Fiduciary Duties in Distressed Corporations: Second Generation Issues

by

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I. INTRODUCTION

This paper seeks to provide some insights into properly framing the contours of the fiduciary duties owed by those managing solvent corporations operating in the vicinity of insolvency, there being, in a majority of jurisdictions (according to the count of others), a well-known shift of fiduciary duties to creditors on a corporation’s insolvency.¹ The decision spawning over a decade’s worth of scholarship on the subject is the Delaware Chancery Court’s opinion in Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland v. Pathe Communications Corp.² At the outset it should be noted that the discussion in this paper examines a context at the interstices of a number of areas of law. Normal state principles governing fraudulent conveyances and transfers³ and federal bankruptcy law bear on the issue.⁴

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¹ Unsecured Creditors Comm. of Debtor STN Enters., Inc. v. Noyes (In re STN Enters.), 779 F.2d 901, 904-05 (2d Cir. 1985) (“Thus, the ‘majority rule’ permits recovery by creditors of an insolvent corporation for mismanagement as if the corporation itself were plaintiff, while the ‘minority rule’ precludes suit by injured creditors of an insolvent corporation, although a suit for misappropriation or diversion of corporate property may stand on different and more solid footing.” (citations and footnote omitted)). Assorted authority is collected in Royce de R. Barondes, Fiduciary Duties of Officers and Directors of Distressed Corporations, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 45, at 63 n.54 (1998).


³ UNIFORM FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT, __ U.L.A. __; UNIFORM FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT, __ U.L.A. __.

The principles also may interact with each other. See generally Kittay v. Atlantic Bank of New York, 316 B.R. 451 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“Allegations that an insolvent corporation made a fraudulent transfer state a claim for breach of fiduciary duty.”).

⁴ A separate issue that arises in litigation is the extent to which actions of insiders are charged to corporation subsequently in bankruptcy proceedings, depriving a trustee of
In addition, other corporation law provisions, e.g., the limit on corporate distributions to shareholders\(^5\) and principles regulating dispositions of firms,\(^6\) may apply.

The law of fiduciary duties applied to distressed corporations should be a comprehensive whole, consistent both internally and externally with other principles such as federal and state laws governing debtor / creditor relations. There is a wealth of authority, in case-law and academic commentary, that is potentially pertinent. The purpose of this contribution to the conference, *Twilight in the Zone of Insolvency: Fiduciary Duty and Creditors of Troubled Companies*, is to assemble some of the components of that whole, without undertaking the task (overwhelming for purposes of making some observations for this conference) of (i) seeking describe the full multi-field context of the academic discussion of the issues or (ii) seeking to provide a comprehensive solution or (iii) seeking to catalogue standing to assert claims against third party professionals. See generally Shearson Lehman Hutton v. Wagoner, 944 F.2d 114, 120 (2d Cir. 1991); Smith v. Arthur Andersen L.L.P., 175 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1199 (D. Ariz. 2001) (stating, inter alia, in connection with not applying the *Wagoner* rule, “Where, as is alleged here, the Complaint alleges a far-reaching scheme to continue a company in business past its point of insolvency and systematic looting it, it cannot be said that such conduct benefitted the corporation.”); (debtor-in-possession permitted to maintain claims against former Board of Directors for breach of fiduciary duty, distinguishing *Bangor Punta Operations, Inc. v. Bangor & Aroostook Railroad Co.*, 417 U.S. 703 (1974), on the basis that the claims were being asserted on behalf of unsecured creditors). This issue is the subject of other ongoing work and is not discussed further in this paper.

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\(^5\) E.g., ___ DEL. CODE ANN. tit. __, § __ (____); Model Business Corporation Act § __ (____). Compare Carroll v. Valuation Research Corp. (*In re Munford, Inc.*), 97 F.3d 456, 460 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding state limit on corporate payment of dividends and stock repurchases, Ga. CODE ANN. § 14-2-91 (1988), Ga. CODE ANN. § 14-2-154(a)(1), (2) (1982) (current version at ____), applied to consideration received by stockholders of firm acquired in reverse triangular merger) and *Wiebolt Stores, Inc. v. Schottenstein*, 94 B.R. 488, 494, 510-12 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (denying motion to dismiss claim that distribution unlawful under Ill. Rev. Stat. Ch. 32, ¶¶ 8.65(a)(1), 9.10(c)(1) (1983) (current version at ____)) was effected by an LBO structured as a tender offer for all the target’s stock in which substantially all the target’s assets were pledged to finance the loan funding the tender offer with *C-T of Virginia, Inc. v. Barrett* (*In re C-T of Virginia, Inc.*,), 958 F.2d 606, 614 (4th Cir. 1992) (holding amounts received by stockholders of firm acquired in reverse triangular merger had not received distributions subject to the limit on dividends provided by Virginia corporation law, Va. Code Ann. § 13.1-653(C) (Michie 1989) (current version at ____)).

\(^6\) See infra Part __ (discussing fairness of conflict-of-interest transactions and *Revlon* duties).
the full range of variation among jurisdictions from Delaware corporation law.

This introduction is being written in advance of the conference. Even if not proposed at the conference itself, others discussing the subject may assert that all of this should be relegated to express contract among the parties, perhaps proposing that none of these duties should be imposed by law and that, to the extent they are to exist, they should be expressly created by contract. That appears to be a hyper-abstract approach to analyzing efficiency, hyper-abstract meaning the analysis evidences a level of economic abstraction that has, in abstraction, omitted pertinent nuance, producing questionable conclusions. Two reasons immediately come to mind.

The first reason is that this view focuses on the long term, without adequately addressing the short-term and the intermediate-term consequences. Many of the debtor / creditor relationships that present these issues are long-term relationships. Their duration may be thirty years or more, perhaps representing more than a generation in the case-law development of the pertinent fiduciary duties. Simply relegating all this to express contract does not address how the law should treat relationships already formed under contracts that cannot practicably be renegotiated at this time, e.g., long-term, publicly-traded debt. Appropriate resolution of those cases is needed and should not be sacrificed for purposes of developing a mechanism to address temporally distant disputes.

A second reason is that some of the subjects of these duties may be difficult to negotiate. The debtor / creditor relationships that one would assert should be simply governed by express contract would, one supposes, be voluntary transactions, e.g., not debtor / creditor relationships arising from tort claims. Some matters may be sufficiently sensitive that, in the ordinary case, it taints the process of forming the mutual trust required to enter into a business relationship to raise them. For example

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Although not in the area of debtor / creditor law, *Favrot v. Barnes*, 332 So. 2d 873, 875 (La. Ct. App. 1976) (waiver of affirmative marital obligations), *rev'd in part by* 339 So. 2d 843 (La. 1976) (reversing as to “whether the earning capacity of an unemployed, divorced wife bars her from alimony absent a compelling reason which prevents her from accepting employment”), *superceded by statute*, __ La. Acts page no. __, as recognized in *Arrendell v. Arrendell*, 390 So. 2d 927, 929 (La.App. 1980), raises expressly negotiated issues that, one supposes, generally would not be the subject of an express ex ante agreement, although there might be some general implicit expectations in that regard.
one of the fiduciary duties owed by those managing a corporation, at least a Delaware corporation, is a duty of candor.⁸ Although my personal recollection of practice is limited by both the fact that I engaged in private transactional practice for only a limited amount of time and that the experiences I had in practice are now somewhat shrouded in my memory by the passage of time, I cannot recall a circumstance in which opposing counsel expressly urged that his client should be permitted to make affirmative misstatements to me or my client. A review of asset purchase agreements in the Contracting and Organizations Research Institute (CORI) database confirms that, at least in that sample of contracts, parties do not negotiate contract provisions allowing one party to “lie.”⁹

It is, perhaps, common for parties to provide for a similar result by negotiating contract provisions saying that one party has not relied on certain information or that a warranty arising from any statement is disclaimed.¹⁰ But that only serves to further the point. If it were not difficult to discuss these issues, the matter—one party’s freedom to lie—would be stated more directly, or at least stating it directly would occur occasionally where the other formulations seem not to work consistently.¹¹

A normal justification for the hypothetical bargain standard of contract law¹² is that it provides off-the-rack rules mimicking what the parties

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⁸ See infra Part __.

⁹ A search of all the 866 asset purchase agreements currently in the database, which is accessible, at www.cori.missouri.edu, for the words “lie,” “lied,” “lier,” and “lies” disclosed only four agreements. Each used the word in some other way, e.g., as to whether a subsequent lawsuit would “lie” in a particular a particular location. Asset Purchase Agreement by and among SRS California Operations LLC, Noble Logistic Services, Inc. (CA), Noble Logistic Services, Inc. (MI), and Noble International, Ltd. at 32 (March 24, 2003).

¹⁰ See generally, e.g., Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. v. Allegheny Energy, Inc., 382 F. Supp. 2d 411, 416 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (construing contract stating, inter alia, “Except for the representations and warranties contained in this Article III, neither the Sellers nor any other Person make any express or implied representation or warranty on behalf of or with respect to the Sellers, the Business or the Purchased Assets, and the Sellers hereby disclaim any representation or warranty not contained in this Article III.”).

¹¹ See Allegheny Energy, 382 F. Supp. 2d at 417 (noting that the effectiveness of disclaimers of reliance on misrepresentations is influenced by whether the disclaimer “tracks the substance of the alleged misrepresentation,” (quoting Banque Arabe et Internationale D’Investissement v. Maryland National Bank, 57 F.3d 146, 155 (2d Cir. 1995)).

¹² E.g., David Charny, Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative Structure of Contract Interpretation, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 1815, 1815-16 (1991) (“To interpret contracts, lawyers ask: what would the parties have agreed to had they explicitly adverted to the
would have bargained for without the associated cost.\textsuperscript{13} A separate justification is that the process of reaching the bargain may alter the relationship between the parties and perhaps prevent formation of contracts that would be beneficial were the default rule properly selected. Raising some issues in negotiation, such as whether one party is free to lie as long as the lie is not made in anticipation of reliance,\textsuperscript{13} simply may inhibit formation of mutual trust required necessary to form some contracts.

It may be helpful to outline the remainder of the discussion and to summarize the principal conclusions reached. The basic conclusions this paper reaches are the following:

- The existence of an affirmatively enforceable duty under the principles of \textit{Credit Lyonnais} is not moot, because, inter alia, the existence of aiding and abetting liability for breach of fiduciary duty will give rise to a greater set of potentially liable defendants, and increase the remedies otherwise available were the duties contemplated by \textit{Credit Lyonnais} not affirmatively enforceable (aiding and abetting a fraudulent transfer typically not separately giving rise to liability).

- The application of the business judgment rule to directors’ operations of distressed firms should be, if anything, stronger than the corresponding provisions as applied to solvent firms, because a contrary right would create an anomalous option for creditors having expressly negotiated approval rights. Similarly, the current trend finding charter provisions limiting liability to creditors or trustees for breaches of fiduciary duties of care is desirable.

\textsuperscript{13} \textit{E.g.}, \textsc{Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, \textit{The Economic Structure of Corporate Law} 34 (1991)} ("Why not abolish corporate law and let people negotiate whatever contracts they please? The short but not entirely satisfactory answer is that corporate law is a set of terms available off-the-rack so that participants in corporate ventures can save the cost of contracting. Corporate law—and in particular the fiduciary principle enforced by court—fills in the blanks and oversights with the terms that people would have bargained for had they anticipated the problems and been able to transact costlessly in advance.").

\textsuperscript{14} Reliance is an element of the tort of misrepresentation. \textit{See infra} note 118 and accompanying text.
The determination of the time horizon for which corporations are managed should continue to be delegated to management, notwithstanding distress.

During distress short of bankruptcy proceedings, fiduciary duties to maximize firm value on a sale should continue to be owed to stockholders. Approval of conflict-of-interest transactions by disinterested stockholders should continue to shift the burden of proof as to the fairness of the transaction.

During distress, the obligation of candor under Malone v. Brincat\(^\text{15}\) should appertain to communications with creditors, thereby creating a duty not to make affirmative misstatements, regardless of whether the communication is in connection with approval of a particular action by the creditors. Financial creditors will consider the information provided in connection with deciding whether to exercise contractually negotiated control rights, and creditors should be entitled to rely on truthfulness even if the debtor is not aware of a particular action the creditor may take in reliance.

In disputes with a trustee or creditors, principles of implicit ratification of an officer or director having taken a corporate opportunity should be enhanced. The clearest case for allowing creditors to bring an action for breach of corporate opportunity obligations involve opportunities in which the director or officer will be competing with the distressed debtor.

Before turning to the analysis, it is helpful to make one final remark concerning the scope of this paper. This paper will not emphasize the difference between those obligations that give rise to direct claims and those that can be asserted only derivatively. Litigation of the corresponding duties to creditors frequently will be raised in bankruptcy, so that procedural obstacles to pursuing these claims in solvent corporations lose their force—a trustee may be bringing the claims if the creditors cannot directly.\(^\text{16}\) This paper, for ease of exposition and because the typical procedural obstacles will not apply in the context of litigation of these issues in bankruptcy, may refer to stockholders as beneficiaries of fiduciary duties in contexts where a claim for breach can only be brought derivatively.\(^\text{17}\)

\(^{15}\) 722 A.2d 5 (Del. 1998).

\(^{16}\) See generally supra note 4.

\(^{17}\) See generally Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., 845 A.2d 1031 (Del. 2004) (restating the distinction between direct and derivative claims).
II. THE ISSUE IS NOT Moot

1. Different Scope of Persons Potentially Liable.

In Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland v. Pathe Communications Corp., the court stated:

At least where a corporation is operating in the vicinity of insolvency, a board of directors is not merely the agent of the residue risk bearers, but owes its duty to the corporate enterprise . . . .

. . .

. . . In managing the business affairs of a solvent corporation in the vicinity of insolvency, circumstances may arise when the right (both the efficient and the fair) course to follow for the corporation may diverge from the choice that the stockholders (or the creditors, or the employees, or any single group interested in the corporation) would make if given the opportunity to act.

. . . The issuer board or its executive committee had an obligation to the community of interest that sustained the corporation, to exercise judgment in an informed, good faith effort to maximize the corporation's long-term wealth creating capacity.\(^\text{18}\)

In that case, the “duty,” if it can be called that,\(^\text{19}\) to non-shareholder constituencies was used in a defensive context, i.e., to defend the propriety of action by those managing the corporation against a claim that an improper constituency's interests were being promoted.\(^\text{20}\) An initial question is whether the contemplated duty gives rise to affirmatively

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\(^{19}\) The uncertainty in terminology arises from ambiguity in whether there is a duty affirmatively enforceable by creditors.

\(^{20}\) See 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 215 at *5, 106 (discussing a claim that a member of a distressed firm’s executive committee breached a fiduciary duty owed a controlling stockholder by delaying sales of firm assets). See generally Odyssey Partners, L.P. v. Fleming Cos., 735 A.2d 386, 420 (Del. Ch. 1999) (“Moreover, in arguing that the defendant directors’ failure to file for bankruptcy law protection was a violation of the board’s fiduciary duties to the stockholders, plaintiffs overlook that the board was obligated to consider and protect interests other than those of the stockholders. When bankruptcy and foreclosure are compared, and the effects of both on the shareholders, creditors and other corporate constituencies balanced, the decision to proceed with the foreclosure cannot be said to have been made in bad faith or a manner that was disloyal to ABCO, taken as a whole.”).
enforceable obligations, a matter that has been previously examined by courts, which have expressed varying conclusions, and discussed by commentators.

A threshold question in assessing the significance of case-law finding an enforceable duty owed to creditors of firms operating in the vicinity of insolvency is whether it makes any difference at all. If the remedies this theory makes available merely duplicate remedies available under other principles, the matter merits little discussion, which would make for a short conference program. By happy coincidence, the issue is not, in fact, moot. One illustration involves aiding and abetting liability for breach of fiduciary duty, which expands upon the liability regime otherwise available in two ways. As developed below, the availability of a remedy for breach of fiduciary duty adds potentially liable defendants who

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21 See generally Weaver v. Kellogg, 216 B.R. 563, 580-84 (S.D. Tex. 1997) (stating, in construing Texas and Delaware law, denying summary judgment on claims asserting corporate opportunity doctrine violations in corporation allegedly in the vicinity of insolvency); Kittay v. Flutie New York Corp. (In re Flutie New York Corp.), 310 B.R. 31, 57 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“A court will find that breach of fiduciary duty is properly alleged when the Debtor was insolvent or rendered insolvent by a fraudulent transfer or was operating in the vicinity of insolvency at the time of or immediately after the transfer.”); Production Resources Group, L.L.C. v. NCT Group, Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 790 n.57 (Del. Ch. 2004) (reviewing critically arguments that there should be an affirmatively enforceable duty qualitatively different from that during solvency, stating, “I doubt the wisdom of a judicial endeavor to second-guess good-faith director conduct in the so-called zone.”).

Somewhat ironically, the court in Production Resources, in discussing the issue, impugned, apparently as counterfactual, “extreme hypotheticals involving directors putting cash in slot machines.” There is, however, authority involving this kind of activity. Dwyer v. Jones (In re Tri-State Paving, Inc.), 32 B.R. 2 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1982) involved officers who withdrew all the funds the debtor had in its bank account and gambled it all in Las Vegas “to win enough money . . . to pay the corporate-debtor’s creditors.” Id. at 3. The strategy was unsuccessful. See id. at 4-5. Of course, it is unlikely that a reported case would involve managers who successfully adopted such a strategy. Yet such a strategy may be beneficial for creditors. See Laura Lin, Shift of Fiduciary Duty upon Corporate Insolvency: Proper Scope of Directors’ Duty to Creditors, 46 Vand. L. Rev. 1485, 1491 n.19 (1993) (reporting that the founder of Federal Express successfully adopted such a strategy during a period of financial difficulty).

22 E.g., Barondes, supra note 1, at 69-71.

23 There is no intent to provide an exhaustive catalogue of differences, which could include different statutes of limitations, see generally Weaver v. Kellogg, 216 B.R. 563, 586 (S.D. Tex. 1997) (two-year statute of limitations for breach of fiduciary duty tolled when “a corporation’s board is composed of alleged wrongdoers”).
SECOND GENERATION ISSUES

otherwise would not be liable and changes the nature of the remedy available.

As a general matter, conspiracy to commit and aiding and abetting a tort may give rise to liability.24 Where actionable, the elements for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty are: “(1) the existence of a fiduciary relationship, (2) a breach of the fiduciary’s duty and (3) a knowing participation in that breach by the defendants who are not fiduciaries.”25 Although historically there was some curious authority in the Seventh Circuit,26 currently a number of jurisdictions hold that one

24 The following discussion of the distinction between conspiracy to commit a tort and aiding and abetting a tort is provided in F.D.I.C. v. Romaniello, 1992 WL 369,557, at *1 (Conn. Super. Dec. 3, 1992):

In Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, the court traces the development of the liability of a secondary defendant for the tortious conduct of a primary wrongdoer. The court focuses on two variations of the theory of vicarious liability, “... (1) conspiracy, or concerted action by agreement, and (2) aiding and abetting, or concerted action by substantial assistance.” Id. at 477. It finds that these “bases of liability correspond to the first two subsections in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 876 (1979)...” It quotes that section on “Persons Acting in Concert” as follows:

For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of another, one is subject to liability if he

(a) does a tortious act in concert with the other or pursuant to a common design with him ... or

(b) knows that the other’s conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so to conduct himself....

The first of these the court designates “conspiracy;”, the latter, “aiding-abetting.” The court finds that “[T]he prime distinction between civil conspiracies and aiding-abetting is that a conspiracy involves an agreement to participate in a wrongful activity. Aiding-abetting focuses on whether a defendant knowingly gave ‘substantial assistance’ to someone who performed wrongful conduct, not on whether the defendant agreed to join the wrongful conduct.” The court continues, “[T]here is a qualitative difference between proving an agreement to participate in a tortious line of conduct, and proving knowing action that substantially aids tortious conduct.” Id. at 478.


26 The court in Koutsoubos v. Casanave, 816 F. Supp. 472, 475 (N.D. Ill. 1993), stated, “Illinois has never recognized the tort of aiding and abetting a breach of a fiduciary duty,” quoting a Seventh Circuit case stating, “There is no tort of aiding and abetting under Illinois law or, so far as we know, the law of any other state,” Cenco, Inc. v. Siedman & Siedman, 686 F.2d 449, 452 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J.). Assorted authority recognizing aiding and abetting predating Cenco includes, for example, Penn Mart Realty Co. v. Becker, 298 A.2d 349, 351 (Del. Ch. 1972) (stating the test quoted
may be liable for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty. On the

\textit{supra} text accompanying note 25, other than the last four words thereof, and stating, “The directors of a corporation stand in a fiduciary relationship to the corporation’s shareholders. And one who knowingly joins with any fiduciary, including corporate officials, in a breach of his obligation is liable to the beneficiaries of the trust relationship.”) and Jackson v. Smith, 254 U.S. 586, 589 (1921) (firm’s receiver breached fiduciary duty by agreeing to be a joint venturer in the purchase of firm assets in a foreclosure sale, where the court stated, “[O]thers who knowingly join a fiduciary in such an enterprise likewise become jointly and severally liable with him for such profits.”); see generally Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Serv. Ctr., Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 485 (Ky. 1991) (citing eight cases preceding 1970 in eight different court systems as authority for a similar proposition); and In re Aluminum Mills Corp., 132 B.R. 869, 892 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1991) (noting, “Under Illinois law, a third party’s inducement of, or knowing participation in, a breach of duty by an agent is a wrong against the principal that may subject the third party to liability” (quoting Corroon & Black of Illinois, Inc. v. Magner, 494 N.E.2d 785, 790 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986)) and denying motion to dismiss claim against lender who allegedly paid $100,000 to a company owned by one defendant to induce defendant directors to breach their fiduciary duties to the debtor by releasing claims against the lender). Modern authority construing the state of the law in Illinois includes Shapo v. Engle, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17,966 at *60 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 10, 1999) (“Although it seems that at one point Illinois did not recognize a tort of aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty, it appears that such a claim is now viable.”); Technic Engineering, Ltd. v. Basic Envirotech, Inc., 53 F. Supp. 2d 1007, 1011, 1012 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (stating, in connection with claim a that officers of insolvent closely-held corporation breached a fiduciary duty to a creditor and were assisted by a family member who allegedly was not an officer, that Illinois law recognizes liability “for inducement or participation in breach of fiduciary duty.”).
other hand, it appears that the current trend is to hold there is not separate civil liability in comparable contexts against an aider and abettor of a fraudulent conveyance (although, as discussed in the margin, aiding and abetting qualitatively more egregious misconduct defrauding creditors has resulted in criminal liability under other principles and participation in managerial malfeasance that is a tort in addition to a breach of fiduciary duty has resulted in third party liability under principles of civil conspiracy). This distinction is significant because the existence of trust relationship.”); Weinberger v. Rio Grande Indus., Inc., 519 A.2d 116, 131 (Del. Ch. 1986) (granting motion to dismiss claims that acquiror in two-step acquisition by omitting information about the target in a press release aided and abetted disclosure-based fiduciary duty breach by management of the target); Joel v. Weber, 602 N.Y.S.2d 383, 384 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (denying law firm’s motion to dismiss claims that it aided and abetted a breach of fiduciary duty; breach involved diversion by entertainer’s former management company of partnership distributions due the entertainer; funds used to pay legal fees to the management company’s outside counsel (a defendant). See generally Bancroft-Whitney Co. v. Glen, 411 P.2d 921, 936 (Cal. 1966) (unfair competition claim in connection with corporate president’s breach of fiduciary duty benefiting competitor). Compare Time Warner Entertainment Co., L.P. v. Six Flags Over Georgia, LLC, 537 S.E.2d 397, 407 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) (“Although this court has never explicitly recognized a cause of action for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty, we have at least twice implicitly acknowledged that such claims are viable... We have explicitly ‘acknowledged an aiding and abetting cause of action in ... fraudulent conveyances.’” (citation omitted)), cert. denied, ___ (Ga. Jan. 18, 2001), vacated, 122 S. Ct. 24 (2001), punitive damages award reaffirmed, 2002 WL 472306 (Ga. App. Mar. 29, 2002) with Munford v. Valuation Research Corp., 98 F.3d 604, 613 (11th Cir. 1996) (“In this case, we decline to extend aider and abettor liability to breaches of fiduciary duty concluding that Georgia courts would not recognize such a cause of action.”).

28 Baker O’Neal Holdings, Inc. v. Ernst & Young LLP, 2004 WL 771,230, at *14 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 24, 2004) (“The Florida Supreme Court... recently joined the multitude of other courts in holding that there is no accessory liability for fraudulent transfers under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act.”); see also, e.g., Chepstow Ltd. v. Hunt, 381 F.3d 1077, 1080; Freeman v. First Union Nat’l Bank, 865 So. 2d 2d 1272, 1275 (Fla. 2004). But see, e.g., Munford v. Valuation Research Corp., 98 F.3d 604, 613 (11th Cir. 1996) (stating one party “notes that Georgia courts have acknowledged an aiding and abetting cause of action in torts involving violence, the sale of unregistered securities, breaches of covenants with employment contracts, and fraudulent conveyances


30 The actions that have been the objects of civil conspiracy, and that have given rise to liability to co-conspirator professionals not arising from a breach of fiduciary duty, have been qualitatively more egregious than the actions that might give rise to aiding and
affirmatively enforceable fiduciary duties can materially increase the potential liability of third party professionals such as accountants, investment banks and lawyers.\(^{31}\) Indemnification is unlikely to mitigate the potential liability materially, because this kind of claim would be most typically brought against a professional upon the insolvency of the client—the party who might naturally provide an indemnification.

A second distinction would be the type of remedy. An aider and abettor of a breach of fiduciary duty is liable for compensatory damages.\(^{32}\)


\(^{32}\) Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Serv. Ctr., Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 486 (Ky. 1991) (stating, in connection with two third parties who formed a partnership to finance a
A jurisdiction might also allow punitive damages. On the other hand, liability for a fraudulent transfer typically results in a rescission of the transaction in question. A recent Seventh Circuit opinion states:

[W]e are aware of no reported cases in which monetary damages were awarded under the IUFTA, and courts such as Robinson have held under their state version of the UFTA that monetary damage awards are only appropriate where reconveyance of the fraudulently transferred property is impossible or where the subject property has depreciated in value. Policy considerations would support such a rule, as it would avoid speculation as to the value of conveyed assets.

[33] Whitney v. Citibank, N.A., 782 F.2d 1106, 117-20 (2d Cir. 1986); Roth v. Mims, 298 B.R. 272 (N.D. Tex. 2003) (noting compensatory damages including consequential damages are available for breaches of a fiduciary duty, affirming award of compensatory damages equal to the difference between an estimate of the debtor’s value ($2,049,000) and the value received ($275,000), and $1 million in punitive damages, noting the bankruptcy court found, in a matter not part of the appeal, that the buyer of the debtor’s assets was jointly and severally liable for the compensatory and punitive damages under an aiding and abetting theory); cf. Holmes v. Lerner, 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d 130 (Cal. App. 1999) (business consultant to general partnership found liable to other partner for conspiracy and aiding and abetting fraud and breach of fiduciary duty; awarding compensatory damages for loss of partnership interest; jury also awarded punitive damages); Time Warner Entertainment Co., L.P. v. Six Flags Over Georgia, LLC, 537 S.E.2d 397, 416 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) (affirming an award of punitive damages against a general partner (and persons controlling the general partner) of a limited partnership, for breach of its fiduciary duty to limited partners in the management of the partnership, cert. denied, _____ (Ga. Jan. 18, 2001), vacated, 122 S. Ct. 24 (2001) (as to ____), remanded to 2002 WL 472,306 (Ga. App. Mar. 29, 2002) (____).]

[34] DFS Secured Healthcare Receivables Trust v. Caregivers Great Lakes, 384 F.3d 338 (7th Cir. 2004), certified question accepted by DFS Secured Health Care Receivables Trust v. Caregivers Great Lakes, Inc., No. 94S00-0410-CQ-447, 2004 Ind. LEXIS 895, at
The former remedy could be significantly larger.


Now that distinctions (who is potentially liable and the nature of the remedy) have been identified, the question arises whether the distinctions matter. A brief assessment discloses that the increased scope of liability can influence incentives, which would alter market outcomes and therefore be significant. Before confirming that the distinctions can make a difference, it bears mentioning that it is easier to identify that the distinctions can influence market outcomes than to assess whether the increased scope of the potentially liable parties is desirable.

Consider whether creditors should be able to recover consequential damages against an aider and abettor of a distressed corporation’s transaction that did not promote the creditors’ interests. Allowing the claim provides compensation for harm actually incurred. As an initial matter (i.e., before considering market reaction to the legal rule), if consequential damages cannot be recovered by creditors, some adverse consequences of distressed corporations’ actions will be externalized. Of course, the initial allocation of cost will affect market prices. If the costs are allocated to creditors, creditors will charge more for extending credit.

*1 (Ind. Oct. 13, 2004) (identifying one of three certified questions as, “Is an award of monetary damages under the IUFTA available only where reconveyance of the fraudulently transferred property is impossible or where the subject property has depreciated in value?”); accord Forum Ins. Co. v. Devere Ltd., 151 F. Supp. 2d 1145, 1148 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (stating, “UFTA allows only equitable remedies such as avoidance, attachment, an injunction, or appointment of a receiver. Upon finding an UFTA violation, the court may cancel the transfer or impose a lien against the transferred property, but it may not award damages.”).

The Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act has a residual remedial provision allowing the award of “any other relief the circumstances may require.” **UNIFORM FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 7(a)(3)(ii).** Some authority construing this provision has been described as allowing “compensatory” damages, albeit in the nature of tracing the proceeds of property instead of consequential damages. *See, e.g.*, Profeta v. Lombardo, 600 N.E.2d 360, 361-64 (Ohio App. 1991) (allowing recovery of compensatory damages equal to the amount realized on a subsequent sale of property fraudulently transferred). Other authority addresses the availability of monetary relief for purposes of assessing the right to a jury trial on the issue, Hansard Const. Corp. v. Rite Aid of Florida, Inc., 783 So. 2d 307, 308-09 (Fla. App. 2001), or in other circumstances not referencing a right to recover consequential damages. Morris v. Askeland Enterprises, Inc., 17 P.3d 830, 831-33 (Colo. App. 2000) (holding punitive damages unavailable under the UFTA under a principle that punitive damages are not available in equitable actions, in connection with monetary award for fraudulent transfer of funds from corporation to sole shareholder).
If the costs are instead allocated to professionals who advise distressed corporations, those costs will be reflected in prices charged distressed corporations by the professionals.

In either case, the costs will be reflected in what corporations are charged, but that does not mean that they will have the same effect. Even if the costs are passed on to the same aggregate extent, the costs will not necessarily be ultimately imposed on debtor corporations in the same way. There will be a variation in the impact on market prices if the parties on whom the law may initially impose the costs vary in terms of their ability to discriminate among their customers along two dimensions. The discrimination can be (i) in the form of identifying those debtors likely to create costs imposed externally and (ii) in the form of varying pricing among customers. It would appear that third party professionals engaged by distressed firms would necessarily be better at the former. An investment bank assisting in recapitalizing a distressed firm necessarily knows the firm is in distress. A creditor extending long-term credit, on the other hand, may do so long in advance of the financial distress. Such a creditor would have to spread at least some of the potential costs of distress over many debtors (including some that would never become insolvent).

By definition, a distressed firm would be in distress when deciding whether it should engage in an action potentially governed by *Credit Lyonnais* principles that creates external costs. On the other hand, costs imposed on third party creditors who could allocate the expected value of the costs in advance of distress would necessarily not influence debtors’ decision-making when in distress. That is because the fee charged a distressed firm frequently would, at that point in time, be sunk (although judiciously crafted covenants might nevertheless influence decision-making35). Relieving of liability parties necessary for distressed firms to take acts that impose external costs of their actions will necessarily produce more of those actions.

To be clear, this discussion does not conclude that liability should be imposed on these third party professionals. The only conclusion stated here is that it makes a difference whom the duty is imposed upon. One can make a plausible argument that liability should not be imposed on the third party professionals. The potential liability imposed on a third party professionals.

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35 *Cf.* Barondes, *supra* note 1, at 51-59 (discussing covenants in financial instruments and cross-defaults).
professional found to have aided and abetted an action resulting in an ultimate insolvency can be quite large. Imposition of this liability may cause the best professionals to avoid doing business with distressed firms.\textsuperscript{36} Large potential liabilities would create incentives for doing this kind of work favoring professional firms that could externalize the cost of a large judgment for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty (e.g., thinly capitalized firms). It is not clear that it is ultimately desirable to create disincentives for large, highly sophisticated professional firms to advise distressed firms. The distressed firms may ultimately get worse advice. Of course, to reach a definitive conclusion, one would also need to consider the extent to which all professionals could segregate potential liability through, for example, incorporation of separate entities.

Thus, the principal purpose of the discussion in this subpart is limited. It identifies one context in which whether the Credit Lyonnais duties are affirmatively enforceable can alter the extent to which parties are granted a right to a remedy, in a way that will influence market conduct. The issue is therefore not moot.

III. ANALOGOUS ISSUES CREATED BY PREFERRED STOCK

As a final preliminary matter of background, it also should be noted that issues of directors dealing with conflicting constituencies is not unique to conflicts between creditors and stockholders in distressed corporations. Although this paper is not the place to provide a comprehensive recounting of how legal principles of corporate finance have regulated conflicts between holders of preferred stock and common stock, it bears mention that these conflicts have been litigated in a variety of contexts. Three types of contexts of these disputes are identified below, to provide a sense of how courts have gone about resolving conflicts between holders of claims having conflicting interests.

The first illustration involves anti-dilution provisions. Well-drafted anti-dilution provisions typically provide that, after an extraordinary event, convertible stock will be convertible into whatever property the holder would have received in the extraordinary event had the stock been

\textsuperscript{36} Cf. Royce de R. Barondes et al., Underwriters’ Counsel as Gatekeeper or Turnstile: An Empirical Analysis of Law Firm Prestige and Performance in IPOs, at 26 (n.d.) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (asserting potential liability may be a factor in a complex mechanism by which the level of law firm compensation is set, accounting for a matching in reputation levels of clients and law firms).
converted immediately before the event. However, various circumstances may cause holders of preferred stock to seek protections above those that have been bargained for by contract. Courts typically hold that holders of preferred stock are limited to the express protection provided by contract.

The second illustration involves payment of dividends on preferred stock. Preferred stock frequently provides that arrearages on dividends prevent payment on junior stock, and that some level of continued arrearages will allow the holders of the stock to elect a specified number of directors. Baron v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp. involves a challenge to a board’s failure to declare sufficient dividends on the preferred stock to eliminate the separate right of the preferred stockholders to elect a portion of the board. The court describes the test as follows: “Before a court will interfere with the judgment of a board of directors in refusing to declare dividends, fraud or gross abuse of discretion must be shown. And this is true even if a fund does exist from which dividends could legally be paid.”

In this case as well, then, a court has in large

38 See Mariner LDC v. Stone Container Corp., 729 A.2d 267, 274 (Del. Ch. 1998) (stating, in construing anti-dilution rights, that the rights are principally contractual and that preferences and limitations will not be implied), citing Elliott Associates, L.P. v. Avatex Corp., 715 A.2d 843, 852-53 (Del. 1998); See generally HB Korenvaes Investments, L.P. v. Marriott Corp., 1993 WL 257,422, at *14 (Del. Ch. July 1, 1993) (concluding anti-dilution provisions prohibited dividend that would have resulted in a negative conversion price); DAVID A. DREXLER ET AL., DELAWARE CORPORATION LAW & PRACTICE § 15.13 (through December 2004; Release No. 17) (“[W]here the matter for directorial action directly concerns the preferences or limitations affecting a class or classes of preferred stock, the scope of the directors’ obligation is contractual, and the rights of preferred stockholders vis-a-vis the corporation will generally be measured strictly by the terms of the charter provisions creating such preferences or limitations.”).

It bears mention, however, that in connection with allocation of consideration between holders of preferred stock and holders of common stock, authority provides fiduciary duties may cabin the discretion in allocation of the consideration between the two constituencies. Jedwab v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., 509 A.2d 584, 594 (Del. Ch. 1986) (favorably commenting on plaintiff’s allegation that holders of preferred stock are entitled to a “fair” portion of merger consideration). See generally DREXLER ET AL., supra, § 15.13.

39 Exchange listing requirements may impose this kind of obligation. 
40 337 A.2d 653 (Del. Ch. 1975).
41 Id. at 659. Elsewhere in the opinion the delegation to management seems less clear: “[T]he contractual right to elect a majority of the board continues until the dividends can be made current in keeping with proper corporate management, but that it
measure left the decision to management, few circumstances being triggered by the fraud or gross abuse standard. Burton v. Exxon Corp.\textsuperscript{42} involves payment of dividends on a senior class of preferred stock, the entire class of which was owned by the controlling shareholder, without payment of dividends on a junior class.\textsuperscript{43} The court held the dividend must be judged under the intrinsic fairness test.\textsuperscript{44} Applying the test, the court concluded the test had been met,\textsuperscript{45} rejecting the argument that the funds should have been retained and invested until the firm had sufficient funds to pay dividends in arrears on all classes of preferred stock.\textsuperscript{46}

A third illustration involves a corporation that changed its assets through a combination of conveying some assets to a subsidiary whose stock was spun-off and the acquisition from a controlling stockholder of other assets, ultimately changing the nature of the issuer’s assets.\textsuperscript{47} In dismissing the breach of fiduciary duty claim, the court stated, “When, however, the corporate actions complained of are expressly contemplated by a certificate, the duties and obligations of the corporation and its preferred stockholders are governed exclusively by their contract.”\textsuperscript{48}

In sum, as a general rule, in these disputes between classes of claimants having opposed interests, the courts have simply relegated resolution of the matter to the parties themselves. That approach is desirable. There is a lack of rigorous (meaning well-defined and producing, as applied, a clear unique result) principle to guide an alternative approach.

\textsuperscript{42} 583 F. Supp. 405 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
\textsuperscript{43} \textit{Id.} at 408, 411-12.
\textsuperscript{44} \textit{Id.} at 416.
\textsuperscript{45} \textit{Id.} at 416.
\textsuperscript{46} \textit{Id.} at 419. The analysis includes an interesting turn of phrase: “It is true that stockholders are owners of the corporation and expect to share in its profits. However, these expectations can be crushed. . . . As investors, the stockholders bear the risk that the company may not make profits in which they can share.” \textit{Id.} at 418 (citation omitted).
\textsuperscript{47} Winston v. Mandor, 710 A.2d 835 (Del. Ch. 1997).
\textsuperscript{48} \textit{Id.} at 845 (also denying motion to dismiss claims alleging violation of anti-dilution provisions of preferred stock).
IV. PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE SCOPE OF THE FIDUCIARY DUTY

Part II has identified a circumstance in which whether the principles of *Credit Lyonnais* result in an affirmatively enforceable fiduciary will affect the potential liabilities. That implies further review of the doctrine is warranted.

Properly crafting fiduciary duties requires consideration of the extent to which the duties will affect the performance of distressed corporations. It is helpful as a preliminary matter to set forth a few principles that should guide the analysis of the *Credit Lyonnais* duties. Three of these principles are identified here: *First*, imposition of liability for failure to maximize simultaneously the interests of two constituencies having different interests is not defensible. *Second*, the governing principles should not facilitate self-dealing. *Third*, legal rules should not force distressed firms into insolvency by preventing activities necessary to allow ongoing operations to continue pending resolution of distress, and should not materially impede desirable actions necessary for distressed firms to resolve financial distress.

In advance of reviewing these three principles, it is helpful to note that there are multiple components to traditional fiduciary duties of directors, i.e., the duties absent distress, concerning how the directors consider the interests of the stockholders. The duties contemplated by *Credit Lyonnais*, however, are *sui generis*. In part they necessarily are so, because they form a transition between two regimes—management of the clearly solvent firm and management of the insolvent firm—that involve qualitatively different duties to the ultimate beneficiaries, the stockholders and the creditors, respectively. For example, Delaware law has long permitted disparate treatment of creditors by those managing an insolvent corporation. On the other hand, disparate treatment of shares of the

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49 Asmussen v. Quaker City Corp., 156 A. 180 (Del. Ch. 1931) ("[T]he weight of authority favors the view that as among creditors, no trust exists which prevents the directors of an insolvent corporation from preferring some over others, notwithstanding the corporation is in failing circumstances and manifestly headed for disaster.").

On a complementary level, exercise of creditors’ rights against a distressed debtor by a creditor who is a majority stockholder may not be burdened by a fiduciary duty flowing to the debtor. *See* Odyssey Partners, L.P. v. Fleming Cos., 735 A.2d 386, 388, 406 & n.18 (Del. Ch. 1999) (stating, as to actions by Fleming, the debtor's majority stockholder and sole secured creditor, “Fleming is said to have breached its fiduciary duties by exercising de facto control over ABCO and a majority of its directors, in such a manner as to ‘frustrate or foil’ ABCO’s efforts to raise needed financing or capital, in
same class ordinarily would not be permitted.\textsuperscript{50} Thus, in the transitional area, there must be differential treatment of some of the duties that normally appertain for the benefit of the pertinent constituency, the stockholders or the creditors—some of the duties must disappear but others simply shift.

These three principles do not have the same impact on all components of directors’ customary fiduciary duties in solvent corporations. The principles may highlight the desirability of restructuring some of the fiduciary duties, but not others, when a corporation is in distress. Yet because these fiduciary duties are \textit{sui generis}, that variation in treatment is not inherently inappropriate.

1. Multiple Principals.

It has long been recognized that a fiduciary cannot simultaneously promote the interests of principals having varying interests.\textsuperscript{51} There is not an obvious reason why liability should be imposed on a class of business participants for failing to perform this impossible task. This provides a justification for the outcomes discussed in Part \textemdash, where in contexts where the parties have negotiated contract provisions addressing extraordinary transactions, courts largely relegate to boards decision-making that involves “pie-splitting” between preferred stockholders and common stockholders.\textsuperscript{52} It would appear to be sufficiently uncontroversial so that additional explanation is unnecessary.

Reference to preferred stock also raises a second issue that further complicates a determination of the proper principles: Even if one includes as constituents only stockholders and creditors as creditors, resolution of

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\textsuperscript{50} E.g., Gann v. Zettler, 60 S.E. 283, 283 (Ga. Ct. App. 1908) (“It is recorded of Him ‘who spake as never man spoke’ that, ‘seeing the multitudes, he went up into a mountain, and when he was set his disciples came unto him; and he opened his mouth and taught them; saying:  * * * *’No man can serve two masters; for either he will hate the one and love the other, or else he will hold to the one and despise the other.” ’ So, also, is our law.”).

\textsuperscript{51} But see Jedwab v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., 509 A.2d 584, 594 (Del. Ch. 1986) (favorably commenting on plaintiff’s allegation that holders of preferred stock are entitled to a “fair” portion of merger consideration).
the issues raised by Credit Lyonnais can involve resolution of competing claims among multiple constituencies. If the point is to have a corporation’s directors promote the interests of the then-current residual claimants, preferred stockholders may be appropriate constituents. Preferred stock frequently will have a liquidation preference. Where the corporation’s net assets are positive but less than that aggregate liquidation preference, preferred stockholders are the residual claimants.

Of course, a corporation may have multiple classes of preferred stock, having varying relative liquidation preferences. Subordinated debt presents similar issues. Where a corporation has negative net assets but can pay senior claims, the subordinated creditors are residual claimants. In sum, there may be a succession of classes of residual claimants as a corporation becomes increasingly distressed. The existence of numerous tranches of potential residual claimants would militate against some affirmatively enforceable duty shifting among constituents of distressed corporations. In those cases, as the number of tranches increases, the burden on management to select the proper constituency increases. As

\[ \text{assets} = \alpha \text{ liabilities} \]

Senior creditors will recover the following, up to the amount of their senior claims:

\[ \frac{\alpha \text{ liabilities}}{\text{senior debt} + \text{subordinated debt}} \frac{\text{senior debt} + \text{subordinated debt} + \text{other debt}}{ \text{senior debt} } \]

For senior creditors to recover in full, the above amount equals \text{senior debt}, which occurs when \[ \alpha = \frac{\text{senior debt}}{\text{senior debt} + \text{subordinated debt}} \]

Of course, when insolvency straddles the amount of debt subordinated, there can be the awkward circumstance of multiple classes of residual claimants who are not \textit{pari passu} (e.g., trade creditors to whom the subordinated creditors were not subordinated). The trade creditors will not be effectively \textit{pari passu} with subordinated creditor, who abruptly become residual claimants when the ratio of the assets of the firm to its liabilities (a ratio less than firms that are insolvent on a balance sheet basis) equals the ratio of the senior debt to the sum of the senior and subordinated debt (as derived below). Trade creditors also will not be \textit{pari passu} with senior creditors whose percentage residual claim changes abruptly in that circumstance as well.

The derivation of the first proposition is as follows:

Define \( \alpha \) as the ratio of the firm’s assets to its liabilities, implying that

\[ \text{assets} = \alpha \text{ liabilities} \]

Senior creditors will recover the following, up to the amount of their senior claims:

\[ \frac{\alpha \text{ liabilities}}{\text{senior debt} + \text{subordinated debt}} \frac{\text{senior debt} + \text{subordinated debt} + \text{other debt}}{ \text{senior debt} } \]

For senior creditors to recover in full, the above amount equals \text{senior debt}, which occurs when

\[ \alpha = \frac{\text{senior debt}}{\text{senior debt} + \text{subordinated debt}} \]

See generally Equity-Linked Investors, L.P. V. Adams, 705 A.2d 1040 (Del. Ch. 1997) (denying holders of preferred stock equitable relief seeking to enjoin a transaction to fund further operations where the corporation had a net worth less than the aggregate liquidation preference of the preferred stock.)
discussed below.\textsuperscript{56} for some types of fiduciary duties, however, this problem is more manageable than others.

2. \textit{Facilitating Self-Dealing.}

A fundamental precept of developed analysis of business organization law is the separation of ownership from control creates incentives for suboptimal behavior.\textsuperscript{57} The problem is particularly acute because the judicial system is not well-crafted to identify some of this suboptimal behavior. An examination of the development of the \textit{Credit Lyonnais} duties should consider the extent to which the principles produce legal rules that make it more difficult for undesirable self-dealing to be identified, and give rise to liability, in judicial proceedings.

3. \textit{Operation of Distressed Firms and Resolution of Distress.}

One focus of the principles governing management of a distressed firm should be maximization of aggregate distressed firm value. That is not to say distributional concerns—how the principles will influence allocation of value among different classes of claimants—are necessarily irrelevant. However, one focus should be whether developing legal principles will impede actions that are collectively desirable. In particular, the developing notions of duties in distressed corporations need to be examined from the perspective of whether they will materially impede the ongoing, i.e., ordinary course, operation of distressed corporations\textsuperscript{58} and whether they will inhibit the formulation, adoption or implementation of desirable attempts to resolve the distress outside the ordinary course.

The existence of affirmatively enforceable fiduciary duties to trade creditors and, perhaps, some other creditors including employees, raises issues that are qualitatively different from the implications of duties owed to shareholders. Continuing operation of a distressed corporation typically will include ongoing contracting with current creditors, such as the purchase of additional inventory and services on trade credit and revision

\textsuperscript{56} See infra note \underline{__} and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{57} See ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 6 (1932) (“The separation of ownership from control produces a condition where the interests of owner and of ultimate manager may, and often do, diverge, and where many of the checks which formerly operated to limit the use of power disappear.”).

\textsuperscript{58} See generally Production Resources Group, L.L.C. v. NCT Group, Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 797 (Del. Ch. 2004) (discussing possible fraud liability for omissions in negotiations with creditors).
of existing employment relationships. A corporation’s relationships with its shareholders certainly can involve post-relationship contracting, e.g., stock buybacks, and frequently does in connection with stock-buybacks triggered by termination of employment. Nevertheless, the scope of the interactions between a distressed corporation and its creditors can be expected to be qualitatively different in frequency from the transactions between a corporation and its shareholders. This qualitative difference creates possible concerns with importing into the regulation of distressed corporations, for the benefit of creditors, certain components of the fiduciary duties that ordinarily apply to solvent corporations. Two that may have a particularly significant impact on the ability of a distressed corporation to continue operations or to resolve its distress are discussed below: a fiduciary’s disclosure obligations in transactions with the beneficiary of the fiduciary duty and a fiduciary’s obligation to assure fair pricing in those transactions.

V. IMPROPERLY FRAMING THE ISSUE AS MERELY A QUESTION OF EXPANDING THE SCOPE OF ACTIVITIES PROTECTED FROM JUDICIAL REVIEW BY THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE

One might argue that the duty initially formulated in Credit Lyonnais simply represents an increase in the scope of directors’ (and potentially officers’) activity that, by virtue of the business judgment rule, is not subject to judicial review. In this view, the principle has a number of components. First, it exculpates directors from liability to creditors for disinterested management decisions, supplementing the limit on liability to the corporation generally applicable when the corporation is solvent. Second, it further restricts the ability of a court to entertain challenges to some managerial decisions in distressed corporations.

A problem with this view is that the law of fiduciary duties applied to distressed corporations should be a comprehensive, internally consistent

59 See infra Part __.
60 See infra Part __.
61 See infra Part __.
62 There appears to be curiously little authority directly addressing the extent to which officers benefit from the business judgment rule. For example, in the preeminent treatise on the business judgment rule, DENNIS J. BLOCK ET AL., THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE: FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS (____ ed. ____ & Supp. ____), identifies only ____ cases addressing the issue, with ____ ruling officers benefit and ____ holding ____. A discussion of the merits of the various positions is beyond the scope of this paper.
whole (the purpose of this paper being to develop some of the components of that whole). The articulation of the issue that Credit Lyonnais identifies also brings to mind other contexts in which the fiduciary duties of distressed firms need to be examined. Four of those contexts are discussed below:

(i) which constituency of a distressed corporation may, by approving a transaction in which management is interested, diminish the judicial scrutiny that would otherwise apply;

(ii) the impact of distress on Revlon duties;

(iii) the impact of distress on the disclosure obligations of distressed corporations to, and other aspects of the negotiation between distressed corporations and, their creditors, including the implications of Malone v. Brincat,\textsuperscript{63} and

(iv) the impact of distress on the manner in which corporations consider corporate opportunities that insiders are interested in taking for themselves.


In discussing whether the refinement in directors’ duties initiated by Credit Lyonnais can be viewed as simply a slight enlargement of the business judgment rule, it is helpful to begin by identifying that rule and the principles underlying its adoption. The fiduciary duties of directors, as cabined by the business judgment rule, are best viewed as reflecting the scope of judicial competence. Lawyers acting in a judicial capacity are not well-suited to reviewing previously made business decisions. Courts are, however, competent to assess the propriety of how the decision-making process was constructed—whether appropriate information was gathered, whether appropriate experts were consulted and whether there were conflicts of interest that could have affected the outcome. Recognition of this limit on judicial competence is reflected in the business judgment rule,\textsuperscript{64} a principle which has been described as follows:

\textsuperscript{63} 722 A.2d 5 (Del. 1998).
The business judgment rule has been well formulated by Aronson and other cases. See, e.g., Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812 (“It is a presumption that in making a business decision the directors ... acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the corporation.”). Thus, directors’ decisions will be respected by courts unless the directors are interested or lack independence relative to the decision, do not act in good faith, act in a manner that cannot be attributed to a rational business purpose or reach their decision by a grossly negligent process that includes the failure to consider all material facts reasonably available.65

2. Fairness Review in Distressed Firms; Earn-Outs

**De Facto Elimination of Fairness Review in Distressed Firms.** Of course, the business judgment rule does not, as an initial matter, insulate decision-making involving conflicts of interest. Under Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.66 and its progeny, “[a] controlling or dominating shareholder standing on both sides of a transaction, as in a parent-subsidiary context, bears the burden of proving its entire fairness.”67 Procedurally, 

[t]he initial burden of establishing entire fairness rests upon the party who stands on both sides of the transaction. However, an approval of the transaction by an independent committee of directors or an informed majority of minority shareholders shifts the burden of proof on the issue of fairness from the controlling or dominating shareholder to the challenging shareholder-plaintiff.68

Alternatively, some Delaware authority indicates that where the disposition involves an interested party transaction with one not considered to control the corporation, informed approval in good faith by a

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65 Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 n.66 (Del. 2000).
66 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
68 Kahn, 638 A.2d at 1117 (citation omitted). See generally In re Emerging Communications, Inc. S’holders Litig., 2004 WL 1305745 at *31 (Del. Ch. May 3, 2004) (burden of proof not shifted by approval by special committee and minority stockholders where company disclosed some projections but failed to disclose more recent projections).
majority of disinterested stockholders subjects the transaction to review under the business judgment rule.\textsuperscript{69}

The question arises of how a court will interpret these judicially crafted provisions in the context of a distressed corporation.\textsuperscript{70} What constituency’s approval, if any, would be sufficient to shift the burden to those challenging the transaction? A combination of constituencies voting collectively would be problematic. There is not a clear mechanism for relatively weighting various constituencies, and leaving the weighting to management creates problems. One can expect constituencies to have differing desires. Requiring separate votes of and approval by creditors and stockholders is likely not to result in both constituencies approving (to say nothing were there separate classes of each). Because management can play a key role in running a reorganized firm,\textsuperscript{71} it does not seem prudent to adopt a principle under which disinterested approval cannot be obtained and the burden of proving the fairness of the transaction is kept on managers.

If the constituency to be promoted is left to management to identify, which would be one extension of the business judgment approach to understanding Credit Lyonnais duties, management will have much greater flexibility to defend inefficient self-dealing by carefully selecting a constituency or combination of constituencies whose interests are allegedly being promoted. For example, any voluntary sale in which a class of creditors, the common stockholders or a class of preferred stock voluntarily participated might be sustainable, the voluntary participation of one of these classes suggesting, at least in some cases, that the

\textsuperscript{69} In re Wheelabrator Technologies, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, 663 A.2d 1194, 1203-04 (Del. Ch. 1995) (“Even if the ratified transaction does not involve a controlling stockholder, the result would not be to extinguish a duty of loyalty claim. In such cases the Supreme Court has held that the effect of shareholder ratification is to make business judgment the applicable review standard and shift the burden of proof to the plaintiff stockholder.”).

\textsuperscript{70} See generally In re Aluminum Mills Corp., 132 B.R. 869, 891 n.21 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1991) (stating shareholder ratification merely estops the shareholders, it “does not apply in the context of the liquidation of an insolvent company, for in such a case, it is the creditors who will benefit from a recovery” (quoting In re Western World Funding, Inc., 52 B.R. 743, 772 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1985))).

particular constituents approve, or will approve if required to vote separately.\footnote{See generally \textit{In re} Emerging Communications, Inc. S’holders Litig., 2004 WL 1305745 at *31 (Del. Ch. May 3, 2004) (“But no Delaware case has held that burden-shifting can be accomplished by a tender of shares rather than by an actual vote.”).}

In sum, the contours of fiduciary duties in distressed corporations need to be formulated to address more than ex post creditor complaints concerning whether the corporation was well-managed. They also need to identify the constituency whose approval of an interested-director or interested-controlling-shareholder transaction can shift the burden of proof to those challenging the transaction.

A process allowing this kind of approval is needed as part of implementing a process that prevents conflict-of-interest transactions produced by improper self-dealing. One supposes whose approval would be required to shift the burden of proof would need to be the constituency whose interests the board is to promote at that time. Were the two not the same, the disinterested approval might frequently be withheld simply because the potentially approving constituency sought more of the “pie,” i.e., the disapproval might be for reasons other than that the transaction improperly represented managerial self-dealing.

If the selection of the constituency to be promoted in that context is simply delegated to management, that choice is likely to remove from judicial oversight a material percentage of transactions designed to resolve financial distress in which management personally participates.\footnote{See generally supra note 71.} That delegation could effectively eviscerate the fairness obligations in conflict-of-interest transactions with distressed firms.

\textbf{Uncertainty in Structuring the Terms of Extraordinary Transactions—Earn-outs.} Under Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.\footnote{506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986)} and its progeny, “in a sale of corporate control the responsibility of the directors is to get the highest value reasonably attainable for the shareholders.”\footnote{Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1288 (Del. 1988).} For a number of reasons, a final period resolution of a distressed corporation is particularly likely to be found substantively objectionable to at least one constituency. It is well-understood among financial economists and legal scholars that leverage can create incentives for a stylized corporation being managed on behalf
of its stockholders to invest in negative return activities because the risk of failure can be disproportionately borne by creditors.\textsuperscript{76} Famous footnote fifty-five of \textit{Credit Lyonnais}\textsuperscript{77} reflects this principle.

The converse incentive also can exist in a distressed corporation being managed for the benefit of its creditors. Creditors, who have capped claims, would not benefit from the incremental value of strategies that increase a stylized firm’s value over the amount of the creditors’ claims. Admittedly, this broad statement of principle is somewhat incomplete. A creditor whose claims are not immediately due may benefit from increased current value to the debtor. Such a creditor is ultimately concerned about solvency when its claim becomes due and payable, and increases in current solvency can make it more likely the debtor will be solvent when the creditor is to be paid. Nevertheless, just as the fact that the possibility that adverse outcomes will disproportionately be borne by creditors can influence the incentives of a firm managed for the benefit of its stockholders, the possibility that positive outcomes will be disproportionately benefit stockholders can alter the incentives of a distressed firm managed for the benefit of creditors.

This concern is not simply theoretical. One basic issue in the structuring of a sale of a firm is whether the purchase price will include deferred payments based on the firm’s post-sale performance, sometimes called “earn-outs.”\textsuperscript{78} If the distressed firm can negotiate a non-contingent


\textsuperscript{78} Maier defines “earn-out” provisions as follows: “Sometimes a portion of the consideration payable to the shareholders of the target company will be contingent on the future productivity of the target company or (less commonly) on the productivity of the
sale price component at least equal to the aggregate amount of the creditors’ claims, a seller managed for the benefit of the creditors alone will be indifferent to the amount of any additional contingent compensation. This conclusion represents a context-specific application of the more general point, that has been previously made, concerning the desire of creditors to “collapse [the] probability distribution[]” of potential outcomes. Of course, the shareholders, and a hypothetical constituent seeking to maximize aggregate firm value, would not be indifferent.

Use of contingent compensation can be important in allowing a seller to maximize the value it realizes. It can mitigate informational disadvantages a buyer has that may otherwise yield lower purchase prices. Adoption of legal principles that shift incentives for using contingent compensation are therefore of potential concern.

**Identifying a Principle for Resolving the Duties.** *Credit Lyonnais* identifies an issue that, on reflection, cannot be summarily resolved by simply asserting that when a corporation becomes distressed, directors are given greater leeway to promote nonshareholder constituencies. Two possible theoretical concerns have been noted in the context of extraordinary transactions designed to resolve distress. First, that approach, delegating to management the authority to decide which constituency to promote, would eviscerate fairness review as to many distressed corporations; some class of participating constituents would consent. Second, creditors and stockholders of distressed firms may have diametrically opposed views concerning the use of a customary compensation provision in the sale of a business—an earn-out. Earn-outs can be beneficial in mitigating the adverse consequences of information asymmetries between buyers and sellers. Elimination of their use in the

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A circumstance that might be considered analogous is presented in *McMullin v. Beran*, 765 A.2d 910 (Del. 2000). In that case, the Delaware Supreme Court held that minority shareholders had properly pleaded violations of fiduciary duties of directors in connection with the negotiation and approval of a sale of a majority-owned subsidiary in connection with, inter alia, improper emphasis on the controlling stockholder’s desire for immediate receipt of cash. *Id.* at 921-23.
disposition of distressed corporations is therefore likely not to be joint wealth maximizing. However, promoting consideration of creditors’ interests could require avoiding this structure.

These theoretical concerns are accompanied by post-Credit Lyonnais authority examining the final period resolution of a distressed corporation. A few courts have noted a tension between typical board fiduciary duties on the sale of a firm and the altered fiduciary duties arising on distress or insolvency. One court stated, “It is commonplace to say that the directors of [the debtor] (due to its balance sheet insolvency) owed a fiduciary duty to the Noteholders in considering the authorization of the Merger. It is a more difficult proposition to apply that legal precept to the facts presented in this case.”

As recently noted by the court in Production Resources Group, L.L.C. v. NCT Group, Inc., the decision in Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc. highlights that the issues identified in Credit Lyonnais are problematic upon disposition of the firm. In Omnicare, the court found to be an unlawful abdication of an insolvent corporation’s directorial authority the entering-into of deal protection provisions for a merger agreement designed “to assure that the creditors were paid in full and that the stockholders received the highest value available for their stock.” Significantly, the opinion references the minority stockholders, i.e., not the creditors of the insolvent

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80 On the other hand, the court in Wiebolt Stores, Inc. v. Schottenstein, 94 B.R. 488 (N.D. Ill. 1988), rejected the argument of the former directors of an allegedly insolvent corporation that their Revlon duties sanctioned their approval of an LBO. Id. at 510. The court held this rationale to be inapplicable because the sale of the firm was not inevitable. Id. That approach could produce a curious outcome; if the sale became inevitable by virtue of greater distress, the board then would not have to consider creditors’ interests.

81 Angelo, Gordon & Co. v. Allied Riser Comm. Corp., 805 A.2d 221, 226, 228 (Del. Ch. 2002) (examining a transaction that, in the view of the creditor’s board, enhanced the likelihood of debt repayment).

82 863 A.2d 772, 788 n.51 (Del. Ch. 2004) (referencing “a decision that arguably reflects a very different perspective than Credit Lyonnais”)

83 818 A.2d 914 (Del. 2003).

84 The agreement provided that the board would submit the plan to the stockholders for their approval even if the board subsequently withdrew its recommendation of the transaction, id. at 933 (referencing Delaware General Corporation Law § 251(c) (___)), and omitted a fiduciary-out. Id. at 936. Approval was assured because stock held by controlling stockholders, who were directors, was also irrevocably agreed to be voted in favor of the transaction. Id.

85 Id. at 938.
corporation, in identifying the beneficiaries of fiduciary duties whose interests had been inadequately protected by the directors.\textsuperscript{86}

Proceeding on the assumption that it is desirable to allow distress to be resolved outside of bankruptcy proceedings, the need to allow review of managerial decision-making for purposes of decreasing self-dealing indicates that it will not be efficient to allow managers to determine at the time of distress whose interest to promote. The determination needs to be made ex ante, so that there is a constituency that can bring an action monitoring management.

Characterizing the rights of potential constituents as options illuminates the issue. Banks and other creditors who provide capital frequently will have bargained for certain express rights to participate in the management of a corporation. Some of the more intrusive powers to influence management will be actuated when financial distress triggers covenants allowing acceleration of indebtedness.\textsuperscript{87} The point of these rights is to give these creditors the ability to monitor how the business is being run, and the ability to require that corrective action be taken while the debtor is still capable of being rescued.

Making creditors the intended\textsuperscript{88} beneficiaries of fiduciary duties is different from making stockholders the intended beneficiaries of the duties. Creditors will have retained the ability to challenge actions the creditors wish the corporation to undertake. Imposing a separate fiduciary duty owed to creditors of these distressed firms gives creditors two sets of rights: either the creditors can intervene, using the expressly negotiated rights, or the creditors can choose not to intervene, relying on the possibility that if things do not turn out well, they can bring a claim for breach of fiduciary duty.

Consider a distressed firm considering two courses of action, A and B. The distress, triggering covenants, may have given some creditors the ability to influence the choice. Assume the creditors desire choice A. If the corporation’s management chooses A, the creditors will not object, the course will be pursued, and the creditors will have retained some ability to challenge the propriety of the action as a breach of fiduciary duty. If the

\textsuperscript{86} Id. at 937.

\textsuperscript{87} See supra note 35.

\textsuperscript{88} Of course, some of these fiduciary duties cannot be directly enforced by shareholders, but can only be enforced in a derivative capacity. Solely for purposes of ease of explication, much of the discussion in this paper elides that distinction.
corporation’s management chooses $B$, the creditors will object and force the selection of choice $A$.

That does not mean management would be helpless in this circumstance. It could seek express approval of any action, as part of seeking to estop the creditors in any subsequent challenge. This would be similar to the approval of the fairness of management conflict-of-interest transactions discussed above,\textsuperscript{89} but it would be more burdensome because it would also apply to the wider array of transactions in which management is disinterested. That process, if frequently invoked, would deviate from what one normally envisions as the efficient delegation of decision-making to informed directors (and the officers they appoint).

**Balancing Representation to Replicate Aggregate Wealth Maximization.** Part of the customary fiduciary duty scheme seems well-designed, perhaps inadvertently, to accommodate issues of distressed corporations. Under *Time*, part of what is delegated to directors is the determination of the time horizon considered by directors in managing a corporation.\textsuperscript{90} Selection of the time horizon can be particularly important in allocating value between creditors and equityholders in distressed corporations.\textsuperscript{91} There may be a schizophrenic quality to the management of a distressed corporation as a result. Unless management seeks to promote the interests of creditors, managerial decision-making may be subject to being overruled piecewise as to activities implicating contractual approval requirements.

Yet keeping this issue—the time horizon—within those delegated to management may give management sufficient flexibility to accommodate goals of maximizing aggregate wealth within the contours of decision-making subject to limited review by creditors having focused (contractually-negotiated) approval rights. Because creditors will have express rights to intrude into decision-making that are not accompanied by a comparable right in stockholders, creditors may have relatively more ability to influence choices that have an impact on the time horizon being pursued. It is possible that, where promotion of the interests of the creditors may not reflect the time horizon in the best interests of all constituencies collectively, having fiduciary duties owed to stockholders may be helpful in providing balance in management.

\textsuperscript{89} See supra ___.
\textsuperscript{90} See supra ___.
\textsuperscript{91} See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
Conclusions. These concerns might be harmonized in the following conclusions. First, the application of the business judgment rule should, if anything, be stronger, not weaker, as to claims by creditors in connection with alleged breaches of duties of care. When creditors have the ability to influence management decisions but nevertheless allow management to proceed in a particular way, those creditors should be, if anything, more limited in their ability to challenge the activity ex post. Any other outcome creates an option. The option is undesirable because, inter alia, it will be difficult to price ex ante, suggesting that creditors will not pay for the option ex ante. It is also problematic because it needlessly enhances potential personal liability of directors, which is not desirable insofar as these individuals are risk-averse. Thus, the trend toward applying the business judgment rule in claims by creditors and toward enforcing against creditors charter provisions limiting director liability to creditors is desirable.

92 E.g., Pereira v. Farace, 413 F.3d 330, 342 (2d Cir. 2005) (charter provision eliminating director liability to the fullest extent permitted by law prevents assertion by trustee, whether brought on behalf of the corporation or on behalf of the creditors, seeking monetary damages against directors for breach of duty of care; applying Delaware law); Angelo, Gordon & Co. v. Allied Riser Comm. Corp., 805 A.2d 221, 229 (Del. Ch. 2002) (“My preliminary view is that, even where the law recognizes that the duties of directors encompass the interests of creditors, there is room for application of the business judgment rule.”); Continuing Creditors’ Committee of Star Telecommunications Inc. v. Edgecomb, Civil Action No. 03-278-KAJ, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25807, at *35-38 (Dec. 21, 2004); see Weaver v. Kellogg, 216 B.R. 563, 584 (S.D. Tex. 1997) (implicitly approving application of the business judgment rule in claims of mismanagement of a distressed corporation); cf. LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. Perelman, 82 F. Supp. 2d 279, 288, 292 (D. Del. 2000) (discussing actions in implementing a recapitalization developed one month before a voluntary bankruptcy petition was filed, where the debtor’s reorganization was not approved by the bankruptcy court until one and one-half years later); cf. In re RegO Co., 623 A.2d 92 (Del.Ch.,1992) (“When directors of a dissolved Delaware corporation are, during the course of winding-up corporate affairs, required to make decisions affecting various classes of interest holders, they are protected from liability in doing so, so long as they act disinterestedly, with due care and in good faith. Devereux v. Berger, 264 Md. 20, 284 A.2d 605 (1971); In re Xonics Systems, 99 B.R. 870 (Bkrtcy.N.D.Ill.1989).”); see generally Dennis J. Connolly & Wendy R. Reiss, Second Circuit Says Exculpation Provisions Apply to Trustee Claims Against Directors, AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE JOURNAL, Sept. 2005, at 26; Growe v. Bedard, No. 03-198-B-S, 2004 WL 2,677,216 (D. Me. Nov. 23, 2004); Steinberg v. Kendig (In re Ben Franklin Retail Stores Inc.), No. 97C7934, 2000 WL 28,266 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 12, 2000).

93 E.g., Production Resources Group, L.L.C. v. NCT Group, Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 798 (Del. Ch. 2004).
Second, determination of the appropriate time-horizon for measuring firm strategies should continue to be delegated to management notwithstanding distress. If the obligation were to follow creditors’ desires, the principle could drive managers to ignore future profits not inuring to the benefit of creditors having capped claims.

Third, the fiduciary duties to maximize firm value on the sale of a solvent but distressed firm should continue to be owed to stockholders. In some distressed firms, creditors will have bargained for express approval rights. However, neither constituency’s interests will be directly aligned with the interests of the constituencies as a whole. Requiring that directors seek to promote the interests of stockholders creates a balance in which the competing interests can be resolved through negotiation at which both creditors, having whatever express approval rights they have negotiated, and equityholders are represented. Creation of a model of resolution of final-period problems based on bargaining between competing constituencies is likely superior to requiring directors simultaneously maximize the returns to constituencies having competing interests. It also creates a single constituency whose interests are to be promoted, which limits the ability of management to cloak self-dealing by purporting to represent a non-common stockholder constituency. And it allows a single constituency to approve a conflict-of-interest transaction, shifting the burden of proof as to fairness, retaining the ability of some independent group (the stockholders) to act as a check on managerial self-dealing.

Waiver. A final question is the extent to which these duties should be waivable. At the moment, only tentative observations, not firm conclusions, have been developed. Although at the moment empirical evidence is not being supplied to support the proposition, one might hypothesize that it is particularly important to focus on restraining self-dealing when assessing whether these duties can be revised by agreement (a charter provision or the like). It has been noted by others that one of the advantages of property rules is that they create uniform sets of rights. The

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94 Cf. C-T of Virginia, Inc. v. Barrett (In re C-T of Virginia, Inc.), 958 F.2d 606, 612 (4th Cir. 1992) (stating, in rejecting one party’s argument that consideration received by stockholders in the firm’s acquisition in a reverse triangular merger constituted a distribution subject to limits on corporate dividends, that it would impracticable for directors to fulfill Revlon duties in maximizing sales price in an acquisition structured as a merger if the directors also had to consider whether the acquiror would remain solvent following the sale).
point is that, in some contexts, they allow efficient abstraction—the rights are the rights, and one need not separately investigate the scope of rights that are the subject of market transactions. A limited set of rights also facilitates comparison between possible investments in corporations.

This principle also has been applied to corporation law. If we have “corporations” that have different rules pertaining to how self-dealing in distress is controlled, there will be additional costs in ascertaining the operative rules for individual corporations. The expenditure would be beneficial to make on an individual basis because, as distress approaches, those with greater knowledge will be more likely to sell their ownership stakes to those who are less-informed. However, the fact that it would be beneficial to some to make these expenditures does justify creating a legal scheme that makes the expenditures desirable on an individual basis. In the aggregate, the expenditures represent the costs to assemble information that is only valuable by virtue of the pertinent legal rule. No one would have to make the expenditures if legal rules did not allow for multiple possible relationships. At the moment, no empirical evidence is being presented that the value from allowing, for example, corporations to elect to have the burden of proof of fairness of conflict-of-interest transactions shift on distress to approval by creditors. All that can be said is that it is not clear that the aggregate value of allowing this would exceed the aggregate cost arising from investigating whether particular corporations had adopted such provisions.

3. Fairness of Terms Negotiated with Creditors; Disclosure Obligations.

Consideration of Credit Lyonnais raises the issue of how any duties owed to non-shareholder constituencies will influence a distressed corporation’s dealings with its creditors. Typically, of course, a corporation’s contracting with trade creditors is the product of ordinary

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96 There are also distributional concerns. Less-informed investors would be less likely to investigate, and would therefore be more likely to be disadvantaged. The costs of allowing waiver would need to include precaution costs expended by less-informed investors, e.g., in the hiring of investment advisors, any consequences of disproportionate bearing of these costs on persons particularly more risk-averse than others and the possibility that those with access to the information would use it as part of implicit commercial bribery to influence other corporate decisionmaking (e.g., an investment firm providing the information in advance to “favored” customers who may steer future business, in the same way that initial public offerings have been allocated in the past).
market transactions in which the corporation is not required to defer to the interests of the creditors. The traditional rule as to employment relationships is the same—in negotiating the terms of an employee’s compensation, the parties are not fiduciaries of each other.\footnote{97}

Somewhat anomalous in this regard is the application of federal insider trading prohibitions on the sale of shares, which in market transactions could easily be to persons who are not already shareholders.\footnote{98} Nevertheless, insider trading prohibitions apply to a fiduciary’s sales of shares on the basis of material nonpublic information.\footnote{99} Thus, a full extension upon distress or insolvency of the fiduciary duties owed to stockholders could appertain to each extension of credit in distress or in insolvency. Of course, federal insider trading principles would not apply to most extensions of credit, as they would not involve the sale of a security.\footnote{100} But, on a similar theory, a court applying general state anti-fraud provisions, i.e., fraud provisions not limited to the purchase or sale of a security, could find fiduciary obligations applying in a transaction creating the fiduciary relationship.

Of course, a determination that fiduciary obligations did not apply to a transaction creating a fiduciary relationship would not dispose of the issue of the nature of fiduciary obligations owed creditors of distressed corporations. In the course of normal operations, distressed corporations will contract with existing creditors, and the issue of the scope of fiduciary duties appertaining to that contracting requires resolution. Two types of duties are discussed below: \textit{First,} a court could seek to reform the process by which these contracts are negotiated by imposing disclosure obligations that would not appertain in market transactions between independent parties. \textit{Second,} a court could impose a fairness obligation.

\textbf{Disclosure.} Particularly thorny consequences of classifying creditors as beneficiaries of fiduciary duties of distressed corporations are raised by disclosure obligations of fiduciaries. There are two possible theories giving rise to altered disclosure obligations. In some contexts, when a fiduciary contract with the beneficiaries of the duties, the fiduciary operates under heightened disclosure obligations, even as to transactions


\footnote{99} \textit{Id.}

\footnote{100} \textit{See} 15 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5\textit{(_ )} (200\textit{_}).
that are not modifications of relationships that gave rise to the fiduciary obligation. Transactions between a corporation and its stockholders alleging breach of fiduciary duty typically, however, involve transactions in the securities, which raises substantial questions concerning whether other transactions, e.g., transactions not involving the instrument creating the beneficiary relationship, would trigger disclosure obligations. However, *Malone v. Brincat* suggests another basis for duties concerning disclosure. In that case, the Delaware Supreme Court stated:

> When the directors are not seeking shareholder action, but are deliberately misinforming shareholders about the business of the corporation, either directly or by a public statement, there is a violation of fiduciary duty. That violation may result in a derivative claim on behalf of the corporation or a cause of action for damages. There may also be a basis for equitable relief to remedy the violation.

The *Brincat* opinion at times seems to peg the duty to the fact that the stockholders elected the directors. At other points, however, the opinion indicates these duties “derive[] from the combination of the fiduciary duties of care, loyalty and good faith.”

Conceptualizing creditors as beneficiaries of fiduciary obligations can significantly affect how a distressed corporation is required to be run. Consider, for example, subsequent purchases of goods or services on trade credit. Imposing a fiduciary duty of candor to creditors would require greater disclosure of the corporation’s financial position.

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outstanding debt at reduced prices, perhaps as part of an exchange offer.\footnote{See, e.g., Allen L. Weingarten, Consensual Non-Bankruptcy Restructuring of Public Debt Securities, 23 SEC. & COMMODITIES REG. 159, 161 (Sept. 19, 1990).} In the face of sparse authority, there has been some disagreement in the literature concerning whether traditional norms, i.e., principles not arising from Credit Lyonnais, impose disclosure obligations on the corporation.\footnote{Insert, e.g., In re Worlds of Wonder Securities Litigation, 1990 WL 260,675 (N. D. Cal. Oct 19, 1990) (discussing insider trading claim asserted by holders of convertible bonds); DONALD C. LANGEVOORT INSIDER TRADING REGULATION, ENFORCEMENT, AND PREVENTION § 3:12 (Database updated June 2005) (“The approach more consistent with Chiarella is that no abstain or disclose obligation arises in connection with trading in debt securities, leaving liability in such a case to rest on the misappropriation theory . . . .”); Richard Hall, Recent Developments in Duties of Disclosure and Candor, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INSTITUTE: BLUEPRINT FOR GOOD GOVERNANCE IN THE 1990S, at 719, 727 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 1053, 1998) (“It is not clear whether the requirement that an issuer not be trading in its own securities applies to repurchases of debt securities or equity securities other than common stock. As the analytic basis for the disclosure requirement under Rule 10b-5 is the fiduciary duty owed to certain securityholders, the better view seems to be that repurchases of debt securities and preferred stock (at least non-convertible preferred stock) should not give rise to any disclosure requirement.”).}

A disclosure obligation could materially influence the outcome of attempted debt repurchases not accompanied by a simultaneous exchange offer (a simultaneous exchange offer, on the other hand, could impose candor obligations\footnote{See Weingarten, supra note 107, at 163-65.).}

Debt repurchases may be a single component of a multi-part plan of recapitalization. For example, additional equity may be contemplated. Plans for subsequent equity infusions could well be material to bondholders deciding whether to accept a repurchase offer. Application of fiduciary duties would clarify the pertinent legal landscape, affecting the efficacy of debt repurchases in resolving distress.

Whether a corporation should be able to repurchase its debt without disclosing other material plans is a complex subject, whose analysis is beyond the scope of this paper. The point being made here is more limited: treating creditors as the beneficiaries of a corporation’s fiduciary duties will, as to distressed corporations, influence this currently open issue of law. The decision is consequential in this context.

Moreover, because a corporation’s operations typically involve greater ongoing communication between the firm and its creditors than between the firm and its stockholders—communication that is much more
voluminous—the disclosure obligation under Brincat could be implicated in numerous communications with creditors. The required communications could accelerate exercise of creditors’ remedies and limit the corporation’s options in resolving distress.

**Fair Terms.** Fiduciary duties in some contexts require that any contract between the fiduciary and the beneficiary of the duty be on fair terms. The precise contours of such a duty to stockholders are, unfortunately, not entirely clear. For example, Loewenstein and Wang have recently noted:

> On the more general question as to whether the corporation owes fiduciary duties to an individual stockholder, the decided cases are surprisingly mixed. Some courts hold, as a general proposition, that a corporation does owe a fiduciary duty to an individual shareholder, while others conclude the opposite. Possibly, in some jurisdictions, a company otherwise has no fiduciary duty to an individual stockholder, but does breach a fiduciary duty to a shareholder from whom it purchases stock without disclosing material, nonpublic information. Obviously, from a doctrinal viewpoint, this is troubling. So, from the initial question noted above, one is led quickly to the general question of the corporate fiduciary duty to an individual stockholder and its implications.\(^{110}\)

Transactions in the securities themselves, i.e., repurchases, to which Cox, Hazen and O’Neal indicate “[d]isclosure obligations clearly attach,”\(^ {111}\) are perhaps most likely to give rise to fairness obligations as well.\(^ {112}\) However, because the contours of the actual duties to stockholders are different from other fiduciary duties\(^ {113}\) and are also not

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\(^{111}\) JAMES D. COX ET AL., CORPORATIONS § 21.8, at ___ n.13 (___).

\(^{112}\) One potentially relevant case is *Birbeck v. American Toll Bridge Co. of California*, 2 A.2d 158 (Del. Ch. 1938), a case involving stockholders who exchanged their stock for stock in a second, newly-formed corporation in a transaction organized by officers of the corporation. The court ordered cancelation, as a “secret” profit, of stock acquired by those officers in the successor corporation disproportionate to their interests in the initial corporation. *Id.* at 165.

\(^{113}\) An interesting adverse relationship between a controlling stockholder and the corporation was at issue in *Odyssey Partners, L.P. v. Fleming Cos.*, 735 A.2d 386, 388, 406 & n.18 (Del. Ch. 1999). The court indicated that a controlling stockholders’
fully formulated, it is difficult to assess the extent to which these incompletely formulated fiduciary duties would be revised upon distress.  

A final wrinkle involves principles governing close corporations. Some jurisdictions, notably including Massachusetts and excluding Delaware, have in the past sought to impose on stockholders of closely held corporations the norms of conduct typically applied to partners in a partnership. Creative counsel might seek to assert in a jurisdiction following this norm that, where a distressed corporation has a relatively small number of creditors, the creditors benefit from fiduciary duties akin to those in partnerships.

**Principles Underlying a Potential Approach.** One may hypothesize that it is relatively unusual for a sophisticated business entity, in the course of negotiations, to seek expressly the right to lie to the other party. That does not mean parties do not lie. Nor does it mean that they do not, in negotiations, recast their desire to avoid liability for false or misleading statements in more palatable terms. A seller of a business might, for example, assert that it is providing all information that it knows but wants to avoid the transaction costs of post-sale squabbles.

A typical formulation of fraud liability, based on one provided by Prosser and Keeton, is as follows: (i) a false representation, ordinarily of fact; (ii) the defendant’s knowledge the statement is false or that he does not have a sufficient basis to make the representation; (iii) an intention to induce the plaintiff to act, or to refrain from acting, in reliance; (iv) justifiable reliance by the plaintiff; and (v) damage.

acquisition of the assignment of a commercial loan made to the corporation is not subject to fiduciary constraints.

114 One potentially analogous case is *PPI Enterprises (U.S.), Inc. v. Del Monte Foods Co.*, 2000 WL 1,425,093, at ___ (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2000). In that case, the court stated that no fiduciary duty owed was owed by corporation directly to holders of preferred stock who were selling the stock. The court consequently dismissed an aiding and abetting claim against investment bank.


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118 This statement is a highly edited version of the elements stated in W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 105, at 728 (W. Page
Consider the nature of the relationship between a distressed corporate debtor and financial creditors (e.g., banks). A debtor might seek to make misleading statements that would influence the creditor in deciding whether to exercise remedies available by virtue of covenant defaults—cause an omission.\textsuperscript{119} In this way, the relationship between the distressed debtor and its trade creditors may be qualitatively different. The distressed debtor may be engaged in ongoing transactions with its trade creditors, and the pending transaction that may be influenced by a misstatement (e.g., the purchase of inventory or raw materials on trade credit) may be patent. One potentially desirable component of an affirmative fiduciary duty to creditors of distressed corporations, then, could be the imposition of a duty, paralleling that formulated in \textit{Brincat}, requiring communications between creditors and distressed debtors be accurate, regardless of whether a transaction was pending.

This proposed principle of corporation law is designed to address management of a corporation, not the general principles of rights creditors have against debtors.\textsuperscript{120} The proposed principle is that misstatements designed to influence whether a creditor exercises contractually acquired rights to control a now-distressed debtor should be actionable without

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{119} The \textit{Brincat} opinion in fact expressly notes that the plaintiffs allegedly did not sell and therefore did not have a claim under federal securities law. 722 A.2d at 13.
\item \textsuperscript{120} But cf. ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 91-92 (1986) (identifying as principles that should collectively produce a coherent body of law principles of veil piercing, fraudulent conveyance and equitable subordination). See generally C-T of Virginia, Inc. v. Barrett (\textit{In re C-T of Virginia, Inc.}), 958 F.2d 606, 613 (4th Cir. 1992) (noting the availability of fraudulent conveyance statutes as a means of addressing creditors’ grievances in discussing why corporation law restrictions on dividends did not restrict payment of consideration in a reverse triangular merger).
\end{itemize}
proof that the debtor anticipated reliance. It is not designed to address general principles of debtor / creditor law and statements made to influence normal creditors’ rights (e.g., repossession of collateral and initiation of legal proceedings to collect on matured and unpaid obligations).

An affirmatively enforceable fiduciary duty in favor of creditors of distressed corporations is being proposed here. That raises the question whether it can simultaneously co-exist with a similar fiduciary duty for the benefit of the stockholders. It is submitted that these two fiduciary duties can properly co-exist, and that creating this fiduciary duty does not, therefore, put directors in the untenable position of having necessarily conflicting duties to two constituencies having different interests. In brief, the reason is that a duty to be candid with one constituency does not impose a concomitant obligation not to be candid with other constituencies.

Within the range of lawful conduct, fiduciaries have some discretion in setting the level of candor that they bring to negotiations. Some sets of fiduciaries would be entitled to expect that, in negotiations, they would be given discretion to decide the extent they disseminate information to counterparties. For example, a client has no right to expect a lawyer to provide an opposing party false or misleading information merely because no reliance on that misstatement is anticipated.

It may be that imposing duties of candor applicable to both equityholders and creditors would produce results that, in the immediate term, are worse for equityholders than not imposing these obligations. In that way, one might view these additional duties as inconsistent with the obligation owed to common stockholders. But if one views beneficiaries of fiduciary duties as not necessarily entitled to demand lack of candor with third parties, there would appear to be more of a basis for imposing on those managing a distressed corporation a duty to speak accurately when speaking. To put it another way, Brincat imposes an affirmative duty of candor in some contexts. But this is an asymmetric duty; it does not impose an obligation to avoid candor with others.

VI. COMPETITION AND CORPORATE OPPORTUNITIES

**Formality in Decision-making.** Weaver v. Kellogg\(^ {121} \) illuminates the interaction of fiduciary duties owed to other constituencies with the

\(^{121}\) 216 B.R. 563, 580-84 (S.D. Tex. 1997).
corporate opportunity doctrine. These concerns are not trivial, particularly in the case of smaller corporations.

Although the language of the opinion is not entirely clear on this point, Broz appears to indicate that a financial inability of a corporation to take advantage of what otherwise would be a corporate opportunity exculpates the fiduciary who takes advantage of the opportunity.\textsuperscript{122} Although the Broz opinion is not express on the point, this interpretation of Broz implies that the \textit{Credit Lyonnais} duties do not extend to corporate opportunities. The language in Broz concerning there being no obligation to offer an opportunity to those anticipated to be stockholders in the future\textsuperscript{123} is not inconsistent.

The A.L.I. principles, on the other hand, do not have this broad exculpation.\textsuperscript{124} Following the A.L.I. approach in this circumstance creates difficulties if the \textit{Credit Lyonnais} duties are to extend to corporate opportunities. The problem is that insiders are likely to inadvertently violate the pertinent requirements. The insider seeking to take advantage of the opportunity would not necessarily have any reason to know of the interests of creditors of the distressed corporation. Multiple creditors might be interested in a particular opportunity, presenting questions of which creditor should be offered the opportunity. There is not a simple mechanism in place that would allow the creditors to vote—determining the number of votes for each creditor, for example.

Lastly, in the case of smaller distressed corporations, one can expect a significant amount of informality in the way in which corporate opportunities are relinquished. In the course of trying to say afloat, resources may be diverted away from what may appear unimportant matters of legal housekeeping. If the informality can be subsequently challenged by a trustee, or the creditors bringing a direct action, the law will have created a potentially significant adverse consequence that can be inadvertently created.

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{122} Broz v. Cellular Information Systems, Inc., 673 A.2d 148 (Del. 1996).
\item \textsuperscript{123} \textit{Id.} at ___
\item \textsuperscript{124} American Law Institute, Principles of Corporate Governance § 5.05, reporter’s n.8 (1994) (“Section 5.05 contemplates that whenever an opportunity, as defined in § 5.05(b), is present, it is to be offered to the corporation, which may then determine whether the obstacles to accepting the opportunity are insuperable or can be avoided. . . . If the opportunity is never offered to the corporation, the director or senior executive who takes the opportunity may not thereafter defend on the ground that there was no opportunity because the corporation was unable to accept it.”).
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
Weaver v. Kellogg\textsuperscript{125} illustrates the problems. In that case, the court denied a motion for summary judgment on claims alleging breach of the corporate opportunity doctrine. The corporation, which had only two shareholders (who, at the pertinent times, also were the sole directors), loaned the shareholders money, which allegedly was used to purchase other businesses.\textsuperscript{126} Notwithstanding the defendants’ argument that the transactions were implicitly approved or ratified,\textsuperscript{127} the court stated, inter alia, “Defendants would not, in any case, have had the right to waive the rights of [the corporation’s] creditors.”\textsuperscript{128} The court ultimately concluded, “The Court holds that Plaintiff may therefore prevail on his breach of corporate duty claims if he shows, for each allegedly wrongful transaction, that [the corporate debtor] was, at the time, in ‘the vicinity of insolvency[]’ that the transaction led to [the corporate debtor’s] insolvency; or that the transaction was a fraudulent conveyance, as defined by the federal and state statutes . . . .”\textsuperscript{129}

A concern with inadvertent failure to waive properly a corporate opportunity is offset by concern that a corporate opportunity or other breach of a duty may be waived in undesirable circumstances. Distress may cause stockholders, or those acting on their behalf, to be indifferent, which can result in waiver of fiduciary obligations not in the best interests of all constituencies (the return to the corporation of taking the opportunity may in some future states benefit only the creditors.) One might seek to treat differently (i) direct competition with the distressed corporation and (ii) opportunities coming to the insiders’ attention solely by reason of his office with the corporation. Tests of corporate opportunities typically reference opportunities that in fairness belong to the corporation. That does not really provide an actual test. A better principle in the context of distress is as follows: If the corporation is insolvent, the creditors, with capped claims, would benefit. However, their failure to have exercised creditors’ remedies suggests creditors should not be able to challenge the activity ex post. If the corporation is distressed by solvent, creditors are particularly particularly disadvantaged only by actions that decrease corporate value, not merely as much as acts that prevent the corporation from further increasing its solvency. One may therefore seek to distinguish between competition with the distressed

\textsuperscript{125} 216 B.R. 563 (S.D. Tex. 1997).
\textsuperscript{126} \textit{Id.} at 579-81.
\textsuperscript{127} \textit{Id.} at 581.
\textsuperscript{128} \textit{Id.} at 582.
\textsuperscript{129} \textit{Id.} at 584 (citation omitted) (quoting \textit{Credit Lyonnais}).
corporation, and opportunities in other geographic areas or in lines of business only related to the distressed corporation’s business. On this basis, one might find as actionable by, or on behalf of, the creditors officers or directors improperly competing with the corporation or improper, premature actions in preparing to compete. An illustration is provided by Roth v. Mims, in which during distress the president made arrangements for sale of the distressed corporation’s assets and employment with a firm that would operate the assets.\textsuperscript{130}

VII. CONCLUSIONS

This paper demonstrates that existence of an affirmatively enforceable duty under the principles of Credit Lyonnais is not moot. The existence of aiding and abetting liability for breach of fiduciary duty will give rise to a greater set of potentially liable defendants and will increase the remedies otherwise available were the duties contemplated by Credit Lyonnais not affirmatively enforceable (aiding and abetting a fraudulent transfer typically not separately giving rise to liability).

Moreover, the issues raised by Credit Lyonnais highlight a basic problem that has not yet been definitively addressed: which constituency’s approval of a distressed corporation’s conflict-of-interest transactions will result in the application of the business judgment rule. This paper argues that during distress short of bankruptcy proceedings, fiduciary duties to maximize firm value on a sale should continue to be owed to stockholders. Approval of conflict-of-interest transactions by disinterested stockholders should continue to shift the burden of proof as to the fairness of the transaction.

This paper also argues that the obligation of candor under Malone v. Brincat should appertain to communications with creditors, thereby creating a duty not to make affirmative misstatements, regardless of whether the communication is in connection with approval of a particular action by the creditors. Financial creditors will consider the information provided in connection with deciding whether to exercise contractually negotiated control rights, and creditors should be entitled to rely on truthfulness even if the debtor is not aware of a particular action the creditor may take in reliance.

The fact that parties do not expressly bargain for these rights does not mean that providing them would be inefficient. The nature of the subject

\textsuperscript{130} 298 B.R. 272 (N.D. Tex. 2003).
matter—one’s ability to lie—makes it difficult to address in contract formation. Parties may not raise the issue in negotiations because doing so inhibits the trust necessary to enter into voluntary contractual relationships. If it were not difficult to raise this issue, it would be the subject of express bargaining, and at least some of the parties would not avoid using the colloquial term “lie” where the typical formulations do not invariably limit liability. Nevertheless, a search of the 866 asset purchase agreements in the CORI contract database identified no contract in which the parties included language addressing “lies.”

Lastly, this paper argues in favor of the developing trend extending application of the business judgment rule to alleged violations of duties of care during distress by or on behalf of creditors, and to applying charter exculpation provisions to eliminate that liability. In reaching this conclusion, this paper examines the extent to which an alternative conclusion creates options in creditors that are difficult to value and are therefore problematic.