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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

Editor's Introduction

## Books

**I. CHINA, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF (MAINLAND)**

  - P. Ridley
- Brugger, ed., *China Since the 'Gang of Four'* Genevieve des (1980) 4
  - Cognets Yancey
- Copper, *China's Global Role* (1980) 5
  - William R. Kintner
  - John F. Copper
  - Leo Y. Liu
- Jain, *China in World Politics* (1980) 12
  - Robert L. Downen
  - Jan S. Prybyla
- Whitehead, Shaw and Girardot, eds., *China and Christianity: Historical and Future Encounters* (1979) 19
  - Kathleen L. Lodwick

**II. CHINA, REPUBLIC OF (TAIWAN)**

- Chiu, ed., *China and the Taiwan Issue* (1979) 22
  - A James Gregor
  - Robert L. Montgomery
  - John F. Copper
III. U.S.—CHINA RELATIONS

Kintner and Copper, A Matter of Two Chinas: The China-Taiwan Issue in U.S. Foreign Policy (1979)  
Maria Chang

Chiu and Murphy, ed., The Chinese Connection and Normalization (1980)  
Robert L. Montgomery

Fairbank, The United States and China (4th ed., 1979)  
Kathleen L. Lodwick

IV. OTHER AREAS

Kenneth R. Stunkel

Kathleen L. Lodwick
EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION

The last two to three years have been eventful ones in East Asia. To future historians they may prove to be watershed years — especially in terms of the U.S. role in East Asia and its relations with the two major nations in the region, China and Japan.

The main event, of course, was the U.S. decision to recognize the People's Republic of China in December 1978, and in so doing derecognize the government of the Republic of China on Taiwan. This move had multifarious ramifications for China as well as for Taiwan, Japan and the Soviet Union. The move appeared to assume that China was a power of growing importance in the region and that the U.S. had to have formal relations with that country. It also assumed much about China's potential to help the U.S. offset the growing Soviet military presence in the region. Latently, it may have related to the U.S.-Japan trade problem and efforts by the Carter Administration to compete with Japan in the China market or perhaps use U.S.-China trade to prop up the U.S. economy or offset the imbalance with Japan.

These past two or three years also saw an effort by China to modernize, through engineering, rapid economic growth, based upon increasing foreign trade, accepting foreign loans and technology and adopting more pragmatic economic policies. At the same time, however, China exposed many of its weaknesses and debunked to some extent the argument that China is a powerful country and can be used as an ally to offset the growing Soviet.

The books reviewed in this volume generally look at these problems or issues. Some simply put Asia in perspective or give the reader a critique of a recently published book in the field that may or may not warrant his attention.

Occasional Papers/Reprints Series in Contemporary Asian Studies plans to review new and worthwhile books in a year-end issue in coming years. This is a modest beginning.

John F. Copper
I. China, People's Republic of (Mainland)


China's Four Modernizations is the product of a workshop held at St. George, Bermuda in January 1979 for the purpose of assessing the present state and future prospects of China's program of modernization as envisaged by Deng Xiaoping. The volume consists of ten papers on various topics relating to modernization, seven of which were among the eighteen papers presented at the workshop and three of which were commissioned later. Several of the chapters are followed by remarks and commentaries prepared from the tapes of the workshop, with the result that the reader is offered the benefits of the insights and knowledge of a wide range of specialists.

In his paper on the modernization of Chinese industry, Chu-yüan Cheng outlines the original goals of the 1976-1985 developmental plan with particular reference to the petroleum industry, the coal industry, agricultural machinery, improvement of efficiency in an economy operating "below its potential," provision of material incentives, reform of industrial organization and improvement of management. He then surveys the concrete problems standing in the way of the program, including the high capital investment that will be required, the problem of absorbing foreign technology and integrating it with the existing system and problems stemming from the poor efficiency of Chinese enterprises. As Cheng indicates, many of these factors have already led the Chinese leadership to cut back on the original ambitious plan. While Cheng believes that the Chinese may succeed in reaching their revised goals in electricity and cement production, he concluded that their output of steel, coal and crude oil may fall short of their targets. On the whole, Cheng sees many barriers to achievement of the high rate of capital formation required for the program, including the necessity of importing large quantities of food and of investing heavily in agriculture. Cheng's analysis leaves the reader with the impression that the cards are stacked against the full achievement even of the revised modernization program.

Thomas Fingar, in his paper, "Recent Policy Trends in Industrial Science and Technology," concentrates on the attitudinal, organiza-
tional, technical, managerial and financial problems that the Chinese must deal with in order to achieve their goals. From his analysis, it is clear that the leaders of the modernization program must overcome a wide variety of obstacles that in the long run may raise more problems than the concrete limitations discussed by Cheng. That is, ways must be found to overcome resistance to new methods on the parts of the workers and to make up for shortages of skilled and experienced management personnel. Fingar goes on to outline the educational and manpower policies, the managerial and leadership policies and the financial policies that have been developed in response to these problems.

In "A Note on Recent Policy Changes," Genevieve Dean deals with the problems arising because of lack of a systematic approach to technological innovation. Dean indicates that the trend since 1978 has been to adopt those institutions that foster innovativeness in technologically advanced economies. With this has come an emphasis on productivity as a function of management and on enterprise profit as a measure of management efficiency. The writer stresses the necessity for the Chinese engaging in studies of technology policy in assessing the implications for the society as a whole.

In "The Institutional Structure for Industrial Research and Development in China," Richard Suttmeier discusses the relationships among the institutions primarily responsible for industrial research and development, i.e., the Chinese Academy of Sciences, the ministerial sector and the institutions of higher education, which are organized as vertical sectors. While Suttmeier believes that the Chinese are fortunate in having a well-developed system of research and development institutions that are well funded and that enjoy political support, he does see a problem in a shortage of senior manpower capable of providing leadership. As he notes, the system represents a shift back to the system in existence before the Cultural Revolution with its greater emphasis on basic research. A major question that he raises is whether a system in which innovation is viewed as a planned activity will ultimately be conducive to innovation.

Shannon Brown, in "China's Program of Technology Acquisition," considers the policy of technology acquisition that has been adopted since 1976 to be a turning point in the history of the People's Republic if it is maintained, a factor that is dependent on the extent to which Deng's views are generally shared and will be supported after his departure from the scene. However, Brown sees the ultimate success of the program of technology acquisition as being dependent
on the degree to which the process of economic change can be internalized and integrated into Chinese society.

In "The Absorption and Assimilation of Acquired Technology," Rudi Volti explores the question of integrating modern technology into Chinese society in greater detail. Volti sees a number of organizations as being allowed to develop programs without concern for their integration into other segments of the society. He anticipates that centralized organization will result in the selection of more "modern" technologies that will be confined to preselected sectors. On the other hand, Volti finds an instance of successful integration, or "technological dualism," in the field of medicine, in which traditional medicine and modern medicine have worked hand in hand, although he does not see such an integration developing in other fields in which the Chinese have a history of traditional technological innovation. In any event, he views the next decade as a critical period in that the technological policies that are chosen now will exert their effects far into the future.

In "China's Energy Technology," Vaclav Smil concludes that during the next two decades China will become the world's second largest coal producer, will move forward in the ranks of oil- and gas-producing nations, and will greatly enlarge its power generation. However, he also believes that the "sophistication and performance of its energy technology" will "remain behind the world's top level."

Jonathan Pollack, in "The Modernization of National Defense," concludes that China will remain far behind both the United States and the Soviet Union and that even acquiring prototypes of foreign weapons will not improve the situation to any extent since the systems acquired would be obsolete by the time they are functional.

In the final chapter, Jeffrey Schultz summarizes the content of the modernization program and what its consequences may be. His most provocative suggestion is that the effects of technological change may not be confined solely to the technological sector, but may also affect the society as a whole, perhaps undermining the socialist system itself.

On the whole, the reader will find in these essays an excellent compendium of information on the current state and prospects of modernization in the People's Republic. If there is a defect, it is one inherent in the form of the book itself, that is, of a work based on conference papers, in which it is difficult to achieve the integration of views that is possible at the hands of a single author. However, the diversity of the views that are presented more than compensates for
this defect. Nevertheless, in the end, the reader is left with the final
task of piecing the information together to make his own assessment
of the ultimate prospects for success or failure of China’s moderniza-
tion program.

One of the basic assumptions underlying this work appears to be
that China will proceed on its new course, albeit with modifications of
the original plan, as the evidence of the more recent cutbacks in
purchases of foreign plants suggests. One point that might have been
considered is foreign response to curtailment of projects to which
foreign contractors have devoted considerable expense and effort and
the consequences of such actions in terms of future endeavors. A case
in point is the recent cancellation of several Japanese contracts
amounting to $1.5 billion, an action that drew an angry response
from the Japanese and resulted in conciliatory moves from the
Chinese.

Again, some consideration might have been given to assessing
the potential threat to the modernization program posed by remnants
of those sympathetic to the “gang of four,” particularly in the light of
the constant shifts between “left” and “right” that have characterized
the history of the People’s Republic.

In conclusion, I would certainly recommend this work to anyone
whose professional interests and activities are concerned with the
state of Chinese technology. It should as well be required reading for
those members of the business community who are now dealing with
China or plan to do so in the future.

C. P. Ridley
Palo Alto, California

Bill Brugger (ed.), China Since The ‘Gang Of Four’ (New York, St.
Martin’s Press, 1980), 288 pp., $27.50

China Since The ‘Gang Of Four’, is comprised of seven conference
papers. These papers consider various aspects of changes that have
taken place in China since 1976. In viewing recent events many
questions have surfaced from Western scholars; Brugger raises some
of the most provocative questions in the introduction, most of which
are assessed in the following chapters.

Michael Sullivan, writing the first chapter, investigates several
views of the nature of socialism by examining disagreements over
political lines. Considering these differences, Graham Young in
Chapter 2 assesses the Chinese Communist Party and the changes it has made in the theoretical rationale behind its leadership.

Chapter 3, written by Andrew Watson, examines policies dealing with the industrial sector. Bill Brugger in Chapter 4 adds an examination of policy toward the rural sector. Both of these chapters include specific details of "modernization"—past and probable future policies and their implications.

Sylvia Chan presents, in Chapter 5, an interesting exploration into the realm of art and literature and the controversies that they have produced in China since the "hundred flowers" campaign of 1957. In the next chapter, Ronald Price examines changes in the function of the educational system, which, he says, has reversed its major goal from that of helping to bring about mass participation to the new prescribed role of selecting an élite. The concern over China's emerging role in the international economy is dealt with directly in the concluding chapter by Greg O'Leary.

Acknowledgement and praise is due to these seven contributors for succeeding in covering a wide range of topics in varied perspectives and depths. Four of the authors have lived and worked in China. These four witnessed the Cultural Revolution at first hand. All of the contributors have been in China recently.

The treatment of these studies is detailed, thoroughly documented and clearly presented, particularly given the sheer complexity of studying this stage of rapid change within China.

The studies presented in this fairly short book offer important contributions to the growing knowledge about China's past, present, and future. Every effort is made to answer the questions raised by Brugger in the introduction with as few illusions as possible.

Genevieve des Cognets Yancey
Southwestern at Memphis


*China's Global Role: An Analysis of Peking's National Power Capabilities in the Context of Evolving International System* is an impressive assessment of the capacity of the Peoples' Republic of China to be a major actor in the international system. This book
constitutes an effort to measure China's power capabilities using the following six time-tested components of national power: geography and population; natural resources — which includes food and energy supplies; economic strength — which encompasses industrial capacity; military power; political system — including government control and stability, the will of the leaders, and the nation's diplomacy; and science and technology.

Copper notes that estimates of China's potential span the gamut from "extreme pessimism to ardent optimism." Obviously for thousands of years China was the dominant power in Asia and the center of a splendid civilization. When the West began to encroach upon China in the 18th century, China was on the verge of a time of trouble in which many structural weaknesses became patently clear. After the communists' 1949 takeover of China, the sleeping dragon began to awake and it was frequently predicted that China would soon become a modern industrial state.

The empirical data which the author assembled in this study has led him to conclude that China is not a superpower and will not be in the future. He says, "China must be regarded as a second-ranking power. And China's rank among the second-ranking powers is not necessarily at the top." Copper's conclusions merit careful attention by American policy-makers concerned with U.S. relations in Asia and particularly with respect to the Soviet Union, the PRC and Japan.

Some of the conclusions on China's military power seemed to have been based on the supposition that the PRC will probably have no ICBMs in the near future due to her fear of the negative U.S. reaction (p. 138). This has, of course, been proven untrue. China has an ICBM — a fact which was not known when the book was written.

As a recent visitor to China this reviewer can attest that the PRC is a developing country, reminiscent of Taiwan twenty years ago. However, there is no certainty that China will reach its goal of becoming a modern industrial state by the end of this century. Copper's arguments regarding China's economic power would have been more valid if the announced PRC's goal for the year of 2000 could have been included, e.g., an estimated GNP per capita of only $1,000 by that time.

While Copper's conclusions for the short term are incontestable, only the future will tell whether his categorical long-term judgment will be correct. The Sinetic Peoples of Asia have demonstrated a remarkable capacity for rapid modernization, in particular, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore.
China is an immense country with a huge population. The Asian countries just cited are all relatively small with smaller populations. Will the very magnitude of China's modernization task prevent its fulfillment? Furthermore, the modern industrial societies surrounding China all hew to free-market economies. Despite some decentralization and liberalization, China will continue to be a planned economy as long as the Chinese communists continue to rule that vast country. Perhaps the currently more pragmatic Chinese leadership will find ways to achieve rapid modernization under a planned economy. For this to happen, however, they will have to overcome the many weaknesses so fully delineated in China's Global Role.

William R. Kintner
Foreign Policy Research Institute


Technology, Defense and External Relations in China, 1975-1978 is a serious effort by a well-known China scholar to assess policy changes in four important realms in China during the early post-Mao years. These include foreign policy, defense, economic growth and technological acquisition. The author's approach is one of applying the methodologies used in the fields of economics, sociology and international relations to the Chinese scene — rather than the other way around — during a crucial period in which a new leadership was ostensibly setting a course which China will follow for decades and which may decide China's future in terms of rapid growth and integration into the world, community, economically and socially.

The central aim of the book is to examine what the author considers crucial policymaking realms in order to understand the "new" China. Gelber also endeavors to assess problems that the new leadership faces in implementing what he feels are "revolutionary goals." In areas where he feels that the new regime's policies reflect reality and where China is heading in the right direction, he suggests a time frame in which announced aims can be attained. In some other areas he is critical of what he regards as "unrealistic" plans.

In the first chapter, entitled "political change and foreign policy," the author assesses the intimate relationship between internal and foreign policies. He stresses, however, that China's foreign policy is
impacted by the international environment, noting especially America's need or desire for better relations with China. Examining political tradition, ideology, bureaucratic and organizational determinants, Gelber concludes that China changed dramatically so as to adjust to the global environment during the three-year period he focuses on: 1975-1978. On the other hand, he also avers that the Sino-Soviet dispute and national security problems remain unresolved.

In the chapter on defense, Gelber assesses China's military strengths (manpower and morale) and its weaknesses (antiquated weapons, low level of military technology, poor logistical capabilities, etc.), juxtaposed beside China's military strategy past and present. He notes that in the wake of Lin Piao's death — perhaps before, therefore suggesting why his death happened — China's threat perception changed markedly. As a consequence, the "people's war" doctrine was given a lower priority and conventional war capabilities a higher priority. He concludes that China now needs the West for military information, aid and sales — yet there are many constraints, especially money. He concludes that defense is the lowest priority of China's four modernization and this is unlikely to change.

In the third chapter, which deals with the economy, the author traces the record of China's past economic development, which he describes as not outstanding by East Asian standards. He notes disagreements about economic growth models, lack of many skills needed to engineer development, the population impediment, and other problems. Gelber underscores the importance of agriculture, yet stresses the limited growth potential in this sector of the Chinese economy. He also points up the importance of foreign trade, noting that by 1978 China has accepted Western ways of financing and transactions.

In the final chapter, the author discusses the level of China's technological development, the importation of technology and its use, and the relationship of technology to defense and economic growth. Gelber asserts that difficulties in applying and using imported technology are more serious than are usually assumed and there will be a larger time gap between acquisition and results. He argues specifically that the policy of self-reliance must be discarded (and it has been to a large extent), but that there are serious social and political problems to overcome in so doing.

Gelber concludes in a final short chapter that after Mao's death truly new policies were adopted and that China is on a new course in terms of its economic development and modernization. He argues that
new plans have been put into operation that have laid the groundwork for financial, technological and managerial rationality for quick growth. On the other hand, he is not overly optimistic — certainly not as much as Chinese leaders, or their friends abroad who have applauded them for their new plans. Some of the problems he notes are: agricultural surpluses will not be large and therefore cannot generate much in the way of savings; foreign concessional loans will probably not continue for long; the educational system will require more than twenty years to show marked improvements; the time gap in applying new technology is larger than Chinese leaders think; industrialization will evoke labor problems; foreign ideas will cause class changes and will present a threat to traditional culture; the rural-urban standard of living gap will widen; and there may be a political backlash to the modernization program. He also notes that China’s relations with the U.S. and Japan are crucial to its modernization and yet good relations cannot be guaranteed. The international environment, he says, is also complex — more so than the Chinese seem to realize.

While the sections of this book will seem somewhat disparate to the average reader and many will not be impressed with the chronological order in some of the chapters, this was to a large degree necessitated by the author’s effort to focus on policy change during a limited but crucial time period and an effort to bring into play variables which are somewhat difficult to relate conceptually or organizationally. Indeed, the four main themes pursued in this book — foreign policy, defense, economic growth and technology — are intimately related in terms of assessing China’s modernization effort; yet, their interconnectedness is not easy for the reader to grasp. In the view of this reviewer, the time frame in which policy changes occurred could have been made less important or less a parameter, and categories of decisions or policies given greater emphasis.

This book is well-written, well-researched and well-documented. It will be of interest to the China scholar and to anyone with a more than superficial interest in China, especially those concerned with policy changes that occurred in China during such a crucial and recent period.

Technology, Defense and External Relations in China, 1975-1978 is clearly valuable reading to anyone who desires to understand decisions being made in China at the present time. It is likewise revealing in terms of trying to understand the direction China is heading and the prospects for success or failure. Finally, the book is
indexed and can serve as a reference for events during the crucial period it covers.

John Franklin Copper  
Department of International Studies  
Southwestern at Memphis


The People's Republic of China: A Handbook is a useful reference in Chinese studies. It covers important subject areas such as: political systems, history, geography, economic development, science and technology, social affairs, education and culture, military affairs, and foreign relations. Subject headings are both clear and concise and the handbook contains a vast quantity of important facts, yet it remains easily readable. Ten of the eleven sections are accompanied by either a bibliography or a reading list. The index is of particular value for the researcher.

What makes this handbook truly outstanding is its objective treatment of all subject matter, and especially, in the opinion of this reviewer, China's egalitarianism and its clash with India. The section on "history" is particularly comprehensive. It even provides the reader with information on recent political struggles in China.

All Chinese names and places in the handbook still use the Wade-Giles transliteration instead of the Pinyin system. This, however, is a plus because of the novelty of the Pinyin system. It would, for example, be difficult to immediately recognize that Jiang Qing in the Pinyin system is what was formerly Chiang Ch'ing.

One criticism that can be made of the handbook is the inconsistency of its footnoting. While the sections on geography, history, agricultural development, social affairs and foreign relations have no notes at all, the section on the political system has as many as seventy-seven footnotes. It seems desirable to have notes in all sections, especially when tables or maps are used.

The section on "economic development" relies heavily on a single source, China: Economic Indicators, which uses pre-1976 data. The section on "social affairs" similarly, relies solely on literature published on or before 1977. And, the section on "culture and education" uses extensively secondhand quotations and outdated data.
As far as its subject matter is concerned, while no one would dispute the importance of agriculture and population changes in China, the handbook overemphasizes background information and technical problems related to the collection and reporting of data. More important topics such as population control are only briefly mentioned. Similarly, there is too much discussion on the history of China's agriculture while only half a page is devoted to the period 1977 to 1978. "Future prospects" regarding China's agriculture are reduced to less than one page.

The book could be improved by giving more coverage to the following areas: (1) China's present transportation policy, especially railroads (The railway network in China as of 1980 covered 31,250 miles, but there are plans to extend the network to 80,000 miles by the end of this century); (2) China's policy toward the Soviet Union (The book gives the topic only half a page in its foreign relations section); (3) China's relations with the United States (This important topic is treated in less than half a page); (4) Taiwan and China's policy toward Taiwan; (5) the struggles for leadership among Hua Kuo-feng, Teng Hsiao-ping and to a lesser extent, Yeh Chien-yin; (6) the capability of China's armed forces (The Handbook only provides a brief discussion on this subject and a table); (7) the factions of the military and the deployment and training of the armed forces; (8) the functional and structural relations between the twenty-nine provincial party committees and revolutionary committees; and (9) the Red Guards and the Cultural Revolution.

Also, a number of claims made by authors of some sections are not verified. For example, statements on the Party's General Secretary are contradictory (pp. 118-19 and p. 124). The claim that Wei Kuo-ch'ing, instead of Hsu Shi-yu, protected Teng after his purge during the Cultural Revolution is debatable (p. 365). Finally, Teng is not known to have served as commander in the People's Liberation Army (p. 364). Minor errors include: The Ninth Party Congress was held in 1969 instead of 1960. Lin Piao allegedly died in a plane crash in 1971 rather than 1974. Regional military commanders are reportedly permitted to take along a personal staff of five (the more commonly accepted number is one).

Some statements in the book are also vague. For example, it is difficult to concur that there is "a fundamental contradiction between the basic slogan "power grows out of the barrel of the gun" and "the Party command the gun and the gun must never command the Party" as one author claims (p. 355). One also finds it hard to agree that "in Chinese usage the 'red' and 'expert' are supposed to go together and
reinforce each other” (p. 286). Past disputes between Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-Chi and the more recent disagreement between Teng and Hua in May 1980, over the issue of “red vs. expert,” indicate that there must be a potential conflict between the two elements. Another unsupported statement is that “in the most recent internal struggle, the animosity that senior officers felt toward being directed by a woman, particularly one like Chiang Ch’ing, was definitely a factor in the downfall of the Gang of Four.” A final confusing statement is: “the forceful personality of Teng Hsiao-p’ing and the sophistication of his close military associates will probably reduce somewhat the power of regional officials.” (p.366)

These comments, however, should not detract from the high quality of the book. Most of its assessments have proven both valid and accurate. For example, one writer asserts that China’s economic planning in the future would place substantial emphasis on agricultural development (p. 222). Indeed, by mid-1979, China was already forced to abandon its ambitious ten-year plan (1975-1985) and introduced a new three year "readjustment program" which shifted China’s priorities from heavy industry to agriculture, light industry, and energy production. Numerous other accurate predictions can be cited.

In conclusion, this book is a generally thorough and certainly handy reference. Its broad coverage of topics makes it useful reading to those with a general interest in China.

Leo Y. Liu
Department of Political Science
Brandon University

J. P. Jain, China in World Politics (Atlantic Heights, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1980), 290 pp., $15.00

Notwithstanding its ambitious title, this book is not a comprehensive study of China’s role in the world community. Instead, author J.P. Jain has given us essentially a chronological history of post-civil war China and its mercurial relationship with Britain.

The latest edition of the book, scheduled for publication and distribution by Humanities Press early in 1981, is an update of the 1976 work available through South Asia Books in Columbia, Missouri. It is organized as a collective study of six specific policy issues and their effects upon Sino-British relations: the initial
Communist victory in China, the Korean War, the Taiwan Crisis, the conflict in Southeast Asia, Hong Kong's colonial status, and Chinese representation in the United Nations. Each section is a chronological documentary of the issue and its impact, primarily, on economic and political contacts between London and Peking during the 1950s and 1960s.

*China in World Politics* is best suited for the historian with a greater than average interest in Sino-British relations of the past three decades. The sometimes plodding account of esoteric trivia and extended obscure quotations relating to that era is of more interest to the specialized researcher rather than casual scholarly perusal. The book had its origin in Professor Jain's doctoral dissertation, and it frequently reads like one. It is peppered throughout with annotations that will tend to distract all but the dedicated student of documentary lore.

One also suspects that the book's appearance, first in 1976 and again just recently, is intended in part as a promotional device for closer economic ties between China and Britain — which have undergone a revival since 1972. Jain spares no effort to detail the intersecting interests of London and Peking throughout the past three decades, with particular emphasis focused on present conditions and future prospects. Strategically and economically, he argues, the two nations only stand to gain from expanding cooperation — especially in trade.

The author drives home this point by lamenting the many missed opportunities between 1949 and 1970, a period when, he suggests, China and Britain were constrained from pursuing their naturally shared interests by international circumstances largely beyond their control. According to this thesis, Washington's early commitment to the Kuomintang cause on Taiwan closed off prospects for a Communist Chinese opening to the West, and effectively stifled the development of Sino-British relations after they were officially established in January 1950. According to the author, despite the periodic surfacing of more "reasonable" voices in London, British policy was heavily influenced all along by American "pressure" regarding the key issues of Formosan defense, the Korean War, United Nations membership for Peking, and the trade embargo on strategic goods for China. Britons themselves are depicted as indecisive after 1949 as to whether a "carrot" or "stick" approach was more likely to moderate Chinese Communism, but nevertheless limited in their options by U.S. policy recommendations.
Just as important is Jain’s contention that it was Washington’s antagonism, supported by London’s acquiescence, that drove Peking headlong into the Soviet embrace. The point is stressed repeatedly that China’s own pro-Soviet belligerency towards the West was a reaction to the hostile attitudes it encountered soon after consolidating power on the mainland. Thus, for example, the reader is told that:

The imposition of an embargo by the U.N. in May 1951 proved injurious to Chinese economic recovery and compelled Peking to take the course of autarchy and economic integration with the Soviet bloc. (p. 216)

Once the die was cast, Jain suggests, the Soviet Union was able to manipulate China quite easily to its own advantage during the subsequent Cold War era.

In many respects, then, China in World Politics reads like an apologia for Chinese Communist behavior before 1970. This, of course, fits the basic objective of promoting Sino-British relations now. We are reminded several times of the extent to which Western commitments to Taiwan’s inviolability during the Korean War helped set the course for long-standing contentions with the People’s Republic of China. As a basis for its entry into the Korean War, it seems that “Peking could not but view with serious concern the prospects of U.S. forces coming close to the Chinese frontier . . . . Concern for its security was the primary consideration behind Peking’s decision to intervene . . . .” (p. 50 and p. 55). We are also told that hostile Western attitudes — inspired by the United States — of necessity drove Peking into alignment with Moscow after 1949. But this simplistic rationale fails to account for development of the Sino-Soviet rift of 1960, when Western attitudes remained much the same. While it may be true that U.S.-British policy of the 1950s and 1960s did little to nurture Chinese affinities, it is not enough to explain by itself the fundamental pro-Soviet and anti-Western orientation of China’s leadership in the formative years. One always tends to be a bit skeptical of academic efforts to downplay the significance of doctrine in China’s behavior after 1949.

The basic inference of the work seems to be that the United Kingdom would have best served its interests, especially the interests of its commercial concerns in Hong Kong and on the Chinese mainland, by following its own economic instincts from the outset, rather than by bowing to U.S. policy persuasion. But Jain fails to suggest what possible alternative course Sino-British relations could have taken so long as U.S.-Soviet objectives remained basically at
odds, and the Chinese remained (by their own initiative) bound philosophically, strategically, and economically to the Soviet Union. One is not impressed by the alleged flexibility of the situation at that time. Indeed, in this regard, the degree of Britain’s importance to China seems exaggerated out of proportion throughout the book. So long as both China and Britain remained fundamentally aligned with their respective political spheres, there were few policy alternatives open to either nation in the post-World War II era.

The book does do a fairly good job of comprehending the common economic motivations of London and Peking which kept alive a degree of contact and indirect cooperation throughout the difficult period. The section outlining various theories for Peking’s longstanding toleration of British presence in Hong Kong, for example, is particularly revealing and useful. Also, Jain illustrates well the key role of economic rivalry among Western nations which has traditionally influenced all political decisions regarding China, and which now appears to be in an advanced stage of revival.

Robert L. Downen
Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies


Myers’ *The Chinese Economy Past and Present* is one of several volumes in the Wadsworth Civilization in Asia series. The series, according to the publishers, is designed to provide college students with lucid and literate general summaries of topics that, despite their brevity, present the subject without distortion. The Myers volume very creditably fulfills this objective.

However, this book also demonstrates how apparently difficult it is to compress three turbulent centuries of Chinese history into a smoothly flowing and lucid narrative which does not leave the reader wondering how one episode follows from or fits in with the one that went before and the one that comes after. Perhaps the sense of disorientation one experiences after closing the book is due in some measure to the fact (pointed out by the author in his preface) that “contrary to popular belief, Chinese history has not been a continuity — one thing growing organically out of the last and on to the next. It
has been a series of breaks or ruptures, each of which involved a novel mutation." Of course, that is not an unusual occurrence in the economic history of nations. Paradoxically, Myers does address himself explicitly to this problem in an early chapter. For exposition­al purposes, however, one should be able, with the help of an integrating theme, concept, or analytical framework, to make things hang together from introduction to conclusion, which is, after all, the rationale for going back three hundred years to explain what is going on now. While strong in many other respects, the book is weak on unity.

Chapter Two briefly discusses the analytical framework elabor­ated by Marx and Malthus (as well as the neo-Malthusian, more sophisticated Mark Elvin model) to explain economic history, and it suggests an alternative conceptual construct which is to serve as the unifying thread of the narrative. The history of how a society organized its resources for production, how it employed those resources for production, and how the final product was distributed between current consumption and future growth involves, according to Myers, three basic relationships: state and society, economic organizations and markets, and technology and economic organizations. In using these three relationships to explain development history it is necessary, Myers argues, to "identify the important social groups that make the basic economic decisions" (the "directors" of the system or the "leading participants" as they are known in the literature of comparative economic systems). It is also necessary, says Myers, to examine "the important values or norms that shaped the political, economic, and social culture" of each of those leading social groups.

All of this is, I think, correct and useful. Unfortunately, the analytical apparatus used by Myers seems unable to carry the burden of the empirical details and profuse observations that the author brings to bear on his subject. Perhaps part of the reason is the generous sweep of the construct, the attempt to bring in everything (the "political, economic, and social culture" over a span of three hundred years) and take nothing for granted. Political economists institution­alists, and economic historians will, no doubt, agree with this approach. It serves a meritorious function as a counterweight to the fashionable abstraction and narrowly focused mathematical modeling which dominate developmental literature these days. But just as there are advantages to be gained from the stance adopted by Myers, so also is there a cost exacted in clarity and consistency of presentation. The field of Chinese economic studies can accommodate
all kinds of approaches. In the hands of a scholar of Myers' caliber the outcome is, by and large, positive and constructive.

After discussing in a first part (Chapters 1 and 2) the general conceptual issues involved in economic growth and structural change and the analytical apparatus proposed to handle those issues, Myers divides the core of this subject into three major parts: premodern economic growth (the ancien régime, roughly from the late seventeenth century to 1895); early modern economic development (1895-1949); and modern economic growth or, as he calls it, the "economic revolution" (1949 to the latter part of the 1970s). Modern economic growth, according to Myers, is characterized by: (a) growth in the output of new industries and agriculture, more rapid than that which had occurred in the past; (b) a demographic revolution consisting in a sharp and sustained dip in the death rate eventually followed by a decline in the birth rate; (c) rapid expansion of the capital stock; (d) accelerated change in the production structure (decline in the relative contribution to gross national product of agriculture and a concurrent increase in the relative contribution of industry) accompanied by radical shifts in the rural-urban pattern of population distribution; and (e) significant alterations in the sharing-out of income and wealth, such alterations proceeding dialectically, first toward greater inequality than before, later toward lesser disparity. The crux of the matter, the essence of "modern" growth is increased factor productivity through the application to production and distribution of science and technology (p. 228).

In the course of his analysis Myers tries to answer what he deems to be three central questions: (1) why has China managed during the premodern era to expand the output of goods and services to match its steady population growth without any marked increase in the productivity of its resources ("Why growth without development in the Ch'ing period"? (2) why was modern economic growth retarded until nearly the twentieth century? and (3) why an "economic revolution" after 1949? The answers given to these three questions stem from the three basic relationships (between state and society, economic organizations and markets, technology and economic organizations), but as noted earlier, the parentage is not altogether clear, legitimate, or convincing.

For example, it is far from clear whether or not there was, in fact, an economic revolution after 1949 using Myers' meaning of the term. Certainly, there was a marked increase in total factor productivity in the producer goods industries in the 1950 due in large part to massive technology transfers from the U.S.S.R. But after the
mid-1960s and through the late 1970s the picture is much more clouded, and, as Myers' himself suggests, there may have taken place a decline in factor productivity in heavy industries in the 1970s.

In Chapter Seven, Myers talks of a "green revolution on a limited scale" which occurred in China by the later 1960s, a revolution achieved without technological borrowing from abroad (this is not quite true: Japanese strains of rice were imported and improved upon). A green revolution means "that total output per sown area each year increased more rapidly than the combined inputs of land, labor, and capital." Granted, this happened on a limited scale, mainly in the so-called "high and stable yield" areas (perhaps one-third of the total sown area). Then we learn (p. 230) that according to four independent studies (with which Myers appears to agree), since 1952 total factor productivity in China's agriculture steadily declined: "labor productivity has not been increased, and the trend since 1952 is similar to the long-term labor productivity trend during the Ch'ing period — constant. The supply of farm capital greatly increased, but its efficient use has been questionable . . . . Waste of capital and substitution of labor for leisure appear to be the two main ways that farm inputs have been utilized in agriculture to prevent total factor productivity from rising." It is not very likely that total factor productivity rose in the lower priority light industries, rural workshops, and urban cooperative enterprises. So where has the economic revolution gone? And what, given these findings, does post-1949 "modern" growth mean?

Myers is not the only author whose theses have been strained by the avalanche of information roaring down from Peking after the gang of four was put away. Thus, Myers speaks of China's "balanced type of economic growth that so far [has] won for China acclaim throughout much of the world. . . ." (p. 225). Yet we are told by the new leaders in Peking that balanced growth has been a myth for a long, long time, that there are intersectoral and intrasectoral imbalances of all kinds, some of which (for example the grain über Alles policy) have caused far-reaching ecological damage. Myers has some nice things to say about Dazhai (Tachai) and notes the "charismatic leadership" of the brigade's top man Ch'en Yung-kuei. Dazhai, as we know, was a fraud and its charismatic leader has now been retired. Daqing, too, has been downgraded as part of the anti "blood-and-sweat school" drive. Similarly, flexibility and experimentation in organizational management mentioned by Myers as characteristic of China's post-liberation developmental experience (p. 220) seems — if the present revelations are to be believed — to have
been more flexible and experimental on paper than in actual practice. In fact, we are told, rigidity and the "blind" issuance of administrative orders were the rule. Wheat was, and continues to be, imported (p. 235) not just because of the "inability of the transportation and storage system to make sufficient grain available to the urban inhabitants of [the] three huge metropolitan areas" (Peking, Shanghai, Tientsin) but, if truth be sought from facts, for a simpler and more compelling reason: the insufficiency of domestic production.

Parts of Chapter 8 and the Epilogue look as if they had been patched up late in the day to accommodate the latest tidbits emanating from Peking. For no apparent reason the last section deals with China and U.S. trade prospects. All this sniping notwithstanding, The Chinese Economy Past and Present is a useful book, a workmanlike product of a very knowledgeable scholar.

Jan S. Prybyla
Department of Economics
Pennsylvania State University

James D. Whitehead, Yu-ming Shaw, and N.J. Girardot, (eds.)
China and Christianity: Historical and Future Encounters (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1979), 331 pp., $8.95

Christianity in China has been the subject of much scholarly work and controversy since the days of Matteo Ricci and particularly in the last century and a half when vast numbers of foreign missionaries went to China with the purpose of converting and saving the souls of Chinese masses. This collection of essays treats the Christian experience in China as it relates to indigenous religious traditions. This is done in its historical context and with theological reflection. The papers were first presented at a conference at the University of Notre Dame in 1977 and while differing in approach and length, the essays are generally thoughtful and accurate with the possible exception of one (Lawrence J. Burkholder's) which dwells too much on American materialistic culture and another which dates the Arrow Incident in 1848 (Eric O. Hanson's).

Langdon Gilkey's paper, "The Covenant with the Chinese," set the theme for the conference and for this work. Historically, according to Gilkey, Christianity was taken to China in the form of a mission from the Western Church so that the Christianity the
Chinese learned was the product of Western culture and Western theology rather than the Christianity of the Church universal. Gilkey feels the imperialistic Christianity of the past “instead of pointing beyond itself to its non-Western Lord and its transcendent God, ... pointed to itself as a Western religion — and sealed its own doom.” Tracing the historical changes Western Christianity has made to adapt to the changing world, Gilkey stresses the need for Christians to form a covenant with the Chinese to allow them to adapt the theology of the kingdom of God to their cultural requirements.

“Confucianism: A Philosophy of Man” by Julia Ching emphasizes the common nature and “natural equality” of all men and the teaching of jen (universal love) in Confucianism. In its practical application, Ching finds that Confucianism is a universal system, not bounded by any nationalist borders, but applying to all “under Heaven.” She believes that Confucian humanism will again surface in China, as it has on previous occasions after governments tried to suppress it. She concludes that Confucianism and Christianity have many points in common and dialogue between the two would best be based on commonalities despite the Confucian view of the perfectability of the person and the Christian emphasis on human fallibility.

N. J. Girardot’s essay, “Chinese Religion and Western Scholarship,” is the most illuminating in the book because it emphasizes how much of the information Westerners have about China has come through religious connections. From the “dim shadow of China” known to the peoples of the ancient Near East to present-day scholarly studies of Maoist theology, religion has always loomed large in the Westerners’ view of China. As early as the 13th century, Westerners traveling to China recorded information about the country’s religions. The Jesuits of the Ming-Ch’ing period contributed to this literature as did the 19th century missionaries. Girardot attributes to this means of transmission the Westerners’ view of Chinese culture as inferior to Western culture.

Another major contribution to this study is Yu-ming Shaw’s essay, “The Reaction of Chinese Intellectuals Toward Religion and Christianity in the Early Twentieth Century.” This article provides insight into how China perceived and dealt with the religion factor of Western culture. Analyzing the writings of eight prominent Chinese, Shaw finds that their views ranged from acknowledgment of the achievements of the Western missionaries in China (Liang Ch’i-ch’ao, a Buddhist) to admiration for the teachings of universal love and self-sacrifice (Ch’en Tu-hsiu, a Marxist). As an example of a Chinese Christian who had difficulties accepting some of the teachings of the
religion, Shaw cites Chao Tzu-ch'en, American-educated and a president of the World Council of Churches, who rejected the divinity of Jesus, the virgin birth, the resurrection, and miracles. Shaw concludes that even at present most Chinese intellectuals find religion, in general, and Christianity, in particular, "repulsive."

Several of the essays deal with contemporary China and the theology of Maoism. Raymond L. Whitehead in "Christ, Salvation, and Maoism" reviews some of the extremely critical remarks about China found in Western religious publications of the 1950s and cautions that such feelings are not far below the surface among many Westerners. Yet he believes that "faith, hope, love, struggle and sacrifice" are present in China today despite the fact that the Chinese are not Christians. He believes that the atheism of Maoist China has not eliminated the possibility of a spiritual side of life.

Other essays include Laurence G. Thompson's "The Scrutable Chinese Religion" which seeks to identify the borrowings Chinese religions have made from other religious traditions in contrast to those which are indigenous to China. Eric O. Hanson's "Political Aspects of Chinese Catholicism" treats such topics as the ecclesiastical power of women in the Chinese church which developed in the period between the expulsion of the Jesuits and the coming of the 19th century missionaries, and the struggles the Vatican had with the French government which assumed the role of protector of Catholics in China.

Collectively, the essays in this work deal with an aspect of the Western encounter with China which in the past has been largely the concern of those who themselves were missionaries or who sought to justify the Christian missionaries' activities in China in terms of their contributions to China. Although some of the contributors to this volume fall into that latter category, the inclusion of works by scholars less personally concerned with missions provides this study with a more welcome dimension.

Kathleen L. Lodwick  
Department of History  
Southwest Missouri State University
II. China, Republic of (Taiwan)

Hungdah Chiu (ed.), *China and the Taiwan Issue* (New York: Praeger, 1979), 295 pp., Index, $24.95

This is perhaps the best single volume devoted to the Taiwan issue available to the general public and the scholarly community. The five substantive essays that constitute the core of the volume are crafted by specialists of the caliber of Jan Prybyla, King C. Chen and Hungdah Chiu. They provide relatively brief, but competent, accounts of Taiwan’s modern history (by Yu-ming Shaw), its political development (by John Franklin Copper), and its economic development (by Jan Prybyla), as well as two special studies, one devoted to "Taiwan in Peking’s Strategy" (by King C. Chen) and the other, "The Question of Taiwan in Sino-American Relations" (by Hungdah Chiu).

The account of Taiwan’s modern history provides background information for the subsequent discussion. Shaw’s essay is crisply written and informative, illuminating a long and dense period of the island’s history. The essay on political development that follows is an impressive piece of political analysis. While rehearsing all that which constitutes common knowledge — that the government of the Republic of China on Taiwan is characterized by many authoritarian features, for example, Copper goes on to identify some of the less well-known factors that are contributing to change. Some of those factors — such as the increasingly large numbers of alienated college educated youth — might move Taiwan’s political system further in the direction of Western democracy. The increasing number of non-KMT or anti-KMT candidates standing in local elections, in turn, might herald systemic structural changes in the politics of Taiwan. Traditional attitudes toward authority that seem endemic to Chinese populations, on the other hand, might obstruct any rapid change in the direction of more democratic processes. In effect, Taiwanese politics is subject to a number of strains produced by rapid economic growth — an increasingly literate population influenced by the expansion of the communications network and the introduction of Western ideas, as well as increased secularization and consumerism. That such strains might affect political change is almost self-evident. What the character of those changes might be is as yet difficult to determine.

Copper’s essay — supplemented by more extensive treatments like that of Arthur J. Lerman (*Taiwan’s Politics: The Provincial Assemblymen’s World* [Washington, D.C.: University Press of Amer-
China's Four Modernizations

— conveys a reasonably accurate picture of the complexity of politics in the Republic of China. Read with Jan Prybyla's "Economic Development in Taiwan," one receives a clear impression of the bone and muscle that make up Taiwan's body politic.

Prybyla's summary account of Taiwan's economic development is a conscientious rendering of the island's dramatic achievements in the production of goods and services. Moreover, until the recent fuel crisis, Taiwan's economic development was singularly stable, remarkably rapid, and surprisingly equitable. Two recent volumes provide a more extensive account — but fully correspond in their general conclusions. (See Walter Galenson, editor, Economic Growth and Structural Change in Taiwan [Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1979]; and John C. H. Fei, Gustav Ranis and Shirley W. Y. Kuo, Growth with Equity: The Taiwan Case [New York: Oxford University Press, 1979].)

King C. Chen's essay on Peking's strategy vis-á-vis the Republic of China on Taiwan is a helpful catalog of factors that influence the political and military behavior of the Chinese authorities on the Mainland. Chinese nationalism, the ideological commitments of the Mainland regime, the strategic importance of Taiwan, and the factional politics which regularly impact on political decisions in the People's Republic of China are all considered in an effort to anticipate the future behavior of Communist China with respect to Taiwan. Chen provides a plausible list of alternative scenarios one might expect to mature in the Taiwan Strait region. Mainland China has a clear list of priorities it is attempting to serve. For its part, the regime on Taiwan has a number of options it can pursue if the Mainland Chinese attempt to exert undue pressure. One such option is to attempt to establish a "secondary" relationship with the Soviet Union as a guarantor of the island's security. An alternative option is the development of nuclear arms on Taiwan. Taiwanese industry and technology make Taiwan but one step removed from the production of munitions-grade nuclear material. Moreover, it is reported that experimentation is proceeding on the development of a suitable delivery system. Both the Soviet option and the nuclear alternative are clearly unattractive measures that the Republic of China would pursue only in desperation. Finally, Taiwan might declare itself a sovereign and independent state to escape the "embrace of the motherland."

All these options are perilous — both for the regime and the population of Taiwan. Any of them would destabilize the Taiwan Strait region and threaten armed conflict that might well involve the
major powers. The clear implication of Chen's instructive study is that only the continued sale of defensive arms to the Republic of China by the United States holds out the promise of regional stability by reducing Taiwan's disposition to pursue any of these desperate options. Recognizing that American support is necessary for the developmental programs of the People's Republic, the United States can use its knowledge of Mainland China's priorities to further its own policy goals — one of which is the continued stability of the Taiwan Strait region. Given Chen's argument and the fact that the Taiwan Relations Act, which now governs our relationship with the derecognized Republic of China, recommends the sale of such arms, such an outcome is eminently possible.

Finally, Hungdah Chiu's essay on the history of the Taiwan issue in American Pacific policy is a discursive account of the evolving relations between the United States, the Republic of China, and the People's Republic of China. What emerges is a suggestion of the kind of dilemmas with which the United States is now faced. For more than a quarter century the United States has insisted that the security and integrity of Taiwan was critical to the economic and strategic interests of our country. Six presidents have committed our nation to the defense of Taiwan. No other country, save Israel, has received so many assurances of American support. Yet in 1979, the Carter Administration withdrew diplomatic recognition from the Republic of China. For the first time in our history we proceeded to "derecognize" a friendly nation with whom we shared a mutual defense commitment. All of this was done, however, with the insistence that the United States would continue to have "an interest" in the "peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue by the Chinese themselves." Over the objections of the authorities in Peking, the United States announced its intention to continue to sell arms of a "defensive nature" to the now derecognized Republic of China.

In effect, the United States continues to be intimately involved in the fate of Taiwan irrespective of formal derecognition. Any number of thorny issues will continue to trouble the United States in its continued relations with the People's Republic and the Republic of China. Disputes over the territorial waters around Taiwan, continued arms sales to the island, the possibility of armed attack on the Republic of China by the Mainland Chinese, and the contested representation of both Taiwan and the Mainland in any number of international organizations are only some of the issues that will test American integrity and diplomatic ingenuity in the future.
China and the Taiwan Issue is the kind of reading that leaves one with a sense of foreboding. The potentially explosive Taiwan issue will remain with us for the foreseeable future. It is an issue that will try America's strength, integrity and credibility. It is an issue that involves not only the welfare and future of seventeen and a half million people on Taiwan, but the economic and strategic interests of the United States in the West Pacific as well. The issue is rich with real and potential threat. It might provide the occasion for a major conflict. But it might also afford America the opportunity to exercise a constructive and productive role in Asian affairs. What it will produce, in fact, is impossible to determine with any conviction at this juncture. But for those who would like to know something of the complexities of the issue itself, and its possible outcomes, China and the Taiwan Issue is highly recommended.

A. James Gregor
University of California, Berkeley

Jyh-pin Fa, A Comparative Study of Judicial Review Under Nationalist Chinese and American Constitutional Law (Published by the University of Maryland School of Law, No. 4 — 1980), 200 pp., Index, $3.50.

The concept of judicial review, taken for granted by most Americans, is not a part of the political systems of most nations. Even in constitutional systems, the legislature is frequently the organ of government responsible for legal interpretation. In China, the power of judicial review was not recognized until the Nationalist government put it in the 1947 Constitution. The Council of Grand Justices, a separate entity from the hierarchy of ordinary courts on Taiwan, is now entrusted with the power of interpreting the ROC Constitution, yet it is unlikely that the Council would stand in the way of executive officials responsible for the security and prosperity of the nation. Thus, it is possible to say that judicial review is in its infant stage in Nationalist China.

Fa Jyh-pin's comparative study of American and Nationalist Chinese judicial review is a study of the development of judicial review in the Republic of China. The author begins by assessing the early use of the judicial system. Then he reviews the procedural aspects and the practice of judicial review in Taiwan. Comparisons with American judicial review and with American ideas relating to
the role of judicial systems in the legal and political system are frequently injected. This study would be especially useful to the researcher who is studying both the Nationalist Chinese judicial system and the arduous process of constitution-making during the formative years of the Republic of China.

Robert L. Montgomery
Southwestern at Memphis


The combined efforts of a former Vice Admiral in the U.S. Navy who served as commander of the Taiwan Defense Command from 1974 through 1977, a scholar and expert on arms control and sales as well as the current scene in Asia as it relates to China, and a student of Chinese history and politics have produced an incisive study concerning the problems that relate to Taiwan's security in the wake of derecognition by the United States, the Republic of China's only important ally, in December 1978.

The central theme or argument presented in this book is that, while the Taiwan Relations Act guarantees Taiwan's security, its effectiveness in so doing is uncertain. Taiwan, or the Republic of China, is seen as limited in its ability to produce weapons because it does not have an arms industry and though it has the funds it cannot buy what it needs. This puts Taiwan in a vulnerable situation, and, so contend the authors, creates a situation of potential conflict.

In the way of setting the scene for the current problems the authors begin with the act of derecognition by the Carter Administration in December 1978. They note that U.S. recognition of the People's Republic of China was expected, though it was not anticipated that Washington would surrender to China's demands in such a way as to create a potentially dangerous situation as perceived by Taipei and serve as a cause for future conflict in East Asia that may involve several other powers.

The reason for abandoning Taiwan, according to the authors, was the United States concern for the buildup of Soviet military strength in East Asia and a perceived need by U.S. foreign policy decision makers for an informal "alliance" with China in this context. But, according to Snyder, Gregor and Chang, it was not necessary to leave
Taiwan undefended; nor did Taiwan deserve the treatment it received. The authors in arguing this point quote a number of U.S. Senators, a large number of whom are liberal and are not considered pro-Taiwan, during debates that led to writing the Taiwan Relations Act in early 1979. In contrast, the Department of State (not unexpectedly) and the Department of Defense in (in marked contrast to its usual “all-possibilities-considered” approach to potential conflict situations) tried to present an optimistic case for Taiwan’s security — the latter apparently at the behest of the White House.

The authors then proceed to present a worst case scenario. They delineate People’s China’s military strength and its superiority over the Republic of China’s armed forces — which is stark in terms of both manpower and the quantity of weapons. They juxtapose this beside an argument — which has clear historical precedence — that Taiwan’s friendship with the U.S. and Japan will not deter Peking from an attack on Taiwan. The only solution to avoiding a conflict then in their estimation is to make an attack more costly — a solution the Carter Administration was unwilling to accept.

In defining what sufficiency means to Taiwan, the authors assess the strategies used by Israel in two Middle East wars and by China in a recent conflict against Vietnam. Israel’s use of jamming equipment, better planes and pilots, say the authors, is instructive in knowing how Taiwan can defend itself. The recent Sino-Vietnam War is also telling for the reason that China did not use its air force against Vietnam. Why? Because Vietnam’s air space was too well defended by ground-to-air missiles and the losses to the Chinese air force would have been too great.

From here the authors proceed to portray the most likely strategy to be used by the People’s Republic of China against Taiwan, a naval blockade. If this happens, they agree, much depends upon whether China can gain immediate air superiority or not. (It is axiomatic that China can impose a blockade in view of its seventy to ninety submarines — twice the number Germany used in World War II and more than the U.S. used to destroy Imperial Japan’s merchant fleet). The authors also note that Taiwan’s anti-submarine warfare capabilities are limited — not to mention the fact that is possesses only two submarines.

Using the above situation as a problem situation or scenario the authors cite what Taiwan needs in terms of weapons and weapons systems. The list includes: a better fighter plane (Taiwan has asked to purchase F-16 and F-18 fighter bombers); airborne early warning aircraft to maintain a radar “look down” and thereby provide more
lead time in the event of an attack and to use in guiding defensive efforts; electronic counter-measure equipment, particularly for use in defending against missiles fired from Chinese ships; portable surface-to-air missiles for use on Taiwan's naval craft; a better air defense system that would not be so vulnerable to bombing; anti-submarine warfare weapons, including helicopters and anti-submarine torpedoes; and finally short range missiles to halt a landing and an inland invasion.

Tying this to the central problem, Snyder, Gregor and Chang note that Taiwan has no place to purchase these weapons except the U.S. Western European nations will not sell weapons to Taiwan for fear of endangering their relations with People's China. Israel is a possibility, though for other reasons, namely its dependence upon the Arab countries for oil, Taiwan cannot buy the weapons it needs (though it has bought some) from Israel.

The obstacle, they note, to buying from the U.S. relates to general policies instituted by the U.S. in recent years to restrict arms sales. Taiwan is put into "category B" which means that it has a lower priority than NATO nations, Japan, Australia and New Zealand, and must compete in a zero-sum buying situation with other category B nations.

Making the situation more difficult yet — and the authors contend this is the real problem — Taiwan has no counterpart or representative American military or advisory group to initiate and carry through requests. Rather, requests have to be funneled through the Department of State — the organization which engineered the derecognition of Taiwan and the termination of the U.S.-Republic of China Defense Treaty. Related to this is the fact that Congress usually uses its veto power to stop arms agreements; it does not initiate them. Otherwise, Congress might be of more help.

The authors conclude that the U.S. denial of weapons sales to Taiwan is unreasonable. First, it is provided for in the Taiwan Relations Act written by Congress (the provisions of which are now being ignored by the Administration). Second, Taiwan can pay. (The year long moratorium on sales means that Taiwan has money saved for this purpose.) Third, arms sales to Taiwan would have a stabilizing effect in the region, not a destabilizing effect (because the Republic of China cannot use the weapons it seeks to purchase for offensive purposes inasmuch as they are defensive weapons and Taiwan does not have any hope of successfully attacking the mainland anyway).
The alternatives, say the authors, are sobering. An attack by Chinese forces against Taiwan would be highly destructive both in terms of Taiwan's industry and ecology, and in terms of loss of life. (The authors don't cite any expected death toll, but other authors have: from a million upward). Taiwan has an industrial infrastructure and can develop its own weapons industry: but this would be costly in terms of economic growth and may require the sacrificing of consumerism and maybe even political rights. Another alternative is building nuclear weapons. The problems this would foster are obvious. Still another alternative is the "Soviet option." This would be self-defeating for the U.S. since China would blame the U.S. for letting this happen.

In the view of this reviewer the authors have skillfully pieced together quite disparate information and arguments and have provided penetrating analysis on several levels to assess the problem of Taiwan's security. They argue convincingly that the commitments in the Taiwan Relations Act cannot be taken literally and that the Republic of China does not believe it can rely upon these commitments in the security realm. In other words "sufficiency" is a very ambiguous term and the Carter Administration defined this to mean essentially what Taiwan has already.

The authors also effectively present the case for arms sales to Taiwan as being in the cause of peace. Critics might argue that any arms sales or deliveries increase the probability of conflict or the damage caused when conflict occurs. Clearly this is not persuasive here. The authors are convincing in their argument that all of the weapons Taiwan wants are for defensive purposes and that they would do very little to make it possible for Taiwan to take the offensive. (They would certainly not augment a bomber force since Taiwan doesn't have one. Likewise, they would not compliment Taiwan's landing forces which are meager).

Although this book was not written for the layman and is more fitting reading for those with a background in U.S. China policy, any reader cannot help but be dissuaded from a policy of abandonment toward Taiwan. Clearly the authors have presented a case that the U.S. is responsible — both because of past relations with Taiwan and legally through the Taiwan Relations Act — for Taiwan's security, and that peace cannot be preserved in East Asia by tilting toward the People's Republic of China to the extent that Taiwan is forced to seek its own solutions to its security problems. In short, the analysis presented in this book demonstrates that the U.S. must make an effort to preserve peace and stability in Asia and Washington must be
guided by foresight and rational planning as opposed to what many critics say amounts to "playing the China card" to offset perceived Soviet gains or as a means of venting anti-Soviet feelings.

This book should be read by everyone that has an interest in America's China policy and most of all by all who have an ability to influence U.S. foreign policy decision making in this realm. It also provides food for thought to those concerned more generally with the future U.S. role in Asia.

John F. Copper
Department of International Studies
Southwestern at Memphis

III. U.S.-China Relations


Much has been written about the normalization of relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China, both before and after the Carter Administration's actual announcement on December 15, 1978. Rarely, however, has there been an effort such as Professors Kintner and Copper's A Matter of Two Chinas, which succeeds, in 127 pages, to provide a concise, economical, and clearly and simply written synopsis of the problematic implications posed by our new China policy. As such, this book is ideal as a required text or suggested reading for undergraduate students in a course in U.S. foreign policy, especially if the focus is on East Asia or recent policy issues.

The book deals with an examination of the new China policy of the United States in the following realms: strategic, economic, legal, human rights, and the Taiwan dimensions. The last pages of the book comprise an appendix containing three relevant documents: the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of China (1954), the Shanghai Communique (1972), and the Joint Communique on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations Between the United States and the People's Republic of China (1978). In their discussion of each dimension of normalization, the authors contrast the intentions of the Carter Administration with a sober assessment of implications of the move.

According to Professors Kintner and Copper, the Carter Administration's recognition of China was primarily designed to achieve a
China's Four Modernizations

strategic purpose — that of creating a new U.S.-U.S.S.R. military balance, one more to the United States' favor, by strengthening the "second front" facing Moscow. This, of course, assumes that the United States can enlist the People's Republic of China in containing the growing Soviet menace. Soviet capabilities in Western Europe, Asia and Africa will be reduced as a result of the deployment of Soviet forces to its "second front." Kintner and Copper, however, question the efficacy of this strategy. To them, "U.S. China policy has been predicated upon some exaggerated views of China, particularly with regard to the PRC's ability to offset the growing military power of the Soviet Union . . . China is not a superpower and . . . it will not become one in the near future, if ever, even with American help. . . ." (pp. 99-100) Moreover, in the authors' view, the direct or indirect assistance in the rapid modernizing and arming of the PRC by the United States may further erode the already precarious U.S.-USSR detente, and may provoke cause for a punitive Soviet attack on one of China's border provinces.

The authors also question the creation of a U.S.-PRC-Japan alliance in Asia. They caution that Japan and China have been historical competitors in Asia and are still engaged in a territorial dispute over areas in the East China Sea where there are thought to be huge oil deposits. Perhaps, say the authors, the United States should heed the lesson of history since, "historically the United States has never had close relations with both China and Japan at the same time." (p. 16)

In terms of the economic basis of the new U.S. China policy, Kintner and Copper contend there are serious limitations to increasing U.S.-China trade beyond an increase of $1 billion to $2 billion in two-way trade in the 1980s. Moreover, even if these obstacles were removed, Taiwan's volume of trade with the United States will still be larger than that of the PRC for at least the next decade. The authors in this context observe that "throughout United States history, trade with China has been a chimera. American trade with China has never constituted more than 2 percent of total United States trade, and China has never been an important U.S. trading partner." Further, they note: if the United States could regain a comparable share in the China trade as it had during the 1930s and 1940s — which even the most optimistic have not suggested — United States-China trade would still be less than America's trade with Hong Kong or South Korea and only a fraction of U.S. trade with Taiwan. (p. 31) Hence, they conclude that the economic evidence indicates that the United States can gain little commercially from
recognition of Peking and the new China policy was "partially built upon commercial gains which appear, to a large extent, to rest on false hopes." (p. 96).

Moreover, the derecognition of Taiwan may well undermine whatever strategic and economic gains the United States achieves from the normalization of relations with the PRC. The Carter Administration, according to the authors, overlooked the importance of Taiwan as "an island with a crucial geopolitical significance." (p. 12). Clearly, Taiwan is important strategically to the Soviet Union since it constitutes the connecting link in the Soviet Navy's sea lanes from Vladivostok to the Strait of Malacca. Taiwan is similarly important to the United States since it lies midway between Japan and South Korea, and the Philippines and Thailand where the U.S. is committed by treaty or by strategic needs. The island is also of strategic importance to the PRC since its incorporation would enable Peking to control the Taiwan Strait, thereby extending its power into the Western Pacific, and perhaps challenging both the Soviet Navy and Japanese shipping in the area. The Carter Administration, by derecognizing Taiwan, thus unsettled rather than stabilized the situation in Asia.

Finally, the derecognition of Taiwan and the abrogation of the Mutual Defense Treaty may force Taiwan to consider new options, such as a declaration of independence, a deal or alliance with the Soviet Union, or the construction of nuclear weapons, any and all of which present obvious problems and dangers to U.S. interests in Asia, U.S. relations with other Asian powers, and to the stability of the region.

Kintner and Copper also discuss Taiwan's status in international law. They assert that when President Carter acknowledged, in the Joint Communique on December 15, 1978, that Taiwan is a part of China, he violated a major assumption in U.S. foreign policy — that the United States supports international law and is resolved to approach international problems according to international legal standards. The reason: the United Nations regards Peking's various claims on Taiwan as dubious and insufficient, except for the claim on the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu. According to Article I of the United Nations Charter, a nation's legal status must be determined by currently relevant arguments without giving much weight to historical claims or wartime agreements and proclamations. Democratic principles are also important. In the case of Taiwan, contend the authors, its legitimacy is to be decided by self-determination. Thus, President Carter's acknowledgement con-
stitutes, in the judgment of Kintner and Copper, "a hasty decision to concede to Peking's territorial claims to Taiwan" which "will contribute to undermining the legal structure of world politics and U.N. practice . . . ." (p. 61).

In its conduct of a new China policy, the Carter Administration has also lent substance to its critics charge that its human rights policy is hypocritical and selective. According to the authors, "the issue of human rights had almost no role in formulating a new China policy" (p. 63) since the United States chose to recognize the PRC and derecognize the Republic of China, where "not only has there been progress in the area of human rights . . . but (whose) government — unlike Peking — has cooperated with the United States and international organizations to allow outside observation and suggestions for improvement." (p. 74). Moreover, note Kintner and Cooper, the obvious lack of consideration for human rights in our relations with the PRC, while making an issue of human rights in our relations with the Soviet Union, strongly suggests a U.S. "tilt" towards the PRC which may further damage U.S.-Soviet relations.

The authors' discussion of the legal and human rights dimensions of normalization constitutes, in the opinion of this reviewer, the best portion of the book. It also contains some of the sharpest criticisms of the Carter Administration. The arguments presented in this chapter demonstrate that, in spite of its oft-touted espousal of morality, the Carter Administration's human rights campaign amounts to little more than hypocrisy and expediency.

All of this leads Professors Kintner and Copper to suggest that "the most important task for the United States will be to fix a 'weight' to the moral element in our cost/benefit analysis of foreign policy decisions." (p. 78) Further, they broach the issue of sacrificing moral ideals for real-politick. Moral hypocrisy may be tolerated if the politics of expediency prove necessary and efficacious. Kintner and Copper have shown us that our new China policy has succeeded in being both immoral and a flawed exercise in pragmatic politics as well.

Maria Chang
Washington State University
Hungdah Chiu and Karen Murphy (eds.), *The Chinese Connection and Normalization* (Published by the University of Maryland School of Law, No. 1 — 1980). 215 pp., Index, $5.00.

Following the normalization of US — PRC relations, there have been a number of studies and evaluations written on everything from the legitimacy of the decision to its desirability. Most of these analyses have concentrated on one or several of the issues involved in recognizing the mainland regime and de-recognizing Taiwan. This particular study, *The Chinese Connection and Normalization*, is a macro-analysis of the situation and provides the reader with a broad evaluation of the change in relations. Its detailed and informative essays cover a broad range of topics, such as: the legal aspects of the normalization process, the history of US-China relations, the value of the Chinese connection, the Taiwan issue, possibilities for scientific and cultural exchange, Pacific diplomacy, and the extent of rule of law in China. Most of the essays are followed by comments from specialists, whose remarks are indispensable since they provide a much needed inside perspective to the problems and implications of the normalization process.

One of the editors, Hungdah Chiu, has carried out extensive research on the US-PRC-ROC issue and is well published in that area. He served as co-moderator for the Law Professor Workshop held at the University of Maryland School of Law on June 8 and 9, 1979, which focused on the Chinese connection and normalization. Papers presented and comments made at the Workshop make up the substance of this volume. Several important documents and government publications concerning normalization are included at the end of the volume. Of particular interest are the two government publications, "Doing Business with China" (Dept. of Commerce 1979) and "Human Rights in the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China."

*Robert L. Montgomery*  
Southwestern at Memphis

Fourth editions of works on China are somewhat rare, but in the case of John K. Fairbank *The United States and China*, most welcome. This standard work, written for both the scholar and the general public, is enlarged by an additional fifty pages in the current edition. The new material covers primarily the period since 1972 when the third edition appeared. The events in China during this time period include the deaths of both Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai, as well as the emergence of Hua Kuo-feng and Teng Hsiao-p’ing.

A major change in the new addition is the inclusion of photographs. Unlike some publishers who use the four-color, comic-book approach to illustrations, these photographs are thoughtfully chosen to portray the key people and events of recent China, as well as glimpses of the past.

The section dealing with American attitudes and policies toward China has always been a special feature of this work, and in the latest edition, there is an assessment of how our attitudes have changed since Richard Nixon’s 1972 visit to Peking.

The bibliography is expanded to include materials published since the third edition appeared. It is prefaced by a list giving the categories of works presented, and is followed by an index to the works in the bibliography. An 86-page bibliography covers virtually every aspect of China from archaeology and poetry to U.S. policy toward the People’s Republic, but the greater position concerns itself with work on China since 1949.

*Kathleen L. Lodwick*
Dept. of History
Southwest Missouri State University

The United States and Japan are the two preeminent economic powers of the non-communist world. Hence, it is reasonable to suppose that their standards of behavior and performance in the world economy, as well as the quality of their relations with one another, can be viewed as omens of good or ill in the balance of this century. Thus, Leon Hollerman has assembled a volume of essays concerning U.S.-Japanese relations whose collective impact is both instructive and unsettling.

The dominant theme of *Japan and the United States: Economic and Political Adversaries* is economic tensions between the two countries that have become politicized at the expense of reason, equity, and proper historical perspective. The eleven essays (three by Hollerman) range in scope from a specialized discussion of technological growth in Japan and the United States to a rather sprawling synopsis of various pros and cons regarding the economic issues in a larger historical and diplomatic perspective.

Five of the contributors are Japanese, most of them professional economists. The American contributors are mainly economists as well. However, the overwhelming presence of economic training does not prevent some of the authors — Sasagawa and Hollerman, for example — from being comfortable with social, historical, and political analysis.

Altogether the book presents a detailed and authoritative picture of the abrasive issues vexing U.S.-Japanese relations at a time of very great insecurity for all industrial nations. While gratuitous bias is directed neither at one nation nor the other by any of the authors, the overall impression one receives is that Japan is more responsible, mature, consistent, sensible, and justified than the United States.

The immediate point of contention is the U.S. trade deficit with Japan, which was nearly $13 billion in 1978. Considering that the total deficit in the U.S. account for the previous year was some $30 billion, the Japanese share of American trade is more than a bagatelle. Running in harness with this huge trade imbalance are still other economic woes, inflation, unemployment, and slippage of the dollar, which have tended to interact awkwardly with U.S.-Japanese trade relations. Moreover, the trade quarrel has flushed out
a host of more general issues bearing on Japan's place in the world as an economic power, U.S. responsibility, or lack of it, in the world economy, and the changing profile of U.S.-Japanese relations since World War II.

Specifically economic confrontation can be summarized as a "dialogue" of charges and counter charges. The U.S. complains about (a) a trade balance with Japan skewed heavily to the deficit side, while the Japanese luxuriate in a handsome surplus (the positive balance worldwide in 1978 was $24.7 billion); (b) obstructions to American trade and investment in Japan such as tariffs and a complex domestic distribution system; (c) a collusion of government and business in Japan whose net effect is a structure of ungentlemanly advantages in the scramble for world markets; (d) a labor force whose relatively modest levels of remuneration make Japanese exports unfairly competitive; (e) pushy, unseemly, and even unethical behavior in the world market to promote Japanese business interests.

In response to these U.S. broadsides, Japan complains about (a) the apparent inability of U.S. public policy to deal effectively with excessive oil imports and inflation; (b) the chronic weakness of the dollar, which the U.S. tries to compensate for by asking Japan to make inconvenient monetary adjustments; (c) failure to provide real leadership and example in the muddled arena of international economic policy; (d) mediocre and declining labor productivity compared to other industrialized countries; (e) blindness or indifference to recent Japanese measures intended to mitigate economic tensions.

The Hollerman volume is quite helpful in establishing the soundness of these charges and sorting out their relative weights. Eleanor Hadley for example, identifies an American propensity to blame its trade balance problems on OPEC price hikes and lagging world demand for exports cranked out by a healthy "expanding" U.S. gross national product (GNP), the implication being that sluggish growth abroad keeps American goods at home. The true situation, however, is that American economic growth has not exceeded that of other industrial nations and has actually been rather poor. Thus superior GNP performance in a slack world market does not work as an explanation of trade flows.

Hiroshi Kato, Hsiao Kanamori, and Leon Hollerman adduce still other observations discomfiting to the American position. Japanese labor is no longer cheaper than in America or Western Europe. Indeed, the lifetime employment policy of many large enterprises has begun to threaten financial hardship. Nor is it true that Japanese investment flows one-sidedly to export industries while social welfare
languishes. Recent shares of Japanese GNP given to social welfare (housing, recreation, health, and the like) have been substantial. In point of fact, the U.S. share of Japanese exports has been declining, not increasing, since 1973. Similarly the reasons for a decline of U.S. imports to Japan have less to do with willful barriers than with substantive contingencies: increased Japanese imports from the Middle East because of the oil price revolution; imports of food, fuel, and minerals from other nations commensurate with Japan's emergence as an economy of world stature; and the downward trend of American competitiveness in the world market. These developments suggest "it is inevitable that Japan will move to expand its trade with the whole world," for the nation "has grown too large to remain dependent on the United States alone" (Kanamori, p. 141). The dynamics of Japanese economic growth, and the immense scale reached by 1980, require a global rather than a narrowly bilateral orientation.

Meanwhile, the U.S. is plagued by conspicuous weaknesses, which include: (a) a ratio of saving below that of a half dozen other industrial states, thus squeezing capital available for reindustrialization and other investment targets; (b) one of the lowest inputs of capital investment among major industrialized nations; (c) a poor competitive spirit in the U.S. domestic market and self-seeking attitudes on the part of labor, whereas in Japan business rivalry tends to be sharp because "workers define themselves in terms of their company, and in Japan's hierarchical world, it is important to be in first place" (Hadley, p. 71); (d) the flagging productivity of American labor, which was the lowest among 11 industrial nations between 1960 and 1977, whereas Japanese productivity in the same period was the highest.

As the unfavorable comparisons pile up, an uncomfortable truth begins to intrude itself — that Japan, by every measure except size, including growth potential, productivity, efficiency, organizational skill, competitiveness, and business acumen, has a fair claim to being the world's top economic machine. To all of these classically capitalist virtues, one might add a role in the world economy more consistent and responsible than that of the U.S., for, in way of illustration, "by pressuring Japan to relinquish its sound, independent monetary policy, the United States is a destabilizing force in the world economy" (Hollerman, p. 191).

Although many fine books have been written of late on the history, structure, dynamics, and mystique of the Japanese economy, U.S. policy sails along as though nothing much has been learned
about pressures on Japan to export, notably the country's nearly total dependence on imports of fuels and minerals to maintain the world's third largest economy, and the need of most enterprises to pay off a huge debt service as a result of early capitalization through large loans supported by the Bank of Japan. Japan must export to survive, much less to grow. Not to grasp that elemental fact exposes one to the suspicion of being perverse or badly uninformed. Japan is hardly immune from criticism, as Saburo Okita makes clear in his discussion of Japanese economic policy in Southeast Asia, but more often than not U.S. representations of Japan's greed and insensitivity proceed from an arbitrary manipulation of numbers and a haughty assumption that one set of premises alone need be relied upon, usually a set framing U.S. intentions and actions in the best light.

Japan and the United States have had a novel, close, often tense relationship since 1945, with many nodes of conflict cropping up along the way — U.S. military bases in Japan, tariffs and quotas, the military budget, the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, the reversion of Okinawa, nuclear fuel reprocessing plants in Japan, and much more. Throughout this relationship the U.S. has behaved as the dominant party, well after historical reality had rendered such an attitude obsolete. Even in the late 1960s Japan was seen as "a small import-dependent, trade-deficient" (Trezise, p. 152) country and was treated accordingly. In the 1970s Japan was obliged to absorb the "Nixon shocks": diplomatic recognition of China without prior consultation with Japan, even after extracting a 1951 pledge from the Japanese as a condition for the U.S.-Japan peace treaty that Japan would not recognize the People's Republic of China; pressure to raise the external value of the yen; and an embargo on soybeans, essential to the Japanese diet, the U.S. being the major foreign supplier. In the wake of these indignities, by the late 1970s, Japan had weathered the OPEC revolution and the winds of recession better than the U.S. while piling up an unexpected trade surplus. One might call this string of successes the "Nippon shocku," or Japan shock, to which U.S. foreign and economic policies have not made a graceful adjustment. By displaying more adaptive behavior in the midst of changing circumstances, Japan has earned its momentarily strong position. By tolerating inefficiency, resistance to change, sagging productivity, and undisciplined oil consumption, the U.S. deserves its headaches.

While it would be prudent for Japan to moderate export levels so as to achieve maximum benefit without provoking the closure or reduction of foreign markets, Trezise rightly points out that trade
riches can make Japan a major exporter of capital, a role desperately needed in the world economy, and one that the U.S. would do well to acknowledge and even applaud. In any event, there is no evidence at hand that Japan and the U.S. will stop being significant trading partners in the future, short of some unforeseen catastrophe. In 1977 the U.S. got 21.5 percent of Japan's exports, compared to Japan's second largest trading partner, the Republic of Korea, which got 5.1 percent, and West Germany, which got 3.5 percent. The U.S. accounted for 17.5 percent of Japan's imports, followed by Saudi Arabia at 12.1 percent, and Australia at 7.5 percent. The differential in these instances shows that the American share of Japanese trade, despite a recent decline, has remained well ahead of other nations.

Moreover, there is great potential for fruitful cooperation on the strategic question of developing sources of energy to offset petroleum dependence. As Nishimizu and Sasagawa amply demonstrate, Japan has come abreast of the U.S. in technology sophistication, although remaining weak in basic research. With a now mature technology and surplus capital to invest, Japan can be a major force in the search for renewable energy. The U.S. will continue to be important to Japan's defense, for there is no adequate substitute in sight for the controversial security pact. As to the compatibility of the two political systems, Scalapino sees no likelihood that they will wander in radically divergent directions.

On the other side of the fence, however, the state of the U.S.-Japan economic relationship "is certainly one of tension, perhaps dangerous tension" (Trezise, p. 153). American displeasure notwithstanding, signs lead one to expect nothing less than an unrelenting Japanese policy of exports and overseas investment in the next decade, and the U.S. may just have to become reconciled to the accommodation of more tension than usual. Three dangers must be anticipated and provided for. The first is that "Japan's very successes may retard the . . . changes . . . necessary for a healthy U.S.-Japanese economic relationship" (Scalapino, p. 191). The second is that conflict over resources, especially energy supplies, may intensify and make the trade deficit squabble look amicable. The third is that largely economic issues capable of rational adjustment and amelioration may become uncontrollably politicized, leading to myopic protectionism, and beyond that to "the growth of bilateralism, discrimination, and retaliation." For "the history of the postwar period does not encourage the belief that nations have the ability or the will to coordinate their economic policies within a multilateral world market system" (Hollerman, p. 223).
Both countries must find leadership capable of seeing beyond short-term advantages that alienate to long-term advantages that entail stability, mutuality, good will, and a reciprocal concern for one another’s legitimate interests.

Kenneth R. Stunkel
Monmouth College


A much-needed addition to reference works for Asianists is Hong N. Kim’s Scholars’ Guide to Washington, D.C.: East Asian Studies, which is part of a series of such guides done by the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.

The major sections of Kim’s work deal with libraries and archives and manuscript collections, but there are also sections dealing with museums, music collections, maps, films and photographs and data banks. There is also a section on organizations ranging from those of an academic and professional nature to foreign governments and international organizations, U.S. government agencies, and cultural exchange groups. Eight appendices provide such information as addresses and personnel of East Asian press offices, media centers, religious groups, and social and recreational clubs. Bookstores serving those interested in East Asia are also listed, but perhaps a most helpful list for the out-of-town scholar is the cataloging of housing agencies which provide temporary accommodations.

For each listing, the mailing address, telephone number and hours of service are given as well as information on the availability of interlibrary loan and reproduction facilities. The names of key personnel at each library are also cited, and although this is currently helpful it will serve to date the work rather quickly. Each entry also gives the size of the collection, the subjects covered and an evaluation of the holdings. Any special collections of periodicals, government documents, monographs and books, archives, films, tapes and maps are also noted in each entry.

In many cases these notes on the special collections provide some very interesting reading for the user of this index. For example, the
China notes on the Library of Congress list 17 special holdings including 41 original volumes of the estimated 500 in existence of the *Yung-lo ta tien*, the handwritten encyclopedia compiled by the third emperor of the Ming between 1403 and 1407. The Japan section includes six works among them a collection on the South Manchurian Railway Company which contains some 5,000 items. Of a more technical nature is the Patent Office Scientific Library of the Commerce Department where Japanese patent publications are the most numerous of the East Asian holdings.

The Archives and Manuscripts section covers a wide variety of collections from the American Red Cross, which has extensive holdings on China Famine Relief in the early 1900s, to the Anthropological Archives at the Smithsonian's Museum of Natural History with its reports of 17th century Ainus.

Useful too is the listing of manuscripts in the Library of Congress of Presidents, Secretaries of State, diplomats and diplomatic missions, military and naval officers' records, and missionaries, businessmen and scholars which relate to East Asia. For each, the dates covered and the number of East Asian items are noted.

The section on museums and galleries and art collections is of use both to the scholar and to the capital visitor with a few free hours to spend. Along with the well-known holdings of the Hirshhorn and Freer Museums, lesser-known collections here listed include the Luther Whiting Mason Collection of rare Japanese musical instruments located at the University of Maryland; the National Bonsai Collection at the National Arboretum; textiles and carpets, primarily from China to be found at the Textile Museum; and swords and firearms from China, Japan, and Korea at the National Rifle Association Firearms Museum.

The section on music and sound recordings lists primarily those holdings of the National Archives and Records Service and the collection of the Library of Congress.

Much more extensive are the sections on maps and films and photographs. The Geological Survey Library whose holdings are open to the public and the Defense Department's mapping agency whose holdings are classified are listed along with extensive descriptions of the collections of the Library of Congress and the National Archives and Records Service. The detailed descriptions of films and photographs should help most researchers locate whatever illustrations they might need. For example, the Army Audiovisual Agency is reported to have over one million photographs, 250,000 of which deal with East Asia. The Library of Congress listing reveals that there
one might find such unique items as a 1901 movie made in China, photographs of Mah Jong pieces deposited as part of a 1924 copyright application, and 1898 photographs of Japanese army maneuvers. The holdings of the National Archives include numerous films from World War II agencies on the conduct of the war and its aftermath.

The organizations listed range from Amnesty International and the World Population Society to the Chinese Opera Society and the Tibet Society, but all have something to offer the East Asian scholar.

Thirty-two agencies of the U.S. government with East Asian connections are also listed as are the embassies of China, Japan, and Korea and such international organizations as the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization and the International Monetary Fund.

Finally, a very useful feature of the guide is the cross referencing of various organizations whose holdings are not limited to a single category used in this work. The guide is certainly a great time-saver for those scholars whose visits to Washington are limited to the semester breaks or spring vacations, but it is also extremely useful to those scholars who cannot travel to Washington, but need to know where to write for a particular item.

Kathleen L. Lodwick
Department of History
Southwest Missouri State University
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