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TWO KOREAS' UNIFICATION POLICY
AND STRATEGY
YONG SOON YIM*

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PREFACE

This study has two purposes in mind. First, although Korea is one of the major puzzles to the understanding of East Asian politics, it has been either neglected or misunderstood by the American public. Thus this small study is an attempt to shed some light on Korean politics in this country. Second, the reunification is not a single-dimensional issue in the spectrum of Korean politics. An awareness of the political problems of the reunification would tremendously enhance understanding of the subtlety of Korean politics.

This modest study is deeply indebted to many institutions and individuals. The author wishes to express gratitude to the Library of the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea, the Korean National Commission for UNESCO, the Bureau of Statistics of the Economic Planning Board, the Korea Land Unification Board, the Institute for Far Eastern Studies, and the Research Center for Peace and Unification. He would also like to extend his gratitude to many individuals who have made this study more meaningful. They are Professors Ardath Burks, Richard W. Wilson, and Dr. Se­Jin Kim, who has supplied this study with many valuable materials from Korea. The author is particularly grateful to his enduring friend, Robert Cadden, who has in so many ways improved this and other studies that this author has published over the last several years. He is also gratefully indebted to Dona McIntosh, who has polished many of my papers with her skillful typing and editing. Gratitude also goes to Professor Hungdah Chiu who took the responsibility to publish this modest study without reluctance. Finally, the author is particularly appreciative of his wife, Hyon Ja, for her enduring cooperation and great patience in coping with the difficulty that the life of a junior scholar with three children must face in materializing this small study.

Needless to say, for all errors and shortcomings, the author alone bears the responsibilities.
INTRODUCTION

The question of Korean unification is perhaps the one that has been discussed most in Korean politics in the last few decades without a plausible answer. Since the search for solutions and answers on various issues and questions involved in the unification problem has not been successful, one wonders whether the possibility of Korean unification is a reality or a merely unobtainable fantasy. Granting that Korean unification is indeed an enigmatical problem, why should we, as western political scholars, be so concerned with the problem of Korean unification? What is the meaning of Korean unification in terms of global politics? The answers to these questions can only be ascertained by placing the problem of Korean unification in multiple perspectives. First, Korean unification is deeply related to political stability in the international arena, being a key to the stability of Northeast Asia. A perusal of twentieth century history shows that the politics of the Korean peninsula had caused or contributed to three major wars in recent history; viz., the Sino-Japanese, Russo-Japanese, and Korean conflicts. More than twenty countries have been involved in these three wars.

Second, the Korean peninsula has always been a key, or at least a critical variable, to the stability of the Far East region. Particularly, Korea is of vital concern to Japan who has invested more than 1.5 billion dollars in South Korea with more investment certainly expected in the future. Japan, therefore, desires a stable political situation in order to ensure her investments in South Korea. Also, Japan has had historically an enduring fear that Korea is "a dagger pointing at the heart of Japan." This theory, of course, has been a polemic subject among military strategists and students of international politics. Whether or not one agrees to "the dagger" theory, many Japanese believe it,1 and certainly many Japanese leaders express concern over the political situation on the Korean peninsula. As Professor W. I. Thomas aptly puts it, "If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences."2

Third, Korean unification is certainly related to the progress of the economic systems of "concerned countries." Of course questions about how and to what extent defense industries influence the economic growth of any nation are polemic. It is

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1. See constantly repeated statements of previous and current foreign ministers, Kosaka, Hatoyama, and Sonoda, of Japan.
2. For further discussion on the relationship between perception and reality, see Joseph H. de Rivera, The Psychological Dimension of Foreign Policy, (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Company, 1968).
quite clear, however, that any country which spends more than 5 per cent of its GNP on defense is going to do so at the expense of badly needed social services which should have a higher priority. As is already well-known, South Korea's defense budget totals about six percent of its GNP, and North Korea is expected to spend somewhere between fifteen to twenty percent of its GNP for military purposes. When compared to the level of economic and social development of these two political systems, the expenditures for both military establishments are indeed excessive in terms of domestic needs and national resources. Excessive military spending is a major factor adversely affecting the healthy progress of both Korean societies. Discounting direct military and non-military aid given to South Korea in the last few decades, the U.S. still maintains more than thirty thousand troops in South Korea. Furthermore, the U.S. will also continue to bear some of the burden of South Korean defense in the foreseeable future.

Fourth, the division of Korea is, in fact, a product of rivalry in the international political arena. It is a division which occurred and continues against the wishes of millions of Korean citizens. Furthermore, once the country divided into two parts, Korean citizens on both sides were practically forced to accept for themselves an alien political system; i.e., a capitalistic system in the South and a Communist system in the North. Under these totally different conditions, the people in each political system have been disparately socialized in varying ways to such a great degree that eventually Koreans in the two systems have acquired different personality and value premises. Various studies, furthermore, indicate that intensive efforts have been made by the leaders of each political system to compel ordinary Koreans to accept and integrate a disjointed personality system, mainly for the purpose of furthering political values and goals. If this situation continues to exist, the possibility of reunifying and reintegrating Korean society will cease to exist. Clearly, the longer the division exists, the more difficult it becomes to integrate the two Koreas. Furthermore, Korea has had a unique development as a unified nation prior to the unfortunate situation which forced her to divide into two parts. As pointed out by a distinguished Korean scholar, Jun-yop Kim, "Korean unification demanded by

History means at once the growth of the Korean nation and the condition necessary for Korea's role in the world as a modern state. Thus, reunification is a prerequisite for Korea to realize its full potential as a modern Asian nation state.

Fifth, reunification will perhaps provide a new and expanded role for Korea in international politics. The international role of Korea in the past has been severely restrained because the division has discouraged both Koreas from pursuing a more meaningful and active role in the world political arena. Both Koreas have constantly diminished their influence in international affairs by bickering with each other. Furthermore, each side has attempted to disgrace the other. The attacks of both Koreas have been so intensive that the competitive arena encompasses the world, ranging from the United Nations and Africa to Latin America. Moreover, the division of Korea has greatly reduced the political autonomy for both South Korea and North Korea. Reunification will eliminate the unnecessary and unseemly efforts of each to disgrace the other. The end of intra-Korean rivalry will make the beginning of a newly established political autonomy, and Korea's participation in the affairs of the international community will be more meaningful and constructive. The role of Korea will become more active and more positive, as it should be, in the international political community. The foregoing implications are reason enough to venture into a speculation about a possibility of Korean reunification.

While externally, or internationally it has become an acute political problem, the reunification of Korea is something that every Korean in both South and North Korea dreams of. Because Korea was a unified nation-state for a millennium, many Koreans strongly feel that the division is intolerably against Korean spiritual nature. Thus the issue of reunification is able to generate an extraordinary degree of support as a political symbol. Many Koreans realize that it is presently unrealistic and a remote possibility to envision a unified Korea. Nonetheless, they do dream of it and naturally speculate about such a possibility. Frequently, frustration drives Koreans to strongly demand from their politicians the creation of conditions conducive to such a possibility. Naturally, politicians find reunification a useful issue to be exploited for their own political causes. It is not only a useful issue to be exploited, but it is also an issue which often forced

governmental leaders to take a position. Thus various incidents reported in the news media around the DMZ or some policy statements in South and North Korea are partly a result of both Koreas' tactics on how to achieve the unification. Both Koreas' diplomatic offenses toward other countries is also invariably related with its overall strategy toward ultimate unification of Korea. In this respect, both North and South Korean governments have taken various policy positions on the unification.

Thus, understanding of unification politics is indeed essential for an overall comprehension of Korean political behavior. This study will attempt to investigate historical patterns of the strategy and policy of unification, and to illuminate major factors contributing to the strategy and policy. In examining the strategy and policy, this study will primarily utilize a descriptive and contextual analysis using mainly written documents. The time parameter of this study will be the period of 1948-1978 for North Korea, and the period of 1953-1978 for South Korea. It will, therefore, cover the policies of the first republic, the short-lived Second Republic, and the current government of the third republic for South Korea. The interpretation of various documents from Korea is largely based upon the deductive and inductive reasoning of the author.
PART I: NORTH KOREAN UNIFICATION STRATEGY

1. Unification Strategy by War, 1948-1953

A brief survey of North Korean politics reveals that the North Korean strategy of reunification has changed several times. The first was reunification by war. This was during the period from the establishment of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the end of the Korean conflict. The division of Korea occurred after World War II when Russian forces occupied North Korea and the U.S. military authorities entered South Korea.5 Later a new constitution for North Korea was adopted by the Supreme People's Assembly on September 3, 1948, under the auspices of the Russian army. At the end of December, 1948, all Soviet forces were withdrawn from North Korea. One of the first policy positions of North Korea was presented at an organizational meeting of the People's democratic Front for the Unification of the Fatherland on June 28, 1949. North Korea proposed the following unification principles:

1. The unification must be achieved by Koreans alone.
2. The U.S. troops and the U.N. Commission on Korea must be withdrawn from Korea immediately.
3. A national election should be held to elect members of a legislative organization.
4. The election committee must be composed of representatives from various political parties and social organizations of South and North Korea.
5. The election committee will give necessary instructions to the present governments of South and North Korea for the preparation of the nationwide election. A committee to supervise withdrawal of foreign troops will be organized. This committee will also directly take over police power from the governments of South and North Korea.

5. For a detailed cause of Korean division, see my work, "U.S. Policy in Korea Partition," *Asian Profile* (October, 1977).
6. The legislative body newly established by the national election will adopt a constitution for the Korean Republic, and organize a new governmental structure. The new government will take over powers from South and North Korean governments.

7. The army of South and North Korea will be absorbed by the government of the new Korean Republic. But those South Korean forces which participated in the suppression movement of the partisans should be dismissed from the army.⁶

On June 7, 1950, the Democratic Front again proposed a reunification plan:

1. A general election shall be held throughout Korea on August 5–8, 1950, to establish a unified supreme legislative organ.

2. The legislative assembly so elected shall convene on August 15, 1950, the fifth anniversary of Korea's liberation, in Seoul.

3. A conference of representatives from all political parties and social organizations throughout Korea shall be called on June 15–17, 1950, in either Haeju or Kaesong. The conference shall discuss and adopt decisions on the following matters: a) Various conditions necessary for the peaceful unification of the Fatherland, b) Procedures governing the holding of a general election for the Supreme Korean legislative organ, c) The establishment of a central election guidance committee which will guide the general election.

4. The conference shall specifically exclude certain individuals such as Syngman Rhee, Yi Pom-sok, Kim Song-su, Shin Hung-u, Shin Song-mo, Cho Pyong-ok, Chae Song-uk, and Yun Chi-yong. The U.N. Korea Commission shall not be allowed to interfere in the business of national unification. The Korean people must solve the question of national unification on our own without foreign intervention.

5. During the duration of the conference and of the general election, the government authorities in the southern and northern sections shall be responsible for maintaining social order.\(^7\)

These proposals of North Korea appear to be, at least superficially, very reasonable. The North Korean proposal included a few coherent elements in its plan. First, the reunification must be achieved without foreign interference. It means that the principle of self-determination must be incorporated as the foremost important principle. Second, a nationwide general election on the basis of the popular will is the method selected to establish the national government. Third, the future government of unified Korea should be totally a new government.

A careful investigation of this proposal will, however, easily detect a number of conditions which could not possibly be accepted by South Koreans. First, this proposal did not recognize the authority of the South Korean government. Second, it failed to recognize the U.N. authority which legitimized South Korean government. Third, it proposes to absorb the military establishments of South and North Korea, except those who participated in the suppression of the partisans in South Korea. This practically excludes all of the South Korean soldiers. Fourth, it excludes certain individuals such as Syngman Rhee, Yi Pom-sok, Kim Song-su, and many others, comprising practically the entire spectrum of the leadership in South Korea. This proposal, therefore, was a very hostile message to the South Korean government.

Furthermore, Kim Il Sung in his message of 1950 almost declared war against South Korea by urging South Koreans to “launch more vigorously than ever the grand nationwide country-saving struggle” against the Rhee regime. In order to do so, Kim urged the South Korean people to isolate Rhee and then to “arouse uprising of the people, destroy the regime from within and without ... and incessantly support the guerrillas both morally and materially.”\(^8\)

While North Korea was proposing various plans for the reunification, Kim Il Sung went to Moscow early in March, 1949, and signed an agreement on economic and cultural cooperation.

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\(^8\) Ibid., p. 41.
Furthermore, the Soviet Union secretly agreed to furnish North Korea with arms and equipment to build the North Korean army. North Korea subsequently received, in 1949–50, from the Soviet Union ten reconnaissance aircraft, one-hundred Russian T-34 and T-70 tanks and heavy artillery. By June 1950, the North Korean ground forces exceeded 135,000 men, including approximately 77,838 in seven assault infantry divisions, 6,000 in the tank brigade, and 18,600 highly trained border constabulary. In early 1950 Communist China added to this impressive force by repatriating about 12,000 experienced Korean veterans from the Chinese Communist Forces. With this capability, on January 26, 1950, Choi Yong Kon, the Minister of National Defense, made a confident statement that North Korean forces were “ready for combat at all times to crush enemies of the unification and independence of the Fatherland.” Therefore, it is quite safe to assume that North Korea completed its plan for the impending invasion of the South, and for the reunification by a massive military force. While this impressive preparation of North Korea was going on, the U.S. troops were completely withdrawn from Korea, and the famous Acheson doctrine was announced.

2. **Strategy of Peaceful Coexistence, 1954-1956**

The policy of unification by war totally failed due to the intervention of the U.N. forces under the leadership of the United States. During the three years of fighting millions of Koreans suffered and thousands of families were dislocated. The war resulted in more than a million South Korean deaths, yet North Korea still could not achieve the noble goal of reunification. This forced North Korea to enter the second stage of North Korean unification strategy which began when the Armistice Agreement was signed on July 27, 1953.

The Armistice Agreement was signed with a stipulation that “the peaceful settlement of the Korean question” was to be arranged in the near future. The failure at Panmunjom to arrange a high-level political conference led to the Berlin Conference where on February 18, 1954, an agreement was again made to call the Geneva Conference for the purpose of arriving at a peaceful settlement of the Korean question. At this conference, Nam Il,
the North Korean delegate, proposed the following scheme of Korean unification:

1. The government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the government of the Republic of Korea are urged:
   a) to hold general elections for a national assembly for the formation of a unified Korean government;
   b) to organize an all-Korean Commission, the members of the Committee to be selected by the Supreme People's Committee of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea respectively, and to include representatives of the largest democratic social organizations in South and North Korea;

   * * *

   d) in order to assist the economic reconstruction of Korea, which is the first important step for the creation of the conditions necessary for realizing the national unification of Korea and with a view to promoting the material well-being of the Korean people and to maintaining and developing the culture of the people; the all-Korean Commission should immediately take measures to establish and develop economic and cultural relations between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea.

2. The necessity should be recognized of the withdrawal of all foreign military forces from Korean territory within six months.

3. The necessity should be recognized for all those countries most interested in the maintenance of peace in the Far East to guarantee the peaceful development of Korea.

Throughout this conference the North Korean proposal clearly suggested conditions to be met. First, the U.N. could not be a competent body to supervise Korean unification. Second, the

organization to oversee the all-Korean election should be represented equally regardless of the population from both sides. Third, a veto power should be preserved. Fourth, perhaps most interestingly, prior to a political settlement non-political problems such as economic, cultural and social concerns were to be settled first. North Korea made it quite clear that "the economic reconstruction of Korea" must be the first step rather than an immediate political unification.

The Supreme People's Assembly of North Korea passed a resolution on October 10, 1954, which was quite similar to the version presented by Nam Il at the Geneva Conference, except for a few minor procedures regarding how to achieve unification. Furthermore, the United Democratic Fatherland Front made a statement in its 18th Session on March 7, 1955, that the failure to establish negotiations between North and South Korea and the delay in reunification was essentially due to American imperialism and to Syngman Rhee's clique. The Fatherland Front, however, opened a possibility for further negotiations by stating that, despite a denial by the U.S. imperialists and South Korean rulers to heed an appeal from the Supreme People's Assembly, the road to reopen direct negotiations between South and North Korea was not necessarily completely blocked. Then on August 15, 1955, Kim Il Sung of North Korea made a five-point proposal:

1. In order to guarantee a permanent peace in Korea, an international conference should be reopened.

2. All foreign forces are to be withdrawn from Korea.

3. A non-aggression treaty should be concluded between North Korea and South Korea.

4. Armed forces should be limited within a range of one hundred-thousand men.

5. A conference for the representatives of political parties and social organizations from both Koreas should be called. 12

On April 28, 1956, the Third Congress of the Korean Worker's party again adopted a declaration on peaceful unification which urged convening of an international conference for the solution of the Korean question. During this second stage of North Korean

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unification policy, several observations can be made. First, North Korea’s policy was a conciliatory, or to some degree, an acquiescent one. Perhaps it was at least an attempt to avoid provoking confrontation with South Korea. Second, North Korea again urged the opening of an international conference to “guarantee a permanent peace” in Korea, which suggests that unification was not an immediately pressing matter. A peaceful status quo on the Korean peninsula was a rather urgent matter. To support this position, North Korea again proposed a “non-aggression” treaty between North and South Korea. Third, North Korea again proposed the reduction of armed forces to a minimal level. This meant that North Korea wanted to create a conducive condition for the future unification, i.e., a peaceful condition. To support this, North Korea urged an immediate withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea. All of these quite clearly characterized North Korean strategy, namely maintaining a peaceful coexistence policy while delaying the reunification until the time was right.

The question remains, why did North Korea take this position? North Korea’s sudden policy shift from achieving a military victory to achieving peaceful unification was partly due to external pressure upon the North Korean government. Particularly, pressures from the Soviet Union and Communist China with unexpected American intervention were important external influences affecting North Korean behavior. Kim II Sung, who was virtually unknown to most Koreans, was introduced to the public by the Russian military authorities as a nationalist hero at a citizen’s rally in Pyongyang on October 3, 1945. At that time, the very existence of Kim’s regime was based on the Soviet Union’s presence. Even the preparation of the Korean War was supported by the Soviet Union. According to a study done by Kiwon Chung before the war, the allocation of Russian military advisers to North Korea’s army was thought to have been as many as 150 per division. Furthermore, it is assumed that at least ten thousand men, mostly youths recruited by selective conscription, were sent to Siberia mainly for military and technical training in Khabarovsk and the Chita Far Eastern Military Academy. While the Russians helped to build North

Korean military capability, the U.S. announced the famous Acheson Line in January, 1950. The Acheson Line defined the American Pacific security line within the perimeter created by Japan, Okinawa, and the Philippines. This statement encouraged Stalin to believe that the Line excluded Korea. With this opportunity, the Soviet Union “ordered its Communist satellite to attack.” American intervention, however, led to the highly unfavorable result of the Korean War. Stalin, furthermore, did not want to become involved in a direct confrontation with the United States. In this respect, the Soviet Union suggested as early as June, 1951, that an armistice could be arranged in Korea without the settlement of outstanding political issues.

Kim Il Sung, therefore, was constantly under mounting pressures from the Soviet Union. Ulam even stated that the crucial decision concerning the conclusion of the armistice of 1953 was made by the Soviet Union and reflected Russian interests. The sudden death of Stalin on March 5, 1953, left the Soviet Union temporarily without a leader. In this situation, it might be that there was considerable uncertainty in defining the general line of Soviet foreign policy. Furthermore, it seems clear that no member of the collective leadership could advocate an adventurous foreign policy before his political position had been consolidated at home. It seems reasonable to conclude that the Soviet Union would certainly press North Korea not to develop further trouble. Molotov’s proposal, in the Geneva Conference, requesting “withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea” was an oblique attempt to avoid any further direct confrontation between Communist China and the United States.

Communist China is also to be considered a source influencing North Korea’s behavior. The relationship between North Korea and Communist China was a close one. As the fortunes of war changed drastically for South Korea and her allies, the Chinese warned that they would intervene if the U.N. forces crossed the 38th Parallel and pushed toward the Chinese border. Furthermore, Communist China’s intervention in October, 1950 enhanced China’s influence on North Korean policy, for it practically saved North Korea from total defeat. Although Communist China feared the control of the strategic Korean peninsula by unfriendly military forces, it appears that China was

16. Ibid., p. 533.
very reluctant to continue a head-on collision with the United States and that after twenty years of continuous civil and foreign wars China probably would have had difficulty waging war against the United States. Moreover, Truman's and Eisenhower's threats regarding the possibility of nuclear attack were obviously perceived by and affected the decision of the Chinese leadership. As pointed out by Harold Hinton, the American hydrogen bomb test also helped to remind the Communists of the military odds facing them. Furthermore, Peking's peaceful coexistence strategy was extensively launched with the Bagong Conference of 1955. Therefore, Peking's efforts to avoid more military conflict with the U.S. and China's positive involvement in establishing improved relationships with a strategy of peaceful coexistence policy were well-reflected in North Korea's policy of favoring the status quo.

North Korea's policy of favoring the status quo was also influenced by domestic factors. The instability of North Korean leadership within the Korean Worker's Party was a particularly important factor affecting the policy of status quo. The major cause of instability was attributable to factional conflict within the party. North Korea has had a long history of factional struggles which very often changed the direction of public policies. The 1954–56 period can be characterized in terms of a high degree of conflict politics among four factions: the Soviet faction, the Yenan faction, the domestic faction, and the immediate associates of Kim Il Sung known as the Kapsan faction.

Kim Il Sung was constantly challenged over the leadership position by various factions until 1956. One of the factions which threatened Kim's leadership in this period was Ho Kai-I and his Soviet faction. Ho was confirmed as the second in authority as early as January, 1951 in the North Korean power structure.


According to a former high ranking official in North Korea, Yi Chull Choo, the Soviet Union ordered Ho to be installed in that position so that in the event something happened in North Korea, the Russians could control the KWP through him.\textsuperscript{21} As a chief of the Organization Bureau of the KWP, Ho had become a political threat to Kim Il Sung. Kim barely managed to replace him in 1953. Then Kim was challenged by the domestic faction man Pak Hon Yong who had been very influential throughout the history of the Korean Communist movement. During 1953-55, Kim Il Sung managed to eliminate the domestic faction and Pak as rivals. A more elaborate factional conflict was illustrated at the Third Party Congress held in April, 1956. At this congress prominent leaders of the Soviet faction and the Yenan faction directly engaged in attacking Kim Il Sung’s leadership. This conflict also ended in favor of Kim’s Kapsan faction. As a result, the Soviet and Yenan factions were almost completely excluded from the Central Committee of the KWP. Kim barely survived the Third Party Congress, and it proved to be one of the most serious challenges to his leadership.

While engaged in factional conflicts, Kim had to rebuild his country destroyed by the war. Kim particularly preferred to develop heavy industry as a means of establishing a solid base for the future revolutionary movement toward reunification. In this respect, Kim introduced in 1954 a three-year plan which placed the greatest emphasis on the development of heavy industry. Furthermore, Kim Il Sung wanted to continue this policy in the next Five-Year Economic Plan to lay the foundation for an independent, self-supporting national economy. Facing these external and internal problems, Kim’s policy of “coexistence” or of maintaining the status quo was a logical choice to follow.

\section{3. Peaceful Unification Strategy, 1957-1960}

The third stage of North Korea’s unification policy was marshalled in during 1957. In this stage, North Korea launched two campaigns of reunification, namely, unification under the well-known Kim’s Chuche thought and a strategy of peaceful unification. Kim Il Sung proposed in a speech delivered at the North Korea’s Supreme People’s Assembly on September 20, 1957 that:

\begin{quote}
\end{quote}
1. It is imperative that all the foreign troops be withdrawn from Korea, and both of Korea's military forces be reduced to 100,000 in number.

2. In order to provide a peaceful settlement for the Korean problem, an international conference of concerned nations should be called immediately.

3. A national election should be held on the basis of equality, and direct secret balloting.\(^{22}\)

Then North Korea again proposed in February, 1958 the following points:

1. The simultaneous withdrawal of all foreign forces from both Koreas.

2. The holding of all Korean free elections under "the supervision of neutral nations."

3. The opening of negotiations for economic and cultural contacts between North and South Korea.

4. The reciprocal reduction of armed forces to a bare minimum. North Korea has already reduced its army by 80,000 men.\(^{23}\)

North Korea's peaceful unification policy was further elaborated in a speech delivered by then Vice Premier Nam Il at the Sixth Meeting, Second Term, of the Supreme People's Assembly held on October 26, 1959. Nam Il proposed that:

1. All of the foreign troops must be withdrawn.

2. Military forces of both sides should be reduced to less than 100,000 men within a short period.

3. North and South Korea should simultaneously declare that military forces must never be used against each other.

4. After the complete withdrawal of all foreign troops, an all-Korean free election should be held.

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\(^{23}\) *Nodong Shinmun* (February 20, 1958).
5. A standing committee composed of representatives from national assemblies, governments, political parties, and social organizations of the South and North should be organized in order to discuss the matters of reunification, including the free election.

6. Residents of South and North Korea be permitted to visit freely wherever they wish to go and to send mail.²⁴

Kim Il Sung proposed a drastic plan for reunification in a speech commemorating the fifteenth anniversary of Korean Liberation of August 14, 1960. He stated that:

Although we consider the unification by a national election without foreign intervention as a most realistic and rational way for the peaceful reunification of the Fatherland and, . . . if the national election cannot be acceptable to the South Korean authority . . . we propose a confederation scheme to meet the problem.²⁵

This was a scheme to create a loose confederation of the fully autonomous North and South Korean governments on a provisional basis. Kim furthermore suggested that "if South Korean authority cannot accept the confederation proposal, then we propose a purely economic committee composed of representatives from various industries to cooperate for a mutual trade and economic reconstruction."²⁶ Choi Yong Kun, then President of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly made a report at the Eighth Session of the Second Supreme People's Assembly on November 19, 1960. According to the report, Kim Il Sung's new proposals were accepted as a "very realistic and reasonable program based on the correct analysis of the current internal and external situation."²⁷ It then proposed and repeated a number of points:

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²⁶. Ibid., p. 397.
1. The question of unifying Korea must be settled without fail by peaceful means, and independently by the Korean people themselves.

2. The proposed confederation is to be enforced by way of setting up the Supreme National Committee . . . while retaining the present political systems.

3. For this, the technical forces of North and South Korea should be mobilized to survey the reclaimable land and carry on designing work.

5. We are always ready to receive any South Korean unemployed who want to work in the northern part.

10. This first step toward fulfilling the solemn national task confronting us is to open negotiation between the North and South at an early date.²⁸

Throughout the study of the policy proposals of North Korea in this stage there are several characteristics to be detected. First, North Korea would still not accept the legitimacy of the U.N. as a supervising body of all-Korean elections for the reunification. Instead, it suggested the “holding of an all-Korean election” under the “supervision of neutral nations.” North Korea also called for an international conference of “concerned nations” to provide a peaceful settlement for the Korean problem. Second, North Korea repeatedly proposed a mutual reduction of military forces of both sides. It also repeatedly called for an immediate withdrawal of all foreign troops from the Korean peninsula. Third, North Korea proposed a “mutual renunciation of military means” to unify the country. In order to achieve this peaceful unification, it offered to execute a non-aggression treaty between South and North Korea. Finally, in this stage North Korea proposed the well-publicized confederation scheme. The consistent theme in this period of North Korean strategy was the peaceful unification of Korea.

There were several factors affecting the change in policy of North Korea. First, it was related to the North Korean political leadership structure. As already discussed, Kim and his followers

²⁸. Ibid., pp. 17-62.
faced strong resistance from opposing factions and adroitly managed to survive in power during the 1956 Third Party Congress. Since then Kim’s leadership had gradually reorganized the party leadership structure. By 1958 Kim and his Kapsan faction had become much stronger. A massive purge of the Army in 1958 ensured consolidation of the control of the Kapsan faction over the military recruits and command. The remaining Soviet and Yenan faction members had completely been removed from the party with the exception of a few who cooperated with Kim Il Sung in expelling their fellows. Kim and the Kapsan faction, therefore, enjoyed a high degree of stability in the party. This stability of the internal structure left a considerable amount of room within which Kim could maneuver his external policy.

Second, in the economic sector North Korea achieved a remarkable success during this period. North Korea stated that the tasks of electrification and irrigation had been basically completed in this period. While some of the features of the communes might possibly have been retained, the kitchen plots, small hand tools, chickens, pigs, rabbits and other animals were returned to private hands. Thus a report from North Korea stated that the farmer and his family increased their private production of livestock and vegetables so that they could sell them on the farmer’s market and earn enough money to build a new house. Furthermore, in this period, the leading position of the state-operated farms had begun to play an important role in the development of agricultural production. In this regard North Korean leadership perceived a certain level of modernization in North Korea.

Third, Communist Chinese troops which had become a great economic burden were completely withdrawn from North Korea in 1958. More important to the Kapsan faction, however, was the political burden. As long as Chinese forces were stationed in North Korea, Kim’s leadership was vulnerable, particularly to attacks by the Yenan faction. In this regard, the term “withdrawal of all foreign forces” might well have been directed overtly toward the United States, and covertly toward the Chinese Communists. In this effort Kim negotiated with the Soviet Union.

After prolonged negotiations, a Sino-Korean Joint Communique was signed on February 19, 1958 indicating Chinese willingness to complete the evacuation by the end of 1958. After the withdrawal North Korea became less susceptible to Chinese influence in North Korea. In this sense all of the internal reconstruction of economic, military and political strength, plus the withdrawal made Kim Il Sung a confident leader. Kim Il Sung’s major report to the Fourth Congress reflected “the newly found confidence of a man who completely smashed internal dissension and succeeded in pushing his people through years of bitter sacrifices on behalf of state development with a substantial degree of success.”

Fourth, another factor was related to situations in South Korea. Social discontent reached its height in this period in South Korea. The annual growth of per capita real income from 1956 was less than two percent. The rapid increase of population, however, virtually nullified all sectors of economic growth. The financial disequilibrium of the South Korean Government exacerbated the situation of chronic underemployment and poverty. Police brutality, rigging elections for public offices and political corruption were widespread under Rhee’s Government. Dissatisfaction against Rhee’s regime was tremendous in city areas. Political corruption and police interference with civilian life led to widespread desertions by intellectual groups from South Korean society. As the Government increased its repression of civil liberties, the ill will of the people toward the Government also increased. The Government went so far as to order a popular newspaper, Kyunghyang Shinmun, to close its doors. This was indeed a shocking move to the Korean public.

Furthermore, while conflict between the ruling party and the opposition was at a high point the newly emerged progressive party (Jinbo Dang) was gaining the attention of the public. This party openly advocated a peaceful reunification of the country and publicly denounced the attitude of the Liberal Party toward North Korea. One thing to note is that the leader of the Progressive Party, Cho Bong Am, was an arch-rival of Rhee in the 1956 presidential election and won almost 2.2 million votes. Cho

Bong Am, however, was eventually arrested and sentenced by the court to death, and the Progressive Party was outlawed.

Then the April student uprising toppled the Rhee regime. The April uprising was apparently as much a surprise to the Communists as it was to the Government of the Republic of Korea. According to Pak Dong Un the uprising had never been considered in the North Korean tactical plan toward South Korea.³⁴ This uprising provided an opportunity for North Korea to advance the theme of peaceful unification. North Korea hailed and appealed to the students to rebel, to become "anti-government," and to be "anti-American." Even though North Korea had wished to promote social disorder in the South, the Communists did not commit acts of individual terror. This avoidance of violent tactics was largely due to North Korea's perception that "since the symbols of Communism and bloodshed are fused with horror in popular attitudes as a result of the wartime experience, it would have been suicidal to have raised the blood-red banner of Communist insurrection on the streets of Seoul in the spring of 1960."³⁵

The Chang Myon Government replaced Hehr Chung's interim government. Social chaos and political instability continued in South Korea. It appeared that North Korea might have a chance to take advantage of the situation through tactical violence. It must have been well perceived by the North Korean leadership, however, that only a few leftist-oriented persons managed to get elected to the National Assembly. Thus as conservative and anti-Communist trends were still strongly held in South Korea, it appeared that Kim's leadership attempted to alleviate fears on the part of the South Korean Government that the entire nation would fall under Communist control. This was the situation when Kim Il Sung proposed "the confederated unification" scheme rather than a direct appeal to those elements favoring Communism or leftist ideology. The scheme was an effort to demonstrate to the rightist or conservative sectors that Kim's North Korea would recognize any existing elements in South Korea.


While alleviating South Korean fears toward North Korea by recognizing the legitimacy of the South Korean Government's existence, North Korea launched a multi-stage tactical offensive. The first stage continued psychological warfare by promoting a widespread peace offensive in South Korea. Second, there was a reconstruction of the underground cell organization which was completely exposed and destroyed during the war. Third, there was an attempt to elect Communists to National Assembly seats by collaborating with various leftist groups in South Korea. The peaceful unification by confederation in this regard, was a highly convincing tactic. The fourth stage was an attempt to manipulate an end to the American presence by forging a combined front of top level government officials, students and the intellectual community. Thus, the situations which occurred during this period in South Korea became an important factor in the strategy of North Korea in this stage.


The fourth stage of North Korean unification strategy began in 1961. During this stage North Korea gradually transformed its unification strategy. North Korea reacted to the military coup in South Korea with apprehension. A short while after the coup, however, North Korean Vice-Premier Kim Il reported the North Korean unification policy posture at the 16th commemoration of the liberation from Japan on August 14, 1961. The following points were proposed:

1. It is our persistent and unchangeable principle that a peaceful unification of the fatherland can only be achieved by Koreans themselves on the basis of free and democratic principles through an all-Korean election without foreign intervention.

2. In order to achieve a peaceful unification, the first step will be a free and open-minded negotiation between our peoples.

3. We will always cooperate and work hand in hand with anyone, without questioning his religious and political beliefs, if he wishes to work for the cause of peaceful unification.

4. The only way to rehabilitate the economy and to solve the poverty in South Korea is to establish a channel for trading between the South and the North, so that South Korea can benefit from the strong economy of the North.\textsuperscript{37}

The Third Session of the Third Supreme People’s Assembly in March, 1964, adopted a resolution appealing to the South Korean National Assembly and to various social organizations. According to the resolution:

1. We urge an immediate end to the currently progressing Japanese-South Korean talks. We then propose a North-South conference to save the Fatherland by means of peaceful and independent reunification.

2. We urge the immediate overthrow of the traitorous Park Chung Hee Government.

* * *

5. We urge that the chronic poverty of the South Korean economy be solved not by a reliance on foreign aid, but by a realization of a free self-reliance through South-North economic cooperation so that the national capacity can be fully mobilized. In this regard, we offer South-North economic cooperation.

6. We will accept unemployed South Koreans, and provide for them functionally suitable jobs and security.\textsuperscript{38}

On January 8, 1965, Kim Il Sung laid down a unification policy in a letter replying to the President of the Korean Affairs Institute in the United States. Kim made the following points:

1. The North and South Korean authorities conclude a peace agreement pledging not to resort to armed attack against each other.

2. We will join hands with anyone at any time if he defends the interest of the national and aspires to the country’s unification irrespective of his political views and ideology and of his past actions.

\textsuperscript{37} Chokuk Tongil (August 14, 1961).

\textsuperscript{38} Chosun Chungang Yongam: 1965 (Korea Year Book), p. 111.
3. To achieve the reunification of the country, we should pool the strength of the entire Korean people in North and South and fight against the foreign imperialist aggressive forces and their allies — the traitors, reactionary bureaucrats, political quacks and impostors who are hindering reunification.

4. If all the patriotic forces of North and South Korea unite, we will definitely open the road to contact and negotiation between the North and the South, realize mutual cooperation and exchange, force the U.S. Army to withdraw, and achieve the reunification of the country.

5. Without unity and struggle we can neither drive out the U.S. aggressor army nor achieve national reunification.39

Throughout the analysis of North Korean policy in this stage there are a few things which can be observed. First, there are a number of elements that North Korea reiterated in prior policy directions such as unification without foreign-intervention and economic interchange with the Seoul Government. The proposals of confederation and a peaceful reunification were also repeated. North Korea also repeatedly urged a peace agreement between North and South Korea.

Second, there are, however, a number of gradual policy shifts in this stage which can be detected. One shift was the extremely hostile attitude toward Park’s Government in the South. North Korea made it clear that Park’s Government must be overthrown. This was quite contrary to the previously expressed attitude that the North would negotiate with anyone for the purpose of achieving reunification.

Third, probably the most distinctive characteristic of the policy in this stage was the strategy of reunification by “the people’s democratic revolution,” particularly, in South Korea. This strategy was an attempt on one hand to avoid a massive direct confrontation, namely war, between North and South Korea, and on the other hand to create a conducive condition for a revolution in South Korea, which would eventually overthrow the existing government. Then it would be merged with North Korea. This strategy was an attempt to exploit political and social discontents stemming from military rule and economic degradation in South Korea.

Korea. In this respect, North Korea repeatedly appealed to South Koreans to remedy "the chronic poverty by a realization of a free self-reliance through South-North economic cooperation." Furthermore, North Korea called for a united fight against "the traitors, reactionary bureaucrats, political quacks and impostors who are hindering reunification."

One of the factors influencing North Korea to adopt the strategy of "the people's democratic revolution" was the new situation which occurred in South Korea. North Korea reacted to the military coup in Seoul in a cautious manner. In the early period of the coup, North Korean broadcasts reportedly hailed the overthrow of the corrupt and puppet government of Chang Myon. It appears that North Korea believed the new situation in the South was beneficial to its interests. It became apparent, however, that the military government was going to develop a strong anti-communist posture. As stated in the revolutionary pledges, anti-communism became the first national policy. Then, the Junta made sweeping arrests of leftist-oriented groups and individuals. All the vocal exponents of political negotiation with North Korea were banished. This made it difficult for the North to pursue its strategy of peaceful unification.

This new situation indeed was an unwanted and unexpected turn of events for the North Korean leadership. Even Kim II Sung reportedly admitted the difficulty in pursuing further his peaceful unification strategy. Kim declared that "the South Korean people find themselves in the worst adversity in which the outrageous bayonet stifles everything, and the struggle of the masses for the country's peaceful unification and for existence is subjected to ruthless suppression." Furthermore, Kim confessed that due to "the absence of the political party of the working people, the South Korean people failed to collect the fruits of costly struggles in the past." Kim exhorted the South Koreans to establish their own communist party in order to carry out the revolution ahead. In this regard, while Kim was showing a conciliatory gesture to the South by stating that "the Korean people do not want a fratricidal war nor do they want to squander the precious fruits of

40. This was Glenn Paige's view. North Korea possibly perceived a strong possibility of establishing an anti-American government in the South due to personal background of the coup leader, then Major General Pak Chung See Glenn D. Paige, "North Korea," loc. cit., pp. 234-235.
42. Ibid., p. 388.
their labor in a civil war," he intended first to rebuild Communist forces in the South by exploiting the social and political discontents. The turmoil stemmed from the transition from military rule to civilian government, and from continuing social unrest. Thus the uncertain situation in South Korea became one of the factors involved in the strategy of "the people's democratic revolution."

Another factor which can be attributed to the strategy stemmed from the increasing conflict between the Soviet Union and Communist China. In earlier years the Sino-Soviet conflict provided an opportunity for Kim to play client politics between the two giants. Furthermore, North Korea attempted to avoid becoming entangled in the conflict. Although Kim II Sung managed to stay neutral, both the increasing belligerency of the South Korean government and the Sino-Soviet rift brought a new element of uncertainty into Kim's perception of North Korea's relations with South Korea. Kim's concept of ultimate security was predicted on unity between the Soviet Union and Communist China. With this uncertainty, in order to guarantee its own safety, North Korea signed the Soviet-Korean treaty in Moscow on July 6, 1961. According to the treaty in the event that either contracting party was militarily attacked by another nation, the other party would, without delay, provide military and other assistance "with all means at its disposal."

After the signing of the Soviet-Korean treaty, Kim II Sung flew to Peking where he signed the Sino-Korean treaty with Chou En-lai on July 11, 1961. Despite a strenuous effort on the part of North Korea to remain neutral, Kim II Sung was gradually forced to shift his position. There were a number of incidents which forced North Korea to change its neutrality. Once involved, for example, Yugoslavia and another had to deal with the Communist Chinese

44. Nodong Shinmun (July 7, 1961).
45. According to Byung Chul Koh, the Soviet-American Confrontation in Cuba, measured in terms both of the number and scale of mass rallies waged in support of the Cuban people and of the space devoted to it in Nodong shinmun, received as much attention as the South Korean Student uprisings of April, 1960. See Byung Chul Koh, Foreign Policy of North Korea (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1967), pp. 65-66.
invasion of Indian territory. Adding to these situations, the Cuban missile crisis occurred. This crisis attracted a great deal of attention in North Korea. North Korea vigorously supported the Cuban people, declaring that “to crush the aggressive maneuvers of the U.S. imperialists” was “the sacred duty of the world proletariat and all peace-loving people alike.” The Soviet capitulation, however, created a profound feeling of disappointment inside Communist China and North Korea. North Korea vehemently expressed the disappointment by accusing the Soviet Union of “beautifying imperialism — capitulation to imperialists, spreading illusions about imperialism, and maliciously plotting to disarm the masses before the imperialists.” The Soviet Union eventually withdrew its economic aid from North Korea which remained without military and economic assistance from the Soviet Union until 1965. Until the end of 1964 North Korea sided with China in the Sino-Soviet conflicts.

The Sino-Soviet conflict and the Cuban crisis led Kim Il Sung to reevaluate North Korea’s policy posture. North Korea realized that there was no assurance it would in fact get massive support from both the Soviet Union and Communist China should it decide to engage in a major war for unification with South Korea. With regard to this uncertainty North Korean leadership adopted the policy of a “self-reliance defense” posture. This policy known as the four point military program was designed: (1) to transform every recruit into a model soldier; (2) to modernize North Korea’s arms and equipment; (3) to arm the entire population; and (4) to transform the whole country into a vast impregnable fortress.

Added to these considerations are a number of other factors such as the economic difficulty and the restructuring of North Korean political leadership. With these new situations North Korea realized that its strategy for peaceful unification was not workable. Even Kim Il Sung confessed that anti-Communism was too deeply rooted in South Korea. He also realized that there was great uncertainty about the outcome of attempting to unify Korea by a massive war. In this regard, well perceiving the situation, Kim Il Sung made plain that the South Korean revolutionary forces were still very weak. He then noted that even though the South Koreans could count on help from the North,

47. Nodong Shinmun (December 17, 1962).
substantial struggles must be carried out by the South Koreans themselves in a spirit of self-help. Thus he stressed that the South Koreans must have their own party and wage a struggle according to their own strategic and tactical thinking.\textsuperscript{50} Furthermore, in order to unify the country by mass revolution, Kim Il Sung ordered the following multi-staged tactics: (1) preserve and maintain revolutionary forces in South Korea; (2) rebuild the revolutionary party; (3) raise revolutionary consciousness among the people; (4) expand revolutionary strength; (5) build a "united front" of poor peasants, workers, and students and intellectuals; and (6) build a united front for anti-American efforts."\textsuperscript{51} Kim hoped with this strategy that when the time came for the mass revolution in South Korea, South Korea would be unified again.

5. \textit{Unification by Vietnamization, 1966-1976}

The fifth stage of transformation of the unification strategy was gradually occurring in the early months of 1966. In this stage, the strategy can be characterized in terms of the "unification by Vietnamization" of South Korea. This strategy persisted up to 1976. Kim Kwang Hyop, then the Vice-Premier of North Korea proposed the following points in his speech of September 8, 1966:

1. The United Nations must stop any further discussion on Korea, and cancel all of the resolutions adopted by the organization.

2. All foreign troops including the U.N. forces should be withdrawn immediately from Korea.

3. Dissolve the UNCURK.

4. A South-North joint conference for political parties and social organization should be held to discuss the question of Korean reunification.

5. An international conference of "the concerned nations" must be called for a peaceful coordination of Korean questions.\textsuperscript{52}

\textsuperscript{50} See \textit{Kim Il Sung Sunjiip (Selected Writings of Kim Il Sung)} (Pyongyang: Tongbang Sa, 1965), pp. 594–598.
\textsuperscript{51} See \textit{Nodong Shinmun} (September 8, 1966).
This proposal was merely a reiteration of previous positions. Kim Il Sung made a statement again on December 16, 1967:

We regard whatever attempt to realize the country's unification by relying on foreign forces as a treachery to the country and the nation to place the whole of Korea in the hands of foreign aggressors. The question of Korean unification is an internal affair of the Korea people, . . . We hold invariably that the question of unifying our fatherland must be settled by our people themselves without interference from outside forces after the aggressive army of U.S. imperialism is withdrawn from South Korea.53

This statement is again a repetition of the position that Korean unification must be achieved by Koreans alone. In order to accomplish that U.S. forces must withdraw from South Korea. North Korea repeatedly urged similar positions through various channels of communication such as the United Nations, conferences at Panmunjom, and others. Then North Korean Foreign Minister, Ho Dam, offered an Eight Point proposal for the unification at the Supreme People's Congress on April 12, 1971:

1. Withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea.
2. Reduce military forces of both South and North Korea to less than 100,000 numbers.
3. Abandon or declare to nullify South Korea's mutual defense treaty with U.S. and the treaty with Japan.
4. Establish a unified central government through a free all-Korean election.
5. Immediate release of all the political prisoners, and guarantee freedom for all the political activities in South Korea.
6. Establish a confederate government as a temporary expedience.
7. Mutual exchange of delegates for various non-political activities; i.e., sports, art, culture, education, economic trade. And, in addition, allow mail exchange.

8. In order to discuss the procedural matter to achieve the goals, call for a North-South Koreans' political conference composed of representatives from various political parties and social organizations.\(^{54}\)

Then a surprising development occurred when a joint communique, signed by Yong Chu Kim, Director of the Organization Bureau of the Korean Worker's Party, was announced in early 1972. According to the communique, there were seven points of agreement reached between North and South Korea: (1) reunification must be based on three principles, independence from and non-interference by outside forces, peaceful means to achieve unification, and acknowledgement that national unity transcended ideological and system differences; (2) disavowal of propaganda or armed provocations against each other; (3) various exchanges in many fields; (4) support for the Red Cross talks; (5) establishment of a direct telephone line between Seoul and Pyongyang; (6) establishment of a South North Coordinating Committee; and (7) a solemn pledge to carry out the agreement faithfully.\(^{55}\) Unfortunately, and contrary to the great expectations of the Korean people which stemmed from the surprise announcement, the political talks between South and North Korea were eventually deadlocked.\(^{56}\)

While a stalemate of the meetings of the Committee persisted, North Korean maneuvers for unification were continuing. Kim Il Sung made a speech in Pyongyang on June 23, 1973 regarding Korean unification. He made the following suggestions:

1. Remove the state of military confrontation and ease tension between the North and the South.

2. Realize many-sided collaboration and interchange between the North and the South in all the political, military, diplomatic, economic and cultural fields.

3. Invite the broad sections of people of all strata in the North and the South to participate in the nation-wide patriotic work for national reunification.

\(^{54}\) Hankuk Ilbo (July 4, 1972).


\(^{56}\) See Journal of Korean Affairs (October, 1973), pp. 52-54.
4. Institute a North-South confederation under the single name of the state.

5. The North and the South should advance jointly in the field of foreign relations.\footnote{57}

North Korean Foreign Minister, Ho Dam, offered the following unification plan at the Fifth Supreme People’s Assembly on March 22, 1974:

1. Both sides shall pledge to each other not to invade the other side.

2. The two sides shall discontinue arms reinforcement.

3. The foreign troops should be withdrawn at the earliest possible date.

4. Korea shall not be made a military base of any foreign country.\footnote{58}

An analysis of the unification policy position from 1966 to 1976 evidences, at least on the surface, that North Korea had pursued a position similar to that of previous periods. It repeatedly offered a measure of peaceful unification. It also demanded an immediate withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea. North Korea continuously proposed the confederation scheme. It also offered the mutual exchange of various fields in order to create a conducive condition for the eventual unification. A careful analysis of North Korean behavior, however, reveals a remarkable departure in a number of aspects from previous periods of unification strategy. First, North Korean hostility toward the South was increasingly virulent. There were increased North Korean violations in the DMZ. The number of North Korean provocations in the DMZ in 1967 was reported to be ten times that reported in the previous year. In that year, there were 423 major incidents and 117 minor incidents involving North Korean intruders in the DMZ.\footnote{59} The North Korean violations of the armistice, furthermore, drastically increased up to 1975.\footnote{60}

\footnote{57. The \textit{Pyongyang Times} (March 30, 1974).
60. For an account of all these incidents, see \textit{Donga Ilbo} (June 24, 1970).}
Second, North Korea attempted massive infiltration into South Korea. North Korea sent large numbers of secret agents and guerrilla units into South Korea. For example, in 1967 alone, there were 215 armed clashes between North Korean infiltrators and South Korean authorities. From the beginning of 1966, there were a number of major incidents reported in South Korean territory. North Korea killed four South Korean seamen, and kidnapped their ship on January 26, 1966. It also sank a South Korean naval ship and wounded forty crew members on January 19, 1967. Then, on January 21, 1968, the famous North Korean commando incident occurred in South Korea. A North Korean commando unit composed of 24 men came within a mile of the presidential mansion in Seoul with the mission of assassinating South Korean President Chung Hee Park. After a violent armed clash with the South Korean authorities, twenty-one of the commandos were killed, one was captured, and two fled to the North. Furthermore, in the same month, North Korea kidnapped the U.S.S. Pueblo and its crew. On September 17, 1969, North Korean infiltrators again killed seven South Korean including two policemen and five civilians near a small island called Wando. On December 11th of the same year, a South Korean airline jet was hijacked to the North. A South Korean naval communication ship and its entire crew were forced to sail to North Korea on June 5, 1970. Those are merely a few examples of North Korean attempts to infiltrate South Korea. This type of North Korean tactical infiltration continued, while the North-South Korean talks were being held. One of the most dramatic incidents occurred on March 19, 1975. On that day, the U.N. Command in South Korea revealed that a second underground tunnel had been constructed by North Korea. According to military sources in South Korea, not only motor vehicles but also certain types of field-artillery weapons could have passed through this tunnel. The tunnel was apparently intended for a large-scale infiltration of North Korean manpower into the South.

Third, North Korea apparently attempted to rebuild en masse the underground organization in South Korea. North Korean leaders perceived, in particular, that the underground organization had to find a way to participate legitimately in the South.

Korean political process. By doing so, North Korea could cultivate the elements of the anti-government movements in the South. In this regard, North Korea invested a great deal of money which was smuggled into the South, and eventually rerouted into a legitimate channel of political activity. One of the organizations which eventually surfaced was the famous Tonghyok Tang (Revolutarian Unification Party). This was a front organization of several underground groups. The Tonghyok Tang, however, was dismantled by the South Korean authorities in 1968. There had reportedly been a number of cases of North Korean attempts to infiltrate legitimate political activities in South Korea during this period. Fourth, while North Korea carried out various tactics already mentioned, it also accelerated a peace offensive abroad. It was an attempt to cultivate international opinions in favor of North Korean positions. The offensive had two major targets, one being the third world countries which could help the North in the U.N., and the other being the American public. As various data indicates, in this period North Korea expanded enormously its overseas missions, particularly in Africa and to a lesser extent in Latin America. Despite the financial burdens, the North Korean campaign to picture itself as a peace-loving country was very extensive throughout the world. Particularly, the campaign to influence the American public was rather extensive. North Korea purchased expensive full-page advertisements in prominent newspapers such as *The New York Times* and the *Washington Post*.

Through a brief analysis, a few characteristics of North Korean unification strategies can be observed in this period. One characteristic can be called the “hit and run” strategy. This was an attempt to scare the South Korean public by utilizing various tactics, while simultaneously proposing peace initiatives. It was a strategy designed to create a psychological disorder in the South. Its aim was to create a public panic which would lead to the instability of the South Korean economic structure. This strategy, if successful, would also have had a discouraging impact on the investment of foreign capital in South Korea. North Korea clearly wanted to weaken the internal solidarity of South Korea. If this strategy succeeded, it would have been easy for North Korea to carry out guerrilla warfare, or possibly even limited strategic warfare. Another element of strategy was to cultivate international opinion so that it could force the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the Korean peninsula. In this strategy North Korea also appealed to the American people by reminding them that it was
not in their interests for the U.S. government to make such a strong commitment to South Korea. It also reminded Americans that the U.S. government would have to negotiate directly with North Korea about problems concerning the division of the Korean Peninsula. North Korea was clearly sending a message to the United States that there was room for a negotiated settlement of Korean problems. All of these tactics remarkably resemble in many respects the successful unification efforts of the North Vietnamese.

Why did North Korea develop such a multifaceted strategy to unify Korea? The first factor is related to South Korean economic development. As previously indicated, the economy had been always a troublesome problem to the South Korean government. Chronic underemployment and unemployment, continuing inflation, sagging industrial outputs, and so forth had increased societal discontentment and further alienated the people from their government. This economic difficulty of South Korea provided a fertile climate for North Korean peaceful unification offenses. In fact, North Korea repeatedly made known that it would accept South Korean unemployed workers for employment in the North. Thus North Korea perceived that economic troubles might well be a factor to generate a revolution in South Korea.

This economic situation, however, was drastically beginning to change. South Korean GNP grew at an average rate of about 10 percent per annum between 1962 and 1976. Furthermore, despite the energy crisis, during the first two years of the Third Five-Year Plan (1972-76), the real growth of the GNP has averaged 11.6 percent per annum. Even foreign exports increased from $54.8 million in 1962 to $3,220.6 million in 1973. Because of new industrial outputs, unemployment also substantially declined. The increased export earnings also improved the South Korean balance of payments. Even rice and barley production had increased more than 50 percent, eventually making South Korea self-sufficient in these essential grains. Although, as pointed out by David Cole and Princeton Lyman, there were some "structural

distortions emerging in the economy," the remarkable developments of various sectors of the economy substantially improved the quality of life in South Korea. This in turn helped Koreans to gradually have confidence in the political system. Such economic improvement was an unwelcoming situation to North Korean unification strategists. Furthermore, in comparison to the South, the North Korean economy was beginning to slow down in this period. This slowdown of the economy, the expense of the expansion of the propaganda campaigns abroad, and military expenditures created financial difficulties for the North Korean government. Financial problems also weakened north Korean propaganda purposes in the South. Many South Koreans did in fact favorably view the North Korean economic capacity. This favorable view, however, could no longer be sustained. In this regard, as Professor Sang-Wood Lee points out, in economic terms time was working in favor of South Korea.

Second, the rapidly developing relationship between the South Korean and Japanese governments was also an important factor affecting North Korean strategy. This newly developing relationship was a matter of great concern to North Korea. Although there were stormy conflicts over the issue of Japanese-Korean rapprochement in South Korea, the political leadership was eventually successful in concluding a settlement in 1966. This was a grave matter to the North because of the fact that the South Korean economy could develop its strength through dependence on Japan's powerful resources. Indeed, since the normalization treaty Japanese capital and technology has poured into the Korean economy. Japanese investment in Korea exceeded for the first time that of the U.S. in 1969. This success of Japanese investment stimulated other foreign countries to invest their capital in South Korea. Furthermore, tactically, North Korea had expected that economic discontent would eventually erupt into violence in South Korea. This in turn could provide an opportunity for North Korea to persuade the South Korean public to generate a "people's revolution." To some degree, Japanese-Korean economic cooperation helped to reduce the chance of "the people's revolution" strategy. Moreover, this economic cooperation eventually

consolidated the political tie between these two countries, in turn enhancing the security interests of Japan and the U.S. in South Korea. Therefore, as a host of North Korean publications show, North Korea, time after time, criticized activities of Japan in South Korea as a new "Japanese militarism." Kim made it quite clear that "the U.S. imperialists are making preparations for the formation of the so-called Pacific Alliance in the Far East. This is to rearm the Japanese imperialists and utilize them as a shock-brigade for an aggressive war against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea." 67 This statement clearly showed the extent of North Korean uneasiness about the relationship between South Korea and Japan.

Third, the U.S. involvement in the Vietnam conflict became a contributing factor affecting the strategy. The Vietnam conflict was the longest and most expensive war that the U.S. has ever engaged in. The war caused a societal division which in turn led to a lack of consensus in foreign policy direction. This conflict and the Cambodian invasion eventually weakened the executive power of the U.S. government. North Korea correctly perceived that lack of support for the war among the American people forced the U.S. government to withdraw from Vietnam. This withdrawal created skepticism about the U.S. capacity and willingness to protect any of its allies, including South Korea. North Korea was also beginning to sense that even if several political elites wanted to protect South Korea, there was no assurance of getting protection from the U.S. government. This erosion of confidence during the war years rapidly increased during the postwar Watergate scandal in the U.S. Furthermore, North Korea saw the liberalizing effect of American people on Communist political systems and perceived that the American public increasingly became involved in politicized foreign policy issues.

Capitalizing on this situation, Kim Il Sung made it quite clear as early as 1970 that "the peaceful unification of the country is utterly unthinkable so long as the U.S. imperialist aggression army and the present puppets are left alone in South Korea." 68

68. Ibid., p. 117.
Sensing the impatience of the American public, Kim made the following suggestion:

A powerful anti-war movement should be waged on a worldwide scale first of all against U.S. imperialism's criminal aggression on Vietnam, and all the anti-imperialist forces should tender more positive support to the people of Indochina and other people of fighting countries. Meanwhile, all the peace-loving countries and progressive peoples of the world should fight more resolutely against the aggressive maneuvers of the U.S. imperialists in the divided countries.69

Then Kim Il Sung made a speech at a Pyongyang mass rally on March 4, 1974, stating that "those who love the country and the nation should not tolerate the machinations of the U.S. and Japanese reactionaries to convert South Korea into a permanent colony, but compel the U.S. troops to get out of South Korea, thwart the Japanese militarists' invasion, and actively turn out to build a sovereign, reunified and independent Korea.70 Furthermore, Kim made it quite clear that "the U.S. imperialists (have) started going downhill . . . (citing) repeated setbacks in their aggressive wars in Indochina, and their hostile policy towards China (which) has gone bankrupt. Nowadays the U.S. imperialists are again being dealt fatal blows and are sliding into an inextricable quagmire of ruin in Indochina."71

Perceiving the weakened morale of the American public due to the Vietnam War, North Korea attempted to remind Americans that on the one hand the Korean peninsula was not worth armed involvement in Asia and, on the other hand, the U.S. would have to deal with North Korea directly in order to find a peaceful settlement allowing American withdrawal from the peninsula. In this regard Kim repeatedly signaled to the U.S. that North Korea was willing to negotiate with the U.S. by making such statements as the one made on October 9, 1975. Kim said, "We insist that a peace agreement be signed between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States to eliminate the danger

70. Ibid., p. 179.
71. Ibid., p. 213.
of another war and guarantee a durable peace in Korea." This was clearly an attempt on the part of the North to deal directly with the U.S., bypassing South Korea in the negotiations process. Kim perceived that one effective way to get the U.S. to the negotiation table was to create continuous instability on the Korean Peninsula while proclaiming his role as a peace maker. In this regard, North Korean Supreme People's Assembly even sent a letter to the U.S. Congress to "create favorable conditions to eliminate tension in Korea" in 1972. This was similar to the North Vietnamese strategy during the conflict.

The fourth factor shaping the strategy of North Korea involved the political situation in South Korea. As already discussed the South Korean economy was booming. Political conditions, however, were not very conducive to stability. Since 1963, when Park barely managed to win election by a plurality of 42.6 percent, political instability was rife. Many social scandals continuously added to societal discontent which eventually led to criticism of Park's political leadership in the news media. To suppress his critics Park's government passed the "Press Ethics Law." Although the President again managed to win the 1967 election, political discontentment continued. Then South Koreans had to endure an unpopular referendum which permitted President Park to remain in office for a third term in 1971. Then the famous revitalization constitution (Yushin Hon-pub) was passed to maintain President Park in power indefinitely. With these political fluctuations the news media increased its criticism of the government and in return the Government suppressed newspapers. College campuses also became restless and frequently were forced to close their doors. To eliminate this problem the Government adopted a new tenure system for college teachers which resulted in the ousting of more than 400 professors from their posts.

North Korea apparently attempted to derive benefit from this situation in South Korea. Kim made it known that "if revolution takes place in south Korea we as one and the same nation will not just stand by with arms folded but will strongly support the South

73. Ibid., p. 182.
Korean people.”

The following speech was made by Kim on January 2, 1972:

The South Korean puppet cliques have lapsed into a serious political and economic crisis past recovery and this gives them an ever-growing unrest and despair. Though they are trying to find a way out of the blind alley by means of proclaiming the so-called state of emergency and starting a new fascist tyranny, this is no more than the death-bed struggle of the doomed.

Kim boasted that “the South Korean people are waging a staunch struggle to overthrow the military fascist dictatorship.” Kim also confidently stated that, “alarmed by a situation which is developing more and more in favor of the revolution as the days go by, the puppet clique of South Korea clings as always to the coattails of the U.S. imperialists.” Perceiving Park’s difficulty in South Korea Kim laid out a strategy for the opposition by stating:

The South Korean revolutionaries should strive to expand and strengthen the party forces in all places where there are workers, peasants and other revolutionary masses and root themselves deeply in the masses. To expand and consolidate the mass foundation of the Party it is necessary to continue to set up mass organization in various forms among the toiling people and solidify them.

Affected by and utilizing these various factors, North Korea carried out the unification by Vietnamization strategy in this period.

6. A Strategy of Peace Offense, 1977 to the Present

The sixth stage of transformation of the strategy can be detected from the year of 1977. During this period in terms of the official line of the unification policy there is no significant difference from the previous policy position. North Korea, as can be seen in a host of Nodong Shinmun editorials and other publications, repeated previous policy statements such as foreign

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74. Ibid., p. 88.
75. Ibid., p. 84.
troop withdrawal from South Korea, North-South confederation, and mutual exchange of various fields. It also repeatedly offered a measure of peaceful unification. A careful observation of North Korea behavior, however, reveals a somewhat different behavioral pattern. First, North Korean hostility toward the South, compared with the previous period, was gradually modifying. Even North Korean violations in the DMZ have become less frequent in 1977 and 1978. Although North Korean virulent verbal attacks on South Korea and its leadership still exist, its violations of the armistice and its attempt to infiltrate into South Korea have been somewhat reduced from 1977. Second, as Japanese Foreign Minister Sonoda observed, North Korea's stiff attitude toward other countries, notably toward Japan and the United States, has been substantially modified. North Korea has so far been more actively engaging in a peace offense, particularly abroad, while reducing its hostile attitude toward South Korea.

What is the implication of this attitude? Perhaps sufficient time has not yet lapsed to observe more clearly the characteristics of North Korean unification strategy. There are, however, a few tentative conclusions that can be drawn from available data. First, North Korea's peace offense strategy is related with its domestic situation. One of the domestic factors involved is the economic problem in North Korea. Pyongyang Times, Nodong Shinmun, and many other publications reported an economic setback of North Korea. Lack of a proper transportation system to keep up industrial growth, a serious shortage of electric power, lagging agricultural production, and a soaring trade deficit are well reported. In this context, North Korea launched a new ambitious Seven-Year Plan (1978-1984) to improve the economic condition. Furthermore, North Korea has had a consistent problem with its international payments. North Korea apparently defaulted on its payment to Japan and other countries. This in turn created a poor image of North Korea in the international credit market. Thus, North Korea needed time for domestic adjustment. The recent cabinet reshuffle in North Korea was an attempt to restore the economic capacity. The promotion of Yi Chong Ok from head of the Heavy Industry to Premier shows to many Korean observers the seriousness of North Korean attempts to build its economy. The new Premier, Yi, announced that by

77. Donga Ilbo (January 22, 1978).
1984 North Korea would increase electric power to 56,000–60,000 megawatts annually and coal production to 7.4–8 million tons annually. Many experts feel, however, that in order to achieve these goals North Korea needs substantial help from other countries.\(^79\)

The other domestic factor is political leadership. Korean observers have widely speculated upon the successor to Kim Il Sung for the last several years. One speculation revolves around the idea that Kim Il Sung’s oldest son, Kim Chong Il, has consolidated his leadership position by eliminating his uncle, Kim Young Ju, from the leadership contention.\(^80\) Some disagree arguing that Kim Chong Il was deeply involved with the sloppy execution of the Six-Year Plan. He was also at the forefront of the so-called Three Great Revolutions, namely of thought, technology and culture, a somewhat similar movement to the Cultural Revolution in China. This in turn created many criticisms of his political style. Perhaps it is sometimes required to surface the truth of the internal story. It is, however, apparent that there is uncertainty, perhaps even conflict, over the succession of aging President Kim Il Sung in North Korea. At this juncture North Korea apparently attempts to avoid any serious external provocation.

Second, the peace offense strategy is an outcome of North Korea’s attempts to deal with a newly emerging external situation in South Korea. The Vietnamization policy of North Korea, instead of creating social disorder, consolidated South Koreans. South Koreans are united in their fear of continuous North Korean provocations. This has had a dysfunctional effect on North Korean strategy. Furthermore, the U.S. troop withdrawal plan has added to President Park’s political strength in South Korea.\(^81\) In this context South Korea’s government is anxious to develop its own military capacity to balance North Korea’s superior capability. The implication is that should North Korea push too far South Korea might attempt to develop an independent nuclear force. Kim Il Sung of North Korea expressed this fear by stating that “to achieve the independent and peaceful

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80. See The Donga Ilbo (February 25, 1977).
reunification of the fatherland, it is imperative to ease tensions between the North and the South and to remove the danger of nuclear war.\textsuperscript{82} In this regard, Kim Il Sung made it quite clear that “we (North Koreans) have no intention of arming ourselves with nuclear weapons.”\textsuperscript{83}

North Korea’s appeasement attitude is also a reflection of the North Korean effort to avoid jeopardizing U.S. ground troop withdrawal from South Korea. As already discussed, North Korea repeatedly demanded U.S. troop withdrawal from the Korean Peninsula in order to achieve a peaceful unification of Korea. While the U.S. decision is less than North Korea hoped to achieve, North Korea recognizes that President Carter’s decision created a measure of displeasure in the United States. Therefore, any serious provocation from North Korea might well bring a set-back of the troop withdrawal plan. In this regard the strategy of peace offense is a logical outgrowth of internal and external circumstances.

North Korean Unification Strategy since 1948 can be divided into six distinct stages:

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<tr>
<th>Time Period</th>
<th>Unification Strategy</th>
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<tr>
<td>First Stage</td>
<td>1948-1953 Massive War</td>
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<tr>
<td>Second Stage</td>
<td>1954-1956 Peaceful Coexistence</td>
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<tr>
<td>Third Stage</td>
<td>1957-1960 Peaceful Unification</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fourth Stage</td>
<td>1961-1965 People’s Democratic Revolution</td>
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<td>Fifth Stage</td>
<td>1966-1976 Vietnamization</td>
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<td>Sixth Stage</td>
<td>1977— Peaceful Offense</td>
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As the summary of North Korean unification strategy shows, North Korea has changed its unification strategy several times; from massive war strategy to that of peaceful coexistence, from coexistence to peaceful unification strategy followed by a strategy of People’s Revolution, and then from the strategy of People’s Revolution to Vietnamization. This fluctuation of strategy very often occurred due to the deliberated will of the leadership of North Korea. Changes in strategy, however, have frequently been

\textsuperscript{83} Kim Il Sung, \textit{For the Independent Peaceful Unification of Korea}, op. cit., p. 233.
forced upon the North Korean leadership by various uncontrollable external factors such as the international environment. Furthermore, even North Korean internal matters have frequently forced the North Korean leadership to shift its strategy regarding unification. In this regard, while unification will remain one of the highest national goals for all Koreans, North Korean unification strategy will continue to be constantly in motion as national pride, political self-interest, domestic priorities and international events compete with or complement each other.
PART II: UNIFICATION POLICY OF SOUTH KOREA


On July 27, 1953, the Armistice Agreement was signed which stipulated that “the peaceful settlement of the Korean question” be arranged in the near future. Unfortunately, the failure at Panmunjom to arrange a high-level political conference led to the Berlin Conference. On February 18, 1954, at the Berlin Conference, an agreement was reached to call the Geneva Conference for the purpose of arriving at a peaceful settlement of the Korean question.” At this conference, Foreign Minister Pyon Young Tae of South Korea proposed a unification plan:

1. Free elections shall be held under United Nations supervision.
2. The free elections shall be held in North Korea, in accordance with the constitutional processes of the Republic of Korea (South Korea).
3. The U.N. personnel connected with the supervision of the elections shall enjoy full freedom.
4. The all-Korean legislature shall be convened in Seoul immediately after the elections.
5. The existing Constitution of the Republic of Korea shall remain in force.

Throughout the Conference, South Korea persistently demanded that certain requirements be met for a Korean settlement. They were, first, the authority and competence of the United Nations to deal with Korea must be recognized; second, Communist Chinese forces must be withdrawn before the election; third, free elections, with proportionate representation based on the population, should be held; and, finally, U.N. forces should remain in Korea until the mission of the United Nations had been accomplished by the creation of “a unified, independent, and democratic Korea.”

This policy of South Korea was consistently upheld. Then at the Eighth National Convention of the ruling Liberal Party on

84. See the State Department, Bulletin (March 1, 1954), pp. 317–318.
March 28, 1957, Rhee’s Liberal Party adopted an official policy for reunification. Again, it claimed that only the Chinese Army must be withdrawn from North Korea. After complying with this condition, only North Korea should hold a free election under the supervision of the U.N. The South Korean National Assembly, which was dominated by the Liberal Party, passed a resolution calling for the withdrawal of the Chinese Army. Furthermore, this resolution demanded that South Korea alone must be accepted in the United Nations, and free elections should be held only within the North Korean areas under the supervision of the U.N.

This was a quite intransigent policy. This attitude of the ruling party was most widespread in 1959, prior to the national election to be held March 15, 1960. The Liberal Party campaigned under the platform of “march to the North.” The Liberal Party declared that reunification must be achieved by invading North Korea, and suggested in October, 1959, three different possible alternatives: First, marching to the North with the cooperation of the U.N.; second, initiating a massive military campaign with the cooperation of the U.S. Army; and third, marching the South Korean Army alone into the North. These unrealistic alternatives of the Liberal Party were characteristic of the unification policy of South Korea under the First Republic.

The question remains, why had the First Republic of South Korea taken such an intransigent unification policy position? There were several factors which contributed to such a hardline policy posture. First, the societal history was a major contributing factor to South Korea’s unification policy. The South Korean intransigent attitude toward North Korea was due to the experience the society as a whole had had in the past. After the liberation from Japan, South Korea was plunged into a conflict that was tantamount to war between rightists and leftists. The domestic conflict between rightists and the leftists, deliberately acerbated and manipulated by Communists, was so widespread that it encompassed labor unions, the military establishments, journalists, and even the high school and university student populations in South Korea.

Probably the most detrimental factor to improving the South Korean attitude was the Korean conflict which lasted three years.

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86. Chosun Ilbo (March 29, 1957).
87. Donga Ilbo (September 11, 1957).
88. See various newspapers, including Seoul Sinmun, Chosun Ilbo, Donga Ilbo, from October 5 to October 19, 1959.
During the three years of fighting, millions of Koreans suffered and thousands of families were dislocated. In Kyung Cho Chung's assessment the Korean War became a political and a psychological symbol to the people of South Korea. The war resulted in more than a million South Korean deaths. During the conflict, South Korea moved its capital to three different places, and many Koreans experienced the tragedy of fratricide. Local Communists severely punished "the element of the right," the rightists in turn took revenge on "the red element." Understandably, South Koreans blamed all of these tragedies on North Korea's attack. As Americans well know from their own history animosity resulting from a civil war heals slowly — the memory of the Korean War remained vividly alive during the late 1950's and early 1960's.

Another social factor to be considered was a growing distrust by South Koreans of the Liberal Party and its politics. With growing disenchantment about existing conditions due to the scarce resources, overpopulation and scandals involving government officials and military personnel, a pervasive mistrust of those wielding power developed. President Rhee's political strength relied greatly on military groups. Many of these military groups were allegedly infected with social corruption. Publicized scandals such as the National Defense Corp's embezzlement of defense funds and the Kochang massacre of many innocent people, made a mockery of Rhee's "democratic" government. Furthermore, Rhee's government was so incensed by his opponents that, as pointed out by Richard Allen, "he (President Rhee) had come increasingly to equate opposition to himself with pro-Communism."

Social discontent continued. Of course by 1957 some of the war damage had been repaired. The economic growth rate had risen. However, the annual growth of per capita real income from 1956 was less than two percent. The rapid increase of population,

90. For the detailed story, see "Minjok Eui Jungun," (Testimony of Nation), Joongang Ilbo (April, 1972).
moreover, virtually nullified all sectors of economic growth. The financial disequilibrium of the government worsened the situation of chronic underemployment and poverty. Adding to this problem policy brutality and the rigging of elections of public offices were widespread. Suppression of the free press hindered various social activities.

Throughout Korean history the ruler's domination over his obedient people characterized the authoritarian nature of Korean politics. After the end of Japanese rule, however, the ideal of liberalism was openly introduced into South Korean society. The great enthusiasm for Western political ideals made virtually every political party adopt the ideal of liberal democracy as the most important fact of the ideological foundation underlying South Korean politics. The political thoughts of Montesquieu and of Locke were taught from middle school to college. The Liberal Party government's policy of dictatorial control of the society was quite contrary to the ideas that many people supported in this period. The gap between ideals and reality was much wider in city areas where people were generally more educated and sophisticated. This caused widespread desertions by intellectual groups from South Korean society.

Under the circumstances of mounting social discontent and intellectual revolt against the existing regime, the National Security Law was introduced and passed December 24, 1958. This law provided for death sentences or heavy prison terms for vague crimes such as disseminating communist propaganda. Under this law anyone who opposed and criticized the Liberal Party's government was guilty of treason. As the government increased its repression of civil liberties the ill will of the people toward the government also increased. To suppress this ill will the government attempted to reinforce pressure on the society. One of the most dramatic incidents was the closing by the government of one of the most popular newspapers, Kyunghyang Shinmun, under the pretext that the paper's employees had helped North Korean spies and had reported false information. After closing down the paper the government threatened the public by stating that "any publications will face the same destiny if they commit such crimes." This was a shocking act to the Korean public. Furthermore, the law which was the instrument of the punishment was temporarily enacted by the American military administration to

suppress local communist activity in South Korea. Thus to the public the legal basis of the punishment was gravely in doubt. This kind of social discontent and the Liberal Party government's action to suppress social dissatisfaction were critical factors in the intransigent behavior with regard to reunification in this period. The government's actions were always justified in terms of national security. This in turn led to an extreme “anti-communist” policy.

The second factor is related to the personalities of South Korean political leaders. The beliefs of South Korean leaders greatly influenced the policy of South Korea. The importance of personality in the decision-making process has been emphasized in political science literature. Professor Ole Holsti finds that “a decision-maker acts upon his image of the situation rather than upon objective reality.” After having done a case study “Why Nations Go To War,” Professor John Stoessinger concludes that the personalities of political leaders have often been a decisive factor. Numerous scholars find a significant correlation between personality and the political decision-making process, for example: Smith, Boulding, Festinger, Singer, Greenstein, de Rivera, and many others. An empirical determination as to what extent such a relationship exists in each case is, of course, a polemical issue. A study of the Korean leadership in this period clearly indicates that the personalities of the leaders strongly affected their anti-Communist attitude. All leaders who had ruled South Korea, notably Syngman Rhee, were staunch “anti-Communists.” South Korean leaders shared a strong belief that Communist leaders cared for nothing but the cause of their revolutionary movement. Thus South Korean leaders had a deep distrust of Korean Communists. This feeling of the leaders is deeply rooted in Korean political history. As early as the 1920's the conflict between President Syngman Rhee of the Korean Provisional Government in Shanghai and its premier Yi Tong-hwi, who was

then representing the Shanghai faction of the Korean Communist movement, was a well-known historical incident.\textsuperscript{96} Even after the liberation from Japan, serious adversity between rightist and leftist leaders never ended in Korea. After the ill-fated attempt of Kim Koo and Kim Kyu Sik to negotiate with North Korean Communists in order to establish a unified national government the skepticism of South Korean leaders toward Korean Communists resulted in stalemating any sort of fruitful negotiations. Furthermore, even until June 25, 1950, when North Korea launched a massive campaign against the South, North Korea was still proposing a peaceful solution for the problem faced by and created by both sides.

These historical experiences actually reinforced the strong belief among South Korean political leaders that Communists are not worthy of trust. All of the South Korean ruling leaders had become fearful and antagonistic against the North Korean Communist regime. Besides the top leaders on the power echelon many secondary leaders, particularly in the military, are people who escaped from North Korea because the North became a Communist regime.\textsuperscript{97} South Korea, of course, had had a number of political leaders, such as Cho Bong Am, Kim Dahl Ho and Chang Kon Sang, who were less susceptible to this fear about Communism. They had never had, however, any opportunity to control the South Korean Government. Thus the image and perceptions South Korean political leaders held concerning Korean Communists affected South Korean unification policy position.

Third, the political factor was also a major force shaping unification policy. This factor includes as components the structural arrangement of a governmental system, the political leadership structure within the government, and the governmental capacity to mobilize political support for its goal. One of the problems that the Rhee government constantly had to face was the absence of the ability to get strong popular support for the ruling government. This, of course, was frequently due to the failure of the government to convince other groups and the general public that it had to remain in power.


\textsuperscript{97} For a detailed account of the North Korean original military group, see Se-Jin Kim, \textit{The Politics of Military Revolution in Korea} (Chapel Hill, N.C.: The University of North Carolina Press, 1971).
From 1950, President Rhee’s support in the National Assembly quickly diminished. Determined to prevent Rhee’s reelection in 1952, the opposing groups in the National Assembly attacked the Rhee Government for various scandals and inefficiencies. In this situation Rhee’s prospects for reelection as the president by the Assembly were ill-regarded. Perceiving this reality Rhee and his group mobilized and used some political groups, such as the National Society and Korean Youth Corps, in ways that were illegal under a democratic constitution. Furthermore, on the pretext of guerrilla activities, martial law was declared. Many of the Assemblymen were arrested on their way to the Assembly Hall. Some of them were court-martialed on charges of communist conspiracy. It was hardly surprising that the Assembly finally adopted the constitutional amendments providing for the popular election of the President and Vice-President.

Then another problem awaited the President. Under the Constitution at that time a third presidential term was prohibited. On August 6, 1954, the Liberal Party introduced a constitutional amendment aimed at deleting the restriction on the President’s serving a third term. Against stormy opposition the ruling party forced through the legislature a bill with a notorious rule known as the rule of “rounding off any fraction under 0.5.” Then the ruling party again passed a bill called the Government Reorganization Bill on February 7, 1955. This bill included provisions, among others, to enable the President to hold office for more than two consecutive four-year terms, to allow the President to appoint all members of the State Council and to abolish the previous right of the Assembly to impeach members of the State Council. These are only a few examples of how the executive interfered in the functioning of the legislature. All of these made Rhee’s government very unpopular. In the 1956 presidential election, in spite of the sudden death of his arch-rival, Shin Ik Hi, Rhee barely managed to win 56 percent of the vote. Even though he was the only major candidate, nearly 1.9 million “invalid” ballots were cast for the dead opposition candidate. Nearly 2.2 million votes were cast for the third party candidate, Cho Bong Am. The Democratic candidate for vice-president, Chang Myon, successfully defeated Rhee’s personal nominee, Lee Ki Boong.

Then as a result of the election of May 2, 1958, the Liberal Party had to face serious opposition to constitutional change in

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the National Assembly. Although the Liberal Party won the election with a majority, it was far from the two-thirds majority needed to pass a constitutional amendment. In dealing with this circumstance the Liberal Party introduced a series of constitutional amendments and the National Security Law. The Democrats perceived the intention of this legislation as a legal device for use in the 1960 presidential elections. They strongly opposed this legislation and finally conducted a week-long "sitdown strike" against the bill in the National Assembly. The Liberal Party called uniformed policemen and carried the resisting members out of the hall and locked them in the basement. While the legality of the Liberal Party's action was in doubt, the Liberal Party Government managed to abolish the autonomy of local government and to establish a "compact rider" for the President and Vice-President.

While conflict between the ruling party and the opposition was at a high point in the National Assembly, the newly emerged Progressive Party was gaining the attention of the public. As indicated, the leader of the Progressive Party, Cho Bong Am, was an arch-rival of Rhee in the 1956 Presidential election, and won almost 2.2 million votes. Cho urged an immediate consideration of peaceful reunification of Korea. Furthermore, the Progressive Party adopted a resolution in November, 1958, calling for peaceful unification.

The Progressive Party's strong stand for peaceful unification provided an ample opportunity for the Rhee Government to intervene and punish its members for public opposition. In 1958 the police arrested most of the Party leaders and charged them with violation of the National Security Law. The charges brought up by the police were (a) that the peaceful unification proposal of the Party was identical with the North Korean proposal and would jeopardize the existence of the Republic; (b) that an article by Cho Bong Am which appeared in the October issue of *Choongang Jungchi* was subversive because it advocated "all-Korean elections as a means for unification;" (c) that Cho Bong Am illegally possessed weapons and secret documents, including a copy of a letter written to Kim Il Sung; and (d) that Cho received

forty million *hwan* from North Korea for his presidential campaign funds.\textsuperscript{101}

The massive police arrests occurred four months before the National Assembly elections of 1958. Furthermore, the evidence brought by the police to indict members of the Progressive Party was unverifiable. Some of it was highly circumstantial.\textsuperscript{102} Indirectly it signaled that the Liberal Party intended to punish any opponents. With this, Rhee's Government made it clear again that "unification through a march toward the North" must be the only policy for South Korea. The court finally sentenced Cho Bong Am to death and outlawed the Progressive Party.

The interlocking relationship between the Liberal Party and governmental organization became so pervasive that the ruling party was involved in every aspect of governmental organization. The party's oppression of civil liberties was almost unbearable to many Koreans. One Korean scholar called it "a privileged class," not a political party.\textsuperscript{103} The interlocking relationship involved even the military organization in South Korea. After the removal of the insubordinant General Yi Chong Chan from the post of Army Chief of Staff, "those whom Rhee could not control completely were never again appointed to any of the key military positions."\textsuperscript{104} Ever since then a strong tie between the military and the Liberal Party developed. Furthermore, the increasing number of military personnel reached almost 600,000 in 1956. North Korea's peaceful unification proposal was based on a presupposition that the size of the military would be reduced to about 100,000 men. This was unacceptable to the South Korean Army. Thus many South Korean military leaders pledged blind loyalty to the rightist President Rhee. Under these circumstances, perhaps the only legitimacy the Liberal Party Government had came from its claim that President Rhee and his Government were champions of "the anti-Communist" movement. Under this banner, the ruling government contended that "anyone against us is a Communist."

The fourth factor was attributable to the external environment of South Korea. South Korea was a highly penetrated

\textsuperscript{101} The *Voice of Korea* (July 3, 1958).
\textsuperscript{103} Yi Chong Kyuk, "Jayiou Tang" (The Liberal Party), *Sasang Ge* (February, 1956), p. 249.
\textsuperscript{104} Se-Jin Kim, *op. cit.*, p. 52.
system, particularly by the U.S. Thus South Korea's intransigency was in large measure due to, and successful because of, its influence on U.S. Cold War policy. The U.S. policies, Truman's containment, and Dulles' rollback and massive retaliation policy, were based upon a predisposition toward certain ways and means of thwarting Communist expansion. The fall of Chiang's China to communist forces and the Indochina and Korean War aroused criticisms of Truman's containment policy in the United States. Dulles stressed that the American foreign policy objective "should not be to coexist indefinitely with the Communist menace, it should be to eliminate that menace." Dulles' statement of offensive strategy was called the new look "that depends primarily upon a great capacity to retaliate, instantly, by means and at places of our choosing." Thus it was stated that the policy was to permit "selection of military means instead of a multiplication of means." All of these policies provided a moral and psychological boost and "referential point" to the rightists in South Korea. The policy of stressing the United Nations as the means through which Korean unification was to be achieved also coincided with U.S. strategy to use the international organization as a means of achieving its policy objectives. This confluence of policy objectives between the two countries became an important factor influencing the South Korean unification policy position. Thus, this condition helped Rhee's government to establish an aura of legitimacy as the "Champion of 'anti-Communism'."

2. The Second Republic's Unification Policy, 1960-1961

As a new decade began a great internal political transformation occurred in South Korea. The Liberal Party Government was finally crippled by the student uprising of April 19, 1960. The Democratic Party, which became the ruling party of the Second Republic, proposed a general policy line for reunifications on July 26 before the national election of July 29, 1960. The policy stated:

1. A peaceful and democratic unification supervised by the United Nations must be achieved by free national elections in North and South Korea.

106. Ibid., p. 107.
2. The composition of the supervisory body for the election will be decided by the resolution of the U.N. The members of the body should be selected from those U.N. member nations which have held free elections.

3. The proposal to establish a unified committee of South and North Korea before the all-Korean election violates the U.N. resolution that the Republic of Korea is the sole legitimate government of Korea, and therefore the proposal cannot be accepted.

4. Since there is no guarantee that the Communist conspiracy to destroy the Republic of Korea will be stopped, cultural and economic exchanges before the reunification is achieved should be refused.

5. The unified Korea should be a state which preserves democracy and free civil rights. Therefore, neither a "red dictatorship," nor a "white dictatorship" can be accepted.107

The Foreign Minister of the Second Republic, Chung Il Hyong, issued a statement on August 24, 1960 that "the unification by military means as advocated by the Liberal Party Government in the past is so thoughtless that such a policy must be renounced."108 Prime Minister Chang Myon also made known his view on unification policy in a speech concerning administrative policies presented in the National Assembly on August 29, 1960. According to the speech, "a democratic and peaceful unification must materialize under the principle designated by the United Nations."109 To achieve unification the Prime Minister suggested a national election throughout South and North Korea under the supervision of the United Nations. The Fifth National Assembly under the Second Republic passed a resolution concerning a Korean unification plan on November 2, 1960. The resolution stated that "after the measure to guarantee a perpetual and solid national security and people's freedom is enacted according to the U.N. principles, then national elections will be held on the basis of the population ratio under the procedure

provided by the Republic of Korea's constitution effected under the supervision of the U.N.”

At this point in our investigation of the unification proposals it seems clear that the position taken by the Chang Myon Government was somewhat different from the position of the previous regime. For one thing, the policy of the “March to North” was entirely renounced as an official policy of the Second Republic. Second, an important change to note is that the idea of peaceful unification emerged as a legitimate policy. Compared with the official line of the Rhee Government this was a quite drastic change of attitude toward unification policy. Furthermore, the First Republic's political assertion that the election must be held only within North Korea was entirely dropped from the governmental position. Instead, a proposal for simultaneous national elections throughout North and South Korea was incorporated into the policy line.

To all appearances, at least superficially, the Chang Myon Government was willing to peacefully settle the Korean division with North Korea. Careful analysis discloses, however, that Chang's proposal was not a drastic demarche from the policy of the First Republic. Some of the conditions suggested by the South Korean Government were utterly unacceptable to North Korea. Chang's insistence on the U.N. as the sole authoritative supervisory body for the national election was merely a reiteration of the position upheld by the previous government. Considering the fact that North Korea fought against U.N. forces, North Korea could not accept the U.N. as a disinterested neutral party to supervise national elections for reunification. This was understood by the First Republic and was utilized by the Rhee Government to counter North Korean propaganda. Reappearance of the demand that national elections be held under “the procedures of the South Korean constitution” was also similar to the position of the previous government. Despite the fact that the official attitude toward peaceful unification had perceptably changed, the policy of the Second Republic preserved many elements of its predecessor's policy. Thus, while the intransigent and hostile behavior of the Liberal Party Government was publicly denounced, Chang's Government attempted to preserve the status quo of unification politics.

There remains a question: why had the Second Republic of South Korea taken such a position? There were a number of factors affecting the unification position of South Korea. First, the social factor was important. This factor was due in part to the student uprising of April 19, 1960, which led to the crippling of the First Republic. The student revolution made a great impact on the Second Republic, even though it was not motivated by support for Chang Myon's political party. Thus Chang's subsequent opportunity to run the Second Republic was not earned through a political struggle against the Rhee Government, but rather was the result of unexpected circumstances. The student uprising heralded many emerging social problems.

After Chang Myon assumed the political leadership on August 23, 1960, he encountered troubles from several different directions. Frequent public demonstrations, particularly by students, were a very difficult problem confronting Chang Myon. These demonstrations had a great dysfunctional effect on the ruling leadership. After two generations of suppression, the sudden discovery of "public opinion" created the widespread impression that any objective could be achieved by demonstrations. This illusion brought people into the streets on every conceivable issue. It is estimated that there were about 2,000 demonstrations during the one-year period.

Student demonstrations were among the most vocal expressions of public opinion. Numbers of students actively engaged in demanding various commitments from the government which ranged from purging some university professors to removing a number of government officials. On one occasion a group of students occupied the National Assembly and demanded the enactment of a harsh law against several former government functionaries with strong connections to the Liberal Party. Even Prime Minister Chang was frequently forced to "listen to the harangue of the leaders of the students, who were by now called the fourth branch of the Chang regime."

One of the most serious developments was the sudden vocal demand for national unification initiated by students and late

echoed by some adult groups. On November 2, 1960, a group called the Minjok Tongil Yonmaeng (National Students Federation for National Unification) demanded that Prime Minister Chang visit the U.S. and the Soviet Union to discuss Korean unification.\textsuperscript{114} The Mintong Central Committee made other demands, such as exchanging mail between the South and the North, economic transactions, exchanging news reporters and the organization of unified sports teams for participation in international Olympic Games.\textsuperscript{115} A group of Seoul National University students demanded the convening of a South-North Korean student conference, the exchange of student reporters, the opening of a dialogue among academies on both sides, the creation of a South-North Korean students' good will athletic convention and the end of political interference in students' activities.\textsuperscript{116}

This highly vocal and growing agitation by students stirred the nervous social climate. Antagonism between rightists and leftists made Koreans of any prominence abnormally sensitive to the possibility of danger from the left.\textsuperscript{117} Though the Mintong took a strong stance for Korean Nationalism, its action was alarming to conservatives, particularly to many military officers. Those who feared Communist penetration of the student movement could hardly help noticing three things: that it was drawing financial support from Japan; the criticism of the United States structured in terms of Communist theory was often incorporated into discussions of unification; and that many of the slogans were surprisingly similar to those used by Radio Pyongyang in North Korea and Communist groups elsewhere.\textsuperscript{118}

A group of students whose leaders advocated peaceful unification were trying to arrange a debate with North Korean students at Panmunjom. This condition, particularly shocking to conservatives and a number of army officers, provoked some strong voices who urged that these excessive enjoyments of freedom be curbed by the government before they got out of hand.

\textsuperscript{114} Donga Ilbo (November 1, 1960).
\textsuperscript{115} Donga Ilbo (February 29, 1961).
\textsuperscript{116} Chosun Ilbo (May 4, 1961).
\textsuperscript{118} Stephen Bradmer, loc. cit., p. 414.
Outrageously irresponsible journalism was another social problem that the Chang Myon government had to face in South Korea. Under Chang's government, the Korean people enjoyed more freedom than in any other period of Korean history. Unfortunately, this almost unlimited freedom tended to be abused and was carried to extremes by the press. The amended constitution made it difficult for the government to regulate the mushrooming press by statute, and the number of newspapers and periodicals jumped suddenly from about 600 to nearly 1,600 by April 1961. Few of the new publications had printing facilities, and some had no fixed place of business. Their principal, and in some cases their only, business was blackmail. Some of these newspapers took advantage of the situation and openly urged a swift reunification, while others reported students' demands in a highly exaggerated fashion. Gregory Henderson summed it up very well:

Almost all tried to make money by purveying sensational and often inaccurate information . . . some money supporting a very few publications with a slightly leftist editorial line was beginning to creep in from Communist-controlled sources in Japan. Leftist or not, almost no newspapers had any thoughtful regard or sympathy for the problems the Chang regime was struggling to solve in a democratic framework.120

This irresponsible journalism made it highly difficult for Chang's Government to decide public policy. A highly sensitive issue such as unification policy was well publicized, exaggerated, and very often manipulated by various newspapers and this, in turn, nurtured public pressure on the government to take a stand. The critical press, however, did not offer any clear line of direction for unification.

Second, political factors were also critical of the Second Republic's preservative policy toward unification. One of the political factors was related to the structural rearrangement of the political system. Under the First Republic, the characteristics of the presidential system prevailed. The presidential system was transformed into a parliamentary system under the Second republic, primarily to weaken executive power. Many South

Koreans thought that the main reason for Rhee's dictatorship was the unusually strong executive structure in relation to the legislature. In this regard, on June 14, the interim government of Hehr Chung promulgated constitutional amendments weakening the power of the executive. Thus the National Assembly was strengthened and expanded to 233 members for the lower house, and 158 for the new upper house.

This substantial shift of power from the executive to the legislative exacerbated the chronic problem of factional conflicts in the National Assembly. This, in turn, damaged Chang Myon's political leadership in performing governmental functions. Historically, factional conflict was characteristic of Korean politics and the overwhelming election victory of the Democratic Party intensified the factional conflict between the Old and the New factions and between senior and junior factions. To meet various demands from different factions and groups, Prime Minister Chang reshuffled his cabinet three times in less than nine months. The average tenure of ministers under Chang was only six months, and particularly of home ministers, who controlled the national policy force, less than two months. Thus, very often, factional conflicts paralyzed the routine functioning of the government. The National Assembly became a mere marketplace for the advancement of the personal interests of its members. Under these circumstances, especially in view of the fact that a major course of political power was vested in the National Assembly, it would have been a miracle had Chang's leadership been able to perform governmental functions in a proper way. Some members of the Assembly even openly advocated radical unification plans unacceptable to many South Koreans. Furthermore, since unification policy was so sensitive and potentially controversial an issue, Chang's Government was reluctant to take a more drastic step.

Chang Myon also had to face a political difficulty outside the National Assembly. After the downfall of Rhee's regime, there emerged numerous political parties: progressive parties, the Popular Socialist Party and the Democratic Reform Party. A number of left-wing parties were absorbing remnants of the

121. Koh Young Bok, "Chungtang Kwa Pabul" (Political Party and Faction), Social Science Review: A Special Issue on Symposium on Korean Political Party (Seoul: Social Science Research Institute, 1969), pp. 129-144.
original progressive party led by the late Cho Bong Am. The 
Korean Independent Party, formerly led by the late Kim Koo, was 
also revived as a rightists political group. The political arena of 
the Second Republic was indeed a scene of confusion.

Even the unification policies of the contending political 
parties were in a state of confusion. The Central Coordination 
Committee of the Korean Nation's Independent Unification 
Organization made the following proposals: mutual mail ex­
change between North and South Korea; economic interchange; 
creation of an organization to provide national harmony at the 
front line; mutual exchange of reporters and observers; and 
dispatching combined North and South Korean teams to compete 
in international athletic contests.\textsuperscript{123} The Popular Socialist Party 
suggested a scheme of neutralist unification. It proposed that: (1) 
an international conference including both North and South 
Korea be held to guarantee a permanent neutralization of Korea; 
(2) the international body to supervise Korean elections be 
composed of those neutral nations which did not have military 
and political interest in Korea; and (3) after the establishment of a 
unified government, the military capacity must be limited to the 
forces required to preserve a permanent neutrality of Korea.\textsuperscript{124}

In addition to these examples of unification proposals from 
various political groups, different political parties offered propos­
als ranging from neutralization under U.N. supervision to direct 
negotiations. Even some influential members of the National 
Assembly representing conservative groups talked about the 
possibility of direct negotiation between North and South Korea. 
This proliferation of political parties and their unregulated 
political adventurism opened up all kinds of speculation about 
unification politics. Political forces ranging from individuals to 
political parties tried to take advantage of this unprecedented 
freedom of expression. Many of these political forces did not even 
have a concrete practical program on how to achieve unification. 
Clearly, in these circumstances it would have been very difficult 
for any political leadership to support a well-articulated specific 
plan for such a volatile issue as unification.

Third, the external influence was another factor contributing 
to Chang Myon's Government's unification position. Though 
official American policy on Korean unification had not changed, 
several important things happened. The Chairman of the U.S. 

\textsuperscript{123} Minjok Ilbo (February 25, 1961).
\textsuperscript{124} The White Paper, op. cit., pp. 248-249.
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, J. William Fulbright, announced that Korean unification must be achieved on a voluntary basis without foreign influence. This was a statement which stirred Korean nationalism. Yet probably the greatest American impact on the Korean unification question stemmed from a statement by then Senator Mike Mansfield. After a trip to the Far East in the summer of 1960, he recommended that “the United States should consider most carefully the possibilities of a solution to the problems of Korean unification in terms of neutralization on the Austrian pattern.”

Chang's government immediately rejected the idea of an Austrian-type neutralization for the following reasons: the geographical position of Korea is not the same as that of Austria or Switzerland because Korea is surrounded by the two most powerful Communist states; in Austria one government existed even during the four-power occupation, but in Korea two regimes, based on entirely opposite political ideologies, are in power; and Korea would be dominated by Communists if it were unified through neutralization. This argument was not convincing to many Koreans and it was particularly apparent, moreover, that the Austrian-type neutralization was proposed by a U.S. Senator who was believed to be highly influential in American politics. Many Koreans believed that because this was a public statement by an American senator, the concept of a neutral unification not only stirred up the Korean public, it also forced Chang’s government into a difficult situation.

Another external factor was Chang’s newly-opened relationship with Japan. Chang's newly-opened relationship, however, was quickly followed by reports that leftist-oriented groups in Korea were drawing financial support from Korean residents in Japan, who were in turn backed by North Korea. Many conservative groups and army officers were alarmed and the government was criticized for its permissiveness. Furthermore, a number of Korean residents openly advocated neutral unification. One of the representative examples was a Korean resident named Kim Sam Kyu. As a Chairman of the Committee for the Neutralization of Korea and editor of the Koria Kyoron (Korean Review), a Japanese magazine dedicated to neutralism, he proposed a neutralization of Korea with the following statement:

125. Donga Ilbo (November 6, 1960).
The two regimes in Korea are the creatures of the rival powers of the world, in that they represent the interest of their respective sponsors, the two regimes should be dissolved and a nationwide general election should be held to elect a new national assembly that would adopt a new constitution, neutrality of the unified Korea should then be guaranteed by international agreements, and no foreign military base be permitted to be established in Korea.\textsuperscript{127}

This neutralization proposal was again unacceptable to the Chang Myon Government. Its impact, however, was enormous in South Korea and along with Senator Mansfield's proposal it was probably one of the most discussed issues in South Korea, particularly on college campuses. Adding to this acrimonious situation, the new American posture toward the Soviet Union initiated by President John Kennedy also stimulated more lively discussion about the possibility of neutralization of Korea in a changing world.

To face this situation, Chang Myon's Government needed a strong governing ability. However, the police force, once a strong organization and target of public criticism, was not allowed to function properly. The weakened executive body could not control the National Assembly and the leadership of the Democratic Party could not control the party members. The government could control neither students nor street hoodlums. At certain points, Premier Chang Myon could not even control his own cabinet in defining public policy. The Government's lack of a governing capability made it impotent when confronted by opposition on a specific issue such as the unification question, which had extremely high symbolic and emotional value. In this situation, Chang Myon perhaps was well aware that it would be almost impossible to mobilize public support for any of his unification policy. As a consequence, Chang's Government was compelled to react cautiously to domestic and foreign stimuli, and the preservative, namely \textit{status quo}, policy in directing the unification policy was a direct result of this cautious reaction to internal and external inputs.

3. *Unification Policy of the Third Republic, 1961 to the Present*

On May 16, 1961, a military coup dissolved the much troubled Second Republic and the Military Revolutionary Council ruled South Korea. The Military Council made a few pledges regarding unification policy. They stated that:

Anti-Communism will be the cardinal point of national policy and the nation's anti-Communist alignment, which has thus far been no more than a matter of convention and a mere slogan, will be rearranged and strengthened.

In order to implement the long-cherished national desire to reunify the divided land, all-out efforts will be directed toward making the nation capable of coping with Communism.128

This statement made it quite clear that "the anti-Communist alignment will be strengthened." It also states that "all-out efforts will be directed toward making the nation capable of coping with Communism." While making known its position concerning unification, the military government made mass arrests of members of leftist-oriented groups in South Korea. Hence all vocal exponents of political negotiation with North Korea were soon silenced. This extremely intransigent attitude toward North Korea was continued during the entire period of the military government in South Korea.

This militant attitude was somewhat changed after the restoration of civilian government under the Third Republic. The ruling Democratic Republican Party suggested a unification plan on September 3, 1963. According to that plan:

1. Korean unification would be achieved through a national election in the South and the North under the principle of free democracy and under the rightful supervision of the United Nations.

2. The proper attitude for victory against Communism would be completely disseminated throughout all areas of politics, economy, education, culture, and so forth.

3. In order to prepare a unification policy and a policy for after the unification, a research institute for the study of the unification would be created.\textsuperscript{129}

In the same year, Kim Chong Pil, who was then assumed to be the second most powerful member of the Third Republic Government, stated in a speech presented to the student body of Seoul National University that:

1. It is possible to unify Korea through a Third World War, but it is highly unrealistic to expect unification to occur through such an event.

2. A second alternative would be a unification achieved by a civil war such as the Korean War of June 25, 1950. However, it is neither possible under the present international condition, nor desirable on my part.

3. Therefore, in order to achieve unification under the method which we desire, we ought to strengthen our economic ability.\textsuperscript{130}

Prime Minister Chung Il Kwon stated, on October 26, 1964, the South Korean Government policy on reunification. According to the statement, unification must be achieved “through an all-Korean election based upon population ratio under the U.N. supervision.”\textsuperscript{131} Then President Park made it quite clear on November 27, 1964 that even though the election is conducted under the U.N. supervision, “if the supervisory body is not guaranteed a fair election, our government will not accept it.”\textsuperscript{132}

Since the end of 1965, there have been a number of new developments regarding unification policies in Korea. In March 1969, South Korea established a cabinet-level National Unification Board whose function is essentially the study of unification problems. More noticeably, President Park of South Korea publicly invited North Korea in 1970 to join a “bonafide competition in development, in national construction and in creativity.”\textsuperscript{133} Then on August 12, 1971, the South Korea Red

\textsuperscript{129} Donga Ilbo (September 3, 1963).
\textsuperscript{130} Donga Ilbo (November 6, 1963).
\textsuperscript{131} The White Paper, op. cit., p. 234.
\textsuperscript{132} Ibid., p. 238.
\textsuperscript{133} Hankuk Ilbo (August 15, 1970).
Cross Society formally proposed to the North a joint effort to reunify those families separated by the division of Korea. About two months later, North Korea accepted the proposal and subsequently the Red Cross talks began on September 20, 1971.

A surprising development occurred when a joint communique, signed by Lee Hoo Pak, then Director of the South Korean CIA, and Kim Young Chu, Director of the Organization Bureau of the Korean Worker's Party, was announced in early April 1972. According to the communique, there were seven points of agreement reached between North and South Korea. One of the agreements stated that "reunification must be based on three principles, independence from and noninterference by outside forces, peaceful means to achieve unification, and acknowledgement that national unity transcended ideological and system differences."134

Since this agreement was reached, there have been a number of mutual exchanges of delegates between the two Koreas in order to seek some solutions to the Korean questions. Contrary to public expectations, however, there have not been any indications that long standing differences can be resolved in the near future. The delegates have never been able to solve any issues such as the issues of family reunions, methods to achieve unification, the issue of the U.N. membership, and so forth. Meanwhile, South Korea continues to publicize its position on reunification. President Park issued a special statement regarding his reunification policy on June 23, 1974. In that statement, he suggested that "the South and North should neither interfere in each other's internal affairs nor commit aggression on each other in order to maintain peace on the Korean peninsula, and that we for our part would exert our utmost effort to achieve peaceful unification of the country by continuing, with sincerity and patience, our efforts to secure concrete results from the South-North dialogue." Park furthermore stated that "the North Korean side, in diametrical opposition to our foreign policy statement, counter-proposed a number of unrealistic and stereotyped ideas for political propaganda purposes, such as a so-called "Grand National Conference" of the 'Confederation' of the South and the North."135 Chang Key

Young, then South Korean co-chairman of the South-North coordinating committee again reiterated the "non-interference policy" of South Korea and urged North Korea to enter the United Nations as a separate entity.\textsuperscript{136} The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of South Korea issued a statement on April 29, 1975, and again urged North Korea "to take a sincere attitude to expedite the South-North dialogue by upholding the charter of the United Nations and the relevant resolutions of the United Nations on the Korean questions."\textsuperscript{137} President Park, again, made clear in a speech given on August 15, 1977, that in order to achieve an independent reunification of Korea, an open dialogue between the North and the South must come first. The open dialogue will then lead to a mutual friendship, which will eventually lead to an all-Korean free election for the unification.\textsuperscript{138} On March 4, 1978, Min Kwan Sik, South Korean Acting Co-Chairman of the South-North Coordinating Committee proposed an immediate reopening of dialogue between the two Koreas. He made a statement that should there be a normalization of the dialogue and cooperation of technological exchanges between two sides, then there would be tremendous progress of the entire nation.\textsuperscript{139}

This analysis of the Third Republic's unification policy requires that a few further observations be made on the policy. First, the function of the U.N. has always been a prime requisite in the consideration of the operation process effecting unification. The only organization acceptable to South Korean authorities for supervising the election was the U.N. Cognizant of the fact that U.N. supervision might never be acceptable to North Korea, South Korea was tactically indicating its intransigency to North Korea.

Second, anti-Communist propaganda for the purpose of arousing patriotic fever was revived. Moreover, after the military coup, the South Korean government strongly reinforced and strengthened its anti-Communist posture in the society. Many South Koreans were once again, as during President Rhee's regime, forced to frequently profess anti-Communism in order to prove their loyalty.

Third, South Korean policy behavior was transformed gradually in a fashion that demonstrated internal restructuring

\textsuperscript{136} See \textit{Journal of Korean Affairs} (October, 1974), pp. 51-55.
\textsuperscript{137} See \textit{Journal of Korean Affairs} (April, 1975), pp. 78-79.
\textsuperscript{138} See \textit{Donga Ilbo} (August 16, 1977).
\textsuperscript{139} See \textit{Donga Ilbo} (March 4, 1978).
was on going to meet external conditions. Internal policy, therefore, had a higher priority than achieving unification. Thus Kim Chong Pil’s slogan that “in order to achieve the unification as we want to, we ought to strengthen our economic capacity,” became an implicit policy of Park’s government. Therefore, the idea of first building the strength to fight communism domestically, then later negotiating a peaceful settlement with the North, is a consistent attitude of South Korean leadership regarding national unification. In this respect, though the unification issue has a high degree of emotional and symbolic capacity among the Korean people, the South Korean leadership does not want to take any risks in order to achieve it. Therefore, though Rhee’s intransigent policy toward North Korea slowly became transformed into a preservative one under the Second Republic, the different South Korean leaderships consistently put forth unification strategies that borrow time for the purpose of strengthening South Korea first.

The question remains, why has the Third Republic behaved in such a manner. There are several factors which contributed to such behavior. First, one reason is related to the political problems of South Korea. Particularly, this may be traced back to the nature of the military coup of May 16, 1961. Under the Second Republic the unification by neutralization of Korea was openly discussed. Some of the students attempted to march to Panmunjom to talk to North Korean students. The movement for neutralist unification appeared to many Koreans to be influenced by the Communists. As pointed out by Stephen Bradner, this was a matter for concern to “many Army officers who might well lose their lives as well as their jobs if neutralism should turn out to mean Communism.” Moreover, on this occasion Premier Chang Myon pledged to diminish the size of the military forces. This was quite shocking to many Army career officers. Thus Chang’s planned reduction of military forces was perceived by many officers as personally deleterious and as an unwanted weakening of the defensive posture against the Communists.

Furthermore, many of those members who actively participated in the coup were political refugees from North Korea and consequently, vociferous anti-Communists. A good example of these military political refugees was Major General of the Marine Corps, Kim Dong Ha, one of the three most important figures in

the military coup. One of the main attractions which induced him to join the military coup was his faith in anti-Communism.\textsuperscript{141} Many of the important members in Junta, including Colonels Pak Chang Am, Pak Chi Ok, and Lieutenant General Pak Im Hang, were well-known staunch anti-Communists and Northerners. This anti-communist disposition of the military was clearly reflected in the unification policy after the coup. Thus the adoption of the statement that “anti-Communism will be the cardinal point of national policy” as the first revolutionary pledge was understandable. Even after the establishment of the Third Republic, President Park’s leadership was continually and strongly supported by Korean military groups. Furthermore, a large number of former military men were recruited into various governmental and private industries. The interlocking relationship between military groups and governmental organizations strongly affected the policy of the unification. Many military men participated directly in the civilian government. The political justification to the South Korean public, explaining the massive employment of military men in civilian posts and the preserving of a large military establishment, was that only a strong military was capable of resisting a communist attack on South Korea. This political justification in turn shaped the attitude of President Park toward North Korea.

Another political factor was related to the constant internal factional struggles in the leadership of the military government which occurred during the early 1960’s. From June 1961 to May 1963 alone, thirteen anti-revolutionary or counter-revolutionary cases were discovered. One of the first major cases was the conflict between Lieutenant General Chang Do Young and his immediate associates, most whom had Northwest backgrounds, and President Park’s followers. Dissatisfied with the erosion of his power, Chang Do Young began rebuilding his own factional strength with the support of both the Northwestern and Christian leaders. According to the Supreme Council’s report, Chang planned to install Paik Nak Joon, former President of a university as well as former President of the House of Councilors under the Second Republic, to be the head of the Cabinet.\textsuperscript{142} Chang’s plan was discovered before it was launched. It was announced that “the CIA has discovered a plot to assassinate the central figures

\textsuperscript{141} Se-Jin Kim, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 93.
\textsuperscript{142} Donga Ilbo (July 9, 1961).
of the revolution by anti-revolutionary forces led by Lieutenant General Chang Do Young and 45 others.”

Before the wounds of factional conflict were healed, another conflict erupted. This time the conflict was between the second strongest man, Kim Chong Pil, and the third most powerful man, Marine Major General Kim Dong Ha in the military revolutionary echelon. Eventually this conflict ended when Kim Dong Ha's attempted coup was thwarted by the Korean CIA. Then Kim Jong Pil, the head of the hard-line group, resigned from the chairmanship of the newly created Democratic Republic Party on February 25, 1963, and left for an eight-month foreign tour.

During the rule of the military government constant factional conflicts plagued Park's leadership and frequently created difficulties in delineating policy direction. Even after the restoration of civil government the highly conservative military sector attempted to influence governmental policy. One example is the attempted coup led by Colonel Chung Yeun Won who was former Chief Secretary of Public Information in the Supreme Council. This coup attempt of May 7, 1965, clearly indicated that some factions in the military had never been brought under control even after the transfer of power. The factional conflict within the ruling leadership continued up to 1973 in a somewhat different mode. That is to say, while attempted military coups have ceased, factional conflict has continued in the party. Thus the Democratic Republican Party has been constantly plagued with factional struggle up to 1973 with a variety of political issues.

It appears that when factional conflicts developed within the military and the ruling party structure the tendency toward reinforcing the conventional norm, that is, anti-Communism, was extremely heightened. Virtually every factional leader within the ruling leadership claimed to be a real champion of anti-communism. When factional conflict is widely exposed among leaders of factions who have military backgrounds anti-communist dogma becomes even more vociferous. This political factor has clearly induced or at least greatly influenced the intransigent position of President Park's leadership toward North Korea. This, in turn, has influenced South Korean governmental policy on the unification issue.

143. Hankuk Ilbo (July 9, 1961).
Beside these factional conflicts, there was another element contributing to the instability of the political system under the Third Republic. As soon as the junta announced that the presidential election was to be held October 15, 1963, leaders of opposition groups charged wrong-doing to Chung Hee Par. One critical charge was brought by Yoon Bo Sun, the strongest opposition candidate for the presidency. While campaigning in September, Yoon charged that "there are in government those who were involved in the rebellion in You and Soonchon." This was an indirect attack on Park's involvement in the rebellion which was a communist-led military revolt in 1948 in South Korea. Furthermore, Yoon made the accusation on October 9, 1963, that the "Democratic Republican Party was organized long before the elections owing to the political fund made available by the Communist Party of North Korea, and that Kim Chong Pil had contacts with Hwang Tae Sung," an influential member of the North Korean regime.\textsuperscript{145}

This criticism of Park aroused great attention throughout the country. Thus Park was not only plagued by the internal instability within the military group, but was also heavily attacked by the rightist groups. Park had an even more difficult situation to face as the result of the election. Park barely managed to win the election by a plurality of 42.6 percent. Therefore, had the opposition groups united effectively, Yoon Bo Sun would have won the election by a comfortable margin. Furthermore, the unpopularity of Park's government continued, particularly in city or urban areas where the educational level of the population was relatively high. Park again faced tough opposition in 1967, even though Park this time managed to win a majority. Then the South Korean constitution was amended in 1969 to permit President Park to run in 1972 for his third term. This movement faced a stormy opposition in South Korea. Then the constitution was again amended in 1972, to preserve a lifetime presidency for Park. This Yushin (Revitalization) constitution, which was created in 1972, again created a measure of political suspicion among Koreans. Of course, no public criticism was allowed upon its promulgation. The new constitution amassed enormous power for President Park. These various political factors put the ruling leadership in a precarious position in terms of pursuing an innovative and adventurous policy regarding the unification.

\textsuperscript{145} John Oh, op. cit., p. 166.
Second, the social factor also contributed heavily to South Korean unification policy. One component of the social factor was related to the social discontent caused by economic and social conditions. President Chung Hee Park personally wrote that the first order of business for the government was the purification of corrupted politics and an all-out effort to achieve economic improvement.\(^\text{146}\) However, due to an ill-perceived economic condition and mismanagement of economic policies in terms of planning and monetary policies, the government could neither swiftly eliminate an inflationary spiral, nor relieve the chronic unemployment. This worsening economic condition continued until South Korea made a politically and economically profitable decision to aid the defense of South Vietnam. Adding to these economic difficulties and worsening the government's public image were the endless and large-scale social scandals continuing from the Second Republic into the Third Republic. It was reported that a vast sum of money had been swindled by high levels of political leaders in the course of economic activities ranging from importing foreign cars to manipulating stock markets.

Mindful that social discontent would lead to criticism of his leadership, Park's government began to regulate the press. This attempt aroused severe criticism among press, people, and even National Assembly members. Then Park's government started suppressing this criticism. Later the government's negotiation with Japan brought to the streets chronic, bitter, and often bloody student demonstrations. Eventually, in response to continuing student agitation, the government ordered the universities to expel a number of student leaders and professors for being involved in the demonstrations. The government very often sent troops to college campuses to suppress demonstrations. These governmental actions shocked the public.\(^\text{147}\)

Though the economic and living conditions were beginning to substantially improve in South Korea, various social discontents never ended. Large-scale student demonstrations reappeared in reaction to the June 1967 elections. The government's efforts to solve this problem by using increased police power increased the number of violent incidents. The constitutional amendments of 1969 and 1972 again created restlessness throughout the college

\(^{146}\) Park Chung Hee, *Kukkawa Hyokyongkwa na (The Country, the Revolution and I)* (Seoul: Hyang Moon Sa, 1963), p. 60.

cAMPUS. With these political fluctuations the news media increased its criticism of the government. In turn, the government once more suppressed newspapers. One of the most representative examples would be the case of a famous daily newspaper *Donga Ilbo* in 1975. Stung by editorial criticism, the government coerced businessmen to stop advertising in *Donga Ilbo*. Within a few months, editorial criticism decreased.

Colleges were frequently forced to close their doors. To cope with this problem, the government adopted in 1976 a new tenure law for college professors which resulted in the ousting of more than 400 professors from their posts.\(^{146}\) This kind of tense situation became a social input to the unification policy position of South Korea.

Third, various external factors also contributed to the policy of South Korean unification. One of the external factors involved North Korean actions toward South Korea. While North Korea continuously proposed a peaceful unification, its hostility toward South Korea was increasingly virulent. There was a dramatic increase in North Korean violations in the DMZ. In 1967 alone there were 423 reported major incidents and 117 minor incidents involving North Koreans in the DMZ. The North Korean violations of the armistice drastically increased up to 1976. Furthermore, North Korea attempted massive infiltration into South Korea. For example, in 1967 alone there were 215 armed clashes between North Korean infiltrators and the South Korean army, as well as with the police force. A number of major incidents reported in South Korean territory in the late 1960's have already been discussed.

North Korean infiltration continued, while the North-South Korean talks which started in 1972 were being held. One of the most dramatic incidents occurred on March 19, 1975. On that day, the U.N. Command in South Korea revealed that a second underground tunnel had been constructed by North Korea. According to military sources in South Korea, not only motor vehicles, but also certain types of field-artillery weapons could have passed through this tunnel. It was apparently intended for a large scale infiltration of North Korean manpower into the South. In addition to this illegitimate way of infiltration there had reportedly been a number of cases of North Korean attempts to infiltrate legitimate political activities in South Korea. By doing

so, North Korea could cultivate the elements of the anti-government movements in the South. One of the organizations which eventually surfaced was the famous **Tonghyok Tang** (Revolutionary Unification Party). Then on August 18, 1976, North Korean soldiers killed two American officers, and injured four other American servicemen and five South Korean soldiers at the DMZ of Panmunjon. On July 14, 1977, a U.S. Army helicopter was shot down by North Korea over the North Korean side of the DMZ. Three crewmen were killed and one crew member was wounded. All of these activities strongly reinforced many South Korean's suspicions of North Korean motivation and attitude.

Another external factor was related to the U.S. involvement in the Vietnam conflict and its subsequent policy of detente with Communist China and the Soviet Union. South Korea fought with the U.S. soldiers against North Vietnam with determination and sincerity. However, as the war effort soured South Korea correctly perceived that lack of support among the American people forced the U.S. government to withdraw from South Vietnam. This withdrawal created a grave skepticism among Koreans about the U.S. capacity and willingness to protect any of its allies, including South Korea. South Korea was also beginning to realize that even if political elites wanted to protect South Korea, there was no assurance of getting protection from the U.S. government. This erosion of confidence rapidly increased during the post-Watergate period. Particularly, South Korea saw the liberalizing effect on the American people of detente-related cultural and economic activities with Communist political systems. Then South Korea also witnessed President Nixon's historic visit to Peking in February 1972, and Japanese Premier Tanaka's official visit there in September of the same year. This created not only a skepticism about the will and capacity of the U.S. promise, but also a new sense of anxiety and uneasiness among most Koreans. Realizing it could no longer rely solely upon the U.S. shield, South Korea felt strongly compelled to avoid the tragedy that South Vietnam experienced. One of the most fatal blows to South Korea was the U.S. decision to withdraw American ground forces from the Korean Peninsula. Though knowledgeable Koreans speculated on the possibility, to most South Koreans it came as a surprise. Many South Koreans believed that there was a serious military imbalance, particularly in the air force, between North and South Korea. Therefore, many Koreans felt that the possibility of North Korean attacks against the South was eminent. Even though Defense Secretary Harold Brown assured Koreans by stating on
February 20, 1978, that "we are and will remain a major force in the Pacific," South Korean uneasiness over the decision became quite serious. South Koreans, furthermore, witnessed an erosion of their support in the American Congress due to the Korean lobbying scandal known as Koreagate. In response to these problems, President Park launched an ambitious economic and military program to offset the perceived deficiency in the military capability of South Korea.

This in turn resulted in a hardening attitude by South Korea toward Northern Communists. While perceiving the mood of detente and pullout of the U.S. shield, the South Korean government knew it could no longer advocate a policy of unification by "marching to the North" as President Rhee did. On the other hand, internal and external conditions made it difficult for South Korea to accept a policy of peacefully negotiated unification with North Korea. Meanwhile, among new issues created by the mood of detente, and fluctuations in the international relations, the unification of Korea remained the most emotional and symbolic issue to practically all South Koreans. Therefore, the attitude of "First build the strength to fight Communism, then negotiate a settlement with the North" appeared to be a very cogent policy to the South Korean leaders of the Third Republic. A cautious preserving of the status quo by the Third Republic government was the result of these domestic and external factors.

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

The reunification of Korea is a highly emotional issue to Koreans. It persists as a sacrosanct political symbol in the minds and hearts of Koreans. Furthermore, Koreans believe that the division was unnaturally and arbitrarily created by foreign powers against the Korean will. The division has also caused traumas and tragedies to Koreans. Because of the division, many families are still separated. Family reunions can only be treasured hopes. The division has also substantially restrained the prosperous economic development of Korea.

All of the considerations discussed in this paper make reunification a most sensitive political issue. The dream of
reunification is kept alive by these considerations, but they also keep it a dream. Because of the popular desire to make the dream come true, South Korean politicians find they are constantly pressured to take a stand on the issue. Understandably, this impetus generates and very often formulates the governmental policy of unification. The internal and external condition of Korea, however, has constantly been in fluctuation. Naturally, the governmental policy of reunification has also had to undergo changes. To cope with domestic and international environmental change South Korean unification policy has gradually and slowly been remolded. Undoubtedly, this process will continue, because of its importance to Korean hearts, and to domestic and international peace. Continued systematic study of Korean unification policy remains an imperative for political scientists in the future.
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