitaisko-Ameryanskikh otnosheniyakh (1969-1979), pp. 67-73.
obliged to comment, as late as 1967, that Chiang only reluctantly
returned to China from the Soviet Union.104 Three years later, the
embassy report noted that Chiang was rumoured to have espoused
Communism.

CHIANG Ching-kuo was indeed a member of the Soviet
Youth Organisation (Komsomol), a candidate member (from 1929)
of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and a member of
the Bolshevik party (since 1936). Before studying in the Soviet
Union, he was a young radical, actively participating in the May
30th Movement in Shanghai (for which he was expelled from
school) and in the anti-imperialist and anti-warlord demonstrations
in Beijing (for which his school imprisoned him for two weeks).
Ching-kuo volunteered to enrol at the SUN Yat-sen University of
Toilers of China (UTK, in 1928, renamed to the Communist Uni-
versity of the Toilers of China).105 Although labelled a “university,”
the UTK was not a conventional educational institution. It trained
revolutionary cadres for the Chinese revolution. Students often par-
ticipated in a variety of meetings, discussing problems and drawing
conclusions. Chiang (now known as Nikolai) leaned towards Left
Opposition and Trotskyism in the intense ideological debates taking
place in Moscow in the mid-1920s. He reportedly spent much of his
leisure time reading and studying Marxist theory “wholeheartedly”
and even entered a secret Trotskyist organisation, where he became
one of its leaders arguing against Stalinism.106 Ching-kuo ques-
tioned the growing bureaucratisation of the party-state apparatus in
the Soviet Union, called for reform of the party and struggle against
Stalin’s ”White Guard regime.” He was particularly active in propa-

105. According to CHIANG Kai-shek’s correspondence with his son, Ching-kuo did
not go against his father’s wishes by studying in Moscow. In fact, CHIANG Kai-shek
was proud of his son’s ideological progress and did not object to his son’s membership
in the Komsomol. Yu, “A Reassessment of CHIANG Kaishin and the Policy of Alli-
ance with the Soviet Union.” Larin speculates that CHIANG Kai-shek’s consent to his
son’s study in Moscow was a political gesture underscoring Chiang’s readiness to sus-
tain the KMT’s close links with the USSR. Interestingly, Ching-kuo received little fi-
nancial support from his father and had to survive on a modest stipend of 25 roubles
per month. A. G. Larin, “Tsyen Tsingguo v Rossii” (CHIANG Ching-kuo in Russia),
in Sovremennyi Taiwain (Contemporary Taiwan), Irkutsk: Centr po Izucheniyu Taivania,
Institut Vostokovedenia RAN, 1994, pp. 128-129. Taylor notes that “sending his son to
Moscow served Chiang’s political and professional interests and was quite consistent
106. Larin, “Tsyen Tsingguo v Rossii,” p. 130, YUEH Sheng, Sun Yat-sen University
in Moscow and the Chinese Revolution: A Personal Account, Lawrence: Center for East
Asian Studies, University of Kansas, 1971, p. 131.
ganda work, by posting wall newspapers and posters, intervening at party and Komsomol meetings and speaking in class to defend the platform of the Opposition insofar as such open speeches were permitted. Following CHIANG Kai-shek’s anti-communist coup in April 1927, Ching-kuo and his fellow students considered the fall of the communist movement in China as a tragedy. Ching-kuo’s public condemnation of his father for the betrayal of the revolution was widely publicised by the Soviet news agency TASS: “In the past, he was my father and a good friend of the revolution, now he has gone over to the enemy camp and is my enemy.”107 At the same time, Ching-kuo discarded Trotskyism. According to Alexander Pantsov, he was the first to quit the Opposition as “the thought of active Trotskyist activity simply terrified him.”108 About 100 Chinese students, who supported Trotsky, were sent to the Soviet gulags. Ching-kuo was spared for obvious family reasons. Yet, even though he wanted to return to China as early as April 1927, the Soviet authorities “advised” him to further his studies in the USSR.109

By 1936, having left the UTK and having studied briefly in Leningrad (at the military academy), worked on the farm, in a mine and in a few industrial plants, Ching-kuo longed to return to China.110 Given Stalin’s Great Purges in the 1930s, Ching-kuo’s wish to return home is not altogether surprising. Whatever his real thoughts about Stalinism, Ching-kuo’s ideological credentials were immaculate. When in November 1936 he applied for full membership in the Bolshevik party, he entered the party after one month. His greatest wish, however, came true in March 1937, when he was allowed to leave the Soviet Union, after Stalin rediscovered CHIANG Kai-shek’s value as a strategic ally against Japan.111 Upon his return to China, Ching-kuo became his father’s principal adviser on the Soviet Union, occasionally serving as a “liaison officer” between Stalin and the senior Chiang. He was a member of

107. Yueh, *Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow and the Chinese Revolution*, p. 122. Some interpret Ching-kuo’s criticism of his father as a necessary political expression and survival tactic at a time of escalating Stalinism in the USSR.


110. Jiang, *The Biography of Jiang Jingguo*, p. 38. Having graduated from the Tolmachev War-Political Academy in June 1930, Ching-kuo requested either a return to China or a military service in the Red Army. Both options were rejected.

111. Supposedly, during the Xian Incident, CHIANG Kai-shek discussed his son’s return to China with ZHOU Enlai. The latter promised assistance.
the Chinese delegation negotiating the Friendship Treaty of 1945 and sought a solution of the Manchurian problem – ultimately unsuccessfully – in face-to-face talks with Stalin in December-January 1946. Due to his intimate knowledge of the Soviet Union, as well as his fluency in Russian, it is hardly coincidental that he was personally involved in talks with the Soviet agents in the late 1960s-early 1970s.

And yet, the doubts about CHIANG Ching-kuo’s allegiances proved misplaced. His wife, Faina – unlike CHIANG Kai-shek’s life partner, SOONG Meiling – adopted a low public profile. Any ideas or opinions Faina may have had were kept entirely private, and it is apparent that she did not involve herself in her husband’s policies in any way.\footnote{According to the biography of the “Russian Cinderella,” written by WANG Mei-yu (a senior Zhongguo shibao journalist) and based on interviews with Mrs. Chiang’s youngest son, CHIANG Hsiao-yung, Faina never had any say or any role in politics. \textit{Central News Agency}, May 12, 1997.} In any case, the 1990s proved that her loyalties lay on the Belarusian rather than Russian side (she was a Belarus native who shunned Russian overtures).\footnote{Until her death in 2004, Faina refused to meet any Russian representatives. In 1992, however, she welcomed the visit by the mayor of Minsk. Despite encouragement by her youngest son, Hsiao-yung, Faina never re-visited Belarus. \textit{China News}, May 1, 1995.} Ching-kuo, throughout his whole public life, maintained a staunch anti-Soviet position to fall in line with his father’s convictions, as well as to stay in tune with the KMT’s rank-and-file and the KMT’s American patrons.\footnote{In Larin’s view, it is very difficult – if possible at all – to determine categorically the extent to which Ching-kuo departed from the communist ideas he adhered to in his early years. Larin concludes that some traits from Ching-kuo’s Soviet days could be found in Ching-kuo the KMT leader. These are: the ideas of the state’s interest being more important than individual’s interests, the revolution as a higher task of the nation, the party as an unconditional leader of the revolution, cadres decide all, humility in private life and obligatory optimism. Larin also attributes Ching-kuo’s developed oratory skills to his Soviet years. Larin, Tsyon Tsingguo v Rossii,” pp. 142-143.} Foreign minister Chou’s public courtship of the Soviet Union in 1971-72 was apparently carried out without consulting either CHIANG Kai-shek nor his son (although it is hardly plausible that the foreign minister took major foreign policy initiatives independently of his superiors). Within a few days of becoming Premier in May 1972, CHIANG Ching-kuo demoted Chou, first to minister without portfolio and, later, removed him from the government altogether.\footnote{Chou returned to the political arena after CHIANG Kai-shek’s death as foreign policy adviser to Ching-kuo. In December 1977, he was appointed ROC ambassador to the Vatican, by then Taiwan’s only diplomatic mission in Europe.}
Chou’s successor – SHEN Chang-huan – was well-known for his strong anti-communist credentials.\textsuperscript{116} Ching-kuo also replaced Jimmy Wei, as head of the Government Information Office, with CHIEN Fu (QIAN Fu, future Foreign Minister), who reportedly put a stop to the contacts with Louis. Finally, in order wipe out any doubts about his Soviet policy, Ching-kuo ordered the release of a statement ruling out “a Soviet card.” In his book (first published in 1974), \textit{Fengyu zhongde ningjing} (Calm in the Eye of a Storm), Ching-kuo wrote of the Soviet Union in the same manner as his father did three decades earlier. The Soviets were “imperialists” who “left no loopholes unexploited in their sinister conspiracy against China," Russian imperialists, and bandits who could “never escape their final destiny of destruction.”\textsuperscript{117}

CHIANG Ching-kuo, in his capacity as prime minister, steered clear of any “pro-Soviet” allusions and reiterated the ROC policy of no contact with the Soviet communists. In the aftermath of CHIANG Kai-shek’s death, Ching-kuo’s government report to the Legislative Yuan in September 1975 confirmed anti-Sovietism to be the guiding principle of Taipei’s foreign policy. “United with all freedom loving nations, the ROC stands against communism. […] Regardless of the changes in the world, there will be no contact with the Soviet communists.”\textsuperscript{118}

\section*{XI. TRADE WITH EASTERN EUROPE}

Taiwan’s professed anti-Sovietism – however appropriate in the context of Cold War sentiment – failed to stop Washington from the long-awaited switch of diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing in January 1979. Once again, the ROC leadership was forced to reconsider its diplomatic strategy in general and to consider a possible opening up towards communist Europe (including the Soviet Union) in particular. As the number of Taipei’s allies diminished to an all time low of 21, while that of its archenemy shot


\textsuperscript{117}. Taipei: Li Ming Cultural Enterprise, 1978, pp. 73, 75 & 87.

to 120, support from any international quarter seemed desirable. The time seemed right to mend fences with the Soviet bloc as China’s invasion of Vietnam in 1978 lowered the temperature of Sino-Soviet relations to sub-zero. Taipei dusted off CHOU Shukai’s scheme of pursuing trade relations with the “non-hostile” communist states. In November 1979, the Executive Yuan (ROC government) allowed direct commercial ties with several East European states, namely, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland and Yugoslavia. In December 1981 Bulgaria joined this group and Romania followed shortly. Yet, the biggest communist economy and geo-strategically most important player in the communist bloc – the Soviet Union – retained its classification of “hostile,” together with Albania. As a sweetener, Moscow was allowed to trade with the ROC indirectly and Soviet merchant vessels were allowed to dock in Taiwan’s ports, provided they lowered their flags before entry. But what seemed to be a step towards preparing domestic and Western (particularly American) public opinion for the possibility of ROC-Soviet – at the very least commercial – rapprochement proved, in fact, to be Ching-kuo regime’s re-emphasis of its continued anti-Soviet strategy. Thus, even during the period of deep disappointment with – if not resentment towards – the United States in 1979, CHIANG Ching-kuo rejected the idea of pursuing a relationship with the Soviet Union. By 1981, The New York Times concluded that CHIANG Ching-kuo “intensely dislikes the Soviet Union.”

American analysts admitted the possibility of Taiwan seeking to play its “Soviet card” in order to keep both Beijing and Washington on notice that Taiwan had other options. However, they considered Taiwan unlikely to tilt towards the Soviet Union. In 1981, Edward Olsen listed three reasons why Taipei was predicted to continue its pro-American foreign policy: (1) the Nationalist legacy of anticomunism, which would be difficult to reverse; (2) Taiwan’s extensive economic ties with the West, which Taipei would not jeopardise in exchange for the “failures of the Soviet economic model;” and (3) The ROC’s leadership’s fear of contributing to So-

119. James P. Sterba, “Peking Persists on Unity; Taiwan Insists No Deal,” The New York Times, October 4, 1981. CHEN Li-fu makes a similar observation in his memoir, saying “Ching-kuo was a very strong anti-Communist, and, according to him, the Russians never treated him well.” Chang and Myers (eds.), The Storm Clouds Clear over China, p. 245.
viet domination of any Chinese government – communist or otherwise.120

Beijing, however, was not as optimistic as Olsen regarding the likelihood of Taiwanese alliance with the Soviet Union.121 Being convinced that the ROC’s survival depended on foreign power support, the US withdrawal from Taiwan, in Beijing’s view, opened geopolitical space that Moscow could potentially fill. Furthermore, fearing international isolation, the Chiang regime could have sought a diplomatic deal with the Soviet Union. DENG Xiaoping expressed his concern over the possibility of such a deal to a group of US senators in April 1979, warning that Soviet involvement in the Taiwan issue was one of the two factors that could trigger Chinese invasion of the island (the other was the KMT’s persisting refusal to negotiate reunification).122 By the mid-1980s, the number of conditions under which Beijing pledged to use force to regain Taiwan increased to five, but Taipei’s possible alliance with the Soviets remained the most important one.123

Beijing’s concerns proved misplaced, as Taipei’s limited opening to the Soviet Union’s allies was not part of the wider geopolitical game. It was, nonetheless, momentous as it signified a major re-evaluation of Taiwan’s foreign policy strategy towards the communist states. Placed in the context of separating trade from politics (zhengzhi maoyi fenli), commercial ties with Eastern Europe were designed (at least publicly) to diversify Taiwan’s export markets. In an interview with the Far Eastern Economic Review, President Chiang stated that “trade is trade: our trade with East European countries has no connection with politics or ideology.”124 And it genuinely did not, but neither was it big business for any of the


121. Garver argues that the PRC leaders took seriously the possibility of collaboration between Moscow and Taipei. Beijing’s fears of Soviet involvement could have contributed to Beijing’s compromise with Washington on the Taiwan issue during the 1971-1972 negotiations, as Beijing’s interests were better served by allowing Taiwan to remain under the US influence rather than forcing it into the arms of the Soviet Union. Garver, The Sino-American Alliance, pp. 280-281.


sides. Taiwan's trade with seven East European economies started off quite dynamically, reaching US$71 million in 1980. In 1981 and 1982, however, it fell to US$61 million and US$30 million respectively, with Taiwan registering a consistent deficit. In subsequent years, trade recovered to the US$40-60 million level and Taiwan began enjoying a surplus. Still, in absolute numbers, the level of trade was negligible for both sides. It represented roughly 1% of the ROC's total trade and less than 1% of the Soviet allies' foreign trade.125 With trade came contacts between the ROC and communist firms. In May 1982, for example, during the first exhibition of high-tech products from Europe, firms from the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia were present.126

However disappointing the scale of ROC trading with the Soviet allies was, it was surprising that trade took place at all. Despite Taipei's 1979 announcement, trading with selected communist states was conducted indirectly, via third countries. This was conditioned by the lack of visa offices, unfamiliarity with each other's markets, no direct communication links, not to mention lingering ideological prejudices. Moreover, trade with Taiwan was not officially supported by any East European government. In March 1985, the Executive Yuan reiterated that based on the policy of interaction with the communist countries and for security reasons, no communist country would be invited to participate in any international activities organised in Taiwan. Concerning trade with Eastern Europe, the approval for contacts between Taiwanese companies and their East European counterparts was to be considered on a case by case basis. Thus, Ching-kuo's official anti-communism prevented Taiwan from capitalising politically on the renewed hostility between the Soviet bloc and China. Economically, it stopped Taiwanese businesses from exploring communist markets. Only in the area of sports did Taipei sanction direct contacts with the East European communists, as the ROC teams were seen participating in selected sports events in Poland in the late 1980s.127 When the

PRC rapprochement with the communist states commenced in the mid-1980s, the ROC’s limited contacts with the Soviet Union and its allies were insufficient to challenge the re-emerging camaraderie between China and Eastern Europe.\textsuperscript{128}

**XII. SOVIET “TAIWAN OPTION”?**

Officially, Moscow supported Beijing’s territorial claims to the rebel island, opposed the ROC’s UN membership and emphasised the “one China” policy. Despite confrontation with the Mao regime, the Soviet Union endorsed the Albanian motion to expel Taiwan from the UN and did not respond to Chou’s offer of trade and economic relations. Domestically, it was impossible to obtain trustworthy news about the Republic of China and the precious few books about Taiwan that were available were translations of PRC publications. Foreign books about Taiwan were placed in libraries with restricted readership. Soviet publications on the topic were intended for internal circulation only among the top party-state officials (most notably V.N. Baryshnikov’s *Taiwanskiy vopros v Kitaisko-Amerikanskikh otnosheniyakh* 1949-1958 [The Taiwanese Problem in Sino-American Relations, 1949-1958]). All publicly available publications about the ROC were filled with propaganda, reinforcing the image of Taiwan as “a puppet of American imperialism” or “the refuge of the Kuomintang clique.”\textsuperscript{129} Moscow’s Taiwan policy, however, was hardly consistent. Although some of the departures from the “one China” principle resulted from the lack of political sensitivity by Soviet officials regarding the Taiwan question, others raised doubts about Moscow’s unconditional support for the PRC’s claim over Taiwan. Louis’s visits in particular revealed the divisions within the Soviet leadership regarding the Tai-

\textsuperscript{128} Eastern Europe’s relations with the PRC followed the trajectory of the Soviet ties with China (excepting Albania, Romania and Yugoslavia). When the latter reached their nadir in the early 1960s, the East Europeans distanced themselves from China. When Moscow initiated a policy of rapprochement with China in the early 1980s, Eastern Europe made concerted efforts to re-establish party relations and revitalize state-to-state cooperation with Beijing. Their efforts succeeded following the official visits to China by East European party-state leaders between 1986 and 1987. See Harish Kapur, *Distant Neighbours: China and Europe*, London and New York: Pinter, 1990, pp. 164-70.

\textsuperscript{129} Ivanov, “Russian-Taiwanese Relations,” p. 6; Toder, “Istoria izucheniya Taivanija v Rossii,” p. 53-54. Toder’s *Taiwan i evo istoriya (XIX)* (published in 1978) was an exception among the Soviet publications on Taiwan in a sense that it attempted to portray Taiwan not only in the context of the struggle among world powers but also as an interesting object of cultural study in its own right.
wan question and the possibility that the Taiwan issue had been assigned a role in the Soviet strategy to normalize relations with the PRC.

Throughout the 1970s, improved Sino-Soviet relations notwithstanding, rumours continued regarding Moscow’s interest in Taiwan. In May 1973, two days before the head of the newly established US Liaison Office in Beijing assumed his post, Soviet ships passed through the Taiwan Straits.130 In May 1975, several ships of the Soviet Pacific Navy passed through the Taiwan Straits. A month later, Louis made his (possibly) last visit to the ROC. In 1978, stories circulated in Moscow about possible Soviet recognition of Taiwan. In November 1978, Soviet ships visited the port of Makung for repairs. In the 1970s, Moscow also established contact – via its embassy in Tokyo – with the Taiwan separatist movement. In 1980, the Central Committee of the CPSU allegedly passed a resolution urging the Soviet Union to establish commercial relations with Taiwan.131

Yet, the ideological affinity and the necessity for good neighbourly relations with China convinced Moscow to maintain a broad, anti-ROC foreign policy, rather than pursue a ‘Taiwan option’. The Kremlin consistently considered Taiwan as an outpost of US militarism and viewed the status quo of the divided China as favourable to Soviet diplomacy, which rested assured that as long as the US recognised the ROC, Sino-American hostility would continue. This is why Moscow accused Beijing of backtracking on its principled claim on Taiwan to curry favour with the US when the process of Sino-American rapprochement began in the early 1970s. A Soviet monthly on foreign affairs, Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn, concluded that, “part of the Chinese leadership is so greatly interested in the rapid normalisation of relations with the United States that it is ready to remove the main obstacle and actually go back on its previous stand on the Taiwan question.” Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn stressed that it “becomes increasingly obvious that Beijing departs more and more from its “firm” and “principled” stand on Taiwan and has arrived at de facto recognition of the very concept of ‘two Chinas.’” The monthly reminded Beijing that Washington still maintained diplomatic ties with Taiwan and American troops were based in Taiwan. It asserted that Chinese diplomats were hard-

pressed to explain why they were opening a mission in Washington while Taiwan maintained a full embassy there. Ultimately, the Soviets' supposed fear of Beijing's *de facto* recognition of two Chinas proved unfounded. By 1979 – to Moscow's displeasure – the Taiwan question no longer blocked the emergence of Sino-American "united front" against the Soviet Union. The Sino-US rapprochement notwithstanding, the Kremlin stood firm on the "one China" principle. In his Tashkent speech in March 1982, the Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev reiterated Moscow's recognition of China's sovereignty over Taiwan and refusal to support the "two China" concept "in any form."133

The Soviet allies displayed a greater consistency regarding relations with Taiwan. Diplomatically, they broadly supported the "one China" principle, but did not avoid contact with ROC officials at international forums (as the Taiwanese presence in the Bulgarian conference on tourism in 1968 testified). Domestically, the issue of Taiwan appears to have generated little interest since the 1960s and was hardly even mentioned, let alone debated, in the media. Ivana Bakesova remarks that the last reports on Taiwan were printed in the Czechoslovak press in 1962, when Taipei allegedly attempted to "use the Great Leap Forward to provoke military confrontation with China."134 Economically, the East European governments neither obstructed nor encouraged an indirect commercial interaction with the ROC. In January 1980, the Polish shipping concern, 'Ocean Line', began regular shipping service between the communist region and Taiwan. Several Eastern European companies approached Taiwan to patent their products there (subsequently, each year Taipei has approved a number of patents from the region). Some East European firms even managed – on very rare occasions – to participate in trade exhibitions staged in Taiwan. Among such visitors, the most curious took place in late 1980, when the economic counsellor of the Romanian Embassy in Bangkok visited Taipei, reportedly to express Bucharest's interest in direct trade


133. NI Xiaojian and LI Fanghua, "Eluosi yu Taiwan guanxi" (Relations between Russia and Taiwan). [in] Lu (ed.), *Zhongguo duiwai guanxi zhong de Taiwan wenti*, p. 221.

with the ROC. It should be noted that at that time Romania was China’s closest partner among the Soviet allies. Thus, while pursing a “one China” policy, the Soviet allies did not object to some token commercial relations with Taiwan. Neither did they engage in any games involving “Taiwan cards,” leaving the big diplomatic ante to the Kremlin.

XIII. RESTRICTIONS ON TRADE LIFTED

Until CHIANG Ching-kuo’s death in January 1988, the KMT – unaffected by Mikhail Gorbachev’s domestic reforms (glasnost and perestroika) – maintained anti-Sovietism. The only sign of possible change in Taipei’s Soviet policy, as a consequence of the progressive democratisation of the Soviet Union and Moscow’s diplomatic overtures to the West, came in 1986, when consent was given to the ROC women’s basketball team to participate in the Women’s World Cup in Moscow in August. The spirit of separating politics from sport (zhengzhi yu tiyu fenkai) did not extend, however, to trade, as Taipei maintained a ban on direct trade with the Soviet Union.

In the context of democratisation of Taiwanese politics (manifested in the lifting of marital law in 1987 and the emergence of opposition parties, which challenged the KMT in local and island-wide elections) and the lifting of restrictions on trade with and investments in the PRC (1985-1987), Taipei’s continued hostility towards the Soviet bloc looked increasingly anachronistic. The demand for new thinking on relations with communist states came from Taiwanese businessmen, who anxiously watched South Korea successfully enter communist markets. By late October 1987, the ROC Council for Economic Planning and Development proposed “The Main Points of Trade Measures towards Eastern Europe” (Dui Dongou maoyi shishi yaodian), according to which direct trade between Taiwan and Eastern Europe (except the USSR and Albania) would be allowed, application procedures by Taiwanese traders eager to organize trade tours (kaochatuan) to Eastern Europe simplified, and visa formalities for East European businessmen explicitly formulated. Before the government preliminarily approved ‘The Main Points’ in January 1988, ROC businessmen or-


organized the first tour of Eastern Europe in mid-October 1987. Grouped into the Northeast European Trade and Manufacturing Association (Dongbeiou Maoyi Changshang Youyihui), they visited Hungary, Poland and Yugoslavia. Although ostensibly private, the tour was led by CHIANG Pin-kung (JIANG Bingkun), Secretary General of the semi-official China External Trade Development Council (CETRA, Zhonghua Minguo Duiwai Maoyi Fazhan Xiehui) and future Vice-Minister of Economic Affairs. Upon their return, the businessmen compiled an “Investigation Report of East European Markets” (Dongou Shichang Diaoacha Yanjiu Baogao), which urged the government to lift all restrictions on trade and contact with communist states.137

Convinced of the profitability of economic relations with Eastern Europe, in March 1988, the ROC government formally lifted restrictions on direct trade with Eastern Europe.138 At the same time, however, it emphasized the continuity of its anti-communist and anti-Soviet foreign policy, and the principle of separating trade from politics.139 Yet, to express its conciliatory attitude towards Moscow, Taipei repatriated three remaining sailors of the Soviet oil tanker Taupse, who returned to the Soviet Union in late August 1988.140


138. Specific trade policies included: 1. direct trade and economic cooperation with seven East European countries, including Yugoslavia; 2. opening of the Taiwanese market to East European consumer products; 3. simplification of visa procedures for businessmen from Eastern Europe; 4. allowing banking links; 5. allowing direct telecommunication links; 6. lowering tariffs on imported goods from Eastern Europe; 7. specifying an ROC bank to issue insurance for Taiwanese exports to Eastern Europe.

139. According to MOFA, the ROC’s policy towards the Soviet Union was conditioned by Moscow’s alleged continued “aggressive ambitions” (yxin) vis-à-vis China. It remained Taiwan’s “bitter enemy” (shichou). Lianhe bao, February 25, 1988.

140. Zili zaobao, August 17, 1988. Each sailor received US$20,000 as compensation for their forced stay in Taiwan. The repatriation of the sailors received wide publicity in the USSR. TASS News Agency, Moskovskii Komsomolets and Novoye Vremya, among others, published articles on their return. Taipei’s gesture of good will turned into a public relations disaster as the Soviet media focused primarily on the negative aspects of their Taiwan experience. See Lagunina and Khrobostov, “‘SOS’ protyazhennost’yu v 34 goda,” pp. 40-43.
Taipei's revision of trade policies towards Eastern Europe was well accommodated within its new diplomatic strategy, "flexible diplomacy" (tanxing waijiao), introduced by CHIANG Ching-kuo's successor, President LEE Teng-hui (LI Denghui). In his address to the KMT Congress in July 1988, President Lee stated that the ROC should "strive with greater determination, pragmatism, flexibility, and vision in order to develop a foreign policy based primarily on substantive relations." The declared political objectives of "flexible diplomacy" were:

1. to consolidate existing diplomatic ties or gain new diplomatic allies;
2. to maintain and develop substantive (semi-official) ties with the states that maintained diplomatic relations with China; and
3. to participate or resume participation in inter-governmental organisations.

There was also a purely economic dimension to Taiwan's flexible diplomacy, namely, a goal of diversifying Taiwanese export and import markets in order to render the Taiwanese economy more resilient to economic cycles in the US and Japan, Taiwan's major trading partners. Thus, "flexible diplomacy" implied the ROC's greater flexibility on issues previously considered heresy, such as dual recognition or reaching out to communist countries. Lifting restrictions on trade with Eastern Europe could be seen, therefore, as a manifestation of Taipei's new thinking on its foreign affairs.

Having convinced the government to lift restrictions on economic relations with Soviet allies, Taiwanese businesspeople continued to press the authorities to lift the ban on Soviet trade. The first sign of the Taiwanese government's willingness to do so came in October 1988, when it approved the first-ever Taiwanese trade delegation to the USSR, which included two civil servants (from the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Board of Foreign Trade). As this approval amounted to a de facto reversal of Taipei's long-standing anti-Soviet policy, it drew criticism from the old guards of anticomunist foreign policy, who questioned the desirability of relaxing policy vis-à-vis the Soviet enemy. The critics were particularly an-

gendered by government approval of the trade mission without prior consultation with the policymaking Central Standing Committee of the KMT. Following stormy disputes, the KMT leadership endorsed the trade delegation as a private business initiative, but resolved to continue trading with Moscow indirectly. Taipei reaffirmed its opposition to any direct contact with the USSR, be they cultural, academic or economic. In 1989, while still considering the USSR as a hostile country (duiwo buyouhao guojia), MOFA for the first time – but not without serious deliberation – granted visas to the Soviet citizens: two beauty queens (Russian and Estonian), who attended a world beauty contest in March, becoming the first Soviet visitors to Taiwan since 1949, and two trade specialists, who attended the Pacific Basin Economic Council in May. Still, MOFA felt necessary to declare that its decision to grant visas to a handful of Soviet citizens did not indicate any change in Taipei’s general anti-Soviet foreign policy and the government’s stand on prohibiting direct trade with the Soviet Union. Towards the end of 1989, however, the Taiwanese government quietly relaxed its visa policy. As a result, a group of five Soviet journalists wishing to study Taiwan’s economic success and a Soviet medical delegation were allowed to visit the ROC.

By early 1990, calls for reversal of the government’s policy of banning trade with the Soviet Union grew louder. Taiwanese traders pointed to the economic and political reforms pursued by Gorbachev, peaceful collapse of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe in 1989 and the sizeable Soviet GDP per head (calculated by Lianhe bao as greater than US$8,000 a year). Disregarding the

144. Subsequently, a visa request for a Soviet scholar to participate in the international conference on culture to be held in Taiwan in December 1988 was rejected. Zhongyang ribao, November 25, 1988.
146. Lianhe bao, March 15, 1989. The seemingly innocent beauty contest stirred quite a controversy in Taiwan. The contest organisers probably threatened the Taiwanese authorities not to stage the event if Taipei did not agree to the participation of two Soviet beauty queens. The Soviet participants were accompanied by a manager, who openly admitted a communist party membership. Moreover, during the competition, the Soviet national symbols were shown, probably for the first time in Taiwan’s history. Lianhe bao, March 26, 1989; Jingji ribao, May 19,1989.
ban on direct Soviet trade, ROC industrialists in consumer industries went ahead with their plans to stage trade exhibitions in the Soviet Union and to establish a Sino-Soviet Economic Development Association (Zhongsu Jingji Fazhan Xiehui). The Ministry of Economic Affairs seconded the calls for the relaxation of the Soviet trade restrictions, identifying the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe as potential new export markets for Taiwan.

In February 1990, the ROC government finally gave in to the pressure and passed a resolution allowing direct trade with the Soviet Union (and Albania), as well as Taiwanese investment in the USSR (provided that such did not endanger the ROC’s security and were not related to any government-sponsored project). Soviet firms were allowed to bid for contracts tendered by Taiwanese state-owned companies. At the same time, Taipei relaxed visa regulations for Soviet visitors and opened direct dialling with the USSR. Amid reports of Soviet food shortages, Taiwan set up a cabinet-level task force to consider food aid to its former Cold War enemy. Plans to send rice were put on hold, however, when Soviet troops intervened in the Baltic Republics.

XIV. RESPONSES FROM EASTERN EUROPE

In Eastern Europe, only Hungary recognized in Taiwan a strong trading power (then 13th largest trading state) and a source of potential investment (Taiwan had foreign reserves totalling US$74 billion). Hoping to attract Taiwanese investment, Budapest moved to establish direct economic relations with Taipei. In September 1987, the Hungarian Commercial Bank signed a cooperative agreement with the ROC state-owned banking corporation, the Central Trust of China (Zhongyang Xintuo Ju), the first economic agreement ever signed between a Taiwanese company and its counterpart in the Soviet bloc. In January 1988, the Hungarians organised the first delegation from the Soviet bloc to Taiwan. Composed of Chairman of the Hungarian Chamber of Commerce
Peter Lorinche, President of the Hungarian Commercial Bank Sandor Demjan and eleven representatives from state-owned trading companies, the delegation called on the ROC Ministry of Finance, where it discussed bilateral trade, direct banking links and joint investment ventures. The hosts, for their part, talked about possible establishment of a trade or investment office in Hungary and reaching an investment protection agreement via non-governmental trade organizations.

Other East Europeans cautiously followed the Hungarian lead. In June 1988, a delegation of the East German Association of Commerce paid CETRA a visit. The Yugoslav Chamber of Economy also expressed an interest in cooperation with CETRA, setting up a Commission for Taiwan. In late March 1989, a Polish trade delegation arrived in Taipei, where it invited Taiwanese businessmen to trade with and invest in Poland. Although the Taiwanese press termed the Polish visit as “official,” the Poles were unable to say anything concrete on such issues as the possibility of opening an ROC trade office in Warsaw or the likelihood of Poland reducing tariffs on imports from Taiwan.

Taipei expected to capitalize on the East European interest in Taiwan. When a CETRA delegation visited Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Hungary in March 1989, it not only signed a cooperation agreement with the Yugoslav Chamber of Economy, but also obtained a promise from Sofia concerning the opening of direct airlinks and an assurance from Budapest of the possibility of opening a Taiwanese trade office in Hungary. In response to tariff reductions on Taiwanese products by Hungary, East Germany and Yugoslavia, Taipei introduced corresponding preferential tariff treatment for the products from these countries in April 1989. It also officially allowed CETRA to establish a trade office in Budapest and Belgrade.

---


156. *Lianhe bao*, March 16, 1989. As Taiwan imported mostly timber from three East European states, the move to reduce tariffs benefited mostly the economic development of Taiwan. *Lianhe bao*, April 28, 1989.
XV. END OF TAIPEI'S COLD WAR WITH EASTERN EUROPE

The collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe in 1989 caught MOFA unprepared. Rather than taking radical steps to adjust its foreign strategy towards Eastern Europe, the Taiwanese government opted for a gradual approach. In August 1989, it lifted the ban on all forms of exchange visits with Eastern Europe and allowed its flag carriers to serve the region directly. A month later, it permitted investment and the establishment of representative offices in Eastern Europe, as well as East European investment and offices in Taiwan. In November, all restrictions on East European merchant ships in the island’s ports were lifted.157 The MOFA simplified visa regulations for visitors from the Soviet bloc (except those from Albania and the USSR), agreed to tourist exchanges with all communist states (again, except Albania and the USSR) and allowed citizens of Eastern Europe to seek long-term residence in Taiwan.158 The Taiwanese government also allowed its high level officials to visit Eastern Europe, reversing past regulations, which permitted only non-governmental organizations (e.g., CETRA) to visit the region.159

Only in October did the Taiwanese government realize that official contacts with the newly democratized states could give Taiwan greater leverage in international affairs. To this effect, Taipei subsequently instructed its diplomats in Europe to open political communication with the post-communist states.160 Two months later, the ROC Foreign Minister, LIEN Chan (LIAN Zhan), told the Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post of Taipei’s readiness to provide Eastern Europe with economic assistance. He also stressed Taipei’s willingness to develop substantive relations (shizhi guanxi) with East European states, set up official trade offices in the region and alluded to the possibility of establishing diplomatic relations with the post-communist states in some unspecified future.161 In late December 1989, against the background of the fall of the Ceausescu regime in Romania, ROC Foreign Minister Lien announced Taipei’s hope to develop substantive relations with all post-communist states in such areas as the economy, sports, science/

education and culture, and reiterated the plan to open trade offices in Hungary and Yugoslavia.\textsuperscript{162} Three days later, Lien no longer limited Taiwan's foreign policy objectives to economic cooperation with Eastern Europe, but also considered establishing “friendly relations” (youhaode guanxi) with the region, which would “obviously” include official ties ("dangran baokuo guanfan guanxi zainei"). A translation of Lien's announcement by Taiwan's official Central News Agency explicitly referred to Taipei's eagerness to establish diplomatic relations with East European states "on the basis of mutual agreement."\textsuperscript{163} Lien also declared that Taiwan would provide Romania with humanitarian aid through its Fund for International Disaster and Humanitarian Assistance (Guoji Zainan Rendao Jiuyuan Jijin). The money was to be provided either directly to Romania via its diplomatic missions abroad or through the International Red Cross.\textsuperscript{164} Meanwhile, the Ministry of Economic Affairs decided that the Overseas Economic Cooperation and Development Fund (OECDF, Haiwai Jingji Hezuo Fazhan Jijin) could in principle extend assistance to Eastern Europe, particularly "pro-Taiwan" Hungary and Yugoslavia, as well as Poland, Taiwan's largest trade partner in the region.\textsuperscript{165}

\textbf{XVI. RESPONSES FROM THE SOVIET UNION}

Moscow was somewhat interested in tapping into Taiwan's investment and trade potential. In March 1988, the representative of the economic section of the TASS News Agency office in New York, Anatoli Belousov, welcomed Taiwanese traders to the Soviet Union. Under Gorbachev's economic reforms, he claimed, Moscow was ready to establish commercial ties with Taipei, as the Soviet market needed not only Taiwanese investment, but also electronics and consumer products made in Taiwan.\textsuperscript{166} Numerous Soviet academics agreed that Gorbachev's perestroika effectively separated politics from the economy and, thus, created necessary conditions for the development of Taiwanese-Soviet commercial relations.\textsuperscript{167}

---

A. Yakovlev of the Institute of Far Eastern Studies, for example, argued that the ‘one China’ principle did not clash with Soviet non-political interaction with Taiwan. Recognising Taiwan as a part of China, Moscow was free to establish commercial, cultural ties with Taipei.\textsuperscript{168} Similarly, Mikhail L. Titarenko, Director of the Institute of Far Eastern Studies, while emphasising Moscow’s “one China” policy, did not rule out commercial, non-political relations with Taipei.\textsuperscript{169}

Soviet diplomacy seemingly supported trade with Taiwan. The Soviet embassy in Bangkok in particular appeared active in this regard. It not only helped Taiwanese trade delegations to the Soviet Union, but also – according to Hong Kong-based daily Ta Kung Pao – took an initiative in September 1989 to foster Taiwanese-Soviet-Thai joint ventures in foreign trade, which could go around the ban on Taiwanese-Soviet direct trade.\textsuperscript{170} Soviet diplomats in Japan also encouraged Soviet-Taiwanese communication, providing visa services, market information and even venue for Soviet-Taiwanese dialogue.\textsuperscript{171} The Soviet Foreign Ministry Spokesman, Gennadi Gerasimov, in an interview with the Zhongguo shibao, expressed his personal view of having no objections against Taipei trade office in Moscow as trade relations were separate from political ties.\textsuperscript{172} The Soviet Red Cross and the Soviet embassy in Bangkok sent public notes expressing gratitude for the Taiwanese donations to the Armenian earthquake victims.\textsuperscript{173} In January 1991, newly appointed Soviet Prime Minister Valentin Pavlov expressed hope for the development of economic relations with Taiwan, while noting “political obstacles.”\textsuperscript{174} At the same time, the Soviet press began publishing articles friendly to Taiwan.\textsuperscript{175}

Signs of interest in developing commercial relations with Taiwan notwithstanding, Moscow was unwilling to compromise newly re-established camaraderie with Beijing for the sake of elusive gains from trading with Taipei, rejecting not only official contacts with Taipei but even direct trade.\textsuperscript{176} On the eve of Gorbachev’s historic

\textsuperscript{168} Zili zaobao, October 16, 1989.
\textsuperscript{169} Zhongguo shibao, May 14, 1989.
\textsuperscript{170} Ta kung pao (Hong Kong), September 8, 1989.
\textsuperscript{171} Zili zaobao, November 24, 1990.
\textsuperscript{172} Zhongguo shibao, February 13, 1990.
\textsuperscript{173} Ziyou shibao, July 23, 1989; Qingshan ribao, August 13, 1989.
\textsuperscript{174} Lianhe bao, January 17, 1991.
\textsuperscript{175} See, for example, Aleksandr Chudodeyev, Skhvatka dvuh tigrov (Fight of two tigers), Novoye Vremya, No. 46 (1990), pp. 30-32.
\textsuperscript{176} Zhongguo shibao, May 14 & 15, 1989.
visit to Beijing in May 1989, Evgeny M. Primakov, Director of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, reminded Taipei that Soviet-Taiwanese rapprochement was possible only in the context of the “one China” principle, which recognised Taiwan as a province of the PRC. Predictably, a Beijing communiqué issued after Gorbachev’s trip to Beijing restated Moscow’s “one China” policy. In October 1989, Moscow forbid Soviet journalists to make what would have been the Soviet media’s first-ever visit to the ROC. The Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Council on International Relations, Aleksander Dzasohov, during a press conference in Tokyo, declared that visits to Taiwan by Soviet officials at the ministerial level or members of the Supreme Soviet were illegal. At the same time, the Trade Counsellor at the Soviet Embassy in Washington, Yevgenii V. Afanasyev, reminded Taipei that the Soviet official policy on trade with Taiwan remained unchanged: Moscow opposed direct commercial relations with Taipei.

XVII. SOVIET-TAIWANESE RAPPROCHEMENT

Following the dismantling of the one party system in early 1990, the Kremlin no longer could veto non-governmental visits to Taiwan. Thus, the first Soviet journalist, Boris Pilistskine, Mozambique correspondent for the Soviet daily Izvestia, arrived in Taipei in April 1990. In May, Moscow Municipal Councilmember Aleksander Lukin (Sinologist and former diplomat) visited Taipei at the invitation of the daily Zhongguo Shibao. Upon his return, Lukin’s article in the New Times highlighted Taiwan’s economic prosperity and democratisation, and called for friendship between Moscow and Taipei. The first delegation of Soviet bankers from the Bank for Foreign Economic Affairs of the USSR arrived in Taipei in early July 1990 and conducted preliminary talks with three

181. Zili Zaobao, April 14, 1990. In early November 1990, the Soviet Minister of Finance, Valentine Pavlov, confirmed that the Soviet Union traded with Taiwan indirectly and pointed out political obstacles as hindering the development of commercial ties with Taiwan. Jingji Ribao, November 7, 1990.
Taiwanese banks, presumably on banking cooperation. In July, a six-man delegation from Soviet Republics (including the Russian minister of industry) arrived in Taiwan on what appeared to be a holiday. By mid-August, the ROC office in Singapore revealed that from August 1989, more than 100 visas were issued to Soviet citizens wishing to visit Taiwan. At the same time, Taiwan studies within the USSR were revived; presenting the history and contemporary development of the ROC as no longer affected by ideological bias.

The most momentous visit to Taipei was that of Gavril Popov, the democratically elected Mayor of Moscow, in October 1990. During his “private” visit, he met Foreign Minister CHIEN Fu and Vice Foreign Minister CHANG Hsiao-yen (ZHANG Xiaoyan). While meeting WUER Kaixi, one of the leaders of the Tiananmen student movement of the spring 1989, Popov condemned China for its dismal human rights record and suggested the need for closer Russian ties with the ROC. He also called for an exchange of offices between the two cities. Popov’s visit to Taipei accelerated communication between Moscow and Taipei. In January 1991, a delegation of nine members of the Moscow Municipal Council (including Lukin) arrived in Taipei at the invitation of the Taipei Municipal Council. The Moscow councillors admitted that Beijing was displeased with the people-to-people exchanges between the USSR and Taiwan, but this would not stop unofficial Soviet-Taiwanese communication.

Despite the ban on official visits to the ROC, a number of Soviet party and government officials travelled to the island as well. Although such visits were formally unofficial or private, they usually featured meetings with Taiwanese government officials. Soviet Vice-Minister of Electric Industry Ivanov, for example, paid a “private visit” to Taiwan in March 1991, during which he “secretly” met the ROC minister of economic affairs. Some Soviet officials attempted to exploit the potential of Soviet-Taiwanese relations for their own benefit. Aleksander Vladislavlev, a member of the USSR

Supreme Soviet and one of the leaders of the Soviet Scientific-Industrial Union, appeared to be the most active in this respect. He visited Taiwan in early January 1991 with an expressed goal of encouraging Taiwanese investments in the Soviet Union. According to Peter Ivanov, Vladislavlev was a proxy of an influential group of party cadres associated with A. Volsky, a well-known Soviet Communist Party Central Committee activist. When in Taipei, Vladislavlev – together with CETRA and the ROC Ministry of Economic Affairs – floated the idea of establishing a Sino-Soviet Foundation of Economic Exchanges (Zhongsu Jingji Jiaoliu Jijinhui) with the goal of strengthening Taiwanese-Soviet economic cooperation by providing market information and facilitating contact between Soviet and Taiwanese firms. The Volsky group, enjoying an influential position within the Soviet hierarchy, allegedly hoped to monopolise Moscow’s relations with Taiwan to the extent of gaining authority to process visas. The proposed foundation was meant to be a vehicle to carry out these ambitious plans. During his second trip to Taipei in July 1991, the Foundation of Soviet-Far Eastern Exchanges (Sulian-Yuandong Jiaoliu Jijinhui) was indeed established (agreement on establishment was signed between Vladislavlev and HUANG Shang-hui, President of Hung Pang International Enterprise Group). There were meant to be two branches of the foundation, one in Taiwan and one in the USSR. The Soviet branch was to be headed by former Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze (as it turned out later, Shevardnadze was indeed considered a key member of the Foundation). Although the project received much media publicity in Taiwan, CETRA chose not to be involved as it was not officially backed by the Soviet authorities.

Various Soviet republics also showed interest in pursuing relations with Taiwan. Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation Andrei Kozyrev was careful to note that Russia’s interest in commercial relations with Taiwan did not violate the Soviet ‘one China’ principle. In February 1991, President of the Russian Fed-

---

eration Boris Yeltsin, in an interview with the Taiwanese media, confirmed Russia’s interest in expanding trade relations with Taiwan.\textsuperscript{196} Taipei even invited him for a visit, but the visit never took place.

The first Baltic officials visited the island in early March 1991. Two Latvians: Maris Gailis, General Director of the Department of Foreign Economic Links, and Ojars Kehris, Chairman of the Economic Commission of the Supreme Council, allegedly proposed a reciprocal establishment of trade offices, as well as requested Taiwanese financial assistance to strengthen Latvia’s budget and support its educational system and small-size enterprises.\textsuperscript{197} Communication channels were also established with Estonia (and, possibly, Lithuania). MOU Tun, Deputy Secretary General of CETRA, visited Tallinn in mid-July 1991, where he held talks with Prime Minister Edgar Savisaar. Estonian Minister of Foreign Economic Relations Mehis Pylv promised CETRA to visit Taiwan in October 1991.\textsuperscript{198}

Belarus also joined Taiwan’s “fan club.” Minsk’s flirtation with Taiwanese business executives culminated in the summer of 1991, when Vice Prime Minister Piljubo visited Taipei.\textsuperscript{199} In July 1991, a Taiwanese company specialising in East Central European trade, Xin Zhong Qiye Gongs, reportedly reached an agreement with Belarusian Premier Viacheslav F. Kebich securing exclusive rights to operate cargo and passenger air service between Taipei and Minsk via Tokyo.\textsuperscript{200} Beijing suspected that Belarusian officials’ intense contacts with Taiwanese businessmen could potentially pave the way to diplomatic relations between Minsk and Taipei. Kebich admitted later that “the Taiwan problem was a stumbling block during negotiations on the diplomatic recognition agreement with China.”\textsuperscript{201}

By early 1991, this largely uncoordinated communication no longer suited the Taiwanese authorities. In March, the government created a “Working Group on Relations with the Soviet Union” (dui su gongzuo xiaozu). It was headed by Vice Foreign Minister CHANG Hsiao-yen and composed of officials from the major governmental departments (including MOFA; Ministry of Economic

\textsuperscript{196} Zhongyang ribao, February 10, 1991.
\textsuperscript{197} Lianhe bao, March 6, 1991.
\textsuperscript{198} Lianhe bao, August 28, 1991.
\textsuperscript{199} Lianhe bao, June 17, 1996.
\textsuperscript{200} Jingji ribao, July 5, 1991.
\textsuperscript{201} As quoted in Ivanov, “Russian-Taiwanese Relations,” pp. 30-31.
Affairs, MOEA; Ministry of Defence; Ministry of Transportations and Communications; Ministry of Education; National Science Council; Central Bank of China; National Security Bureau; and CE-TRA). The Working Group’s major objective was to further unofficial relations with the USSR, primarily in the economic area. Its most immediate tasks were to conclude a fishery agreement with the Soviet Union (in order to resolve the problem of Taiwanese fishing boats operating in Soviet territorial waters) and establish a trade office in Moscow.\textsuperscript{202}

There is no evidence that Taipei schemed to win Soviet diplomatic recognition. Although in April 1990, former Foreign Minister LIEN Chan, in response to the question raised by CHEN Shui-bian of the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP, Minjindang), did not rule out the possibility of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in some unspecified future (‘jianjiao bushi meiyou keneng’), however, he acknowledged that even the modest goal of establishing direct trade ties had not yet been achieved.\textsuperscript{203} In November, ROC Prime Minister HAU Pei-tsun (HAO Pocun) publicly ruled out diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, hinting that such a development would not conform to Taiwan’s national interests.\textsuperscript{204}

Until mid-1991, there were no open promises of any concerted effort to aid the Soviet Union. Even though in mid-December 1990, MOFA requested its representatives stationed abroad to study the Soviet grain situation so that the Soviet food needs could be determined.\textsuperscript{205} A year later, Foreign Minister CHIEN Fu disqualified the Soviet Union as a recipient of Taiwan’s economic aid due to the insufficient progress of political and economic reforms in the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{206} Only in mid-1991, following the G7 decision to aid the Soviet economy, did MOEA announce its readiness to consider providing loans and assistance to the USSR, but via the World Bank, rather than directly.\textsuperscript{207} Yet, any concrete details of such assistance were left undetermined.


\textsuperscript{203} Lianhe bao, April 29, 1990. In January 1990, the ROC MOFA officially lifted the prohibition against contact by ROC diplomats with their Soviet counterparts when stationed abroad. Zili zaobao, November 24, 1990.

\textsuperscript{204} Zhongyang ribao, November 3, 1990.

\textsuperscript{205} Zhongguo shibao, December 19, 1990.

\textsuperscript{206} Lianhe bao, June 24, 1991.

\textsuperscript{207} Lianhe bao, July 19, 1991.
While pursuing a calculated policy of restraint towards the Soviet Union, Taiwan appeared keener on establishing official contacts with Soviet republican governments, which – unlike the Kremlin – were prepared to ignore Chinese anger and engage in a dialogue with Taipei. Successful Taiwanese courtship of the Russian Federation has been already noted. The Russians were expected to approve Taiwan’s first trade office in Moscow, despite the Soviet Foreign Ministry’s objection.²⁰⁸ Taipei was even more successful in the Baltic region, where Taiwanese officials gained access to high-ranking politicians.²⁰⁹ In return for the Latvian proposal to exchange trade offices with Taipei, ROC Vice Foreign Minister CHANG Hsiao-yen spelt out the ROC’s inclination to make substantial capital investments in Latvia, while dismissing criticism that promoting economic ties with Latvia would affect emerging Taiwanese-Soviet cooperation.

XVIII. CHINA’S REACTION

To say that Beijing was nervous about Taiwan’s encroachment on what it considered to be the zone of its exclusive geopolitical influence would be an understatement. Although in responding to CETRA’s announcement on the opening of a trade office in Budapest (March 1989), China’s Foreign Ministry commented that in principle China did not object to non-governmental contacts between China’s allies and Taiwan, unofficially, Beijing strongly opposed Budapest’s plans to allow a Taiwanese trade office. For obvious geopolitical and propaganda reasons, however, Beijing was most concerned with the possibility of Soviet-Taiwanese rapprochement.

As early as 1989, CCP General Secretary JIANG Zemin wrote a secret letter to Gorbachev, expressing fear that the Taiwan problem would become an obstacle to Sino-Soviet relations.²¹⁰ During a visit to Moscow in April 1990, PRC Premier LI Peng raised the Taiwan question, soliciting from Moscow a firm commitment to the


²⁰⁹ Taiwan’s Baltic friends, who happened to be well placed individuals, were most likely generously rewarded for facilitating the ROC’s activities in the region. According to the Taiwanese dailies, Taipei’s early communication with Riga was aided by an unnamed individual, who enjoyed close ties with the Latvian leadership and arranged the Latvian visit to Taiwan in January 1991, which, however, did not materialize. See *Lianhe bao*, November 24, 1991 and *Zhongguo shibao*, November 24, 1991.

“one China” principle. In November, the PRC weekly, Liaowang, published an article “exposing” Taipei’s scheme to upgrade relations with Moscow by shifting from the policy of “separating politics from the economy” (zhengjing fenli) to the policy of “giving equal significance to politics and the economy” (zhengjing bingzhong). The weekly identified four interrelated goals of Taiwanese diplomacy towards the Soviet Union:

1. to promote the establishment of official relations and upgrade the level of exchanged delegations (the visit by Popov was cited as a prime example);
2. to ease visa regulations for ROC visitors;
3. to facilitate communication between the USSR and Taiwan (via the establishment of direct telephone and fax links and direct flight connections); and
4. to strengthen economic cooperation with the Soviet Union.

Liaowang agreed that the Soviet Union provided an opportunity for Taiwan to diversify its export and investment markets, but it also warned against Taipei’s activities in the USSR as they were politically motivated. Thus, fearing that economic interaction – however unofficial – between Taiwan and the Soviet Union would stimulate an inevitable political rapprochement, Beijing appeared determined to obstruct any form of Soviet-Taiwanese ties, including trade and commerce. This became evident at the end of JIANG Zemin’s visit to Moscow in May 1991, during which Gorbachev expressed Soviet interest in trading with Taiwan. Beijing’s earlier tacit acceptance of the idea vanished and (no doubt, to the surprise and chagrin of the Soviets) the Soviet version of a communiqué, which included a phrase about unofficial Soviet-Taiwanese economic and cultural ties, was rejected. The final version made no mention of Soviet-Taiwanese relations, confirmed the Soviet long-standing adherence to the “one China” principle and voiced a criticism of Taipei’s “flexible diplomacy”.

Facing a wave of Taiwanese trade visits to the USSR, Beijing applied pressure on the Soviet Foreign Ministry to not only keep the commercial contacts between the Soviet Union and Taiwan firmly on the unofficial level, but also to cancel visits by higher
ranking ROC officials. Bowing to such pressure, Moscow invalidated ROC Vice Minister of Economic Affairs CHIANG Pin-kung’s visa shortly before he was to leave Bulgaria for Moscow to lead the CETRA trade and investment delegation and become the highest ranking Taiwanese official ever to visit the Soviet Union. However, Vice Minister Chiang had no problems visiting Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Hungary.  

Finally, Beijing condemned “private” visits by Soviet dignitaries to Taiwan and retaliated against them whenever the chance arose. In response to Popov’s Taipei trip, Beijing not only issued a protest to the Soviet Foreign Ministry, reminding Moscow of its continued objection to “any development of relations or exchanges of an official nature between Taiwan and the countries having diplomatic relations with China,” but also cancelled Popov’s planned trip to Beijing in July, despite an official invitation from the city of Beijing. China also froze municipal cooperation between Moscow and Beijing. Soviet Foreign Ministry reassurance of its unchanged position on the Taiwan issue and Popov’s article in the daily Pravda explaining that his Taiwan visit did not amount to the Soviet negation of the “one China” principle failed to appease Beijing.

XIX. AFTER THE COUP D’ETAT

Given the relatively inadvanced level of direct communication between the Kremlin and Taipei, the latter unsurprisingly did not feel overly distressed over the military coup d’état in August 1991. Following the coup, the Working Group on the Soviet Union warned against travel to the Soviet Union, while the ROC authorities showed some concern over the possibility of the coup leaders uniting with the Chinese communists, which could potentially destabilize East Asia. MOFA, however, refrained from making any public statement on the coup, awaiting further developments. The Taiwanese Information Bureau, in turn, decided to go ahead with the advertisement campaign to propagate the Taiwan success story in the Soviet print media (including the Russian edition of Reader’s Digest).

Gorbachev's ban on the Communist Party and his resignation from the Communist Party leadership, which followed the failed coup, convinced the ROC government that the time was right to abandon its cautious policy towards the Soviet Union and exploit rapid Soviet democratisation and the need for economic assistance to foster a relationship going beyond economic co-operation. Although in early September, the ROC press speculated that Taipei had set its eyes on diplomatic or, at worst, quasi-diplomatic relations with Moscow, Taipei first focused on expanding the economic partnership with the USSR.218 Shortly after the coup, the Minister of Economic Affairs, Vincent Siew (XIAO Wan-chang), pledged that once the situation in the Soviet Union stabilized and the economic reforms progressed, the OECDF would consider granting developmental assistance to the Soviet Union.219 In September, CETRA established its first warehouse in Moscow to overcome the shortage of foreign currency and transport problems. Large Taiwanese trade delegations headed to the Soviet Union. The first one, visiting in mid-September, met the Soviet Chamber of Commerce and reached agreement on strengthening commercial relations and establishing reciprocal trade offices.220 The second followed in late November. CETRA expected to set up its trade office up in Moscow by the end of 1991 and to sign a transport agreement on the basis of mutual benefits. Its personnel were already stationed in Moscow on a long-term basis. Such an office was indeed officially established on December 16, 1991, named the Taipei World Trade Centre, Moscow Branch Office.221 CETRA began making plans to set up similar offices in Ukraine and Belarus. The first Taiwanese-Soviet joint venture, Island Trading Inc., was established in late November 1991 to trade in textiles. The Taiwanese side of the venture, Geo-Fiber Company arranged numerous visits of Soviet light industry officials to Taiwan (including Soviet Minister of Light Industry L. Davletova in October 1991).

218. Lianhe bao, September 11, 1991; South China Morning Post, December 21, 1991. Taipei did not rule out diplomatic relations with Moscow as early as April 1990. Lianhe bao, April 29, 1990. It should be noted, however, that Taipei seemed more hopeful for diplomatic relations with Ukraine than Russia.


221. Ziyou shibao, December 17, 1991. The office was staffed by five people: the CETRA representative and 4 locals. The Russian government approved the office on December 26.
Taipei also initiated contact with the Soviet Central Bank. Viktor Gerashenko, President of the USSR Central Bank, met President of the Taiwanese Central Bank XIE Senzhong in Bangkok, at a dinner organised by the China Trust Corporation (Zhongguo Xintuo) in October 1991. In mid-October, Gerashenko visited the island. Considered as the most senior Soviet official to visit Taiwan, he confirmed Moscow’s interest in expanding commercial ties with Taiwan on a “semi-official basis” and did not exclude the possibility of Moscow accepting the ROC’s economic assistance. Gerashenko participated in a conference on Soviet finance and trade, organised by the MOEA’s International Trade Bureau and attended by 300 local businessmen. At the seminar, the ROC authorities asked Gerashenko to relay to the Kremlin four requests: exchange of trade offices, establishment of direct sea and air links, establishment of banking cooperation, and adoption of preferential tariff treatment by Moscow.

Taiwanese academics viewed the possible disintegration of the Soviet Union as beneficial to Taiwan. According to Dr. SU Chi (SU Qi), the Vice Director of the Centre of International Relations at Chengchi University, who spoke at an academic forum entitled “The Republic of China and the New International Order,” organised in Taipei on August 21, 1991, the benefits would come from the collapse of the strategic triangle between Beijing, Moscow and Washington, the impact of the wave of democratisation on China, the intensified international isolation of the Chinese communists, and increased competition between China and the Soviet Union for foreign investments. SU Chi suggested that Taiwan could use the Soviet upheavals to highlight its democracy and economic prowess in the international arena.

As early as March 1991, Taipei set its eyes on developing closer ties with the Russian Federation, Ukraine and Belarus, primarily due to their economic potential. Russia was undisputedly the primary candidate for intensified economic cooperation, due to its size, industrial and military potential. Ukraine and Belarus were also considered economically attractive partners. The former was the second largest republic of the former USSR, rich in natural and human resources, and a nuclear state. The latter – the third largest republic – was industrially developed, producing 1/5th of the cars,

10% of the refrigerators and 1/6th of the electricity of the Soviet Union. In order to strengthen economic ties with these three republics, CETRA prepared itself for the establishment of trade offices in Moscow, Kiev and Minsk. Once the three republics declared their independence, Taipei hoped to seize the opportunity to gain not only new substantive partners, but even – luck permitting – diplomatic allies. Their greatest asset, apart from their economic potential discussed above, was their membership in the United Nations and other inter-governmental organizations. Thus, their decision on diplomatic ties with the ROC could not have been affected by China’s potential veto on their membership in various international organisations.

Yet, the ROC leadership was keenly aware of the geo-political importance of China in Russia’s diplomatic strategy and did not even hope for the establishment of diplomatic ties with Moscow.\(^{226}\) This did not mean, however, that Taipei gave up on communicating with independent Russia. Given China’s support for the coup, the wave of anti-communist sentiment across Russian society, and expectations of the inevitable collapse of the Chinese communist regime, post-coup Russia appeared friendly to the Taiwanese political envoys. In early December 1991, the KMT member, Prof. MING Chi (also Chairman of the Russian Studies Institute of the Chinese Culture University) was invited to the Russian Democratic Party Congress. President LEE Teng-hui hoped to use this opportunity to open party diplomacy (zhengdang waijiao) so that Taipei could make more friends in Russia.\(^{227}\) In accordance with its original intention, the Foundation of Soviet-Far Eastern Exchanges planned to play a greater role in Taipei-Moscow communication once the Soviet Union was buried. Its leader, LIN Shou-shan, claimed to have signed a memorandum in Moscow according to which the Foundation within three months would be allowed to issue Soviet visas in Taiwan. The Foundation was also to be made responsible for all non-official cooperation between Russia and Taiwan in trade, culture and tourism. Lin and other members of the delegation, which visited the Russian Federation in late November-early December, were allegedly scheduled to meet Yeltsin. Although the meeting did not take place (possibly due to Chinese protests), the delegation was received by Yuri V. Petrov, the Director of the Rus-

---

sian Federation Presidential Office, who was Yeltsin's close associate and a very influential figure in Russian politics at the time.228

Taiwan's greatest diplomatic hopes were associated with Ukraine. Ever since Ukraine's declaration of independence on August 24, 1991, Taipei publicly toyed with the idea of extending its diplomatic recognition to Kiev. Official contacts were already established: the Ukrainian Minister of Light Industry and Vice Minister of Culture visited Taiwan. Kiev's ambassador to the UN, Gennadi Oudovenko, when interviewed by the Zhongguo shibao, attempted to cool down Taipei's enthusiasm regarding potential diplomatic ties with the Ukraine. He made it clear that Kiev was interested purely in economic, non-official relations with Taiwan and would adhere to the "one China" principle.229 Having little, if any, proof of the Ukrainian willingness to reciprocate with diplomatic recognition, MOFA decided to await the Western response towards the Ukrainian declaration of independence. A referendum in Ukraine on December 1, 1991, which resulted in a majority of over 90% in favour of a fully independent state, reignited Taiwanese debate on the possibility of making Kiev an ally. MOFA publicly announced the wish to establish diplomatic relations with Ukraine. However, despite the calls from the ROC Legislative Yuan, urging ROC diplomats to send officials to Ukraine to lobby for the inauguration of diplomatic ties, Taipei eventually opted against seeking Kiev's diplomatic recognition, fearing potentially embarrassing rejection.230 Publicly and privately, Kiev communicated to Taipei its resolve to expand commercial ties with Taiwan and pleaded for financial assistance. However, it insisted on the "one China" policy and saw no benefit in offending Beijing with a pro-Taiwan foreign policy.231

Despite prioritizing relations with Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, MOFA's greatest success occurred in the Baltic region.232 Shortly after the Baltic states proclaimed independence on August

232. For a more detailed discussion of Taiwan's relations with the Baltic states in 1991, see Czeslaw Tubilewicz, "The Baltic States in Taiwan's Post-Cold War 'Flexible Diplomacy,'" Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 54, No. 5 (July 2002), pp. 791-810.
27, 1991, the Taiwanese approached them, expressing readiness to recognize their sovereignty. Technically, the friendship treaties between the ROC and Latvia and Estonia – signed before the Second World War – continued as none of the signatories had renounced them. Despite ROC legislators’ advice to declare formal recognition, Taipei abstained from doing so, fearing being spurned in favour of Beijing. China recognized the Baltic states in early September 1991. This setback notwithstanding, Foreign Minister Chien declared a pro-active strategy towards the Baltic states, aimed at “all-round diplomatic relations” (quanmian waijiao guanxi). Among the three Baltic republics, Latvia emerged as the keenest on establishing close relations with the ROC. Prior to its resumption of sovereignty in August 1991, Riga requested from Taipei economic aid amounting to US$10 million. Taiwan pledged to provide it with a grant of US$60 million on the condition that the Latvians establish official ties with the ROC. Both sides reportedly waited for Latvia’s UN membership to initiate official relations. In December 1991, Latvian Foreign Minister Janis Jurkans – while visiting Taipei – lent credence to such reports, claiming that recognition of mainland China instead of Taiwan was an expedient move solely for the purpose of winning entry into the United Nations.

In early November 1991, Vice Foreign Minister Chang officially visited the Baltic states. Armed with promises of aiding the Baltic economies via the OECDF, he convinced his hosts of the advantages of establishing reciprocal trade representative offices. The Latvians and Estonians agreed that the Taiwanese office would bear the ROC’s official name and signed memoranda on trade and economic cooperation with Taiwan (in which Latvia acknowledged the sovereignty of the ROC on Taiwan). Keen on attracting Taiwan’s financial aid (including food and fuel), in late November, Riga opened an “export council office” in Taipei to issue visas and

233. Latvia concluded a Treaty of Friendship with the ROC in June 1936 and Estonia followed suit in December 1937. Lithuania, despite an effort to forge a formal relationship with China initiated in July 1929, failed not only to reach a desired commercial treaty, but even a standard friendship treaty. The Soviet invasion of the Baltic states in 1940 terminated nascent Sino-Baltic relations. The Republic Chinese government, however, did not recognize the forced incorporation of the Baltic states into the USSR – despite its renewed friendship with Moscow – and did not renounce the treaties signed with Latvia and Estonia. Lianhe bao, August 27, 1991.
promote investment and tourism and sent Foreign Minister Jurkans to the ROC in mid-December 1991. Jurkans consented to Taipei’s proposal to call the ROC office the ‘Mission of the Republic of China’ and invited ROC President LEE Teng-hui to Latvia, provided that both sides established diplomatic relations. In return, Taipei allegedly promised substantial economic and technological assistance to Latvia.237

Eventually Estonia and Lithuania chose to adhere to the “one China” policy and Latvia remained the only Baltic state committed to relations with the ROC. Vice Foreign Minister Chang once again travelled to Riga, where on January 29, 1992 he signed an agreement on the exchange of consulates “as soon as possible,” in what appeared to be a prelude towards full diplomatic relations. While enjoying official status, the Taiwanese consulate-general was not meant to have diplomatic status and was to bear the name Riga, rather than Latvia.238 Due to the lack of funds, the Latvians did not establish a consulate in Taipei.

XX. PLANNING A LONG TERM OFFENSIVE

Taiwan’s anticipation of winning diplomatic allies from the ruins of the USSR proved premature. In the Baltic region, the PRC, as a permanent member of the UN Security Council with the right to veto the Baltic states’ membership in the UN, enjoyed a natural advantage over Taiwan. The Baltic states welcomed China’s diplomatic recognition and pledged not to develop any official ties with Taiwan. On December 27, 1991, China also formally recognised the Russian Federation and eleven other former republics of the USSR. For geo-strategic and economic reasons, no former Soviet republic seriously considered diplomatic ties with Taiwan and all confirmed their commitment to the “one China” principle. “Recognising the Commonwealth of Independent States is not currently a top priority for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,” reposted MOFA. “Instead emphasis will be placed on pursuing substantive relations with individual republics such as Russia, Ukraine and Belarus.”239

Foreign Minister Chien noted that the immediate task was to establish direct communication channels with the leadership of Belarus, Russia and Ukraine.240 The Working Group on the Soviet

238. South China Morning Post, February 1, 1992.
Union resolved that food aid (liangyuan) could be utilised to establish such channels. If Moscow's immediate positive response to Taipei's suggestion of providing food aid was a telling sign, Taipei's expectation of establishing substantive – or semi-official – relations with the core member-states of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was based on realistic assessment rather than daydreaming.241

In January 1992, Foreign Minister Chien in his report to the Legislative Yuan officially formulated the ROC diplomatic strategy towards the CIS, consisting of 10 points, including the following:

1. Russia, Ukraine and Belarus remained Taipei's primary targets for economic as well as semi-official relations;
2. the ROC authorities aimed at an establishment of representative offices in these republics and active exchange of official visits;
3. Taipei pledged to support the economic exploration of these three republics' markets mainly via study tours of Taiwanese business executives;
4. various governmental departments were obliged to seek accords with their CIS counterparts in such areas as direct airlinks, postal, telecommunications and banking services;
5. the government was to support academic, cultural and sports exchange with CIS member states, as well as to further simplify visa procedures for visitors from the CIS. The Ministry of Education was to provide 20 scholarships for students from the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe to study Chinese in Taiwan, while MOFA was to coordinate the dispatch of Taiwanese students to study Russian in the CIS and
6. Taipei was to launch a propaganda campaign to publicize Taiwanese culture via exhibitions, publications and cultural centres.

The foreign minister realistically noted the difficulty in establishing diplomatic ties with any of the priority states of the CIS. He expressed hope, however, that some CIS member-states would either follow the "Latvian model" and establish consular ties with the

---
241. In late 1991, Moscow sent three government representatives to discuss the details of the aid programme.
ROC or the 'Lithuanian model' and agree to the establishment of trade offices.  

XXI. COMMERCIAL RELATIONS

When in November 1979, the Executive Yuan lifted restrictions on direct trade with selected communist states, some predicted that Taiwanese trade with the Soviet allies would soon amount to US$1-2 billion annually. The optimism followed from the complementary nature of Taiwanese and communist economies. Eastern Europe, in particular, was rich in raw materials (such as precious metals, iron and metal materials) and specialised in the production of machinery, chemicals, and chemical products. These products were priced below world levels and could benefit Taiwanese economic development. Taiwan, for its part, could supply communist nations with necessary consumer goods and processed food. Yet, as noted earlier, such optimistic predictions did not materialise. Taiwan's trade with Eastern Europe oscillated between US$30 million to $71 million per year and represented roughly 1% of the ROC's and Eastern Europe's total foreign trade figures. The reasons behind the low trade figures can be summarised in four points.

1. Due to the lack of official channels of communication, Taiwanese companies failed to establish direct contacts with state-owned foreign trade companies in the Soviet bloc. Both sides lacked trade representative offices or branches of representative offices.

2. The Taiwanese traders were unfamiliar with communist trading methods (which relied on barter trading or credit trading). They had no information about communist markets and lacked motivation to explore them. ROC trade promotion bodies failed to assist Taiwanese companies in breaking into communist markets.

3. The communist economies suffered from economic recession, lacked hard currency and insisted on barter trade. This limited the growth potential of their trade with Taiwan.

4. The Taiwanese government did nothing to promote trade relations with the communist nations. It continued its restrictive visa regulations and instituted elaborate rules for Taiwanese businesses intending to visit

or trade directly with the communist states. Similarly, the communist regimes paid no attention to the economic prospects offered by commercial cooperation with the ROC. It was China, not Taiwan, that got the greatest attention from communist traders interested in commercial ties with East Asia.

As noted earlier, by the mid-1980s, pressure from Taiwanese businesses and the need to diversify Taiwanese export markets (due to loss of competitiveness on the American market) forced the ROC government to reconsider its stand on trading with communist states. The quickly increasing tempo of bilateral trading, reported to jump from US$120 million in 1986 to US$250 million in 1987 despite the lack of official encouragement, convinced the ROC government of the potential of trade with communist nations. New regulations relaxing trade restrictions led to a further increase in bilateral trade figures to over US$300 million in 1988. Taiwan’s main exports to Eastern Europe consisted of computers and textiles, while imports included agricultural products, raw materials (iron) and some machinery. Within the Soviet bloc, Poland was Taiwan’s major trading partner. It maintained its lead even after Taipei ended its prohibition of direct trade with the USSR (see table 1).

The removal of restrictions on trade with the Soviet Union was believed to induce faster development of Taiwanese-Soviet trade as both economies were complementary: Taiwan offered consumer products and new technologies, while the Soviet Union provided raw materials. In the aftermath of Taipei’s decision to allow direct trade with Moscow in March 1990, the first Soviet trade mission to the ROC (November 1990) placed orders worth US$100 million to purchase Taiwanese consumer goods. It soon, however, turned out that the Russians lacked hard currency to finalise the contracts. However, Russians’ shortage of foreign exchange did not discourage Taipei, as the barter trade seemed to offer a solution. In mid-1991, Taipei allowed 10 large enterprises (including China Steel Corp. and Chinese Petroleum Corp.) to barter trade with the Soviet Union. They were allowed to procure raw materials such as coal, crude oil and scrap iron from their Soviet counterparts.

---

244. *Jingji ribao*, November 1, 1989.
245. Taiwan exports to the USSR in the late 1980s consisted mainly of machinery (about 40%) and consumer products (about 20%). *Ziyou shibao*, November 3, 1989.
Table 1. Taiwan’s Trade with Communist and Post-communist States, 1984 & 1988-1991

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>T</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td></td>
<td>-2.7</td>
<td>-7.8</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td></td>
<td>196.3%</td>
<td>-98.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>T</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>12.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>-22.6</td>
<td>-4.2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td></td>
<td>-52%</td>
<td>-25.9</td>
<td>19.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>T</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>22.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>-14.5</td>
<td>-15.5</td>
<td>-4.4</td>
<td>-32.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td></td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>-33.1</td>
<td>216.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Germany</td>
<td>T</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>76.6</td>
<td>79.3</td>
<td>62.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>-66.2</td>
<td>-52.3</td>
<td>-34.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td>-20.7%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>T</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>50.8</td>
<td>57.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>38.1</td>
<td>34.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td></td>
<td>67.1%</td>
<td>12.4%</td>
<td>29.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>T</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>77.9</td>
<td>82.1</td>
<td>171.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>-39.9</td>
<td>-39.3</td>
<td>-107.9</td>
<td>-129.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td></td>
<td>5.4%</td>
<td>108.4%</td>
<td>59.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>T</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>40.9</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>-37.1</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>-6.4</td>
<td>-2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td></td>
<td>-73.1%</td>
<td>34.5%</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet Union</td>
<td>T</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>75.4</td>
<td>119.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>-7.8</td>
<td>-34.2</td>
<td>-1.56</td>
<td>-101.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td></td>
<td>868%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>T</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>47.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>-12.6</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>13.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td></td>
<td>-43.5%</td>
<td>294.2%</td>
<td>-33.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

T: total trade  B: Taiwan’s trade balance (deficit or surplus)
%: change in trade over the previous year  X: data unknown

Notes: Above trade figures are only approximate as trade was indirect. Export figures could be higher than stated.

CETRA played an active role in promoting Taiwanese businesses in the Soviet Union. In January 1991, it led a large Taiwanese trade delegation to a Moscow consumer products exhibition. More than 30 Taiwanese traders exhibited clothing, shoes, leather products, car spare parts, electronics and electric products, construction materials, and toys. Four months later, it organized a trade seminar, which attracted more than 300 Soviet participants, including representatives from all Soviet republics. In July, Taiwanese trade officials reportedly reached preliminary agreements with their Soviet counterparts on four issues:

1. the reciprocal granting of most favoured nation status;
2. the signing of investment guarantee agreements;
3. the establishment of a CETRA office in Moscow; and
4. cooperation between small and medium-sized enterprises.

According to Vice Minister of Economic Affairs, WANG Zhigang, the ministry’s primary objective in the Soviet Union was to set up a trade office.

Despite the stated objective, Taipei aimed at expanding economic cooperation with the Soviet Union on many fronts. One such area was fisheries. In August 1989, the Soviet navy intercepted a Taiwanese boat allegedly fishing in Soviet territorial waters and demanded US$2 million for the boat’s release. The ship and the crew were released only after the intervention of PRC authorities. To avoid such incidents, Taipei attempted to sign a fishery agreement as soon as possible. In November 1990, Taiwanese and Soviet officials made first contact in Tokyo, where they discussed cooperation in fisheries. The Soviet Union Fishing Industry Company and the ROC Association for Overseas Fishing Cooperation (Duiwai Yuye Hezuo Fazhan Xiehui) signed a memorandum on fishing in August 1991. However, Soviet officials did not recognize the legality of the memorandum and fishing disputes continued.

252. According to the memorandum, both sides were to cooperate in squid fishing and the Soviets were to help Taiwanese vessels apply for fishing permits to operate in Soviet waters. *Zhongguo shibao*, August 20, 1991; *Lianhe bao*, August 20, 1991.
Another area of desired cooperation concerned direct shipping links. Moscow prohibited Taiwanese vessels from visiting Soviet ports, although the ROC Ministry of Transportation and Communications allowed direct transport links with the Soviet Union in June 1990. Only after the collapse of the Soviet Union did Moscow permit ROC vessels – recognized as Chinese ships – to access Russian ports. A Moscow-Taipei maritime transportation agreement had to wait until January 1998. Finally, Taipei attempted to seek an aviation agreement with the Soviet Union that would not only establish direct airlinks, but also grant Taiwanese airlines fifth freedom rights to pick up passengers in Moscow and fly them to other European destinations. A Soviet aviation delegation visited Taiwan in February 1991, yet a formal agreement was not finalized until many years later.

The disintegration of the Soviet Union in December 1991 did not stir anxiety among economic officials in Taiwan. To Minister of Economic Affairs Vincent Siew, the fall of the USSR was unlikely to have a major impact on the ROC in the short term. He mentioned the possibility of listing the three Baltic republics as eligible to benefit from economic assistance, but left that decision to MOFA. Taiwanese businessmen, for their part, expressed concern over the security of barter trade with the disintegrating Soviet Union. Following the Soviet collapse, Taiwanese trade with Moscow continued to soar, but was driven by imports of Russian raw materials (especially steel, iron, nickel and aluminium, which constituted 80% of all imports) rather than exports of consumer goods to Russia.

XXII. CONCLUSION

Following the KMT’s defeat in the civil war and Soviet support for the Chinese communists, the ROC on Taiwan and the USSR became sworn enemies. Their enmity reached its zenith in the mid-1950s, when the Taiwanese navy intercepted the Soviet tanker, Tuapse. The Sino-Soviet rift did not affect the Chiang regime’s perception of the Soviets. If anything, it only confirmed CHANG Kai-shek’s belief in Soviet designs to subjugate China. Yet, in the late 1960s, emerging doubts about the long-term prospects of American

253. Until mid-1991, only one Soviet shipping company, using ships registered in Panama, carried goods between the Soviet Union and Taiwan. It did so, however, on an irregular basis. Lianhe bao, July 11, 1991.
support for Taiwan forced the ROC leadership to re-consider its diplomatic policy towards the Soviet Union. New evidence suggests that CHIANG Kai-shek explored the possibility of an ROC-USSR joint action against the PRC. Although little – if anything – resulted from secret contact with Soviet agent Victor Louis, Taipei publicised Louis’s visits in an attempt to play the “Soviet card.” A re-summation of contact with the Soviets was designed to remind the Americans that Taipei’s loyalty could evaporate as a consequence of the US decision to seek rapprochement with the PRC or to abandon its commitment to defense of the island. The “Soviet card” was re-played in 1971-1972 and – to a lesser extent – in 1979. Taipei, however, never actively sought Soviet friendship. Principled anti-Sovietism demonstrated Taiwan’s ideological loyalty to the United States and helped the Taiwan lobby in Washington argue for continued US support of the KMT regime. Cordial relations with Moscow would have adversely affected US determination to defend the ROC, destabilized the Taiwanese economy and possibly provoked military action by China. Furthermore, the KMT’s pre-1949 experience of Soviet assistance left little trust in the reliability of a Soviet alliance.

Ever since the Sino-Soviet split, political commentators have speculated that the Kremlin contemplated a reversal of its “one China” policy. The emerging evidence suggests, however, that the Soviets never seriously considered abandoning the “one China” principle. The Taiwan problem provided Moscow with numerous opportunities to display its solidarity with China on the questions of China’s unity and representation at various international organizations. Taiwan’s independence of the PRC under US patronage was also advantageous to Moscow as it hindered Sino-US rapprochement and increased the value of a strategic partnership with the Soviet Union. All members of Soviet leadership were aware that they could not control Mao’s plans regarding Taiwan. Until the late 1950s, they – reluctantly or not – endorsed the military solution to the Taiwan question. Khrushchev in this respect was the most enthusiastic. There is no evidence, however, that any Soviet leader contemplated the “Taiwan option,” that is, the possibility of recognizing the ROC. Louis’s communication with Taipei reveals that the “hawk” faction in the Soviet Politburo did consider some form of military cooperation with the ROC in order to overthrow the Mao regime. Brezhnev and Kosygin, however, did not take such an option seriously. At most, they exploited the rumours of the emerging Soviet-ROC understanding in the context of their military and dip-
Diplomatic strategy in the late 1960s, designed to compel the Chinese to normalize relations with the USSR. Moscow sought to avoid facing, over the long run, an increasingly powerful and unfriendly China while it was preoccupied with managing its European allies and sustaining strategic competition with the US. An exotic alliance with the ROC would have been counterproductive to the Soviet long-term policy of mending fences with the PRC and could have accelerated a Sino-American rapprochement. By the late 1970s to early 1980s, the Soviet Union set its mind firmly on normalization of relations with the PRC. An unambiguous adherence to the "one China" principle was to demonstrate to the Chinese leadership the earnestness of Moscow's desire to mend fences with its neighbour.

Both Taipei and Moscow viewed each other through the prism of their respective relations with the United States and China. Despite some consideration given to possible cooperation, Cold War hostility suited both sides more than collaboration. As a result, the Soviet Union and Taiwan remained sworn enemies until the waning days of Soviet communism.

Throughout much of the Cold War, the Soviet allies played no role in the PRC-ROC conflict, except Albania, whose motion led to the expulsion of Taiwan from the United Nations in 1971. All Soviet allies in Eastern Europe continued to support the "one China" policy irrespective of the Sino-Soviet split and Beijing's ideological hostility towards them. They took no notice of CHOU Shu-kai's efforts to differentiate them into "hostile" and "non-hostile," nor of the reincarnation of Chou's policy in 1979. While maintaining the "one China" policy, they did not object to indirect trade with Taiwan. The level of ROC trade with the Soviet allies, however, was economically insignificant for both sides. Eastern Europe (particularly, Hungary) began revisiting its economic policies towards the ROC only after the normalization of relations with the PRC in the late 1980s.

Taipei considered the Soviet allies as hostile until the early 1970s, when the move to differentiate them signalled the possibility of ROC modification of its anti-communist diplomacy. In the late 1970s, the ROC re-discovered Eastern Europe, this time not only to flaunt the "Soviet card" once more, but also to initiate an economic rapprochement with selected communist states and, thus, further diversify Taiwanese export markets. Hostile or non-hostile, the ROC government, however, did not trust the communists and discriminated against traders from the Soviet bloc.
The analysis of Taipei's rapprochement with the communist states in 1988-1991 reveals that, Taipei did not appear to follow, or to have even developed, any master plan regarding the Soviet bloc. The change in Taiwan's attitude towards the communist states was initiated by the ROC's business community, which demanded a pro-active policy towards the Soviet bloc in order to gain access to communist markets. Responding to intense lobbying efforts by businesspeople, the Taiwanese government consented to direct economic ties first with a select group of East European states, then with the Soviet Union and Albania. Yet, due to Taipei's lingering ideological prejudices and the communist states' adherence to the "one China" principle, Taiwanese economic ties with the Soviet bloc were kept separate from political relations. Therefore, despite the momentous political reforms undertaken by the communist regimes in the late 1980s and the guiding principles of "flexible diplomacy," Taiwanese diplomacy maintained a broadly anti-communist course until Soviet communism irrevocably disappeared. In hindsight, however, it should be noted that Taipei's decision to open direct commercial relations with communist states benefited not only Taiwanese traders and manufacturers, but also ROC diplomats, as it facilitated semi-official political dialogue with the communist regimes. By the late 1980s to early 1990s, armed with promises of food and financial assistance, Taipei's diplomacy - no longer burdened by ideological dogma and focused on establishing political relations with the post-communist governments - landed its foot firmly in the region, where the PRC previously enjoyed an exclusive friendship. The stage was set for zero-sum competition between the two governments of a divided China for the diplomatic loyalty of the post-communist region.
GLOSSARY OF SELECTED NAMES AND TERMS

C
Chang, Hsiao-yen 章孝嚴 (蔣孝嚴)
Chen, Li-fu 陳立夫
Chen, Shui-bian 陳水扁
Chen, Zhimai 陳之邁
Chiang, Ching-kuo 蔣經國
Chiang, Hsiao-yung 蔣孝勇
Chiang, Kai-shek 蔣介石
Chiang, Pin-kung 江丙坤
Chien, Fu 錢復
China External Trade Development Council (CETDC)

D
dangguo tizhi 黨國體制
danran baokuo guanfang guanxi zainei 當然包括官方關係在內
Democratic Progressive Party 民進黨
Deng, Xiaoping 鄧小平
duiwo buyouhao guojia 對我不友好國家

F
fangong, kang’e 反共抗俄
Foundation of Soviet-Far Eastern Exchanges 蘇聯遠東交流基金會
Fund for International Disaster and Humanitarian Assistance

G
Gu, Zhenggang 谷正綱
H
Hau, Pei-tsun  郝柏村

I
Investigation Report of East European Markets
東歐市場調查研究報告

J
Jiang, Zemin  江澤民

K
kaochatuan  考察團

L
Lee, Teng-hui  李登輝
Li, Peng  李鵬
Li, Zhisui  李志綏
Lianhe bao  聯合報
jianjiao bushi meiyou keneng  建交不是沒有可能
Liangyuan  粱援
Liao, Zhongkai  廖仲凱
Liaowang  瞭望
Lien, Chan  連戰
Lin, Shou-shan  林壽山
Liu, Shaoqi  劉少奇
Lu, Wei  盧為
Liu, Yalou  劉亞樓

M
The Main Points of Trade Measures towards Eastern Europe  對東歐貿易實施要點
Mao, Zedong  毛澤東
Ming, Chi  明驤
N
Nationalist Party  國民黨
North East European Trade and Manufacturing Association
東北歐貿易廠商友誼會

O
Overseas Economic Cooperation and Development Fund
海外經濟合作發展基金

Q
quanmian waijiao guanxi  全面外交關係

R
ROC Association for Overseas Fishing Cooperation
對外漁業合作發展協會

S
Sanminzhuyi  三民主義
shehui zhuyi dang  社會主義黨
Shen, Chang-huan  沈昌煥
Siew, Vincent (Hsiao, Wan-chang) 蕭萬長
shichou  世仇
shizhi guanxi 實質關係
Sing Tao Evening News  星島晚報
Sino-Soviet Economic Development Association
中蘇經濟發展協會
Sino-Soviet Foundation of Economic Exchanges
中蘇經濟交流基金會
Soong, Meiling  宋美齡
Su, Chi  蘇起
Sun, Yat-sen  孫中山（孫逸仙）

T
Ta Kung Pao  大公報
lanxing waijiao  彈性外交
W
Wang, Ping  王平
Wang, Shumin  王叔岷
Wang, Tien-ching  王天競
weiliang guojia shencun, ye keyi he mogui dajiaodao  爲了國家生存，也可以和魔鬼打交道
Working Group on Relations with the C.I.S.
  對俄協工作小組
Working Group on Relations with the Soviet Union
  對蘇工作小組
Wu, Lengxi  吳冷西
Wuer, Kaixi  吾爾開希

X
Xie, Senzhong  謝森中
Xin Qingnian  新青年
Xin Zhong Qiye Gongsii  新中企業公司
Xu, Jincheng  許竟成

Y
Yang, Hucheng  楊虎城
Ye, Xiangzhi  葉翔之
youhaode guanxi  友好的關係
Yuan, Shikai  袁世凱

Z
Zhang, Xueliang  張學良
Zheng, Zemin  鄭澤民
zhengdang waijiao  政黨外交
zhengqing bingzhong  政經並重
zhengqing fenli  政經分離
zhengzhi maoyi fenli  政治貿易分離
zhengzhi yu tiyu fenkai  政治與體育分開
Zhongguo shibao  中國時報
Zhou, Enlai  阎恩來
**Maryland Series**  
*in Contemporary Asian Studies*  

500 West Baltimore Street  
Baltimore, Maryland 21201-1786  
U.S.A.  
Tel: (410) 706-3870  
Fax: (410) 706-1516  
(For back issues, new prices effective from October 1, 1991)  

**1977 Series**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Pages</th>
<th>Price</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>Chinese Attitude Toward Continental Shelf and Its Implication on Delimiting Seabed in Southeast Asia</td>
<td>Hungdah Chiu</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>$3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>The Indonesian Maoists: Doctrines and Perspectives</td>
<td>Justus M. van der Kroef</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>$3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>Taiwan's Foreign Policy in the 1970s: A Case Study Adaptation and Viability</td>
<td>Thomas J. Bellows</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>$3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>Asian Political Scientists in North America: Professional and Ethnic Problems</td>
<td>Edited by Chun-tu Hsueh</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>$6.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>The Sino-Japanese Fisheries Agreement of 1975: A Comparison with Other North Pacific Fisheries Agreements</td>
<td>Song Yook Hong</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>$5.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Foreign Trade Contracts Between West German Companies and the People's Republic of China: A Case Study (Robert Heuser), 22 pp.  $3.00

No. 8 - 1977  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-942182-07-3
Reflections on Crime and Punishment in China, with Appended Sentencing Documents (Randle Edwards, Translation of Documents by Randle Edwards and Hungdah Chiu), 67 pp.  $3.00

No. 9 - 1977  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-942182-08-1
Chinese Arts and Literature: A Survey of Recent Trends (Edited by Wai-lim Yip), 126 pp.  $5.00

Legal Aspects of U.S.-Republic of China Trade and Investment — Proceedings of a Regional Conference of the American Society of International Law (Edited by Hungdah Chiu and David Simon), 217 pp. Index  $8.00

No. 11 - 1977  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-942182-10-3
Asian American Assembly Position Paper: I. A Review of U.S. China Relations, 62 pp.  $3.00

No. 12 - 1977  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-942182-11-1
Asian American Assembly Position Paper: II. A Review of U.S. Employment Policy, 24 pp.  $3.00

1978 Series

Indian Ocean Politics: An Asian-African Perspective (K.P. Misra), 31 pp.  $3.00

No. 2 - 1978 (14)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-942182-13-8
Normalizing Relations with the People's Republic of China: Problems, Analysis, and Documents (Edited by Hungdah Chiu, with contributions by G. J. Sigur, Robert A. Scalapino, King C. Chen, Eugene A. Theroux, Michael Y.M. Kau, James C. Hsiung and James W. Morley), 207 pp. Index  $5.00

No. 3 - 1978 (15)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-942182-14-6
Growth, Distribution, and Social Change: Essays on the Economy of the Republic of China (Edited by Yuan-li Wu and Kung-chia Yeh), 227 pp. Index  $5.00

No. 4 - 1978 (16)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-942182-15-4
The Societal Objectives of Wealth, Growth, Stability, and Equity in Taiwan (Jan S. Prybyla), 31 pp.  $3.00
No. 5 - 1978 (17) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-942182-16-2
The Role of Law in the People’s Republic of China as Reflecting Mao Tse-Tung’s Influence (Shao-chuan Leng), 18 pp. $3.00

No. 6 - 1978 (18) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-942182-17-0
Criminal Punishment in Mainland China: A Study of Some Yunnan Province Documents (Hungdah Chiu), 35 pp. $3.00

A Guide to the Study of Japanese Law (Lawrence W. Beer and Hidenori Tomatsu), 45 pp. $4.00

No. 8 - 1978 (20) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-942182-19-7
The Pueblo, EC-121, and Mayaguez Incidents: Some Continuities and Changes (Robert Simmons), 40 pp. $4.00

No. 9 - 1978 (21) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-942182-20-0
Two Korea’s Unification Policy and Strategy (Yong Soon Yim), 82 pp. Index $4.00

1979 Series

No. 1 - 1979 (22) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-942182-21-9
Asian Immigrants and Their Status in the U.S. (Edited by Hungdah Chiu), 54 pp. $4.00

No. 2 - 1979 (23) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-942182-22-7
Social Disorder in Peking After the 1976 Earthquake Revealed by a Chinese Legal Documents (Hungdah Chiu), 20 pp. $4.00

The Dragon and the Eagle — A Study of U.S.-People’s Republic of China Relations in Civil Air Transport (Jack C. Young), 65 pp. $5.00

No. 4 - 1979 (25) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-942182-24-3
Chinese Women Writers Today (Edited by Wai-lim Yip and William Tay), 108 pp. $5.00

No. 5 - 1979 (26) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-942182-25-1
Certain Legal Aspects of Recognizing the People’s Republic of China (Hungdah Chiu), 49 pp. $4.00

No. 6 - 1979 (27) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-942182-26-X
China’s Nationalization of Foreign Firms: The Politics of Hostage Capitalism, 1949-1957 (Thomas N. Thompson), 80 pp. Index $5.00
No. 7 - 1979 (28) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-942182-27-8
U.S. Status of Force Agreement with Asian Countries: Selected Studies
(Charles Cochran and Hungdah Chiu), 130 pp. Index $4.00

No. 8 - 1979 (29) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-942182-28-6
China's Foreign Aid in 1978 (John F. Copper), 45 pp. $4.00

1980 Series

No. 1 - 1980 (30) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-942182-29-4
The Chinese Connection and Normalization (Edited by Hungdah Chiu
and Karen Murphy), 200 pp. Index $7.00

No. 2 - 1980 (31) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-942182-30-8
(James C. Hsiung), 17 pp. $3.00

No. 3 - 1980 (32) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-942182-31-6
Policy, Proliferation and the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty: U.S. Strategies
and South Asian Prospects (Joanne Finegan), 61 pp. $4.00

No. 4 - 1980 (33) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-942182-32-4
A Comparative Study of Judicial Review Under Nationalist Chinese
and American Constitutional Law (Jyh-pin Fa), 200 pp. Index (out
of print) $6.00

No. 5 - 1980 (34) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-942182-33-2
Certain Problems in Recent Law Reform in the People's Republic of
China (Hungdah Chiu), 34 pp. $4.00

No. 6 - 1980 (35) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-942182-34-0
China's New Criminal & Criminal Procedure Codes (Hungdah Chiu),
16 pp. $3.00

China's Foreign Relations: Selected Studies (Edited by F. Gilbert Chan
& Ka-che Yip), 115 pp. (out of print) $5.00

No. 8 - 1980 (37) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-942182-36-7
Annual Review of Selected Books on Contemporary Asian Studies
(1979-1980) (Edited by John F. Copper), 45 pp. $4.00

1981 Series

Structural Changes in the Organization and Operation of China's Criminal Justice System (Hungdah Chiu), 31 pp. $3.00
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Pages</th>
<th>ISBN</th>
<th>Price</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Readjustment and Reform in the Chinese Economy</td>
<td>Jan S. Prybyla</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>0-942182-38-3</td>
<td>$3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Symposium on the Trial of Gang of Four and Its Implication in China</td>
<td>James C. Hsiung</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>0-942182-39-1</td>
<td>$5.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>China and the Law of the Sea Conference</td>
<td>Hungdah Chiu</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>0-942182-40-5</td>
<td>$4.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>China's Foreign Aid in 1979-80</td>
<td>John Franklin Copper</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>0-942182-41-3</td>
<td>$4.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Chinese Regionalism: Yesterday and Today</td>
<td>Franz Michael</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>0-942182-42-1</td>
<td>$4.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Elite Conflict in the Post-Mao China</td>
<td>Parris H. Chang</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>0-942182-43-X</td>
<td>$4.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(Out of print, please order No. 2 - 1983 (55) for a revised version</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Proceedings of Conference on Multi-system Nations and International</td>
<td>Hungdah Chiu and Robert Downen</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>0-942182-44-8</td>
<td>$8.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Law: International Status of Germany, Korea, and China</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**1982 Series**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Pages</th>
<th>ISBN</th>
<th>Price</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>Socialist Legalism: Reform and Continuity in Post-Mao People's</td>
<td>Hungdah Chiu</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>0-942182-45-6</td>
<td>$4.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Republic of China</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>Kampuchea: The Endless Tug of War</td>
<td>Justus M. Van der Kroef</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>0-942182-46-4</td>
<td>$4.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(out of print)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>Taiwan's Security and United States Policy: Executive and Congres-</td>
<td>Michael S. Frost</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>0-942182-48-0</td>
<td>$4.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>sional Strategies in 1978-1979</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>ISSN</td>
<td>ISBN</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Pages</td>
<td>Price</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>0730-0107</td>
<td>0-942182-49-9</td>
<td>Constitutional Revolution in Japanese Law, Society and Politics (Lawrence W. Beer), 35 pp.</td>
<td></td>
<td>$4.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>0730-0107</td>
<td>0-942182-51-0</td>
<td>Chinese Law and Justice: Trends Over Three Decades (Hungdah Chiu), 39 pp.</td>
<td></td>
<td>$4.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>0730-0107</td>
<td>0-942182-52-9</td>
<td>Disarmament and Civilian Control in Japan: A Constitutional Dilemma (Theodore McNelly), 16 pp.</td>
<td></td>
<td>$4.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1983</td>
<td></td>
<td>0-942182-53-7</td>
<td>1983 Series</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>0730-0107</td>
<td>0-942182-54-5</td>
<td>Essays on Sun Yat-sen and the Economic Development of Taiwan (Maria Hsia Chang and A. James Gregor), 60 pp.</td>
<td></td>
<td>$3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>0730-0107</td>
<td>0-942182-55-3</td>
<td>Elite Conflict in the Post-Mao China (Revised version of No. 7-1981 (44)) (Parris H. Chang), 48 pp.</td>
<td></td>
<td>$3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>0730-0107</td>
<td>0-942182-56-1</td>
<td>Media-Coverage on Taiwan in The People's Republic of China (Jörg-M. Rudolph), 77 pp.</td>
<td></td>
<td>$4.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>0730-0107</td>
<td>0-942182-57-X</td>
<td>Transit Problems of Three Asian Land-locked Countries: Afghanistan, Nepal and Laos (Martin Ira Glassner), 55 pp.</td>
<td></td>
<td>$3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>0730-0107</td>
<td>0-942182-58-8</td>
<td>China's War Against Vietnam: A Military Analysis (King C. Chen), 33 pp.</td>
<td></td>
<td>$3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>0730-0107</td>
<td></td>
<td>The People's Republic of China, International Law and Arms Control (David Salem), 325 pp. Index</td>
<td></td>
<td>$7.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 1984 Series

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>1984 (60)</th>
<th>ISSN 0730-0107</th>
<th>ISBN 0-942182-60-X</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>China’s Nuclear Policy: An Overall View (Shao-chuan Leng), 18 pp.</td>
<td>$3.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>1984 (61)</th>
<th>ISSN 0730-0107</th>
<th>ISBN 0-942182-61-8</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Communist Party of China: Party Powers and Group Politics from the Third Plenum to the Twelfth Party Congress (Hung-mao Tien), 30 pp.</td>
<td>$3.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Legal Problems of Seabed Boundary Delimitation in the East China Sea (Ying-jeou Ma), 308 pp. Index (paperback out of print)</td>
<td>$10.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A New Direction in Japanese Defense Policy: Views from the Liberal Democratic Party Diet Members (Steven Kent Vogel), 63 pp.</td>
<td>$3.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>1984 (64)</th>
<th>ISSN 0730-0107</th>
<th>ISBN 0-942182-65-0</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Taiwan’s Elections: Political Development and Democratization in the Republic of China (John F. Copper with George P. Chen), 180 pp. Index</td>
<td>$5.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cankao Xiaoxi: Foreign News in the Propaganda System of the People’s Republic of China (Jörg-Meinhard Rudolph), 174 pp. Index</td>
<td>$5.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 1985 Series

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Political Basis of the Economic and Social Development in the Republic of China (Alan P. L. Liu), 22 pp.</td>
<td>$3.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Legal System and Criminal Responsibility of Intellectuals in the People’s Republic of China, 1949-1982 (Carlos Wing-hung Lo), 125 pp. Index</td>
<td>$5.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>1985 (68)</th>
<th>ISSN 0730-0107</th>
<th>ISBN 0-942182-70-7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Symposium on Hong Kong: 1997 (Edited by Hungdah Chiu), 100 pp. Index</td>
<td>$4.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Author(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>The 1982 Chinese Constitution and the Rule of Law</td>
<td>Hungdah Chiu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>Peking's Negotiating Style: A Case study of U.S.-PRC Normalization</td>
<td>Jaw-Ling Joanne Chang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>China's Marine Environmental Protection Law: The Dragon Creeping</td>
<td>Mitchell A. Silk</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**1986 Series**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Pages</th>
<th>ISBN</th>
<th>Price</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>From Tradition to Modernity: A Socio-Historical Interpretation on</td>
<td>Wen-hui Tsai</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>0-942182-74-X</td>
<td>$4.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>China's Struggle toward Modernization Since the Mid-19th Century</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>Peace and Unification in Korea and International Law</td>
<td>Byung-Hwa Lyou</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>0-942182-75-8</td>
<td>$8.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>The Hong Kong Agreement and American Foreign Policy</td>
<td>Hungdah Chiu</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0-942182-76-6</td>
<td>$3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>United States-China Normalization: An Evaluation of Foreign Policy</td>
<td>Jaw-ling Joanne Chang</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>0-942182-77-4</td>
<td>$8.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Decision Making</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(Hardcover edition published in Maryland Studies in East Asian Law</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>and Politics Series, No. 7. ISBN 0-942182-78-2)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>Communications and China's National Integration</td>
<td>Shuhua Chang</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>0-942182-79-0</td>
<td>$8.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>An Analysis of People's Daily and Central Daily on the China</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Reunification Issue</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>Since Aquino: The Philippine Tangle and the United States</td>
<td>Justus M. van der Kroef</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>0-942182-80-4</td>
<td>$3.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## 1987 Series

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>1987</th>
<th>ISSN</th>
<th>ISBN</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Pages</th>
<th>Price</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1987 (78)</td>
<td>0730-0107</td>
<td>0-942182-81-2</td>
<td>An Analysis of the U.S.-China Nuclear Energy Cooperation Agreement (Benjamin Chin)</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>$3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1987 (79)</td>
<td>0730-0107</td>
<td>0-942182-82-0</td>
<td>Survey of Recent Developments in China (Mainland and Taiwan), 1985-1986 (edited by Hungdah Chiu, with the assistance of Jaw-ling Joanne Chang)</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>$8.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1987 (80)</td>
<td>0730-0107</td>
<td>0-942182-83-9</td>
<td>Democratizing Transition in Taiwan (Yangsun Chou and Andrew J. Nathan)</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>$3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>1987 (81)</td>
<td>0730-0107</td>
<td>0-942182-84-7</td>
<td>The Legal Status of the Chinese Communist Party (Robert Heuser)</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>$3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>1987 (82)</td>
<td>0730-0107</td>
<td>0-942182-85-5</td>
<td>The Joint Venture and Related Contract Laws of Mainland China and Taiwan: A Comparative Analysis (Clyde D. Stoltenberg and David W. McClure)</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>$4.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>1987 (83)</td>
<td>0730-0107</td>
<td>0-942182-86-3</td>
<td>Reform in Reverse: Human Rights in the People’s Republic of China, 1986/1987 (Ta-Ling Lee and John F. Copper)</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>$8.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## 1988 Series

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>1988</th>
<th>ISSN</th>
<th>ISBN</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Pages</th>
<th>Price</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1988 (84)</td>
<td>0730-0107</td>
<td>0-942182-87-1</td>
<td>Chinese Attitudes toward International Law in the Post-Mao Era, 1978-1987 (Hungdah Chiu)</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>$3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1988 (85)</td>
<td>0730-0107</td>
<td>0-942182-88-X</td>
<td>Chinese Views on the Sources of International Law (Hungdah Chiu),</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>$3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1988 (86)</td>
<td>0730-0107</td>
<td>0-942182-89-8</td>
<td>People’s Republic of China: The Human Rights Exception (Roberta Cohen), 103 pp. (out of print)</td>
<td></td>
<td>$5.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>1988 (87)</td>
<td>0730-0107</td>
<td>0-942182-90-1</td>
<td>Settlement of the Macau Issue: Distinctive Features of Beijing’s Negotiating Behavior (with text of 1887 Protocol and 1987 Declaration) (Jaw-ling Joanne Chang), 37 pp.</td>
<td></td>
<td>$3.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
No. 5 - 1988 (88)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-942182-91-X
The Draft Basic Law of Hong Kong: Analysis and Documents (edited by Hungdah Chiu), 153 pp.  $5.00

No. 6 - 1988 (89)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-942182-92-8
Constitutionalism in Asia: Asian Views of the American Influence (edited by Lawrence W. Beer), 210 pp. (out of print)  $10.00

1989 Series

No. 1 - 1989 (90)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-925153-00-1
The Right to a Criminal Appeal in the People's Republic of China (Margaret Y.K. Woo), 43 pp.  $3.00

No. 2 - 1989 (91)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-925153-01-X
The Status of Customary International Law, Treaties, Agreements and Semi-Official or Unofficial Agreements in Chinese Law (Hungdah Chiu), 22 pp.  $3.00

No. 3 - 1989 (92)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-925153-02-8
One Step Forward, One Step Back, Human Rights in the People's Republic of China in 1987/88 (John F. Cooper and Ta-ling Lee), 140 pp.  $6.00

No. 4 - 1989 (93)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-925153-03-6
Tibet: Past and Present (Hungdah Chiu and June Teufel Dreyer), 25 pp.  $3.00

No. 5 - 1989 (94)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-925153-04-4
Chinese Attitude toward International Law of Human Rights in the Post-Mao Era (Hungdah Chiu), 38 pp.  $4.00

No. 6 - 1989 (95)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-925153-05-2
Tibet to Tiananmen: Chinese Human Rights and United States Foreign Policy (W. Gary Vause), 47 pp.  $4.00

1990 Series

No. 1 - 1990 (96)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-925153-06-0
The International Legal Status of the Republic of China (Hungdah Chiu), 20 pp. (Out of print, please order No. 5-1992 (112) for a revised version of this issue)  $3.00
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. 2 - 1990 (97)</th>
<th>ISSN 0730-0107</th>
<th>ISBN 0-925153-07-9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. 3 - 1990 (98)</th>
<th>ISSN 0730-0107</th>
<th>ISBN 0-925153-09-5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nationality and International Law in Chinese Perspective (Hungdah Chiu), 37 pp.</td>
<td>$4.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. 4 - 1990 (99)</th>
<th>ISSN 0730-0107</th>
<th>ISBN 0-925153-10-9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Taiwan Relations Act after Ten Years (Lori Fisler Damrosch), 27 pp.</td>
<td>$3.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. 5 - 1990 (100)</th>
<th>ISSN 0730-0107</th>
<th>ISBN 0-925153-11-7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Taiwan Relations Act and Sino-American Relations (Hungdah Chiu), 34 pp. (out of print)</td>
<td>$4.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. 6 - 1990 (101)</th>
<th>ISSN 0730-0107</th>
<th>ISBN 0-925153-12-5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan’s Recent Elections: Fulfilling the Democratic Promise (John F. Copper), 174 pp. Index (out of print)</td>
<td>$8.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**1991 Series**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legal Aspects of Investment and Trade with the Republic of China (Edited by John T. McDermott, with contributions by Linda F. Powers, Ronald A. Case, Chung-Teh Lee, Jeffrey H. Chen, Cheryl M. Friedman, Hungdah Chiu, K.C. Fan and Douglas T. Hung), 94 pp.</td>
<td>$6.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. 2 - 1991 (103)</th>
<th>ISSN 0730-0107</th>
<th>ISBN 0-925153-14-1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Freedom of Expression: The Continuing Revolution in Japan's Legal Culture (Lawrence W. Beer), 31 pp.</td>
<td>$5.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. 4 - 1991 (105)</th>
<th>ISSN 0730-0107</th>
<th>ISBN 0-925153-16-8</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The 1989 US-Republic of China (Taiwan) Fisheries Negotiations (Mark Mon-Chang Hsieh), 84 pp.</td>
<td>$6.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. 5 - 1991 (106)</th>
<th>ISSN 0730-0107</th>
<th>ISBN 0-925153-17-6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Politics of Divided Nations: China, Korea, Germany and Vietnam — Unification, Conflict Resolution and Political Development (Edited by Quansheng Zhao and Robert Sutter), 198 pp. Index (out of print)</td>
<td>$12.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 1992 Series

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>ISBN</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Pages</th>
<th>Price</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>0730-0107 0-925153-20-6</td>
<td>China's Ministry of State Security: Coming of Age in the International Arena</td>
<td>Nicholas Eftimiades</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>$4.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>0730-0107 0-925153-21-4</td>
<td>Libel Law and the Press in South Korea: An Update</td>
<td>Kyu Ho Youm</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>$5.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>0730-0107 0-925153-23-0</td>
<td>The International Legal Status of the Republic of China (Revised version of No. 1-1990 (96))</td>
<td>Hungdah Chiu</td>
<td>37 pp.</td>
<td>$4.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>0730-0107 0-925153-24-9</td>
<td>China's Criminal Justice System and the Trial of Pro-Democracy Dissidents</td>
<td>Hungdah Chiu</td>
<td>21 pp.</td>
<td>$3.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 1993 Series

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>ISBN</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Pages</th>
<th>Price</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>0730-0107 0-925153-25-7</td>
<td>Can One Unscramble an Omelet? China's Economic Reform in Theory and Practice</td>
<td>Yuan-li Wu and Richard Y. C. Yin</td>
<td>34 pp.</td>
<td>$4.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>0730-0107 0-925153-26-5</td>
<td>Constitutional Development and Reform in the Republic of China on Taiwan (With Documents)</td>
<td>Hungdah Chiu</td>
<td>61 pp.</td>
<td>$6.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>0730-0107 0-925153-27-3</td>
<td>Sheltering for Examination (Shourong Shencha) in the Legal System of the People's Republic of China</td>
<td>Tao-tai Hsia and Wendy I. Zeldin</td>
<td>32 pp.</td>
<td>$4.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
No. 4 - 1993 (117)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-925153-28-1
In Making China Modernized: Comparative Modernization between Mainland China and Taiwan (Wen-hui Tsai), 281 pp. Index (out of print, please order No. 5 - 1996 for 2nd ed.)  $18.00

No. 5 - 1993 (118)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-925153-30-3
Hong Kong’s Transition to 1997: Background, Problems and Prospects (with Documents) (Hungdah Chiu), 106 pp.  $7.00

No. 6 - 1993 (119)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-925153-31-1
Koo-Wang Talks and the Prospect of Building Constructive and Stable Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (with Documents) (Hungdah Chiu), 69 pp.  $5.00

1994 Series

Statutory Encouragement of Investment and Economic Development in the Republic of China on Taiwan (Neil L. Meyers), 72 pp.  $7.00

No. 2 - 1994 (121)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-925153-33-8
Don’t Force Us to Lie: The Struggle of Chinese Journalists in the Reform Era (Allison Liu Jernow), 99 pp.  $7.00

No. 3 - 1994 (122)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-925153-34-6
Institutionalizing a New Legal System in Deng’s China (Hungdah Chiu), 44 pp.  $5.00

No. 4 - 1994 (123)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-925153-35-4

Taiwan’s Legal System and Legal Profession (Hungdah Chiu and Jyh-pin Fa), 22 pp.  $3.00

No. 6 - 1994 (125)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-925153-37-0
Toward Greater Democracy: An Analysis of the Republic of China on Taiwan’s Major Elections in the 1990s (Wen-hui Tsai), 40 pp.  $6.00

1995 Series

Relations between the Republic of China and the Republic of Chile (Herman Gutierrez B. and Lin Chou), 31 pp.  $5.00
The Tibet Question and the Hong Kong Experience (Barry Sautman and Shiu-hing Lo), 82 pp. $10.00

No. 3 - 1995 (128)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-925153-40-0
Mass Rape, Enforced Prostitution, and the Japanese Imperial Army: Japan Eschews International Legal Responsibility? (David Bolding), 56 pp. $5.00

No. 4 - 1995 (129)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-925153-41-9
The Role of the Republic of China in the World Economy (Chu-yuan Cheng), 25 pp. $3.00

No. 5 - 1995 (130)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-925153-42-7
China’s Economy after Deng: A Long-Term Perspective (Peter C.Y. Chow), 43 pp. $5.00

No. 6 - 1995 (131)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-925153-43-5
An Entrepreneurial Analysis of Opposition Movements (Ching-chane Hwang), 179 pp. Index $18.00

1996 Series

Taiwan’s 1995 Legislative Yuan Election (John F. Copper), 39 pp. $6.00

No. 2 - 1996 (133)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-925153-45-1
Russian-Taiwanese Relations: Current State, Problems, and Prospects of Development (Peter M. Ivanov), 76 pp. $10.00

No. 3 - 1996 (134)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-925153-46-X
Recent Relations between China and Taiwan and Taiwan’s Defense Capabilities (Hungdah Chiu & June Teufel Dreyer), 28 pp. $4.00

No. 4 - 1996 (135)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-925153-47-8
Intellectual Property Protection in the Asian-Pacific Region: A Comparative Study (Paul C. B. Liu & Andy Y. Sun), 183 pp. Index. $25.00
(Hardcover edition: ISBN 0-925153-48-6) $32.00

No. 5 - 1996 (136)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-925153-49-4
In Making China Modernized: Comparative Modernization between Mainland China and Taiwan (2nd ed.) (Wen-hui Tsai), 297 pp. Index. $30.00
No. 6 - 1996 (137)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-925153-51-6
A Study of the Consular Convention between the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China (Stephen Kho), 68 pp. $6.00

1997 Series

No. 1 - 1997 (138)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-925153-52-4
Tiananmen to Tiananmen, China under Communism 1947-1996 (Yuan-Li Wu), 348 pp. Index $35.00
(Hardcover edition: ISBN 0-925153-53-2) $45.00

No. 2 - 1997 (139)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-925153-54-0
The External Relations and International Status of Hong Kong (Ting Wai), 72 pp. $8.00

No. 3 - 1997 (140)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-925153-55-9
Sheltering for Examination (Shoushen) in the People’s Republic of China: Law, Policy, and Practices (Kam C. Wong), 53 pp. $6.00

No. 4 - 1997 (141)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-925153-56-7
Legal Aid Practices in the PRC in the 1990s — Dynamics, Contents and Implications, (Luo Qizhi) 68 pp. $8.00

No. 5 - 1997 (142)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-925153-57-5
The KMT’s 15th Party Congress: The Ruling Party at a Crossroads (John F. Copper), 38 pp. $5.00

From Pirate King to Jungle King: Transformation of Taiwan’s Intellectual Property Protection (Andy Y. Sun), 138 pp. $18.00

1998 Series

No. 1 - 1998 (144)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-925153-59-1
From “Multi-System Nations” to “Linkage Communities”: A New Conceptual Scheme for the Integration of Divided Nations (Yung Wei), 20 pp. $4.00

The Impact of the World Trade Organization on the Lack of Transparency in the People’s Republic of China (Stephen Kho), 63 pp. $7.00

No. 3 - 1998 (146)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-925153-61-3
The Nationalist Ideology of the Chinese Military (Xiaoyu Chen), 45 pp. $6.00
Convergence and the Future of Reunification between Mainland China and Taiwan: A Developmental View (Wen-hui Tsai), 33 pp. $5.00

Chinese Patent Law and Patent Litigation in China (Xiang Wang), 61 pp. $8.00

The Development of Banking in Taiwan: The Historical Impact on Future Challenges (Lawrence L.C. Lee), 39 pp. $6.00

1999 Series

An Analysis of the Sino-Japanese Dispute over the T’iaoyutai Islets (Senkaku Gunto) (Hungdah Chiu), 27 pp. $6.00

Taiwan’s 1998 Legislative Yuan, Metropolitan Mayoral and City Council Elections: Confirming and Consolidating Democracy in the Republic of China (John F. Copper), 53 pp. $7.00

The Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands Dispute: Its History and an Analysis of the Ownership Claims of the P.R.C., R.O.C., and Japan (Han-yi Shaw), 148 pp. $20.00

Election and Democracy in Hong Kong: The 1998 Legislative Council Election (Shiu-hing Lo & Wing-yat Yu), 68 pp. $9.00

The ROC on the Threshold of the 21st Century: A Paradigm Reexamined (Edited by Chien-min Chao & Cal Clark), 189 pp. $24.00

Party Primaries in Taiwan: Trends, Conditions, and Projections in Candidate Selection (Julian Baum and James A. Robinson), 39 pp. $6.00

2000 Series

United States-Taiwan Relations: Twenty Years after the Taiwan Relations Act (Edited by Jaw-Ling Joanne Chang & William W. Boyer), 309 pp. Index $28.00

(Hardcover edition: ISBN 0-925153-72-9) $42.00
Taiwan’s 2000 Presidential and Vice Presidential Election: Consolidating Democracy and Creating a New Era of Politics (John F. Copper), 66 pp. $9.00

Legal Eligibility of Taiwan’s Accession to GATT/WTO (CHO Hui-Wan), 22 pp. $6.00

No. 4 - 2000 (159) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-75-3
Russia’s Northeast Asia Policy: Challenges and Choices for the 21st Century (Sharif M. Shuja), 22 pp. $6.00

No. 5 - 2000 (160) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-76-1
East Asia and the Principle of Non-Intervention: Policies and Practices (Linjun WU), 39 pp. $7.00

No. 6 - 2000 (161) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-77-X
The Association of South East Asian Nations' Confidence and Security Building with the People's Republic of China: Internal Constraints and Policy Implications (Kwei-Bo HUANG), 61 pp. $9.00

2001 Series

No. 1 - 2001 (162) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-78-8
Socio-economic Changes and Modernization in an Age of Uncertainty: Taiwan in the 1990s and Its Future Challenge (Wen-hui TSAI), 35 pp. $7.00

No. 2 - 2001 (163) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-79-6
Implementation of Taiwan Relations Act: An Examination after Twenty Years (Edited by Hungdah CHIU, Hsing-wei LEE and Chih-Yu T. WU), 267 pp. $27.00

No. 3 - 2001 (164) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-80-X
The Diplomatic War between Beijing and Taipei in Chile (Lin CHOU), 61 pp. $9.00

No. 4 - 2001 (165) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-81-8
Reforming the Protection of Intellectual Property: The Case of China and Taiwan in Light of WTO Accession (Andy Y. SUN), 46 pp. $8.00

No. 5 - 2001 (166) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-82-6
Arbitration of Commercial Disputes in China (Vai Io LO), 26 pp. $6.00
No. 6 - 2001 (167) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-83-4
Building a Democratic State in Modernizing Taiwan: The 2001 Legislative Election and the Push for Pluralism (Wen-hui TSAI and George P. Chen), 24 pp. $6.00

2002 Series

United States and Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea: A Study of Ocean Law and Politics (Yann-huei SONG), 321 pp. $35.00

No. 2 - 2002 (169) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-85-0
The Politics of Racial Discrimination in Hong Kong (Barry Sautman and Ellen Kneehans), 83 pp. (out of print) $10.00

No. 3 - 2002 (170) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-00-3
The Social and Political Bases for Women's Growing Political Power in Taiwan (Cal Clark and Janet Clark), 40 pp. $7.00

No. 4 - 2002 (171) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-01-1
The U.S.-Taiwan Free Trade Agreement: A Bridge for Economic Integration in the Asia-Pacific Region (Peter C.Y. Chow), 62 pp. $9.00

2003 Series

No. 1 - 2003 (172) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-02-X
Bringing People Back In: Collected Essays on Major Elections in Taiwan at the Turn of the 21st Century (Wen-hui TSAI), 125 pp. $18.00

No. 2 - 2003 (173) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-03-8
Taiwan: The Commercial State (Arthur I. Cyr), 81 pp. (out of print, please order No. 1 - 2005 (180) for a revised version of this issue) $10.00

No. 3 - 2003 (174) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-04-6
New Rules to the Old Great Game: An Assessment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization's Proposed Free Trade Zone (Leland Rhett Miller), 25 pp. $6.00

No. 4 - 2003 (175) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 1-932330-05-4
The Republic of China Legislative Yuan: A Study of Institutional Evolution (Thomas J. Bellows), 35 pp. $7.00
# 2004 Series

No. 1 - 2004 (176)  
**ISSN 0730-0107**  
ISBN 1-932330-06-2  
Taiwan's 2004 Presidential and Vice Presidential Election: Democracy's Consolidation or Devolution? (John F. Cooper), 80 pp.  
$10.00

No. 2 - 2004 (177)  
**ISSN 0730-0107**  
ISBN 1-932330-07-0  
Peace, Reunification, Democracy and Cross-Strait Relations (Zhaohui HONG and Yi SUN), 16 pp.  
$5.00

No. 3 - 2004 (178)  
**ISSN 0730-0107**  
ISBN 1-932330-08-9  
Judicial Discretion in Dispensing with the Service of Process Requirement in Hong Kong under Order 45, Rule 7(7): Moving towards a Doctrinal Change? (Simon Teng), 27 pp.  
$7.00

No. 4 - 2004 (179)  
**ISSN 0730-0107**  
ISBN 1-932330-09-7  
Taiwan's 2004 Legislative Election: Putting it in Perspective (John F. Copper), 75 pp.  
$13.00

---

## 2005 Series

No. 1 - 2005 (180)  
**ISSN 0730-0107**  
ISBN 1-932330-10-0  
$13.00

No. 2 - 2005 (181)  
**ISSN 0730-0107**  
ISBN 1-932330-11-9  
Retracing the Triangle: China's Strategic Perceptions of Japan in the Post-Cold War Era (Danielle F. S. Cohen), 74 pp.  
$13.00

No. 3 - 2005 (182)  
**ISSN 0730-0107**  
ISBN 1-932330-12-7  
Putting Things into Perspective: The Reality of Accountability in East Timor, Indonesia and Cambodia (Suzannah Linton), 90 pp.  
$13.00

No. 4 - 2005 (183)  
**ISSN 0730-0107**  
$13.00
MARYLAND STUDIES IN EAST ASIAN LAW AND POLITICS SERIES

(The following books are published under the auspices or co-auspicces of the East Asian Legal Studies Program of the University of Maryland School of Law. The views expressed in each book reflect only those of the author. All books published in hard cover edition, unless otherwise indicated.)

ISBN 0-03-048911-3
$49.95

ISBN 0-03-059443-X
$49.95

$15.00

ISBN 0-942182-63-4
$15.00

(Published under the co-auspicces of the Committee on Asian Studies, University of Virginia.)
ISBN 0-8138-1027-7
$35.00

(Published under the co-auspicces of Committee on Asian Studies, University of Virginia.)
ISBN 0-87395-950-7 (hardcover)
ISBN 0-87395-948-5 (paperback)
$74.50
$24.95

* Occasional Papers/Reprints Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, Inc. (It has been changed to Maryland Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, MSCAS), 500 West Baltimore St., Baltimore, Maryland 21201-1786. (Tel. 410-706-3870)


ORDER FORM

Mail this order form to Maryland Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, University of Maryland School of Law, 500 West Baltimore Street, Baltimore, Maryland 21201-1786, U.S.A. Or e-mail to eastasia@law.umaryland.edu or fax to (410)706-1516

Check One:

☐ Please Send:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ISBN</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>No. of Copies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

☐ Please start my subscription of the MSCAS: Starting year ______

Subscription price is U.S. $35.00 per year for 4 issues in the U.S. and $40.00 for Canada, Mexico or overseas (regardless of the price of individual issues).

My check of U.S. $ __________________________ is enclosed. 

________________________________________copy(s) of invoice/receipt required. (Institution/library may request billing before making payment)

Please add postage/handling of $4.00 for one copy and $1.00 for each additional copy. Make checks payable to MSCAS.

Please send books to:
Contact Name
Corporation/Library/Institution
Address (Please include zip code)
Country

________________________________________

________________________________________