POLITICS OF DIVIDED NATIONS: CHINA, KOREA, GERMANY AND VIETNAM—UNIFICATION, CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

Edited by Quansheng Zhao and Robert Sutter

School of Law
University of Maryland
Occasional Papers/Reprint Series in Contemporary Asian Studies

General Editor: Hungdah Chiu
Executive Editor: Chih-Yu Wu
Associate Executive Editors: Andrew Stone
          Su Yun Chang
Managing Editor: Chih-Yu Wu

Editorial Advisory Board
Professor Robert A. Scalapino, University of California at Berkeley
Professor Gaston J. Sigur, George Washington University
Professor Shao-chuan Leng, University of Virginia
Professor J. S. Prybyla, The Pennsylvania State University
Professor Bih-jaw Lin, Institute of International Relations, National Chengchi University, Republic of China
Professor Toshio Sawada, Sophia University, Japan
Professor Gottfried-Karl Kindermann, Center for International Politics, University of Munich, Federal Republic of Germany
Professor Choon-ho Park, International Legal Studies, Korea University, Republic of Korea

All contributions (in English only) and communications should be sent to
Professor Hungdah Chiu, University of Maryland School of Law,
500 West Baltimore Street, Baltimore, Maryland 21201-1786 USA.

All publications in this series reflect only the views of the authors.
While the editor accepts responsibility for the selection of materials to be published,
the individual author is responsible for statements of facts and expressions of opinion contained therein.

Subscription is US $22.00 for 6 issues (regardless of the price of individual issues) in the United States and $28.00 for Canada or overseas. Check should be addressed to OPRSCAS.

Tel.: (301) 328-3870
FAX: (301) 328-4045

Price for single copy of this issue: US $12.00.

ISSN 0730-0107
ISBN 0-925153-17-6

POLITICS OF DIVIDED NATIONS: CHINA, KOREA, GERMANY AND VIETNAM—UNIFICATION, CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

edited by Quansheng Zhao and Robert Sutter
ABOUT THE EDITORS AND CONTRIBUTORS

Editors and Contributors

QUANSHENG ZHAO, Peace Fellow, United States Institute of Peace, Washington, D.C., on leave from Old Dominion University, Norfolk, Virginia, where he is chairman of the Asian Studies Committee and a faculty member of the Political Science Department.


Other Contributors

BYUNG-JOON AHN, Professor of Political Science, Yonsei University, Seoul, Korea.

HUNGDAH CHIU, Professor of Law, University of Maryland, Baltimore, Maryland.

SUNG-JOO HAN, Professor of Political Science, Korea University, Seoul, Korea.

YUNG-HWAN JO, Professor of Political Science, Arizona State University, Tempe, Arizona; and, Director of Far East Studies, Kyongnam University, Masan and Seoul, Korea.

GERARD MARÉ, Ph.D. Candidate, Political Science, University of California, Berkeley, California.

GEORGE TOTTEN, Professor of Political Science, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, California.

DIRK VERHEYEN, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Loyola Marymount University, Los Angeles, California.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. Introduction: Unification, Conflict Resolution and Political Development</td>
<td>QUANSHENG ZHAO</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Chinese Communist Policy Toward Taiwan and the Prospect of Unification</td>
<td>HUNGDAH CHIU</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Federation, Democratization, and China’s Unification</td>
<td>QUANSHENG ZHAO</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. South Korea and the Politics of Korean Unification</td>
<td>GEORGE TOTTEN &amp; YUNG-HWAN JO</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. Peace, Cooperation, and Reunification in Korea</td>
<td>BYUNG-JOON AHN</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI. Problems and Prospects for Peace and Unification in Korea</td>
<td>SUNG-JOO HAN</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII. Dimensions of the German Question</td>
<td>DIRK VERHEYEN</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII. Unification and the Dialectics of (mal) Integration in Vietnam</td>
<td>GERARD MARÉ</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IX. Conclusion: Possible Outcomes and Implications for U.S. Policy</td>
<td>ROBERT SUTTER</td>
<td>179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Index</td>
<td></td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION
UNIFICATION, CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

Quansheng Zhao

This book brings together the first major collection of research on politics of current or formerly divided nations — China, Korea, Germany, and Vietnam. There is a wide range of diversity among the four countries in terms of historical backgrounds, geographic locations, and the international roles that they have played. But, they have all shared at least one common characteristic: these divided nations are products of the Cold War, dividing along political and ideological lines: communist v. capitalist. Therefore, they all have to answer a series of questions with regard to conflict resolution and political development in each society: How should the current political and economic systems on both sides be dealt with? What kind of relationship should exist between communist and non-communist political forces? And how can national unification be achieved by peaceful means?

Hence, the issue of national unification can be effectively linked to broader research topics such as conflict resolution and political development. Studies on conflict and conflict resolution have increasingly drawn attention from specialists in international relations, whereas political development (process of democratization, for example) has remained a favorite topic among scholars of comparative politics. The divided nation cases of China, Korea, Germany, and Vietnam will certainly provide useful examples for the examination of these theoretical as well as practical issues.

The evolution of the Cold War (from the peak in the 1950s and 1960s to its end in the late 1980s and the post-Cold War era in the 1990s) and the changing international environment have inevitably played a significant, if not a decisive, role in the internal and external politics of the divided nations. The radical changes in the Soviet Union, the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, the internal upheaval of China, the increasing demands for unification within both North and South Korea have all had a great impact on the politics of divided nations and the issue of unification. One may conclude that a
peaceful and favorable international environment is crucial for the resolution of conflicts such as those arising out of national divisions that were caused primarily by external powers.

At the same time, domestic factors have proved to be extremely important. All of these divided countries have developed different political and economic systems, as a direct result of either the Cold War (in the cases of Korea and Germany), or a civil war between communist and non-communist forces (in the case of China). These separations are long-standing: The shortest is the 22-year division of Vietnam, the others have existed for more than four decades. These long separations inevitably have had a great impact on the political development of both sides and have inspired different interpretations of the issue of unification.

In addition to examining the past experiences and future directions of unification between PRC-Taiwan, North-South Korea, East-West Germany, and North-South Vietnam, this comparative analysis will contribute to a strengthening of the understanding of how domestic political developments shape the attitude toward unification in each country, and the impact of changing global and regional international relations on these countries.

Each country study in this volume reviews unification politics in both domestic and international terms. Attention to these countries, however, is not equally distributed. More discussion and examination are devoted to China and Korea, the two countries that have so far remained divided. There are two chapters on China and three on Korea, and one chapter each for Germany and Vietnam, the two countries that have already achieved national unification.

The first two chapters examine the issue of China — the Mainland and Taiwan. Both articles provide detailed discussions of the relationship between unification and domestic politics. Hungdah Chiu surveys the evolutionary process of Beijing’s peaceful unification overture toward Taiwan and the responses from Taipei. In addition to the main themes of his paper, Chiu touches upon several sensitive issues, such as the development of the Taiwan independent movement, the “ADB (Asian Development Bank) formula” for Taiwan’s future activities in the international communities, and the Taiwan authority’s new mainland policies including one that deals with members of the Chinese Communist Party. Quansheng Zhao concentrates on the likely impact of the unification process on China’s political development and democratization. He argues that the unification policy of “one country, two systems” proposed by Beijing, may well lead to the creation of “one country, two (or more) parties,” which is an unintended conse-
quence of unification. Therefore, the prolonged evolutionary process of unification is likely to promote China's political pluralization. Zhao also discusses the suitability of a federal system for China, including the Mainland, Taiwan, and Hong Kong and Macao.

The second group of chapters discusses North-South relations in Korea and the prospects for unification. George Totten and Yung-hwan Jo review North-South relations for the last several decades in detail, and raise three possible scenarios for the future development. By making a brief comparison with the case of Germany, Totten and Jo argue that a collapse of North Korea (the kind that happened to East Germany) would not be in the interests of South Korea. Byung-joon Ahn argues that both the international environment and the situation in the South favor negotiations for unification, whereas the North is ambivalent regarding negotiations. Sung-Joo Han believes that South Korea has undergone a political transformation (for example, the merger of three parties into one large ruling party), which makes it receptive to any reasonable proposals about improving North-South Korea relations that the North can offer. Han further discusses the new South Korean proposal, "a dual track plan": The reunification of the people will precede the restoration of a unified state.

The third country study is concerned with German politics and unification. As Germany is a newly unified country, its experience may provide a useful example to examine the prolonged, evolutionary process of unification. Dirk Verheyen analyzes the issue of Germany from a broad range of perspectives: German identity, German unity, and the management of German power. Verheyen surveys not only the current political development, but also its historical and cultural roots, thereby providing a comprehensive picture of the German question and its likely development in the future.

Vietnam, the only country among the four to achieve unification through military conquest after decades of war, is the focus of Gerard Maré's chapter. Maré convincingly argues that even though Vietnam achieved its goal of unification in 1975, a deep north-south cleavage continues to skew and divide Vietnamese political life, and the two societies remain distinct. This cleavage was caused by Hanoi's economic incompetence and political inability to penetrate and remold the Southern society. Maré warns that other divided countries should draw a lesson from the case of Vietnam — unification may bring not only national unity but also a long period of self-absorption, frustration, dialectical adjustment, and electoral volatility, which may alter the country's regional and international orientation.
Finally, the concluding chapter focuses on possible outcomes and implications for American foreign policy. Robert Sutter analyzes U.S. interests in three dimensions: political-security, economic, and political-ideological. While fundamentally optimistic about the future, Sutter calls for a more prudent course for U.S. policy-makers that would keep enough American strength available to deal with possible contingencies and to check potentially adverse trends before they become major crises.

In sum, there are different paths leading to national unification and conflict resolution. One is unification through military force where one side takes over the other side entirely. This happened to Vietnam in 1975, when the North took over the South and eliminated all opposition forces. Another path to unification is peaceful evolution, which is a long process involving political, economic and cultural exchanges between the two sides. These exchanges will eventually create an environment in which new political forces may emerge to promote further mutual understanding. This is the case of Germany, where the goal of national unification was reached in 1990.

In the cases of China and Korea, the second path of unification — peaceful evolution — is apparently the choice desired by the peoples of both sides. Even though one cannot entirely rule out the possibility of military action between Beijing and Taipei or Pyongyang and Seoul, there are encouraging signs that the two countries may realize their unification through peaceful and evolutionary means. The recent developments in Germany demonstrate that peaceful unification is a prolonged and evolutionary process. Political change and unification as two different yet closely related processes may take place simultaneously. As several authors in this book point out, the process of unification itself may create a new environment for political development, thereby promoting political pluralization.

There are close linkages between political and economic development. Enormous capital, advanced administrative personnel, and technologies from the non-communist side (such as West Germany, Taiwan, and South Korea) are increasingly needed by the communist side. It is probable that mutual economic benefits, together with the close cultural and geographic connection, will push bilateral private economic exchanges to new levels. More importantly, economic development will stimulate each society's demand for political development. This pressure is one of the basic foundations of political pluralization. Pluralistic development in the non-political fields of economics and culture will foster future political pluralization. Meanwhile, the development and consolidation of various political forces
CHAPTER I

will provide favorable conditions for future political development, leading to a gradual accommodation between the two sides. The process of unification, therefore, may have the unique function of serving as a catalyst for political pluralization in the divided nations.

One important point worthy of a closer examination by future studies, the achievement of the goals for national unification, as demonstrated by the on-going experiences of Germany and Vietnam, does not necessarily mean the end of conflict between the formerly divided parts. Unification may only solve conflict in political and legal dimensions, but not in economic, psychological, and cultural dimensions. The need for continuing work on conflict resolution has thus remained.

The original idea for this collection arose during the course of the 1989 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association in Atlanta, where several authors of this volume participated in a panel on the politics of divided nations. The panel was organized by Quansheng Zhao for the Asian Political Scientists Group. The chapters written by Sung-Joo Han and Byung-joon Ahn on Korea were originally presented at the Asian-Pacific Dialogue in Honolulu sponsored by the East-West Center and the University of Hawaii, and subsequently appeared in an East-West Center publication. The permission from Charles Morrison of the East-West Center for the inclusion of these two articles in this volume is appreciated. I would also like to thank Jim McAdams and Wonmo Dong for valuable inputs at the earlier stages, Paula Smith for research assistance, and Old Dominion University, the East-West Center, and the United States Institute of Peace for research support.
CHAPTER II

CHINESE COMMUNIST POLICY TOWARD TAIWAN AND THE PROSPECT OF UNIFICATION*

Hungdah Chiu

I. INTRODUCTION

On September 30, 1981, Marshall Yeh Jianyin, then Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress and de facto head of state of the People's Republic of China (PRC),¹ made a specific nine-point proposal to Taiwan on unification. The proposal offers Taiwan “a high degree of autonomy as a special administrative region” after unification with the PRC. Taiwan can also retain its armed forces. It also renewed its 1979 call for establishing “three links” (mail, air and shipping services, and trade) and “four exchanges” (relatives and tourists, academic groups, cultural groups, and sports representatives) with Taiwan as a first step toward the ultimate goal of unification.² This proposal set forth the basic principles of the Chinese Communists' unification policy toward Taiwan.

At a panel on unification of China of the 35th Annual Meeting of the Association for Asian Studies (AAS) held at San Francisco, March 25-27, 1983, I made the following personal comments on Yeh's proposal as follows:

credible terms [for unification] should contain at least the...

---

* The Wade-Giles system is used for Republic of China (Taiwan) names, places and others, the Pinyin system is used for People's Republic of China (Mainland) names, places and others. This paper was originally published in Issues & Studies, Vol. 27, No. 1 (January 1991), pp. 13-38 and reprinted with revisions for publication here with the permission of the Institute of International Relations, National Chengchi University, Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China.

1. There is no head of state under the 1978 Chinese Constitution. According to Article 26, paragraph 1, of the Constitution, the Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress in fact exercises the function of the head of state. In 1982, China enacted a new Constitution.


(7)
right to self-defense, including the right to purchase adequate defensive weapons, before and after unification; no possibility of unilateral alteration of the settlement terms after unification; complete, not just "a high degree" of autonomy, and appropriate international status in foreign relations and international organizations. If these terms could be offered, if the mainland could attain a certain degree of political stability and economic development, and if the people there could enjoy considerable political and economic freedom, then the Chinese people in Taiwan would definitely be willing to consider peaceful unification. 3

After the AAS meeting, one of the panelists, Professor Winston L.Y. Yang of Seton Hall University, visited the Chinese mainland and had a two-hour interview with Deng Xiaoping, Chairman of the Military Affairs Commission — the most powerful position in the PRC. Deng said that after unification, Taiwan could continue to buy weapons abroad to sustain its own defense capability, "so long as they do not constitute a threat to the mainland." Taiwan would also keep its own judicial system, which would not be subject to control or review by the PRC's Supreme Court. Deng, however, rejected the concept of "complete autonomy" and placed two important limitations on the "high degree of autonomy" offered by the PRC: (1) Taiwan can no longer be called the "Republic of China" but would be called China-Taipei or China-Taiwan and (2) the PRC would be the sole representative for foreign affairs and international relations. On one specific issue, Deng said that "Taiwan" can remain a member of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) under the name "China-Taipei," after the PRC's admission to that organization. 4

On June 22 and 23, 1984, during the period of Sino-British negot-


CHAPTER II

9

On the question of returning Hong Kong to China in 1997, Deng Xiaoping referred to its policy toward Hong Kong and Taiwan as “one country, two systems,” i.e., allowing both places to continue their “capitalist system” after unification.5

Despite the rejection by the Republic of China (ROC) of the PRC’s terms for unification, which is preconditioned on the ROC’s giving up its sovereignty, the PRC decided to implement its “one country, two systems” policy with Hong Kong and is attempting to use that as a model for unification with Taiwan.

II. THE HONG KONG MODEL FOR UNIFICATION AND THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA’S RESPONSE

On September 26, 1984, the United Kingdom (UK) and the PRC initialed, after almost two years of negotiation, a Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong.6 From the PRC’s point of view, this agreement is an example of successful implementation of the “one country, two systems” policy advocated by Deng Xiaoping to serve as the basis for incorporating Taiwan into the PRC.7

The Joint Declaration spelled out in detail the PRC’s policy toward Hong Kong, the post-1997 Hong Kong regime and its international relations. The highlights of the Declaration are as follows:

(1) After 1997, Hong Kong will become a Special Administrative Region of the PRC under Article 31 of the PRC Constitution. It will enjoy a “high degree of autonomy” except in foreign and defense affairs.

5. On Constructing Socialism, ibid., pp. 41-42.
7. See, Michael Weisskopf, “Peking Eyes Taiwan as Accord is Initialed,” The Washington Post, September 27, 1984, p. A21. On November 6, 1984, in his report to the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, PRC Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian said: “The nature of the Taiwan question and Hong Kong question is different, but the idea of ‘one country, two systems’ is equally applicable to the settlement of the Taiwan question. The settlement of the Hong Kong question will produce a far-reaching impact on the Taiwan authorities and the Taiwan people and thus is beneficial to the promotion of the early completion of the unification of the motherland.” Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Quanguo Renmin Daihui Dahui Changwu Weiyuanhui Gongbao (Gazette of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress), No. 5 (November 22, 1984), p. 10.
(2) Hong Kong will be vested with executive, legislative and independent judicial power, including that of final adjudication.

(3) Hong Kong's chief executive will be appointed by the PRC after elections or consultation in Hong Kong. The government of Hong Kong will be composed of local people.

(4) Hong Kong shall maintain the capitalist economic and trade systems for 50 years after 1997.

(5) The existing social and economic system will remain unchanged. Freedoms of speech, of movement, of the press, of assembly, to strike, of religion, and others will be protected by law. Similarly, private property rights will be protected.

(6) Apart from displaying the national flag and national emblem of the PRC, Hong Kong may use a regional flag and emblem of its own.

(7) Hong Kong may participate in relevant international organizations and international trade agreements. It may establish official and semi-official economic and trade missions in foreign countries, using the name "Hong Kong, China" to maintain and develop relations and to conclude and implement agreements with states, regions and relevant international organizations in appropriate fields.

(8) The PRC defense force stationed in Hong Kong shall not interfere in the internal affairs of Hong Kong and the expenditures for these military forces shall be borne by the PRC's Central People's Government.

Under the above arrangements, Hong Kong will enjoy on the surface a "high degree of autonomy," but a closer analysis of the Declaration and the PRC's 1982 Constitution casts serious doubt on the durability and credibility of such autonomy. First, under Article 1 of Annex 1 of the Declaration, the PRC's National People's Congress (NPC) shall enact a basic law for the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, to guarantee the continuation of Hong Kong's capitalist system and lifestyle for 50 years and other matters as provided in the Joint Declaration. While under the PRC's law, Hong Kong may elect roughly 40 delegates to the NPC, the practical use and strength of 40...
Chapter II

Hong Kong delegates among the 3,000 delegates in the NPC's decision-making process would be insignificant. Moreover, Article 67, paragraph 4, of the 1982 Constitution provides that the Standing Committee of the NPC shall have the power “to interpret statutes,” thus both legislative and interpretative powers regarding the basic law for Hong Kong are in the hands of the NPC. Under such circumstances, the persistence of the so-called “high degree of autonomy” is at the mercy of the NPC, and thus the commitment lacks a credible guarantee.

Second, under Article 2, paragraph 1, of Annex 1 of the Declaration, “after the establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, the laws previously in force in Hong Kong . . . shall be maintained, save for any that contravene the Basic Law . . . .” As stated above, the Standing Committee of the NPC has the right to “interpret statutes;” therefore, the Standing Committee could annul those local Hong Kong laws it dislikes on the ground that they contravene the Basic Law.

Third, while Article 2, paragraph 2 of Annex 1 of the Declaration provides that the Hong Kong “Legislature may on its own authority enact laws in accordance with the provisions of the Basic Law and legal procedure,” Article 67, paragraph 8 of the PRC Constitution provides that the Standing Committee of the NPC has the power “to annul those local regulations or decisions of the organs of state power of . . . autonomous regions . . . that contravene the Constitution, the statutes or the administrative rules and regulations,” thus effectively placing a severe restraint on the power of the Hong Kong legislature.

Fourth, under Article 89, paragraph 14, of the PRC Constitution, the State Council (Cabinet) has the power “to alter or annul inappropriate decisions and orders issued by local organs of state administration at different levels.” Therefore, the PRC's State Council can interfere, based on this legal foundation, with the Hong Kong government's administrative function at anytime if it chooses to do so.

Fifth, Article 1, paragraph 3 of Annex 1 of the Declaration provides that the “chief executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be selected by election or through consultation held locally and be appointed by the Central People's Government.” Since the PRC has the final say on the appointment of their chief executive,

Xinhua Press, 1983, p. 226. Assuming all Hong Kong residents are considered city residents, its 5,147,900 population can elect roughly 40 delegates.

to what extent the Hong Kong people can exercise their free will to choose is open to serious doubt. In a country with a federal system such as the United States, the election of the chief executive of a member state is the sole decision of the people of that state without any participation of the central government. For instance, in the United States, a governor of a state is elected by the people of that state, and there is no way for the President or federal government to block that selection.

In view of the above analysis, it is clear that the so-called "high degree of autonomy" for Hong Kong has no credible guarantee and the PRC can legally interfere with the legislative and administrative operation of Hong Kong any time it chooses to do so.

On September 27, 1984, a day after the announcement of the Joint Declaration, an editorial in the People's Daily, the official newspaper of the Chinese Communist Party, stated that the Hong Kong Declaration will "promote Taiwan's return to the motherland," and noted that the same formula could be applicable to Taiwan. The ROC government and public opinion in Taiwan immediately rejected this statement. On October 4, 1984, the Foreign Minister of the ROC, Chu Fu-sung, told the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Legislative Yuan (Congress) that the so-called theory of "one country, two systems" is nothing but a guise used to confuse foreign nations as the Chinese Communists pursue their political plots. He thus categorically rejected the Hong Kong model as the basis for unification. The reason for this rejection is very simple. By agreeing to become a "special administrative region" of the PRC, the ROC would immediately lose its sovereignty and international personality. Without sovereignty and an international personality, there would be no legal restraints to prevent the PRC from taking away what it promised Taiwan at the time of unification.

In the case of Taiwan, the PRC leaders have stated that no military or administrative personnel will be sent to Taiwan after unification. There is, however, no credible guarantee to prevent the PRC from doing so. During the Hong Kong negotiation, PRC leaders first announced that no troops would be sent to Hong Kong after 1997, but they later changed their minds. Commenting on the credibility of

12. "Foreign Minister Rejects Hong Kong Solution," Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report, China (hereinafter referred to as "FBIS, China"), October 5, 1984, p. VI.
the Chinese Communists, then ROC Premier Kuo-hua Yu said on September 26, 1984:

To achieve their purpose of swallowing Hong Kong, the Chinese Communists — fearful of resistance from the Chinese in Hong Kong and Kowloon, who demand freedom and democracy — went out of their way to embellish an illusion of “one country, two systems.” They “promised that the present Hongkong system would remain unchanged for 50 years, in order to confuse the world and to bilk the people of Hongkong and Kowloon.

It is no secret that throughout the history of the Communists, there has never been any record established of their good faith nor any “agreement” that was not later trashed. No matter what the illusion the Chinese Communists attempt to create today, the basic policy identified in their “four principles” [socialist road, people’s democratic dictatorship, the leadership of the Communist Party and Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong thought] is a sharp illustration of the fact that Communism’s totalitarian nature will never change.

Freedom cannot be faked, nor can it be divided, nor confined in fences. What the whole Chinese people seek is an eternal, perfected, and fully realized state of well-being nourished in freedom and democracy.14

On April 28, 1988, PRC’s Basic Law Drafting Committee published the “Draft Basic Law for Solicitation of Opinions,” which undercuts the promise of a “high degree of autonomy” provided in the 1984 Joint Declaration. For instance, Article 17, paragraph 3, of the Draft authorizes the PRC’s State Council to apply Chinese laws in Hong Kong in case of an “emergency” as decided by that Council, thus effectively ending Hong Kong’s “high degree of autonomy.”15

The ROC government was not even interested in making an official denunciation of the Draft, and only the ruling Nationalist Party made some comments in an editorial in its party newspaper:


The basic principles of the [Draft Basic Law for Hong Kong] are: (1) Adopting a comparatively free and open policy in economic aspects; (2) taking strict control of [Hong Kong's] politics; and (3) explicitly allowing freedoms of speech, publications and others, but subject to restrictions. . . Moreover, [Article 39] of the Draft states that those freedoms provided in the Draft may be restricted on the ground of national security, public order, public health and public morals. . . The "one country, two systems" concept [to be implemented by] the Chinese Communists in Hong Kong is aimed at Taiwan. However, the tactics used by the Chinese Communists in Hong Kong only make the Chinese in Taiwan know the true face of Chinese Communists' "one country, two systems" and therefore more resolutely resist Chinese Communists' [attempt to unify Taiwan and the mainland].

In February 1989, the Standing Committee of the PRC's National People's Congress published the Basic Law (Draft), which, after further consultation and comments, would be revised and re-drafted for submission to the National People's Congress for adoption. The ROC government and the ruling Nationalist Party totally ignored this document because it was absolutely unacceptable to them.

On April 4, 1990, the Basic Law was adopted by the PRC's National People's Congress. On April 20, 1990, then ROC Premier Li Huan (the Premier spells his surname Lee) announced that the ROC Government will not recognize this Law.

III. THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA'S "THREE LINKS" AND "FOUR EXCHANGES" AND THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA'S RESPONSE

The PRC's overture for "three links" and "four exchanges" has great appeal to many people in Taiwan. Those who have family ties

---


17. Text published by the Secretariat of the Basic Law Consultation Committee.


with people on the mainland would naturally like to visit their relatives. For others, who only learned about China from books, there is a natural curiosity and nationalistic feeling toward visiting the Chinese mainland. Taiwan businessmen are attracted by the opportunity of opening a vast new market on the mainland. Under such circumstances, the ROC government is in a dilemma. If it categorically rejects the overture, this definitely would cause popular discontent in Taiwan. If it responds positively to this overture, it may be seen as impliedly acceding to the PRC's sovereign claim to Taiwan. There is also the security concern that extensive contacts with the mainland may facilitate the Communists' infiltration of Taiwan and undercut the people's anti-communist will and vigilance. This concern is especially important, from the ROC's point of view, because the Chinese Communists have refused to renounce the use of force against Taiwan. Moreover, on August 17, 1982, under PRC pressure, the United States signed a joint communique to limit the quality and quantity of its arm sales to Taiwan.20 In view of this dilemma, the ROC has taken an indirect and limited, yet positive, response to the PRC's overture for "three links" and "four exchanges."

In the early 1980's, the ROC quietly allowed indirect trade between Taiwan and the mainland to develop and finally legitimized such trade in 1985. It also permitted scientists and others from Taiwan to sit down with their PRC counterparts at international meetings. The ROC allowed indirect mail exchanges and did not prosecute ordinary people who quietly visited their relatives on the mainland. On March 23, 1981, the ROC agreed to have the Republic of China's Olympic Committee renamed as the Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee,21 thus making it possible for athletes from both the mainland and Taiwan to compete in international sports activities.

After the signing of the August 17, 1982 Taiwan arm sales restriction communique, the ROC confronted a serious security problem. One can expect the military balance in the Taiwan Strait to gradually shift in the PRC's favor as Taiwan's weaponry ages and the PRC gains access to U.S. and European weaponry. This concern was partially resolved in 1985-1986 when the U.S. permitted its industries to transfer military technology to Taiwan.22

With the resolution of this basic security issue and generally favorable response from indirect contacts with the mainland, the ROC

moves toward a more positive response to PRC's "three links" and "four exchanges."

On July 16, 1987, the ROC government formally lifted the ban on direct tourist visits to Hong Kong to facilitate people from Taiwan meeting their relatives from the mainland. On October 15, 1987, the Central Standing Committee of the ruling Nationalist Party approved a new policy to allow people living in Taiwan to visit their relatives on the Chinese mainland. On November 2, 1987, the Red Cross Society of the Republic of China began to handle the applications for mainland visits and to provide assistance to people who want to locate their relatives on the mainland. Soon after, mail exchanges through Hong Kong were permitted. On June 10, 1989, direct mail exchanges with the mainland began. In 1988, the ROC began to allow a limited number of mainland Chinese to visit their sick relatives in Taiwan or to attend their funeral services.

Trade between the mainland and Taiwan has flourished since the early 1980's. The total volume of trade between 1979 to 1986 was about 4 billion U.S. dollars. In 1987 alone it was 1.6 billion, and in 1988 it jumped to 2.4 billion.

In April 1989, the ROC began to allow its reporters to visit the mainland and considered allowing mainland reporters to visit Taiwan.

---

26. In 1988, there were 389 Chinese from the mainland who went to Taiwan to visit their sick relatives or attend funerals. See "Press Conference of Ding Guangen, Director of the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council," Taisheng (Voice of Taiwan), 1989, No. 3, p.6.
27. Ibid.
28. After the Tiananmen Square Massacre of June 4, 1989, the ROC decided to postpone its decision to allow PRC reporters to visit Taiwan. After the massacre it became clear that mainland reporters were under the total control of the PRC government and could not report Taiwan's situation in a reasonably objective way. Chung-yang Jih-pao (Central Daily News), international edition, August 7, 1989, p. 1. On August 1, 1990, the ROC lifted the ban on PRC reporters visiting Taiwan. However, it still requires those reporters to renounce their membership in the Chinese Communist Party before being ad-
CHAPTER II

In view of the above stated development, it appears that the PRC's "three links" and "four exchanges" peace overture to Taiwan has been relatively successful. But, would such developments lead, as the PRC expects, to unification under Yeh's nine-point proposal and Deng's "one country, two systems" formula?

IV. THE PROSPECT OF UNIFICATION UNDER THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA'S TERMS

Increasing contacts and reduction of tensions between Taiwan and the mainland under the so-called "three links" and "four exchanges" definitely have created an atmosphere beneficial to the unification goal. However, such a development alone will not lead to political unification under the PRC's terms as will be analyzed and explained below.

The PRC's terms for unification and its promise for a "high degree of autonomy" after unification are preconditioned on the ROC's relinquishment of its sovereignty and its agreement to become a "special administrative region" of the PRC. There is no credible guarantee to prevent the PRC from repudiating its promise after unification. The so-called guarantee of the Basic Law and Article 31 of the 1982 PRC Constitution,29 as demonstrated by the history of the drafting of the Hong Kong Basic Law, is nothing but a farce. As a matter of fact, how long any PRC Constitution will last is highly questionable; the present Constitution is the fifth official text since the establishment of the PRC.30

Moreover, since 1979, PRC leaders have spoken of using force

---

29. Cf. following comment by an ROC writer:
Article 31 of Communist China's Constitution is the base melody in the Communists' orchestrated effort to solve the "Taiwan problem," i.e., destroy the Republic of China and establish Communist China's "sovereignty" over Taiwan. What deserves special notice is this: the "special administrative districts" are to be established "when necessary" and when the necessity is no longer operative, they may be abolished. The entire system to be practiced there will be "stipulated by law" by the Chinese Communists. In due course it may be revised or eliminated "by law." The strategy employed here is one of absolutely gradual, step-by-step encroachment. The ambition and the cunning that lie behind it need no comment.

30. The following table will illustrate this point:
against Taiwan on a number of occasions. On June 10, 1982, then Premier Sun Yun-suan responded, quoting President John F. Kennedy's inaugural address, that the ROC would never negotiate out of fear. On February 22, 1988, President Li Teng-hui (the President spells his surname Lee) also stated at a press conference:

Stability on the Taiwan Straits is not a unilateral issue. The mainland side, while continuing to follow the "four cardinal principles," has never rejected the use of force as a means to liberate or reunify Taiwan, or to maintain the status quo. I believe that if the well-being of the one billion Chinese peo-

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) 1949 Common Program of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (Provisional Constitution)</td>
<td>Replaced by the 1954 Constitution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) 1954 Constitution</td>
<td>When the Great Proletarian Cultural Resolution broke out in 1966, this Constitution was in fact suspended and later formally replaced by the 1975 Constitution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Draft 1970 Constitution</td>
<td>This draft was allegedly put out by Lin Biao, then Defense Minister and Vice-Chairman of the Party. It was distributed nationwide for discussion but was recalled after the failure of the alleged Lin Biao coup against Mao in the fall of 1971.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) 1975 Constitution</td>
<td>This was later called the &quot;Gang of Four&quot; Constitution and after the fall of the &quot;Gang&quot; in October 1976, it appeared to be ignored. In fact it lasted less than 2 years (17 January 1975 to October 1976). It was replaced by the 1978 Constitution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) 1978 Constitution</td>
<td>Adopted by the National People's Congress on 5 March 1978. On 1 July 1979, Articles 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 42, and 43 were amended. The present Constitution replaced it on 4 December 1982. It thus lasted only 4 years and 9 months.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) 1982 Constitution</td>
<td>December 4, 1982 — present</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


When peace is taken into account, the old concept of using force to coerce the other side into reunification must be abandoned. Taiwan, as a complex area, will react to whatever pressure befalls it. Thus I don't believe this question can be resolved by the use of pressure, and this is very important.33

Furthermore, there are wide political, economic, social and cultural gaps between the mainland and Taiwan; unless such gaps narrow with the passage of time, the conditions for peaceful unification can never gradually mature. Unfortunately, since the suppression of the student movement for more democracy and press freedom in late 1986,34 which culminated in June 1989 massacre of student demonstrators in Beijing,35 the gaps between the mainland and Taiwan have been widening rather than narrowing.

Finally, the ROC has been steadily moving toward a multiparty democratic system,36 and the ROC government cannot ignore public opinion and popular will when reaching a unification agreement on the PRC terms. There has been almost no popular support for Yeh's nine-point proposal for unification or Deng's "one-country, two systems" concept in Taiwan.

V. THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA'S POLICY TO ISOLATE TAIWAN FROM THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA'S COUNTER-OFFENSIVE

While the PRC has taken positive steps to increase contacts and to improve mutual understandings with Taiwan, it nevertheless has not ceased its efforts to isolate Taiwan internationally. In March 1982, the PRC Foreign Ministry notified many countries that they should not establish representative agencies in Taiwan and vice versa.

35. See, infra, note 44 and accompanying text.
versa.\textsuperscript{37} Since Taiwan's economy relies heavily on international trade, the lack of foreign representative agencies in Taiwan will be a great inconvenience for businessmen. Moreover, the PRC, which has successfully driven Taiwan from all United Nations' affiliated international organizations, has continued to exert pressure on other international organizations to oust the ROC.

In 1983, Deng Xiaoping appeared to be willing to reconsider this policy of isolating Taiwan from the international community when he told Professor Winston L.Y. Yang that, after the admission of the PRC to the ADB, Taiwan can retain its seat under "Taipei, China."\textsuperscript{38} In March 1986, the PRC was admitted to the ADB without ousting the ROC, though the latter had to change its name to "Taipei, China."\textsuperscript{39} The ROC, then under late President Chiang Ching-kuo, protested this change of its name, but did not withdraw from the ADB. In May 1989, when the ADB held its annual meeting in Beijing, the ROC's new President, Li Teng-hui, approved its delegation to participate, though still protesting the change of the ROC's name.\textsuperscript{40}

Many in Taiwan hope that the ADB formula can be applied similarly to Taiwan's participation in other international organizations, so as to resolve one of the basic issues of unification. However, a statement issued by the PRC's Foreign Ministry on December 19, 1988, explicitly said:

Back in 1971, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution which restored the legitimate seat of the People's Republic of China in this world body. Accordingly, the United Nations has expelled Taiwan from all its organizations, and the offices of organizations of the UN system must not have any dealings with Taiwan. This principle also applies to other inter-governmental, international organizations. As for individual intergovernmental international organizations, for instance, the Asian Development Bank, the Taiwan authorities are allowed to join it in the name of "Taipei, China," subject to agreement reached through consultations between the Chinese Government and the international organization concerned. This is only a kind of special


\textsuperscript{38} See supra note 5 and accompanying text.


arrangement and cannot be regarded as a model universally applicable to other intergovernmental, international organizations.41

The PRC's policy to exclude Taiwan from international organizations is undercutting its attempt to win over Chinese people in Taiwan for the cause of unification. This is because many people in Taiwan feel, as long as Taiwan maintains its “one China” policy and accepts the ultimate goal of unification, there is no reason to exclude their participation in international organizations. Many of the international organizations in which Taiwan wishes to participate are non-political, but essential to Taiwan's economic and social development (such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the International Civil Aviation Organization, the World Intellectual Property Organization and many others). Arrangements can be made, as in the ADB formula, to avoid the “two Chinas” issues in which the PRC has a legitimate concern.

The PRC also blocks Taiwan's participation in multilateral international conventions. For instance, the ROC on Taiwan is the thirteenth leading trading country of the world, but it is unable to become a contracting party to the 1980 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sales of Goods.42

Furthermore, the PRC uses economic aid to solicit countries one by one to establish diplomatic relations with it and to sever diplomatic relations with the ROC. In 1981, there were only 23 countries maintaining diplomatic relations with the ROC.43 However, since the early 1980's the rapid economic development of the ROC has attracted the attention of some third world countries that have diplomatic relations with the PRC. A few of them were interested in establishing diplomatic relations with the ROC in order to get some economic and technical assistance. Ironically, the ROC insisted that they must sever relations with the PRC before establishing diplomatic relations with the ROC in order to avoid a “two Chinas” situation. This condition was unacceptable to those countries.44 This policy was criticized se-

44. Surinam was interested in establishing diplomatic relations with the ROC in 1980, but could not accept the ROC condition of severing diplomatic relations with the PRC first.
verely by legislators and scholars in the ROC. In the meantime, the PRC stepped up its diplomatic offensive against the ROC. Between 1983 and 1987, four countries severed diplomatic relations with the ROC and established diplomatic relations with the PRC, i.e., Lesotho, Bolivia, Nicaragua and Uruguay. Under strong domestic pressure, the ROC in 1989 changed its policy and established diplomatic relations with Grenada, Liberia and Belize without demanding the severance of diplomatic relations with the PRC. The PRC, however, considered that such a situation would create "two Chinas" and thus suspended its diplomatic relations with these countries. The PRC also accused the ROC of pursuing a "two Chinas" policy, which the ROC categorically denied.

The PRC's policy to isolate Taiwan from the international community would ironically help the elements of the "Taiwan Independence Movement" to promote their cause. They can make a seemingly convincing, though unrealistic, argument that only when Taiwan becomes independent, can it break its present international isolation, as will be discussed in the last part of this paper.

45. At the hearings on foreign policy of the ROC at the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Legislative Yuan held on April 13 and 14, 1988, almost all scholars who testified opposed the ROC government's policy of requiring a country to sever its diplomatic relations with the PRC before it could establish diplomatic relations with the ROC. Almost all legislators shared this view. For the text of the testimonies and discussions of the hearings, see Chung-kuo kuo-chi-fa yu kuo-chi shi-wu nien-pao (Chinese Yearbook of International Law and Affairs), Vol. 3 (1987-1988), Taipei: Taiwan Commercial Press, 1989, pp. 107-177.

46. On July 20, 1989, Grenada established diplomatic relations with the ROC; on October 9, 1989, Liberia resumed its diplomatic relations with the ROC which were suspended on February 24, 1979; and, on October 11, 1989, Belize established diplomatic relations with the ROC. See "Diplomatic Ties Established with Grenada," FBIS, China, July 21, 1989, pp. 50-51; Lien-ho pao (United Daily News), overseas edition, October 3, 1989, p. 1 (Liberia) and Shih-jie jih-pao (World Journal), October 13, 1989, p. 1 (Belize), respectively.


CHAPTER II

VI. THE TIANANMEN SQUARE MASSACRE AND ITS INFLUENCE ON TAIWAN-MAINLAND RELATIONS

As analyzed in previous sections, before the June 4, 1989, Tiananmen massacre, there already had existed several almost irreconcilable differences between the PRC and the ROC on the terms of unification. Although the PRC's "three links" and "four exchanges" overture and the resulting ROC step-by-step positive response to it gradually have reduced tensions between Taiwan and the mainland, this creates a false impression that both sides are moving toward rapprochement and the unification goal.

The two basic issues between the PRC and the ROC are: (1) the ROC considers the PRC's promise unreliable and the so-called constitutional guarantee a farce; and (2) political, economic and social development in Taiwan and the mainland are moving in opposite directions. Taiwan under the ROC is moving in the direction of Western style democracies with free trade and a free enterprise economy, while the PRC decides to retain its dictatorial system and allows only very limited economic freedom.

On June 4, 1989, when Chinese students were exercising their constitutional rights of freedom of speech, assembly and demonstration\(^{50}\) at Tiananmen Square in Beijing, the Chinese Communist government ordered its military forces to use tanks and machine guns to massacre them, resulting in thousands of casualties.\(^{51}\) Moreover, after this tragedy, the PRC has engaged in a large scale disinformation campaign to distort the facts,\(^{52}\) claiming at first that not a single student was killed and then saying only a few students were killed.\(^{53}\) This atrocity shocked the whole world and further proves, from the ROC's point of view, that the Chinese Communists are totally unreliable.

---


\(^{53}\) John Suhidlovsky, "China raises students' death toll," *The Sun*, Baltimore, July 1, 1989, pp. 1A, 2A.
Soon after the massacre, Chinese Communist Party Secretary-General Zhao Ziyang was removed from power and the Chinese mainland entered a period of political and economic instability.

On June 27, 1989, Tang Shubei, Deputy Director of the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council stated that the Chinese Communist Party and government will not change the basic national policy for the solution of the Taiwan question, i.e., “peaceful reunification and one country, two systems.” But he blamed Taiwan for repeatedly expressing “support” to what he called “an extremely small number of people who created the counterrevolutionary riot in Beijing.” The PRC's media also launched an attack on Taiwan for supporting the students' democratic movement. The PRC's security agencies also arrested several so-called Kuomintang (KMT, Chinese Nationalist Party) agents on the mainland for alleged involvement in the recent turmoil, i.e., the democratic movement on the mainland.

The ROC's response to the democratic movement on the Chinese Mainland has been very cautious in order not to give the PRC an excuse to renew its military threat against Taiwan. While severely condemning the atrocity committed by the Chinese Communist military forces in Tiananmen Square and the subsequent mass arrests and executions, the ROC has made it clear that it does not consider the

59. E.g., President Li Teng-hui issued a statement on June 4, 1989, stating:

With a deeply grieved and heavy heart, I wish, on behalf of the government and people of the Republic of China, to summon all the peace-loving nations and people of the world who share a concern for human rights to sternly condemn the Chinese Communists; to demand they put an immediate stop to this bloody massacre; and to demand they offer their best care and relief to the wounded and families of the dead.

I also summon all Chinese people at home and abroad to put their great love for their countrymen into practice, to closely unite and act as a backup for our mainland compatriots in their struggle for survival and freedom, to support and assist them in every way possible, and to make a complete break with the Chinese Communists.

mainland under Communist rule as a belligerent and it will not attempt to launch a military attack against the mainland. On July 20, 1989, President Li Teng-hui severely condemned the Chinese Communists' bloody crackdown on the democratic movement on the mainland and called upon all countries to morally and materially support the democracy movement on the Chinese mainland, but he did not mention any belligerent or subversive actions against the PRC. Earlier then ROC's Premier, Li Huan, also denied that his government instigated the recent turmoil on the mainland. These responses appear to suggest that the ROC on Taiwan does not want to increase tension in its relations with the PRC, but after the Tiananmen Square Massacre it does want to slow down its recent policy to increase contacts with the mainland. For instance, it indefinitely postponed considerations to allow mainland reporters to visit Taiwan. Both sides, however, have decided to maintain their present mutually beneficial trade relations.

VII. THE DECEMBER 2, 1989 ELECTION IN TAIWAN AND THE RISE OF THE TAIWAN INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT

In the 1983 election for the Legislative Yuan, the candidates who later formed the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) jointly espoused a platform that advocated, among other points, "self-determination for Taiwan." After the formation of the DPP, the new party platform said that "the future of Taiwan should be decided jointly by all the inhabitants there." Many believe both platforms are just a euphemism for "Taiwan independence." However, before the December 2, 1989 Legislative Yuan, Provincial Assembly, Taipei and Kaohsiung City Councils, and City Magistrates election, a faction of the DPP called New Tide formed a "New Country Front" and publicly advocated

64. "'Relaxation' of Mainland Policy Still Slow," FBIS, China, July 17, 1989, p. 69.
“Taiwan Independence.” The PRC, through its controlled media, severely criticized this view. Finally, an article published in the *Liaowang* (The Outlook) Weekly of November 27, 1989, implied the use of force could be used to eliminate the Taiwan independence movement by stating:

The flood of thought of “Taiwan independence” on the island will cause some very bad influences to the development of relations across the strait and for the Taiwan authorities.

1. To some extent, it will disrupt the stable development of Taiwan. At present, Taiwan is at the stage of political change, transforming itself from the despotic and totalitarian “anticommunist martial law system” to an “incomplete” form of “democratic politics.” Owing to the escalation of speeches and activities for “Taiwan independence,” the ruling authority in Taiwan has been “shaken.” This will necessarily intensify the “struggle between reunification and independence” and cause a tense relation between the Kuomintang and the opposition forces. Under external and internal pressure, the Kuomintang will find that it cannot tolerate the open activities for “Taiwan independence,” which will weaken and shake the foundation of its rule. Recently, the Kuomintang authorities have announced that “any words or activities advocating ‘Taiwan independence’ must shoulder legal responsibility,” and that the persons involved will be investigated and prosecuted. This will cause opposition or even conflict between both sides, and bring about “chaotic” clashes in the election for government posts in the end of this year, making Taiwan’s already confused

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>News Media</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Title of Article</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New China</td>
<td>October 27,</td>
<td>There is Only One China is Our Unshaken Stand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Agency</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New China</td>
<td>November 7,</td>
<td>Unbridled View on “Taiwan Independence” within Island of Taiwan Causing Attention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News Agency</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wen Hui Po, Hong</td>
<td>November 8,</td>
<td>Behind the Unbridled Activities of Taiwan Independence [Movement]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kong</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China News Agency</td>
<td>November 17,</td>
<td>Watching “Election Campaign” Across the Sea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1989</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China News Agency</td>
<td>November 23,</td>
<td>Opposing “Taiwan Independence” is the Joint Responsibility of Both Sides of the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>Strait</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

situation at the stage of political change even more confused and jeopardizing the stable development of Taiwan in every aspect.

2. It will . . . jeopardize . . . the development of relations across the strait. In the past few years, relations across the strait have become less tense, and various exchanges, including visits by relatives across the strait, have developed; this is beneficial to China’s reunification and is in conformity with the interests of the Chinese people. “Taiwan independence” or the “Republic of Taiwan” will not be permitted by the PRC authorities and will not be accepted by the absolute majority of compatriots in the mainland. If it really happens, the PRC authorities must respect the will of the people in the whole country and react forcefully; this, I am afraid, would not be for the well-being of the people in Taiwan. At present, some people in Taiwan think that by relying on the factors such as support from the United States, even if Taiwan announces independence, the PRC will not “dare to use force.” This is a very dangerous thought. To conclude, “Taiwan independence” can only bring disaster to Taiwan people, not welfare.

3. It will increase difficulties for the opposition forces. The radical advocators of “Taiwan independence” can only create a “bad image” for themselves and their allies, scare away some people, and lose some votes in the election to be held at the end of this year. At the same time, they can only cause disputes and internal strife within the opposition forces or even within the Democratic Progressive Party to the extent that their normal growth is affected. . . .

Despite the PRC warning, candidates of the “New Country Front” did surprisingly well in the election as indicated in the following table:

---

If this trend for supporting Taiwan independence continues, tension in the Taiwan Strait will increase. Ironically, it is the PRC's policy to isolate Taiwan from the international community that helps the advocates of Taiwan independence, because they can make a seemingly convincing argument that only when Taiwan becomes independent can it break its present international isolation. At present, only a minority of people in Taiwan are convinced of this view. However, if Taiwan's international isolation engineered by the PRC continues, more people, out of frustration, may support the cause of Taiwan independence.

VIII. NEW INITIATIVE FROM THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA TO BREAK THE MAINLAND-TAIWAN STALEMATE AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA'S RESPONSE

In order to break the stalemate in mainland-Taiwan relations, President Li Teng-hui took a new initiative in his inaugural speech of May 20, 1990. After reaffirming the position that “Taiwan and the mainland are indivisible parts of China's territory . . . and all Chinese should work together to seek peaceful and democratic means to achieve our common goal of national reunification,” he stated:

I would like at this point to earnestly declare that, if the Chinese communist authorities can recognize the overall world trend and the common hope of all Chinese, implement polit-

---

ical democracy and a free economic system, renounce the use of military force in the Taiwan Strait and not interfere with our development of foreign relations on the basis of a one-China policy, we would be willing, on a basis of equality, to establish channels of communication, and completely open up academic, cultural, economic, trade, scientific, and technological exchange, to lay a foundation of mutual respect, peace, and prosperity. We hope then, when objective conditions are ripe, we will be able to discuss our national reunification, based on the common will of the Chinese people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait.  

Two days later, at his press conference, President Li stated that “it is not necessary that all the three conditions I put forward are met before we can improve relations with the Mainland China,” and “issues can be dealt with one by one.” He gave two examples of how the Chinese Communist authorities could show their sincerity toward Taiwan: refrain from opposing Taiwan’s membership in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and pull back their armed forces along coastal areas by 300 kilometers (about 187 miles). 

On June 11, 1990, Jiang Zemin, General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, responded to Lee’s appeal at his speech delivered at the opening ceremony of a national conference on the work of the united front. Jiang repeated the earlier call for “talks on a reciprocal basis between the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang [KMT, Nationalist Party],” but made a minor concession on allowing other parties to participate in the talk. He said that before the negotiation between the Communist Party and the Kuomintang could get underway, all political parties and people’s organizations must be consulted; during the negotiations, they would be well-informed and their opinions would be solicited. Representatives from these parties and people’s organizations may also be invited to attend the negotiations. Jiang rejected the “one China, two governments” concept, which he apparently considered as implied in Presi-

71. Ibid., p. 63.
74. See, supra, note 72.
dent Li’s calling on establishing “channels of communication” on “a basis of equality.”

Jiang also said that the exchange of mail, trade, and air and shipping services should be realized prior to formal negotiations and that specific problems that emerge in the exchanges may be dealt with through consultations between appropriate authorities. He did not, however, respond to President Li’s call for not opposing Taiwan’s membership at the GATT and pulling out troops from the coast. He also criticized President Li’s call for the Chinese Communists to implement political democracy and a free economic system by pointing out that “some of [Li’s] remarks . . . were quite improper and lacked sincerity.”

While Jiang’s response to Li’s initiative was generally negative, the tune of his speech was mild and moderate. Articles before and subsequently appearing on PRC-controlled medias, however, severely criticized President Li’s position.

The ROC responded to Jiang’s June 11, 1990 speech on the same day. Commenting on Jiang’s speech, Chiu Chin-i, spokesman of the ROC Presidential Office, stated that President Li’s speech made no mention of “one country, two governments,” and the Chinese Communists’ strong criticism and their response, which indicate a lack of good intentions, also bear out the fact that they have not changed their attitude and nature.

76. On October 19, 1989, the spokesman of the PRC Foreign Ministry stated that after the “restoration” of Chinese membership at the GATT, then there is a possibility for Taiwan, as a province of China, to join the GATT. Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily), October 20, 1989, p. 1. In August 1990, a PRC responsible official in charge of economic and trade affairs, reiterated the above position. “Official of Economic and Trade Ministry Talks on the Question of Taiwan’s Participation in the GATT,” Liaowang, No. 33 (August 13, 1990), p. 5.

77. See, supra, note 75.


Despite the lack of positive response from the PRC on President Li's initiative, the ROC has continued its effort to normalize its relations with the mainland. It is now working on lifting the ban on members of the Chinese Communist Party visiting Taiwan.\(^\text{80}\) To resolve legal issues involving the mainland, the ROC decided to adopt the concept of “one country, two regions [areas]” so that some PRC laws and regulations may be applied by Taiwan administrative agencies or courts through conflict of law principles.\(^\text{81}\)

In early September 1990, representatives of the Red Cross Committees of the mainland and Taiwan conducted talks at Quemoy (Kinmen) on the problem of repatriating mainlander who illegally went to Taiwan and reciprocal repatriation of criminals.\(^\text{82}\) As this is an unofficial contact, the ROC considers it did not violate the “three nos” principles.

IX. THE ROC'S GUIDELINES FOR NATIONAL UNIFICATION AND THE PRC'S RESPONSE

President Li Ten-hui of the Republic of China (ROC) set up a National Unification Council in October 1990. The Council is headed by the President and has three vice-chairmen and 30 members representing a wide spectrum of Chinese interests at home and abroad. President Li also appointed 12 research members of the Council to study various aspects of mainland-Taiwan relations.\(^\text{83}\)

On February 23, 1991, the Council adopted Guidelines for National Unification which were approved by President Li on March 5, 1991. According to the Guidelines, the unification process of China should go through three phases as stated below:\(^\text{84}\)

1. Short term — A phase of exchanges and reciprocity.
   (1) To enhance understanding between two sides of the Straits through exchange and eliminate hostility

\(^{80}\) "CPC Members to Be Permitted to Enter Taiwan," \textit{FBIS, China}, September 18, 1990, p. 54.


through reciprocity; and to establish mutually benign relations by not endangering each other’s safety and stability while in the midst of exchanges and not denying the other’s existence as a political entity while in the midst of effecting reciprocity.

(2) To set up an order for exchanges across the Straits, to draw up regulations for such exchanges, and to establish intermediary organizations in order to protect people’s rights and interests on both sides of the Straits; to gradually ease various restrictions and expand people-to-people contacts in order to promote the social prosperity of both sides.

(3) To improve the people’s welfare on both sides of the Straits with the ultimate objective of unifying the nation, economic reform should be actively carried out in the mainland area, the expression of public opinion there should gradually be allowed, and both democracy and the rule of law should be implemented; while the Taiwan area should accelerate constitutional reform and promote national construction to establish a society of equal prosperity.

(4) The two sides of the Straits should end the state of hostility and, under the principle of one China, solve all disputes by peaceful means, and furthermore respect — not reject — each other in the international community, so as to move toward a phase of mutual trust and cooperation.

2. Medium term — A phase of mutual trust and cooperation.

(1) Both sides of the Straits should establish official communication channels on equal footing.

(2) Direct postal, transport and commerce links should be allowed, and both sides should jointly develop the southeastern coastal area of the Chinese mainland and then gradually expand this to other areas of the mainland in order to narrow the gap in living standards between the two sides.

(3) Both sides of the Straits should work together and assist each other in taking part in international organizations and activities.

(4) Mutual visits by high-ranking officials on both sides should be promoted to create favorable conditions for consultation and unification.

A consultative organization for unification should be established through which both sides, in accordance with the will of the people on both the mainland and Taiwan, and while upholding the principles of democracy, economic freedom, social justice and nationalization of armed forces, jointly discuss the grand task of unification and map out a constitutional system to establish a democratic, free, and equitably prosperous China.

The Guidelines were adopted on March 14, 1991 by the Executive Yuan Council (Cabinet) as guiding principles for dealing with mainland-Taiwan relations. Earlier, the Executive Yuan established a Mainland Affairs Commission to take charge of mainland-Taiwan relations. A “private” Strait Exchange Foundation was also established to make unofficial contacts and negotiations with the Chinese communist authorities on the mainland. The Foundation is funded two-thirds by the Government and one-third by private contribution. It is specifically authorized to undertake the following tasks:

1. Accepting, ratifying and forwarding on entry and exit documents from the two sides of the Straits;
2. Verifying and delivering documents issued on the mainland;
3. Deporting fugitives on the two sides of the Straits;
4. Arbitrating trade disputes;
5. Promoting cultural and academic exchanges;
6. Providing consultation on general affairs;
7. Helping protect the legal rights of ROC citizens during their visits to the mainland; and
8. Dealing with other affairs commissioned by the ROC government.\(^{85}\)

X. THE PRC’S RESPONSE TO THE UNIFICATION GUIDELINE AND THE ROC’S TERMINATION OF THE STATE OF HOSTILITIES TOWARD THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS

The language and tone used in the Unification Guidelines are quite conciliatory and mild. The Guidelines also avoid any offensive language against the Chinese communists. It does not explicitly demand the PRC to renounce the use of force against Taiwan, nor does

---

It require the PRC to give up the so-called four basic principles, namely, the socialist road, the People's Democratic Dictatorship, the leadership of the Communist Party, and Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought. With respect to the PRC's "one country, two systems" model for unification, the Guidelines do not categorically reject it, but imply that at the third phase (long term) of unification process, every model for unification is negotiable as long as it is based on the principle of democracy, economic freedom, social justice and nationalization of armed forces.

The PRC has so far not yet officially responded to the Unification Guidelines, though several commentators have taken a somewhat critical view of the Guidelines. Among their major criticisms are:

1. "Three direct links," i.e., direct trade, direct investment and direct air and shipping services should be moved to the short term phase, rather than remain in the medium term phase.

2. "Not denying [each other's] existence as a political entity" means "two Chinas" which is not acceptable to the PRC.

3. Taiwan attempts to promote peaceful changes on the mainland by bringing about China's unification on the basis of democracy, freedom, and equal distribution of social wealth, i.e., unifying China on Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles of the People, which is rejected.

The PRC has not published the entire text of the Guidelines in its official Renmin Ribao (People's Daily). On the contrary, in recent years, all major newspapers in Taiwan usually publish the full text of the Chinese communists' documents on Taiwan or other important subjects.

On May 1, 1991, the ROC terminated the "Period of Mobilization for the Suppression of the Communist Rebellion," which was

---


87. But it was published in Cankao Ziliao (Reference Materials), which is distributed only to high officials.

announced on July 4, 1947, thus formally ending the state of hostility toward the Chinese Communists.

On June 7, 1991, the Taiwan Affairs Office of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) issued a statement on mainland-Taiwan relations. After rejecting the "equal political entities" and "changing the mainland peacefully" concepts allegedly advocated by the "Taiwan authorities" (ROC), the statement again calls for establishing three direct links and urges the Chinese Nationalist Party to send representatives to contact the CCP "so that conditions can be created for negotiations in connection with formally ending the two sides' hostility and achieving peaceful reunification step by step."

It further states that "under the premise of upholding the principle that there is but one China, we can also discuss other issues which the Taiwan authorities are concerned about." It also offers to send a Chinese Communist Party delegation to Taiwan to discuss the unification issue or welcomes the Chinese Nationalist Party to send a delegation to the mainland to establish contacts.

The next day, ROC Government Spokesman Dr. Yu-ming Shaw rejected the Chinese Communist Party's offer for party-to-party contacts and considered that the Chinese Communist Party's statement "lacks new meaning [and] does not contain any good intention."

"Before the Chinese Communists renounce the use of military force to invade Taiwan and refrain from exerting diplomatic isolation against us, their offer to send a delegation to Taipei for a party-to-party talk would be absolutely unacceptable," he said.

With respect to the question of establishing "three direct links" (trade, investment, and air and shipping services), Shaw said that "they are listed as the second stage [phase] of cross-strait development under our National Unification Guidelines," and would only be made possible when the communists commit to stop threatening to use force against us and isolating us from international community.


XI. CONCLUSIONS

In view of the above study, it seems clear that there is almost no
possibility for the PRC and the ROC to reach an agreement on unification in the foreseeable future — though cultural, commercial and other contacts between them will continue. However, the rise of the Taiwan independence movement as indicated in the December 2, 1989 Taiwan election has introduced an unstable element in mainland-Taiwan relations. If this movement continues, even the present cultural, commercial and other contacts between the mainland and Taiwan will be in jeopardy. The PRC may renew its military threat against Taiwan to deter the expansion of the independence movement. Since the Taiwan independence movement is primarily a response to the PRC's policy to isolate Taiwan in the international community, unless the PRC modifies this policy, it seems likely that this movement will continue to spread in Taiwan. Moreover, as long as the PRC maintains its present policy of anti-democratic reform on the mainland, thus widening the political, economic and social gaps between Taiwan and the mainland, the PRC's call for unification will have little appeal to the Chinese people on Taiwan.

The PRC has been demanding complete and direct exchange of mail, trade, and air and shipping services before formal negotiation. In view of the PRC's lack of positive response to President Li's initiative, as expressed in his inaugural speech and the Guidelines for National Unification, it is unlikely that the ROC will respond positively to such a demand. Moreover, even if direct exchange of mail, trade, and air and shipping services were established between the mainland and Taiwan, it will not necessarily follow that the ROC and its people will be willing to enter unification negotiations with the PRC on the latter's proposal of "one country, two systems." Hong Kong has direct exchange of mail, trade, and air and shipping services with the mainland for many years. The people of Hong Kong have, however, responded negatively to the PRC's decision to unify on the basis of "one country, two systems" as embodied in the Basic Law of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region adopted by the PRC National People's Congress in 1991.92 Since the adoption of the Basic Law, the people of Hong Kong have accelerated their immigration to other countries to avoid living under "one country, two systems" after the Chinese Communist takeover on July 1, 1997.93

As the PRC has insisted on "party-to-party" negotiations with Taiwan and refused to consider President Li's call for establishing

92. See, supra, note 18.
"channels of communication" on "a basis of equality"; high level contacts between Taiwan and the mainland do not appear to be possible in the foreseeable future. However, "unofficial" contacts, such as through Red Cross Committees of Taiwan and the Mainland, to resolve non-political issues will continue.
CHAPTER III

FEDERATION, DEMOCRATIZATION AND CHINA'S UNIFICATION

Quansheng Zhao

The issue of Taiwan's unification with China is closely linked to China's political development. There has been an increasing consensus that unification will have a significant impact on the process of political pluralization on both sides of the Taiwan Strait.

The Mainland-Taiwan separation, a direct outcome of the late 1940's civil war, has now existed for more than forty years. The civil war and the long separation inevitably have had a great impact on the political development of both sides. The issue of unification, although with different interpretations, has been equally important to people on both sides, and especially to the two ruling parties, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) on the Mainland and the Nationalist Party (KMT) in Taiwan.

This chapter will elaborate a theme I raised in 1983 that, "Unification can promote smooth development of democratic processes on both sides," and will analyze how unification may promote China's democratization. A related subject is what kind of nation system will be most suitable for the PRC-Taiwan unification. I will first discuss the concept of federation and the ideas of federalism, and then will examine the relationship between unification and democratization.

UNIFICATION AND FEDERATION

In addition to political considerations, one of the major obstacles to China's unification is the traditional idea of authoritarian central government, which seems to have significant influence over China's political leaders. But one has to consider the current political reality. The division between the Mainland and Taiwan has lasted for more than four decades. Neither side is willing to give up its own political

and economic system. Furthermore, unification brought about through the use of military force is unacceptable to either side. Therefore, the notion of a united China under an authoritarian central government is neither achievable nor desirable. Other possibilities for peaceful unification must be examined.

The federal system is one of several major proposals for China's unification. "Federation" is a concept rooted in Western political systems, and in a general sense can be defined as: "a group of states united with one government which decides foreign and defense affairs; but in which each state can have its own government to decide its internal affairs." Hence, the federal system has two distinct characteristics: First, there is a clear division of labor between the central and local governments in terms of administrative power; second, local governments have a high degree of autonomy with regard to internal affairs.

In the contemporary world, there are many countries that have adopted the federal system, and it appears that the system is particularly suitable to large countries, such as the United States, the Soviet Union, India, Canada, Australia, Germany, Pakistan, and Brazil (there are also smaller federalist countries such as Malaysia, Yugoslavia, Argentina, and Switzerland). Countries choose the federal system primarily as a result of historical background, social structure, and political culture. Furthermore, there are different types of federal systems, for example, the federal system in the Soviet Union is different from that of the United States in terms of basic political and economic structures.

There are several advantages to the federal system, the most obvious being the creation of an environment that will simultaneously enable a country to be a united political entity, while allowing for pluralistic development in the fields of politics, economy, and culture. This arrangement can best serve different political, ethnic, and cultural groups and areas, and promote evolutionary rather than radical changes in a society.

A weakness of the federal system is that the power of the central authorities can be diminished by localism and separatist tendencies, as in the case of Canada, where Quebec has long struggled to achieve more autonomy (and sometimes even independence) from the federa-

3. Beijing has promised that it will not use force against Taiwan unless Taiwan moves towards independence. See further discussion later on this issue.

tion. Overall, however, the post-World War II development of most federalist countries (such as the United States) has demonstrated that the authority of the central (federal) government has not been weakened, but strengthened. With proper handling, such as the accordance of adequate recognition to a local government’s special interests, localism and separatism can gradually be overcome.

The suitability of a federal system for China depends on China’s political and social reality. China’s division into three parts — the Mainland, Taiwan, and Hong Kong and Macao — was primarily due to foreign imperialism and the internal civil war of the 1940s between the CCP and the KMT. Future relations between the Mainland and Hong Kong and Macao are relatively clear, although many concrete issues remain unresolved. The future status of Hong Kong, for example, has been set by the Sino-British Agreement of 1984. This agreement covers the future of Hong Kong from 1997 until well into the next century. Portugal and China have also reached an agreement on Macao. By comparison, the status of Taiwan and Mainland-Taiwan relations are still very much uncertain. Where is China heading — Will the division continue to exist well into the future, or is unification possible under certain arrangements, such as the federal system? These questions deserve special attention.

Although the tradition of a single authoritarian central government will be a major obstacle to the creation of a federal system, the idea of federalism is not new to China’s political and intellectual leaders. As early as 1894, Sun Yat-sen, the founding father of the Republic of China, advocated the establishment of a “united government” in the new China. Sun’s idea was influenced by his understanding of the federal system adopted by the United States. After the 1911 Revolution, Sun began to emphasize the idea of “local self-government,” which was similar to federalism.

Liang Qichao, a leading Chinese thinker in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, also looked at the federal systems of other countries as a reference for China’s political reform movement. In an article published in 1901 Liang examined the experience of Switzerland saying, “if there is a big country that could follow the example of Switzerland to adopt the federal system and to be democratic, then this country’s strength and freedom will strike the whole world. This big country

5. Although there is close linkage between the issue of Taiwan and the issue of Hong Kong and Macao, the two are different in nature. I will try not refer to the latter in great detail here.
will become an example for all the countries in the world."  

During this period, many scholars and politicians in China participated in discussions on the idea of federalism. Zhang Shizhao, for example, in his article published in 1915 discussed three points: “First, local state government can be organized after the establishment of the central federal government. Second, local state government is not an independent state. Third, to carry out a federal system, there is no need to conduct a revolution; what is needed is the influence of public opinion.” Other scholars who advocated federalism or “local self-government” include Zhang Taiyan, Hu Shi, Li Zhaonong, Xiong Xiling, and Zou Rong.

Chinese communist leaders during the 1919 May Fourth Movement also expressed support for federalist ideas. For example, Mao Zedong advocated self-government for Hunan Province. Chen Duxiu, the first CCP Secretary General, argued that, “We communists do not oppose federalist ideas, and support provincial self-government. What we are against is the division of the country.” In 1922, the CCP made a clear statement in the communique of the second National Congress, that one of the goals of the CCP is to unify China through a free federalist system, and to establish the Federal Republic of China.

Obviously, all these discussions took place at different times and under different circumstances, and may not be suitable for the current situation. At present, leaders on both sides of the Taiwan Strait do not show any support for federalist ideas for China’s unification. But this does not mean federalism should not be discussed. In order to clarify ideas and achieve a consensus on issues, it is necessary to discuss federalist ideas and their implications for China’s political development fully. In fact, beginning in the 1980s, a number of scholars proposed that the federal system may be an ideal way for China to achieve its goal of peaceful unification.

---

10. See, for example, Zhang Xin, “Lianbangzhi: zhongguo hepingtongyi zhi tu? [Is federal system suitable for China’s peaceful unification?], Minbao Yuekan, July 1983; and Jiang Jingkuan, “Zhongguo tongyi zuilixiang de tujing — shixing lianbang gonghezhi [The
A new development in Beijing is worthy of attention. In 1991 Beijing made it clear that it would support Kim Il Sung's "federal system" idea for Korean unification, that is "one nation, one country, two systems and two governments." In addition, it is believed that Beijing played a key role in Pyongyang's dramatic reversal of its policy on the issue of United Nations membership by seeking separate memberships together with Seoul in May 1991. Immediately after North Korea's announcement seeking separate U.N. membership, Chinese Premier Li Peng commented positively that this move was "an interim measure before the unification," and would be "welcomed by international community, including China." This fact has signaled Beijing's positive attitude toward the federal system idea and its possible application to the course of national unification, at least in the case of Korea.

UNIFICATION AND POLITICAL PLURALIZATION

The second concern of this chapter is the impact that future peaceful unification will have on China's political development. My principal argument is that the unification policy of "one country, two systems" proposed by Beijing, may well lead to the creation of "one country, two (or more) parties." That is, the realization of unification may become the starting point for a real multi-party system in China. There will be two major parties, the CCP and the KMT, and a few minor parties in China's political scene. This incremental development will be, perhaps, an unintended consequence of unification. According to this model, unification will not be the simple process of combining two into one, but rather a process of social integration and interdependency of various political forces.

In using the term "pluralism" I mean (1) there is no single source most ideal way for China's unification — the system of federal republic]." Zhongbao, March 12-13, 1984, p. 2.


15. Political pluralization means a multi-party system, not necessarily only two parties. Later discussions concentrate mainly on the two big parties — the CCP and the KMT — in part this reflects the reality of the two major parties, but it also is used for the sake of convenience.
of authority; therefore there is no concentration of power in the sense of the absolutist state; (2) political and non-political groups have a legitimate right to exist and to influence the state; these groups may include, for example, "business organizations, trade unions, political parties, ethnic groups, students, prison officers, women's institutes and religious groups;"\textsuperscript{16} and (3) these groups must be "organized into an unspecified number of multiple, voluntary, competitive, non-hierarchically ordered and self-determined categories."\textsuperscript{17}

Prior to the 1989 turmoil on the Mainland, there were far-reaching political and economic changes under the banner of "openness and reforms," which began at the end of 1978. Market economy, as emphasized in 1987 by now-purged Party Secretary General Zhao Ziyang, became a "new economic mechanism."\textsuperscript{18} Economic reforms covered a wide area and included the dissolution of the commune system in rural areas and the establishment of the responsibility system; the opening up of free markets for agricultural goods; the development of private enterprise; the enlargement of the entrepreneurial base and the granting of additional power to managers; the revival of material incentive systems; the reduction of ideological intervention in the economy; the undertaking of price reforms and housing system reforms; the initiation of open-labor markets; and the dismantling the "iron rice bowl" system. Changes in the area of "openness" to the outside were also impressive: China joined the world (especially western) economic system; established special economic zones and opened coastal cities; encouraged foreign investment and joint ventures; exported labor abroad; developed tourist industries; and reformed its foreign trade system.

In contrast to China's achievements in the area of economic reform, political reform on the Mainland has remained sensitive and tortuous. The party elders who have controlled the decision-making power of the party and the government for the last four decades are still tremendously resistant to political changes. The government's military suppression of the Tiananmen Square demonstrations in 1989 shows that the conservatives are willing to pay any price to preserve


their own power and interests. The crackdown on the pro-democracy movement has delayed or even reversed the political reform of the Mainland, inevitably jeopardizing the process of unification with Taiwan.

Internal changes in Taiwan are also notable. Taiwan’s economic and political development has drawn world-wide attention. Ever since high-speed economic growth began in the late 1960s, Taiwan has been labeled one of the “four little tigers,” or East Asian NIEs (newly industrialized economies), together with South Korea, Hong Kong, and Singapore. As economic growth accelerated, the democratic movement in Taiwan has progressed remarkably. The most well-known opposition groups were called Dangwai — the non-KMT forces — which challenged the KMT’s ruling position vigorously. The KMT’s top leaders carried out a series of political reforms under intense pressure from both within and outside the island. These reforms included repealing the thirty-eight-year old martial law in 1987, legalizing opposition parties, allowing the news media greater freedom, and recruiting native Taiwanese into the highest levels of the ruling circle, which reduced tensions between “the Taiwanese” and “the Mainlanders” on the Island. The most striking sign of progress, as I will discuss later, is the change in policy toward the Mainland.

In sum, economic modernization and political democratization — the two major goals for future development — will gradually be accepted by the majority on each side of the Strait. They will lay the foundations for future unification. The slow progress of internal political development on the Mainland, however, means that unification will be a prolonged and incremental process.

**CHANGING MAINLAND-TAIWAN RELATIONS**

There have been significant changes in Mainland-Taiwan relations since 1979, when Beijing changed its Taiwan policy from “liberation” to “peaceful unification,” advocating “three links” (trade, transportation, and postal services) and “four exchanges” (exchanges between relatives and tourists, academic groups, cultural groups, and

---


20. “Mainlander” refers to those who moved to Taiwan from the Mainland after 1945, when Taiwan was returned to China from the Japanese colonial rule; and “Taiwanese” refers to those who were originally from the Chinese mainland, mostly from Fujian Province, but have lived in Taiwan for many generations. In fact, this distinction comes from the people in Taiwan. The people on the Mainland do not really distinguish the “Mainlander” from the “Taiwanese,” but consider both fellow countrymen.
Development of bilateral relations gained further momentum in October 1987, when Taiwanese authorities made a dramatic move—allowing their citizens to visit Mainland relatives—reversing the stubborn, long-standing "three nos" policy (no contact, no negotiations, and no compromise). A year later, in a much more limited manner, specific groups from the Mainland were allowed to visit the island. Bilateral contacts have since increased tremendously.

At the beginning stage, the following groups of people from the Mainland were allowed to visit Taiwan: those whose relatives in Taiwan just died or have been seriously sick; those left on the Mainland in 1949 as soldiers of the KMT troops who were originally from Taiwan; and those who are invited (or selected) as "distinguished intellectuals," such as scholars (including overseas students and scholars) and sports representatives. The policy on Mainland visitors is expected to be further relaxed. In August 1991, two news reporters from the Mainland visited Taiwan with formal arrangements by the Taiwan authorities.21

In 1988, right after the removal of the ban, more than 380,000 people from Taiwan visited the Mainland, among those more than 40 percent were not "Mainlanders" but "Taiwanese" who did not necessarily have Mainland relatives. In 1989, the number of Taiwanese visitors reached 500,000; exchange of mail exceeded ten million letters, encouraged by Taipei's decision to open direct telephone and mail links to the Mainland. Some 3,100 people from the Mainland visited Taiwan in 1989. In a highly publicized manner, a 12-member official delegation headed by Taiwan's Finance Minister Shirley Kuo visited Beijing in early May 1989, to attend the Asian Development Bank meeting. And in mid-1989 for the first time, the Taiwan authorities allowed their newspaper and television reporters to be based on the Mainland.22 Students from Taiwan have begun to enter graduate programs for advanced studies on the Mainland. In 1991, thirty-nine (increased from 1990's twenty-three) Taiwanese students applied to Mainland universities—twenty six for master programs and sixteen for doctoral programs.23

The total value of indirect trade, mostly through Hong Kong, increased more than ten times within one decade from US $300 million in 1980 to US $4 billion in 1990. Direct and indirect Taiwanese investment on the Mainland has also increased rapidly, despite the polit-

ical turmoil of summer 1989. At the Guangzhou Trade Fair of spring 1990, for example, more than 4,600 businessmen from Taiwan conducted trade and investment negotiations with their Mainland partners. By the end of 1990, the investment from Taiwan reached US $1.2 billion in Fujian Province alone, about one third of the province's total foreign investment.\(^{24}\)

Since the late 1980s, Taipei has moved from its passive, defensive position to an active, pragmatic, and flexible policy, creating new challenges for Beijing. Since the end of the 1970s, when Beijing first raised proposals for peaceful unification,\(^{25}\) the PRC has always actively campaigned for unification, while the Taiwanese have long insisted on a "three-no" policy — no contact, no negotiation, and no compromise — a policy that appeared to be passive, rigid, and defensive. Starting in the late 1980s, however, Taipei launched a series of initiatives in its Mainland policy. In addition to legitimizing bilateral economic and cultural exchanges, Taiwan has also set up a top advisory group chaired by President Li Teng-hui — a thirty-member National Unification Council — to bring about a consensus and to clarify long-term objectives in its Mainland policy.\(^{26}\) Under the Council, there is a policy-coordination working organ, the Mainland Affairs Commission (MAC). In November 1990, the Foundation for Exchanges Across the Taiwan Strait was established. At least half of the Foundation's funding comes from government sources, and the group is accountable to the Premier and the Legislative Yuan through the MAC. The Foundation hopes eventually to be allowed to open offices in Hong Kong and major cities on the Mainland.\(^{27}\) In April 1991, a delegation of the Foundation visited Beijing and held talks with Mainland officials, including Vice Premier Wu Xueqian.

The Taiwanese authorities have also actively worked on their own formulas for unification. To counter Beijing's "one country, two systems" proposal, for example, Taipei raised its own proposal for unification. In May 1990, Li Teng-hui, President of Taiwan, declared that, if Beijing can "implement political democracy and a free economic system, renounce the use of military force in the Taiwan Strait and not


\(^{25}\) "A Message to Compatriots in Taiwan" issued by the Standing Committee of China's National People's Congress, see *Renmin Ribao*, January 2, 1979, p. 1.


interfere with our development of foreign relations on the basis of a one-China policy," then Taipei will be willing "to establish channels of communication, and completely open up academic, cultural, economic, trade, scientific, and technological exchanges," and will discuss "national reunification [with Beijing] based on the common will of the Chinese people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait." In June 1990, Shi Qiyang, Deputy Head of Taiwan's Executive Yuan, proposed the idea of "one China, two areas," advocating a "peaceful coexistence of two separate-but-equal regimes." Some Taiwanese officials further proposed that Taipei should regard Beijing as a "politically competitive regime," preparing for the legalization of the status of the communist party. In return, Yang Shangkun, President of the PRC, suggested that once negotiations start, there is no need to clarify the issue of "central-local" (who is the central government and who is the local government). It is not beyond imagination that the time for holding official negotiations or even a summit on bilateral relations and the unification issue may eventually become mature in the foreseeable future.

Other than unification with the Mainland, one possible path of development for Taiwan, according to some external and internal observers, is to become a legally independent state (or taidu in Chinese). Taidu is unlikely at the present time for the following reasons. First, the sense of Chinese nationalism and Chinese culture is deeply rooted on the island as well as on the Mainland. With the exception of opposition groups, such as the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) who openly demand "Taiwan's self-determination," there are few mainstream politicians who can afford to become a lishi zuiren (a person condemned by history) for splitting the nation. Second, the Mainland has persistently refused to give up using force against Taiwan if Taipei moves toward independence. Beijing has consistently opposed taidu and any other similar idea such as "one China, one Taiwan," or "dual recognition." A major criticism, for example, of Taiwan's "programme for state reunification" are the concepts of Taiwan's "political entity" in the international community and diplomatic "dual recognition." The risk of war makes taidu an undesirable choice for Taiwan.

28. Yang Liyu, "Cong yiguo liangzhi dao yiguo liang qi [From 'one country two systems' to 'one country two areas']," Zheng Ming, August 1990, pp. 76-78.
Third, the international community has looked on *taidu* with disfavor, ever since the People's Republic of China (PRC) entered the United Nations in 1971. No major power in today's world would openly support a declaration of Taiwan's independence at the expense of breaking relations with the PRC and triggering a new crisis in the international community. In addition, the legal status of Taiwan as part of China has been accepted in a number of important international documents, such as the Cairo Declaration of 1943 (signed by China, the United States, and Great Britain), the Sino-U.S. Shanghai Communique of 1972, and the statement establishing formal diplomatic relations between the PRC and the United States in 1979. All these internal and external conditions have made it extremely difficult for Taiwan to declare independence.

On the other hand, as long as Taiwan maintains *de facto* separation from the Mainland, there will always be political forces from within and outside the island demanding *taidu*. It is not difficult to imagine that the longer the separation continues, the stronger Taiwan's tendency towards independence will become. This tendency will be further enhanced if there are major political setbacks on the Mainland, such as the Tiananmen incident. Under these circumstances, public opinion in the international community may become more sympathetic toward Taiwan. Therefore, while emphasizing the unlikeliness of *taidu*, one should not entirely rule out the possible evolution of Taipei toward independence.

**HOW UNIFICATION CAN PROMOTE CHINA'S DEMOCRATIZATION**

The unification process poses a series of questions regarding China's political development: How should the current political and economic systems on both sides be dealt with? What kind of relationship should exist between the political forces of each side, in particular, between the two ruling parties? Can the CCP and the KMT tolerate each other's activities under a federal system? Some of these questions have already been answered. Others remain unclear.

The KMT's authority on Taiwan has been increasingly challenged by the DPP and other opposition parties. The CCP on the Mainland has also faced severe criticism from the pro-democracy movement and intellectual dissidents such as Fang Lizhi, Liu Binyan, and Wang Ruoshui, who were openly expelled from the Party in early 1987. Nevertheless, the present positions of the ruling KMT and CCP are the result of internal and external struggles that can be traced back to the 1911 Revolution or the May Fourth Movement of 1919. Based
on this historical background and on current conditions, the most probable development in the foreseeable future would be that the two parties will continue to play leading roles on each side. This assumption only reflects the current situation and has nothing to do with the issue of legitimate rule (that is broad-based popular support). One has to remember this when considering China's future choices.

The influence of feudal monarchical rule that lasted over two thousand years in Chinese history still remains. The Soviet Stalinist political system has also had an influence, in varying degrees, on the two ruling parties. Neither side has yet reached a truly political institutionalization, a fact that is reflected in the uncertainty and abruptness of transfers of power at the highest levels — such as Hu Yaobang's sudden departure from his top position as General Secretary of the CCP in January 1987, and the downfall of Hu's successor, Zhao Ziyang, in the wake of the 1989 crackdown on the Mainland. One key question has been around for several years and is still debated by scholars and politicians all over the world: Who will Deng Xiaoping's real successor be and what will happen to China after Deng passes away (despite the propaganda campaigns that the new Party General Secretary Jiang Zemin has become the core for the "third generation leadership")? In Taiwan, the internal struggles for political leadership surrounding the issue of succession before and after the death of Chiang Ching-kuo in January 1988 also show an instability in power transfers. Both examples demonstrate that the pattern of "strong man politics" is still influential on both sides. Taiwan's political development during the past several years, however, has made greater progress than that of its Mainland counterpart. In fact, one may even argue that political pluralism may come to Taiwan well before unification. In turn, Taiwan's democratization will have a tremendous impact on the Mainland, similar to the influence on East Germany exerted by the west prior to the Germany unification in 1990.

From the PRC perspective, the proposal of "one country, two systems" will only solve the external issue of "one China," not the internal issue of different social systems. Under the Mainland proposal, for a long period (fifty years or more) after unification, the political

31. Although the power transition in Taiwan after Chiang Ching-kuo's death was constitutional in nature, and was consummated fairly swiftly, there were, however, serious internal power struggles with regard to KMT's chairmanship, involving such important political figures as Madam Chiang (widow of Chiang Kai-shek), Yu Guohua (Prime Minister), Li Huang (General Secretary of the KMT), Song Chuyu (Deputy Secretary of the KMT), and others.
and economic systems of each side will develop in their own directions. One can further argue that the political forces of each side will not be controlled by the other. The leading positions of the CCP and the KMT on the Mainland and Taiwan respectively will not be changed by unification. Therefore, unification will create a unique environment for China to start its own type of federal system. Externally, there will be a federal government that represents "one China." Internally, there will be two major political forces leading two areas (Beijing and Taipei), in roughly equal positions in the sense of political legitimacy, yet autonomous from each other. This reality will become the foundation for the model of "unification-led political pluralization."

This model will be divided into two stages. The first stage can be called "cross-checking and mutual influence." During this period, important issues such as foreign and defense policies will be decided by the federal government led by Beijing in consultation with Taipei and other political forces. (Since the PRC has promised that Taiwan will be allowed to maintain its own armed forces after unification, Taiwan will reserve certain defense policy authority with regard to regional affairs, which in turn would involve some foreign policy considerations. Beijing will not send its military forces, the People's Liberation Army, to Taiwan.) After consultation, new policies will be sent to the legislative and executive branches for approval and implementation. In this sense, the CCP will continue to be the ruling party; the KMT will switch to the position of non-ruling or opposition party. As a former high-ranking KMT official privately told me, "the KMT would not mind becoming an opposition party after unification, because the KMT's future is not on Taiwan, but on the Mainland."

On the other hand, however, the internal affairs and external economic relations of each side will be handled by their respective authorities, and will not intertwine. At this early stage, the two ruling parties and other forces will not deal with one another directly. Instead, they will send representatives to carry out various political functions, i.e., the KMT and opposition parties will participate in the leading bodies of the federal government in Beijing, whereas the CCP and the federal government will send representatives or liaison officials to Taiwan. In this sense, the KMT will continue to enjoy its ruling party position on the island, while the CCP will play the role of "opposition party" in terms of Taiwan's local politics, creating a seemingly symbolic yet very significant political structure.

Non-intervention in internal affairs does not mean that mutual influence will not exist. Mutual political influence can be exercised
through the following four ways. First, representatives stationed on each side are entitled to raise suggestions and to criticize directly. Second, since the news media will be, as now, controlled largely by the ruling party of its own side, the media coverage, style, and viewpoint of each side will still differ substantially (with control of news media, there is an asymmetry between the two sides. The Taiwanese news media has recently moved toward pluralism much faster and more extensively than its Mainland counterpart). After unification, it would be difficult to prohibit people from reading and watching the other side's news media (newspapers, periodicals, and TV programs). This will increase information sources in each society, and will effectively break the monopoly over the news media on the Mainland. Third, increasing exchange visits across the Taiwan Strait will open opportunities for non-ruling party forces to exchange experiences and information. These trends will bring further development to social and political groups in both societies. Finally, political reforms on both sides, growing in similar contexts and directions, will provide a challenge to each party, producing an environment of peaceful political competition. Any setback to the reforms will not only draw domestic and international criticism, but will slow, even stop, the unification process, damaging the interests of China as a whole. Conservatives of both sides will face tremendous difficulties "moving the clock back."

The unique pattern of "cross-checking" has several implications. First of all, since the mutual influence is legal and independent, it will be difficult to stop even if the ruling parties attempt to do so. At the same time, however, this political checking will be rather limited. The checking itself is not a significant threat to the ruling parties' leading positions, thereby making it easier for the CCP and the KMT to tolerate each other. Furthermore, this limitation will slow the pluralization process, thus avoiding political chaos and maintaining the stable social environment that is needed for continued economic growth and modernization. Cross-checking may also be welcomed by opposition parties and social groups because it will promote political pluralization and democratization.

We have discussed the importance of mutual influence across the Taiwan Strait at this stage, but it would be wrong to assume that the CCP or the KMT could replace indigenous opposition forces on either Taiwan or the Mainland. Because the two have been separated for so many years, they have largely lost their roots on the other side. Hence, it will be easier for both sides to move toward pluralism if the new political forces are independent and indigenous organizations.

In Taiwan, the opposition forces have obtained the right to form
political parties, and have begun to flourish in the past several years. One may anticipate that as the current leadership on the mainland, which is composed of members of the older generation, passes away, new leaders from the younger generation may have to respond to the popular demand for more democracy. This has already been demonstrated by the Lee Teng-hui administration in Taiwan. Under a federal system, both the ruling parties and citizens will likely become familiar with political competition, which will enhance conditions for both societies to progress towards a more plural and democratic stage. The experience of “cross-checking and mutual influence” will also greatly reduce or even eliminate hostile feelings and estrangement on each side and increase mutual understanding. Therefore, what I emphasize at the first stage is the limited “checking function” and “mutual influence,” which are different from “mutual penetration,” or “real participation.” After a long period (and it would be difficult to predict how long) of “cross-checking and mutual influence,” the process will move to the second stage.

During the second stage, which I call “fair competition and pluralistic politics,” political forces of each side, including the two ruling parties, will be allowed to conduct political campaigns on the other’s territory. These campaigns will be held under the principles of equality, democracy, and fair competition. This hypothetical development could only take place in the fairly remote future. No one can apply this idea to the current situation since the mutual suspicion between the two sides remains deep, and the internal conditions are not yet mature enough. By the time of the second stage, there will be a real co-existence of two major political parties and several small parties in Chinese political life. As various political forces continue to develop, it is not impossible that a third major party outside of the CCP and the KMT may emerge. Regardless of what kind of political situation exists during the second stage, the general trend towards political pluralization will continue.

NECESSARY CONDITIONS

Political change in general depends on various factors, including internal efforts, political and economic structures and their development, historical and cultural background, and the international environment. The political transformation of a society requires a period of preparation of the necessary conditions for such a transition. For a process as complex as “from an authoritarian government to a federal system,” or “unification-led political pluralization,” the following six
conditions will be necessary. Each of these conditions, if not met in the future, can give rise to obstacles in the unification process.

First, the foundation of unification, or the federal system, is the formation of “one China” to include both the Mainland and Taiwan. The announcement of *taidu* (Taiwan’s legal independence) would mean not only the cessation of the unification process, but could also mean the start of another civil war. As we discussed earlier, the Mainland will not use force against Taiwan unless Taiwan asserts itself as an independent state. Since this is an important development in terms of the PRC’s Taiwan policy, one would expect a full, high-level authoritative confirmation from Beijing. As a first step, a formal bilateral agreement containing phrases such as “no-taidu” and “no-use-of-force” might be appropriate. This would help prevent *taidu* and create a more relaxed atmosphere between the two. On the other hand, unification in which “the big one swallows the small one” would probably also lead to a civil war. This point must be remembered by the “big one.” It is obvious that another civil war would seriously injure both the Mainland and Taiwan, and could constitute a major setback for political and economic development.

Second, both sides will continue to develop their own political and economic strengths, which are the foundations for the principle of “one country, two systems.” For quite a long time, each side will continue relatively independent operation of its internal affairs. This is what I call the stage of “cross-checking and mutual influence.” This arrangement will give the CCP and the KMT, as well as the people on each side, enough room to prepare for the second stage — “fair competition and pluralistic politics.” Further reform and democratization within the ruling parties seems to be a key element for the future directions of political development. It is rational and logical to begin negotiations when each side is healthy and strong both politically and economically.

Third, there must be precise and feasible legal arrangements. This will become an important consideration once the negotiations open. The legal aspect is closely connected with the continued political reforms on both sides. After the passing of Chiang Ching-kuo [who died in 1988] and Deng Xiaoping [who is still alive], “strongman politics” in both camps may gradually be phased out. It appears that in the future there will be a more institutionalized structure of political leadership. Under the influence of political and economic reform, “rule of man” will be replaced by “rule of law.” In this regard, the future development of Hong Kong and Macao will serve as a touchstone for the reliability of the framework of “one country, two sys-
In fact, prior to the Beijing crackdown, the main trends already underway in Hong Kong were conducive to the realization of the model discussed in this article. With the military crackdown on the student demonstration, Hong Kong's confidence in Beijing was seriously damaged. Because Hong Kong and Taiwan serve as political insurance for each other, this loss of confidence in Hong Kong will inevitably have a significant impact on the people on Taiwan. It seems clear that the confidence of the Hong Kong population will not be restored until the eventual emergence of a new, more moderate leadership after Deng Xiaoping.

Fourth, economic and political reforms must be continuously pursued. The high-speed economic development and the rise in the standard of living on the Mainland may narrow the economic gap with Taiwan, facilitating unification. But, if development on the Mainland slows, the gap will widen and the unification process will likely be delayed. The current economic reforms on the Mainland, especially the establishment of “special economic zones” and open cities along the coast, have moved the Mainland markets from “potentiality” to reality. Meanwhile, Taiwan's enormous capital, advanced administrative personnel, and its technologies in certain fields are increasingly needed by the Mainland. It is not difficult to predict that mutual economic benefits, together with the close cultural and geographic connection, will push bilateral private economic exchanges to a new level, well ahead of the official unification. More importantly, economic development will increase each society's demand for political development. This pressure is one of the basic foundations for political pluralization.

Fifth, ideological considerations should be further cast off. On the issue of unification, national interests should precede all other considerations. Other ideologies, such as “socialism,” or “three principles of the people,” are secondary. Therefore, under the principle of “one unified China” all issues should be negotiable, including a new name for the country and a new national flag and anthem. A simple name “China” (Zhongguo in Chinese), or “The Federal Republic of China,” might be choices to replace both “The People's Republic of China” and “The Republic of China” that are currently used by the two sides respectively. Furthermore, one of the basic criteria for a

---

32. It refers to Sun Yat-sen's three principles: nationalism, democracy, and "people's livelihood," used for the 1911 Revolution and the new republic. "Unifying China through the three principles of the people" is the official slogan of the KMT authorities in Taiwan.
democratic society is toleration of different ideologies. Freedom of thought and freedom of expression will be a basic law.

Sixth, it is necessary for the cause of unification to have a peaceful and favorable international environment, especially in the Asia-Pacific area. That is to say, all major powers in this area — the United States, the Soviet Union, and Japan — should support, or at least not hinder, the process of China's unification. The current international environment is a favorable one. Since the beginning of the 1970s, Northeast Asia has remained relatively peaceful and stable. Both Mainland-Taiwan relations and relations between the major powers have improved.

The international environment has also witnessed progress in other divided nations such as Germany and Korea, which will put additional pressure on the PRC's unification policy. The German model now has a new significance for other divided nations. It demonstrates that national unification may be achieved through a long process of peaceful coexistence and mutual recognition. The German experience shows that a temporary peaceful coexistence in the international community may work better than open confrontation between two different regimes. This model is likely to facilitate national unification, rather than lead to national division. South Korea's recent diplomatic breakthrough in its relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe has further isolated North Korea. In turn, the two Koreas have held several high-level (prime ministers) dialogues with a possible presidential summit in the future. Progress in Korea may place more pressure on Beijing.

CONCLUSIONS

The focus of this chapter is on the issues of China's unification and its prospects for the establishment of a federation system and political pluralization. It is a long transformation process from monist politics into pluralistic politics, yet there are growing demands for democracy throughout the entire East Asian area including the Mainland and Taiwan. These demands are directly correlated with the high-speed economic growth of the area. The primary push for transformation is from inside of each society. Influences from outside, for example from the West, are usually secondary. Patterns for the transformation vary depending on historical background and economic and political conditions. Each individual state or area has its own pattern of development. In this sense, pluralistic politics is only a direction for political development. It does not, and cannot, provide concrete models for each society.

In research on East Asian political development, I argued that
Japan developed into a democratic stage by adopting a model of “informal pluralism.” The model demonstrates that while Japan is similar to other democracies in terms of basic democratic structure, it has been able to maintain its own characteristics in political as well as economic development. Therefore, “informal pluralism” has met Japan’s strategic goals for development and met its own internal conditions as well.

It is not appropriate for a country to adopt another nation’s political development model without regard to domestic conditions. Obviously, the Chinese model will be similar to those of other countries in many ways, yet will keep its own distinguishing characteristics. The models of a federalist China and “unification-led political pluralization” may be quite different from the patterns of other countries. One has to recognize China’s political reality: Since 1949 there have been two opposing regimes under the leadership of two major parties, living in different political and economic systems across the Taiwan Strait. Separation has had a great impact on the political development of each side. In other words, the current political situation is not only the result of the internal development of each society, but is also heavily influenced by the lack of bilateral relations. As time has passed, tension across the Taiwan Strait has been sharply reduced.

Progress in pluralistic development and the strong popular demands for democracy and political freedom within both societies is even more significant. The pluralistic development in non-political (economic and cultural) fields will foster future political pluralization. Meanwhile, the development and consolidation of various political forces will provide favorable conditions for future political development, which will lead to a gradual accommodation across the Taiwan Strait. This process makes the above models possible.

I would like to emphasize that without the issue of unification, Chinese politics would still move towards democratization on both sides of the Strait. It is important to note that unification, although critical in nature, is only one of many important issues that the two sides have faced. Issues like internal politics, economic reform programs, and foreign policy are no less important than the issue of unification. Political liberalization and reform in both Taiwan and the Mainland most likely will continue separately and autonomously in both societies for a long time to come. The push toward political de-

development of each society is being led by indigenous forces. This has been demonstrated by the Tiananmen demonstrations on the Mainland and the development of opposition forces in Taiwan.

Nevertheless, the process of unification does have its unique function. It is true that neither the CCP nor the KMT could or should try to replace indigenous opposition forces on the other side. But, they may play largely symbolic roles at the beginning, such as the checking function. They will gradually move from the first stage of “cross-checking and mutual influence” into the second stage of “fair competition and pluralistic politics.” In this sense, unification will serve as a catalyst for China’s political pluralization. “One country, two systems” may well develop into “one country, two (or more) parties” under a federal system — an unintended consequence of unification. Hence, it will become a peaceful and evolutionary process breaking the political monopoly of the ruling parties and integrating various social groups. In China’s future political life, the CCP and the KMT, together with a few minor parties, will coexist peacefully for the first time since the outbreak of the civil war in the mid-1940s.

This is not to say, however, that unification will only have a positive impact on China’s political development. There is a negative side of the possible development: After unification the new “federalist state” will pose a great challenge to leaders on both sides. As demonstrated by the experiences of Germany and Vietnam, the stresses caused by the clash of different political and economic systems may grow. These stresses, if not handled properly, will produce new tensions between the two sides, which may lead to another political crisis. Therefore, the feasibility of the model will depend largely on the realization of the six conditions that I have discussed. The whole idea is based on two assumptions — a deep-rooted sense of identity as “one China,” and irreversible trends on both sides toward a more democratic society. The unification process will be in great danger if either of these conditions fails to be met.

If Beijing really wants to prevent Taiwan from asserting independence and wishes to achieve the goal of peaceful unification, it will have to learn to tolerate non-communist political forces including opposition parties. It has to accept not only the concept of “one country, two systems,” but also the notion of “one country, two (or more) parties” leading two different areas under, possibly, a federalist system. On the other hand, if Taipei really hopes to unify with the Mainland, or at least, to maintain a friendly relationship with Beijing (thus a peaceful environment for the island), it will have to recognize the ne-
cessity of finding a common ground (such as a federal system) with the Mainland.
CHAPTER IV

SOUTH KOREA AND THE POLITICS OF KOREAN REUNIFICATION

George O. Totten and Yung-Hwan Jo

The fever for reunification, following the arbitrary division of the peninsula by the occupying powers of the United States and the Soviet Union in 1945, has risen and fallen with the tides of internal and external events. It reached a new historical level when the Prime Minister of South Korea, Kang Young Hoon, met and shook hands with the Prime Minister of North Korea, Yon Hyong Muk, on Wednesday, September 5, 1990. Although no immediate “breakthrough” resulted, a new plateau had been reached in that both sides were implicitly recognizing the legitimacy of the other and they were calling each other by their official names, the South being the Republic of Korea (ROK or Taehan Minguk) and the North, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK or Choson Minjujuui Inmin Konghwaguk).

SOUTH KOREA'S POLICIES TO 1980

It was in the 1970s, almost twenty years after the tragic Korean War, that the North and South Korean governments began to take some concrete steps toward peaceful reunification (which means showing some willingness to compromise) without the intervention of the superpowers. In 1945 the Koreans had been unable to get their spontaneous attempt at creating a single government recognized by the American occupation forces in the South. In the next three years the Soviet and American occupying powers failed to get a coalition government formed, and they withdrew after their protégés had each established their own separate regime, the South being the first to establish a government claiming to represent the whole country.

With both sides calumniating the other as illegitimate and both justifying the use of force to realize their claims, the North's military move south on June 25, 1950, no matter how it may have been induced, brought forth a United Nations condemnation and the intervention of the United States, using the UN's authority to legitimize its military actions in concert with other supporting nations. This forced the North back to its former borders. However, instead of stopping
there, the United Nations forces in hot pursuit crossed that border themselves and advanced north almost to the Chinese border at the Yalu River before triggering the intervention of Chinese "volunteers," who in turn forced the UN troops back to approximately the original border between North and South Korea. This line was later recognized in a cease-fire agreement in 1953 which remains in force today, signed by the North Koreans, the Chinese, and the United States (as the representative of the United Nations). South Korea, however, under its President Syngman Rhee, refused to sign the accord.

During the rest of the 1950s and the 1960s both the North and the South were licking their wounds. Their borders were tightly closed against each other. It was the high tide of the Cold War. The United States opposed "appeasement" of communism anywhere. But with the turn of the decade, President Richard M. Nixon did an unbelievable thing. Through his Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, he made secret, and then open, contact with the People's Republic of China, culminating in the February 27, 1971 communiqué with the Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai, in which the United States said in effect that there was just one China and that it was up to the Chinese to work out how a peaceful reunification could occur. By this time, the United Nations had recognized Beijing (rather than Taipei) as the government that represented China in the United Nations.

Also by 1972 Park Chung Hee had been in power for a decade, had become President of South Korea in 1963, and was nearing the end of his constitutionally limited second term. A former military man, he had first come to power by a coup d'état on May 16, 1961 against the short-lived government that followed in the wake of the fall of Syngman Rhee in 1960. Now with over ten years' experience as leader of South Korea in which remarkable strides in an export-oriented economy had been made, Park shocked the world almost as much as Nixon had, by imitating him. Park secretly dispatched his own "Kissinger," Lee Hu Rak, to North Korea to meet its Prime Minister, Kim Il Sung. The result was made public by both sides on July 4, 1972, in a joint communiqué declaring that the reunification of Korea should be done through (1) independent Korean efforts "without being subject to external imposition or interference," (2) peaceful means, and (3) a greater national unity, "transcending differences in ideas, ideologies, and systems." When this communiqué was issued, hopes in Korea were raised that progress would be made.¹

¹ United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK), Report 1972, p. 39; for the North Korean version, see Foreign Broadcast Informa-
President Park was able to use these hopes to argue that, if he were given greater powers and a secure tenure, he would be in a stronger position vis-à-vis Kim Il Sung and thus be able to set in motion a process that would lead to peaceful reunification. He thus drew up what he called the Yushin (Revitalizing) Constitution and got it ratified in a referendum on November 24, 1972 by an overwhelming 91.5 percent. But he never succeeded in getting very far with reunification, even though the constitution gave him dictatorial powers and ensured his tenure for life.

Park justified his slow pace on reunification by promoting “incrementalism” as an approach in his 1973 New Year’s press conference. According to him, the North-South dialogue would have to develop steadily with mutual patience and sincerity, searching for the settlement of the easier questions first. This could start out with removal of long-standing distrust and misunderstanding — what we can call “confidence-building measures” (CBMs). He argued that, although on the surface they looked as though they would take a long time, they were really short-cuts to the achievement of peaceful reunification. In other words, this was “reunification preceded by peace.”

---

2. This was called his way of legitimizing his premeditated “coup in office” which did away with the Third Republic and replaced it by the Fourth Republic. Young Whan Kihl, Politics and Policies in Divided Korea: Regimes in Contest, Westview Press: Boulder, CO, and London, 1984, p. 61.

3. Since Park was elected on December 23, 1972 by a handpicked constituency that virtually assured him the presidency permanently, Kim Il Sung, the leader of North Korea, possibly believing he may have to deal with President Park very soon, drew up a new constitution himself with a strong presidency on December 27 and got himself elected President the next day, attaining the same official status, as head of state, as Park. Up until that time, since the founding of the DPRK in 1945, he had served as Prime Minister (and more importantly as Secretary General of the Workers [Communist] Party). For the significance of this change, see Dae-Sook Suh, Kim Il Sung: The North Korean Leader, New York: Columbia University Press, 1988, pp. 269-276.


5. The Korean term “tong’il” is often translated as “unification,” but in English “reunification” is more appropriate, since Korea was unified, except intermittently since 668 A.D. Also in this connection “nampook” is translated as “north-south” rather than as “south-north” which is more literal but not good English. It is as bad as “pooknam” would be in Korean. In English “north-south” is neutral; it does not mean that the speaker prefers “north” to “south.” In this book, “North Korea,” the “North,” and “South Korea” and the “South” are capitalized, but it is equally permissible to use lower case, since they are not proper names and the Koreans consider Korea as a single state temporarily divided
Park sought to institutionalize a relaxation of tensions, while keeping up a military guard, including the American forces.

The American military forces played a dual role. They served as a safety shield in the eyes of the South Korean people, because they would deter an attack from the North. The North knew that any attack on the Americans would bring the tremendous power of the United States into play on the peninsula again. Secondly the presence of American forces gave the South Korean people the feeling that the United States approved of the South Korean government. This perceived approval by the United States, which had the reputation of being the champion of democracy, rather than the stationing of troops per se, gave the government a certain amount of legitimacy.

Finally, since the issue of peaceful reunification, or at least more friendly relations with the North, was very popular, it provided the leaders with political capital. Thus, Park, as well as his successors, have found it extremely important to appear to be sincerely pursuing the goal of national reunification.

To sum up, the reunification policy of the South during Park's last years was (1) utilized for political purposes, (2) consisted of a step-by-step approach, and (3) should start with tension relaxation vis-à-vis the North. This policy was already set when Park clarified it further at his press conference for the New Year held on January 18, 1974, by calling for a non-aggression pact between North and South Korea wherein (a) both sides would promise publicly that they would never wage armed aggression against each other, (b) both sides would refrain from mutual interference in the internal affairs of the other side, and (c) in all events, the existing armistice agreement would remain in effect.

NORTH KOREA'S POLICIES TO 1980

In North Korea, the DPRK continued to champion the three basic principles of the joint communique of July 4, 1972, mentioned above. The first principle being that reunification is an internal prob-
lem for Koreans to solve without outside interference. Therefore, it has since happened that the first demand the North Koreans have almost invariably made was for the withdrawal of American troops. The second principle of peaceful reunification became compromised by the North Korean government's reluctance to deal with the "illegitimate" government of the South, especially in the early years of the Chun Doo Hwan regime, which had come to power through a coup d'état in 1980. This means that instead of proposing "negotiations and dialogue" with the authorities in the South as the peaceful alternative to violence, the North simply left it as reunification by nonviolent means. And finally the third principle of greater national unity was interpreted by the North to mean that reunification talks should involve representatives from all parties and social organizations, not just the "responsible authorities" in the South.

The Northern leadership is well aware that the Southern leadership — and this is truer today than ever before — has to deal with a vocal domestic opposition that wants to share power itself in the South. The North attempts to appeal to such political opposition and the radical student groups in order to put pressure on the leadership of the South. The government of South Korea takes this as "proof" that the North is trying to destabilize the government of the South, overthrow it, and set up a "communist" regime that would submit to the North on all its terms. Thus, if the North wants to pressure the South into hurrying along with negotiations, this does not appear to be a very fruitful tactic. But it is one way of trying to paint the South Korean leadership as not being "democratic," because it keeps the control of negotiations exclusively in the hands of the top leader of the South and also because it uses the National Security Law against the opposition. (That law is directed against subversion by the North but it is so vaguely worded that it can be employed against a broad variety of opposition to the government in the South.)

During the 1970s neither side made proposals sufficiently attractive that the other side could not refuse. Nevertheless, the overall peace was maintained, despite a number of provocations, which are not taken up in this chapter, but which served to keep tensions high. One ray of hope flickered for six years and then went out. That was the Red Cross talks that began in 1971 to address the problem of the estimated ten million families that had been torn asunder by the Korean War. However, after 1973 these talks became stalemated for all

---

practical purposes, although working-level meetings were held from time to time until December 19, 1977. Such an issue, of course, could not go away, and has reappeared.

At the very end of the decade, renewed attempts were made to get negotiations on track again. President Park in January 1979 made a proposal to the North to resume discussions on all issues pending between the two sides "without any preconditions." The [North] Korean Democratic Front for the Reunification of the Fatherland responded by proposing a meeting in Panmunjom, which was held. Nevertheless, the talks soon became deadlocked.

The assassination of President Park Chung Hee on October 26, 1979, changed the situation completely. North Korea quickly made a proposal for holding a meeting between the prime ministers of the two sides. Before this could get underway, the Chun Doo Hwan coup d'état in May 1980, followed by the Kwangju uprising and its bloody suppression, occurred, all of which threw cold water on any rapprochement between the two sides. The North took the position that the government of the South was "illegitimate," and condemned the Kwangju Incident as a massacre.9

After a great deal of preparation and fanfare the [North] Korean Workers Party held its Sixth Party Congress starting on October 10, 1980. At that time it unveiled its proposal for the establishment of a Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo (DCRK).10

The use of the name "Koryo" was put forward to solve the problem of the two names then and still in use, as mentioned above, "Choson" for North Korea and "Hanguk" for South Korea. Koryo was the name of the dynasty in Korea (936-1392) when its borders approximated more closely the present borders of the country than those of the preceding Silla Dynasty. The Silla Kingdom had incorporated Paekche and Koguryo and in that sense was united in 668, but then the Parhae Kingdom came into existence in the North, taking over part of what was Koguryo, so, in that sense, Korea was not as united as during the later Koryo dynasty. Incidentally Koryo is the source from which the West gets the name which in English we write

---

as "Korea." At the beginning of the dynasty, the capital was moved to what is the present-day Kaesong, which is more or less in the middle of the peninsula. The 38th parallel which divided Korea between 1945 to 1948 ran north of Kaesong. Since the Cease-fire of 1952, the Demarcation Zone (DMZ) runs south of it. Because it is so centrally located, it could conceivably be made the new capital of the Confederation, as the North proposes a "reunited" Korea be called, or the Commonwealth, as proposed by the South.\(^\text{11}\)

The DPRK proposal envisioned the establishment of a supreme national confederal assembly composed of an equal number of representatives from the North and from the South plus some overseas Korean representatives (along the lines presumably of China). This assembly would create a standing committee to act as its executive and guide the existing governments of the North and the South. Each side would have its own government, presumably continuing the governments (and economic systems) that already exist. The reunited nation would be neutral or independent in foreign policy without foreign alliances. The two states of the republic would presumably have the task of reducing and combining their military forces.

As summarized by Young Whan Kihl, the confederal republic's national government would have the following functions:

(1) adhere to independence in all state activities and follow an independent policy;

(2) effect democracy throughout the country and in all spheres of society and promote great national unity;

(3) bring about economic cooperation and exchange between the North and the South by ensuring the development of an independent national economy;

(4) realize North-South exchange and cooperation in the spheres of science, culture, and education by insuring uniform progress in the country's science and technology, national culture and arts, and national education;

(5) reopen the suspended transport and communications between North and South, by ensuring free utilization of the means of transport and communications in all parts of the country;

(6) ensure a stable livelihood for the entire people in-

\(^{11}\) For the history of these dynasties mentioned earlier in this paragraph, see, for example, Ki-balx Lee, \textit{A New History of Korea}, translated by Edward W. Wagner with Edward J. Shultz, Seoul: Ilchokak Publishers, 1984, Chapters 4-8.
including the workers, peasants, and other working masses by promoting their welfare systematically;

(7) remove military confrontation between the North and the South by forming a combined national army to defend the nation against invasion from outside;

(8) defend and protect the national rights and interests of all Koreans overseas;

(9) handle properly the foreign relations established by the North and the South prior to reunification, by coordinating the foreign activities of the two regional governments in a unified way; and

(10) as a unified state representing the whole nation, develop friendly relations with all countries of the world by pursuing a peaceful foreign policy. 12

From this summary, it is apparent that the North was proposing a policy of "one nation and two autonomous regions." Moreover, this arrangement was to be considered "permanent" for the foreseeable future.

Looking back at this plan from 1991, over ten years later, it seems a shame that so little has been accomplished by the two sides. The borders are still as tightly guarded as before. The suspension of transport and communications as well as the bar on exchange and cooperation in the spheres of science, culture, and education continue unabated. No direct trade took place until 1991. Still have been no reductions of the military on either side. The mere thought of combining the reduced military on both sides into one force for defense of the reunified country seems like a pipe dream.

In contrast to the North's policy of all or nothing, that is, "reunification" in terms of a confederal system first — after the withdrawal of American forces — and then the working out of the various problems, the South has called for a step-by-step approach. Its pre-1980 position was basically incrementalist, calling for readjusting psychological attitudes prior to gradually working out the easier and then the more difficult problems, culminating in reunification. The South's position, then, can be characterized as having as its goal "one nation, one government."

12. Kihl, Politics and Policies, supra, note 2, p. 215. This quotation has only been altered by capitalizing "North" and "South."
CHAPTER IV

CHUN DOO HWAN'S POLICIES

With the advent of former General Chun Doo Hwan as President of South Korea on March 3, 1981, greater emphasis was laid on a possible meeting between the presidents of North and South Korea, which he averred could create an atmosphere in which smaller problems could be worked out over time. On January 12, 1981, President Chun invited President Kim Il Sung to visit Seoul without any preconditions and offered to visit North Korea himself, if invited. He followed this up by a proposal in January of 1982, calling for the two sides to jointly draw up a draft constitution. This would be done, he proposed, by a Consultative Conference for National Reunification (CCNR).

Granting that this would be a giant step, Chun proposed that the two sides should first "normalize relations" by concluding a Provisional Agreement on Basic Relations between North and South Korea containing seven provisions, conveniently summarized by Kihl, as follows:

First, relations between South and North Korea shall be based on the principle of equality and reciprocity pending unification.

Second, the South and the North shall abandon all forms of military force and violence, as well as the threat thereof, as a means of settling issues between them and seek peaceful solutions to all problems through dialogue and negotiation.

Third, South and North Korea shall recognize each other's existing political order and social institutions and shall not interfere in each other's internal affairs in any way.

Fourth, the South and the North shall maintain the existing regime of armistice in force while working out measures to end the arms race and military confrontation in order to ease tensions and prevent war on the Korean peninsula.

Fifth, the South and the North shall facilitate free travel between the two halves of the peninsula, including the reunion of separated families, and shall promote exchanges and cooperation in the fields of trade, transportation, postal service, communications, sports, academic pursuits, education, culture, news gathering and reporting, health, technology, environmental protection, and so forth.

Sixth, until unification is achieved, both parties shall respect each other's bilateral and multilateral treaties and
agreements concluded with third countries, irrespective of differences in ideologies, ideals and institutions, and consult with each other on issues affecting the interests of the Korean people as a whole.

Seventh, the South and the North shall each appoint a plenipotentiary envoy with the rank of cabinet minister to head a resident liaison mission to be established in Seoul and Pyongyang. The specific functions of the liaison missions shall be determined by mutual consultation and agreement, with each party providing the liaison mission from the other party with all necessary facilities and cooperation to insure its smooth functioning.\textsuperscript{13}

This proposal was followed up by many smaller concrete proposals that would bring Koreans from the North and the South together, including at the 1986 Asian Games and at the 1988 Summer Olympics later held in Seoul. However, the North found objections to all the proposals and the result was their non-participation in the Olympics.

One offer by the North, however, was accepted by the South. It was the offer by the Red Cross of North Korea of September 8, 1984 to provide relief goods for the victims of a flood in South Korea. Without asking how much was needed the North announced that it was willing to send 225,950 bushels of rice, 500,000 meters of fabric, 100,000 tons of cement and various medicines.\textsuperscript{14} It is no secret that one reason this was accepted was that the South thought that the North believed that South would not accept aid from the North and the South doubted whether the North could really deliver what was promised. Nevertheless, despite the South’s saying this was not really needed and disputes about how the goods would be shipped, it turned out that the goods were duly delivered to South Korea’s Red Cross. To upstage the North, the South took the occasion to send back as presents to the North packages of consumer goods including TV sets (that could receive South Korean broadcasts) altogether worth as much as, or more than, the aid that had been sent by the North. Despite the snide remarks made by both sides, this gesture did seem to improve the atmosphere in both the North and the South.

North Korean attitudes, however, were extremely self-righteous and contemptuous of the South’s leadership. In the North, the idea of

\textsuperscript{13} As summarized by Kihl, \textit{Politics and Policies, supra}, note 2, pp. 219-20 on the basis of the account in the \textit{Korea Herald}, February 2, 1982.

\textsuperscript{14} These figures are from \textit{A White Paper on South-North Dialogue in Korea}, published by the National Unification Board, Republic of Korea, December 31, 1988, p. 202.
the “Great Leader” Kim Il Sung meeting with Chun Doo Hwan was ridiculed, on the basis that the former enjoyed great legitimacy, whereas the latter did not. All the South’s rejections of North Korean reunification proposals were summarily denounced as measures to make de jure the North-South de facto division of the peninsula, inevitably perpetuating “two Koreas.” Also the North insisted that the rhetoric about respecting treaties with “third parties” was designed to keep American troops in the South. The North argued that the South’s talk of humanitarian concern for the reuniting of families was contradicted by the South’s pressuring overseas Koreans not to go to the North to visit relatives.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE OLYMPIC GAMES

The big issue that thereafter dominated the 1980s and became intertwined in the reunification issue was none other than the Olympic games. Ever since the International Olympic Committee (IOC) in September 1981, sitting in Baden-Baden, West Germany, chose Seoul as the venue for the 24th Olympic Games, North Korea was highly concerned. It first attempted to abort that decision. When it found that was impossible, it proposed co-sponsoring. This led to long and difficult negotiations in which the IOC attempted to get the two sides to work out some agreement. But the North in the end did not accept the concessions that the South was willing to make, and consequently boycotted the Games. The North promised not to disrupt the Olympics in any way. The South nevertheless took tremendous precautions. But the North evidently kept their word and caused no trouble.

The two sides did meet earlier, in 1984, to discuss the formation of a single team to send to the 23rd Olympics in Los Angeles in July of that year but North Korea joined the Soviets and others in boycotting the Games, although the People’s Republic of China participated fully.

The Seoul Olympics were relevant to the reunification process in several ways. Obviously any joint sports participation held the probability of confidence building on both sides. The “ping-pong diplomacy” of the Chinese and Americans that started in Japan in 1971 and eventually led to normalization of relations was on people’s minds. While the Olympics did not open up North Korea, they did bring the Soviets and the Chinese as well as teams of Eastern Europe to Seoul, where great goodwill was demonstrated toward them. This led to the Soviets establishing an economic liaison office in Seoul and the Chinese setting up special economic arrangements between the Shandong region and Seoul.
The goodwill demonstrated by the Koreans toward the Russians at the Olympics led, two years later, to the surprise meeting between President Mikhail Gorbachev and President Roh Tae Woo in San Francisco on June 5, 1990. That meeting in turn made it just a matter of time before diplomatic relations would be established between the Soviet Union and the ROK. All this aided the South's strategy of "cross-recognition," whereby the Republic of Korea would be officially recognized by the Soviet Union and China and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea would be recognized by the United States and Japan. At least South Korea was making contact with the Soviet Union and China, North Korea's allies, but Pyongyang was making little headway with Washington or even (until later) with Tokyo. It looked as though everything was going South Korea's way. The East European socialist states, starting with Hungary, established formal diplomatic ties with South Korea, in the face of protests from North Korea. Only China was hesitant about more formal ties in consideration for North Korea's feelings.

The Seoul Olympics were significant in another respect. They served as a further incentive to the democratization of South Korea. Preparing the country for the games, both the government and the people wanted to project a good image when the eyes of the world would be on Seoul. They wanted South Korea to be seen as peaceful and democratic. One of the main causes for violence and dictatorship in South Korea had been the desire of Presidents Rhee and Park to hold onto power indefinitely. Just one year before the Olympics, politics in South Korea had reached crisis proportions with masses of people joining with students in street protests. The issue was whether Chun Doo Hwan would actually carry out his pledge to step down after his seven-year term as President ended, in 1987, as he was required to, according to the Constitution, and, if he did, whether he would try to continue to rule from "behind the throne," by putting in a successor who was a puppet indebted to him. When he announced in May 1987 as his chosen successor another former general, Roh Tae Woo, who allegedly supported Chun in his decision to send troops to put down the uprising in Kwangju in 1980, the reaction against this was unexpectedly great and took the form of still wilder protests.

15. "Cross-recognition" had originated with U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in 1975 and at the same time he suggested that the South propose that both North and South be admitted to the United Nations simultaneously. See Byong-youn Choy, *A History of the Korean Reunification Movement: Its Issues and Prospects*, Peoria, IL: Research Committee on Korean Unification, Institute of International Studies, Bradley University, 1984, p. 141.

16. For a fuller exposition of the significance of the Olympics as well as the argument
CHAPTER IV

ROH’S DEMOCRATIZATION OF SOUTH KOREA

However, what was even more unexpected by far was Roh’s reaction to the reaction. On June 29 he announced he was willing to accept all the demands of the opposition, including a presidential system with direct popular vote and the release of the many political prisoners as well as the restoration of full political rights to the chief opposition figure, Kim Dae Jung, who had gained great support for putting his life on the line in championing democracy and challenging both Park and Chun. While Roh’s move toward democracy was unexpected, he probably had no other alternative. Only the military could put down the degree of opposition that had arisen, but the military had become neutralized by the rising tide of anti-Americanism that had its inception in the aftermath of the Kwangju Incident of 1980 when troops were moved down from the DMZ to Kwangju in the very south of the country, because local troops could not be counted on to not sympathize with the local people and the protesters were calling for Chun Doo Hwan to step down. People began to criticize the Americans for supporting Chun by allowing troops, all of whom were technically under U.N. (i.e., U.S.) command, to be used for political purposes. In order to counter this, the United States was watching to see that the military would not be used to suppress protestors calling for democracy. In such circumstances, Roh’s move was most logical and, as it turned out, successful.

Thereafter, in collaboration with the opposition leaders, presidential candidate Roh drew up a new constitution, got it ratified by the people, ran under it and won. His victory, however, was only possible because Kim Dae Jung and the erstwhile co-leader of the democratic movement, Kim Yong Sam, fell out with each other and could not find a formula for collaboration. In the voting for president, Roh Tae Woo won only by a plurality. His two liberal opponents stacked up more votes together than he got. His own vote was also eroded by another conservative, Kim Jong Pil, who had once been a right-hand man of the assassinated former President Park Chung Hee. Roh proclaimed a new Republic in South Korea, the Sixth. Because of its popular support and its creation in collaboration with the opposition, it gained greater legitimacy than any preceding regime. The image created helped make the Olympics perhaps the most successful ever held.

Many were disappointed that the North Koreans did not partici-

---

on democratization that comes in the next section below, see George Totten, The Democratization of South Korea and the Role of the Olympics in the Process, Occasional Paper 3, August 1988, Center for Pacific Asia Studies, University of Stockholm, pp. 14-16.
participate in the Games, but even under Chun a number of initiatives toward the North had been taken. An important one of these resulted in renewed Red Cross talks for reuniting families. This occurred during the fall of 1984. On September 20-24 for the first time officially sponsored private-level exchange took place. Visiting groups of 151 members reached Seoul from the North and the same number reached Pyongyang from the South. They included art troupes that presented performances in the host capitals. This was a moment of great joy for both sides of the divided peninsula.17

Economic talks also began and broke off during this period. Five meetings were held between November 5, 1984 and November 22, 1985. The sixth was to be held on January 22, 1986 but was suspended two days earlier by the North in protest against the joint exercises of American and South Korean troops called “Team Spirit,” which had been, and thereafter has continued to be, held almost annually.18

Even discussion about three-way talks on military issues among the North, the South, and the United States forces were taken up on North Korean initiative starting June 9, 1986. In the course of this, North Korea on July 23, 1987 proposed “multi-national arms reduction talks” to discuss phased arms reduction on the Korean peninsula. They called for reducing both the North and the South Korean forces to 100,000 each by which time the United States would withdraw its entire forces “including nuclear weapons.” But the South proposed that the North should start first, since it has so many more arms than the South. Also the South insinuated that the North was making this proposal to divide public opinion in the South and was therefore not sincere.19

When former General Roh Tae Woo took over as President in January 1988, he gradually began to take a more positive position with regard to reunification. Most significantly on July 7, 1988 he made a “Special Presidential Declaration for National Self-Esteem, Unification and Prosperity.”20 In this he called for promotion of exchanges between the people of North and South Korea and for opening the door to overseas Koreans to visit both the North and the South.

It has since become clear that there is a contradiction between North-South exchange and the Anti-Communist and National Secur-

17. For the negotiations leading up to this and its realization, see A White Paper on South-North Dialogue in Korea, supra, note 14, pp. 201-263.
19. Ibid., pp. 359-362.
20. The statement may be found in ibid., pp. 461-465 and discussed on pp. 381-90.
ity Laws, which have so far not been abolished. To overcome this, the South Korean government selectively gives permission to certain people to contact North Koreans, thus waiving the law in their cases. In this way President Roh and the South Korean government try to retain control on all contact, using the police and the legal system to arrest and sentence persons who make contact without prior government approval. As for the overseas Koreans, however, they are no longer harassed by the South for visits to North Korea.

In his July 7, 1988 declaration “For National Self-Esteem, Unification and Prosperity,” President Roh brought up six other items. The second was for arrangements to aid dispersed families to reestablish communication with each other. The third was to begin North-South trade. The fourth was for ending the South’s objections over South Korea’s allies having trade relations with North Korea for everything except military goods. The fifth item was the expression of hope for free inter-Korean contacts and cooperation in the world community. And finally the sixth was an expression of an intention to help improve North Korea’s relations with South Korea’s allies.

This last item was part of a new policy on the part of the South, namely, of ending North Korea’s relative international isolation. This was a real turnabout. It also provided further justification for South Korea’s attempts at rapprochement with Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and China. North Korea continued its policy of opposing “cross-recognition.” Nevertheless, it was clear that North Korea was very interested in “contact” with the United States and Japan.

In a step that allows for greater participation by the people of South Korea in the “policy making” of reunification, the South Korean government on September 3, 1988 made public its intention to roll back censorship of “communist” materials on a selective basis for selected people. For instance: The Rodong Shinmun (the main north

---

21. This National Security (Gong’an Chongchi) law has been slightly amended from time to time, the latest as far as this chapter is concerned was on May 10, 1991. In order to try to lessen the pressure on Kim Dae Jung, in hopes he would not support the radical students, the law was revised so as to make it not a crime not to report someone going to the North. Kim Dae Jung had been accused of knowing about one of his party people making a trip to North Korea. By the change in the law, Kim would be let off the hook. The government felt this would be a concession worth making to reduce somewhat the opposition in the streets, since Kim had joined demonstrations and even suffered from the tear gas used by the police to quell them. Korea Herald, May 11, 1991, pp. 12-14.

Korean newspaper) and visual materials, it was said, "shall be open to the public on a selective basis." Also broadcasts which slander North Korea or its leader would be unilaterally suspended. Contacts with North Korea were initiated in August 1988 with a view to arranging meetings between North and South Korean parliamentarians to discuss relevant issues, an item that made a step in the direction of the wider contacts that had been called for by the North.

President Roh's most dramatic appearance was his speech at the United Nations on October 18, 1988. Some people wonder why President Kim Il Sung did not also accept an invitation to appear at the same time at the same forum in front of the nations of the world. It would be pointless to speculate other than to note that Kim Il Sung may have felt it would be awkward to appear before the United Nations while the U.S. "cover" was still being used by American troops poised against Kim's alleged threat to invade South Korea. As for Roh, this was a wonderful opportunity for him, while he was still basking in the afterglow of the Seoul Olympics (held September 17 to October 2), and he made the most of it.

In his speech President Roh proposed to President Kim Il Sung that Kim and he hold direct talks with each other at a summit meeting that could be held in Pyongyang or elsewhere and discuss issues such as the following: (1) a non-aggression pact, (2) problems of disarmament, arms control, and other military matters, such as transforming the existing Armistice Agreement into a permanent peace arrangement, (3) institutional structures for bringing about reunification, and (4) other types of exchange and cooperation. He also called for a "city of peace" to be built in the Demilitarized Zone. And he proposed setting up a consultative conference for peace composed of the United States, the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, and Japan, as well as North and South Korea.

Inside South Korea this U.N. speech and the earlier July 7 declaration were aimed at assuring the people that the new Sixth Republic was more sincerely committed to reunification. These speeches were even designed in part to appeal to the increasingly radical and anti-American students who were demanding direct contact with the North to hurry the process of reunification and the withdrawal of the American military forces.

In the fall of 1988 following the Olympic Games the prospects for improving relations with the North appeared favorable. For instance,

24. For a copy of the talk, see ibid., pp. 478-90 and for a discussion of it see pp. 429-39.
the millionaire businessman (who had been born in North Korea but since the war lived in the South), Chung Chu-Young of the Hyundai Group visited the North with the apparent permission of the South Korean government to talk about joint ventures, including tourism from the South in the Kumgang Mountains which are located in the North.

NON-OFFICIAL REUNIFICATION ACTIVITIES

In the spring, however, the atmosphere suddenly deteriorated again, with the unofficial visit of the Reverend Moon (Mun) Ik-hwan at the end of March 1989 to North Korea. Moon was a well-known critic of the government who had denounced Roh for suppressing democracy and going too slow on reunification. He was apparently invited by President Kim Il Sung along with Cardinal Kim Su-hwan, Paek Ki-wan (a former presidential candidate), and the heads of the four political parties in the South (which included Roh Tae Woo as head of the Democratic Justice Party at the time). This was in line with Kim's call for a Joint Conference of political parties, social organizations, and leading personalities of North and South Korea in 1988 and the North-South Consultative Conference in 1989. And this in turn was part of Kim's alleged concern to carry on a dialogue with more than just the incumbent South Korean leadership. However, in the South this strategy was considered to be "united front" tactics, aimed at seeking allies in South Korea and mobilizing radical elements there. The South Korean government perceived this as attempts by the North to "communize" the South.

The Reverend Moon vehemently and frequently denounced President Chun on the questions of civil liberties and reunification. He took part in demonstrations. Now he made his way to North Korea allegedly without the knowledge of the South Korean authorities, including the Agency for Security Planning (the organization that had replaced the former Korean Central Intelligence Agency [KCIA]). Moon was welcomed by President Kim Il Sung who met with him for some time. The Reverend issued a statement in which he praised Kim and criticized South Korean reunification policy, although he was not in complete agreement with Kim on a number of issues.

As soon as his presence in North Korea was known through an announcement by the North, the South Korean media reported it in a sensational way. It was immediately claimed that he had breached the National Security Law in not getting permission from the South Korean government. And when he did return to the South, he was arrested and later tried and sentenced for that transgression.
This incident was taken up by the Northern delegates at various meetings with South Korean delegations. For instance, the North unilaterally postponed the third preliminary meeting for arranging high-level official talks, slated for April 12, to April 26 and again to July 12 and so on, while the South objected to the intrusion of political issues into what they called an "administrative matter."25

Then during the summer of 1989 North Korea held the 13th World Festival for Youth and Students in Pyongyang starting July 1. Young people came from many countries, both developing and industrially developed, with views ranging from left to center, most representing youth organizations to which they would report their experiences. The South Korean radical Chondaehyop (Association of National Student Representatives), a federation of student groups from various universities in South Korea, secretly sent a female student from Hankook (Hanguk) University of Foreign Studies in Seoul to the Festival as a representative claiming to represent the youth of South Korea. Her name was Lim Soo-kyong (Im Su-kyong). She had been able to get there, since she was staying in East Berlin. It turned out that she was a Catholic student, who had been very much involved in student protest. She was a type not much seen in North Korea, where girls are more bashful and where there is no vocal opposition. As such, she was said to be very impressive to North Korean youth. She was an experienced speaker, self-confident, capable, and beautiful. Being the only student from South Korea, she was the center of attention not only for the authorities in the North but also the students from all the other countries. She denounced the South Korean authorities for not allowing South Korean students to attend the Festival.

The South Korean government was furious, especially when a Catholic priest, Father Moon (Mun) Kyu-hyon, a Korean resident in the U.S., went to Pyongyang to escort her home, saying they would arrive at Panmunjom, as a gesture to break down barriers, and enter South Korea that way. This they did, and they were arrested, tried for violating the National Security Law, and sentenced.26 This prompted protests from the North Koreans' Committee for Peaceful Reunifica-

26. The South Korean government did originally look into the situation and considered allowing or even promoting South Korean student participation in the North Korean affair. A year before the Festival on July 15, 1988, the South Korean North-South Student Exchange Promotion Committee proposed a meeting with the North to discuss South Korean student participation. The North, however, rejected the overall exchanges and approached...
tion of the Fatherland, to which in turn the South Korean National Reunification Minister, Lee Hong Koo, retorted that the North should not be interfering in South Korean political affairs and especially not condoning unlawful acts.

In recounting these events it might appear that North Korea was eager to open up wide contacts with the South, while the South feared contacts with the North. The irony of the situation was that the North was probably more fearful of the exposure of its people to the affluent South, being well aware of the way the East Germans came to envy the West Germans. The South Korean government was cognizant of this, but they evidently feared losing internal control more than what they might gain from subverting the North.

PRESSURES PUSHING THE TWO SIDES TOGETHER

The fact that Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union were becoming more friendly with South Korea and were eager to do business with it was putting pressure on North Korea to carry out some "glasnost" and "perestroika" of its own.

In the eyes of its own people, the North Korean government, especially Kim Il Sung, must continue to be seen as leading the movement towards reunification of the fatherland. It should not be perceived as afraid to lose some of its power for the higher purpose of reuniting the country, but that is logically and understandably the prospect of what opening the country would entail. This probably goes a long way to explain the stop-and-go tactics by the North. 27

The picture one gets of 1988 and 1990 is that both the North and the South are being pushed toward each other by the trend of world events, even while trying to outwit each other. They each want to appear to be the one more eager for reunification, while the other side is the one being unreasonable and sabotaging the effort. Despite all this, to an outsider it does appear that they are inching towards a reunification in which both sides continue to exist and maintain their own positions and but find the mere presence of the other unsettling and the prospect of having to share decision-making alarming.

During these last two years contacts have continued to increase in number in several areas. While talks go on to prepare for some summit conference in the future, intergovernmental contact becomes more

---

frequent. There are discussions on the parliamentary level. More in the limelight are endless contacts and meetings on sports. For example, the first successful joint North-South Teams were those for the 41st World Table Tennis Championships held in Japan in April 1991 and the planned 6th World Youth Soccer Championships. But more significant by far is the fact that South Korea imported US $162,000 worth of items between October 1988 when indirect trade was first approved by both sides and January 1991.29

Closer to the hearts of still grieving families are the Red Cross working-level delegates contacts, holding out the glimmer of hope that some may yet live to see long-missed loved ones and relatives. While war appears more remote than ever, the glint of the steel of military weapons reminds people that the terrors of war are close at hand ready at the push of a button in anger, or fear, or by mistake.

The inter-Korean parliamentary talks have borne some fruit. Before the beginning of 1990 some nine such meetings had taken place since their initiation in August 1988. The two sides mutually agreed to include a declaration of mutual non-aggression and pledges of increased exchange and cooperation in the agenda of future meetings, but the North reserved the right to suspend them, unless the Team Spirit military exercises were suspended. The 10th preparatory contact for the proposed North-South parliamentary talks took place in the newly constructed Peace House in the Southern sector of Panmunjom on January 24, 1990. This was built by the Seoul government in a little more than a year, as a symbol of its dedication to the cause of reunification.30

The 6th preliminary meeting to prepare for the proposed North-South High-Level Officials Talks, i.e., prime ministers' talks was held in the Unification House in the Northern sector of Panmunjom. This led to the historic first meeting of the prime ministers of both sides that took place on September 5, 1990 in Seoul when the South's Prime Minister Kang Young Hoon introduced the North's Prime Minister to President Roh Tae Woo. A month later on October 18, Kang shook hands with President Kim Il Sung in Pyongyang. The eventual goal of

28. The agreement on these events was first mentioned in *The Pyongyang Times*, March 9, 1991, p.1.
29. Ford S. Worthy, “Can the Koreas Get Together?”, *Fortune Magazine*, Vol. 123, No. 3 (February 11, 1991), pp. 126-132; see p. 131. During the same period South Korean chaebul (such as Samsung, Saangyong and Daewoo) spent about US $35 million on imports such as zinc, iron ore, fish and cement, which should whet the appetite of the North.
these meetings was to organize a summit meeting when President Roh would meet with President Sung. During the last year or so there have been rumors that Kim II Sung would step aside as President and hand over that office to his son, Kim Jong Il. Since that did not happen, there was speculation that Kim II Sung himself may "condescend" to meet with Roh, if that would either "bless" or consummate the founding of a "confederal" republic.

President Roh's proposal made on September 11, 1989 for a "commonwealth" is surprisingly close to Kim II Sung's "confederation." Actually, the Korean word "yonbang" is used to translate both of these words. In that speech Roh used the word "gongdongche," which literally means "common entity," but it was translated as "commonwealth" in English. With this idea, Roh associated the three long-standing basic principles for reunification, namely, "independence, peace, and democracy."

This formula suggests that, while expanding openness, exchanges, and cooperation, and building mutual trust through North-South dialogue, a Korean National Charter should be adopted (through a summit meeting between the two Koreas). This charter would contain a comprehensive package of agreements covering a basic scheme for attaining peace and reunification, mutual non-aggression arrangements, and the founding of a Korean commonwealth, as an interim stage towards reunification.

In characterizing this as an "interim stage," Roh was actually going back to a position Kim II Sung had abandoned. Kim had changed this in 1980 to say that he considered the "confederal" republic to be a permanent arrangement and thus "reunification" itself.

Now Roh has said that this "commonwealth" could be a transitional arrangement. The commonwealth, he suggested, should have a Council of Presidents as its highest decision-making organ, a Council of Ministers as the executive organ, a Council of Representatives as the legislative body, and a joint Secretariat.

This Council of Representatives, he further proposed, should draft a constitution for a reunified Korea. This would provide for a new unified legislature and a single central government for a democratic republic.31

Another front on which North Korea is inching forward is in contact with the United States. Consular level contacts between Americans and North Koreans began taking place in Beijing. America nevertheless still carried on its economic embargo and policy of diplomatic non-recognition, vis-à-vis North Korea. Also the North Koreans considered that the U.S. was letting too few North Koreans into the U.S. So they decided to cut down on visits to North Korea of South Koreans living in the U.S. The U.S. had made an earlier concession to North Korea in 1988 by slightly amending the Trading with the Enemy Act to allow American exports of much needed humanitarian items, such as foodstuffs and medicines.

It is in the academic field where perhaps the most hopeful signs for improvement have appeared. A symposium took place on July 5-7, 1990 in San Francisco. It was jointly sponsored by Stanford's Center for International Security and Arms Control, together with the Center for International Studies of Seoul National University and the Peace and Disarmament Institute of North Korea. Delegates included Professor Chung Chong-uk, Director of the Center for International Studies, and Professor Han Sung-Joo of Korea University from the South. The main organizer on the American side was Dr. John W. Lewis of the Department of Political Science at Stanford. Delegates from the North included Song Yo-gyong, Director of the Peace and Disarmament Institute.

At that symposium scholars from the North appeared to be taking the talk of confidence-building measures (CBMs) seriously, for example, cuts in the military forces on both sides of the border. Representatives from both the North and the South seemed to have reached a consensus on trimming down and eventually stopping the arms race, which is still going on between North and South Korea. In fact, the North Korean scholars were even willing to accept the concept of joint inspection in a process of arms reduction.

NORTH KOREAN REACTIONS

The first North Korean scholars to come to the Los Angeles area were Kim Byong Hong, Vice Director, Institute for Disarmament and Peace, DPRK, and Chong Yon Gap, Researcher, from the same Institute. This meeting took place on January 22, 1991 and was arranged by Tony Namkung for the Asia Society in connection with the University of California at Los Angeles where the meeting took place. At that talk Mr. Kim interrupted Mr. Chong, when the latter translated

32. See George Totten, "Developing Contact with North Korea," in ibid., pp. 58-67.
incorrectly what Mr. Kim said. Mr. Kim did not call for the "immediate" withdrawal of American troops but a "phased" withdrawal, according to three-way agreements. Mr. Chong was so used to saying "immediate" that he had forgotten the policy had changed. At that meeting the scholar from the South was Kim Hakjoon, who was serving as Chief Assistant to President Roh for Policy Research.

The South Korean view has been that the military and political confidence-building measures should proceed gradually and incrementally. The North’s position has been that the presence of the enormous amounts of military hardware on the peninsula causes tensions and saddled both sides with enormous economic burdens; large-scale reductions of armaments would alleviate this. This means that the North holds arms reduction as the first measure. Namely, confidence-building would be ineffective until some concrete evidence of arms reductions takes place.

The South from the beginning has called for nation-wide elections. The North has been skeptical of this, because the population of the South is twice as large as that of the North and the North feared they would be outvoted. In view of this perspective, the North’s demand for a confederal system of two equal states is easily understandable. The South has accepted the concept of equality, for without that nothing could be accomplished.

In the words of a North Korean, "[The Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo] is not for a certain specific class or section but for the entire Korean people; it is a form of a unified state in the interest of both, without causing damage to either side. The regional autonomy of the DCRK is designed to provide independence of each part within the framework of effecting national unity and reunification." Therefore, the DCRK concept seeks "an equal number of governmental representatives from the north and the south." True to this concept, the North insists on equal representation in all its negotiations with the South.

In 1990 the North Korean approach towards reunification has

33. This was noted by Totten who was present at the seminar which was titled somewhat misleadingly "China in Asia: Implications for U.S. Policy." Significantly there was also a scholar from Vietnam, Dao Huy Ngoc, Deputy Director, Institute of International Relations, Hanoi. There was some discussion as to whether Hanoi or Pyongyang would be first in gaining American recognition. The impression was that it would be Hanoi.

become somewhat more defensive, probably brought on in part by the increasingly aggressive stance of the South, demanding national integration, and in part by the perception in the South that the North was becoming increasingly isolated in the context of what might be called the emerging "new international order." This scaling down of Pyongyang's demands into accepting the DCRK framework as the end product of reunification and the coexistence of the two "equal" parts is consistent with the DPRK's Ninth Supreme People's Assembly held in late April 1990.

Some of the other policies that the Assembly adopted also revealed a growing change in perspective, notably the following:

1. Tension reductions and the creation of a peaceful international environment.

2. Removal of all obstacles separating the North and the South — such as the "concrete wall," that runs along the southern side of the Demilitarized Zone, and the National Security Law, which forbids unauthorized contact with North Korea — which hinder free human interaction and movement.

3. Adopting policies by both sides, particularly foreign policies, that will not hinder the independent and peaceful reunification of the motherland. Here one can see the underlying assumption that historically Korea has been overly influenced by outside powers to its detriment, the present division of the country being only the latest tragedy. In line with this way of thinking, separate membership in the United Nations would only play into the hands of those who wish to see the continued condition of division. Therefore, there should be just one foreign policy.

North Korea does not want any of its neighbors, including the Soviet Union and China, to be able in any way to pursue a "two Koreas" policy. That is why North Korea continued to oppose "cross recognition."

Despite the North's wishes, however, Eastern Europe has now recognized South Korea, China has established semi-formal trade ties, and the Soviet Union has, in addition to an economic liaison mission in Seoul, established formal diplomatic ties.

While unable to stop the Soviet Union, especially after the sur-
prise meeting between President Mikhail Gorbachev and President Roh Tae Woo in San Francisco on June 4, 1990 and again on Chejudo on Gorbachev’s return home from Japan on April 23, 1991, North Korea has continued to be successful in temporarily halting China’s move toward full diplomatic recognition of South Korea.

Nevertheless, when Japan made clear its intention to begin rapprochement, after a year and a half of feelers, North Korea could no longer refuse. It welcomed Japan’s “king maker” Shin Kanemaru, when he arrived with a bipartisan delegation in Pyongyang on September 24, 1990. Kim Il Sung listened to an apology for the “agony and damage” that Japan inflicted during its occupation of Korea. That was expressed by Kanemaru on behalf of the head of the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan, Toshiki Kaifu, which means it was not exactly an official Japanese government act, but after all Kaifu was the Prime Minister. This was accompanied by Kaifu’s recognition of North Korea’s right to demand war reparations. Kanemaru met with President Kim three times. Kim raised the question of diplomatic recognition in a positive fashion but also demanded compensation for the 45 years of division since Japan’s withdrawal in 1945.36

The question of American contact and even recognition of the DPRK is also being discussed in Washington. In the Spring 1991 issue of Foreign Affairs, Admiral William J. Crowe, until recently Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, called for the elevation of talks in Beijing to higher levels in order to prepare for the normalization of relations between North Korea and the U.S. Specifically, he suggested linking the U.S. call for an international inspection of the North Korea nuclear facilities with the North’s demand for removal of U.S. nuclear deployments in South Korea and a U.S. pledge not to use nuclear weapons against North Korea. He also advocated that the North should pledge not to attack the South and not to develop nuclear weapons.37 In order to prepare the atmosphere for such talks, Washington could unilaterally end the annual “Team Spirit” military exercises in South Korea. In any case, it appears that cross recognition is proceeding inexorably.

Whether this will impede or facilitate the “reunification” of the two Koreas is still not clear. But in view of the German case, even having two separate seats in the United Nations as separate states did

not prove to be an obstacle to the country’s reunification. The fact that West Germany "swallowed" East Germany and is staggering under the tremendous economic burden of East Germany with its comparatively backward economy provides a sobering warning concerning Korean reunification.

"REUNIFICATION" SCENARIOS

In the light of this example, one can imagine at least three possible scenarios in North Korea concerning Korean "reunification." (1) North Korea could collapse like East Germany, or Rumania for that matter, following a popular revolution against the government. This would place South Korea in the position of paying huge amounts of money to integrate the North Korean economy into that of South Korea. Not being as comparatively strong as West Germany, this might well bring South Korea to the point of collapse or beyond it. (2) The North Korean government could carry out a controlled opening of its doors to the outside world in a selective manner, while at the same time engaging in its own version of "perestroika," if not "glasnost." The attempt would be to avoid the "spiritual pollution of Western bourgeois liberalism," of the kind that led to the Tiananmen Square Incident in China. This would maintain the North as a viable institution, able to take care of itself in collaboration with the South during a period of transition. (3) The North Korean government might be overthrown by a coup d'état of progressive minded military and party people, who would carry out changes learned from the experiences of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and then negotiate and collaborate with the South. This would mean that the South would have to pay more for the realignment of the economy of the North than under condition (2) above but a lot less than under condition (1).

Variations of the above scenarios can easily be imagined. But clearly a collapse of the kind that happened in East Germany — and that may have weighed on the minds of perceptive thinkers in South Korea and even in the North in recent years — would not be in the interests of South Korea.

Despite all the talk of the "economic miracle" of South Korea and statistics that purport to show that it has a Gross National Product (GNP) four, five, or even ten times larger than that of the North, South Korea does not have the economic strength in comparison to North Korea that West Germany had to East Germany. Even in terms of population, East Germany with less than 20 million was only one-third the size of West Germany with its almost 60 million,
whereas North Korea with about 20 million is about one-half the size of South Korea. In land mass North Korea is approximately the equal of South Korea and in terms of the potential of mineral wealth it is superior.

Finally the political legitimacy of East Germany was highly compromised by the stationing of Russian troops there for so many years. East Germany did not champion the reunification of the motherland, as has North Korea. In addition North Korean independence vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, thanks to the proximity of the People’s Republic of China, is much greater than East Germany’s. And finally no matter how exaggerated are the tales of Kim Il Sung’s participation in the Korean resistance to Japan, that gives him a legitimacy never enjoyed by the East German leadership.

One can also imagine various scenarios taking place in South Korea that could affect reunification.

(1) Increasing anti-government riots in South Korea demanding the resignation of President Roh Tae Woo, which might result in some faction of the army taking over again as has happened in the past. If that happened, it would slow down the process of reunification, because it would probably use the anti-Communist National Security Laws to crack down on the students and others. But this scenario seems unlikely, given the present world situation and the widespread attitudes against military intrusion in politics both internally and abroad.

(2) The South Korean government may make concessions to the anti-government protestors by abrogation or significant revision of the National Security Laws. After all, the government on Taiwan in May 1991 abrogated the Law on Suppression of the Communist Rebellion. If Taiwan that is so small compared to mainland China can do this, how about South Korea? This could lead to a more democratic approach to reunification in that the government would not be able to monopolize the process of reunification, as it has so far.

One cannot predict what will happen, but it is ironic in the light of the past that the South and the North may gradually start to collaborate for extending the life of the North Korean regime for the sake of a more peaceful and orderly transition than that which occurred in Germany.

East and West Germany had years of closer contact than North and South Korea have today. That included communication, travel and trade. In the case of the Koreas, the first direct trade between the two parts was initiated when a South Korean freighter left Mokpo on July 27, 1991 for Nanjin in North Korea loaded with 5,000 tons of
South Korean Tongil (Reunification) variety rice, grown in the South in 1988. It had been arranged that payment would be made in coal and cement. This was the first trickle in what bids fair to become torrent in both directions in time.

On the international political level contact was growing fast also. Seeing that its two staunchest allies would no longer keep South Korea out of the United Nations, North Korea reversed itself on full U.N. membership and then on July 8, 1991, handed in its own application for membership in the U.N. Assembly. A month later when South Korea had submitted its application, the U.N. Security Council adopted a resolution recommending both North and South Korea be granted entry simultaneously.

Thus, the challenge to both North and South Korea is the same — find a way (or many ways) to work together for the mutual benefit of both the North and the South, for the future generations of Korea as a whole, and for regional and world peace and prosperity.

---

CHAPTER V

PEACE, COOPERATION, AND REUNIFICATION IN KOREA

Byung-Joon Ahn

PEACE AND COOPERATION BEFORE REUNIFICATION

Despite movement toward reunification by China, and the unification of the two Germanies — Korea remains a divided nation. The cold war continues on the Korean peninsula, both politically and militarily.

North-South Korean relations are moving from confrontation to negotiation. Dialogues on political and military issues have begun, but no substantive progress will be seen in the immediate future. North Korea continues to guard its political system under Kim Il-Sung, despite strong external pressure for change. When the North Koreans deliberately transform the political structure, then the North and South will achieve peace, cooperation, reconciliation, and eventually reunification.

Five conclusions may be drawn from the status of North-South Korean relations:

First, the international trend toward detente and interdependence is forcing the two Koreas to move toward peace and cooperation. The impact of international changes will encourage direct dialogues between the two sides, which in turn will "Koreanize" their relationship and normalize diplomatic relations, ultimately resulting in crossrecognition.

Second, the South has achieved democratization at home and greater international acclaim for having successfully hosted the 1988 Olympics. As a result, the South is in a position to normalize relations with socialist countries through its Nordpolitik initiative. In conjunction with its diplomatic initiative, the South has begun to pursue a policy of building a Korean commonwealth with the North.

Third, although North Korea's economy is stagnant and the Northern government has made efforts to improve relations with the South, the U.S., and Japan — the present Northern leadership is committed to preserving the current political system.

Fourth, North-South relations are shifting into an era of recognition. Militarily and politically, the South is in a more favorable posi-
tion than the North, which has been reluctant to negotiate for domestic reasons. The main issues of negotiation will, therefore, be arms control and economic cooperation.

Fifth, though little will be achieved from North-South dialogues in the next few years, both sides anticipate that negotiation will bring peace, cooperation, and reunification. To achieve these goals, the two Koreas will need the support of the U.S., Japan, China, and the Soviet Union.

The following elements affect the current status of North-South Korean relations: 1) the international situation, 2) the situation in South Korea, and 3) the situation in North Korea. The South Koreans and the international politics favor negotiation, while the North Koreans remain ambivalent.

THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT: GLOBAL DETENTE AND DE JURE CROSSRECOGNITION

The changing international environment reveals a clear trend toward global detente, which in turn is transforming the relationship between the two Koreas from de facto to de jure crossrecognition. Among the changes that have a substantial impact on the Korean peninsula are the end of the cold war, the thrust toward German unification, political shifts in Eastern Europe, normalization of Soviet-South Korean relations, the U.S. strategic view toward Asia, and the rise of Japan as a global economic power.

1. The End of the Cold War and the Advent of German Unification

The multitude of changes that have occurred in Eastern Europe signal the end of the cold war, as the NATO leaders at the London summit declared in July 1990. German unification also changed with its currency reunification on July 1, 1990. More than anything else, the (so far) successful merging of two economies in Germany acts as persuasive pressure on North Korea to modify its rigid stand on unification. The resurrection of civil societies — along with the resurgence of pluralism and market forces — in Eastern European countries is making North Korea an international outcast, even among the socialist states.

After Gorbachev changed the Brezhnev Doctrine into the Sinatra Doctrine, the Soviet Union decided to pull troops out of Eastern Europe, virtually ending the cold war. After its ideology is challenged and war is no longer a viable state plan, communism will inevitably
CHAPTER V

91
collapse, as demonstrated so graphically by the Romanian incident. The assertion of ethnic nationalism in the Soviet Union is threatening to break apart this communist empire. The Warsaw Pact seems to have become defunct, and a unified Germany is a foregone conclusion. At the sixth U.S.-USSR summit in June 1990, Presidents Bush and Gorbachev renewed their commitment to the new detente with their agreements on START nuclear weapon reductions and new trade relations.

2. Normalization of Soviet-South Korean Relations

The Soviet Union is gradually normalizing its diplomatic relations with South Korea in the midst of these changes. It is remarkable that Moscow has begun to separate the Korean question from its global rivalry with the U.S. — and even from its alliance with Pyongyang. Gorbachev signaled this to Kim Young Sam when they met in the Kremlin on March 22, 1990.¹

North Korea is interested in securing as much economic cooperation as possible from South Korea; it is also engaged in a diplomatic game — playing South Korea against Japan in an attempt to prod Japan into changing its policy. At the same time South Korea hopes to use its leverage over North Korea, so that the latter can emulate the examples of Eastern European countries by initiating reforms and greater opening to the world community.

Moscow is applying its New Thinking and Glasnost to Asia in general and Korea in particular. Thus, Moscow has begun to take up the issue of divided Korea in its bilateral talks with Washington. On record, it is urging both Seoul and Pyongyang to resume dialogues and reduce tensions. The Soviet press accurately reported and openly characterized North Korea as Kim Il Sung's personal museum.² For this reason Alexander Shebin, a veteran correspondent based in Pyongyang for seven years, was expelled from North Korea in May 1990.³ Nevertheless, since establishing a consular department in Seoul in January 1990, Moscow has been seeking a “two-Koreas” policy by diplomatically recognizing the Republic of Korea. The summit meeting of Presidents Roh and Gorbachev in San Francisco on June 5, 1990 marked the culmination of this process, which will have far-reaching impact on North-South Korean relations.

With its relations with Washington steadily improving, Moscow

¹ Korean Herald, March 31, 1990.
² Yomiuri Shimbun, April 1, 1990.
is interested in applying pressure on Pyongyang to sign the safeguard agreement regarding the nuclear reprocessing facilities in Youngbyun. Moreover, Moscow has made it clear that establishing peace and stability on the Korean peninsula takes precedence over accomplishing unification. Thus, its view on security and economic matters have been edging toward Seoul's.

3. The U.S. Strategic Review: Troop Reduction and Arms Control

After conducting a strategic review of the presence of American forces in Asia and Korea, the U.S. plans to reduce troops in its forward deployment. As the U.S. plans to reduce troops stationed in South Korea (in pace with North Korea's willingness to take measures to build confidence), this review should encourage arms control negotiations between the North and the South.

Under the Nunn-Warner Amendment, the Bush administration has submitted a report concerning this review to Congress, which envisions a future transition where South Korea assumes "a leading role" and the U.S. "a supporting role" in South Korea's defense. According to Paul Wolfowitz, who explained the report, the U.S. would play the role of "a region balancer, honest broker and an ultimate security guarantor" in Asia. As for Korea, the report provides a flexible timetable outlining three stages for both the reduction of American troops and the sharing of the financial burden. During the first phase in 1991-93, the U.S. will reduce American forces by 7,000 persons, including 2,000 Air Force personnel and 5,000 noncombatants. Washington has asked Seoul to appoint the chief delegate to the Military Armistice Commission and to increase South Korea's burden of maintaining American troops to $1.3 billion.

During the second stage in 1994-95, the U.S. will reexamine the North Korean threat, the state of North-South relations, and improvements in South Korea's military capabilities — and then consider further U.S. military restructuring. At this stage, the U.S. can transfer operational control over land forces to a Korean general. Finally, during the third stage in 1996-2000, the U.S. expects South Korea to take the lead role in defense.

It is evident that this report is prompting Seoul to increasingly

4. The text of Paul Wolfowitz's testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee on April 19, 1990.
assume responsibility for Korea’s own defense. Equally clear is the assumed linkage between American troop reduction and North-South arms control possibilities, because all U.S. forces will be withdrawn from Korea only when the North and the South agree on a confidence building measure that can assure peace and stability.

4. Japan as a Global Actor: A Regional Political Role

The relative decline of the U.S., and the Chinese and the Soviet preoccupation with their own domestic problems have helped to change the status of Japan from a “free rider” to a global actor. With growing economic and technological power, Japan has begun to reassert a regional political role in Asia.

While the U.S. continues to play a balancing security role, Japan is being asked to play more important roles in economic matters. Since Japan does not have many friends in Asia, it has eschewed from assuming security roles. But Tokyo is currently aiming at asserting its political role commensurate with its economic clout by increasing its international activities. Evidence of this trend is indicated by Japan’s resumption of credit to China, for which Prime Minister Kaifu sought President Bush’s approval at the Houston Summit in July 1990. By inviting President Roh in May 1990, Tokyo provided Emperor Akihito with a chance to apologize to South Korea by saying that he felt the deepest regret for the suffering of Koreans caused by his country during the colonial period.6 Besides these gestures, Tokyo is planning to use the Emperor’s visit to South Korea and other Asian countries as a means to enhance Japan’s image abroad. In this symbolic manner, Japan is attempting to play a stabilizing role in Korea and throughout Asia.

It should be clear from the analysis below that South Korea has become an active global participant. In contrast, North Korea has alienated itself by rejecting the global trends toward political pluralism and economic interdependence.

THE SOUTH KOREAN SITUATION: STABILITY AND SELF-CONFIDENCE

The propitious development in the international system coupled with the democratization and economic development at home has enabled South Korea to project a measure of stability and self-confidence in its foreign policies and unification efforts. This can be discerned from Seoul’s Nordpolitik diplomacy and the idea of a Korean Com-

monwealth. The merger of three parties into one large ruling party does hold some political uncertainty, but it is being regarded as a preparation for the coming era of negotiations with the North.

1. Economic and Political Development

Although the South Korean economy is facing a sluggish phase now with the rising prices of land, goods, services, and labor, South Korea has demonstrated its potential by hosting the 1988 Olympics. If it achieves a successful structural adjustment to overcome current difficulties, South Korea could become one of ten leading trading countries by the end of this century.

In addition, South Korean politics have experienced democratization since June 1987 when Roh Tae Woo agreed to accept demands for the popular election of the president. Elections and party politics have been restored; human rights and an independent judiciary have also been reactivated. As a result, the old pattern of authoritarianism is being transformed into a new pattern of pluralism. Although politicians have failed to elicit public support, the overall trend of democratization seems to be irreversible. As institutions of democracy set their roots in the State and society, there will emerge an optimal balance between economic development and political stability in South Korea.

2. Nordpolitik: Crossrecognition

Seoul's diplomatic success in Nordpolitik, i.e., its policy toward China, the Soviet Union, and other socialist countries, has been quite spectacular. Since South Korea established diplomatic relations with Hungary in February 1989, South Korea has similarly done so with Poland, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Mongolia. On October 20, 1990, South Korea and China signed a treaty establishing trade offices on each side’s capital and promoting normalization of foreign relations. It is also on the verge of establishing diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. It is currently engaged in negotiations for this diplomatic purpose with Vietnam and the other remaining socialist countries.

South Korea’s economic relations with these countries have rapidly expanded. In 1989, trade with these countries exceeded $4 billion, making South Korea their fourth largest trade partner: about $3 billion with China, $600 million with the Soviet Union, and $400

---

CHAPTER V

million with Eastern European countries. Its investment and cultural relations are also likely to expand in the years to come.

3. A Korean Commonwealth

Against the backdrop of these developments, President Roh announced a plan in September 1989 for building a Korean Commonwealth. The key to this new proposal is to institutionalize ministerial meetings, summits of the highest authorities, and consultations of representatives from the two legislatures as an interim forum before accomplishing reunification.

It is important to note that the South pledged itself to treating the North as a partner in the process of building a national community. In so doing, the South accommodated much of the North's contentions for equal representation and addressing military and political issues first. By embarking on programs to build confidence and facilitate economic cooperation, this proposal seeks to lay the groundwork for reunification which will be achieved by peaceful agreement.

4. Party Realignment for a Grand Ruling Party

On January 22, 1990, Roh Tae Woo, Kim Young Sam, and Kim Jong Pil reached a dramatic agreement to merge their parties into the new Democratic-Liberal Party, which enabled them to enjoy an overwhelming majority in the National Assembly. One motivation for this move was to restore unity and stability in preparation for negotiations with the North.

This merger served to end the political stalemate that had plagued Korean politics since Roh was elected as president with only 37 percent of the popular vote. The outbreak of infighting between Kim Young Sam and Roh, however, has disappointed the public. Faced with economic and social malaise, the leaders are trying hard to preserve a united front.

Whatever happens to their struggle for political succession, it is inescapable that this new party will be primarily responsible for governance and for devising policies toward the North.

From a comparative perspective, the South Korean situation has improved a great deal. Hence, the South is in a position to accommodate most of the North's demands with a sense of self-confidence, except for those attempts at military or revolutionary provocation.
THE NORTH KOREAN SITUATION: ISOLATION AND DEFENSIVENESS

North Korea is isolated, because it is defensive against the democratic revolution rising in its erstwhile allies. North Korea is bent on keeping socialism by consolidating the existing system under Kim Il Sung. New ideas in the North are not so much in the substance of politics and policy as in the style. An example of such a change is found in Pyongyang's deliberate efforts to improve relations with Washington and Tokyo.

1. Diplomatic Isolation

It is evident that North Korea is isolated, even from the socialist countries. Pyongyang has recalled most of its students from the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries. After its ambassadors to these countries had an emergency meeting in January 1990, Pyongyang halted verbal attacks on those countries which established diplomatic relations with the South.

China is one of the few countries still friendly with North Korea. In March 1990, Jiang Zemin paid a formal visit to Pyongyang and promised to defend socialism with North Korea. But China's reforms and open-door policy are at odds with North Korea's rigid central planning and self-reliance policy. Most devastating of all is Gorbachev's summit with Roh which hit at the heart of Kim Il Sung's political legitimacy. He has lost support from those on which he could rely as a source of strength.

2. Economic Stagnation

All indicators show that the North Korean economy is stagnating. The lack of infrastructure, incentives, and proper policy accounts for this. The bulk of the North's industrial production depends on plants and technologies from the Soviet Union. Over one half of its trade has been with the Soviet Union. Apparently, both China and the Soviet Union have decreased supplies of energy and goods to the North in recent years.

Since Pyongyang has defaulted on its payments for foreign debt, it cannot successfully invite trade and investment from the West. The rule of diminishing returns seems to be further limiting its productivity. Most serious of all is the shortage of food and necessities. This picture is really far from the North's official depiction of itself as a paradise on earth.
3. Internal Consolidation

Faced with external isolation and economic difficulties, North Korea has chosen to consolidate the political system in the mold of Kim Il Sung's cult of personality and long-held philosophy. The Ninth Supreme People's Assembly was formed in April 1990, six months ahead of schedule to consolidate "the people's regime." Contrary to expectations, Kim Il Sung was reelected as president to a fifth term at the first session in May; he further pledged to uphold his brand of socialism. He put some of the old military guards in positions of power and appointed his son Jong-il as the second ranking Vice Chairman of the National Defense Commission. One third of the new 687-member parliament are newcomers who are allegedly followers of Jong-il. Interestingly enough, about six percent of them are non-communist party members. Also noteworthy is the fact that most provincial governors are members of the Central People's Committee, while premier Yong Hyong-muk of the State Council is not a member. 8

4. A Softer Stance Toward the South, the U.S., and Japan

In his speech to the Supreme People's Assembly, Kim Il Sung revealed a somewhat softer stance toward the South, the U.S. and Japan. In a five-point statement on unification, he reaffirmed the familiar calls for a peace agreement with U.S., for free movement of people by removing "concrete walls" between the North and the South along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), for abrogating anti-communist laws, for building an international environment conducive to unification, for resuming dialogues not only between authorities but also between social groups and political parties, and, finally, for forming a national united front involving all Koreans at home and abroad.

The only new aspect in this speech was revealed when he said: "If the North and the South are to join the U.N. before Korea's reunification is achieved, they must not hold two separate seats but enter it jointly as one member." 9 This is designed to forestall the South's unilateral entry into the U.N.

The way in which Kim Il Sung departed from his previous speeches is that he avoided attacks on the U.S. and Japan. Moreover, North Korea returned the remains of five American soldiers killed in the Korean War to the United States at Panmunjom on May 28, 1990 as a humanitarian gesture. This is only a tiny fraction of the 8,172

---

military personnel listed as missing in action [MIA] that are still unaccounted for since the Korean War ended in 1953. By offering further returns, Pyongyang is calling upon the U.S. to upgrade the level of negotiations that have been held at the consulate level in Beijing to an ambassadorial talk at some other place.

Clearly, Pyongyang is signalling a willingness to improve its relations with Washington. Yet Washington has insisted that Pyongyang stop supporting state terrorism, resume dialogues with Seoul, stop diatribes on the U.S., sign the safeguard agreement on nuclear facilities, and expand confidence building measures in addition to further accounting for U.S. MIA’s. Unless there is real progress in these areas, Pyongyang’s approaches to Washington are likely to remain fruitless.

What concerns the North Korean leaders most is how to keep their system intact in the face of serious challenges from abroad. Their priority lies in justifying their continued rule to their domestic audience. By tightly controlling channels of communication, they are trying to minimize the impact of foreign inputs and find their own way to survive politically. Should they allow reform as did many Eastern European countries or as did the Soviet Union under Gorbachev, their own power will be in jeopardy. They have little choice but to opt for the Chinese model of defending their political stakes while allowing some economic reforms. This is why they refuse to change. Hence, they have become defensive by displaying a soft flexible stance at least in style, if not in substance, toward the outside world.

NORTH-SOUTH KOREAN RELATIONS AT A CROSSROAD

North-South Korean relations are at a crossroad between confrontation and negotiation. The diplomatic and economic race has been won by the South, and even the military and political race seems to be shifting that way. But the North relies primarily on the so-called “Juch’e” ideology of unification which refuses to recognize the South Korean system, whereas the South is diversifying the sources of its political legitimacy by achieving democratization, economic development, social welfare, and internationalization.

Confrontation seems inevitable as long as the two different systems struggle for legitimacy and security. Negotiation is also necessary for survival and coexistence. Settlement of pending issues, such as economic cooperation and arms control can be achieved only through dialogue. Substantial differences in the way that the two sides approach these issues still exist.
1. The Struggle for Political Legitimacy: Peace before or after Unification

The North and the South have been struggling for political legitimacy. The North has attempted to legitimize itself via the Juche ideology and by applying it to the South through advocating unification before peace. The South, however, has been trying to engage the North in dialogues so that peace can be assured before unification, which should be reached through mutual agreement. The very nature of the North Korean political system compels Pyongyang to seek a united front strategy against the South to justify its own political legitimacy to its domestic audience and to some sympathizers in the South.\(^\text{10}\)

This struggle is a distinctive aspect of North-South Korean relations. Unlike the two Germanies, both sides are technically at war, with hostilities abated by an armistice, creating a zero-sum game with a high quotient of distrust and hostility.\(^\text{11}\) In this sense, political and military conflicts are combined. The North still refuses to recognize the South as a legitimate entity while the South is ready to accept the North as a partner for a North-South Commonwealth.\(^\text{12}\)


The military balance along the DMZ favors the North at least in quantity because it has about one million troops, whereas the South has only 600,000. Given the size of South Korea's GNP, which is almost eight times that of North Korea's, and the level of the South's technology, the balance should soon shift in the South's favor in terms of quality.

Because the North has deployed 60 percent of its forces along the DMZ and because Seoul is only 35 miles away from the DMZ, the North has reduced the warning time for attacks to only 24 hours. The American troops between Panmunjom and Seoul serve as the most effective deterrent to a possible North Korean invasion. For political reasons, Pyongyang has consistently demanded the South's withdrawal and replacement of the armistice with a peace agreement with


3. Dialogue: Between Social Groups or Governmental Authorities

Thus far, there have been three rounds of dialogue since 1971. From January 1988 through July 1990, there were thirty-five contacts at Panmunjom: nine preliminary sessions preparing for a senior level political and military talk, eleven preliminary sessions preparing for a parliamentary talk, fifteen sessions of sport talks preparing for a single team for the Asian Games in Beijing, and seven sessions of working level Red Cross talks preparing for resumption of family visits and exchanges of art troupes. Just before “Team Spirit 1990” got underway, the North unilaterally suspended all of these dialogues. Even after the South called for their resumption after the exercise was over, the North showed a negative reaction, complaining that the South had refused to accept revolutionary plays. Suddenly in June 1990, however, the North called for resumption of high level parliamentary talks, and the South welcomed this.

In principle, Pyongyang wants to have a dialogue, but insists on having political consultative meetings of leaders from various social groups and political parties, in addition to the talks between the two authorities. For example, Pyongyang has extended an invitation to President Roh not as the president of the Republic of Korea, but as the ruling party — along with others, including dissident leaders.

Seoul also wants to have talks with Pyongyang. Preferring governmental talks, the South is committed to blunting any attempt by Pyongyang to capitalize on the divisiveness within the South Korean society. Since August 1989, Seoul has added democracy to peace and self-determination as principles for unification, while calling upon Pyongyang to improve its human rights record.

4. Military Settlement v. Economic Cooperation

Another difference in the approach is the degree to which each authority places emphasis on military settlement as its first priority and calls for the withdrawal of American troops. Seoul favors having economic, social, and cultural cooperation first — and moving onto the more difficult military and political settlement later in order to relax tension and to restore trust. Since October 1988, when President Roh said at the U.N. that he would go to Pyongyang to discuss any

13. Ibid., pp. 200-205.
issues raised by Kim Il Sung including those on the non-aggression declaration and arms control, Seoul has been trying to accommodate Pyongyang's calls for military talks as well.

Since Seoul set out to accommodate Pyongyang's preference for political and military issues at high level talks in July 1990, both sides agreed to convene prime minister level talks in September and October 1990. Hence, this round of dialogue has raised hopes for opening a new era in North-South relations.

Indeed, there are emerging some areas of convergence as Seoul is ready to take up military issues and Pyongyang is interested in economic cooperation. For example, the North invited Chung Ju Young, honorary chairman of the Hyundai Group, in January 1989, and persuaded him to sign an agreement for the development of a tourist attraction around Mount Kumgang. But when Mr. Chung wanted to deliver some vehicles and equipment before his second visit, Pyongyang rejected the offers in May 1990.

It should be noted here that Seoul can make concessions on economic cooperation and Pyongyang on military settlement. If the two sides are seriously interested in probing each other's interests, they can find some common ground. It is significant that Pyongyang made a proposal for arms control right after the plan for the Roh-Gorbachev summit was announced. The proposal called for a direct meeting between the North and the South for the first time, even though it revealed almost no new substance.14

PROSPECTS: PEACE, COOPERATION AND REUNIFICATION

Considering the changing international environment and the North-South Korea situation, a long term and gradual development should involve first peace, then cooperation, and finally reunification. International political changes and the South Korean situation augur well for making such a shift from military confrontation to political negotiation. North Korea seems to be hesitating mainly for domestic reasons. But even the North cannot go against the mainstream of history forever; it has little choice but to accept dialogue, crossrecognition, confidence-building measures, cooperation, and reunification by mutual agreement.

1. Dialogues

Resuming dialogues between the two governments is the surest way to build trust and peace. Once Seoul and Pyongyang resolve to settle their differences through negotiation, it will be easy for them to reach agreement on issues such as crossrecognition, arms control, economic cooperation, and reunification on the basis of common interests.

Logically speaking, there is no reason why Presidents Roh and Kim could not have a summit for this purpose, given that the Roh-Gorbachev summit was realized. Even without such a summit, the responsible authorities should negotiate pending issues. It is unrealistic that they can be resolved through meetings of social groups, as the North is demanding. The first priority in the North-South relationship, therefore, should be to resume a series of dialogues between the two governments for the purpose of probing each other's real interests on the basis of self-determination for all of Korea, instead of rehashing the propaganda of the past. This is the essence of what is meant by the "Koreanization of the Korean question."

2. Crossrecognition

The surrounding powers should render assistance and urge both sides to have dialogues. To do so requires that they normalize relations with the North and the South. China and the Soviet Union should normalize their relations with South Korea, and the United States and Japan should normalize their relations with North Korea. It must be emphasized that this should only be a provisional state of diplomatic relations until the Korean peninsula is completely reunified (provided, of course, that North Korea and South Korea remain peaceful in the meantime).

The North's contention that such crossrecognition is a device to perpetuate the Korean division has been discredited by the German reunification. By no means is crossrecognition an end in itself; it is only a means to reduce tension and encourage cooperation. Also, the North seems to change its position on crossrecognition, demonstrated by the fact that the North is cooperative in applying for one-vote U.N. membership with the South — although it is unrealistic to imagine how these two states can function together with only one vote if both are admitted to the U.N.

3. Confidence-Building Measures and Arms Control

Now that the North has indicated a willingness to have direct military talks with the South, there is a possibility that the two sides
can have constructive negotiations concerning arms control and confidence-building. In fact, many points in Pyongyang's recent proposal coincide with what Seoul has consistently advocated. Among these are operational measures like informing each other of military exercises and making the DMZ a truly demilitarized zone.

It is significant that Pyongyang proposed placing confidence-building measures and the need for the reduction of forces on both sides before the withdrawal of American troops and other items. In addition, it did not specify a timetable for such withdrawal in this new proposal. This comprehensive proposal contains important measures to build political confidence and improve Korea's image, which should precede other operational and structural arms control steps, as was similarly done in European negotiations. No less important is that Pyongyang has indicated its serious willingness to negotiate confidence-building and arms control with Seoul bilaterally.

To realize a structural arms control measure like the reduction of armed forces and disengagement of forward deployment from the frontline necessarily requires long and hard bargaining. This is why a political talk should precede a military talk in Korea. It can contribute to restoring some measure of trust, economic cooperation, and other exchanges which might be considered confidence-building measures. Most important of all, given the tense military situation along the DMZ, negotiating a disengagement of troops and offensive equipment by both sides to a rear area is essential to assure deterrence, as a one Soviet arms control expert has proposed.15

After the North and the South reach some agreement on these matters, other concerned parties can be involved in guaranteeing their implementation. From this perspective, linking progress in arms control to the reduction of American forces is necessary, not only to facilitate political dialogue, but also to encourage military talks between North and South Korea. After the two sides conclude a peace agreement, the U.S., China and other concerned powers can discuss the issue of ending the armistice and endorsing the peace agreement.

4. Peace, Cooperation and Reunification

In conclusion, a realistic prospect for North-South Korean relations is a scenario of peace, cooperation, and reunification. If the

North decides to accommodate such a process or experience some structural transformation as have other socialist countries, the potential time span of this prospect of unity will be shortened. Translating such a scenario into action accords with the goal of diffusing the Korean cold war and of sustaining the global detente that is becoming universal. Seen in this light, there seems to be no more important task than keeping peace and stability on the Korean peninsula which has become an island of the cold war in contemporary international relations.
CHAPTER VI

PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS FOR PEACE AND UNIFICATION IN KOREA

Sung-Joo Han

INTRODUCTION

Since the three-year Korean Conflict ended 37 years ago, there has not been a war on the Korean Peninsula. But the peace has been an uneasy one, often punctuated by incidents and clashes that could have escalated into a major conflict. Both North and South Korea have lived with the fear that the other side might be inclined to provoke a war. The arms buildup on both sides and the alliance relationships that have evolved to date can be traced directly back to the war and the resultant anxiety and sense of insecurity. Thus, it has been a precarious peace, maintained by a balance of defense and deterrence capabilities.

Today, in 1990, the Korean people on both sides of the demarcation line, have an historic opportunity to make that peace more durable and to make the unification of their divided country a reality. The objective circumstances, both domestic and international, allow the two sides to begin to build bridges of exchange, open channels of communication, and devise means of cooperation that will make the relationship less dangerous and more productive, as well as more conducive to peaceful unification. However, this can only happen if the two sides transform their old ways of confrontation and rivalry into new approaches of accommodation and cooperation. They must learn to refrain from mutual recrimination and accusation, from attempts to take advantage of each other's internal political dynamics and from the creation of artificial obstacles and preconditions to constructive talks and exchanges which could otherwise lead to cooperation and peace, and ultimately to unification.

The international situation today is ripe for a breakthrough in the North-South Korean situation. Increasingly, members of the international community are placing greater importance on economic advancement rather than on political or military goals. All this is evidenced not only by improvement of the major power relations, but also by the actual and prospective improvement of relations between
traditional rivals in the area. This means that as the North and the South are undergoing a major change from confrontation to accommodation, both in form and in substance, other countries are not likely to object to, or obstruct, the development of constructive and productive relationships between them.

Furthermore, during the past several years, South Korea has gone through rapid political change and economic development that would make it necessary and ready to start to expand exchanges and cooperation with North Korea. Indeed, South Korea has undergone a political transformation that makes it receptive to any reasonable proposals about improving North-South Korean relations that North Korea can offer. Economically, South Korea, which has had double-digit growth during the past years, is becoming a major power. This presents both North and South Korea with an extraordinary opportunity to cooperate for the common prosperity of all the Korean people. As they cooperate, work together, freely travel in each other's territory, and conduct economic, cultural, sports and other exchanges, the chances of peace and of unification will ultimately be enhanced.

In order to achieve permanent peace on the Korean Peninsula, unification of the country would be the best way. Even as Koreans strive for peaceful unification, however, they have to recognize that it is not going to be an easy and quick task, considering the mutual distrust that pervades the relationship between the two sides, as well as differences in ideological orientations, socio-economic structures and political systems. However, there is no reason to leave all forms of exchange and cooperation until the day when unification is achieved.

Thus, in order to promote peace and the unification of Korea, the two Koreas should adopt a gradual and simultaneous approach. As they work on the grand design of unification, they can also work for the gradual reduction of tension, through arms talks and confidence-building measures. At the same time, they can and should try to build a structure of peace based on an agreement between North and South Korea — which one might call a peace agreement — which will replace the present armistice structure.

In short, what is most urgently needed is the building of confidence, which has been lacking between the North and South ever since the outbreak of the Korean Conflict in 1950. Rather than simply talking about the results of tension, such as the weapons systems and deterrence capability, they have to go to the causes thereof, which are intentions and anxieties. As confidence and trust build up, it will be possible to restructure the security arrangements that North and South Korea have with their respective allies.
THE STATE OF NORTH-SOUTH KOREAN RELATIONS

Twice since 1953, when the Korean War ended with the signing of an armistice, both North and South Korea were engaged in serious dialogues to improve their hostile relationship, with a third occasion yet to come. The first dialogue took place during the 1972-73 period, when the North-South Korean Red Cross met to discuss the possibility of reuniting family members separated between the two areas. Subsequently, the two sides agreed to establish a North-South Coordinating Committee to discuss reconciliation and reunification. The dialogue was discontinued in 1973 because of Pyongyang's refusal to deal with the Seoul government. The second period of North-South Korean dialogue was between 1984 and 1985. At that time, North-South Korean talks were divided into four different subjects — Red Cross/family reunion, economic cooperation, political discussion between the parliamentarians, and sports. By examining why the conciliation talks of the mid-1980s failed to produce any positive results, we can diagnose the problems of today's North-South Korean relationship and prognosticate its future.

In 1984, hopes of North-South reconciliation arose when North Korea made, and South Korea accepted, an offer of relief supplies to aid victims of the flood in September of the same year. That gesture opened the way for the economic talks — the first between high-ranking representatives of the Pyongyang and Seoul governments since the division of the country, as well as meetings to discuss issues related to family reunion and possible North Korean participation in the 1988 Olympics. The Red Cross talks in 1985 led to an exchange of meetings in Seoul and Pyongyang, and also to visits by 50 separated family members from each side to the "other area" where many of them had reunions with their kin and relatives.

Pyongyang apparently concluded that talks with Seoul would be a necessary step in establishing ties with Western powers, particularly with the United States and Japan. It also saw talks with Seoul as a necessary means of realizing its proposal for "tripartite talks" among the United States and North and South Korea, inasmuch as the United States was insisting that direct inter-Korea talks should precede any possible multilateral negotiation on the Korean issue.

North Korea probably had an economic motivation as well for opening the various channels of dialogue with South Korea. Recognizing that it was lagging behind the South economically, it wished to move out of its political and diplomatic isolation and regain its ability to borrow from abroad and trade with other countries — an ability that had been seriously damaged by previous debt defaults. By start-
ing dialogues with South Korea, Pyongyang hoped to open the possibility of starting or otherwise expanding economic exchanges with noncommunist countries such as the United States, Japan and the countries of Western Europe.

The South Korean government had its own political motives for welcoming Pyongyang's willingness, although shortlived, to engage in talks with the South. As the host country for various major international events, including the Olympic Games that were to come, it was eager to secure North Korean acquiescence, if not cooperation. At the same time, the improvement of North-South Korean relations was seen by Seoul as a necessary step to open its own relations with the Soviet Union and China. Seoul also hoped that the North-South Korean dialogues and exchanges and improving relations with the "northern neighbors" would promote peace and the possibility of unification in Korea.

Renewed exchanges in the mid-1980s led nowhere, as several obstacles kept Pyongyang from seriously pursuing accommodation with South Korea. Pyongyang was constrained by its own ideology and by political requirements. For Pyongyang, dealing directly and officially with South Korean "authorities" was tantamount to accepting the "two Koreas" formula, which it had opposed all along. Furthermore, it did not have any intention of making it easy for Seoul to stage the 1988 Olympic Games successfully, as it was understandably unhappy that the potential participation of North Korea's allies in the games would enhance South Korea's prestige.

Under these circumstances, when the South Korean domestic political scene became increasingly volatile and unpredictable, Pyongyang decided at the end of 1985 to suspend all talks, ostensibly in protest of the U.S.-R.O.K. "Team Spirit" military exercise. Inasmuch as the exercise had been a regular annual event, it was clear that North Korea concluded that the dialogue had to be suspended until after the political situation in South Korea, as well as in North Korea itself, was sorted out. North Korea was undergoing a process of succession and, hence, one could not rule out the possibility of a policy debate within its leadership.

In the final analysis, the second period of North-South Korean dialogue came to an end because neither side had a genuine interest in a productive outcome from the exercise. Pyongyang was afraid of "conferring legitimacy" on the South Korean government and also of facilitating South Korean expansion of relationships with its own allies, particularly the Soviet Union and China. It saw the possibility of the South Korean policy collapsing under the weight of its own inter-
nal division, a lack of legitimacy and political instability. On the other hand, the South Korean government was afraid of a false sense of security that might result from superficial reconciliation with the northern adversary, and which might, in turn, lead to the weakening of the U.S. security commitment to Korea. Both protagonists recognized the usefulness of the status quo and the absence of a major breakthrough in inter-Korean relations, at least for the time being. In short, inter-Korea talks between both Pyongyang and Seoul were not likely to be seen as a means to achieve a genuine improvement of relations between them. Thus, it came as no surprise that the talks produced no positive results.

North Korea refrained from participation in the Seoul Olympics altogether, and instead concentrated on staging a successful International Youth Festival, which was held in June 1989. South Korean student activists were invited to the event. The South Korean government, for its part, insisted that the visits and exchanges should be undertaken within a framework agreed upon by Seoul and Pyongyang. Pyongyang, however, intended to bypass the Seoul government and take advantage of the pluralistic nature of the South Korean polity. Unproductive as they were, talks nonetheless continued in a sporadic fashion between both North and South Korea for a while in several areas, holding out a slim hope that one day a breakthrough in North-South Korean relations might take place. Even those talks have been suspended completely since 1989.

Meanwhile, Seoul and Pyongyang continued to exchange unification proposals. In response to Pyongyang’s call for a Washington-Seoul-Pyongyang tripartite meeting to discuss military matters and the withdrawal of U.S. troops, Seoul proposed a North-South Korean discussion on a peace agreement, credibility-building measures, and arms reduction. In addition, South Korea has shown much eagerness to open economic and trade relations with the North. As a means to encourage economic exchanges, the Seoul government removed restrictions on inter-Korean trade, making it possible for South Korean companies to engage in direct transactions with North Korea and to import North Korean goods.

NEW ELEMENTS IN NORTH-SOUTH KOREAN RELATIONS

In the second half of the 1980s new domestic and international developments have given the North and the South policy dilemmas as well as options that could bring about a change in their relationship. In the international arena, the most notable and important development was a new detente between the United States and the Soviet
Union, which resulted from Gorbachev’s new political thinking and accommodation policy. It not only led to the signing of an new Intermediate Nuclear Force (INF) Treaty between the two superpowers, but also caused a reassessment of U.S. strategic requirements and plans in both Europe and Asia. As the United States is gradually persuaded that both Soviet military might and the threat that it poses are actually decreasing, there is a weakening of U.S. conviction that it needs to counter the Soviet Union militarily throughout the globe and on all levels. A change in the U.S. perception of the Soviet military threat and challenge also affects the U.S. view concerning the strategic value of the Korean Peninsula, as well as the presence of U.S. troops in Korea.

The Soviet Union is extending its conciliatory hand, not only to the United States, but also to its allies. For South Korea, which has been seeking the establishment and expansion of relationships with the socialist (or formerly socialist) countries, the Soviet initiative presented a welcome opportunity to accomplish that goal. Improvement of the relationship between the Soviet Union and South Korea can also serve as an incentive for the United States to seek an improvement of its relationship with North Korea.

Another element that would have an important bearing on U.S. policy toward South Korea is the enormous double deficit — in budget and trade — that the United States has been experiencing for several years. Facing a critical need to cut (or at least slow down the increase of) its defense budget, the United States has been emphasizing “burden-sharing” by its allies in Asia as well as Europe. The temptation to resort to “burden-sharing” grows as the deficit continues to place serious political and financial burdens on the United States. Ironically, the countries who oppose this policy are those with whom the United States has the largest trade deficit — Japan, West Germany and South Korea — where the United States maintains large overseas contingents. These facts combined may very well lead to a reduction of U.S. military presence in those countries. Many Americans are beginning to wonder whether the United States should continue to assume the main defense role for countries which maintain a large trade surplus with the United States at a time when U.S. strategic interests, particularly in relation to military rivalry with the Soviet Union, seem to require reassessment.

While so many changes have taken place in and around the Korean Peninsula, North Korea manifests essentially the same rhetoric and goals that it has maintained for over four decades. Although the changed environment has not caused North Korea to initiate a major
change in its domestic and external policies, it does present a serious policy dilemma to Pyongyang, which has to choose between opening up the country and reconciling with South Korea, on the one hand, and maintaining the existing stance at the cost of further lagging behind in its economy and international standing on the other. The lack of progress in North-South Korean relations, at least until now, presents Seoul with a dilemma of its own in that it has to maintain a strong military posture while everything else points in the opposite direction. At the same time, however, the fluidity of the situation presents both the Seoul and Pyongyang governments with policy options that were not available before, offering the possibility of a significant change of relations between Seoul and Pyongyang.

**POLICY DILEMMAS AND OPTIONS**

The most critical policy question for Pyongyang is whether to open up the country — even partially, to the outside world, at considerable political risk — and thus to forego its time-old goal of driving the South Korean government out of existence. So far, it has shown virtually no indication of doing so, although such a policy choice could be made in the future. Pyongyang can still choose between several alternatives on other more concrete and specific issues concerning its relations with South Korea and the United States.

Pyongyang’s existing policy consists of three key elements: a proposal for a confederation between North and South Korea, namely the Democratic Confederation Republic of Koryo; a call for a tripartite conference of the two Koreas and the United States; and a demand for the withdrawal of U.S. troops. [On May 31, 1990, in the wake of a summit meeting between South Korean President Roh Tae Woo and Soviet President Gorbachev, Pyongyang proposed arms control talks with South Korea.] As preconditions for its implementation, the confederation proposal calls for the signing of a peace agreement between North Korea and the United States and the withdrawal of foreign (U.S.) troops from Korea. From Pyongyang’s point of view, it is a useful proposal, not only because it will be to the political advantage of monolithic North Korea in the unlikely event that the confederation is actually realized, but also, and perhaps more relevantly, because it preserves the propaganda value of Pyongyang’s desire for peaceful reunification, as well as a means of putting pressure on the United States to withdraw its military presence in Korea.

Pyongyang’s proposal for a tripartite conference calls for discussion among the three parties — the United States, North Korea, and South Korea — of the withdrawal of U.S. “military force,” arms re-
duction by North and South Korea, and the verification of U.S. withdrawal and Korean arms reduction. According to the proposal, bilateral negotiations will be held concurrently between the United States and North Korea for a peace agreement, and between North and South Korea for a non-aggression declaration. When Pyongyang first proposed the tripartite format in 1983, it probably did so, at least in part, in response to Beijing's urging that Pyongyang moderate its adamant stance on the exclusion of Seoul as a negotiating partner. Pyongyang probably also expected discord between Washington and Seoul. It could very well have expected that the United States would favor such a format. Both South Korea and the United States, however, rejected the tripartite proposal, instead suggesting a four-party format which would include Beijing.

The removal of U.S. troops and nuclear weapons has been a long-standing demand of Pyongyang, ever since the end of the Korean War. Until recently, their immediate and total withdrawal was presented as the key pre-condition for any settlement of the Korean question. However, in 1988, Pyongyang began to demonstrate some flexibility on this issue as it indicated a willingness to accept the possibility of a phased withdrawal of troops to follow other measures such as a peace agreement with the United States, and a non-aggression declaration between North and South Korea. It is understandable that the North Korean leadership has been so insistent on the U.S. troop withdrawal. It was the U.S. intervention that prevented the military conquest of the Korean Peninsula in 1950, and it was the presence of U.S. troops in the South that kept North Korea from launching another "war of liberation" against South Korea. Pyongyang may be convinced that the South Korean government is so dependent upon U.S. support that a substantial reduction or withdrawal of its troops from Korea would cause the collapse of the government and of the polity itself. Pyongyang may actually even feel threatened and insecure, given the U.S. military presence in South Korea.

Regardless of whether or not North Korea actually wants U.S. troops out of Korea, it will continue to demand their withdrawal, perhaps more for political than for military reasons. However, a unilateral reduction or withdrawal of U.S. troops is likely to be looked upon by Pyongyang with mixed feelings. In any case, it will not be inclined to make significant concessions in terms of a reciprocal arms cuts or confidence-building measures in order to induce a complete withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea. For Pyongyang, establishing financial and economic ties with the United States should have higher priority than the troop withdrawal issue.
Even as Pyongyang may be hoping gradually to increase contacts and exchanges with the non-socialist world, it may be reluctant to come to terms with South Korea. The successful conclusion of the Pyongyang International Youth Festival in 1989 must have given it confidence that contacts with the outside world can be conducted without serious political risks. On the other hand, events in China and political upheavals in Eastern Europe must have served as a warning that the political risk of opening up the country to the outside, particularly to South Korea, remains quite high. Apprehensions over such risks, coupled with Pyongyang's perception (or misperception) of South Korean political vulnerability, could serve as a disincentive on the part of North Korea to change the present stance in any significant way.

Seoul's main policy dilemma is how to keep its security posture intact while actively pursuing its "northern policy" and seeking accommodation with North Korea, while attempting to implement the July 7th (1988) declaration, aimed at promoting exchanges with North Korea. Seoul's northern policy is aimed at improving relations with the socialist and previously socialist countries, including the Soviet Union and China. The Seoul Olympics in 1988 provided a timely boost to northern diplomacy. Seoul's active approach toward the socialist countries, which did not recognize the South Korean government, has shown rather dramatic results. The Soviet Union and Eastern European nations sent large contingents of athletes and officials to Seoul for the Olympics. Talks on trade and other economic exchanges have flourished. Trade offices and new lines of communications have been opened up. Major trading companies have opened formal liaison offices in major cities in China, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. All Eastern European countries, except Albania, have established full diplomatic relations with South Korea. South Korea has exchanged consular offices with the Soviet Union. In Asia, Mongolia has normalized diplomatic relations with South Korea. Together with the July 7th Declaration which called for active promotion of exchanges between North and South and an end to competition and confrontation between them internationally, successful implementation of South Korea's northern policy has produced unexpected and perhaps unwarranted euphoria in the Korean public about North-South Korean relations, thus fostering a false sense of complacency.

Change in the nature of Korean politics has been another source of dilemma for South Korean policy makers. Democratization has not only brought about an explosion of nationalistic sentiments among the people, but has also made the government much more sensitive to pub-
lic opinion and attitude. In matters ranging from trade to burden-sharing, the government is under enormous pressure to be more assertive and unyielding. Both within and outside of the government, those who emphasize national self-respect tend to prevail over the pragmatists who try to place reason and interest before emotion and pride.

All of this would be fine if the Korean security problem had vanished as a result of the East-West thaw and South Korea’s successful northern diplomacy. But, in view of the existing military situation on the Korean Peninsula, Seoul feels that South Korea still needs U.S. security support and its military presence. Herein lies the major policy dilemma for South Korea: How to maintain a security posture and stable alliance while the circumstances under which that alliance was formed have undergone significant changes.

SEOUl’S NEW UNIFICATION FORMULA AND INTER-KOREAN RELATIONS

Ever since Korea was divided after World War II, Koreans in both parts of the country, North and South, have been preoccupied with developing a formula that would bring them together again as one state and one nation. Pyongyang’s proposal for a “Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo” calls for a dual structure of government with a unified governing body and two separate governments for North and South. For its part, until recently Seoul advocated a “national unity, democratic government” formula which called for cooperation and exchanges between the two Koreas to facilitate ultimate reunification.

Both proposals were incomplete and unrealistic. Pyongyang’s formula only provided for the end product of unified Korea without elaborating how it would be achieved. By contrast, the South Korean proposal focused primarily on the process by which the two sides would re-establish contact and common identity without specifying what kind of a unified state was being envisaged.

Pyongyang’s proposal for a confederal republic is problematic because it is predicated upon a degree of trust and cooperation that do not exist at present between the two sides. Pyongyang’s refusal to recognize the governmental authority of the South contributes to mutual distrust and lack of progress in mutual dialogues. Pyongyang’s highly publicized proposal also fails to provide ways and means of getting to the confederation, except to argue that both sides should simply accept the formula. It does not provide a process for the realization of the confederal republic.
CHAPTER VI

The confederal proposal is also incomplete and unlikely because Korea as a nation would still have two governments with their respective autonomous jurisdictions, and socio-economic systems. Since, under this plan, the two separate governments would be joined by a supra-government which is to handle over-arching matters such as external and military affairs, the confederation, if formed, will immediately face serious differences of interests and views with no institutional mechanism to maintain harmony and unity.

Apart from the merits and demerits of the Pyongyang proposal, a unification "formula," no matter which side offers it, has an intrinsic difficulty of its own. In today's context of North-South Korean relations, when such a formula is proposed by one side, it is taken by the other as a propaganda ploy at best or as a recipe for subjugation. The past South Korean proposals more often than not were in fact defensive responses to North Korean initiatives, rather than the product of a well-thought-out blueprint for unification.

Even a balanced, systematic and realistic formula would have only limited usefulness, as peaceful unification, by definition, requires the mutual willingness and cooperation of both sides. Indeed, it is not the absence of such a formula that has prevented progress toward unification. One may even argue that, if one side is sincere about bringing about unification, the most useful and effective steps and measures can be taken unilaterally while awaiting a more positive and constructive response — internal and external — from the other side.

A dramatic breakthrough in North-South Korean relations leading to mutual adoption and realization of a peaceful reunification plan will be difficult to achieve, given the mutual antagonism and vested interests of both sides. Even if an agreement is reached on reunification, there will be numerous difficulties and obstacles in implementing it. Nonetheless, it is important that the two sides continue to have dialogues and try to agree in principle on the process and direction they would take for peace and unification of their country. The recent proposal by South Korea offers a realistic alternative approach.

With democratization in South Korea, there has been a virtual explosion of interest in the unification issue and of the expectation that something can and should be done to improve relations with North Korea that will ultimately lead to unification. The "unification fever" has presented the South Korean government with both the opportunity to initiate and conduct public discussion on the issue and the need to come up with a plan addressing itself to what many Koreans still consider to be the most urgent national task. In particular, the government found it both possible and necessary to seek a semblance of
consensus — that a comprehensive unification formula is necessary; that it should address not only the question of where the Koreans want to go, but how to get there; that it should be a realistic and balanced one; and that it should take account of the changing external environment and internal development of both North and South Korea.

The new unification formula can serve still another purpose. Even though there is only a slim possibility that Pyongyang will actually accept any significant part of the South Korean proposal, it will serve the important function of informing the South Koreans themselves — both the government and the people — of what they can and should do alone and of what they can do and should do with the North Koreans in order to improve North-South Korean relations and to promote unification. Until some kind of agreement, formal or informal, is reached and some degree of confidence and trust is established between the two sides, the only practical approach for South Korea is to prepare unilaterally for the eventuality that North Korea will finally recognize the reality of South Korean existence and agree to set aside ideological and political goals in favor of mutual acceptance and cooperation.

Finally, Seoul's new unification formula will inform the North Koreans of what the South Koreans consider to be the realistic and acceptable goals, ways, and processes of unification. It is possible that, sometime in the future, the external and internal circumstances will be such that Pyongyang will find it necessary to respond positively by making substantive changes. Furthermore, the fact and the existence of South Korean willingness and desire to initiate a process of accommodation, exchanges, and cooperation, coupled with the efforts at unification expressed by the new plan will help North Korea to move from dead center toward both social and political changes.

The new South Korean proposal, known as “the Korean National Community Unification Formula,” is essentially a dual track plan. It calls for the reuniting of the Korean people who have been divided since 1945 on the one hand, and the ultimate restoration of a unified state on the other. It is chronologically a two-step proposal in that the reuniting of the people will precede the restoration of a unified state. Thus, the “Korean Commonwealth,” with all its related organizational paraphernalia, is intended to promote the reunification of the people. On the other hand, the plan envisages the eventual establishment of a “unified democratic republic,” preceded by the adoption and promulgation of a constitution.

This is in fact a development that would most closely resemble
the “German Formula,” although the Germans themselves never had an explicitly agreed-upon plan such as has been proposed by Seoul. While this has been the scenario most preferred by Seoul, it is also the one which has been rejected, indeed denounced, by North Korea. In view of the German experience, in order for the scenario to become a reality, certain preconditions must be met.

Pyongyang refuses to consider the “German Formula.” However, developments in Eastern Europe, and particularly in Germany, should put to rest the criticism that the German method would perpetuate national division. Koreans on both sides of the barbed-wire fence should realize that what is known as the “functional approach” to the unification question, by which the two Koreas recognize each other’s existence and start cooperating in non-political areas such as humanitarian, cultural and economic relations, is in fact the only and the shortest way to bring the two Koreas together into one.

CONCLUSION

For the peace and reunification of Korea, it is the Korean people and their governments that should play the leading role. But in this effort, they will also need help from other countries, in particular, major powers such as China, the Soviet Union, the United States and Japan. They can help, not only by serving as intermediaries, but equally important, by responding positively and taking initiative to establish and expand multifaceted contacts and exchanges, especially in the economic area. The major countries surrounding Korea have an obligation to see to it that peace develops in Korea and that Koreans achieve unification. Both the United States and the Soviet Union must share blame for the 1945 division of Korea. Japan must bear the responsibility of subjecting Korea to Soviet and American occupation after the end of World War II, following its 35-year long colonial rule of Korea. Now it seems that Korea’s neighboring powers are prepared to help the Koreans resolve their differences and problems. All the Koreans of both North and South have to do is to take advantage of the circumstances that seem favorable to establish peace and the basis of unification.

In the Korean Peninsula, as perhaps everywhere else, peace must be a matter of the highest priority. The Korean Conflict of the early 1950s was destructive and tragic. It caused several million casualties and virtually reduced the country, both North and South, to ashes. Today, there are more than twice as many people living on the Korean Peninsula as were living then. There are more than 1.5 million men in arms. Both sides have arms and firepower that are several times more
destructive and awesome than before. The havoc and tragedy from a renewed conflict in Korea would be enormous and unimaginable. There will be no winners, only losers — the Koreans. A war on the Korean Peninsula would also have devastating effects on its neighboring countries and seriously disturb regional and international peace and order. This is why everybody, Koreans and their neighbors alike, have to make absolutely certain that war does not break out in Korea either by miscalculation, misunderstanding, accident or design. That is why communication, exchanges, confidence-building measures and cooperation are necessary not only between North and South Korea, but also between them and all other countries. They must move away from and out of this wasteful and dangerous rivalry and start building a durable structure for peace.
CHAPTER VII

DIMENSIONS OF THE GERMAN QUESTION

Dirk Verheyen

INTRODUCTION*

Events in 1989 and 1990 put the German Question back near the top of the international agenda, right where it was when the war ended in 1945. After 40 years of division in a shifting context of East-West Cold War and tentative detente, the astounding rapidity of change in Central and Eastern Europe confronted the world once again with the future of a united Germany in the heart of Europe.

Developments have been occurring so rapidly that any analyst faces monumental difficulty in seeking to get a firm grasp on the ultimate direction of what is transpiring in this turbulent age. The implications of recent and current events in Europe are truly far-reaching. A new European order is emerging more quickly than most would have predicted even a few years ago.

Western Europe is fully embarked on its ambitious "1992" program. Communist rule has collapsed in one Eastern European country after another, while Soviet troops are beginning to leave the erstwhile "satellites." And the Soviet Union, with Gorbachev still at the helm, continues to struggle on the twin paths of glasnost and perestroika in a context of social unrest, economic stagnation, intra-party upheaval, and nationalist ferment in several of its republics, raising questions about its ability to affect or manage the sudden dissolution of its former Warsaw Pact empire.

Taken together, these developments are clearly signalling the end of the postwar order in Europe. The continent's division into Cold War spheres of influence has lost its former rigidity and coherence. The future of the Warsaw Pact and NATO, symbols of Europe's East-West division, is becoming an unavoidable issue. And perhaps most

* The material used in this essay draws heavily upon my book, The German Question: A Cultural, Historical, and Geopolitical Exploration, Dirk Verheyen, 1991, by permission of Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado. I wish to thank the University Research Committee at Loyola Marymount University for generous research assistance provided during the summer of 1990.
importantly, the unification of the two German states (again) signals a fundamental recasting of European and broader international patterns of power and policy.

A proper understanding of the German Question requires that we place it in its historical context and that we examine its constituent dimensions. In the pages that follow, I will suggest that the German Question consists of three interrelated dimensions: German identity, German unity, and the management of German power (tied to Germany's role in international affairs). Too often the German Question is simplified into a matter of German (re)unification, although that is understandable in view of the spectacle currently unfolding in Central Europe. Yet, I hope to show that this is a misleading approach, and perhaps even dangerous. We shall see that the issue of German unity, rooted in a clear sense of German identity, must be kept connected with a consideration of Germany's power and its consequent role and position in the Europe of tomorrow.

Broadly speaking, the essay's argument has two major components. First, we shall venture into an admittedly selective interpretation of modern German history, in order to delineate the principal ways in which the German Question has evolved. We shall examine a selection of developments in general culture and domestic politics in the first section, and aspects of modern German foreign policy in the second section. Second, we shall look closely at the turbulent events of 1989-90 in the last three sections, surveying the major issues and events, and evaluating the current status of the German Question as Europe moves into the next phase of its history.

GERMANY, A DIFFICULT FATHERLAND: A NATION IN SEARCH OF IDENTITY AND UNITY

Central to any discussion of the German Question should be a consideration of what is German and what is Germany. Closer examination will show that the answers to this question are by no means obvious. It is a question that is not only relevant to an analysis of the divided Germany of the postwar era, but also to an understanding of Germany's historically complex search for identity.

Integrally linked to the problem of German identity is the issue of profound historical discontinuity in the German experience, and its consequences. Richard Löwenthal has noted "a very special lack of chronological continuity, geographic unity and spiritual form and coherence." He notes the crucial discontinuity of both state and nation in the German historical experience and concludes that "[t]his lack of unity across time, in space, and in spirit is in fact the central problem
— or if one wishes, the central secret — of German history."¹

The identity problem acquired additional significance due to the fact that much of pre-1945 German society and culture were characterized by a basic ambivalence, if not enmity, vis-a-vis many of the revolutionary ideas of the 17th and 18th centuries that shaped most other Western nations. According to Löwenthal, we should remember "that Germany in the age of the French Revolution was the great ‘developing country’ of the West."² The new ideas and discoveries of the new age that came to Germany from outside at that time induced a fundamental German ambivalence regarding the process of modernization in culture and politics. The weak or incomplete impact of the Enlightenment on Germany had historical consequences. According to George Bailey, ³

...historians generally hold that German national resistance on [sic] the Napoleonic invasion unfortunately evolved into German nationalist rejection of the Enlightenment. It was as if the whole ethical corpus of the Enlightenment had stumbled into the line of fire and suffered mortal wounds. The Prussians — and indeed the majority of Germans awakened into some sort of national consciousness by the French invasion — threw out the Enlightenment with the invader and persisted in rejecting most of what the Enlightenment involved because it was French and therefore anti-German.³

The German reaction to the Enlightenment became most clearly embodied in Romanticism.⁴ The differences between the two cultural and philosophical movements were (and still are) profound. The Enlightenment gave expression to an optimistic sense of progress, worshiped human individuality, stressed a rationalist and empiricist approach to life and its problems, and focused on human rights and freedoms, as well as questions of basic human equality. The Romantics, however, were animated by a greater sense of pessimism and tragedy. At times such attitudes could be joined to a strong sense of terror, excitement, and foreboding. Instead of rationalism and empiri-

icism, Romantics tended to stress the irrational, the metaphysical, the mysterious or mythical, and the poetic.

The importance of the Romantic epoch for the historical German world-view cannot be understood when divorced from the quest for German unity and identity. Disunity and a lack of clear identity have been mutually reinforcing aspects of the German experience. Bailey suggests that

[i]dentity has always been the main aspect of the German Problem. The Germans have shown a remarkable lack of the sense of identity: they have fought each other in full enmity down the ages. They have banded together with foreigners against other German tribes as often as they have allied themselves against foreigners: Germans have always been more than willing to fight Germans. They have never been united in the sense that the classic nation-states of Europe were and remain united. 5

Initially, Romanticism was a largely cultural and intellectual phenomenon, and fairly apolitical in orientation. However, the Napoleonic wars caused a clear politicization of Romantic thinking. National unity and identity were increasingly sought along Romantic lines. Emphasis was placed on the importance of the Volk, a concept that implied a mixture of “nation,” “race,” and “people.” Insofar as a sense of German identity was sought that was felt to be distinct from the modernizing neighbors to the West, an often ill-defined, anti-modern, and “anti-Western” notion of Deutschtum (“Germanness”) developed. The idea gradually took hold that Germany, as “land of the middle,” bearer of a higher form of Kultur, had the exceptional historical destiny of being either the bulwark against or the bridge between the (decadent) West and the (uncivilized) East. 6 In this Central European geographic area, where the liberal bourgeoisie was particularly conspicuous in its weakness, the mere achievement of national unity became more important than the political nature of the regime that would govern the new realm. This was especially true in the years following the failed 1848 revolution. 7

7. Discussions of 19th and early 20th century German history have in recent years been influenced by the debate over modern Germany’s alleged Sonderweg (“special path”), that is, whether Germany’s developmental flaws (including the political failures of its bourgeoisie) ultimately helped prepare the country for the Nazi disaster. I discuss this issue more fully in a forthcoming book on the German Question. Interested readers may wish to consult David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley, The Peculiarities of German History, Oxford/
But the sense of German identity, as it developed in the 19th century, was fundamentally flawed, which itself had crucial consequences for the German world-view. There were rather clear elements of artificiality, self-deception, and unreality in the search for identity. National unity was to be imposed on regions that had often markedly different historical experiences, and that were by no means fully culturally homogeneous (language aside). Fundamental inspiration was derived from the old ideal of the Reich, particularly the Holy Roman Empire. Unfortunately, that ideal was as much (if not more) based on fiction as on fact. Moreover, the Reich could never be a mere nation. It stood for a larger vision. And even if it meant something more than a nation, its geographic boundaries were fundamentally ambiguous. Moreover, when it finally came, in 1871, national unity was achieved along “small-German” (klein-deutsch) lines (that is, excluding the German-speaking parts of the Austrian empire) and had little in common with the old Holy Roman Empire.

Thus unity was not achieved on the basis of an integrative national experience such as revolution, but rather in large measure by force, conquest, and imposition. The problem of identity was never fully resolved, and continues to play a central role in German politics and culture to the present day. Bailey concludes:

This is the German Problem: what, where, and when is, was, or will be Germany? “Germany” was never more or less what it should have been; it was always less or more than it should have been. The “Germans” have always been more than a nation and therefore always less than one. They were, in fact, many nations and tribes, but the whole was always less than the sum of its parts.8

Germany was late in achieving national unity, compared with most other Western countries. Having come late as a nation-state and sensing a continued degree of artificiality in their national identity, many Germans developed some notable traits in their world-view. There was a pervasive sense of failure. Bailey calls this the “almost factor” in German history. “Except for Bismarck’s half-century, German history is an unbroken chain of failures-by-a-hair, of maddeningly


near misses and no cigars.”

Many Germans acquired an image of their own history marked by a high degree of discontent and dissatisfaction. According to Alain Clement, “from the very beginning the Germans were dissatisfied with Germany and, therefore, with themselves. From century to century drags this oppressive feeling, that Germany falls short of its developmental potential, short of its duty of self-determination.”

One finds considerable evidence of pervasive self-pity and a deep sense of inferiority. At the same time, as we shall see more fully below, much of German foreign policy came to be marked by a compensatory nationalism, a desire to acquire the power and status in international affairs that was felt to accompany Germany’s rightful “place in the sun,” as the Kaiser put it.

Aspects of this traditional preoccupation with German identity and the country’s place in Europe and the world at large remained after 1945, and were, if anything, enhanced by the traumatic Third Reich experience and the subsequent division of the nation.

The discussion thus far clearly suggests that problems of identity and unity in the context of the general German Question center on the problematic idea of nationhood in the German historical experience. The uncertainty of what is and is not Germany, the persistent mystique of the Reich, and the delayed national unification of Germany are issues that have shaped the destiny of the German-speaking peoples in the center of Europe.

Nationalism is probably the most decisive ideology in modern history. The impact of nationalist fervor on domestic political life and foreign policy has not by any means been unique to the German experience. Yet there are aspects of traditional German nationalism that clearly differentiated it from developments in neighboring Western European nation-states.

In Germany, conservative, authoritarian nationalism prevailed, and German national unity was established by means of warfare, under the auspices of illiberal, reluctant Prussia. Germany’s delayed national unification separated the idea of nationhood and nationalism from the Enlightenment.

---

9. Ibid., p. 32.
emptied of any modern political connotations and infused with culturally anti-modern and anti-Western sentiments.

Ideologically, this resulted in a nationalism with a decidedly illiberal political content, implacably opposed to competing political ideologies, such as Liberalism or Socialism. It was a cultural nationalism that stressed the purported virtues and mission of the German Kulturation, leading to political intolerance towards those who were considered (potentially) un-deutsch. Also, as noted above, it was a compensatory nationalism, dedicated to seeking Germany’s rightful “place in the sun.” Together with the political irredentism of the incomplete Reich (especially after the collapse of the Habsburg Empire in 1919) and the assertive messianism of the Kulturation ideology, this compensatory nationalism was a driving force behind Germany’s increasingly aggressive diplomatic behavior in the first half of the 20th century.

The traumas of Nazism and World War II in numerous ways produced a break with the past. After 1945, there was a widespread desire to escape from history and its painful burdens. The old nationalism was one of the prime casualties of the war. It became a thoroughly discredited ideology, and a liability for a new West Germany that sought reconciliation with victims and enemies, and acceptance in the Western community of nations. This does not mean, of course, that nationalism has completely disappeared from German political life.

However, the question of nationalism in today’s Germany ought to be seen in the broader context of the problem of German identity after World War II. Although identity crises have been experienced by most, if not all, nations in our rapidly changing 20th century environment, Germany has faced (and still faces) some unique problems. There have been three general and important aspects to the German identity question since World War II.

First, German identity has been burdened by the traumas of Ger-

---

man national historical experience. The desire to leave behind the past has produced a harmful, and some would say dangerous, "loss of historical consciousness." Could it be that much, if not most, of German history has lost its functional utility for the creation of a modern German identity? This may especially be the case because the traditional German approach to nationhood was so suffused with illiberal, anti-Western elements. Certainly a national identity for a liberal-democratic, Western-oriented Federal Republic could only with great difficulty be rooted in such a heritage.

In the case of the German Democratic Republic, the "loss of historical consciousness" took another direction. After its creation in 1949, the East German regime, controlled by the Communist SED (German Socialist Unity Party), presented the new state as the logical culmination of all progressive and revolutionary strands in German national history, such as the anti-Hitler resistance. The official East German interpretation of German history thus became noticeably selective, often serving the regime's consolidation and legitimation interests. In contrast to a West Germany allegedly controlled by ex-Nazis, nationalist revanchists, and capitalist reactionaries, the GDR was defined as the vanguard of a future socialist and democratic Germany. The East German regime then proceeded to disclaim any and all sense of shared German responsibility for the crimes of the Nazi era.

Yet no complete German identity could emerge in either German state if national historical experiences were to be ignored or avoided, while an attempt to focus on purely cultural aspects of German nationhood would only lead to an incomplete sense of identity, because it would tend to be devoid of any firm political foundation. What is more, a preoccupation with a German Kulturnation could resuscitate

17. Greiffenhagen, Ein schwieriges Vaterland, supra, note 16, pp. 34-44.
foreign concerns regarding culturally based political irredentism and a new German unity-before-freedom mentality.

Second, the question of German identity was made even more complicated by the nation's division into two ideologically competitive republics. The ideological hostility between the FRG and GDR meant that any attempt to have both states share in a purportedly common German Kulturnation would end up begging many political questions. Yet, the Federal Republic was hesitant to claim to be a full-fledged German Staatsnation (nation-state). The West German self-understanding after 1949 was explicitly "provisional." The Federal Republic claimed to be the legitimate successor of the old German Reich, but destined to be dissolved once all Germans regained their national unity. The preamble to the West German state's Basic Law enjoined all federal governments to strive for the restoration of German unity. Attempts to eliminate this preamble in the face of the bitter reality of two independent German states were met by a mixture of vigorous protest and deafening silence. This provisional West German self-understanding produced an elaborate array of legal principles and fictions that played a central role in the Federal Republic's foreign policy. Unfortunately, as the French have reminded us, "il n'est que le provisoire qui dure." As a result, a fairly explicit West German Staatsbewusstsein ("state consciousness") did emerge (before 1989).

In a prominent study published in the 1970's, Gebhard Schweigler noted that, although traditional national sentiment was still quite pronounced in the 1950's, important shifts in public opinion occurred during the 1960's. He suggested that popular expectations of reunification had declined, and that the willingness to recognize the GDR and the Oder-Neisse boundary with Poland had increased. He argued that one could notice a strongly reduced sense of an all-German Staatsnation, and a growing national consciousness focused more exclusively on the Federal Republic. However, he did not (yet) see this increased West German Staatsbewusstsein translated into an explicit form of nationalism. He made a similar argument about developments inside the GDR.

In the years that followed Schweigler's important study, many observers evinced considerably greater skepticism regarding an actual decline of all-German national consciousness, coupled with a rise of a more distinct West German (and East German) sense of identity.

20. Ibid.
Most suggested that the German identity question remained wide open, pointing, for example, at the noticeable interest in Prussia, Luther, Bismarck, and other facets of German history in both the FRG and the GDR. Furthermore, the increasing closeness between the two states in the age of Ostpolitik and Deutschlandpolitik in the 1970's and 1980's could only serve to heighten the sense of a shared German security interest, particularly under circumstances of renewed East-West Cold War tensions during the first Reagan administration. The rush toward unity after November 1989 obviously rekindled a sense of political German nationalism, but it is too early to know the likely domestic and diplomatic consequences of this "new" German nationalism, although later sections of this essay will present some of the speculations and concerns.

Third, postwar German identity has, to an important extent, been dependent on the ebb and flow of world affairs in general and, in the case of West Germany, on European integration in particular. A product of the Cold War in many ways, and animated by a strong sense of anti-Communism, due to the proximity of its East German opponent, the Federal Republic's sense of identity was far more sensitive to changes in the international environment than any other Western country. West Germany's identity today depends for a great deal on the country's membership in and acceptance by the Western alliance and the general community of Western nations. The fear of being the ultimate victim of an East-West political and military bargain produced a persistent strain of anxiety and insecurity, thereby heightening the uncertainties of identity.

For much of the postwar period, it seemed that the Federal Republic's participation in the process of European integration would provide it with an "ersatz," European identity. Many Germans eagerly supported this hopeful opportunity. Whenever the hopes of a united Europe faded, however, and nationalist sentiments in Europe showed their staying power, the Federal Republic's identity problems returned. At the risk of generalization, it is possible to argue that West Germany's quest for identity between 1949 and 1989 involved an


23. The overall development of both West and East German identity is discussed at greater length in my book on the German Question than can be done in this essay.
attempt to focus on both the democratic values shared with the West and the continued sense of German-ness shared with East Germany.

**GERMANY, A POWERFUL FATHERLAND: DILEMMAS AND TEMPTATIONS IN DIPLOMACY AND SECURITY**

Thus far, our focus has been primarily on the dimensions of identity and unity in the general German Question, with particular emphasis on their domestic consequences in modern German history. Yet it is impossible to grasp the ultimate international significance and urgency of the German Question without connecting the twin issues of identity and unity with Germany's search for a role in world affairs and the resulting problem of German power. This implies a full shift to an analysis of modern German foreign policy.

As a great power, Germany in the 19th and early 20th century was a late-comer. It entered an international arena in which established powers had already staked out dominant positions, and in which the new force of nationalism was adding dynamic vigor and emotion to classical inter-state competition. Consequently, German foreign policy after 1871 was frequently characterized by what may be called a "compensatory" style or mentality, especially during the Wilhelmine era. A desire to conquer Germany's "place in the sun" led to self-overestimation, excessive imperial dreams, and a constant preoccupation with German prestige and status. Gerhard Weinberg speaks of an "adolescent assertiveness," a militant, bullying, and unpredictable style. Gordon Craig notes a tendency toward diplomatic maladroitness, amateurism, and parvenuism. 24 The role played by warfare in Germany's unification, together with the militancy of German nationalism and the rather aggressive ethos of a powerful German military caste, produced unmistakable militarism in German foreign policy.

One factor in German foreign policy of which virtually all German diplomats and politicians have been acutely conscious is Germany's central-European location. As we saw earlier, geographic factors have played a crucial role in the problem of German identity: cultural and political boundaries have never really coincided, and a

---

sense of fluidity (and inherent political revisionism) characterizes the German sense of nationhood. Throughout modern history, this central continental location, conducive to feelings of vulnerability, insecurity, and lack of choice in foreign policy, has been a constant and prominent factor in German diplomacy. There has been a persistent fear of diplomatic isolation, a Bismarckian “nightmare of coalitions.”

The power dimension of the German Question is rooted in the unfortunate timing of Germany’s development and unification. The consolidation of German power in the center of Europe had a profoundly destabilizing effect on the 19th century balance of power, and served to enhance the risk of conflict on the continent. A fragmented Germany had served as a useful buffer zone among various powers, but now that “vacuum” had turned into a new competitor with compensatory ambitions. All these various factors have historically contributed to the problem of Germany’s role and position in international affairs, a problem that runs as a red thread through German diplomatic history.

The sense of geographic weakness and comparative disadvantage, the fear of isolation and encirclement, combined with mounting political ambitions and often romanticized dreams of empire, over time led to the increasing popularity of geopolitical perspectives in German foreign policy. To many Germans, the geopolitical perspective seemed particularly suited to their country’s political and economic predicament, and also compatible with the organic-biological and anthropomorphic conceptions of the State that had been popular in Germany ever since the days of Herder and Hegel.

The political and ideological prominence of Geopolitik increased after World War I in an atmosphere of revisionist anger and dreams during the Weimar years. Particularly popular became the vision of a German-dominated Grossraum in central Europe (the so-called Mitteleuropa idea), which mixed geographic considerations with economic, political, and cultural factors. Eastern Europe, seen as a Teufelsgürtel (devil’s belt) of unstable states that separated Germany from the crucial Eurasian Heartland, was more and more considered to be Germany’s Schicksalsraum (area allotted by fate): hence the legendary German Drang nach Osten (push toward the East). Such anti-Slavic and (in time) anti-Soviet imperialist Lebensraum ideas, mixed

---


with explicitly racial elements, played a central role in Nazi foreign policy.

As was true for many facets of German foreign policy thinking, realist and romantic ingredients were combined in most geopolitical visions: *Macht* (power) and military hard-headedness went hand-in-hand with dreams about German *Kultur* and the old Holy Roman Empire. Defeat in World War II and the subsequent division of Germany, plus the rise of the two superpowers, did much to eliminate any and all ideas of *Mitteleuropa* in West or East German foreign policy. This does not mean, however, that geopolitically based revisionism was entirely absent from the Federal Republic's foreign policy debates during the Cold War years.

Altogether, World War II turned into a watershed event in the development of Germany's approach to foreign policy, as we shall see presently. It ended the militarization of foreign policy and the illiberal ideological aspects of the *Realpolitik* tradition, while giving rise to supranational visions that would have been unthinkable in the golden age of Germany's nationalist foreign policy orientation.

In sum, factors of power, geography, identity, and developmental timing have historically combined to turn the question of Germany's place in the international arena into a fundamental problem for German foreign policy. In terms of its power, Germany has tended to be either too weak to alleviate the perennial security fears that permeate German foreign policy thinking, or too strong to leave wary neighbors reassured about their own safety. Karl Deutsch and Lewis Edinger have suggested that the historical "awkwardness" of German power led to a lack of experience in dealing with international equals and a profound uncertainty with respect to Germany's proper role in world affairs.27

Since the 1860's, German foreign policy thinking has contained a variety of strategic visions aimed at dealing with the problem of power and role.28 A consideration of these visions points up some interesting elements of continuity and change in German foreign policy.

---


One vision, historically associated with Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, and to a lesser extent with Gustav Stresemann during the 1920’s, had as its point of departure the realization that Germany is first and foremost a central-European state (*Land in der Mitte*; land in the middle) in many ways located between East and West. From this vantage-point, Germany was seen at times as a “bridge” between East and West, an entity with a balancing and mediating role. Close attention was paid to the maintenance of a European balance of power and the legitimate interests of other powers. Insofar as revisionist intentions entered German foreign policy, they were pursued with caution and considerable respect for the existing status-quo. Germany tended to avoid overly rigid alliances, aimed at keeping diplomatic options open.

While much of the Bismarck vision of Germany’s position and role in international politics was rendered obsolete in the context of the Cold War and Germany’s division, its influence could still be noted in the postwar era. The idea of Germany as “bridge” between East and West, as developed by (among others) the Christian Democrat Jakob Kaiser in the late 1940’s, comes to mind. One might also consider the various plans that were developed by the Social Democrats and the Free Democrats in the course of the 1950’s, aimed at the reunification of Germany based on German military neutrality, European military disengagement zones, and the creation of an all-European collective security system. In addition, there was the idea of a special German *Sicherheits- oder Friedenspartnerschaft* (partnership for security and peace) involving FRG and GDR, in the shadow of superpower bipolarity, as it emerged in the context of Ostpolitik and *Deutschlandpolitik* during the 1970’s and 1980’s. However, these visions were largely at odds with the Federal Republic’s dominant foreign policy orientations, however. They were frequently denounced as a dangerous revival of an obsolete German tradition of *Schaukelpolitik* (“switching policy”) between East and West, based on the illusion of some positive German *Sonderweg* (“special path”) in international affairs.

Another foreign policy vision, associated with the militant great power politics of Kaiser Wilhelm II and his entourage and the much more extreme racial/geopolitical imperialism of Adolf Hitler, shared with the first vision an essentially nationalist focus on Germany’s position and role in international politics. However, the problems of Germany’s international situation were not solved by cautious revisionism, an avoidance of diplomatic isolation, and due regard for the balance of power and the proper interests of others. Instead, there was an aggressive revisionism, reckless power politics, and an expansionist behavior, all of it aimed at breaking the fetters imposed on Germany by geopolitical encirclement and disadvantage. The German Sonderweg disintegrated into imperialism and war. Hitler stood outside the German diplomatic tradition insofar as the racial elements in his policies were of an entirely new kind and different magnitude than anything that had existed in German foreign policy before. Fundamental philosophical rejection and lack of opportunity after 1945 rendered obsolete all these militant, imperialist perspectives, in spite of repeated charges of “revanchism” levelled at the FRG by its various neighbors to the East during the Cold War. A slight revival might have occurred by means of some more extremist “roll-back” and “liberation” ideas at the height of the Cold War, but these never constituted a realistic option.

A third vision for German foreign policy has developed after World War II, and is particularly associated with the legacy of Konrad Adenauer in the FRG’s foreign policy. The emergence of this vision cannot be separated from the international setting in which West German foreign policy had to be pursued. It is a setting that was characterized by defeat and occupation, the division of Germany, the integration of the two German states into Cold War alliances, West German security dependence on the West (especially America), and revisionism regarding the East European status-quo. The FRG could only be understood as a product of the Cold War and as the rehabilitated opponent of a not-so-distant past: these two factors combined to circumscribe the Federal Republic’s diplomatic room for maneuver in many decisive ways, often forestalling choices and imposing particular needs. In addition, defeat, occupation, and subsequent security dependence in the Cold War made the FRG into a uniquely “penetrated” political system, susceptible and sensitive to outside influences that deeply affected policy conceptions and directions.

Any consideration of West Germany’s role and position in post-

war international relations, while dependent on an understanding of Germany’s historical predicament and fate, cannot be separated from the fate and destiny of Europe either. World War II and the eruption of the Cold War had at least five fundamental effects on virtually all (Western) European states.

First, the “displacement of the world power center from Europe,” led to the rise of the two superpowers and the development of Cold War bipolarity. Second, the “dismantling of the European empires,” which became highly symbolic of Europe’s reduced international role. Third, a “European incapacity to guarantee their own national security,” which led to the development of more Europeanist and/or Atlanticist perspectives on national defense, the creation of NATO, and a profound dependence on the American security guarantee. Fourth, a “European incapacity to promote their own national prosperity,” which was conducive to the development of visions, plans, processes, and institutions aimed at increased European economic cooperation and integration. Fifth, a “European crisis of confidence,” which was the cumulative result of the other four developments. 34

Although these five effects were strongest in the immediate post-war period and were to some extent “softened” by subsequent recovery and integration successes, and a mitigation of the Cold War, the fundamental changes in Europe’s international role and position to which they point were quite decisive. The sense that the traditional European nation-state is no longer an adequate framework for security, economic prosperity, and effective prestige and identity persists, despite a partial resurgence of nationalism since the Gaullist 1960’s. At most there resulted a vacillation in policy between more Atlanticist and/or Europeanist, and nationalist frames of orientation.

It is against this German and European postwar background that one must evaluate two key facets of Adenauer’s Westpolitik: the “supranationalization” and the “westernization” (Verwestlichung) of West Germany’s foreign policy. 35 Supranationalization implied a basic abandonment of the almost exclusively nationalist thinking in earlier German foreign policy. The new West German state became a leading champion of schemes for European and Atlantic integration.

34. See, the discussion in Daniel Lerner and Morton Gorden, Euratlantica, Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1969, p. 50 and chapters 1, 2, and 10.
CHAPTER VII

In the context of the Cold War, these integration visions, whose pursuit was the result of a mixture of choice and necessity, were in unmistakable tension with the simultaneous pursuit of reunification, a fact that led to bitter debate between Christian Democrats and Social Democrats during the 1950's. The interplay between national and supranational perspectives constitutes a central theme in West Germany's postwar foreign policy.

"Westernization" aimed at a basic reconciliation of the historical alienation between Germany and the West. The Verwestlichung ("westernization") of German foreign policy was aided by a number of important factors, rooted in ideology and environmental compulsion. Among West German political parties, the CDU in particular was animated by what may be called an Abendland ("Western civilization") ideology, stressing the political, philosophical, and religious beliefs and values that Germany was felt to share with the West. There was a strong Catholic and Carolingian component in the thinking of Adenauer and many of his supporters. The Cold War division of Germany led to the creation of a Weststaat that contained regionally based traditions of Liberalism and anti-nationalism, both of which were crucial for the supranationalization and westernization of German foreign policy. In a Cold War environment marked by international ideological polarization, the FRG's security dependence on Western allies was complemented by strong anti-Communism, pro-Europeanism, and pro-Atlanticism.

Just as the supranationalism of Adenauer's Westpolitik constituted a sharp break with past nationalist traditions in German foreign policy, so did the reorientation effected by Germany's westernization imply an abandonment of older central-European geopolitical perspectives. In the context of the Cold War, Germany became the divided heart of Europe, whereby each German state turned into the outer rampart of its respective alliance system. Adenauer's Westpolitik was animated by a persistent "Potsdam complex," based on the fear of great power agreements at Germany's expense. Only Western inte-

39. The term "Potsdam Complex" refers to the 1945 Conference of World War II victors in this small town west of Berlin, where important decisions about the future of
igration would prevent Germany from becoming or remaining a mere pawn or object in international politics. Ideological inclinations and environmental constraints combined to lead to the failure of reunification ideas offered by the Social Democrats and the Free Democrats based on some form of German neutrality. Growing numbers of West Germans backed Adenauer in his rejection of new attempts at a German *Schaukelpolitik* between East and West. There was certainly in many Western states a distinct "Rapallo complex," fed by fears regarding Germany's diplomatic and ideological reliability, although, as Fritz Allemann tried to point out in the 1960's, the Cold War setting differed so strongly from the 1920's that a new "Rapallo" was never a real option in FRG foreign policy. In the next sections, I will turn to a discussion of the re-emergence of some basic questions about Germany's diplomatic course generated by the unification of the FRG and the GDR.

Even a divided Germany, with two states firmly committed to their respective "camps," was not able, however, to escape the geopolitical logic of its central-European location or the older, national framework of thinking. The decisive problem here was, of course, the issue of reunification. Both West German supranationalism and westernization had to be considered conditional to the extent that they had to be reconciled with unavoidable nationalist, central-European West German revisionism. In the era of the Cold War and successful Western integration, the inherent contradiction was "solved" through the assumption that reunification would result from a *Westpolitik* based on strength, although that assumption was attacked by many critics.

Increased detente after the late 1950's and a lack of progress (even backsliding) in Western integration undermined earlier orientations and increased the FRG's uncertainty about its international role. A resurgence of West German consciousness with respect to Germany's central-European fate, combined with fear of increased West German international isolation, generated a considerably more active *Ostpolitik* as a counterweight to the passive and rather negative *Ostpolitik* that had accompanied the previous *Westpolitik*.

At the same time, these new openings in the East greatly helped...
to expand the FRG’s diplomatic room for maneuver. The framework of thought in this new Ostpolitik was inherently more nationalist than was officially acknowledged, but its recognition of the European status-quo also meant a mitigation of the more explicitly revisionist nationalism of the Cold War era. Both Westpolitik and Ostpolitik came to symbolize the inevitably Janus-like nature of German foreign policy. As policies and as foreign policy orientations, they reflected the imperatives that continued to be generated by Germany’s geopolitical location.

In the case of East Germany, developments occurred along a somewhat different path. The initial, post-1949 vision of a reunited, socialist Germany was replaced by a heightened sense of Abgrenzung ("isolation/consolidation") after the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961. Greater emphasis was placed on the development of a clearer East German Staatsbewusstsein (state consciousness) on the part of a population that could see no alternative but to reconcile itself with the inevitability of a separate socialist state.

By the 1970’s, attempts were even made under the leadership of Erich Honecker to create an explicit sense of separate East German nationhood. And by the 1980’s, a renewed appreciation of a possible connection between East Germany and the legacy of Prussia could even be noted in the GDR. A Janus-like East German foreign policy would thus become rather problematic, in view of such an explicit attempt to sever any basic sense of all-German national linkage with the FRG. Yet, paradoxically, it could be argued that the simultaneous East German interest in a special GDR-FRG “security partnership” in Central Europe during the era of detente only served to reinforce a continued shared political consciousness between the two German “nations.” In other words, the concurrent pursuit of both Abgrenzung and inter-German detente contained inherent inconsistencies. Future historians, looking back on the 1970’s and the 1980’s, may well conclude that, in view of the GDR’s enduring legitimacy deficit and the neighboring presence of an irresistible West German ideological and


42. See, Jeismann, “Die Einheit der Nation im Geschichtsbild der DDR,” supra, note 18, pp. 3-16.

economic magnet, the era of detente did much to accelerate the ultimate demise of East Germany's stagnant Communist regime.

**WINTER OF DISCONTENT AND TURBULENCE**

The astounding events of the fall of 1989 completely shook just about all of the German "certainties" of the past 40 years. Only months before the Berlin Wall was breached, a prominent analyst of German affairs like F. Stephen Larrabee had been essentially correct when he wrote that

the real issue today is not reunification, though this still remains a residual issue, but how changes in the policies of the two German states may affect European security in the next decade, and in turn what impact changes in the postwar security order may have on the policies of the two German states and their role in their respective alliances. It is this question that forms the heart of the new German Question. And it is on this problem, rather than the highly theoretical and less politically relevant issue of reunification, that scholars and politicians should focus in the 1990s. 44

Yet events unfolded with a rapidity that left observers and policymakers alike breathless. Amid spreading political protest, the true dimensions of the fundamental crisis of East Germany's socioeconomic and political system became fully manifest, as discussion and recrimination began about its causes and who was to blame. 45 The mass exodus of East Germans to the West led to the collapse of the Honecker regime in November and the opening of the Berlin Wall. A brief SED interregnum followed, led first by Egon Krenz and then by Hans Modrow, with whom West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl clearly did not wish to deal in any serious longer-term way. As economic and political collapse became imminent, the days of Communist rule in the GDR were clearly numbered. Free elections, the first in that area of Germany since 1933, were scheduled for May 1990 and then re-scheduled for mid-March 1990, in view of a worsening crisis.

Meanwhile, events in the GDR began to have their international implications. Kohl offered a rather daring 10-point plan for German confederation, with continued NATO membership, in November

---


1989, without consulting his closest allies. His go-it-alone assertiveness was a demonstration of West Germany’s increased self-confidence in an environment of collapsing Communist rule in Eastern Europe. The Soviet Union was about to lose one of its closest allies in Eastern Europe and made suggestions regarding a possible German confederation outside both NATO and Warsaw Pact in the hope of salvaging as much of its position as possible. GDR leader Modrow echoed this idea with a January 1990 proposal for a neutralized united Germany. Both ideas were clearly reminiscent of various (Soviet) ideas of the early 1950’s, and were flatly rejected by a West German government that had increasingly worried Western allies to contend with. The FRG’s allies were concerned about the Federal Republic’s future in both NATO and the EC, and it fell especially to FRG Foreign Minister Genscher to provide the needed assurances. It was also Genscher who sought to break a deadlock over possible NATO membership of a reunited Germany by suggesting that NATO forces should stay clear of GDR territory in a united Germany and that the USSR should be allowed to maintain a contingent of forces on East German territory for a pre-arranged period after unification.

By early 1990, it was clear that full German reunification was all but inevitable, and all confederation ideas, predicated on a continued existence in some form of two separate German states, found their end in history’s dust bin. The rapidity of change rendered obsolete the ideas of analysts like Anne-Marie Burley, who wrote in late 1989:

Stability in Europe means the maintenance of the existing international structure: two superpowers and two Germanies. Stability in the G.D.R. means reform without the threat of reunification. . . . [R]ecognizing the German division as permanent could be the final step toward overcoming it.46

The human exodus from East to West Germany continued, economic conditions in the GDR worsened steadily, and East German opinion swung clearly in the direction of unification with the West. In November 1989, only 16% of GDR citizens expressed strong support for unification, while 32% were moderately in favor, and 52% were either moderately or strongly opposed to the idea. By February/March 1990, however, 84% were moderately or strongly in favor of unification, while only 16% remained moderately or strongly op-

posed. In addition, an interesting 60% of GDR citizens professed support for the notion of a militarily neutral united Germany. It is also worth noting that opinion polling in March 1990 in East Germany detected an interesting difference among generations as far as levels of identification with “Germany” and the “GDR” were concerned. Of those born before 1930, 74% professed a strong sense of being German, with only 22% stressing a more primary GDR-identity. The respective percentages were as follows for the other generations: among those born between 1931 and 1945, 66% versus 28%; among those born between 1946 and 1960, 55% versus 39%; and among those born after 1960, 52% versus 37%. In other words, while a strong sense of being “German” characterized all generations, a significant identification with the GDR was quite pronounced among those who had been fully socialized by life in the GDR after 1949. In addition, supporters of the SED overwhelmingly continued to identify with the GDR, while clear majorities of the supporters of the other major parties in East Germany professed a more primary “German” identity.

A major breakthrough occurred in February 1990. Agreement was reached in Ottawa between FRG and GDR representatives and the former Allies of World War II (US, USSR, Great Britain, and France) with their residual legal rights in Germany (including Berlin) on the so-called “two-plus-four” formula: the two German states would work out the internal modalities of unification, while they would join the Four Powers to make the necessary international security adjustments. As far as the internal German process was concerned, the key issue quickly became the cost of what was no less than a West German bailout of a collapsing GDR. East-West disagreement over a possible NATO membership of the new Germany, plus the sensitive issue of the German-Polish border, clearly topped the agenda on the international side of the bargaining process.

The internal German process was heavily colored by the fact that 1990 became a year of “siamese” German elections (March elections

47. For a discussion of the East Germans’ unmistakably economic calculations in their opinions regarding unification, see the discussion and data provided in Manfred Kuechler, “Pocketbook Patriotism: Economic Expectations and the Pursuit of German Unity,” paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, August 30 - September 2, 1990, San Francisco.
in the GDR, December elections in the FRG). For the first time since
the creation of the two German states in 1949, free elections were to
take place on both sides of the intra-German dividing line. Needless
to say, reunification became the decisive campaign issue on both sides.
An additional “siamese” dimension of this joint German electoral pro-
cess lay in the fact that in both German states, some of the principal
parties in the political contest came to coexist (and be allied) as “sis-
ter” parties. Thus one encountered the phenomenon of Christian
Democratic, Social Democratic, and Free Democratic parties on both
sides, in addition to parties or movements with “Green” or ecological
orientations.

The partially conflicting visions of West Germany’s two key par-
ties, the Social Democrats and Christian Democrats, in the area of
foreign policy were mentioned earlier. It became obvious rather
quickly that these differences would continue to play a significant role
in Germany’s political future. The dynamic of “competitive national-
ism” between these two large parties, aimed at proving one’s national-
ist credentials to the electorate, tends to be particularly dangerous.
Carried to an extreme, such a competition could be highly destabi-
lizing for Germany’s evolving democratic political culture, not to
mention the country’s image in the rest of the world.

Chancellor Kohl’s West German Christian Democrats sought to
position themselves as true guardians of the nation, but also as repre-
sentatives of the Adenauer Westpolitik legacy with its strong emphasis
on both European integration and Atlantic partnership with the U.S.
The CDU’s German nationalism has been primarily embedded in a
Europeanist, Atlanticist, and pro-capitalist ideological framework,
although older nationalist elements clearly survive in some sectors of
the CDU and its Bavarian sister-party, the CSU, and among some of
the expellees from former eastern German territories. Yet the possi-
bility also presented itself that if East-West negotiations over NATO
membership of a future Germany would get seriously stalemated, the
CDU’s Atlanticism could become a political liability. Insofar as
NATO’s purpose has been not only the defense of Western Europe vis-
a-vis the Warsaw Pact but also the control of German power, contin-
ued acceptance of NATO constraints (especially foreign troops on
German soil) by a CDU-led government could well turn into a deeply
emotional issue in a reunited Germany, an issue with considerable na-
tionalist explosive potential, which the SPD, among others, could be
expected to exploit. This is why many argued that the transcendence
of both NATO and Warsaw Pact, legacies of a passing era, by means
of the creation of a pan-European security order should receive urgent attention.

The West German Social Democrats have tended to be less strongly Atlanticist, and might be willing to re-examine Germany's role (and membership) in NATO in the context of the overall reunification process, a fact that has led some to warn of a resurgence of SPD-led German neutralism. Since the late 1950's, the SPD's support of European integration has been quite genuine, although it is sensitive to domination of the European Community by big business at the expense of social needs. After initial, and electorally costly, hesitation in 1989 about the reunification issue, the SPD endorsed the broad outlines of Kohl's confederation plan, before seeking to move ahead to articulate its own policy preferences on the matter of national unity amid rapidly evolving inter-German conditions. For the SPD, long-standing contacts with the disgraced and disintegrated East German SED could be a political liability in the time ahead. The same could be said of the SPD's historic alienation from German nationhood.50

The Free Democrats continue to be a crucial coalition partner for either the CDU or the SPD, despite the party's small size. Although more Atlanticist than the SPD, they did collaborate with the SocialDemocrats during the years after 1969 in formulating the basic re-orientation of West German foreign policy known as Ostpolitik. For the foreseeable future, the Free Democrats are expected to continue their participation in the current coalition with the Christian Democrats. The Greens on the Left and the Republikaner on the Right did not appear to be decisive players (yet).

Needless to say, the East German political scene was much more turbulent. The Socialist Unity Party (SED), now renamed Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS), continued to disintegrate as 1990 progressed, because it faced both a basic political credibility problem and a noticeable fragmentation into more conservative and reformist camps. Initial SED attempts to retain influence (if not power) by playing up an alleged neo-Nazi threat clearly backfired. The various opposition groups (New Forum, Democratic Awakening, and Democracy Now) that emerged in the course of 1989 saw their political influence weaken considerably by the beginning of 1990, despite their participation in Round Table talks with the caretaker government and subse-

50. See, the essay by Hellmuth Karasek, "Mit Kanonen auf Bananen?," Der Spiegel, #13, 1990, pp. 56-57. Karasek points to the "new gap" that has opened up in Germany "between the Left and the national question." See also Michael Charlier, "Deutschland, schwierig Vaterland," Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik, February 1990, pp. 179-87.
quent participation in that government. Some have been heavily dominated by groups of intellectuals, and many have had to struggle hard to define an electoral identity, to decide whether they wished to be a formal political party at all, and to delineate a position on the twin questions of German unity and the GDR’s future.\(^{51}\) Initially committed to the continued existence of a separate East German state, they were all soon confronted with a seemingly uncontrollable popular rush in the direction of reunification, and had to adjust their platforms accordingly. Many developed a clearly enduring resentment against what they saw as an East German “sell-out” to West German bourgeois capitalism.\(^{52}\)

The SED’s former allies, “block parties”\(^{53}\) like the East German CDU and FDP, appeared to be severely afflicted by a basic credibility problem in the eyes of the GDR’s electorate. As a result, the West German CDU and FDP were at first far from eager to lend electoral support and endorsement to these “sister” parties. Faced with the rapid growth of the SPD in the GDR, however, Chancellor Kohl’s CDU swung its support behind a small East German coalition of center-right opposition groups (Allianz für Deutschland) that did include the GDR-CDU.

By the early months of 1990, East Germany’s newly reconstituted Social Democratic Party (SDP, subsequently renamed SPD) seemed to emerge clearly as the major new force in GDR politics. This party could not be tainted by the stigma of collaboration with the SED regime, and could tap the historic electoral strength of Social Democracy in the east of Germany. In addition, the party could present itself as a credible defender of those social programs that the average East

---


53. The SED always governed as part of what was presented as a truly democratic “coalition” of progressive parties. In reality, the SED has been essentially omnipotent, and the “coalition” was really more like a “monolith.” See Wolfgang Miecikowski, “Bewegung im Monolith,” *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, 21 April 1984, p. 3ff.
German might not wish to see eliminated altogether after reunification with the more prosperous Federal Republic.

Yet the GDR elections on March 18 defied all earlier forecasts, turning into a triumph for the CDU-backed conservative Alliance. Unlike a still hesitant SPD and PDS, the Alliance promised quick unification in the most unambiguous way, and clearly benefitted from its closeness to a West German Chancellor who would be expected to fulfill his promises of massive economic aid. The fact that the Alliance fell just short of an absolute majority (circa 48%) necessitated the formation of a coalition. After a brief period of haggling, overshadowed by allegations concerning collaboration with the former security police (Stasi) by many of the GDR’s new politicians, a Grand Coalition was formed, including both the Alliance and the SPD, which had polled 22% of the vote. The PDS, which had scored a somewhat surprising 16% in the election, was excluded: Communist rule in East Germany had formally come to an end.

With a freely elected East German government in place, the “two-plus-four” process could now move forward in more decisive fashion. We examine first the internal German process, and then turn to the international ramifications of the resurgence of a united Germany.

GERMANY REUNITES: ECONOMICS, ELECTIONS, AND EMOTIONS

The intra-German process of unification focused on some crucial constitutional, socioeconomic, financial, and political issues. As far as the constitutional modalities of unity were concerned, several possibilities existed. Usage of Article 23 in West Germany’s Basic Law would necessitate a reconstitution of the original Länder (states) in East Germany, which could then vote one by one to accede to the Federal Republic.\(^4\) This was the formula preferred by the Christian Democrats. Another possibility, favored by the Social Democrats, would be to take the route of Article 146, which would involve the drafting of an entirely new constitution by an all-German constituent

---

\(^4\) The exact text in Article 23 reads: “This Basic Law applies for the time being in the area of the Länder Baden, Bavaria, Bremen, Greater Berlin, Hamburg, Hessen, Lower Saxony, North-Rhine Westphalia, Rhineland-Pfalz, Schleswig-Holstein, Württemberg-Baden and Württemberg-Hohenzollern. It will enter into force in other parts of Germany upon their accession.” Note that, given Germany’s postwar fate and the loss of various territories, the phrase “other parts of Germany” is strikingly vague.
A third constitutional possibility, namely the continued existence of two German states in a confederation of some kind, quickly vanished from all official and scholarly discussion. Most observers came to see unification based on Article 23 as the best route, also because it would be the easiest way to bring the GDR into the European Community without elaborate negotiations.

The socioeconomic and financial aspects of unification generated far more immediate controversy, particularly among the general public, than the more technical and even obscure constitutional modalities. The basic question quickly became: what would it cost and who would pay? Estimates of the total (long-term) cost of unification would ultimately range from 500 billion to 1 trillion D-mark. As 1990 progressed, popular pressure in the FRG grew to put an end to West Germany's generous support of those who had left the GDR. It became clear that the emotional excitement of the fall of 1989 had been replaced by outright worry over the economic and financial consequences of a West German "bail-out" of the GDR, in addition to widespread concern about the need to absorb and integrate a seemingly endless number of "immigrants" (Übersiedler) from the GDR. As W.R. Smyser put it at the time, "[t]he unification of Germany is only superficially a merger between a capitalist and a socialist economy. It is really a merger between rich and poor."

Predictions of increased inflation and higher taxes in the FRG created visible uneasiness among the West German public, which in turn was probably responsible for the CDU's loss in two important state elections in West Germany in May, resulting in SPD control of the Bundesrat (the upper house of the West German parliament). While clear popular majorities continued to support the objective of unification, matters of speed and cost became a source of noticeable political divisiveness. The CDU/CSU-FDP coalition government favored a rapid pace and played down the possibility of adverse economic consequences, while the opposition SPD urged a slowing of the pace and hoped to benefit politically from public anxiety over the high cost.

55. Article 146 reads: "This Basic Law loses its legal validity on the day when a constitution enters into force which has been adopted by the German people in a free decision."

56. In this context, see the discussion by Werner Ungerer, "Die Europäische Gemeinschaft und die Einigung Deutschlands," Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik, April 1990, pp. 434-44; Marc Beise, "Die DDR und die europäische Gemeinschaft," Europa-Archiv, #4, 1990, pp. 149-58.

Concern over trends in West German public sentiment even seemed to prompt Kohl to strive for earlier-than-planned all-German elections, clearly hoping to cash in on his party's popularity in the East and thereby offset possible voter losses in the West.

Anxiety was also easy to detect among the population in the GDR, focused on fear over increased unemployment, an inability to compete with the more powerful West Germans, the possibility of sudden property claims arising from past confiscations, and an elimination of numerous aspects of the GDR’s relatively generous welfare state provisions. Sadness among GDR citizens over the real prospect of a noticeable loss of identity also began to surface, as ironic as that may seem, in light of the overwhelming anti-SED and pro-unification mood. Yet the desire for rapid unity, coupled with the expectation of massive West German economic assistance, was sufficient to bring the CDU-dominated Alliance a ringing victory in the March elections, although their electoral outlook for the longer term had to be considered uncertain at best.

Particular controversy was generated by Chancellor Kohl's desire to bring about a quick monetary union between the two German states, to be set up by means of a formal Staatsvertrag (state treaty). Initial opposition by the FRG's Central Bank subsided, but uneasiness over the monetary consequences clearly remained. East and West German negotiators haggled over the conversion rate that would be applied between the strong West German D-mark and the GDR's very weak Ostmark. Popular anxiety in the East rose dramatically, since an unfavorable rate could have a devastating impact on savings, pensions, and purchasing power. In the end, a 1-for-1 rate was agreed upon, although a ceiling was set for the amounts that could be converted at that rate. While early July was selected as the target date for full monetary union, concerns and disagreements on related economic matters, particularly in the area of market-oriented reform, continued to slow down the process.


59. Poll data also showed a continued CDU/CSU-FDP lead in the West German campaign, however. See "Kohls zweiter Sieg schon sicher?" Der Spiegel, #14, 1990, p. 36ff.


61. Polls also reflected a continued West German optimism about the unification process as a whole, however, although mixed opinion about the FRG-GDR state treaty was clearly evident (42% had a "good impression" of the treaty, 28% had "not a good impression," and a significant 30% were "undecided"). See Richard E. Meyer, "West Germans Optimistic About Reunification, Poll Finds," Los Angeles Times, July 1, 1990, p. A1.
But as the spring ended, considerable progress had been made. FRG-GDR negotiations had resulted in a draft state treaty on economic and monetary union that was signed in May. After some complex political maneuvering within the West German SPD, involving the (unsuccessful) demand by the party's Chancellor-candidate, Oskar Lafontaine, that the SPD block the state treaty unless certain improvements were made in the text, the treaty was ratified by the parliaments of both German states in June. On July 1, 1990, amid uncertainty, anxiety, and anticipation, the FRG-GDR economic and monetary merger went into effect. And now, more than ever before, the likelihood of all-German elections in December 1990 came clearly into view.

A $70 billion fund to finance the merger had meanwhile been created, coupled with a "no new taxes" promise from the Bonn government, although widespread skepticism persisted. The fund would cover a 4-year period, with expenditures focused on the rebuilding of the GDR's old industries and infrastructure, adjustments in the tax system, and a much-needed clean-up of the heavily polluted environment in East Germany. Yet it was also significant that the state treaty did not address some highly sensitive issues that would have to be settled through separate negotiations, such as ownership of private property in a de-socialized GDR and some of the basic aspects of reform of East German industry and agriculture, with a potential for a level of unemployment that some felt might reach well beyond 1, 2, or even 3 million (out of a population of 16 million).

Some, but by no means all, of these issues were decided in a second Staatsvertrag that was ratified by the parliaments of both German states on the eve of the formal unification date (October 3, 1990), after a turbulent negotiation process that saw continued political instability and friction in the GDR's shaky "Grand Coalition" of conservative Alliance, liberal FDP, and left-wing SPD. Yet property claims and divergences in abortion legislation remained among the most important issues that promised continued controversy. The signing of the second treaty, and the at times clearly subdued and noticeably non-nationalistic celebration of unification, were followed by elections in the newly reconstituted Länder (states) in the GDR (and in Bavaria in the FRG) on October 14. The Christian Democrats scored impressive victories in four of the eastern Länder (Saxony, Thuringia, Saxony-
Anhalt, and Mecklenburg), while the SPD was only successful in gaining a majority of the vote in Brandenburg. The former Communist party managed to gain an average of about 10-12% of the vote in each GDR Land. The election results also brought a restoration of the CDU/CSU-FDP majority in the Bundesrat.

Aside from the many economic difficulties faced by the new Germany in its internal affairs, such as unemployment, the risk of inflation, disputes over property claims, hesitation among potential investors, and instances of criminal financial corruption in a collapsing ex-GDR, political and basic social problems also came more strongly to the fore. A fundamental revamping of educational policy and curricular content in the primary- and secondary-school system of the ex-GDR was among the urgent questions to be addressed, in addition to much-needed reform of over-staffed academic institutions. Health care and other social services were on the brink of full-scale collapse. Instances of racism and/or violence by skin-heads and other disaffected and alienated groups, including squatters and anarchists in Berlin, emerged as an additional challenge to a virtually disintegrated East German law enforcement apparatus. Tensions between East Germans and the remaining groups of foreign "guest-workers," as well as the thousands of Soviet soldiers, increased steadily.

Political debate over the appropriate policy to be pursued with respect to former GDR spies, Stasi (secret police) employees, border guards, and Communist officials, ranging from possible amnesty to full-scale persecution and partial incarceration, continued to flare up with predictable regularity. At the same time, controversy over ex-Stasi files and their inherent potential for political embarrassment, if not blackmail, persisted undiminished. Furthermore, former East German political parties, especially the SED (renamed PDS), were forced to surrender their extensive accumulations of capital and property.

Meanwhile, the campaign for Germany's first truly national elections since the end of the war erupted in full force, with the governing CDU/CSU-FDP coalition in Bonn enjoying the clear status of virtually unbeatable favorite in the December 2 ballot-box contest. The polls left little doubt about the likely outcome, especially in light of the CDU's renewed successes in the October 14 GDR elections, and most of the SPD appeared resigned to the inevitable: Helmut Kohl would remain the new Germany's Einheitskanzler (chancellor of unity), a new Bismarck in a democratic Germany. ⁶³ Despite widespread West

⁶³. Poll data can be found in "Ist die Wahl schon entschieden?," Der Spiegel, #26,
German worry about the costs of unification, the SPD proved incapable of using this issue to greater political benefit. Its political message seemed to fall on deaf ears, especially in the East German area.

The SPD's prospects were further dampened by the decision of West Germany's Federal Constitutional Court in September that mandated the use of separate 5% electoral thresholds in former East and West Germany in the December balloting. This would benefit smaller parties, especially in the East, that might not otherwise make it into the new German parliament, but it also deprived the SPD of potential cross-over votes from small East German left-wing parties and citizens' movements.

The results of the December 2 all-German vote were largely as expected. Kohl's Christian Democrats, with their Bavarian CSU allies, captured about 44% of the total national electorate, as opposed to the SPD's 33.5%, which amounted to the Social Democrats' worst showing in 30 years. The Free Democrats succeeded in reaching 11% of the vote and were widely expected to demand more ministerial posts in the new CDU/CSU-FDP coalition government. Parties on the extreme right or left generally fared badly. In the West, the Greens failed to surmount the 5% electoral threshold and would therefore not return to the Bundestag. They had been alienated by the increasingly patriotic mood after the collapse of the Berlin Wall, and their ecological agenda had been largely adopted by the larger parties. Only in the East did a coalition of environmental and peace groups known as Alliance '90 capture enough votes to gain representation in the Bundestag. The PDS, successor of the discredited Communist SED, also gained a sufficient number of votes in the East to enter the national parliament. The far-right Republikaner received only a meager 2% of the vote, well below the required 5% for Bundestag representation. Despite a rather low 77% voter turnout, the message of the election was fairly clear: no experiments, continuation of the current coalition, and a strengthening of the center of Germany's political spectrum.

TOWARDS A PAX GERMANICA OR A PAX EUROPAEA?

It is in the international realm, however, rather than in the internal FRG-GDR sphere with its focus on sometimes bitter electoral contests and the marks-and-pfennigs issues of socioeconomic merger, that the German Question with its central dimensions of identity, unity, and power has made itself felt most dramatically since Novem-

ber 1989. One analyst captured the essence of international concern as follows:

There are only two real certainties in European politics today: Eastern Europe has been effectively liberated from Soviet domination, and the reunification of Germany is approaching. For all their historic worth, these certainties, in turn, create new uncertainties — after all, the postwar system of European stability, of deterrence and detente, was based on the permanence of the Soviet threat and of the division of Europe and of Germany. Now that history has turned the tables, it is the hitherto unquestioned structures of European order that are entering a period of unpredictability: in the East, all structures — from the Warsaw Pact to Comecon — set up to camouflage Soviet centralized control; in the West, the NATO alliance and the European Community (EC); in Europe as a whole the familiar ways in which East-West relations are conducted. Germany is at the center of all these uncertainties, not only geographically but politically.64

He added that “Europe’s two new certainties are interdependent: had Eastern Europe not succeeded in slipping away from Soviet control, there would be no chance for the reunification of Germany.”65

One basic and decisive question concerned the diplomatic intentions of the various players in this unfolding drama.66 Perhaps most importantly, was Moscow willing to abandon its East German ally and permit reunification without major Western concessions? Soviet options were by no means clear, and neither were their ultimate objectives.67 After its unsuccessful attempt to bring about an FRG-GDR
confederation that would have preserved the Soviet position in Central Europe to its maximum extent under already adverse circumstances, Moscow appeared to accept full reunification as inevitable, but continued to oppose NATO membership of a united Germany, until a breakthrough was reached in July 1990, as we shall see below.

The Genscher proposal, discussed earlier, sought to break the stalemate, whereupon the Soviets suggested a German membership in both NATO and Warsaw Pact. But this idea was quickly rejected by both Bonn and its allies. Serious limitations on German military power as part of an East-West compromise remained likely, while Western leaders expected Moscow to abandon its opposition to German NATO membership. Such expectation was fueled by a variety of considerations, such as Gorbachev's growing preoccupation with domestic troubles, the steady disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, and a widespread Eastern European preference for a NATO-bound rather than neutralized and possibly unpredictable and uncontrolled Germany.

In addition, polls showed that NATO membership for a united Germany remained clearly the preferred option among West Germans. A June 1990 poll, for example, found that 51% of West Germans interviewed preferred a united Germany in NATO, while 34% would opt for neutrality and 15% were undecided. In addition, 53% of the sample indicated willingness to "accept the presence of foreign troops [on German soil] as part of [Germany's] NATO obligations," whereas 31% felt that "foreign troops should withdraw" (16% were undecided). Attitudes on nuclear weapons were also interesting. Of the interview sample, 54% agreed that nuclear weapons should now be removed from German soil, but 37% argued that they should remain, while 9% were undecided. When asked whether nuclear weapons should be pulled out of Germany if "the Soviet Union made its agreement to German unity conditional on [such a removal of nuclear weapons]," however, only 25% agreed with such a scenario, while 65% felt that "we should not allow ourselves to be pressured in the matter of German unity" and 10% declared themselves undecided.

As the months passed, the likelihood emerged that NATO membership of a united Germany would be tied to an overall East-West

---


68. For poll results and discussion, see "The Germans give their answers," The Economist, June 30, 1990, pp. 45-46.
agreement on conventional military power in Europe (resulting from the negotiations in Vienna on Conventional Forces in Europe) plus extensive Western economic and financial assistance to the struggling Soviet economy. This latter approach, extending beyond the newly created Bank for East European Development, was looked upon skeptically by the US and Great Britain, but favored by the other Western allies, including especially the FRG, which had already promised Moscow to assume the GDR’s trading obligations vis-a-vis the USSR.

For many, Kohl’s exceedingly clumsy handling of the German-Polish border issue in early 1990 was unmistakable proof of the need to anchor the new Germany firmly in the Western alliance. Allegedly concerned over the potential loss of the West German bloc of expellee votes to the far right, Kohl hesitated badly when asked to declare the Oder-Neisse line as the definitive border between Germany and Poland. His argument that only a newly constituted German government and parliament could effectively make such a pledge was legally correct but politically extremely ill-timed and unwise. Declarations by both German parliaments, plus Allied assurances that Poland would be allowed to participate in discussions regarding its border with Germany in the context of the “two-plus-four” talks, subsequently defused the immediate controversy and anxiety, but the damage had been done. By July, the two German states and Poland reached a full understanding about the finality of the current German-Polish border, to be formalized in a treaty at the time of Germany’s official reunification, and tied to plans for extensive German-Polish economic cooperation. In November, agreement on the formal German-Polish treaty indeed became reality: the existing border was declared fixed once and for all, although the fundamental challenge of reconciliation and cooperation would require more long-term effort on both sides.

However, the Polish-German border issue was illustrative of more widespread anxiety among many of Germany’s neighbors regarding the prospect of unification. A poll conducted in January of 1990 in 8 countries (Spain, Italy, FRG, Hungary, Britain, France, USSR, and Poland) detected mixed feelings. “Roughly two out of three Poles are opposed to the reunification of Germany, but a majority of Russians and Hungarians feel positively about the idea. . . . While a solid majority of those questioned in five Western European countries favored a single German state, a significant number of Britons and French — around one in four — were opposed.” The poll revealed “continuing uncertainty throughout Europe.” For example, “[a]mong the Western European countries polled, only Italy had a majority that thought lasting peace was within reach. Forty-nine per-
cent of Britons and 50 percent of French said a serious European conflict was still possible.\textsuperscript{69} As the months progressed, some of the international worries seemed to ease, particularly as a result of a variety of diplomatic assurances made by the Bonn government.\textsuperscript{70} Jewish concerns frequently persisted, however, in part because no explicit all-German admission of guilt for the Holocaust was included in the final FRG-GDR unification treaty. The likelihood of claims made against a reunited Germany by Jews and others also continued to loom as a source of very probable controversy.

As Christoph Bertram pointed out, the basic international agenda resulting from the inexorable drift toward German reunification involved “the security status of Germany, the cancellation of the remnants of Germany’s now obsolete postwar legal regime, the special rights of the Four Powers, the status of the city of Berlin, and the finalization of Germany’s external borders, particularly with Poland.” In addition, “the European Community will have to define the modalities of permitting one of its member states to be enlarged.”\textsuperscript{71}

The exact ways in which this agenda would be managed, and the various issues settled, could only become clearer as time passed, and some aspects might not be fully settled for at least several years after formal FRG-GDR unification. What became very obvious, however, was that this agenda reflected the basic dimensions of an enduring German Question with which Germans and non-Germans alike must continue to contend. It is clear that one aspect of that Question, namely national unity, has been at least formally “solved,” although lingering revisionism due to the loss of former Eastern territories ought to be watched carefully.

But it is also important to remember that territorial and legal


\textsuperscript{71} Bertram, “The German Question,” \textit{supra}, note 64, pp. 50-51.
German unification by itself has not yet by any means resulted in genuine East-West German cultural and psychological unity. Forty years of political-ideological and psychological separation cannot and will not be undone overnight. What is more, the dismal economic picture in the former GDR all but guarantees that the population in “East” Germany will for some years to come have to cope with a (perceived as well as real) status as “second-class” citizens in the new Germany, frequently subject to “West” German disdain, ridicule, and resentment. In fact, Michael Meyer has suggested that “[t]he German Question has . . . been reincarnated, in a new form,” because “[t]he new Germany will be one nation, but two peoples.”

Interesting in this context of continued “disunity” is also the occasional discussion of what the “eastern” part of the new Germany ought to be called in political discourse: “the former GDR,” “the new Federal Länder,” “eastern Germany?” For many conservatives who continue to harbor revisionist dreams regarding the lost “eastern” territories in Poland and the Soviet Union, of course, the former GDR will always remain Mitteldeutschland.

Furthermore, there is absolutely no doubt that the two remaining dimensions, identity and power (and, thus, Germany’s role in world affairs) will also continue to preoccupy scholars and policy-makers alike for at least the foreseeable future. Beyond the concrete military, political, and economic issues that the international community faces as it strives to deal with the new Germany, the psychological aspects, especially fear of a new German nationalism, are equally significant.

Western World and West German insistence on placing the new German giant firmly in the Western community was and is the clear outgrowth of perceived lessons of the German and European past. Throughout its history, Germany’s geopolitical location in the heart of Europe, coupled with its growing power, have been the source of both trauma and temptation, of insecurity and instability. Germany’s alienation from the West was further enhanced by the at least partially

---

72. See, the interesting discussion in “Es ist ein anderes Leben,” Der Spiegel, #39, 1990, p. 34ff. See also the useful poll data on this issue in “Zwei Klassen im einig Vaterland,” Der Spiegel, #38, 1990, p. 28ff. Of East Germans polled, 78% expected to be second-class citizens for the foreseeable future, while only 21% anticipated equal treatment and equal rights.


74. See, the interesting discussion in “Aehm, also, sag doch mal,” Der Spiegel, #42, 1990, pp. 51, 54.
diverging cultural values and political traditions noted above. In this respect, Germany’s reconciliation with the West and the FRG’s membership in both NATO and EC rank among the great success stories of postwar Western, and West German, diplomacy. The steady democratization of West German political culture has been a source of reassurance to the country’s traumatized neighbors.

In light of these considerations, Western and West German insistence on a Germany firmly tied to the West, militarily in NATO and economically through the EC, has been and still is necessary, inevitable, and under current circumstances desirable. A reaffirmation of Germany’s Western identity, coupled with a well-defined role in multilateral (even supranational) Western institutions and organizations, will provide the most appropriate basis for a solution to what is perhaps the most crucial dimension of the German Question: power.\footnote{See, "Germany Inc.: Awesome Power Might Be the Only Predictable Trait Of a Unified Land," \textit{The New York Times}, Section 4, February 18, 1990, p. 1; "The New Superpower," \textit{Newsweek}, February 26, 1990, p. 16ff.} In fact, if this essay has proved anything, it is that what tends to be called the German Question is not necessarily the problem of German reunification but perhaps primarily the problem of German power. History has given us ample indication that the effective management of German power by the Germans themselves and by Germany’s neighbors is crucial to the creation of a stable European order.\footnote{See, the discussion in Michael Lind, “German Fate and Allied Fears,” \textit{The National Interest}, Spring 1990, pp. 34-44.} The Cold War “solution” to this problem, based on the division of Germany and the integration of both states into opposing alliance systems, has come to an end. What lies ahead?

The management of the new Germany’s power will be an international task, but, as Bertram stresses, the Germans themselves now face perhaps the major responsibility:

Germany holds a pivotal role as a generator of policy. The ideas, initiatives and commitments to shape a stable European future will now largely have to come from the Germans themselves — not only because of their weight in Europe’s politics and economy, but also because, with the notable and welcome exception of the United States, Germany’s main partners in the West have largely retreated into attentive (France) or irritated (Britain) passivity. German politicians must thus display an immense degree of statesmanship, not only in order to manage the domestic process of reunification, but to pave the way for the international one as well.
This is a tall order for any country. Germany must accommodate the concern of those worried about the German past as well as that of those troubled by its new power; it must reassure Soviet security interests without arousing suspicions in the West; it must strengthen its Western ties through participation in the reform of NATO and through promotion of political union in Western Europe. In short, Germany has to use its weight and power wisely, considerately as well as confidently.  

International concern over German military power remains, particularly the scenario of a future revisionist German superpower armed with nuclear weapons. Hence the increased effort on all sides to examine various possible security arrangements, including arms control agreements, that might stabilize the emerging post-Cold War European continent.

Major breakthroughs on the security status of a united Germany were finally achieved during the summer of 1990, after months of intense negotiations and posturing by the various parties. In mid-July, the Soviet Union removed its objection to the NATO membership of a united Germany, in return for extensive Western (especially German)

77. Bertram, "The German Question," supra, note 64, pp. 61-62. As Bertram notes, the U.S. has indicated that it intends to remain fully engaged in the future of Europe. To some, the American presence in Europe is in fact a key stabilizing factor. See Josef Joffe, "Europe's American Pacifier," Survival, July/August 1984, pp. 174-81; William E. Odom, "Only Ties to America Provide the Answer," Orbis, Fall 1990, pp. 483-504.


79. The important breakthrough was especially made possible by the results of the summit meetings of the EC, NATO, and the G-7 (leading Western industrial nations) that occurred in rapid succession during June and July 1990. West German success in getting allied support for (its own or joint) economic and financial aid to the USSR, plus subtle but significant shifts in NATO strategy and military/political posture, were particularly decisive.
aid for the faltering Soviet economy, a limit of 345,000 on the troop strength of the all-German army, a German pledge not to acquire any nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, and German agreement to help pay for the maintenance of Soviet troops on East German territory for a transitional period of 3 to 4 years as well as for their subsequent removal. The last obstacle to the rapid and successful conclusion of the "two-plus-four" talks was definitively cleared, and on September 12, the four wartime allies and the two German states signed the agreement formally restoring full German sovereignty. The Soviet-German breakthrough culminated in a formal treaty of friendship and cooperation between the two continental European giants in November, whereupon a grand European/North American summit meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe gave its formal endorsement to German unity, a far-reaching conventional arms control agreement between East and West, and the construction of a new European order beyond the Cold War in what became known as the Charter of Paris.

Yet many of the more immediate and realistic considerations have been focused, not on Germany's military power, but on its inevitable political and economic clout in a changing Europe. The following (estimated) figures give an indication of a united Germany's projected economic power. Exports by the new united Germany might total $354 billion a year, compared with $321 billion for the US, $265 billion for Japan, and $110 billion for the USSR. The new Germany's balance of trade is projected to show a $74 billion surplus, compared with Japan's $77 billion surplus, the Soviets' meager $3 billion surplus, and America's $138 billion deficit. Per capita GNP is calculated at $14,000 for a united Germany, nearly $20,000 for the US, $14,000 for Japan, and less than $9,000 for the USSR. Based on 1988 figures, the united Germany has a GDP of about $1 trillion, compared to $4.8 trillion for the US, $2.5 trillion for the Soviet Union, $1.7 trillion for Japan, $762 billion for France, $755 billion for the UK, and $754 billion for Italy. Many have suggested that Germany's geographic location can be expected to be a key asset in that country's economic future. W.R. Smyser, for example, suggests that "Germany [will] benefit from its central position in Europe, not only as a transportation hub but also as a production center."

Some have sought to place the economic power of a united Ger-

---

81. Figures in "Anything to Fear?," Time, March 26, 1990, p. 36.
many in Europe in context, however, attempting to counter undue concerns. Thus John Roper, pointing to the widespread “speculation of the role that a united Germany would play within the [European] Community,” wrote:

True, its population of some 78m [million] would be one-third greater than that of either Britain, France or Italy, and twice that of Spain. But the change would be quantitative rather than qualitative. West Germany is already the largest member of the EC with just under 20 per cent of the Community’s population and 24 per cent of its economic output (gdp). A unified Germany would increase its share of the EC’s population to 22.7 per cent and initially to around 26 per cent of the Community’s economic output, but this could rise to 29 per cent if the labor productivity of the two Germanies was equated. On the other hand, if eventually the other five Eastern European countries were to join, the united Germany’s proportion of the total EC population would be lower than that of West Germany — at present — only 17 per cent. Its economic share is more difficult to calculate, but it is probable that it would also be less than the present 24 per cent. 83

He concludes that “the idea that, by unification, Germany would automatically leap from a non-dominant to a dominant role is clearly misplaced.” Roper adds that “[a]s to the political aspect, there are too many hands on the levers of the Community for any single member state to impose its will on the rest.” 84

Perhaps the hope that a German economic superpower will be effectively tamed in a context of progressive European integration is justified, but the fact also remains that the new Germany will wield very significant influence in most areas of Central and Eastern Europe. 85 It will also be the European country most directly affected by any turbulence in East-Central Europe in the wake of the collapse of Communism and its socio-economic as well as ethno-nationalist consequences. For historical, geopolitical, and cultural reasons, it is inevi-

84. Ibid.
table that the united Germany will in the coming years and decades once again occupy its Janus-like position as a multifaceted “bridge” between the West and the East, with all the opportunities and liabilities that this entails, including pressures from an economically troubled Eastern Europe and USSR for economic and financial assistance.

In addition, it is an unmistakable fact that the process of German unification has run ahead of the process of European integration, which will pose particularly difficult challenges for the entire EC in the time ahead. In a changing world, where economic strength will be as important as military capability, Germany will be a truly decisive actor on the world stage. Yet, as Fritz Stern points out, “[f]or Germans more than for any other people in the Western world, both the past and the future are unsettled, uncertain, open.” Whether the reunited Germans will manage their power responsibly and play their new global as well as Central European roles effectively, with a solidly anchored Western identity, that is clearly the essence of the enduring German Question.


CHAPTER VIII

UNIFICATION AND THE DIALECTICS OF
(MAL)INTEGRATION IN VIETNAM

Gerard Maré

I. INTRODUCTION

Few people have sacrificed so much in the name of national unification as have the Vietnamese. Despite appalling casualties and a savaged economy, the grand ideal of unification was sustained for many years with unflinching intent. While the two decades of separation into North and South were marked by nearly constant war, these same years also witnessed sweeping and rapid change in both societies. In the North, the Communist regime carried out harsh campaigns of land reform, collectivization, and economic socialization in an effort to recast the society along Leninist lines. In the South, over half the population was uprooted; millions flooded the cities. The old rural social structure was shattered, largely as a result of the Vietcong strategy of commingling terror and land reform. By the early 70's, however, as the war became stalemated and the Vietcong threat subsided, economic progress began to take hold, in part due to vast infusions of American financial and administrative assistance. When communist forces captured Saigon in 1975 after a devastating six-week military offensive, the stage was set for a collision of two disparate worlds.

Within several years Vietnam will have been reunified for as long as it was separated. Yet a deep north/south cleavage continues to skew and divide Vietnamese political life, and the two societies remain distinct. The circumstances and principles under which unification was carried out—the attempt at wholesale socialist transformation and the blind disavowal of the South's unique historical experience—set in motion a dialectic of malintegration which persists to this day. Presently the socializing drive is on the wane if not in retreat, particularly in the South. The central issue confronting the regime is no longer how to recast the South in the Northern mold but the obverse: how to prevent changes occurring in the South—the rapid pullback from socialist forms, vocal disaffection, and cynicism—from creating too wide a gap or too strong a pull vis-a-vis the North.

Regarding most divided nations, reflections on unification by the
parties themselves or by outside observers tend to focus overwhelm­
ingly on ways to achieve a grand national settlement. The Vietnamese

One could hypothesize that in national cases where one side engulfs the other, there is the tendency to believe that lessons deemed successful can be applied wholesale, putting little store in the specific historical lessons or culture of the erstwhile alienated 'other'.

In analyzing the politics of national reintegration in Vietnam, several initial themes stand out. First, the very obsession to achieve unification blinded the regime to the bedeviling complexities in realizing integration. In the euphoria of victory economic plans were laid which forecast rapid recovery and astonishingly high output targets over the following five year span. Hanoi's leaders spent little time either reviewing the weaknesses inherent in its own socialization process or assessing the degree to which absorbing and restructuring the South involved a great deal more than simply rooting out foreign influence. They were particularly blind to the consequences of their own initiatives: how, for example, the Viet Cong, in pursuing a land war strategy, had fostered dynamics of rural reform which left the Southern peasantry resistant to further transformation.

A second theme concerns both the ideological and international context of Vietnamese unification. The war had always been cast as part of a universal struggle against colonialism and imperialism. As a result, the ensuing debates about the nature and pace of socialization and, subsequently, the need to accommodate policies to the distinct conditions in the South became embroiled in ideological conflict and distrust. There was a strong ideological linkage across policy fields, especially in the initial post-1975 period. Only recently, as the policy agenda has become increasingly dictated by the need to respond to repeated economic failure, have these links begun to loosen.

Two arguments are woven in the discussion below, each stressing the central role of political malintegration in the regime's evolution since 1975. The first examines the problems of North/South integration in terms of evolving dynamics of state/society interaction. I argue that the regime's strength, effectiveness, and legitimacy have steadily eroded over the last fifteen years as a result of both its economic incompetence and of its inability to penetrate and remold Southern society. Having made critical macro-economic mistakes and having failed to implant tenable socialist structures in the South, the
regime had its legitimacy stripped down close to its founding nationalist core. Vietnamese socialism became a spent force as it progressed ineffectually southwards.

These failures have in turn brewed discontent. In the last few years, as the party loosened the strictures limiting criticism, a nascent civil society has begun to take root primarily in the South, spearheaded by a loosely knit association of former Southern revolutionary leaders of unassailable prestige who had been sidelined in the intervening years. Tacit alliances with disaffected peasant groups and among the small intellectual elite have begun to broaden. Within this budding opposition—whose influence extends to the Fatherland Front, to Southern branches of mass organizations, to scientific clubs and other professional associations—the rejection of party dogma and autocracy, incompetence and corruption, is expressed in ever more trenchant tones. While Southern in origin, the dissenters' perspective is essentially national in scope, not confined merely to Southern preoccupations or failures. Recent events in Eastern Europe have bolstered their courage while at the same time inviting stern rebuff and admonition from the regime.

How easily these voices of dissent can be muzzled or how quickly they will echo throughout the whole country are difficult questions to answer. Nevertheless, the Vietnamese leadership, in failing the expectations of even its erstwhile allies and supporters in the South, has fostered a dialectical response which makes it more vulnerable in the long term than the leadership of other Asian socialist states. Malintegration has abetted regime drift and decay, such that even in a socialist state with low educational levels and a limited intellectual elite, dissent is increasingly evident. At present, despite having withdrawn most of its forces from Cambodia, the regime is paradoxically more politically isolated than it has ever been as a result of changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. At the same time the society is increasingly open to outside influence through rapidly expanding external economic ties, through the overseas Vietnamese community in the West, and through the 180,000 guest workers sojourning in the East, presently trickling back to face severe unemployment at home.

Whether the regime can adapt and channel the pressures for radical change is an open question.

My second main argument complements the first and asserts that another distinguishing feature of postwar Vietnamese socialism is the lack of regime goal integration. Before 1975 the regime pursued the unification dream single-mindedly, effectively mobilizing all its resources to that end. In the wake of victory it became saddled with conflicting priorities: socialist transformation and integration of the South; economic reconstruction and development; and the perennial goal of military struggle and defense which quickly drew it into the Cambodian quagmire. The image that comes to mind for the first post-1975 decade and beyond is of a regime caught in different and contradictory phases of socialist development, unable to break through or break out of any one phase. Both China and the Soviet Union evolved through separate stages of war communism, socialist transformation, and eventually some conjunction of reform and decay. Identified with each phase was a central set of tasks, and a specific hierarchy of skills and regime institutions. In Vietnam there was a conflation of priorities weakening effectiveness on all three fronts. War, radical social transformation, and economic development and reform are mutually exclusive tasks which simply could not be prosecuted successfully and simultaneously by a resource starved Third World revolutionary regime in a downward economic spiral. Associated—part cause and part effect—with this triple and contradictory regime profile is a collegial leadership style and an overwhelming emphasis on regime continuity and stability, such that even periods of leadership succession have not yielded the kind of major break or realignment often witnessed in other socialist states.

Presently the socializing profile lives on primarily in a vestigial or custodial capacity. The decades-long stress on military struggle has also been subsiding. Thus for the first time in its post-war history the leadership can marshal its attention and resources toward one strategic goal—salvaging and developing its tattered economy. The composition of key leadership organs has begun to reflect this change over the last few years, though not without some lag.2

---

2. The composition of the Central Committee, for instance, has been significantly altered since the 1982 Congress. Central party organs and the military are much more weakly represented while provincial officials and state technocrats now comprise a majority. For a detailed review of these changes, see Carlyle Thayer, “The Regularization of Politics: Continuity and Change in the Party’s Central Committee, 1951-1986,” in David G. Marr & Christine P. White (eds.), *Postwar Vietnam: Dilemmas in Socialist Development*, Ithaca: Cornell Southeast Asia Program, 1988, p. 187. Military representation in the
Both arguments briefly sketched above converge to highlight Vietnam’s integration problem and the long painful sequels to war and separation. Unification threw the regime into contradiction and disarray from which it has only begun to emerge. But it has also created a dynamic of change which in time might lead Vietnam to break out of obdurate socialist orthodoxy.

II. UNIFICATION: THE FIRST DECADE

Many of the problems of malintegration that Vietnam suffers today can be traced to the early post-unification years of 1975-1979. During the war, when unification was still a grand ideal and a fighting cause, little thought had been given to the concrete issues of planning and administration in the post-war years. After an initial phase of recovery and consolidation of control, unification was declared as a fait accompli and the Hanoi-based regime changed its name from the Democratic Republic of Vietnam to the present Socialist Republic of Vietnam. Resettlement schemes were introduced affecting both the North and South to relieve the bloated cities and regions of their burden of unemployed and underproductive population. In the lead up to the 4th Party Congress held in December 1976, the first in sixteen years, plans were drawn up for the wholesale but gradual transformation of Southern society. These plans, however, were based on a number of flawed assumptions, chief of which was the belief that lessons derived in the wake of the collectivization campaigns, carried out in the North two decades earlier, could usefully be put into practice in a post-bellum South dramatically altered by the war.

Before 1954 South Vietnamese agriculture was essentially a wet rice share-cropping system directed to the export market and characterized by a very unequal distribution of land, power, and status. However, over the following two decades both sides in the war focused great attention on gaining rural support, subjecting the peasantry to a barrage, if not a crossfire, of land reform measures. Though much of the undertaking was initiated piecemeal by the Viet Cong, the Thieu government’s Land-To-The-Tiller program of 1970-1973 nevertheless consolidated and made official the changes accomplished to date.3

Central Committee has been cut in half, down to 7% at present; yet party recruitment from within the military is still 37.2% of the national total for the last year, according to Nhan Dan (Hanoi) as translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report East Asia, (hereafter FBIS, DR/EA), March 13, 1989. While down from earlier figures (58% in the 1976-1982 years according to Thayer) the high percentage reveals how the military is still viewed as providing a key pool of dependable elite talent.

3. The discussion of the inherent contradictions in the collectivization policies applied
The result was that by 1974 a largely middle peasant-farmer landholding agrarian structure had emerged from the ruins of war-torn rural areas. Helped by effective extension services, credit availability, and the introduction of miracle rice strains, rice paddy production rose over 40% between 1969-1974, bringing South Vietnam to the verge of rice self-sufficiency. Thus, concomitant to twenty years of war and destruction, steady and extraordinary improvements had been achieved for the material welfare of the surviving Delta peasantry. One can conjecture that the lower 40% of the agrarian population in the Mekong Delta was materially better off in 1975 than the equivalent population in any state in the region. One thing was certain: the vast majority of middle peasant small-holders had acquired considerable interests to protect. And their disposition and receptivity to further transformation, especially in the Delta where over two-thirds of the agricultural production was based, was at best doubtful.

In retrospect there seems to be a tragic inevitability to the collisions and failures of these fateful early post-war years. That the regime would collectivize Southern agriculture and socialize the Southern economy was inescapable. While acknowledging poor performance of cooperatives in the North and problems of implementation, the leadership had never seriously examined the classic economic rationales for collectivization. Collectivization was furthermore part of the effort to unify the country administratively and integrate it socially and economically. Collectivization, equally, served as a potential tool to remold the social and cultural underpinnings of Southern society and to destroy potential bases of opposition—hence the parallel recourse to re-education camps, New Economic Zones, intense political discrimination in jobs and education on the basis of family background, and pervasive security controls—all aspects of an actively socializing regime profile.6

4. Callison, ibid., pp. 60-65. These advances were buoyed by U.S. administrative and financial aid and by the availability of cheap agriculture imports such as fuel, fertilizer, pumps, etc.

5. This is true only in a broad sense. Many discrete policy failures and repressive or discriminatory measures could hardly be called inevitable.

6. In the levelled Southern rural social context, expropriations were effected primarily on the basis of ties to the former regime. They were hence perceived as punitive, not as acts to the South is based on Gerard Maré, Socialist Transformation Drives in Southern Vietnamese Agriculture: An Assessment Five years after 'Liberation,' UC-Berkeley M.A. Thesis, 1981. For detailed information on the Thieu governments' Land-To-The-Tiller program, see Charles S. Callison, Land-to-the-Tiller in the Mekong Delta: Economic, Social and Political Effects of Land Reform in Four Villages of South Vietnam, Cornell Ph.D. Thesis, 1976.
CHAPTER VIII

The collectivization program that was launched simply sought to apply Northern lessons—learned during the period of self-examination following the Land Reform debacle of the mid-50's—in a vastly dissimilar Southern peasant setting. These lessons focused on the need to proceed step by step with a carrot-and-stick approach as opposed to relying exclusively on class warfare. But when applied to the South 20 years later these lessons proved anachronistic. The regime just did not have the organizational and material resources, or the requisite cadre talent, to penetrate and reweave the rural social fabric—at least not without massive coercion, recourse to which had been resolutely ruled out. Considerable pressure was applied and occasionally cadres were rebuked for using coercion. Yet the pressure was mainly economic, in the form of access to key agricultural inputs.

Initial efforts quickly led agriculture production into a steep decline. In 1977-78 the gradual approach was forsaken as the more radical wing of the party under Party Secretary General Le Duan, Truong Chinh, and Le Duc Tho came to the fore. Faced with rapidly falling grain procurements, the decision was reached to nationalize practically all commerce and industry in the South. Combined with a whole panoply of repressive and discriminatory measures, this drove nearly a half million people into exile, a disproportionate number of whom came from the Chinese community.

Throughout 1978 and early 1979 the collectivization campaign was in full swing. Successes were heralded and monthly tallies were reported on the number of collectives established in each region. But while the campaign did achieve some success in the central region, barely 20% of the peasants in the Mekong Delta had been successfully cajoled into joining by late spring 1979.

By 1979 the country was on the brink of economic collapse while militarily committed in Cambodia and at war with China. It is at this point that the 'reform' profile begins to appear with a series of liberalizing measures promoting the rural household economy, agricultural of redistributive justice gaining legitimacy for the new order among the broad peasantry. One can view this as evidence of the inherent weakness and ideological degeneration manifest in the Vietnamese Communists' reversion to socialist transformation after a twenty year hiatus.

7. The shift to a harder line was prompted by a number of factors besides dire economic circumstances, such as increasing hostility with the PRC, Khmer Rouge armed incursions, the failure of normalizing efforts toward the U.S., and increasing dependence and alliance with the Soviet Union. For a useful if brief account, see Nguyen Duc Nhu, "Signes de renouveau au Vietnam," supra, note 1, p. 18.

markets, and small-scale industry. The results were quickly felt. From 1981 to 1985 the regime enjoyed its best economic performance. Agricultural production grew steadily, reaching a peak growth rate of 9.2% in 1982.\(^9\) Small scale local industry for consumer goods developed at an average annual rate of over 14%.\(^10\) Living standards improved markedly. In 1985, the leadership, facing massive deficits and acute inflation, decided to adopt a series of further reforms to sharply reduce state subsidies and usher in 'real' prices throughout the economy.

However, against the advice of reform-minded leaders and after secret deliberations, the government in the same year introduced a revamping of the dong monetary units with disastrous overall economic effect.\(^11\) The objective was to soak up the hoard of circulating cash which had fueled the second economy and fallen outside the control of the central bank. But contrary to expectations, the public sector enterprises bore the brunt of the blow. As is typical of all socialist 'shortage' economies, these enterprises had accumulated large piles of cash to acquire goods on the secondary markets and to pay bonuses to their employees.\(^12\) However, most of the targeted 'speculators' and 'profiteers' had long since acquired the habit of dealing only in dollars, gold, or bartered merchandise. The combined effect of the two policies was devastating: within a year inflation shot up to over 700% and the stage was set for the severe crisis which persisted until 1988-89 when radical austerity measures were introduced.\(^13\)

I highlight this incident because it sharply reveals what can happen when different regime strains collide head on. More than any other policy move in the 80's, the monetary disaster, in the words of a Vietnamese commentator, "made it clear to all that our top leaders were capable of the most egregious errors."\(^14\) As an unanticipated consequence, the fiasco aroused freer discussion and criticism in the press, discrediting those responsible for the blunder.

After ten years of unification the regime, though secure in its rule,
had neither implanted stable or workable collective structures in the South nor effectively remolded Southern society. Malaise and alienation were endemic. Overseas remittances and a vast sub rosa economy helped the bulk of the population to adapt and survive. State employees and cadres, among the worst hit by the accelerating inflation, became demoralized, easy prey to petty corruption. More disturbing for the future was the profound disaffection among the veteran Southern revolutionary elite. As Vietnam entered its second unification decade and launched its own brand of perestroika and glasnost, Southern discontent would find its voice.

III. DOI MOI [RENOVATION] AND CIVIL SOCIETY: THE SOUTH TAKES THE LEAD

Towards the end of 1985 the death of several of the 'old guard' and the renewed economic chaos precipitated a political crisis culminating in the 6th Party Congress held in December 1986. A new party secretary general, Nguyen Van Linh, a Southerner, was appointed who quickly showed himself a proponent of further socioeconomic reforms and greater openness in the image of Gorbachev's glasnost.

Articles began appearing in the press, occasionally penned by Nguyen Van Linh himself, which criticized previous policy and lamented inefficient bureaucracy, party arrogance, and corruption. Literary and film works appeared which greatly stretched the realm of the permissible. Nguyen Van Linh, following Gorbachev, sought to promote change and renewal by first building a strong constituency for himself outside of the top political elite and the entrenched bureaucracy: the small intellectual class, youth, women, and Southern party networks. While the change in public discourse has been dramatic, Nguyen Van Linh unfortunately was not able to staunch the ravages of inflation, which continued in the 700-1000% range until 1989. Furthermore, in loosening the reigns over society, he unleashed a storm of criticism which eventually frightened his neo-conservative opposition into defensive reaction.

Still, new life has begun to spring in mass organizations and in the National Assembly, and Southern members have taken the lead in registering vocal opposition to established practice or party dictates. Yearly assemblies of youth organizations, journalists or writers unions, and professional associations have become turbulent affairs where non-approved speakers come to the fore and rail against the regime.

But the most significant development has been the creation of a loosely knit association of elder veteran Southern revolutionaries of
unassailable prestige who began to establish branches in many of the Southern provincial capitals. One of the first overt political acts of the Club of Former Resistance Fighters was to send a letter to the central committee and to the National Assembly in mid 1988 calling for a genuinely democratic election and the right to choose a prime minister by secret ballot without interference from the party. Signed by over 100 old revolutionaries, including a host of former top Provisional Revolutionary Government officials, the letter did not succeed in preventing the party's official candidate for prime minister, Do Muoi, from being elected. Nevertheless, through public meetings and clandestine publications, the Club's influence began to spread. Its members' critique was caustic. In the words of Nguyen Ho, a former Ho Chi Minh City committee chairman and Club leader, "the American imperialists," could not achieve [i.e. wreak the kind of damage] with all their troops, bombs, and money, what has been achieved in the 13 years since victory. Of particular note was their call for the party to emulate the open proceedings of Soviet party conferences and to grant more rigorous oversight powers to the national assembly. Pervading much of the criticism was rancor at the rapid unification and 'colonization' of the South after 1975, in the process of which many of them were sidelined or retired.

It appears Club members were involved in the demonstrations over land disputes which swept a number of Southern provincial capitals in 1988. In April 1988 the government issued directives downgrading the role of cooperatives. In doing so it revealed the kinds of predicaments that can arise in reversing course. In many Southern provinces cooperatives were essentially defunct. In trying to officiate their demise and even grant quasi-titles to the land, vast pressures were created to return land to previous owners and not merely to those, often local cadre families, who had best positioned themselves in the new free-wheeling economic environment. In the course of these disputes with local cadres, widespread abuse and graft came into the open. The state system of taxation and materials supply was revealed to be a particularly severe source of corruption.

15. Le Thien Tung asserts that branches have been set up in at least half of the Southern provinces. "The North-South Cleavage: A New Pattern of Infighting," Vietnam Commentary, May-June 1989, p. 2.
17. Ibid., p. 26. These comments, which Chanda, perhaps paraphrasing, relates without quotation marks, were delivered in a speech in December 1988 in Ho Chi Minh City.
In this unsettled rural environment the state faces great problems of contract and tax compliance. Government reports revealed that Southern provinces paid only 54% of their grain tax in 1987. Two-way contract commitments have often not been met as farmers prefer to hold on to their grain as a hedge against inflation. They have been emboldened to do so given the state’s incapacity to meet its own contractual obligations to provide key agricultural inputs. On occasion these problems have had a direct bearing on North/South issues. In 1988, when the North faced a severe famine, authorities met stolid resistance in seeking greater grain procurements from the South.

Overall, the renovation era of the last five years and the more open political climate have aggravated rather than defused political tensions and anomie. Greater openness has allowed the latent discontent to find its voice in the stirrings of a civil society. Much central authority has been lost to the provinces in the effort to deal with enduring if not widening interregional differences. Reversing previous policies of socialization has tended to raise anew a host of problems from the past. At the same time, inveterate attitudes and policy biases within the party core are eroding, despite all the gainsaying by forestalling neo-conservatives. A tide has turned in Vietnam, and the challenges spawned foremost in the South will not be easily checked.

IV. PROSPECTS

The foregoing discussion of doi moi and North/South integration shows how the long shadow of the past complicates the many debates enlivening political life in Vietnam today. What does the future hold? Will a post-Cambodia era, with its promise of leadership turnover and renewal, economic democracy, and a more outward looking economy, herald greater political integration? Or will the diverging impact and pace of these changes further intensify leadership tensions? The answer is mixed. As argued earlier, the greater integration problem has been reconciling the regime’s disparate strategic goals, resolving the contradictory pulls of economic growth, military struggle, and socialization. At present, for the first time in its history, Vietnam is entering an era in which economic development is a clear priority. On the other hand, the regime still faces the enormous challenge of creating a consensus around policy packages apt to have a diverging impact and response from the country’s two halves. The central dynamic, however, is no longer Southern resistance to Northern transformation attempts, but the opposite: how to prevent the different pace of

economic liberalization from overwhelming or disrupting the North, all in a period of socialist dissolution in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union.

The collapse of socialism in Eastern Europe and the jettisoning — even in the Soviet Union — of the Communist party’s leading role have given rise to sharply different interpretations. In the South, younger party members and veteran revolutionaries, disaffected by the ruin and poverty of the last fifteen years, see in these events confirmation of their own disillusionment. Articles and commentary by Resistance Club members highlight party arrogance, corruption and lack of concern for the people as chief causes. They thus strongly hint that the Vietnamese party should draw positive lessons from the socialist debacle in Eastern Europe. Conversely, official commentary in Hanoi stresses the negative, warning of “imperialist sabotage” and insidious “peaceful evolution” tactics by the West. General Secretary Nguyen Van Linh, alarmed by the divisiveness engendered by these debates and personally closer to his erstwhile allies in the South than any other figure among the top leadership, did seek to carve out a compromise. While acknowledging internal weaknesses and failures in other socialist regimes and by implication in Vietnam, Linh also has stressed the present need for party discipline and unity, warning equally against ‘voluntarism and stagnation’ and ‘overhastyness and demagogy’.

But in the years ahead even greater strains will arise from the anticipated expansion of foreign economic contacts and deepening of economic restructuring, whose pace and impact are bound to differ sharply along North/South lines. To date the expected increase in foreign investments and contacts in the wake of the Cambodian withdrawal has been slow to materialize. If anything there has been a

---


21. A recent Hanoi Domestic Service broadcast intoned: “The so-called peace, democracy, and right of self-determination serve as a length of red silk hiding the sinister dagger of pluralism with its tip aimed at the socialist countries,” reported in FBIS.DR/EA, Jan.22, 1990, p. 58, under the rubric “Article explains history, nature of Pluralism.”


23. Recent reports indicate 151 foreign investment projects have proceeded to date for
decline in foreign trade in 1989. The lack of foreign exchange, the continued U.S. blocking of aid and credit by multilateral funding institutions, as well as the confusion and competition among different bureaucratic entities at central and local levels have all played a part. Much remains to be done to develop the country’s commercial, legal, and financial infrastructure to favor better integration in the world economy.

Yet as these obstacles diminish, the South is expected to play a leading role for a number of reasons, including its broader urban middle class, entrepreneurial experience, and greater availability of capital. Overseas Vietnamese remittances, which help to support anywhere from one quarter to one third of Ho Chi Minh City’s population, already reach an estimated US$ 200-300 million. Approximately two-thirds of foreign investment licenses to date have been granted to companies investing in the South. Perhaps a quarter of these have gone to overseas Vietnamese. At least so far, traders from ASEAN countries have shown a decided preference to go through Ho Chi Minh City, where there is less red tape and where barter arrangements can be more quickly brokered.

Projections of increasing North/South differentiation vis-a-vis the international economy parallel domestic trends regarding economic restructuring. While the success of recent anti-inflation austerity measures have given government officials fresh confidence, there remains a sense of central drift and loss of control to local actors, as well as a weakening of organizational integrity as the party and the market

---


25. Murray Hiebert gives the total as of last spring at 43 out of 48 licenses going to the South, and 11 to overseas Vietnamese. See “The toughest battle,” FEER, April 27, 1989, p. 69. According to an official Vietnamese source, as of October 1989, 70 foreign investment projects totaling $600 million have been approved, 80% concentrating in the South. See FEER Asia 1990 Yearbook, supra, note 19, p. 246. The latest information, as this volume goes to press, raises the number of licenses to 273 projects for a total possible of US $2.1 billion, two-thirds destined to the former capitalistic South. This demonstrates a very recent surge in foreign investments. Yet the frustration and obstacles notes above continue to prevail. See, Murray Hiebert, “The Rise of Saigon,” FEER, September 5, 1991, p. 62.

26. The argument for foreign preference towards investments and trade in the South should not be overstressed. Central authorities will certainly seek to maintain some balance where they can. Further, at present over half of Vietnam’s foreign trade goes through the port of Haiphong, and this city as well as Danang on the central coast are likely to play a major role.
interact. Greater decentralization translates into more rapid adaptation to a mixed economy in the southern provinces. The disastrous currency reforms of the mid 1980's, the ensuing years of 1000% inflation, and the present drastic cutbacks in subsidies have hit the state sector particularly hard. State enterprises still in operation have been forced to develop alternate sources of supplies, to adapt their products, and to depend on unofficial commercial networking. These adaptations are occurring more rapidly in the South. The pattern emerging, in terms of different pace of adaptation to measures of reform, to some degree parallels what occurred in China during the 1980's, when Guangdong and the southeast coastal provinces adapted and developed much more quickly than the rest of the country. As with China, one can predict that such trends will give rise to alternating periods of decentralization and central drift followed by retrenchment and strident debate about the ‘negative social phenomena’ concomitant to reform. Needless to add, China, in dealing with growing regional disparities in the 1980's did not face the immediate legacies of war, isolation, or harsh and inept recent socialization drives.

How do these prospects of increased North/South differentiation continue to affect regime politics? In the short-run, they complicate policy deliberations and exacerbate political tensions. Economic conditions, especially in the overpopulated Red River Delta, are more precarious in the North, and encroaching commercialization tied to changes in the South could seriously disrupt the flow of key inputs. Orchestrating change in such disparate contexts will be fraught with peril, especially as problems are voiced in conflicting ideological tones.

It would be simplistic to assert that there is a Northern and a Southern line in Vietnamese political life. But the regime’s failures are more palpable in the South: the gap between state and society is more evident with every passing year. And it is in the South that a vigorous inner opposition has more resolutely developed, gaining ground and converts throughout the apparat and beyond. Disillusionment with what the transition to socialism has achieved to date, coupled with a greater awareness of the dynamism of surrounding economies, have now been reinforced by events in Eastern Europe. Conversely, one can sketch an opposite, conservative syndrome, more prevalent in the North. In all evidence, the leadership is entering the new decade under great internal strain.

At this juncture it appears doubtful that these tensions will soon be resolved. While leadership renewal and turnover will surely continue from the bottom up, the Politburo remains in a logjam. It is at this level that Vietnamese political traditions conspire to block decisive change, in a way unique among socialist regimes.

Collegial rule has been a characteristic of Vietnamese politics ever since the death of Ho Chi Minh. The stamp of authority of the party secretary general is nowhere near as dominant as that of top leaders in any other socialist state today. If this feature guarantees a greater level of compromise among competing interests and priorities, it nevertheless inhibits dramatic shifts such as those that have occurred in both China and in the Soviet Union. Only in Vietnam could you have simultaneously a party secretary championing price reforms, private small-scale enterprise, and glasnost; and a Prime Minister, Do Muoi, known at least previously as a 'pure Stalinist' and as one of the prime architects of the brutal collectivization of industry and commerce in the South.

Related is the extraordinary emphasis placed on leadership continuity and political stability, inhibiting the role of succession dynamics as a factor for change. The post of Party Secretary General passed from Le Duan to Truong Chinh (briefly), then to Nguyen Van Linh and very recently to Do Muoi in less than a decade. Nguyen Van Linh, from 1985 to early 1989, sought to emulate Gorbachev and use the politics of glasnost to build a constituency for change. But the rest of the leadership could not tolerate the unleashing of criticism that ensued, and they have sought to curb dissent in the last two years.

Finally there is what could be termed the curse of victory and the tradition of 'struggle' which make a wholesale disavowal of the past difficult if not unlikely. Breakthrough changes in the PRC as well as in the Soviet Union were accompanied with a perception of deep crisis and an escalating attack of past policies and of the preceding leadership. In discrediting the past, new leaders were able to mandate a fresh start, outflank their more orthodox colleagues, and instill new hope in constituencies of the discontent. While economic failure and

28. The 7th Party congress was just held in June 1991, at which Do Muoi was designated as the new party chairman. Weeks later Vo Van Kiet, one of the top leaders more open to reforms, was elected as Premier. Thus the same argument of conflicting priorities at the top still applies. Many new faces were elected to the new Politburo, but it is still too early to predict the fall-out from the congress — or from post-coup transformations in the Soviet Union.
social alienation are all too evident in Vietnam, new leaders have yet to exploit these as possible levers for change. Thus, prevailing crisis and economic urgency have been singularly ineffective in initiating a break, despite the accepted slogan of 'renewal or death.' A worldview forged in decades of struggle and that gravest of crises—all out war—have made the top leadership obdurate and defensive. The collapse of socialism in Eastern Europe and presently in the Soviet Union only reinforces this trend.

These patterns—smooth successions, collegial rule, traditions of inner leadership compromise and continuity—are usually associated with strong regimes. But, ironically, in Vietnam these very traits have had a perverse impact. Smooth succession has been like a prison: leadership changes have not provided the points of departure many might have hoped for.\(^{29}\) At present there is a widening gap between regime and society, with the result that the Vietnamese state, heralded as one of the strongest in the Third World by some observers, has become in fact considerably weaker, weighed down by external exhaustion and internal decay.\(^{30}\) One senses diminished strength in the regime's web of accommodation to local actors and to non state-directed economic forces. Indeed, there is evidence of weakness in the state's declining extractive (tax), regulative (cadre corruption), distributive, and symbolic capacities.

Even if the logjam at the top has not been resolved at the 1991 party Congress, there will nevertheless be a broad renewal in the leadership ranks. Perhaps two thirds of the Central Committee elected at this Congress are either new or incumbents of the last Congress of 1986. One suspects that the new leadership stratum, while hardly uniform in point of view, nevertheless will be generally more sensitive to the failures of the past, and more apt to borrow new ideas from the ambitious experiments in economic liberalization initiated by former bloc allies. Thus over the long run the possibility of breakthrough change exists, even if the immediate reaction to the collapse of the Soviet Union is bitterly defensive.

It is a good thing that Vietnam was separated for only 22 years and that North/South cleavages have not been aggravated by ethnic

\(^{29}\) By speaking of the curse of victory and the ironies of strong regimes I am not suggesting that either defeat, political instability, or chaotic transitions would have been preferable for Vietnam. I simply stress that obdurate resilience over decades has not made the regime adaptable, a strength it sorely lacks.

Already awareness of regional differences among those originating from the north, south, and center is intense and deeply rooted.\textsuperscript{31} Yet, if the regime's socializing mission ran aground in its disastrously inept application in the South, at least the dream of a strong independent nation remains whole. Disillusioned Resistance Club members still wrapped themselves in the nationalist mantle of Ho Chi Minh in disparaging the party's policies towards the South.\textsuperscript{32} One finds little evidence for any groundswell towards Southern independence. Therein lies hope for Vietnam in the long run. For it is in the South that forces for antithetical change will more forcefully gather and develop, casting aside long-standing obstacles in their nation-wide sweep.

VI. CONCLUSIONS

Clearly all the other unification cases examined in this volume are very different from Vietnam. Vietnamese unification was brought about through military conquest after decades of war. There was no antecedent period of protracted negotiation to define a settlement. The less democratic and economically developed half simply prevailed militarily over the other. Furthermore, unification was achieved in a hostile international environment that forced the country to increasingly depend on Moscow and its allies.

However, the Vietnamese case does have broader implications. For one, the strong commitment to a unification ideal does not necessarily imply that national reintegration can be easily achieved. In Vietnam, it masked considerable ignorance about the distinct historical experience marking 'the other'. As a result, despite the North's powerful and engulfing sweep southwards, unification led to a momentous collision in which the lasting effects of separation and war were deepened by policy failure, yielding prolonged malintegration.

The only other unification case today that remotely parallels Vietnam is Germany, where one side has engulfed the other. Certainly circumstances in the German case are far more propitious. Unification was self-determined by the East Germans. No war preceded the process, only a shared awareness of the liabilities of being front line states in the Cold War. The Federal Republic's economic power and resilience nearly guarantee economic betterment for the majority of


\textsuperscript{32} Murray Hiebert, "Not resting in piece?" FEER, September 14, 1989, p. 30.
East Germans—in time. In addition, the democratic process will provide the necessary framework to cushion the collision and to work out the mutual adaptations. Nevertheless, I would still predict a long process of entangling adjustment and a political restructuring that will in time utterly transform German parliamentary politics. In this very early phase, far too many believe that integration will simply be a matter of stretching West German political and economic structures to spread over the East, a perception abetted by recent electoral results. A much more likely scenario is a long period of self-absorption, frustration, dialectical adjustment, and electoral volatility which, eventually, will profoundly alter the German political map and perhaps its regional and international orientation as well.

The above analysis on post-unification politics in Vietnam stresses the inevitably bedeviling sequels to national division. The passage from unification towards reintegration has been marked by ironies. Strong, resolute yet tactically flexible in war, the regime has not shown the same adaptiveness or resolve in charting out a developmental path. Its enviable record of political stability and continuity masks an inability to confront a rapidly changing domestic and international environment. Southern society, defeated and exhausted after a long war, stands presently as the vanguard to national renewal. Yet despite these bitter ironies, for the past fifteen years the attachment to a national ideal has been extraordinarily persistent. One can hope that in the long run this enduring consciousness of the nation could usher in a true renovation in Vietnamese political life.
CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSION: POSSIBLE OUTCOMES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY*

Robert Sutter

The current or formerly divided nations treated in this volume have been at the center of the major national security crises faced by the United States in the post war period. In the recent atmosphere of growing U.S.-Soviet collaboration in world affairs, it is easy to forget the enormous U.S. effort that lay behind the western containment of Soviet-backed communist expansion. The divided countries were literally and figuratively the battle-lines of this struggle. The Berlin airlift, the Korean War, the Taiwan Straits crises, the Berlin Wall and the U.S. war in Vietnam are the highlights of the enormous East-West struggle that shaped four decades of post war world history.

As a result, the thaw in the Cold War has fundamentally changed the way that the United States policy-makers view these divided countries. Their importance as symbols or outposts in the post war effort to contain communist expansion has faded or is fading fast. Under these circumstances, American decision-makers need to look more carefully at longstanding American interests in these countries and to assess developing international trends and trends within the respective countries in order to prepare for possible contingencies. It seems clear that there are more opportunities than difficulties for the United States posed by recent trends; conventional opinion tends to be optimistic about the future. But prudent policy-making requires a careful weighing of U.S. interests in the context of new conditions and possible outcomes. That is the goal of this chapter.

In a broad sense, each of these divided countries has fit into U.S. policy which, when defined broadly, has focused on several major goals:

(1) U.S. political-security interests have seen American national security as dependent on an ability to sustain a favorable balance of power in both Europe and Asia. U.S.

* The views expressed in this chapter are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress.
security has been thought to be fundamentally threatened by any one power that would be able to dominate either Europe or Asia. The collective security arrangements seen in NATO and in various U.S. bilateral security agreements with Asian countries were the foundation of this post war balance. In the late 1960s, the United States recognized that it could no longer bear the major burden of security arrangements in Asia. It began a large-scale withdrawal from Vietnam and other parts of Asia. U.S. leaders used diplomacy, especially the U.S. opening to China and the subsequent close Sino-American cooperation against Soviet expansion in Asia, in order to sustain a balance of power in Asia conducive to American interests.

(2) U.S. economic interests have stressed the development of free trade and economic exchange, unencumbered by protectionist barriers and political or other systematic constraints. As the United States has become increasingly interdependent with others in the world trading system, it has shown great sensitivity to those forces that would threaten access to critical resources or undermine the world trading system that benefits the United States along with others. Indeed, the Bush administration’s strong actions in 1990 against Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and threat to Persian Gulf oil fields seem to underline this major concern in American policy.

(3) U.S. political-ideological interests have focused on promoting political pluralism, greater democratization and human rights. Although these objectives are often seen to get less priority than U.S. national security or economic goals, they are often decisive in determining U.S. policy. This is so especially when basic national security-economic goals have already been met, or when they are split in such a way that political-ideological interests hold the balance in the minds of U.S. decision-makers.

The post World War II period saw U.S. policy toward divided nations as heavily influenced by the national security dimensions of U.S. policy. Divided Germany remained the front line of U.S.-backed NATO’s containment of Soviet power in Europe for over forty years. American interest in endeavors designed to promote economic recovery in Western Europe had this security dimension very much in mind. American interest in seeing a continuation or revival of democratic practices and trends in Western Europe did not extend to foster-
ing a political environment in which pro-Soviet communist parties could rise to power. United States policy repeatedly took action designed to promote political trends that would check the power of these suspected pro-Soviet forces.

In the three Asian countries, the dominance of the national security dimension in American policy was even more clear. United States policy-makers judged that the aggressive policies of North Vietnam gave them little choice or opportunity to deal much with other aspects of U.S. interests in South Vietnam. In the cases of Korea and China, U.S. policy succeeded — at great cost — in stabilizing the security situation. This allowed for greater emphasis on helping the U.S. allies in Seoul and Taipei to develop economically, so that they would become better positioned to deal with pressures from their adversaries, and this would require relatively less support from the United States. United States political goals of liberalization and human rights were often mentioned by U.S. officials but their relatively weak position vis-a-vis national security concerns was repeatedly seen in U.S. policy. Thus, U.S. officials tended to avoid applying too much pressure on its authoritarian allies for fear of promoting an unstable situation that could be exploited by communist adversaries in Pyongyang and Beijing. By the 1970s, the improvement in U.S.-PRC relations was accompanied by PRC gestures toward Taiwan that reduced markedly U.S. concern over possible PRC aggression against Taiwan. Nonetheless, United States policy remained concerned that instability on the island could lead to outcomes (e.g., a declaration of independence) that would add tension to the PRC-Taiwan relationship and seriously upset the delicate balance in the U.S. relationship with both Beijing and Taipei.

The collapse of the U.S.-supported government in South Vietnam in the face of the communist offensive in 1975 represented the most serious reversal in U.S. interests in these divided countries since the "loss" of the China mainland in 1949. The defeat did not fundamentally affect the balance of power in Asia, as the Nixon administration a few years earlier had adroitly positioned the United States to take full advantage of the Sino-Soviet split as a means to preserve a balance in Asia. The fact nonetheless remained that the way was now open to Soviet expansion in Indochina, which resulted in the Soviet-Vietnamese friendship treaty of 1978, the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia and Soviet military deployments to former U.S. bases in South Vietnam.

The unification of Vietnam under communist rule also clearly represented a setback to U.S. economic interests, although it is obvi-
ously arguable how much the United States expected Vietnam to contribute to world prosperity and the international trading system. By far the greatest setback to U.S. interests came in the political-ideological arena. The unification under communist rule saw massive repression of potential political opposition, forced relocation of urban populations, discrimination against ethnic minorities, and the outflow of millions of refugees fleeing from harsh political or economic conditions. Because of a number of factors, notably the close U.S. involvement with Vietnam up to 1975, the United States government took the lead in international efforts to deal with the protracted refugee crisis in a humanitarian way. The perceived U.S. need to pressure Vietnam to withdraw from Cambodia caused U.S. policy to continue an economic embargo and diplomatic restrictions against Vietnam — an approach that seemed to worsen economic conditions in the country and promote the outflow of refugees.

In contrast to the failure of U.S. policy in Vietnam in 1975, the move toward the reunification of Germany in 1989-90 can be seen as the greatest victory for U.S. interests in divided countries after World War II. Soviet-backed communist expansion was successfully contained and rolled back. The need for the expensive U.S. military presence in Europe was reduced. The political system of democracy and pluralism spread from West to East. The Soviet-occupied part of Germany was now free to choose national unification. Economic trends in eastern Germany remain bleak in the near term, but there is considerable optimism that the vibrant West German economy will provide ample support to pull the more backward eastern sector toward modernization and development.

In looking to the future, it appeared clear, in late 1990 that international politics would remain fluid. The outlines of the world order that would replace the Cold War dominated system of the past four decades remained unclear. Nevertheless, several broad trends were evident that would have important influence in general on U.S. policy and in particular on U.S. policy toward the current and former divided countries considered in this study. Those trends are as follows:

(1) Soviet backed communism has failed. The Soviet empire in Eastern Europe has collapsed. The Soviet Union has entered a series of profound economic and political crises. It was unclear what kind of a Soviet Union would emerge from these crises. For the time being at least, Soviet leaders placed emphasis on gaining much needed economic support from the West and other developed countries. For the sake of economizing and other interests, they cut back
sharply on expensive commitments to Third World and other client regimes. Soviet leaders were more accommodating in seeking resolution of regional conflicts, arms control issues and other disputes with the West.

(2) Political legitimacy was seen to rest increasingly on a government’s ability to sustain the political support of its people and to meet popular economic needs through effective policies fostering modernization. Although there remained many exceptions in the Third World, nations and their governments appeared to be placing greater emphasis on democracy and the free market economic system as the most effective means to insure political legitimacy and related economic modernization.

(3) Because of the end of the Cold War and the greater emphasis on economic modernization as a source of legitimacy, governments focused more on international economic competition. Such emphasis often superceded past concern with political-military competition, which had appeared to be dominant during the Cold War. As a result, even countries with relatively weak military structures like Japan enjoyed much greater international influence and were courted by all sides, including the superpowers, on account of their need for economic support.

Some of these broad world trends had an important impact on U.S. foreign policy-making. Policy-makers in the United States do not make foreign policy decisions in a vacuum. They are often heavily influenced by public opinion, the media, interests groups and representatives in the Congress. These groups traditionally place a strong emphasis on morality or values as well as realpolitik or national interest in American foreign policy. Thus, when the United States changes policy in a significant way, these U.S. groups want to see the righteousness of this move, hopefully in terms of values like freedom, democracy and free enterprise that are fundamental to the American experience.

The collapse of the Soviet empire and decline of the Cold War have raised the importance of these groups and their emphasis on values in American foreign policy. During the Cold War, officials in the executive branch had been able to argue, on many occasions quite persuasively, that such domestic U.S. concerns with values should not be permitted to override or seriously complicate realpolitik U.S. interests in the protracted struggle and rivalry with the U.S.S.R. Or they attempted to cloak U.S. realpolitik goals in terms of moral values of
freedom against the immoral oppression of Soviet communism. Now that the Cold War appeared to be ending and with it the sense of danger that accompanied the Soviet "threat," the administration's ability to control the course of U.S. policy appeared to be reduced. It had to take more account of the values held by domestic American constituencies, which tended to be reflected in the opinion of the Congress.

A challenge for U.S. policy-makers was to find ways to channel American enthusiasm for certain values into avenues that supported or at least did no harm to the national interest. American history is littered with instances where U.S. officials attempted in sometimes grandiose, patronizing or self-righteous ways to impose American values on unreceptive foreign societies. The stalemate in the Korean conflict and especially the failure of U.S. policy during the Vietnam War had a salutary effect on this American tendency to overemphasize the righteousness of America's cause in world affairs. The wars gave Americans a sense of tragedy and self-doubt which helped to promote greater sensitivity to other countries' perspectives and interests in world affairs.

The danger was that this self-examination would sap American vitality and optimism. President Reagan set about to reverse a seeming decline in American hopefulness and succeeded in giving the American people a greater sense of confidence about themselves and their values than had prevailed for many years. Indeed, the triumph of traditional U.S. goals such as democracy and free enterprise economics in various parts of the world, and the collapse of the Soviet communist system in the late 1980s reinforced American determination to foster and pursue their values in world affairs.

The recent international trends and changes in priorities in U.S. foreign policy-making appeared in 1990 to support the non-communist side of the two divided countries, Korea and China. Seoul and Taipei had long followed policies that fostered remarkable economic development and growth. Over the past few years, both governments have liberalized politically and become more truly representative of their people. Although some in the United States complained about trade and other economic disputes with South Korea and Taiwan, the American impression of both governments and peoples have become more positive as a result of economic and political changes in recent years.

American opinion also was becoming increasingly positive about the reforming government of the PRC, until the bloody Tiananmen massacre shocked American opinion. As a result, Beijing was subject to U.S.-backed international sanctions. One year later, the PRC gov-
ernment regained a modicum of world support; and entrepreneurs in Taiwan and other parts of Asia were keenly interested in exploiting economic opportunities on the mainland. However, the Chinese leaders in Beijing still faced serious internal problems and a crisis of confidence that sapped the legitimacy of the current communist dominated political system.

North Korea appeared to be even more beleaguered by recent world trends. Falling behind in competition with the dynamic South, pressed by declining support from the U.S.S.R. and China, and confronting serious economic and political problems at home, Pyongyang leaders seemed to be trying to find a way out of their current predicament. Few abroad wanted or needed closer contacts with the North. In a sense, the North Koreans were fortunate that Korean nationalism remained a potent force in the South, and prompted the South Korean government and its international allies and associates to make efforts to seek compromise and accommodation with the North.

If one views the interplay of divided countries as a zero-sum game, it would probably be fair to say that recent trends in the post cold war world give Seoul a dominant hand vis-a-vis Pyongyang, and strengthen Taipei’s position markedly in the face of the militarily more powerful mainland. Both Seoul and Taipei would appear to be well positioned to parry demands of the communist side and wait until their basic conditions are met before considering compromise leading to progress toward reunification.

Those who see the interplay as more of a positive-sum game also would probably tend to see trends moving toward the direction of policies pursued by Seoul and Taipei. That is, movement toward political reunification would be likely to be accompanied by political and economic reforms in the communist areas, that would make them more open, pluralistic and dynamic.

Whether an American policy-maker takes the zero-sum or positive sum perspective, it appears likely that recent trends would be seen as supportive of U.S. interests. In particular, they would serve to ease tension in these traditional international “hot spots;” broaden opportunity for economic development and trade; and appear to hold the promise of greater political liberalization and human rights on both the communist and non-communist sides. Meanwhile, the recent world trends were also having a profound effect on the previously divided Vietnam. Declining Soviet support, a military stalemate in Cambodia and enormous economic problems at home caused the communist leaders in Hanoi to acknowledge past failures and to experiment with more open market oriented economic policies. The result
was a decided Vietnamese "outreach" to the developed world. This change was not yet accompanied by any political changes that directly challenged the monopoly of power of the communist party. Nevertheless, there was considerable optimism voiced by those who judged that economic needs would require openness to the outside world and more effective and pluralistic political organizations that would ultimately lead to the end of repressive communist rule.

In short, when viewed from the perspective of U.S. interests and policy, the favorable trends seen reinforcing the movement toward the reunification of Germany were also likely to result in developments in current and formerly divided countries in Asia that are conducive to American interests. As noted above, it is even possible to foresee developments in the next decade that may result in a more market-oriented, politically pluralistic system in Vietnam — a change that would in effect reverse the major failure of the U.S. policy there in the 1970s.

Issues for U.S. policy under these optimistic conditions tend to focus on sustaining an atmosphere in which favorable world trends would move these nations in policy directions conducive to American interests. Thus, the United States would appear prudent in avoiding sharp changes in security or economic policies such as a unilateral pullback of forces from Europe or Asia, or a shift toward greater trade protectionism. U.S. diplomats would appear well served by being well informed about progress being made toward reunification, reform and pluralism in these countries, and by offering political or more substantive support in order to enhance prospects for successful outcomes.

Of course, prudent analysis requires that analysts do not overemphasize the positive trends in the current world situation or their likely effects on the four countries considered here. Indeed, the 1990s may not see developments favorable to U.S. interests. U.S. policy-makers need to prepare for possible adverse contingencies.

Militarily, the situation along with the DMZ in Korea remains volatile. North Korea has the ability, on it own, to provoke a major conflict. Decision-making in Pyongyang rests ultimately with Kim II-sung. He is approaching 80 and his succession is unclear. Meanwhile, the domestic economic situation in North Korea is bleak. Few western analysts judge that North Korea could win an all out conflict with the South, but the decision-making process in Pyongyang may not be based on western premises, may not require a full scale victory, and/or may be based on North Korean internal issues of political succession or other factors about which the outside world is only dimly aware.

Beijing maintains dominant military power over Taipei. The communist government in China is also in the midst of a succession
crisis of major proportions where domestic factors unappreciated by the outside world could result in seemingly provocative action. Because of recent changes in Soviet policy, Beijing's attention to Taipei is no longer diverted as much as in the past by the need to protect against the national security threat posed by the Soviet Union.

On the non-communist side of this equation, in Seoul and Taipei, it is also possible to conceive of scenarios where officials would take actions adverse to U.S. interests in stability and development. A few well placed disgruntled elements in the South Korean security forces could precipitate a major conflict with the North along the DMZ. And Taipei's leaders could initiate a crisis by following through with demands by some that Taiwan establish a de jure independent status in world affairs.

Politically and economically, there is no guarantee that reform initiatives and signs of greater openness to outside contacts will persist in the Asian communist capitals. Leaders in Pyongyang, Beijing and Hanoi face major economic development problems that would be solved to a certain degree, by greater contact with the West and other developed countries. But the leaders there are also well aware of the line of argument in the West that greater economic contact will lead to the exchange of political ideas that will ultimately subvert the communist systems in Asia. These Asian communist leaders do not appear ready to give up their monopoly of power. If they are forced to choose, they may cut back on economic exchange in the interest of preserving their monopoly of power.

Over the longer term, perhaps the greatest challenge to U.S. policy lies in the area of greatest victory in the current period — Germany. Although the Bush administration has been determined to support German reunification and works closely with Chancellor Kohl, many in the United States are skeptical that American interests will be served by future trends. Various perspectives prevail in this formative period determining a new Europe. One skeptical view holds that after a few years Germany will succeed in incorporating the East and will move with new vigor to dominate Europe. Some judge that this will occur within the framework of European institutions such as the European Community. The net effect thereof will make U.S. influence on the continent increasingly marginal. U.S. options under those circumstances would boil down to acceptance of German dominance or resistance. Although the German-dominated Europe would not fundamentally challenge U.S. interests in democracy or human rights, it could hamper the United States economically, and undermine U.S.
power and influence militarily by calling for a complete U.S. military withdrawal from Europe.

Perhaps the most important lesson for U.S. policy seen in these and other possible adverse trends is to remind U.S. policy-makers that while they could happen, they probably don't have to. Any U.S. policy that appears to be premised on a hostile or worsening relationship with any of these countries could become a self fulfilling prophecy. A more prudent course would appear to keep available enough American strength to deal with possible contingencies; to carefully assess changing trends and their possible implications for U.S. interests; and to adjust U.S. policy in ways designed to check potentially adverse trends, before they become major crises, thereby preserving American interest in a balanced security environment and economic and political trends fostering greater outreach, interdependence and pluralism.
INDEX

A
Adenauer, Konrad, 133, 134, 135, 136, 141
Allemann, Fritz, 136
Asian Development Bank (ADB), 2, 8, 20, 46

B
Bailey, George, 121, 123
Berlin Wall, 137, 138, 149
Bertran, Christoph, 153, 155
Bismark, Otto von, 123, 128, 130, 131, 132
Burley, Anne Marie, 139
Bush Administration, 92, 180, 187

C
Cairo Declaration of 1943, 49
Chen, Duxiu, 42
Chiang, Ching-Kuo, 20, 50, 54
China, 2, 94, 96
  May Fourth Movement of 1919, 42, 49
  1911 Revolution, 49
China, Peoples’ Republic of, 7, 12, 49
  Constitution of 1982, 10, 11, 17
  “Four Principles”, 13, 34
  Openess and Reforms, 44, 55
  Special Economic Zones, 55
China, Republic of, 12
  Dang Wai (The Non-KMT Forces), 45
  Dealing with the Communists, 34, 87
  Diplomatic Relations, 21-22
  Foundation for Exchange Across the Strait, 47
  Guidelines for National Unification, 31-33, 35
  Mainland Affairs Commission, 33, 47
  National Unification Council, 31, 35, 47
  1983 Election, 25
  1989 Election, 36
  Strait Exchange Commission, 33
  “Three Principles of the People”, 55

(189)
UN and Other International Organizations, 20-21, 29, 30
US Arms Sales, 15
China Unification and Mainland-Taiwan Relations, 2, 7, 41, 45-49
“Cross Checking and Mutual Influence”, 51, 53
“Fair Competition and Pluralistic Politics”, 53
Ideological Considerations, 55
Indirect Trade, 15, 46
Legal Arrangements, 54
Mutual Exchange Policy, 32, 36, 37
Mutual Visitation Policy, 16, 27, 31, 32, 46
Olympic Committee, 15
“One China, Two Governments”, 29-30
“One Country, Two Parties”, 2, 43, 58
“One Country, Two Regions”, 31
“One Country, Two Systems”, 2, 9, 12, 13, 14, 19, 24, 34, 36, 43, 47, 50, 58
Party-to-Party Contact, 35, 36
Talks Between Red Cross Committees, 31
“Three Links” and “Four Exchanges”, 7, 14, 16, 17, 23, 34, 35, 45
“Three Nos”, 25, 46, 47
Chiu, Chin-i, 30
Chong Yon Gap, 82
Christian Democratic Party (Germany), 132, 135, 141-149
Chu, Fu-sung, 12
Chun, Doo Hwan, 65, 66, 69, 71, 72, 73
Chung, Chong-uk, 82
Chung, Chu Yuong, 77
Chung, Ju Yuong, 101
Clement, Alain, 124
Cold War, 1, 179
Collapse of Communism, 1, 182
Communist Party of China (CPC), 13, 39, 42, 43, 51, 54, 58
Confidence Building Measures (CBMs), 63, 82, 83, 93, 102-103
Conflict Resolution, 1, 4, 5
Craig, Gordon, 129

D

Democratic Progressive Party (DPP — Taiwan), 25, 48
“New Country Front”, 25, 27
Democratization — see Political Development
Deng, Xiaoping, 8, 19, 20, 43, 50, 54, 55
Deutsch, Karl, 131
INDEX

Do Muoi, 170, 175
Domestic Factors, 2

E

East Asia NIEs (Newly Industrialized Economies), 45
East Germany — see Germany (GDR)
Economic Development, 4
Edinger, Lewis, 131
Enlightenment, 121, 124
European Community (EEC), 139, 142, 145, 150, 153, 154, 155, 158, 159, 187

F

Federal System, 3, 39-43, 51, 56, 58, 81
The Federal Republic of China, 42, 55
Suitability for China, 41
Federation — see Federal System
Free Democratic Party (Germany), 132, 136, 141-143, 145, 147-149

G

Genicher, Hans-Dietrich, 139, 151
German Socialist Unity Party (SED), 126, 138, 140, 142, 143, 146, 148, 149
German Unification, 3, 90, 138-159
German Model, 56
1871 Unification, 123
Germany
Abgrenzung, 137
Definition of German Question, 120
Deutschlandpolitik, 128, 132
Deutschum, 122
Geopolitik, 130
Kulturnation, 125, 126, 127
Mitteleuropa, 130, 131
Ostpolitik, 128, 132, 136, 137, 142
Pre-1945
Foreign Policy, 129-133
National Identity Problem, 120-125
Nationalism, 124-125
Reich, 123, 124, 125, 127
Schaukel Politik, 132, 136
Sonderweg, 132, 133
Staatsbewusstsein, 127, 137
Staatsnation, 127
Volk, 122
Westpolitik, 134, 135, 136, 137, 141
Germany (Federal Republic of Germany — FRG)
   Foreign Policy, 132, 133-137
   National Identity Problem, 125-128
   Nationalism, 127, 128, 136, 137
Germany (German Democratic Republic — GDR), 86, 87, 126, 127, 128
   Foreign Policy, 137
Gorbachev, Mikhail, 85, 90-91, 111, 119, 159

H

Han, Sung-Joo, 82
Hitler, Adolf, 133
Holy Roman Empire, 123, 131
Honecker, Erich, 137, 138
Hong Kong, 8, 41, 54, 55
   Basic Law, 10, 11, 14, 17, 36
   Hong Kong Model, 9-14
   Special Administrative Region, 10, 11, 24
   United Kingdom - PRC Joint Declaration of 1984, 9-10
Hu, Yaobang, 50

I

Intermediate Nuclear Force Treaty (INF Agreement), 110
International Environment, 1, 56, 90-93, 117
International Economic Competition, 183

J

Japan, 56, 93
Jiang, Zemin, 29, 30, 50, 96

K

Kaifu, Toshiki, 85
Kanemaru, Shin, 85
Kang, Young Hoon, 61, 80
Kihl, Young Whan, 67
Kim, Byong Hong, 82
Kim, Dae Jung, 73
INDEX

Kim, Il Sung, 43, 62, 63, 69, 71, 76, 77, 79, 80, 81, 85, 89, 91, 95, 97, 101, 186
Kim, Jong II, 81, 97
Kim, Jong Pil, 73, 95
Kim, Su-hwan, 77
Kim, Young San, 73, 91
Kissinger, Henry, 62
Kohl, Helmut, 138, 141, 142, 143, 145, 146, 148, 152, 187
Korea, 3, 56
  UN Membership, 43
  “Dual Track Plan”, 3
Korea (DPRK — North), 6, 64-68
  International Youth Festival, 78, 109, 113
  Isolation, 96-98
  “Juche” Ideology, 98
  Nuclear Facilities, 85
  Policy Toward South, 64-68, 82-86
  Supreme People’s Assembly, 84, 97
  Yushin Constitution, 63
Korea (ROK — South), 61
  Democratic Process, 73-77, 89, 93-94, 113-115
  Korea Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA), 77
  Kwangju Uprising, 66
  National Security Law, 65, 74, 77, 78, 84, 87
  Policy Toward North, 113, 114-117
Korea Unification and North-South Relations, 3, 62, 86-88, 89, 90, 98-104, 105-106
  Ceasefire Agreement of 1953, 62
  Choson, 66
  “Commonwealth”, 81, 95, 116
  Consultative Conference for National Reunification, 69
  Cross-Recognition, 72, 75, 83, 85, 90, 94, 102
  Demarcation Zone (DMZ), 67, 76, 97
  Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo (DCRK), 66-68, 83-84, 111,114
  Democratic Liberal Party (DLP), 95
  Hanguk, 66
  Joint Communique of Reunification of 1972, 62, 64
  Joint Ventures, 77
  Kaesong, 67
  Koguryo, 66
  Korea National Charter, 81
Military Balance, 99
Non-official Activities, 77-79
Parhae, 66
Parliamentary Talk, 80
Peace Agreement, 103
Possible Conflict, 186
Provisional Agreement on Basic Relations, 69
Red Cross Talk, 65, 70, 74, 80
Relief Supplies to North, 107
Silla, 66
Tripartite Talks, 100, 107, 109, 111
“Two Koreas”, 83, 91, 108
Krenz, Egon, 138
Kuo, Shirley, 46
Kuomintang (KMT - Nationalist Party - Taiwan), 39, 43, 45, 51, 54, 58

L
La Fontaine Oskar, 147
Larrabee, F. Stephen, 138
Le, Duan, 167, 175
Le, Duc Tho, 167
Lee, Hong Koo, 79
Lee, Hu Rak, 62
Li, Huan, 14, 25
Li, Peng, 43
Li, Teng-hui, 18, 25, 28, 29, 31, 47, 53
Lin, Soo-kyong, 78
Liang, Quchao, 41
Lowenthal, Richard, 120, 121

M
Macao, 41, 54
Mao, Zedong, 42
Mekong Delta, 166, 167
Meyer, Michael, 154
Modrow, Hans, 138, 139
Moon, Ik-hwan, 77
Moon, Kyu-hyon, 78

N
Namkung, Tony, 82
INDEX

National People’s Congress (NPC), 10
Nationalist Party — see Kuomintang (KMT)
Nazism, 125, 126, 131
Nguyen, Van Linh, 169, 172, 175
Nixon, Richard, 62
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 119, 134, 138-142, 150, 151, 154-156, 180
North Korea — see Korea (DPRK)

O
Oder-Neisse Line (Germany-Poland), 127, 140, 152
Olympic Games, 71, 72, 73, 76, 107, 108, 113

P
Paek, Ki-wan, 77
Park, Chung Hee, 62, 64, 66, 73
Party of Democratic Socialism (Germany), 142, 144, 148, 149
People’s Republic of China (PRC) — see China (PRC)
Persian Gulf War, 180
Pluralism, 43
Political Development (Democratization), 1, 43-45, 49-53
  Model of “Informal Pluralism”, 56
  Political Legitimacy, 87, 99, 183
  “Rule of Law”, 54
  “Rule of Man”, 54
  “Strongman Politics”, 54
  “Unification-Led Political Pluralization”, 51, 57
Prussia, 121, 124, 128, 137

R
Republic of China — see China, Republic of
Rhee, Syngman, 62
Roh, Tae Woo, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 80, 81, 85, 91, 95, 111
Roper, John, 158

S
Schweigler, Gebhard, 127
Shaw, Yu-ming, 35
Shebin, Alexander, 91
Shi, Qiyang, 48
Sino-US Shanghai Communiqué of 1972, 49
Social Democratic Party (Germany), 132, 135, 136, 141-149
Song, Yo-gyong, 82
South Korea — see Korea (ROK)
Soviet Union, 56, 94, 119, 139, 140, 149-152, 156, 157, 159
Smyser, W. R., 145, 157
Stern, Fritz, 151
Stresemann, Gustav, 132
Sun, Yat-sen, 41
Sun, Yun-suan, 18

T
Taidu — see Taiwan Independence
Taiwan — see China, Republic of
Taiwan Independence (Taidu), 2, 22, 25, 26, 28, 36, 48, 49, 54
“Two Chinas”, 15-16, 28
Tang, Shubei, 24
Tiananmen, 23, 24, 25, 44, 184
Truong, Chinh, 167, 175

U
Unification, 1
   Peaceful Evolution, 4, 63
   Political Re-integration, 162, 177
   Use of Force, 4, 15, 17-18, 26-27, 29, 35, 54
United Nations, 62, 76, 87
United States, 56
   “Burden Sharing”, 110
   Economic Interests, 180
   Foreign Policy, 4, 179-180, 183-184
   Military Force, 65, 73, 92-93, 100, 112
   “Team Spirit” Military Exercise, 80, 85, 108
US-China, 181, 184
US-Germany, 187
US-Korea, 82, 181, 184, 185
US-Taiwan, 184
US-USSR and Europe, 180-181,
US-Vietnam, 180, 181, 182

V
Viet Cong — see Vietnam War
Vietnam — Domestic, 94
   Civil Society, 161, 163, 169, 171
   Collectivization, 161, 165, 166, 167
INDEX

Comparison to China, 174
Comparison with German Model, 177-178
Doi Moi (Renovation), 169-171
Land Reform, 161, 165, 167
Nationalism, 162, 163, 177, 178
Political and Economic Reforms, 185-186
Seventh Party Congress, 176
“Strength” Becoming Weakness, 164, 176, 178

Vietnam — International
Economic Responses to the Outside World, 172-173
Foreign Investments, 172, 173
Influence from Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, 163, 172, 176
Invasion of Cambodia, 181
Isolation, 163
Overseas Communities, 163, 173
Refugee Crisis, 182
Soviet-Vietnamese Friendship Treaty of 1978, 181

Vietnam Unification and North-South Relations, 3
Club of Former Resistance Fighters, 170, 172, 177
Criticism of Rapid Unification, 170
Difference Between North and South, 171, 174
Discontent, 163, 169-171, 174
Economic Integration, 174
National Settlement, 162
Regime Goals and the Lack of Integration, 164, 171
Veteran Southern Revolutionary Elite, 163, 169-170

Vietnam War, 161, 162, 165, 177
Creating a Seige/Struggle Mentality, 164, 175-176
Victory as Curse, 175
Viet Cong Land Reform Strategy, 162

W
Warsaw Pact, 119, 139, 141, 150, 151
Weimberg, Gerhard, 129
West Germany — see Germany (FRG)
Wilhelm II (German Kaiser), 124, 133
Wolfowitz, Paul, 92
Wu, Xueqian, 47

Y
Yang, Shangqun, 48
Yang, Winston L. Y., 8
Yeh, Jian Yin — Nine Point Proposal, 7-8, 17, 19
Yon, Hyong Muk, 61
Yu, Kuo-hua, 13

Z

Zhang, Shizhao, 42
Zhao, Ziyang, 24, 44, 50
Zhou, Enlai, 62