LOCALISTS AND “LOCUSTS” IN HONG KONG: CREATING A YELLOW-RED PERIL DISCOURSE

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I. INTRODUCTION: TIME OF THE LOCUST

“A vast army of locusts has invaded my land. It is a terrible army, too numerous to count. Its teeth are as sharp as the teeth of lions . . . Bring the leaders and all the people into the temple of the Lord your God and cry out to Him there.”

The Old Testament’s Book of Joel (1:6-16) depicts locust swarms bringing ruin to ancient Israel and foretelling the “End of Days” for humanity. Hong Kong’s “localists” (本土派) depict mainlanders as locusts ruining the territory and bringing an end to a vaunted way of life. In early 2012, a Hong Kong newspaper published a full-page advertisement, in which a locust perched high on top of a hill overlooking Hong Kong’s landmark Victoria Harbor. The central message was that “Hong Kong people have had enough!” (Fig.1).

![Anti-Locust Advertisement](image)

Fig. 1: Anti-Locust Advertisement, Apple Daily, Feb. 1, 2012

The main slogan is followed by an elaboration: knowing you are victimized by poisonous milk powders [infant formula], [we] tolerate that you grab milk powder here; knowing you do not enjoy freedom, [we] treat you to an “Individual Visit Scheme” (IVS, 自由行, literally “free travel”); knowing that you have a backward education, [we] share educational resources with you; knowing that you do not understand classical Chinese characters, [we] use amputated characters to send the message: “please respect local culture when coming to Hong Kong; if not for Hong Kong, you’d all be finished.”

The three issues on the list have each been represented as a threat in Hong Kong media: mainlander visitors buy too much in Hong Kong, causing supply shortages for locals; too many mainland IVS tourists can easily crowd the Special Administrative Region (SAR); and mainland women give birth in Hong Kong so their children have the right to schooling in the city. The ad compares mainlanders coming to Hong Kong with locusts arriving en masse, to take advantage of Hong Kong’s commodities, public goods, and social amenities. It calls on the SAR government to change Hong Kong’s Basic Law to stop mainland women giving birth in Hong Kong. The ad became a globally-noted sensation, pushing to a new height already-simmering anti-mainlander sentiment and giving rise to a raft of spin-offs designed to entrench the image of mainlanders as locusts, including through advancing additional accusations against mainland migrants and visitors.

The term “locusts” for mainlanders who shop and use medical services in Hong Kong antedated the ad by two years, originating in 2010 on Hong Kong Golden Forum (香港高登討論區), a computer hardware and software online discussion site where exponents of “Hong Kong local consciousness” (香港本土意識) had become prominent. The term had also been used since 2010 by Hong Kong’s popular tabloid Apple Daily (Apple Daily), where the anti-locust ad was set to appear in 2012. That newspaper “has served as an important platform for both anti-mainlander campaigns and the pro-democracy movement.”

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2. Mainland dependence on Hong Kong is anachronistic. Hong Kong’s economy was 16% of China’s economy in 1997, but 3% in 2014. “Why Hong Kong Remains Vital to China’s Economy,” Economist (UK), Sept. 30, 2014. The idea persists due to the “irrational primacy effect”: a preference for early information, whereby people, after viewing initial evidence, form a hypothesis based on it and use that to interpret later information, regardless of what new evidence actually tells them. Jonathan Baron, Thinking and Deciding (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006): 207.

right-wing newspaper tycoon Rupert Murdoch’s erstwhile UK tabloid *News of the World, Apple Daily* is owned by Jimmy Lai Chee-ying (黎智英), an admirer of arch-conservative economists Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman. Lai has ties to right-wing US politicians, including Sarah Palin and Paul Wolfowitz. He introduced Palin to Hong Kong’s pan democrats (民主派), a loose alliance of opponents of the Hong Kong Government and Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Lai is the pan democrats’ largest funder, providing money to figureheads such as barrister Martin Lee Chu-ming (李柱銘), former Chief Secretary Anson Chan Fang On-sang (陳方安生), and ex-Cardinal Joseph Zen Ze-kun (陳日君). Additionally, he supports leaders of the “moderate” liberalist Democratic Party (民主黨) and Civic Party (公民黨), plus the “radical” Labor Party (工黨), League of Social Democrats (社會民主連線), and People Power (人民力量).\(^4\) Lai first became known as a political activist when his Giordano clothing chain put out t-shirts after the 1989 suppression in China, calling on the “dynasty” to step down. He is explicit that his role is “opposing China”\(^5\) and is appreciated by some localist forces,\(^6\) whose views he has often publicized in his media.\(^7\)

As references to mainlanders as locusts became more common on Hong Kong Golden Forum in 2011, complaints were mostly about New Mainland Migrants (NMMs) getting what little welfare Hong Kong offers. It was demanded that a Hong Kong government “sweetener” to permanent residents of $6,000 each from that year’s budget surplus should pass over anyone who had not yet become a permanent resident by living in Hong Kong for at least seven years. A Facebook page with that demand was “liked” by 80,000 people before it was removed.\(^8\)

The first localist group, Hong Kong Native Power (HKNP; 香港本土力量), emerged during the dispute about the sweetener. Founded by

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7. See, e.g. 李怡, “從無到有的香港本土意識的興起” (The rise of localism from nothing to something), 苹果日报, Nov. 20, 2013.

8. “派6000元撕裂香港” (How the $6,000 is Tearing Hong Kong Apart) 明报 (Hong Kong), Mar. 9, 2011.
young Hong Kong Golden Forum activists, the group vowed to resist “cultural genocide” by a “strong power” (强主；the mainland) and argued that as mainlanders’ roots are not in Hong Kong, they have no reason to fight for justice for Hong Kong people and did not “share the difficulty of 1997,” i.e. the handover. HKNP noted that Hong Kong’s political spectrum had not had an “(explicitly) anti-communist democratic right-wing,” which it aspired to be. Many messages at HKNP’s website referred to mainlanders as “locusts” and it urged supporters to oppose groups that support welfare measures for NMMs. HKNP quickly attracted 80,000 “likes” on its Facebook page. It collapsed however after being taken over by members of the Liberal Party,9 a “pro-establishment” group that espouses laissez-faire capitalism and has close ties to business. Its leaders soon replaced HKNP with a “TParty,” inspired by the US’s Tea Party. It opposed NMMs getting social welfare and a proposed minimum wage law.10

Within a year, the locust image was so common that it gave rise to a line of t-shirts and tote bags11 and by 2014 anti-locust campaigners had focused on mainland visitors as infesting Hong Kong.12 In a demonstration in the busy Tsim Sha Tsui (尖沙咀) shopping district, they targeted mainland visitors for mock extermination, even as they asserted to not be against mainlanders per se, but only their “behavior.”13 The chief organizer of the Tsim Sha Tsui anti-locust demonstration wanted mainlanders replaced with tourists from other countries.14 Two events in early 2012 spurred the creation of the anti-locust ad, which was crowd-sourced in a week at HK$100,000 (US$13,000).15 First, there was a protest staged by

9. “香港本土力量 Nativism Power,” 信报, Mar. 9, 2011, http://gohk.blogspot/2011/03/nativism-power.html; Encyclopedia of Virtual Communities in Hong Kong, s.d., http://evchk.wikia.com/wiki/%E9%A6%99%E6%B8%AF%E6%9C%AC%E5%9C%9F%E5%A9%B9%E9%87%8F.
13. China’s President and Foreign Minister have criticized tourist behaviour abroad. The Chinese government has issued a “Guidebook for Civilized Tourism.” Wang Yunmei, author of the 2013 China猪：中国旅行团 (Pigs on the Loose: Chinese Tour Groups), has said using streets as toilets results from rural-born tourists not knowing how to find public toilets. Many Chinese tourists are also first-time travellers. “Anti-Chinese Feelings in Thailand High as Influx of Tourists Angers Locals,” SCMP, Apr. 15, 2014; Zhang Lijia, “In Time, Chinese Tourists will Learn to Behave Better Abroad;” SCMP, Sept. 26 2014.
1,500 people against mainlanders giving birth in Hong Kong ("birth tourism"). "The 80,000-member Facebook group that organized the demonstration [became] a forum to vent vitriol at the mainland Chinese in Hong Kong, who are called by the derogatory term ‘locusts’ and much worse.” Posters featuring pregnant locusts appeared on university campuses. Secondly, some 150 people also protested at the Chinese Central Government Liaison Office in Hong Kong against a statement said by Beijing University professor KONG Qingdong (孔慶東) that “Some Hong Kong people don’t see themselves as Chinese . . . They are bastards . . . These people are too used to being running dogs for British imperialists.” These two protests marked the formal beginning of the "anti-locust movement" (反蝗蟲运动).

By the time the anti-locust ad appeared, an anti-mainlander campaign using "locust" had been underway for a year. A song entitled "Locust World" (蝗蟲天下), heard in many media, was uploaded to YouTube in February 2011. By February 2012, it had 777,000 views, with a huge margin of “likes” over “dislikes,” in part because YouTube is blocked in China’s mainland, preventing mainlander responses. The scant critical response to anti-mainlander comments at the song’s video site indicates however that few Hong Kong people objected to its vilifying lyrics, which were supposedly contributed by Golden Forum members. Its tune derived from an existing song, “Under Mount Fuji” (富士山下), by Canto-pop star Eason Chan (陳奕迅), giving “Locust World” a highly local flavor. The lyrics however caused some listeners to analogize it to Nazi attacks on Jews.

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Locals and “Locusts” in Hong Kong

Lyrics to "Locust World"

Locust come out from nowhere, overwhelm everywhere
Shouting, screaming, yelling like no one could hear
Ever feel shame to yourself? Smoke like breathing in hell
And your fucking son who shit right in the mall
See this country? countrymen expert in stealing, cheating, deceiving, lying
“I’m Chinese!” scares the piss out of everyone
Locust nation named “Cina” – disgusted by the whole of East Asia
Everyday trying to naturalise us with Mandarin

Invading across the Hong Kong border and taking over our land – that’s your specialty
Parasitic until your citizenship is recognised
Big-belly locust like aliens; pregnant and not stopped by immigration
No one can stop them from scamming HKIDs
Locust eggs hatch in hospitals – taking over beds and not paying bills
Do you feel the anger within the sadness?
What’s really invaded is the future of the next two generations
Setting up this trap, brainwashing me “China is great” everyday

Who’s yelling within our borders without restraint
Lying arrogantly and frivolously
“Without China’s care, Hong Kong would have been dead”*
Thanks to China, Hong Kong has now deteriorated so badly
We thought we’ve seen the worst, but . . .
doing your toilet business on the streets?
There’s no shame – jumping queues, spitting in public . . .
we witness and condemn these acts everyday

Inch by inch, Hong Kong is now being taken over by these pests
Those glittering days are now long gone
While our citizens are bleeding, the locusts buy out all our food
How can we retake our homeland?
Somewhere, fake goods will be shipped from China
and sold in dodgy shops in Hong Kong
The locusts will stop at nothing
Fake bread, milk, egg, vinegar, alcohol . . . there’s no end to this list

Another natural disaster, and our government will again donate to the corrupting officials
Is this all we are to China?
We donate all our reserve up North, and grow poorer ourselves
Who won’t be despair in this situation?
Over so many years, we are tricked by your plays
Groups of young people sang “Locust World” on the streets to taunt mainland tourists. Another song, “Nasty China Style” (核突支那), using the tune of K-pop hit “Gangnam Style,” had over a million views in its first two weeks on the internet in 2012. Sung in mocking Mandarin-accented Cantonese, it refers to China as “Shina,” a racist pejorative used by Japanese invaders during the Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945) that still circulates among Japanese ultra-rightists. Its lyrics “display the most extreme stereotypes of mainland Chinese people as rude savages lacking in manners and civility” and fixate on the idea that mainland visitors habitually defecate in public. Similar obsessions have occurred elsewhere during persecutory episodes, such as in Reformation-era Protestant propaganda against Catholics and Nazis deprecations of Jews. The “Locust World” video is equally scatologically obsessive. A University of Leicester sociologist who formerly taught in Hong Kong has noted it is “misleading in how it repeats and magnifies evidence to make generalizations about mainland Chinese behaviour, such as in reusing one photograph of a defecating child on a train several times within a four-minute montage to illustrate an entire group’s uncivilized behav-

A Hong Kong scholar has said such ‘uncivilized’ scenes hardly represent the normal behaviour of most mainlanders, [but] online opinion and daily conversations among locals tend to paint a negative picture of the mainlanders with a broad brush, and hardly accept any appeal to cultural tolerance.28

Other online images represent the threat to Hong Kong as a communist monster or combine “Yellow Peril” (黃鴉) and “Red Menace” (红色威脅) images, harking back to the early Cold War.29 One depicts a scene similar to the iconic “Tank Man” who stepped out onto a road leading to Tiananmen to confront tanks during the 1989 suppression in Beijing. In this case however, a man blocks a horde of locusts marching toward Hong Kong (Fig. 2).

To fend off these threats from mainlanders, Hong Kong has been shown as buttressed by three walls; the first is “one country, two systems,” the second “human rights and rule of law,” and the third “civilization and ethics.” In this depiction, Hong Kong’s colonial experience, represented by the British Queen’s head and royal seal, is embraced as a protective symbol. Some localists hoist British and Hong Kong colonial-era flags, indicating they prefer British colonial rule to the current Hong Kong government and—since a British return is scarcely imaginable—

27. Ong, Phone Cams.
that they may prefer independence. 30 A 2007 survey showed that 25% supported independence and almost 65% opposed it.31 A possible proxy—a 2015 survey on Hong Kong people’s support for Taiwan independence—found 33% overall support and 51% among those aged 18-29.32 In 2014, a Hong Kong University student publication’s “informal poll of nearly 500 students found that . . . 15% called for independence and 9% wanted Hong Kong to return to being a British colony.”33 A year later, independence garnered 28% support.34 A Reuters “straw poll” of activists at the two main encampments of Hong Kong’s fall 2014 Occupy Central (佔領中環) protest found “45% want an independent Hong Kong unshackled from Chinese rule.”35 Anti-mainlander, localist, colonial nostalgic and pro-independence views are thus imbricated. All use “insect language” to vilify Chinese mainlanders and create a Yellow Peril/Red Menace link.

After Occupy Central, anti-locusts protests resumed. In early 2015, Tuen Mun (屯門) locals complained of an influx of mainland visitors because a mall gave out free bus tickets from Shenzhen Bay Control Point (深圳灣管制站) border station. A localist group launched a petition to protest “cross-border shopping for goods and food in Hong Kong”36 and People Power held a small gathering in Tuen Mun to oppose the ticket giveaway. The bus firm discontinued the free tickets,37 but mainland vis-

32. “Most not in Favor of Taiwan Independence,” The Standard (TS, Hong Kong), Mar. 19, 2015.
33. “Hong Kong Leader’s Criticism Boosts Popularity of Book on Nationalism,” Straits Times (ST, Singapore), Jan. 16, 2015. From 1993-1995, “the proportion preferring either independence or a continued link with Britain had remained constant at around 51-52 percent.” “Hong Kong Wants Independence or Link with Britain, but Not China: Poll,” Agence France Presse (AFP), July 15, 1995. In 1997, 40% “believed Hong Kong should join China, while 35% would like independence and 19% would have preferred Hong Kong to stay a British colony,” “One Third of Hong Kong Favours Independence—Polls,” Reuters, June 26, 1997.
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Visitors still came to Tuen Mun malls. A “Love Tuen Mun” Facebook group staged a rally of 800 people about crowded buses and sidewalks and “parallel trader shops.” Because however the largest localist group, Civic Passion (CP, 黃乘客民), was there in force, along with a new “Indigenous Democratic Front” (本土民主前线), the protest was against all mainlanders. Localists entered a mall and shouted at visitors “Go back to China” and “Locusts, go back to your mainland.” Shoving matches with visitors and locals ensued and 19 Hong Kongers were arrested. Well-known localist participants included CP leader Dr. CHENG Chung-tai (鄭松泰), CP activist “The French Guy” (法国佬) and colonial flag-waving Occupy Central figure Andy Yung Wai-yib (“Captain America”).

More anti-locust demonstrations soon followed. Some 200 protestors in Shatin clashed with traders, shoppers and police, leading to injuries and five arrests. Anti-locust signs—and one reading “expel the barbarians” (驅除蠻夷), a late 19th Century slogan referring to China’s ethnic minorities—plus colonial-era flags, were again seen. The protest attracted much Western media attention. The next week, in Yuen Long, 200 demonstrators led by localist groups coupled anti-mainlander and anti-mainland government slogans, such as “Kick out the locusts!” “We don’t want locusts,” “Locusts, you’re not welcome here” and “Topple the Chinese Communist Party.” Some 400 counter-protestors, many of them Yuen Long residents, appeared. Localist scuffles with counter-protestors, shopkeepers, and police resulted in 38 arrests; less than five of them counter-protestors. A week after the Yuen Long event, about 150 people held a roaming demonstration in four locations. Protestors “vented


their anger at mainlanders - and anyone carrying luggage, including locals [and] tried to stop border-bound buses from leaving.” They cursed at and kicked the luggage trolleys of those thought to be mainlanders, including a mother with a small child and local shoppers at a jewelry store, thus indicating that their targets were mainlanders per se and not parallel traders, who do not bring children or buy jewelry. Moreover, 99% of parallel traders who travel from Sheung Shui—the initial demonstration point that day – are Hong Kong people.42

In what follows, we first discuss anti-mainlander prejudice in Hong Kong and its resemblance to earlier biases by Shanghai people against Chinese from neighboring provinces. We then empirically test claims localists make about the mainlander presence in Hong Kong and show that mainland visitors and migrants are not working the harms attributed to them. There follows a review of “insect language” as integral to racial vilification in several settings, with Hong Kong’s anti-locust movement a recent example. We go on to elaborate on the vilifiers themselves and on the Hong Kong government’s obligations, under international and local law, to punish them.

Hong Kong nativism, we contend is significant beyond the SAR and its relations with the rest of China. Nativist “anti-locust” agitation exemplifies the global advancement of ethnic antagonism as a putative solution to problems that are actually rooted in gross and increasing inequality, not ethnicity per se. Vilification of ethnic groups and these underlying problems must be addressed politically and legally and, while the Hong Kong case is both structurally similar to others and highly specific, what is done in the SAR will have wider implications.

II. ANTI-MAINLANDER PREJUDICE IN HONG KONG

Political discontent in Hong Kong, especially since the SAR’s 2014 Occupy Central protests, is often framed as mainly based on socio-economic concerns, which have an empirical basis obvious even to Asia’s richest man, Hong Kong tycoon LI Ka Shing.43 In the two decades before the anti-mainlander campaign emerged, Hong Kong’s GDP per


capita increased from $7,000 to $38,000, but Hong Kong became the developed world’s most unequal place. Its Gini coefficient (0 = complete equality; 1 = complete inequality) rose from a very high .518 in 1996 to .525 in 2001 and .537 in 2011, the highest since the records began in 1971. Hong Kong, with a population of 7.2 million has 39 billionaires, the highest per capita ratio in the world. Its economy is dominated by a few tycoons with monopoly, duopoly or oligopolistic control over all key sectors. In 2014, Hong Kong topped a “crony capitalism index” devised by a British business journal. The tycoons’ combined net worth equaled 80% of Hong Kong’s GDP. The richest 10% of the population had 77.5% of the wealth, up from 69.3% in 2007, a proportion higher than in the US and much higher than in the UK or Japan. Housing prices are the most expensive in the world, at nearly 15 times median household income, compared to 7.3 times in London and 9.2 times in San Francisco.44

An observer put it in 2014 that “Underlining the current political discontent is not only a lack of representation, but also the serious decline in real income of Hong Kong people due to globalization and asset inflation.”45 Half of Hong Kong workers earn less than HK$13,000 (US$1,676) a month and 13% earn less than HK$5,000 (US$645). The bottom 30% of wealth holders have only 6.4% of the SAR’s total wealth.46 In 2013, almost 20% of the population was officially poor and even after receiving welfare benefits more than 15% remained so.47

It was noted in 2005 that Hong Kong’s neo-liberalism guaranteed that its GDP per capita growth would exacerbate inequality.48 By 2014, “Hong Kong’s economy ha[d] worsened since 2005, in terms of stagnant per capita real income, increasing job insecurity and intensified social polarization.”49 An Oxfam study found that incomes of the working poor

47. “Setting the Poverty Line is Just the Start,” SCMP, Sept. 30, 2013.
49. Li Jing, “Economic and Social Restructuring: Housing Implications for Young People in Hong Kong.”
“persistently deteriorated” between 2010 and 2012 even after enactment of a statutory minimum wage.\(^{50}\) Starting salaries in Hong Kong and upward mobility opportunities for those born since the mid-1970s fell, except for degree holders,\(^{51}\) who are about one-fourth of Hong Kong people born in the 1970s and 1980s. Even for post-80s younger people with a tertiary education however, unemployment rates are increasing and they have much less opportunity for managerial and professional jobs than before.\(^{52}\) Real wages for entry-level positions for the SAR’s college graduates have declined: “Average starting salaries for university graduates have risen 1% annually over the past 17 years, to HK$198,000 (US$25,522) a year, lagging behind inflation, and far behind the rise in housing prices.”\(^{53}\)

Hong Kong’s sharp inequality and deteriorating living standards and prospects for much of the population are however a context, not the direct causes of localism’s greater prominence. Despite localist claims moreover, there is no direct connection between growing inequality in Hong Kong and Chinese sovereignty: the Gini Coefficient’s rise continues a long-running trend that was even steeper when Hong Kong was a British colony: from .429 in 1976 to .518 in 1996.\(^{54}\) There are no studies by income level of support for localism, but a survey of support for Occupy Central in early 2014 showed it was weakest among the poor (no income, 23% support, 78% oppose; $1-9,999, 33% support, 68% oppose) and strongest among those earning $100,000-plus (54% support, 55% oppose).\(^{55}\)

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\(^{54}\) “Hong Kong Protestors Blame China for Rising Inequality and Economic Woes,” Quartz, July 1. 2014.

\(^{55}\) “Constitutional Reform: Confrontation Looms as Hong Consults,” Hong Kong Transition Project, Apr. 2014: 190, www.hktp.org/list/constitutional-reform.pdf. The mean for all groups then was support 42%, oppose 59%. At its height, support was 28% and oppose was 58%, but a new option, “half/half” garnered 14%. “調查結果：” PopCon Surveys on Occupy
If poverty and inequality have not, in themselves, produced nativism, diminished prospects for young people may still play a role. Localist and “radical pan democrat” groups are mainly youthful. Some 23% of supporters of the “moderate” Democratic Party and Civic Party are under 30, but 41% of supporters of “radical” parties (League of Social Democrats, People Power, Labor Party and Neo-Democrats) are.56

Another enabling condition of localism is many Hong Kong people’s long-held negative view of mainlanders57 and its mirror image: a sense of superiority. As Enlightenment philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau observed, a desire to be acknowledged as superior produces material and intellectual corruption,58 in this case a shifting of blame onto a perceived ethnic Other. Already in 2005, a Hong Kong Baptist University scholar wrote that

For most Hong Kong people, an inner distance is still firmly maintained in their consciousness to differentiate themselves from mainlanders and assert their superiority. Even after 1997, Hong Kong locals continually subject mainlanders to slurs and discriminate against them as unsophisticated country bumpkins or corrupted entrepreneurs from across the border. New immigrants from China are generally seen as uneducated, uncivilized, violent, and lazy. There is a looming prejudice against new mainland arrivals, especially after the Asian financial turmoil. Hong Kong people believe that mainlanders will take away their jobs, worsen Hong Kong society, and destroy the city’s prosperity and stability.59

Elements of anti-mainlander prejudice in Hong Kong closely correspond to those about immigrants to Britain advanced by the anti-immigrant UK Independence Party (UKIP). A British journalist has written that

There are multiple concerns. One is that immigrants are taking British jobs. Another is that they are “scroungers,” coming to

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live off benefits. Yet more fears are that they are depressing wages (especially among the low-skilled), responsible for a crime wave, making it harder for the native population to find homes to live in and overloading schools, hospitals and other public services. \footnote{60}

Almost all these concerns lack an empirical basis. \footnote{61} That has not however retarded the recent rise of UKIP, enjoying the support of about 15% of the public by early 2015. \footnote{62}

A journalist for a major Taiwan magazine wrote about Hong Kong in 2014 that

the stereotypical image that the Hong Kong people hold of their Chinese neighbors is: They are dirty, loud, rich but boorish, and ill mannered . . . [Hong Kong people are] developing a strong ‘us’ versus ‘them’ identity never seen before. Sentiment ranges from a sense of superiority and discrimination of mainlanders to outright Sinophobia. \footnote{63}

While this is an overgeneralization made too often, \footnote{64} it does apply to a minority of Hong Kong people who are localists or nativists (排外派; exclusivists or xenophobes). “Localism” (本土主义) prioritizes the local over all other interests. In Hong Kong and Taiwan, it is specifically in opposition to a “Greater China mentality” (大中国意識) and a “Greater China Faction” (大中華派), as localists dub those who adhere to the “liberal patriotism” found among many Hong Kong people. \footnote{65}

Localists refer to both mainstream pan democrats (民主派) or “the opposition” (反對派), as well as “pro-establishment” (建制派) or “pro-
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Neither camp regards itself as leftist however; both are neo-liberalists. Many localists also describe themselves as on the right and associate mainstream forces with a kind of cosmopolitanism (which is at odds with nativism), but both localists and “Great China-ists” (大中國主義者) are anti-Communists. Anti-communism is central to pan-democrats, who even red-bait each other. The “radical” People Power has accused the “moderate” Democratic Party of colluding with the mainland about electoral reforms, while the Democratic Party refer to People Power as “Renminbi Power,” because it allegedly took large donations from Hong Kong businessmen connected to pro-Beijing organizations.

The localist worldview in fact overlaps with that of some pan democrats in “Yellow Peril”/”Red Menace” stereotypes. It is not anomalous that some ethnic Chinese have “Yellow Peril” conceptions. Other people (spuriously) designated as of the “yellow race” also have Yellow Peril proponents. “In the west, we see Mongolia as part of Asia, its people and culture enmeshed with those of its neighbors. But this is not how the Mongolians see themselves. They draw a clear line between themselves and other Asians, particularly the Chinese. Because Mongolians are so keen to deny any cultural and ethnic overlap, to be called Chinese is perceived as a great insult.” Mongolian anti-Chinese forces use the term “Yellow Peril” and invoke stereotypes of Chinese strikingly similar to those deployed in Hong Kong.

Localists view China as a country apart. In 2015, Eugenia Yip (叶璐珊; YE Lushan) was defeated in an election for HKU Student Union (HKUSU) Social Secretary after being denounced for having once been a


high school member of the Communist Youth League in Guangzhou. Even the local leader of the winning slate was Red-baited because his grandfather was a CCP member in Beijing. Most voting undergraduates “[i]n a referendum sparked by a groundswell of support for the so-called localist movement” also voted for the HKUSU to withdraw from the Hong Kong Federation of Students because the “Hong Kong independence [movement] believes [that] the federation’s core mission to ‘build a democratic China’ diminishes its ability to represent the interests of the city.” In 2015, the HKFS decided to not participate in the annual rally to mark the June 4th 1989 suppression, a decision [that] shows that “the federation has compromised with the localism campaign.” Indeed, some student leaders questioned whether Hong Kong people are Chinese.

Fig. 3: “Oppose Reddening; Oppose Colonialization”; “Hong Kong People Work Together to Resist Communist Reddening, Oppose Colonialization: Drive out Locusts Movement.”

72. “‘Commie-Loving Mainlanders’ Targeted at Hong Kong’s Top University,” Reuters, Feb. 17, 2015.
73. “HKU Union to Quit Student Federation,” SCMP, Feb. 15, 2015. The later withdrawal of the Hong Kong Baptist University Student Union was also attributed to “the rising influence of radical localism groups among the young.” “Baptist University Students Vote to Leave Federation,” TS, Apr. 25, 2015.
74. “Federation to Give June 4 Vigil a Miss,” TS, Apr. 28, 2015.
75. “Hong Kong Student Organization Says it Won’t Attend Tiananmen Vigil,” NYT, Apr. 29, 2015.
Localists urge a shift of attention to Hong Kong because they lack confidence that the Hong Kong people can influence outcomes on the mainland or despise not only the mainland’s political system, but mainlanders per se. Whatever they may say about their affinity with traditional Chinese culture, they do not want the Hong Kong people to be identified as Chinese and some do not want Hong Kong to be part of China. Writing of the “populist” (民粹派) nativist movement in Hong Kong, cultural studies scholar Mirana Szeto (司徒薇) has stated

Sinophobic/xenophobic invectives are directed not only against the government in Beijing, but against immigrants and even tourists from China. Like the Yellow Peril imaginary of the United States, this nativist, Cantonese-centric Hong Kong, of which the anti-Chinese-anti-immigrant coalition called Hong Kong Native Power is a key example assumes cosmopolitan, “advanced” capitalist superiority against the barbaric, ruthless, “primitive” capitalism of China and therefore characterizes people from China as “locusts” and products from China as toxic “weapons of mass deception.” Its similarity to the imperial imaginary of racial superiority is too obvious to miss.

During the fall 2014 Occupy Central protests, a US journalist noted that “pro-democracy and anti-mainland sentiment can be difficult to tease apart in Hong Kong. Many protestors want autonomy for Hong Kong in order to boost policies that will mitigate the influence of mainland Chinese on the island.” A Hong Kong academic has observed that “[p]ro-democracy can tend to be perceived as anti-mainland, and mainland tourists labeled together with the Beijing government.” This 21st Century differentiation of Hong Kong and mainland people continues a process underway since the late 19th Century when Chinese elites in

Hong Kong began to cooperate with British colonialists in order to expand capitalism, while building an identity that differentiated them from mainlanders. Their Hong Kong localism accommodated colonial domination and racism to make the city a vibrant part of the British Empire.\textsuperscript{80} By the mid-1980s, a survey showed that given a choice of identities between a Hong Kong person (香港人) and Chinese (中国人), 60% of respondents already chose the former.\textsuperscript{81} This raises questions – in the post-colonial city of Hong Kong, how do we understand this discourse of otherization that has gone beyond conventional forms and contexts of racism? As Hong Kong is the foremost city of migration in the region, with most Hong Kong people having their roots in the mainland, how is Hong Kong “nativism” (排外主义) constructed?

III. CREATING A PECULIAR RACISM: COLONIAL MODERNITY AND RACISM IN SHANGHAI AND HONG KONG

Representations of mainland Chinese in colonial Hong Kong (1842-1997) shifted in the 20\textsuperscript{th} Century. In its early decades, Japanese invasion and Chinese civil war produced waves of war refugees from mainland to Hong Kong. The Hong Kong population was drawn from different parts of China, Mandarin and Cantonese were used, and it was not uncommon for Hong Kong students to aspire to further education in the mainland.

The US embargo against China in 1951 placed colonial Hong Kong at the frontline of the Cold War. Hong Kong lost its traditional role as an entrepot and began to develop itself as a low-end, labor-intensive manufacturing base, taking advantage of the continuous supply of Cold War-era cheap mainland refugee labor, an unregulated colonial labor market, and special access to the US market allowed due to geopolitical considerations of Hong Kong’s Cold War role.\textsuperscript{82} In the mid-1960s Hong Kong also benefited as a supply point for the US military during the Vietnam War. Until then, the image of mainland migrants, for example in Hong Kong films, was largely positive. The mainland migrant protagonists


\textsuperscript{81} Lau Siu-kai and Kuan Hsin-chi,\textit{, The Ethos of the Hong Kong Chinese} (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1988).

\textsuperscript{82} Henry C. K. Liu, “Hong Kong: a Case of Self-Delusion”, Asia Times Online, May 14, 2003, \url{http://henryckliu.com/page50.html}.
were often materially impoverished country bumpkins, but they nevertheless embodied the traditional virtues of Chinese people.83

The late 1960s and early 1970s saw recurrent conflicts in Hong Kong between the left, aligned with the socialist mainland, and right, the colonial government and anti-communist Chinese. Anti-capitalist struggles in 1967 epitomized this conflict, with the left inspired by the mainland’s Cultural Revolution.84 In the wake of intense social unrest, the colonial government brutally suppressed rebellions on the one hand, and on the other hand, began social reforms and public investment. It also took measures to reduce colonial racial discrimination and foster Hong Kong Chinese business collaboration via liberal capitalism. During the 155 years of British colonial rule of Hong Kong, Chinese in Hong Kong did not form a separate identity until the 1970s, which was facilitated by the spread of television.85 It was a time when Hong Kong experienced unprecedented economic growth, emerging as a regional cosmopolitan city. The economic growth also coincided with the coming of age of a new generation brought up on colonial education and detached from the mainland.

Change in Hong Kong’s image of mainland migrants was signaled in 1979 by the birth of a character, AH Chan (阿灿 or 阿灿), in Hong Kong TV series “Wangzhongren” (網中人; The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly). Brought up in the rural mainland and coming to Hong Kong for a family reunion, AH Chan is portrayed as an ignorant, childish, uncivilized hick and clown. He contrasts with his Hong Kong-bred brother who is college educated, modern, smart, diligent and savvy. Although a marginal character in the story, AH Chan became the most memorable one of the show. His name instantly became a synonym for NMMs. Hong Kong identity thus formed in the context of otherization of mainlander.86

AH Chan reflected back a Hong Kong identity in alliance with Cold War modernization triumphalism and was a prelude to a mass encounter
between mainlanders and Hong Kongers. The year 1979 was when special economic zones were created in mainland coastal cities. In ensuing decades, they would draw millions of rural migrants to factories, many owned by Hong Kong capitalists. These AH Chans would encounter modern and savvy Hong Kongers as their managers and bosses. Meanwhile, negative depictions of mainlanders in Hong Kong media were just as present in 2012 and 2013 as they were several decades earlier.

In modern China, the Hong Kong identity is not alone in having been shaped under a colonial context. A comparable example is the Shanghai identity. Shanghai was also a product of the 19th Century Western domination in China, a treaty port full of migrants. Yet not all migrants who lived and settled in Shanghai could claim to be Shanghaiese. The Shanghai identity was formed around those mainly drawn from Zhejiang and southern Jiangsu provinces and excluded migrants from Anhui and northern Jiangsu provinces, who were lumped together as the “Subei people” (苏北人). Despite the two peoples belonging to the larger Han culture, social division and discrimination in Shanghai against “Subei people” was such that historian Emily Honig termed the process “creating Chinese ethnicity.” The coding of the division as “ethnic” may convey an innocent traditional tone, but the Shanghai identity was not formed in a binary relationship with the “Subei people.” Honig’s study shows it was constructed in a triangular, colonial-dominated relationship. In the early 20th Century, the “international settlement” already dominated Shanghai, marginalizing the original Chinese area. The Shanghai identity was formed around Chinese elites in association with foreigners and in disassociation from downtrodden “Subei people,” who often performed low-status manual jobs.

On the corrosive power of colonialism, Frantz Fanon focused on the division within the Black subject under colonial racial oppression and assumed that the oppressed subject is almost homogenous. What we see in Shanghai and Hong Kong is a process in which a major chasm emerges from the Chinese migrants of heterogeneous regional origins. In the context of colonial modernity in Shanghai and Hong Kong, a division

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89. The hierarchy Shanghai people imagine vis-à-vis other Chinese remains. See Chua Kong Ho, “The Rise of the Ugly China Tourist,” ST, July 31, 2005 (Singaporeans treat Chinese visitors “like Shanghaiese sales staff would treat those from the poorer provinces upon hearing their accents”).
was not just created within a singular subject, but also writ large and mapped onto the Chinese population. So created, Shanghai and Hong Kong identities are more than just ordinary regional or local identities, but they are a hybridity in which an association with the West endows it with a distinction and superiority vis-a-vis other local identities, as well as a power to represent and orientalize the “uncivilized” natives.

Colonialism not only produced a codification of differences between colonizer and colonized through race, but it also codified differences through rural-urban differentiation. This codification has not only taken on the specific form of “Shanghai identity” vs. “Subei people” or “Hong Kong identity” vs. “Mainland migrants,” but has also generally reworked the difference between “urban” vs. “rural.” Historically, garrison towns, market towns, and temporary markets existed in China and exchange had long been practiced between them and the countryside. With colonial modernity, market activities were transformed. The colonial treaty ports created a rift in the circuit of exchange between town and countryside. The treaty port became “a center of foreign influence, a gate by means of which foreign goods can come in,” but also an “economic rathole” for dribbling away Chinese wealth.

Rural producers suffered a double blow: not only were they no longer able to sell their handicrafts to town dwellers, but they also had to pay higher land rent, as absentee landlords turned to purchase more expensive and status-enhancing foreign commodities. Writing in the 1940s, the anthropologist FEI Xiaotong observed, “The rise of the modern Chinese cities has been paralleled by the decline in Chinese rural economy.” The rise of treaty ports in colonial modernity created new antagonistic rural-urban relations and defined “urban” in association with colonial modernity against the rural hinterland. A binary of “tu” (土; local/hick/backward) and “yang” (洋) (overseas/modern/progressing) emerged in this context, initially as qualifiers for commodities, but later also for people and places.

Yet we cannot stop here, because the division and discrimination against new migrants in Hong Kong and “Subei people” in Shanghai outlived colonialism. Scholars of coloniality argue that it “survives colonialism, kept alive in books, in criteria for academic performance, in cultural patterns, in common sense, in the self-image of peoples, in aspirations of

self, and other aspects of modern experience.” Hong Kong racism is extraordinary in surpassing the conventional form of racism and going beyond the racism of the Shanghai colonial modernity, because a discourse of vermin is being used against a well-intermixed and culturally proximate people. These otherized people are regarded by localists as more than just innately inferior, underdeveloped humans; they are scarcely seen as human at all.

IV. HONG KONG INFESTED BY MAINLAND VISITORS?

A small satirical group running in Germany’s 2013 national elections and calling itself only Die Partei (the party), held a “protest” at Berlin’s Brandenburg Gate tourist site. Its placards read “Tourists, piss off. No one misses you” and “T(err)urists go home!” One visitor indignantly asked a Die Partei member “You don’t want people to visit?” He replied. “No. Only rich people.” Another visitor queried “But don’t you like to travel outside Germany?” His deadpanned response: “Oh yes. I like it quite a lot.”

The deliberately ridiculous Berlin anti-tourist protest sought to inject levity into a dull election campaign. In few “world cities” would protests against tourists exist as anything but farce, but in Hong Kong they have not been funny and are intended to demean. They serve as part of a racialized Yellow Peril “anti-mainlandization” (反大陆化) discourse that also attacks NMMs and a Red Menace discourse that claims the mainland government interferes with the high degree of autonomy (高等自治) provided for in Hong Kong’s Basic Law.

In late 19th and early 20th century Australia, one “way of vilifying the Chinese was to stimulate a fear of being swamped by millions of Chinese eager to immigrate.” So too in Hong Kong today. Charges of swamping assume an area is being overwhelmed, but what constitutes

overwhelming numbers can be misleading when only a diachronic (then and now) comparison is made. An influx into a city can seem overwhelming when not informed by a comparative perspective, which would reveal that many cities have rising populations. London, for example, had 6.8 million residents in 1990, but 8.7 million in 2015, an almost identical percentage increase with Hong Kong’s growth from 5.7 million in 1990 to 7.2 million in 2015.96

Hong Kong’s resident population growth contributes more to crowding than the visitor influx. For example, take the issue of parallel traders [colloquially: 水客 “water guests”]. Due to mainland currency appreciation, concerns about product safety, and difference in sales taxes (0% in Hong Kong versus 17% in the mainland), they profitably buy goods in Hong Kong for resale in the mainland, causing some affordable Hong Kong amenities to disappear as more businesses cater to tourism.97 Like mainland visitors more generally – and like visitors to any city – parallel traders also represent competition for goods and use of the transport system.98 In 2012, some 70% of polled Hong Kongers blamed mainland visitors for rising prices.99 Localists regard mainlanders generally as an infestation by those guilty of “visiting while Chinese” and distort their crowding effect. Thus, in a 2015 protest, mainland parallel traders were said to have so overcrowded the light rail at Tuen Mun that residents had to wait in the mornings for two or three trains to pass before being able to board. Yet, people in several parts of Hong Kong with no parallel traders responded to an Apple Daily article voicing that complaint by stating that it is just as hard to get on trains where they live.100

The first activity of one of the main leaders of the anti-locust campaign, Ronald Leung Kam-shing (梁金成), was in anti-parallel trader protests in 2011-2013.101 Leung estimates that 80-90% of visits to Hong Kong by mainlanders are by parallel traders and other visitors from just


across the border in Shenzhen (深圳). In 2012, Hong Kong government sources said that there were 3,000-4,000 parallel traders and more than half were Shenzhen residents with Multiple Entry Permits (MEPs, see below). Claims of 20,000 or even as many as 40,000 parallel traders appeared in 2015, with 5,000-10,000 from Shenzhen, accounting for a fifth of all MEP holder trips to Hong Kong. However, there is no indication of an actual increase in parallel trader numbers between 2012 and 2015.

While the number of parallel traders is uncertain, there is consensus, including among Hong Kong parallel traders themselves, that many are Hong Kongers. Pro-Beijing sources report that 60% of parallel traders penalized at Shenzhen border crossings from 2011-2015 were Hong Kong people or that “recent surveys” show 70% are. One journalist has said, that “more than 40% of parallel traders are actually [Hong Kongers]” and another one—plus Legco’s tourism sector member—have said that more than half of parallel traders are Hong Kong people; while Hong Kong’s Secretary for Security has said 50% are. The London-based consultancy Capital Economics stated that “[m]ore than 80% of parallel traders arrested at Shenzhen customs have been Hong Kong locals.”

An elderly Hong Konger who makes HK$280 [US$36] for two cross-border trips a day may be typical. He has said that, “The government is not giving the elderly enough support. This is my way of making a living.” Parallel trading violates visitors’ conditions of stay, so

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106. 吕大樂, “水貨客非問題主因, 区域融合更需深思” (Parallel traders are not the main issue, regional integration requires deep thought), 明报, Mar. 6, 2015.
108. “水客八成港人” (Eight tenths of parallel traders are Hong Kong people), 大公报, Feb. 17, 2015
from 2013 to early 2015, 1,900 mainland parallel traders were arrested\(^{116}\) and “25,000 mainlanders were turned away at the border [in 2014 and] some 13,000 people are on the Immigration Department’s watch list.”\(^{117}\) Hong Kong law however permits residents to engage in parallel trading and they can replace barred mainlanders.

Mainlanders accounted for 35% of retail sales in Hong Kong in 2013, with the local share 62%.\(^ {118}\) Hong Kong’s visitor numbers rose from 17 million in 2002 (7 million mainlanders) to 54 million visitors in 2013 (41 million mainlanders; 23.7 million day-trippers)\(^ {119}\) and 60.8 million (47.2 million mainlanders; 28.2 million day-trippers) in 2014.\(^ {120}\) The higher mainlander proportion results from the IVS, which began in 2003 in response to the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) crisis and was eventually extended to residents of 49 cities\(^ {121}\) in allowing holders “one or two trips to Hong Kong within a specific time frame.”\(^ {122}\) Multiple entry permits (MEPs)(一签多行), created in 2009-2010, allowed until 2015, unlimited visits by Shenzhen permanent residents. Shenzhen however has some 15-20 million people,\(^ {123}\) but only 1.5-1.8 million have an MEP.\(^ {124}\) In 2014, 16.5 million visits were made using IVS (35% of all visits) and 14.9 million visits were by Shenzhen residents using MEPs (32% of all visits).\(^ {125}\) The remaining third of mainland visitors (15.8 million) were from other parts of China. A 2013 study showed that 83% of IVS entrants came from neighboring Guangdong province, almost half

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122. In Need.
125. “Border Shops to Open by October,” SCMP, Feb. 6, 2015. See also Job Opportunities (MEP users averaged 9.1 visits per year in 2014).
from Shenzhen. Thus, Shenzhen residents were 46% of mainland visitors, not the overwhelming number localists claim. In 2015, the central government scaled-back MEPs to allow for only one visit per week. That will cut the participation of mainlanders in parallel trading, yet, mainland parallel traders “will most likely increase the amount of their purchases each time they come. Then, parallel traders who are in fact Hongkongers may buy more for their business since there are fewer competitors.”

In determining whether Hong Kong is overwhelmed, its synchronic (simultaneous) comparison with more-or-less similar places is a better approach than a diachronic comparison. When Hong Kong is compared to other cities with developed tourism and business sectors and the influx of non-residents (overseas and domestic tourists, work commuters, and day-trippers), as well as the cities’ territories are accounted for, the SAR has a lower average proportion of non-residents within its borders on any given day than most comparable cities.

Despite Hong Kong being nestled in the world’s most populace country, its visitor numbers are ordinary by “world city” standards. New York City (NYC) had 8.3 million people in 2013 in 790 sq. km compared to Hong Kong, which had 7.2 million in an area of 1,104 sq. km. Like Hong Kong, NYC had 54 million visitors in 2013, which is an average of some 150,000 visitors a day. The NYC figure however included only tourists, not work commuters or day-trippers. NYC receives a huge number of each. Most commuters work in Manhattan, a 60 sq. km island of 1.5 million residents. It receives almost 2.5 million other people every day (1.6 million commuting workers, 400,000 out-of-town visitors, and 450,000 day-trippers). With hundreds of thousands of non-New

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127. Leung, Policy Shows.
128. Parallel Trader Curbs.
Yorkers entering Manhattan alone most week days, the visitor presence in New York City hugely exceeds that in Hong Kong. Visitors to Hong Kong are generally more recognizable as such than visitors to New York, but each takes up just as much space and they use many of the same kinds of services. Washington, DC also has a greatly augmented commuter-adjusted population: its nighttime residential population in 2010 was 584,400 (in 177 sq. km); its 1,046,036 daytime population represented a 79% increase.133

As elsewhere, visitors to Hong Kong concentrate in certain parts of the city,134 but Hong Kong has rather few work commuting workers entering daily, only 44,600 in 2009.135 That could be all who worked in Hong Kong on any occasion that year, but here, it is assumed to be work commuters who crossed the border on weekdays. Even if the whole daily average of 130,000 mainland visitors and 50,000 cross-border work commuters136 (many of whom may be Hong Kong people) concentrate in a few areas of Hong Kong, that is still less than a tenth of the 2.5 million daily influx into Manhattan. Outsiders coming to Manhattan moreover may be even more concentrated (in the financial district and midtown area) than are tourists and cross-border commuters who come to Hong Kong.

San Francisco had 17 million visitors in 2013 or on average of 45,000 per day. That is less than a third of what Hong Kong and New York received,137 but the figure does not include work commuters, who are said to be a million a day.138 San Francisco moreover is much smaller than Hong Kong or New York. It had only 825,000 residents in 2013 in a

136. About 40,000 of these live in Shenzhen. There are also about 20,000 school children from Shenzhen who commute to classes in Hong Kong. Virtually all are children of at least one Hong Kong parent. “Hong Kong Economy: Aisles Apart, Economist,” Mar. 21, 2015.
city of only 122 sq. km. San Francisco’s visitor density is thus markedly higher than Hong Kong’s.

London had 8 million people in 2010 in 1,572 sq. km. It had 15 million overseas and 11.5 million domestic overnight visitors. But almost one million persons are said to commute into London to work each weekday. There likely are hundreds of thousands of day trippers. Even using the smaller estimate of London having “116 million domestic visitors annually,” the UK capital, whose population is not much larger than Hong Kong’s, had a daily average of overseas and domestic visitors some twice that of Hong Kong.

Paris had a population in 2014 of 2.34 million in an area of 105 sq. km, which is a little more than one tenth of Hong Kong’s. It reportedly had 47 million visitors, as compared to Hong Kong’s 60.8 million. With a third of Hong Kong’s population, it had 78% of its number were visitors.

Barcelona had about 1.6 million residents in 2013 in an area of 102 sq. km., and received 27 million visitors that year, including day-trippers. Spain’s Catalan capital has a tenth of Hong Kong’s area and 22% of its population, but had 50% of the total of Hong Kong’s visitors.

As a recipient of outsiders, Hong Kong is thus less crowded than comparable cities. It is nothing like Venice, Italy, with its 270,000 inhabitants (60,000 of them in the centro storico or historic center) and 20

142. Chan, Crowds.
144. Backlash in Barcelona.
145. Singapore has a lower intake of visitors than Hong Kong. Its population is three-fourths that of Hong Kong’s and its area two-thirds, but it had less than a third of the visitors in 2013. “International Visitor Arrivals Hit Record of 15.5m in 2013,” Channel News Asia, Feb. 17, 2014. Work commuters and day trippers may not be counted however. Singapore’s hinterland is poorer than Hong Kong’s. Notably, 40% of Singapore’s residents are foreigners, against whom protests have been mounted, “Outsiders See Ugly Face of Lion City,” SCMP, Apr. 26, 2014; “Online Lynch Mob Targets Expats,” SCMP, May 8, 2014.. Bangkok’s 2010 population size was almost identical to Hong Kong’s, but with more than 40% additional area. It received 21m domestic and foreign tourists in 2011, work commuters and day trippers not included. “Bangkok Named Thailand’s Most Popular City among Tourists,” Pattaya Mail, Dec. 30, 2011.
million visitors a year, 70% of them day trippers. Venice’s territory is about the same as Hong Kong’s, but most visitors crowd into the centro storico of only 7.6 sq km. Yet, while there are complaints aplenty in Venice about the number of visitors, there is nothing like the racialized disdain deployed by Hong Kong’s anti-locust campaign.

Hong Kong journalist Michael Chugani, writing of his frustration at mainland visitors, has said he has feared for his life in a crowd of locals and mainlanders and, “in a fit of rage” kicked a mainland visitor’s suitcase. Chugani rhetorically queried, “Why should taxpayers like me have to be prisoners in our own homes while we turn the city over to visitors?” He asserts that “No other city has 1.3 billion people at its doorstep, with 300 million in southern China eligible for easy entry and within an hour’s reach of Hong Kong.” That dystopian vision assumes that most Chinese can and will visit Hong Kong, yet many cities elsewhere—in China’s mainland, India, etc.—are much more open to vast nearby populations of potential visitors than Hong Kong. Contrary to Chugani’s claim moreover, other cities are less positioned than Hong Kong to regulate inflows of non-residents.

Hong Kong thus has many more visitors than before, but remains less crowded by non-residents than comparable cities. Berlin, where the satirical anti-tourist “protest” was held, has 3.5 million residents, less than half Hong Kong’s population, in a territory 80% Hong Kong’s size. It had 27 million visitors in 2013 (overseas 43%; domestic 57%), which is half what Hong Kong got. That figure was for tourists who stayed in hotels however. Berlin also had (in 2012) 22 million overnight trips where visitors stayed with relatives or friends and no less than 132 million day trips. Its visitors bureau has stated that, “Theoretically, the city is being visited by ca.500,000 day-trippers and overnight guests every single day.” That is more than 2.5 times the total visitors or four times the 130,000 mainland visitors that Hong Kong receives daily and in a

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147. “Why are Hong Kong People Last in Line in their own City?” SCMP, Feb. 7, 2014.
152. See 旅業現況添政治因素 應全面規劃壯大好處 (The travel industry’s current situation within the political equation: we should plan comprehensively for greater benefits), 明报, Feb. 25, 2015.
less populous and smaller city. The Berlin figure moreover may not even include work commuters. Hong Kong, put in comparative perspective, is thus not “overwhelmed” by a “staggering” number of mainlanders, as an elite US political journal’s article claimed.\textsuperscript{153} Still less is it “infested” by a swarming species.

Also seldom considered is the idea that many Hong Kong people visit or work in the nearby mainland – they were a key component of the 83 million visitors to Shenzhen in 2011.\textsuperscript{154} In 2012, 30 million of the 76 million visits of Hong Kong people to the mainland were to Shenzhen only. They spent on average HK$1,000 (US$130) there, less than what mainlanders spend in Hong Kong. Figures on Hong Kong people visiting the mainland include only visits made for a holiday or business however, not for other purposes, e.g. visiting relatives,\textsuperscript{155} while those for mainlanders visiting Hong Kong are for all visitors. It is thus likely that as many or more Hong Kong people visited Shenzhen in 2012 as mainland people visited Hong Kong (34 million).\textsuperscript{156} Although some Shenzhen people “have pointed to the influx of Hong Kong visitors to Shenzhen as the reason for higher consumer prices in their city” and others say that Hong Kong people’s real estate purchases drive up property prices,\textsuperscript{157} there are no reported claims that Hong Kong people overwhelm Shenzhen. In 12-months from mid-2009 to mid-2010 moreover, 175,000 Hong Kong people worked in the Mainland, i.e. 5% of Hong Kong’s workforce.\textsuperscript{158}

Because Hong Kong has a policed border with the mainland, it is also possible for it to change visitation patterns. To reduce mainland visitors to central parts of Hong Kong, malls may be set up just inside the SAR.\textsuperscript{159} A new shopping center near Lok Ma Chau border station,

\begin{itemize}
  \item 153. Rachel Lu, “Is Hong Kong Running Out of Room?” \textit{Foreign Policy (FP)}, Apr. 22, 2014.
  \item 156. Gregory So, “The Other Side of Tourism,” \textit{CD}, Apr. 19, 2013. Shenzhen’s population is larger than Hong Kong’s (11.9m in 2012), as is its area (1,745 sq. km), but its core area has only about 3m people. Wendell Cox, “The Evolving Urban Form: Shenzhen,” \textit{New Geography}, May 25, 2012, www.newgeography.com/content/002862-the-evolving-urban-form-shenzhen.
  \item 157. Shenzhen’s Parallel Universe.
\end{itemize}
planned to accommodate up to 30,000 customers a day, was scheduled to open in 2015.160 A duty free store opened in Guangzhou in 2015 with prices 60% lower than at other stores for the same imported goods. Its mobs of customers said that buying there will obviate making trips to Hong Kong.161 Prof. LUI Tai-lok of the Synergy Net Think Tank argues that shopping centers should be built on the mainland side of the border.162 The provision of a special zone, just inside Hong Kong, for unlimited purchases by residents and parallel traders for infant formula, cosmetics, etc. has also been proposed.163 Even some localists agree that it is likely visitor numbers will fall, as many mainlanders have already toured Hong Kong or now can access goods similar to those they can buy in the SAR.164

The argument that Hong Kong receives an extraordinary influx is thus weak. It is important to know that inaccurate estimations of the numbers of “outsiders” are the basis for the popular hostility to them. The eminent 20th Century Chinese writer LAO She, who spent four years in London in the 1920s, observed that, “If there were 20 Chinese living in Chinatown, [the media’s] accounts would say 5,000. [And] every one of those 5,000 yellow devils would certainly smoke opium, smuggle arms, murder people . . .”165

Overestimations are commonplace. A 2014 survey found Britons estimating Muslims at 21% of the UK population; in fact they are 5%. In France, the estimate was that 31% are Muslim, but the actual percentage is eight.166 In a 2012 US poll, non-Latinos estimated that 36% of all Latinos were “illegal.” Over 17% of respondents believed more than half of all Latinos are, while another 13% estimated exactly half are undocumented. Thus, 30% of respondents believed that most Hispanics are undocumented. In fact, only 13% are.167

160. Border Shops.
162. In Need.
164. Author interview, Leung Kam-shing, Hong Kong, Aug. 16, 2014.
165. Quoted in Yo Zushi, “Sympathy for the Devil Doctor,” New Statesman, Nov. 28, 2014, 64-65 (65). The 1911 UK census showed 42m people and just 1,319 Chinese (0.5% of foreigners), but talk of a “Chinese invasion” was rampant. Frances Wood, “Made in Herne Hill,” Times Literary Supplement, Jan. 9, 2015.
Correcting such inaccuracies can be consequential. A 2014 survey found that in Britain, 54% of respondents thought there were too many migrants; on average, they believed that 34% of UK residents are foreigners. The actual number is only 11%. When respondents were told the actual percentage of foreigners, the proportion who thought there were too many immigrants dropped to 31%. That also occurred in the US: 38% thought there were too many immigrants, but when told the actual proportion, those holding that view dropped to 21%. 168

A common conception, including in Hong Kong, 169 is that migrants drain public services. That too may be mitigated by presenting evidence. A study of European OECD countries, Australia, Canada and the US found that the net contribution of immigrants varied, but overall was a net nil. This was “driven by the fact that immigrant households [being poorer] contribute on average less in terms of taxes and social security contributions than the native-born and not by a higher dependence on benefits.” 170 Studies found net positive fiscal contributions by migrants in Germany and by EU migrants in Britain. 171

In Hong Kong, because many NMMs are poor and outside the income tax structure, they are likely not net financial contributors; but most are not welfare dependent. Yet, localists say just that. Moreover, in a 2012 Hong Kong Institute of Education survey, 53% of respondents said NMMs depended on the city’s welfare system rather than contributing to society, while only 3% said the opposite. 172 The reality is different: about 5% of Hong Kong’s population receives Comprehensive Social Security Assistance (CSSA) benefits. In 2003, 24.2% of unemployed new arrivals received CSSA; in 2011, 10.9% did, 173 although more than half of One


169. Immigrants from the Chinese mainland—likely referring to non-permanent resident mainlanders—are nearly 5% of Hong Kong’s population. Hou, Showdown. All immigrants from the mainland since 1997 had, by 2013 comprised about 10% of Hong Kong’s population.” Mainland Chinese Migrants Since 1997 Now Make Up 10pc of Hong Kong Population,” SCMP, Mar. 21, 2013.


172. “Hong Kong Accepting Too Many Mainland Immigrants, Survey Finds” SCMP, Nov. 22, 2012

Way Permit Holder (OWPH) NMMs were reckoned to be unemployed. NMMs were 15% of total CSSA recipients in 2003 and 4% in 2011. In 2013, 7% of NMMs received CSSA. NMMs also make non-financial contributions to Hong Kong society by taking jobs “natives” shun. NMM CSSA applicants are nevertheless demeaned as “locusts.”

V. LICE! COCKROACHES! LOCUSTS!: INSECT LANGUAGE AND RACISM

“When by-and-by, the Chinese know their power, they have only to walk slowly westwards, and, like the locusts in Egypt, no pharaohs in Europe with all their mighty boats will be able to stop them. They won’t wait to fire guns or bombs. They’ll just all walk along and smother Europe.”

Baron John Fisher, First Sea Lord of the British Empire, early 1900s

Hong Kong’s “anti-locust” campaigners are said to employ a “patently offensive term” that slurs mainlanders with rhetoric akin to the racial invective used against African Americans. That is accurate as far as it goes, yet the campaign is beyond that: the cry of “locusts!” evokes explicitly dehumanizing “insect language” of the perpetrators of genocide. Indeed, at a 2014 anti-locust demonstration, protesters symbolically “exterminated” mainland visitors by spraying them with bottles labeled “locust insecticide” and displayed banners reading

174. “More than Half of all One-way Mainland Migrants are Jobless in Hong Kong,” SCMP, Oct. 23, 2013
182. John Young, “Hong Kong Must have Zero Tolerance for Anti-Mainlander Hate Campaigns,” SCMP, Mar. 6, 2014.
“locusts, die going home.” The 2014 anti-locust protests were not the first time that “locust insecticide” appeared. In 2012, when guards at the Hong Kong shop of Italian luxury chain Dolce & Gabbanan told the Hong Kong people, but not the mainlanders, to stop photographing window displays, 1,000 local people assembled to protest. One displayed a canister labeled “locust insecticide.” Photos of the canister and its creator appeared on the popular localist blog. Like insect language, insecticide is associated with genocide. During World War II, a million Jews, dubbed vermin by Nazis, were murdered with insecticide. The Rwandan military had “Operation Insecticide,” as part of its preparation for the 1995 murder by Hutus of 800,000 Tutsi and others termed as “cockroaches.”

While genocide will not likely occur in Hong Kong, “insect language” has also been central to the most wounding racial vilifications, which most likely would lead to sanctioning of violence and viciousness. In 2013, a truck killed 25 year-old LIU Han (刘涵), a mainland woman who had graduated from Hong Kong University (HKU) and worked at the Hong Kong office of a “big four” accounting firm. When news of her death and background emerged, more than a thousand abusive comments about her appeared on Facebook, the Hong Kong Golden Forum, and Apple Daily. Some comments praised the truck driver and called mainlanders “locusts” who took away jobs and used up the resources in Hong Kong.

Dehumanization of perceived enemies goes back far. In the early modern period, Britons often described Muslims as “locusts” and other threatening non-humans. Dehumanization reached its zenith over the last century and a half however, especially in modern genocides and oth-

er racist campaigns. They often involved the use of “insect language” to vilify ethnic groups as dangerous, despised species. At the outset of that period, in 1864, Colonel John Chivington marched out troops to massacre, mutilate and despoil, with impunity Native Americans—mainly women and children—at Sand Creek, Colorado, USA. He told his soldiers, “Kill and scalp all, big and little; nits [lice eggs] make lice.”

Locusts present a particularly insidious insect image. Harmless solitary grasshoppers until short of food, they then physically mutate and swarm destructively. A swarm can cover an area greater than Hong Kong’s and 80 million locusts can concentrate in 1.3 sq. km.

In the mid-19th Century, while in the US the insect language was being deployed against Native Americans, in neighboring Canada it was used against Irish Catholic immigrants, who were termed “locusts.” Elite Protestants insisted that the mainly working class Irish Catholic immigrants were colonizing Canada on behalf of a tyrannical Catholic Church, that they would overwhelm it by taking locals’ jobs and claiming social welfare, and that they were criminal and dirty. Also in Canada, the Chinese were being characterized as “‘a swarm of locusts’ who exhausted the mines and left the country ‘impoverished and desolate.’”

In 2013, writing on the anniversary of the US’s first Chinese Exclusion Act—passed in 1882 by a US Congress whose members in debates referred to the Chinese as locusts, rats, flies and leeches—a commentator for a Hong Kong newspaper observed that “Today’s use of the term “locusts” to describe mainland Chinese is really a part of the narrative of

the slanty-eyed race taking over the world.”197 The Chinese have often
been depicted as locusts by anti-immigrant and other racist forces.198
During the Chinese Exclusion Act and anti-Chinese pogroms in North
America, a notorious 1878 magazine illustration by George F. Keller
depicted swarms of “Chinese locusts,” with insect bodies and “Asian fac-
es,” perched for destruction and descending on the US (“Uncle Sam’s
Farm”) (Fig. 4)199 The artist had mastered classic invasion imagery and
animal symbolism to devastating effect.

Fig. 4: Caption: “Seventy millions of people are starving in the northern provinces
of China. All who can do so are making preparations to come to the United States. Look
out for the grasshoppers, Uncle Sam.”

Chinese invading the US and UK and sometimes enslaving inhabitants, see Eric Hayot, “Chi-
nese Bodies, Chinese Futures,” Representations no. 99 (2007): 99-129; Ross Forman, China
and the Victorian Imagination: Empires Entwined (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2013). Sax Rohmer novels (1913-1959) about the insidious Fu Manchu touched on similar
themes. Frayling, The Yellow Peril; Ruth Mayer, Serial Fu Manchu: the Rise of the Chinese
Supervillain and the Spread of Yellow Peril Ideology (Philadelphia: Temple University Press,
2014). Late 20th Century Chinese invasion stories are analyzed in E. Hayot, “Chineseness: a
Pre-History of its Future,” in E. Hayot, et al. Sinographies: Writing China (Minneapolis: Univer-
sity of Minnesota Press, 2007).

198. Hayot, Chinese Bodies: 126. US racists have termed immigrants locusts and cite the
www.youtube.com/watch?v=stzmHyoTw4.

199. “‘Uncle Sam’s Farm in Danger,’ 9 March, 1878,” Illustrating Chinese Exclusion,
march-1878/. Keller’s anti-Chinese cartoon contrast with cartoons of Thomas Nast, who fea-
tured blacks and Chinese as equal citizens with whites. See “Uncle Sam’s Thanksgiving
An editorial accompanying this pictorial in *The Wasp* of March 9, 1878 stated the following:

Our artist has represented the possible immigration as a swarm of grasshoppers driven along by the inexorable hand of Famine. . .Uncle Sam, armed with House Committee Resolutions, assisted by his hired man, the California Press, is striving to stay the torrent of yellow grasshoppers. It seems almost impossible for them to succeed; and it is certain they will be overcome by the invader unless assistance of a more substantial kind be rendered.

The cartoon stoked the fear that famished Chinese “locusts” would overwhelm the US. Evoking this particular insect symbolism was a clever choice designed to arouse the emotions of Californians, whose livelihood depended on the continued success of agriculture. The grasshopper was acutely feared among California farmers. In 1828, a grasshopper plague caused near famine, and in the great plague of 1874-1878, the crop-munching insect caused wide-spread destruction in the Midwest leading western governors to organize days of prayer to keep the tide from coming westward.200 Ironically, the Chinese in California were proving to be the opposite of locusts. Success in California agriculture was due almost exclusively to the transformative innovations contributed by Chinese, whose “work boosted the value of the land from 28 dollars an acre in 1875 to 100 an acre two years later.”201

“Uncle Sam’s Farm” was not the only cartoon of the era depicting the Chinese as locusts. “The Chinese Plague,” in McGee’s Weekly of April 3, 1880, showed a cloud of locusts descending on a wheat field with the heads of wheat labeled as “shoemakers,” “cigar makers,” “common laborers,” “factory hands” and “housemaids.” A farmer says, “What shall we do with this darn’d locust horde. They’ll eat up all my labor crop.” That the farmer is named Knickenbocker, a stereotypical old Dutch settler name in New York, indicates an intention to show that the Chinese “locusts” were a threat not only to the western, but also eastern US.202 In US Senate debates in 1882, when a law to exclude Chinese for the next 20 years was enacted, and in 1902, when it was renewed, propo-

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ments said Chinese “swarm upon us like locusts” and “[c]ame like locusts.” Such rhetoric fueled laws that reduced the Chinese population in the US from 105,000 in 1880 to 62,000 in 1920.

The US was also not the only country where the Chinese were referred to as locusts. In an 1889 article on his travel to China, the poet laureate of British imperialism Rudyard Kipling observed that there are three races who can work: whites, “Hindus,” and Chinese, “but there is only one that can swarm” – Chinese. That view was common in Kipling’s time across the English-speaking world and beyond. In Australia and New Zealand, “no other social or ethnic group has been the object of such prolonged and intense vilification as the Chinese,” who were also subject to exclusionary laws. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the Chinese were commonly depicted in Australia as insects coming in swarms. The *Queensland Figaro* of December 4, 1886 had a cartoon entitled “The Chinese Plague” that showed “an Australian laborer standing up to massed ranks of Chinese-faced locusts, who were threatening his wife, child, and baby, and saying, “It’s these pesky locusts that are eating me out of house and home. I must exterminate them somehow.” In early 20th Century Russia, the Chinese were described as ants, locusts and midges. In Mexico then, racists portrayed them as locusts.

The Chinese have not been the only ethnic groups to be vilified as insects. Persecutors in Turkey referred to the Armenian minority in 1914 as “dog lice.” In the mid-1920s, the “scientific racist” Madison Grant’s bestseller *The Passing of the Great Race* bemoaned other peoples crowd-

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ing out the “superior Nordic race.” Grant arranged a tour for Albert Johnson, a leader in the US Congress of a successful effort to end immigration to the US from outside northwestern Europe, including a total exclusion of Chinese. “After viewing lower Manhattan through Grant’s eyes, Johnson agreed that Nordics had ‘great reason for apprehension’ over ‘the aliens creeping up on New York City like locusts.”211

In the 1930s and 1940s, the Nazis termed the Jews as lice, rats, and vermin.212 The use of the locust image of Jews in Germany goes back to the early 19th Century and the Nazis’ infamous 1940 anti-Jewish propaganda film Jude Suess, which contained a scene of Jews arriving to settle in Stuttgart and the exclamation “They descend upon our country like locusts!”213 When the post-World War II Nuremberg Trials court condemned to death the Nazis’ chief anti-Jewish propagandist Julius Streicher, it noted that one way he incited genocide was by pushing the image of Jews as locusts.214 In the same era, Japanese invaders of China referred to the Chinese as chankuro, “which implied something less than human, on a level with a louse.”215 A perpetrator of Japan’s Nanjing Massacre in 1937 recounted that “We called the Chinese chancorro; that meant below human, like bugs or animals . . . If I’d thought of them as human beings I couldn’t have done it.”216 Another Japanese soldier among the perpetrators described the Chinese as “ants crawling on the ground.”217

In 1944, just before intense incendiary bombing of Tokyo began, the official publication of the US Marines said that “louseous Japanicas” [Japanese lice] have “breeding grounds around the Tokyo area [that] must be completely annihilated.” During the 1994 genocide of Tutsi people in Rwanda, government radio broadcasts repeatedly cast the victims as “cockroaches” to be exterminated. In the run up to the murderous pogroms against ethnic Chinese in Indonesia in the late 1990s, significant numbers of indigenous (prbumi) Indonesians, including officials, disparaged the Chinese as “locusts.”

Insect language continues to be used against immigrants. An analysis by leading scholars of anti-immigrant politics noted that “identifying immigrants with the spread of new global diseases or ‘locusts’” indicates that current images “very much resemble old racist sentiments.” In Russia in 2003, a Cossack leader said immigrants, mostly Central Asians, are “locusts” who should be scared off. “Locusts” is often used on a Vancouver, Canada online real estate forum to describe ethnic Chinese property buyers (some from Hong Kong). Those using the term deflect charges of racism by proclaiming that the epithet “locust” is used in Hong Kong against Chinese. In the US in 2011, an official in the state of Nevada Referring to “dirty filthy Mexican/Latino illegals” compared illegal immigrants to locusts and wrote, “These young girls will spread their legs to anyone to get an anchor baby growing in their bellies so they can illegally cross the border and suck

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up the US citizen tax base resource everywhere they go in the US.”

In 2015, Zulu King Goodwill Zwelithini said of foreigners in South Africa, in a radio broadcast, that “we must deal with our own lice... let’s take out the ants and leave them in the sun. We are asking that immigrants must make their bags and go where they come from.” He blamed foreigners for crowding and dirtying South African streets. Some ruling-party politicians also expressed concerns about the presence of foreigners with President Jacob Zuma promising to “crack down on unchecked immigration.” Zulu mobs in Durban and Johannesburg then descended on African foreigners, who constitute some 10% of South Africa’s population, killing seven and driving thousands into refugee centers. Rioters claimed black foreigners were job stealers, drug sellers or terrorists. The shops of ethnic South Asians and Chinese were also ransacked. Western foreigners and white South Africans were left untouched, but black South Africans with relationships with black foreigners were intimidated, and anti-xenophobia marches were menaced by armed mobs. Neighboring Mozambique, Malawi and Zimbabwe sent buses to repatriate their nationals and counter-protests against South Africans forced hundreds of them to leave Mozambique. A complaint against the King for hate speech was lodged at the South African Human Rights Commission. Nigeria’s Senate called on the International Criminal Court to indict the Zulu king. In fact, his insect language reflected post-apartheid Afrophobic discourse that “has now morphed into a malignant ‘nativism’...” In a 2008 pogrom against black African foreigners, in which 62 people were killed,

Predictably, the language of hatred was directed at those attacked who were named: “Makwerekwere” the standard derogatory name for African foreigners, “Grigambas” (dung beetles), “Amagundane” (rats) “Cockroaches,” and so on... These terms were of course similar to those used during the genocide in Rwanda, ex-Yugoslavia and Nazi Germany. The


language is typical of such ethnic violence and is clearly meant to refer to the extermination of vermin.\textsuperscript{227}

Like many Hong Kong people who rhetorically separate Hong Kong from China, South Africans subscribe to a “myth that South Africa is not part of the African continent, but a different place that just happens to be on the tip of the continent.” Like Hong Kongers’ talk of “going to China,” they speak of “going to Africa” when traveling to countries to their north.\textsuperscript{228}

Like the Nevada official’s diatribe, the anti-mainlander campaign in Hong Kong focused on mainland women coming to Hong Kong to give birth to “anchor babies” (㞬㠀ἳඤ). It claims moreover that most mainland migrants are poorly-educated women who marry Hong Kong men in order to use the SAR’s welfare system.\textsuperscript{229} Mainland wives of Hong Kong men, because of the “low transferability of mainland education to Hong Kong” and discrimination, on average earn 40% less than the general population.\textsuperscript{230} Among One-Way Permit Holders (OWPH) arriving Hong Kong in the 3rd quarter of 2014, more than 90% had finished high school and three-quarter spoke Cantonese, yet most lived in three-person households whose median income was only HK$9,200 (US$1,190) a month.\textsuperscript{231} The profile of OWPH NMMs is changing however: those with higher education increased from 10.1% in 2003 to 17.5% in 2013, while


\textsuperscript{228} Sibusiso Tshabalala, “Why Black South Africans are Attacking Foreign Africans but not Foreign Whites,” Quartz, Apr. 15, 2015.


those working grew from 22% to 42% with “homemakers” decreasing from 60% to 35%.232

Anti-immigrant groups in the US often call undocumented Latino immigrants “cockroaches”233 and a Fox News Radio commentator compared them to “locusts.”234 Anti-immigrant groups in the US have expressed sympathy for the Hong Kong people who oppose NMMs.235 Jews are reportedly depicted as “insects and cockroaches” in Iranian government-distributed cartoons.236 In the US, a song circulated by the White Aryan Resistance depicts Jews as fleas and locusts.237 In 2005, a Tangiers newspaper referred to immigrants from Sub-Saharan Africa as “black locusts” invading North Africa. In response, the Moroccan government banned the newspaper.238 During and since the 2012 pogrom against Muslims of East Bengali descent in the eastern Indian province of Assam, in which 108 lives were lost, the victimized population has been referred to as “locusts” by local chauvinists.239

A notable user of insect language today is Japan’s Zaitokukai (在日特権を許さない市民の会), Association of Citizens to Oppose Special Privileges for Zainichi), which denounces long-term Korean citizen residents of Japan (Zainichi) who vote and access the national pension and welfare systems. It seeks repeal of the Special Act on Immigration Control (入管特例法) that gives Zainichi Koreans permanent residence status. Zaitokukai claims 15,000 members and “regularly holds hate-speech.


rallies . . . with supporters describing Koreans as cockroaches and criminals who should ‘go home.’” It can do so because, as a US news website noted in 2014,

Japan is in the middle of a huge racist boom. Anti-Korean books, magazines, and comic books are selling like wildfire. The anti-Korean diatribe Bokanron (The Impudent Korea Argument), a book released . . . last year, became the top selling book on Amazon within a week and sold 270,000 copies by the end of March. An assistant editor at a weekly magazine stated, “If you have an article ridiculing Korea or Koreans on the cover, the issue sells. That’s the climate we’re in.”

Ultra-rightist groups including Zaitokukai held a demonstration of 2,700 participants in 2010 in Tokyo. They demanded that Koreans and Chinese leave Japan, confronted Chinese on tour buses, and shouted slogans such as “We need to fight against China!” and “Throw illegal immigrants into Tokyo Bay!” Sophia University political scientist Nakano Koichi has observed that, “Badmouthing Chinese or Koreans in a very racist way is so abundant that it doesn’t even offend people any more. There was a taboo and now the taboo is gone. The kind of things they say, even in the late 1990s were almost unthinkable.”

Zaitokukai demonstrators, who wear armbands stating “The Volunteer Corps against Lawless Koreans,” “Expel the barbarians” and (in English) “Korean busters,” have called ethnic Koreans at a Kyoto primary school “cockroaches.” Leaders argue that Japanese should not have to share their shrinking pie with outsiders. Group head Sakurai Makoto, a tax accountant and a “semi-regular pundit on TV shows” claimed Zaitokukai is not racist and is modeled after the US Tea Party. Zaitokukai has held demonstrations against Japanese television stations that air South Korean dramas. Yet, while shouting at Koreans in Tokyo that they


were “cockroaches” at a 2013 rally, Sakura disclaimed any xenophobia.244

In 2014, Japan’s Supreme Court ruled Zaitokukai’s protest at the Korean-run school was racial discrimination and it must pay a Y12.26m (US$103,000) fine.245 The police placed the group on a watch list.246 By early 2015, 24 prefectural governments had demanded enactment of a hate-speech law.247 An ethnic Korean law professor whose daughter was attending the Kyoto school when the Zaitokukai protest occurred recalled that his daughter asked him “if it was ‘wrong to be a Korean.’” He added that, “Hate speech is not just a discomforting form of expression but an act that is very damaging to the people targeted as it destroys their self-esteem.”248

With Zaitokukai and other right-wing groups holding more than 100 demonstrations in the first ten months of 2014 alone and broadening their focus to also oppose immigration by Muslims, the United Nation Committee for the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) “has called on Japan to address hate speech and incitement to racist violence during demonstrations, and to punish public officials and politicians who disseminate hate speech.”249 The reference to politicians is because of apparent links between several Japanese cabinet ministers and Zaitokukai that surfaced in 2014. These politicians include Yamatani Eriko, head of the National Public Safety Commission, which oversees the police, prospective enforcers of any anti-hate speech law.250 It remains doubtful that the right-wing Japanese government will support a hate speech law.251

Like Zaitokukai, most racist movements deny being racist. The head of the North Georgia Ku Klux Klan has stated, “We are not racists. We just want to be with white people.” Another KKK leader has averred that “We do not hate anyone” and that they are only trying to protect white culture.252 The anti-Muslim English Defence League has “displayed

246. Japanese Hate Speech.
250. For Top Pols.
‘Black and White Unite’ banners and stressed its opposition to racism, fascism and Nazism,” while calling on Britons to protect “Christian culture.” However, a 2012 poll found that 74% of Britons regard the EDL as racist. The German anti-Muslim immigrant Pegida claims to not oppose foreigners per se or Islam, but only “economic refugees mooching off the German system.” The movement, however, contains members of the Neo-Nazi National Democratic Party.

Some members of Hong Kong elites deny that the anti-locust campaign is based on bias. Patrick Ho Chi-ping, as Secretary for Home Affairs (2002-2007), oversaw the legislative submission of the Race Discrimination Ordinance (RDO). It contained no express protections for mainland migrants. He has said that the vilification of mainlanders “is merely a matter of ethical conduct. It is not a question of discrimination.” A Hong Kong academic has stated, “I don’t believe that using the word locust is promoting bias.” A teacher and environmental activist has averred that “I would not call [mainland visitors] ‘locusts,’ although I understand why others do. When they squat by the streets and shop in groups at malls, this might give others such an impression.” Michael Chugani has put it that “mocking of mainlanders as locusts . . . stems not from jealousy or loathing of mainlanders.”

There are also academics whose generalizations about NMMs accord with the aspects of the Hong Kong localist and global anti-immigrant worldviews. Hong Kong Baptist University political scientist TING Wai has stated that mainland migrants “don’t really want to integrate into Hong Kong society. They think Hong Kong should adapt to them. If they come with a Chinese mindset and a Communist Party men-


tality, eventually Hong Kong will be changed." The charge that a certain category of immigrants does not want to assimilate is standard with anti-Muslim immigrant parties in Europe deemed racist. There is also no credible evidence that NMMs do not want to integrate into local society, but rather the evidence indicates that part of Hong Kong society discriminates against NMMs and does not want them in Hong Kong. Moreover, no one demands that American migrants to Hong Kong, for example, abandon their putative "American mindset." In fact, white migrants to Hong Kong are generally privileged to avoid any degree of assimilation into local society.

Those who excuse the use of "insect language" in Hong Kong likely also dismiss the vilification inherent in such epithets as "parasite" and "invader" that have also been used against mainlanders. These observers do not know about or are indifferent to the baleful history of insect language used to equate certain peoples with species that are regarded as hostis humanis generis (the common enemies of humanity) and to incite their persecution. They may not know or care that anti-locust campaign organizers share a worldview with anti-immigrant forces elsewhere. For example in Europe, where factors including anti-immigrant sentiment, perceptions of an ethnic threat, economic hardship and notions about the infringement of sovereignty have generated a right-wing upsurge. Thus, at a 2014 anti-locust demonstration at a place where mainland and foreign tourists gather, protestors gave foreign tourists an English-language leaflet that stated,

"Every day, thousands [of Chinese visitors] raid our city snatching our resources, transforming our home into a giant supermarket . . . Thank you for your patience. However we do have"

one lesson for you to take home with: For your own sake, lobby your government representatives to tighten immigration and visa requirements before your country looks like ours: crowded, indecent and dirty.265

Similarly, prominent *Apple Daily* and *HK Magazine* writer, Chip Tsao (陶傑) wrote the following:

Does branding some of our mainland fellow-countrymen “locusts” constitute a new form of racism? No. First, the “locust” label is clearly directed against a specific tribe of widely known, money-squandering invaders who help their babies excrete onto the shiny floors of our shopping mall corridors and the pavements of Canton Road. If such aggressive acts . . . are not contained, it is likely that New Bond Street in London or Fifth Avenue in New York will soon be ploughed through with mainland hot cash and human fertilizer, transforming them into urban paddy fields.266

As a University of Nottingham Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies scholar noted in 2014, “References to insects (“swarms”) or disease (“epidemic” or “plague”) . . . are a surefire way to dehumanize migrants and exclude them from the host community.”267 Knowing that context allows us to understand that targeting mainlanders in Hong Kong through “insect language” and other vilification amounts to a form of racial discrimination.

VI. THE ANTI-LOCUST CAMPAIGN AS ETHNIC VILIFICATION

The commonality that the insect image for Chinese mainlanders has with representations deployed in genocides and other racist campaigns means that the anti-locust campaign is hate speech under international and Hong Kong law. Such speech follows from claims that mainlanders are responsible for all Hong Kong problems. The Nazis had a slogan: “The Jews are to blame for everything” (Die Juden sind an allem

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to which a satirical song responded by making Jews responsible for bad weather, poor sausage, etc. In Britain in 2015, a satirical play’s main character is a Fifth Century politician who mirrors today’s anti-immigrant United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) by blaming Anglo-Saxon immigrants for everything, including deer shortages and overcrowded plague hospitals.

In Hong Kong, by 2013, mainlanders were blamed for (almost) everything, as mainlanders living in Hong Kong noted. Thus, a primary school teacher observed that,

The new migrants and mainlanders are to blame for every problem arising in the territory, shortage of infant formula powder, school places in kindergartens, public housing etc, the most updated one being the scramble for welfare benefits . . .

A reporter for a Canadian newspaper wrote that, “If people are rude on the Hong Kong subway, blame China. Do the same if the hospital emergency room is overcrowded, or there’s no yogurt at your local grocery store. That’s what the locals do.”

A Hong Kong City University graduate recalled that when “there were some unwashed dishes left in the sink of our hostel’s common area, the local students immediately thought they were left by mainland students. The next day someone wrote ‘mainland dog’ on the board next to it.”

Surveys show that many NMMs experience discrimination despite social and cultural overlaps with Hong Kong people. More than half of NMMs are fluent Cantonese-speakers, yet in a 2013 survey more than


271. Influx of Mainland Chinese.


half of adult NMMs reported having experienced discrimination in their daily lives and 20% said they sometimes or often did so.275 Richard Tsoi Yiu-cheng (蔡耀昌), a former District Councillor, is Vice Chairman of the Democratic Party and the Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements of China (支聯會), the pan-democrats’ coalition to annually commemorate the June 4, 1989 suppression in Beijing. He is also a leader of the Society for Community Organization (SOCO; 香港社區組織協會) which, inter alia, assists needy NMMs and, in 2013, won a case in Hong Kong’s Court of Final Appeals that resulted in NMMs’ increased access to Hong Kong’s (meagre) welfare system. As a result, Tsoi was surrounded by localists at the 2014 annual New Year’s Day march and called a “traitor.”276 Tsoi explained that most of SOCO’s migrant clients are permanent residents with families in Hong Kong, but are poor and have accents. As a result, they will be easily identified not as locals by Hong Kongers . . . Once employers recognize you as a mainlander, they give you a lower salary. This is a systemic issue. Even if you have qualifications in the Mainland, they may not be recognized in Hong Kong. Some of our female clients are discriminated against in their daily life. They tend not to go to supermarkets, because the interaction with other people will be a big challenge. When they say some commodity is expensive, merchants will tell them to go back to the Mainland. When their children are playing in the playground, other people will condemn them as exploiting [Hong Kong’s] resources. Many Hong Kong people try to attack them through the media and Internet.

When asked whether the comment that those in Hong Kong who condemn mainlanders are promoting fascism, Tsoi agreed that it was probably so and that “people collectively assembling and openly discriminating against mainlanders by using dangerous and radical action is new to Hong Kong. It is not the original value of Hong Kong.” Agreeing that what had happened in Hong Kong was similar to the anti-immigrant agitation in Britain, Tsoi acknowledged that the effect on the victims of vilification must be taken into account and that some issues, such as crowd-

ing by tourists, parallel trading, and alleged “colonization” were being used by radicals to make more Hong Kong people hate mainlanders.277

Expectedly, the anti-mainlander campaign coincides with anti-migrant sentiment among a significant plurality of Hong Kong people, although the data likely understates the degree of anti-NMM views, as typically questions are asked about immigrants per se. A 2012 survey found that 50% of respondents thought immigration should decrease, 47% believed that immigrants lower local salary levels, 38% thought that they steal local jobs, 36% said they produce an increased crime rate, and 40% thought that they had an adverse effect on Hong Kong’s economic outlook.278

A wide range of problems blamed on mainlanders have given rise to vilification. A supposed “shortage of baby formula is said to have been caused by the hoarding of supplies by mainland Chinese who have crossed the border,” gave a rise to a petition in 2013 on the US White House website. Entitled “Baby Hunger Outbreak in Hong Kong, International Aid Requested,” it garnered 23,000 signatures,279 even though it is unclear whether such a general shortage existed or, if it did, whether it was due to parallel trading or to milk powder suppliers’ sales policies to local pharmacies.280 A giant rubber duck floating in Hong Kong’s harbor in 2013 deflated after weeks. A widespread Hong Kong rumor held it was “burned to death” by mainland tourists who flicked lit cigarettes that punctured the 600 kg figure’s thick skin. In fact, the duck was deflated for a routine examination.281 Also in 2013, a Hong Kong woman claimed that mainlanders abducted her baby on a public street, creating a panic in which local mothers rushed to buy baby alarms. It turned out that the woman had killed her own baby.282

The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Article 20 requires Hong Kong to prohibit hate speech283 and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) Article 4a requires that all parties “declare an offence pun-

277. Author’s interview with Tsoi Yiu-cheng, Hong Kong, Sept. 23, 2014.
279. “Hong Kong TV Show Plays on Uneasy Ties with China,” NYT, Feb. 11, 2013.
283. 999 U.N.T.S. 171
ishable by law all dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred. That provision requires criminalization of all racial vilification. Hong Kong’s RDO does criminalize as a serious vilification, “hatred towards, serious contempt for, or severe ridicule” on grounds of race, an approach in line with that of many states. Australia’s Race Discrimination Act of 1975 is an example. It was amended in 1995 to include provisions dealing with “racial hatred.” Section 18c (1) states that:

It is unlawful for a person to do an act, otherwise than in private, if:
(a) the act is reasonably likely in all the circumstances to offend, insult, humiliate or intimidate another person or group of people, and
(b) the act is done because of the race, color or national or ethnic origin of the other person or some or all of the people in the group.

Racial hatred can be committed through various acts, including “speaking, singing and making gestures in public, as well as drawings, images, and written publications such as newspapers, leaflets and websites.” In judging whether an offense is committed, the perspective of a “reasonable victim” is to be adopted:

The victim’s perspective is the measure of whether an act is likely to offend, insult, humiliate or intimidate. For example, if derogatory comments are made against Indigenous people, the central question to ask is whether those comments are likely to offend or intimidate an Indigenous person or group, not whether they have this effect upon a non-Indigenous person.

284. 660 U.N.T.S. 195
Even if “[t]here might be several reasons for an offensive communication . . . it is only necessary that one of these reasons be race, color or national or ethnic origin.” The Australian states also have their own anti-race hatred laws. Six of the seven criminalize such acts and one (Tasmania) provides only for civil penalties.\textsuperscript{289} State criminalization goes beyond the federal act, which does not make vilification a crime, but instead “unlawful conduct,"\textsuperscript{290} but the United Nations Human Rights Commission has indicated that “Australia must adopt criminal sanctions for advocacy of racial hatred that constitutes incitement to hostility or violence."\textsuperscript{291} Criminalization of hate speech is mandated by the ICERD and ICCPR, and many liberal states such as Canada, the UK, France, Germany, New Zealand and Denmark, have done so.\textsuperscript{292} South Africa has even incorporated a ban on hate speech into its constitution.\textsuperscript{293}

In 2014, Australia’s Liberal/National coalition proposed amending the RDA to substitute a prohibition on “vilification” for the clause that now bans acts intended to “offend, insult, humiliate or intimidate,” arguing that would strengthen the law.\textsuperscript{294} Critics saw it as a dilution and labeled the push for amendment as a defense of the “right to be a bigot.”\textsuperscript{295} Australians agreed: a national poll found that 88% rejected the changes.\textsuperscript{296} Various forces, especially ethnic minorities, mobilized and Prime Minister Tony Abbot then retreated.\textsuperscript{297}

The resistance to racist vilification in Australia could also be seen in a 2015 incident in an Adelaide restaurant. A young white man refused to have his burger made by an ethnic Chinese employee and demanded it be

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Berman, International: 8.
\item Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 16 (2).
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
made by a white person. Customers, including whites, rallied against him and pushed him out of the restaurant. He was later arrested.298

Unlike in Hong Kong, where the anti-locust movement defends its “right” to vilify mainlanders, it is recognized in most countries that there is no “right to be a bigot.” Unlike in Hong Kong also, some liberal political systems go beyond having a law on paper and actually punish vilification. In 2013, a British writer listed 19 people in the UK sentenced to prison terms for inciting racial or religious hatred299 although the list was incomplete.300 Even the anti-immigrant UKIP had to apologize for one of its Members of the European Parliament having racially slurred a Thai UKIP supporter.301

In 2014, a court in Cayenne, in France’s overseas department of French Guiana (Guyane Francaise), handed down a nine month sentence and E5,000 fine to Anne-Sophie Leclere, a local elections candidate for the Front National (FN), France’s main anti-immigrant party, and fined the FN E30,000. Leclere had posted on her Facebook page two pictures, one showing a baby monkey, with the caption “at 18 months” and the other of France’s Minister of Justice Christiane Taubira, who is black, with the caption “now.” When shown these images in a TV interview about the FN and racism, Leclere responded that Taubira was “une sauvage” (a wild animal or savage) and added that “I’d prefer to see her swinging from a tree than in government.” She added that she was not a racist, had said nothing racist, and has black friends.302 Leclere was prosecuted in a locale where blacks are the majority and the victims’ perspective was taken into account. This approach is largely absent in Hong Kong, where “local” Chinese lead the debate about vilification. Ethnic minorities and NMMs only have input through a public consultation process dominated by opponents of anti-vilification laws.

France has had other prosecutions for vilification in 2014. Soon after Leclere’s remarks, the French ultra-right wing newspaper Minute also vilified Taubira with a “monkey” headline and a prosecution was initiat-

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ed. Prosecutions have forced FN head Marine LePen to claim the FN is “not racist” because it now focuses its attacks mainly on “radical Islamic” immigrants, rather than black people. After attacks against a Jewish market in 2015, the French government said it would “introduce tougher penalties for ‘racist, anti-Semitic and homophobic remarks [with] ‘faster, more effective sanctions’ [with] ‘such speech to come under criminal law rather than press laws.” Within weeks it did so.

In 2014, the Dutch government prosecuted anti-immigrant Party for Freedom leader Geert Wilders for discrimination and inciting hatred. He had led a chant against Moroccan immigrants at a rally and referred to “Moroccan scum” in a TV interview. The police received 6,400 complaints about his actions. Wilders said his remarks reflected popular sentiment, but prosecutors stated that his freedom of speech is limited by laws against discrimination. Similarly, in Australia, three state laws of racial vilification challenged in courts have been upheld against claims that they unduly burden free political communication.

When the RDO was framed, the Hong Kong Government recognized that discrimination against mainland migrants is widespread, but held that due to their common Han Chinese ethnic identity with most Hong Kongers, mainlanders in the SAR suffer only “social discrimination” not covered by the RDO. Common Han Chinese ethnicity of Hong Kong and mainland people does not however bar government action against anti-locust campaigners. To persons victimized because of an immutable characteristic, such as origin in the Chinese mainland, it is irrelevant whether the vilifier is or is not a fellow Han Chinese.


305. “‘Tougher’ Penalties for Hate Speech,” SCMP, Feb. 25, 2015.


In key common law jurisdictions, anti-discrimination laws cover “same race discrimination” and “same race harassment.”310 The US Supreme Court has said “it would be unwise to presume as a matter of law that human beings of one definable group will not discriminate against other members of their group”311 and “We have rejected any conclusive presumption that an employer will not discriminate against members of his own race.”312 Courts reject that African Americans cannot racially discriminate against other blacks,313 for example, due to color differences.314 The US Equal Employment Opportunities Commission holds that “[d]iscrimination can occur when the victim and the person who inflicted the discrimination are the same race or color,”315 because “the dispositive factor is not the identity of the parties, but rather the motive for discrimination.”316

University of Hong Kong law professor Puja Kapai has pointed out that RDO Article 4 “does not specify the race of the discriminator [and that] differential treatment on the basis of a person’s race could still be regarded as discrimination.”317 A UK tribunal has held that Hong Kong employees of Phoenix Chinese TV’s London office unlawfully harassed and unfairly fired an employee of mainland origin “because of her nationality.”318 This likely was not because of the victim’s citizenship, which was not specified, but due to perceived ethnic difference, as in English “nationality” is often used in the sense of ethnicity.319

312. Oncale v. Sundown Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 US 75, 78-79 (1998) (rejecting the presumption that an employer would not discriminate against an employee of the same race; noting that “statutory prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable evils”).
Discrimination against mainlanders can also be said to be due to perceived difference in “national origin.” An RDO provision exempting discrimination based on “nationality, citizenship or resident status” is said to bar government action against anti-locust campaigner vilification. 320 The anti-locust campaign is not however directed against mainlanders based on their (legal) nationality, citizenship or resident status, but on the campaigners’ perception of mainlanders as part of a nation that is not the “Hong Kong nation” (香港民族).

Many Hong Kong people, it is said, dislike being called Chinese.321 Young Hong Kong people especially disdain to identify as Chinese per se. A 2013 Hong Kong Baptist University survey found that none of 93 “mainly post-secondary students” identified as Chinese alone.322 A poll at a university in Hong Kong around 2003 found 45.5% of final year students identified themselves as “Chinese,”323 but a 2014 Hong Kong University (HKU) poll found only 5% of 18-29 year olds did so.324 Another HKU poll of Hong Kong adults’ “ethnic identity” found that

When asked to make a choice among four given identities, namely, “Hongkongers,” “Hongkongers in China,” “Chinese” and “Chinese in Hong Kong,” 40% of the respondents identified themselves as “Hongkongers,” 20% as “Chinese,” 27% as “Hongkongers in China,” while 11% identified themselves as “Chinese in Hong Kong.” In other words, 67% of the respondents identified themselves as “Hongkongers” in the broader sense (i.e. either as “Hongkongers” or “Hongkongers in China”), whereas 31% identified themselves as “Chinese” in the broader sense (i.e. either as “Chinese” or “Chinese in Hong Kong”).325

Hong Kong people often refer to the mainland as “China,”326 while many in the post-colonial SAR still view Hong Kong as, in effect, a sep-

320. RDO, Ch. 602, Sec. 8(3)(d) (2009).
323. Alfred Wu, “Mentality of Hong Kong People has Become Not that Inclusive,” CD, June 12, 2013.
326. Chen, Hong Kong-Mainlander Conflicts.
arate country and identify with China only at exceptional times; such as when it fared well in the 2008 Olympics.327 Similarly, some Singaporeans—three-fourths of whom are ethnic Chinese—evidence anti-Chinese sentiment, including by calling wealthy immigrants “rich Chinese locusts.”328

Anti-locust campaigners demand that mainlanders “go back to China.”329 Demonstrators in October 2012 chanted “We are Hong Kongers, not Chinese,”330 and the slogan is the title of a Facebook group which four months later already had been “liked” 30,000 times.331 The localist distinction between Hong Kong people and “Chinese”332 can be seen from the former’s reaction to a newspaper article by singer and actress Ella Koon. She wrote that fellow Hong Kong people should not mock mainlanders, as “[i]n the colonial era, the British treated Hong Kongers in ways similar to how Hong Kongers have treated mainlanders since the 1980s; the colonial masters laughed at Hong Kongers for being noisy and disorderly, for being rude and uncivilized, for behavior similar to that of today’s mainland travelers in HK and abroad.”332 Immediately afterwards, “[n]etizens besieged Koon’s Facebook fan page with messages of hatred and intolerance [and] some took special offence at Koon’s suggestion that Hong Kongers and mainlanders are ‘all Chinese.’”333 At the outset of the fall 2014 Occupy Central movement, thousands of demonstrators chanted “Hong Kong people! Hong Kong people!” and “when the demonstrators chant ‘Hong Kong People!’ they are asserting that to be a citizen of Hong Kong is emphatically not the same as being Chinese.”334

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Stratification of Hong Kong people, NMMs, and mainland people more generally has arguably given rise to an ethnogenesis. In any case, the localist use of “insect language” indicates that they already regard the Hong Kong people and the mainlanders as separate ethnic groups. Those who excuse the anti-locust campaign also claim that fundamental cultural differences exist between the Hong Kong people and the mainlanders. Perceived cultural difference is central to ethnic differentiation; thus many Han Chinese people in Taiwan conceive an ethnic divide between “Native Taiwanese” (本省人), whose ancestors came to Taiwan before the mid-20th Century, and “Mainlanders” (大陆人 or外省人), whose ancestors came to Taiwan in or after the mid-20th Century. Moreover, 2013-2014 surveys in Taiwan indicate that people born there after 1989 “distinguish Hong Kong from the Mainland China in terms of national identity, i.e., Hong Kong people are not Chinese people.”

Besides agreed-upon cultural differences, such as Cantonese, rather than “Mandarin” in spoken Chinese in Hong Kong, anti-locust campaigners, in common with racists, define ethnic differences in terms that vilify the “other,” often by invoking trivialities. Thus, while the Nazis portrayed their Jewish victims as bearded gesticulators, an anti-locust demonstrator said that the “cultural differences” were that “[m]ainlanders cut in line, [and] spit on the streets.” The characteristics cited are of less importance than the fact that ethnic difference is evoked.

Journalist Alex Lo has noted that surveys show that young Hong Kong people rarely visit the mainland and are the most likely to engage in identity politics, which now involves the aspect of “demonize China, idealize Hong Kong.” This includes —

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accentuating the negatives on the mainland while ignoring the positives. And doing the reverse when it comes to Hong Kong . . . Hong Kong is a fountain of goodness . . . Across the border, it’s bad land. And it is leaking badness and contaminating Hong Kong with corrupt officials and “locust” visitors, sometimes literally, like urinating and defecating in public, or spreading a potential flu epidemic.\textsuperscript{341}

Online anti-mainlander commentary in Hong Kong literally deifies and demonizes. For example:

Online Hong Konger versus mainlander identity politics have led to venomous labeling of mainlanders as alien, as well as subhuman and dangerous “Others,” destroying Hong Kong. Some online visuals used metaphors of “Heaven” (Hong Kong) and “Hell” (mainland China) and civilized and law-abiding (Hong Kong) versus uncivilized and lawless (China) to denote the difference between “us” and “them” and to reject a mainland Chinese identity. Others have compared mainlanders to animals and Hong Kongers to humans.\textsuperscript{342}

The idea that Hong Kong is heavenly would be disputed by many residents: a study of income inequality in the SAR put it that “Hong Kong is a heaven to rich families, hell to grassroots.”\textsuperscript{343} The Chinese mainland as “hell” is at odds with the relatively optimistic view of mainlanders: a 2013 Pew Global Attitudes Survey of 39 countries found that in China “82% believe that when Chinese children grow up, they will be better off than their parents . . . the highest percentage registered in the survey.”\textsuperscript{344}

To disparage mainlanders, localists (and Apple Daily) claim that a proclivity of mainland visitors use the streets of Hong Kong as toilet. Some half dozen photos of assumed mainland parents holding their children relieving themselves in public appear on many websites, but give no clear indication that mainlanders in Hong Kong were involved.\textsuperscript{345} The

\textsuperscript{341}Alex Lo, “‘Beautiful Souls’ Blinkered to Reality,” SCMP, June 3, 2013. See also Carol A.G. Jones, “‘Looking North: Hong Kong Images of Mainland Law and Order,’ Taiwan in Comparative Perspective 3 (2011): 99-134.

\textsuperscript{342}Garrett and Ho, Hong Kong at the Brink: 363, 365.


same photos have appeared for years, during which some 100 million
mainlanders have visited Hong Kong, and where cell phone cameras are
ubiquitous. They thus hardly evidence a common phenomenon; yet,
many Hong Kongers see them as proving mainlander incivility.346 One
localist leader has added that the “Hong Kong police discriminate against
Hong Kong people. They tolerate Mainlanders peeing on the streets, but
give tickets to Hong Kongers when they litter in public areas.”347

The “issue” culminated in a 2014 street confrontation in Mong Kok
(旺角) Kowloon between the mainland parents of a two-year old and a
Hong Kong man (Wong) who photographed the child voiding. The
mother (Fu) told Wong that she had found a public toilet, but it was too
crowded, so she used a diaper to absorb the waste. During the shouting
match, the father (Ye) snatched Wong’s cell phone and its SIM card fell
to the ground. Another Hong Kong man (Wu) who detained the couple
was scratched as Fu tried to hang onto her stroller. Ye was arrested for
theft, but was unconditionally released; Fu was charged with assault.348
The confrontation was about more than differing attitudes. Alluding to
familiar occurrences at Hong Kong’s “expat” bars, 349 a comment in a
Hong Kong newspaper pointed out that

The outrage about one mother letting her child urinate in pub-
lic is all very predictable given her original sin of being a
mainlander. Given most people’s professed non-racism, can we
assume that videos of drunk and disorderly white people
urinating and vomiting in public every weekend will also go

false-reasoning-around-public-urination-and-defaecation/; “小便奇案” (urination criminal
art/20140426/18700587. The Taiwan version of Apple Daily reported in 2014 that a mainland
mother allowed her three-year old son to urinate into a bottle at a famous restaurant. It later
had to issue a correction, as the mother was from Taiwan. “Peeing Boy Incident at Taipei 101
at-taipei-101-gets-murkier/.

346. See “Peed Off,” TS, Feb. 20, 2013. Many Hong Kong people are sure mainland
visitors generally use streets as toilets, a result of a belief that photographic evidence must ex-
ist. See, e.g. Evan Fowler, “On Urinating on the Street,” 主场新闻（House News）, May 9,
motivated a call by anti-locust campaigners for more photos to be taken. Shirley Zhao and Lo
Wei, “No Need for Photos, Just Toilet Directions,” SCMP, May 2, 2014.

347. Author’s interview, Chapman Chen, Sept. 11, 2014.

348. Te-ping Chen, “Hong Kong Howls, But 88% of Mainland Chinese Don’t Mind Public
Picture of Hong Kong Incident,” CD, Apr. 23, 2014.

viral? And will it lead to demands for a clampdown on the number of white visitors coming to Hong Kong?\textsuperscript{350}

Hong Kong University Social Work professor Cecilia Chan has said that some Hong Kong people are biased in favor of white foreigners because they “tend to equate them with more benefits for the economy compared with mainlanders.”\textsuperscript{351} An American blogger, who had lived in Hong Kong, argued that the uproar in Hong Kong over the 2014 mainland child incident reflected racism and posted a cartoon (Fig. 5).\textsuperscript{352} In fact, in the UK and some other parts of Western Europe, public urination \textit{by adults} is not uncommon and not in all cases illegal.\textsuperscript{353} The Hong Kong discourse is a conflation—although almost all photographically recorded instances are of small children, the framing is of mainlanders generally—and is in line with a media-promoted stereotype of mainland visitors as especially prone to criminal activity. A media scholar has observed that Hong Kong television fiction shows “[m]ainlanders are born criminals. Thus, they deserved to be discriminated against and are to be rejected from assimilating into the mainstream.”\textsuperscript{355} The notion of mainland criminality is at odds with the empirical evidence however. In the first ten months of 2014, 1,210 mainland visitors (two-way permit holders, passport holders and overstayed visitors, but not illegal immigrants) were arrested. The typical crimes were miscellaneous theft, shop theft, and forgery. Yet, in comparison, 1,426 non-mainland visitors were arrested.\textsuperscript{356} Mainland visitors were 77% of visitors to Hong Kong (47 million of 60 million in 2014), but only 46% of arrested visitors.


\textsuperscript{354} See, e.g. Analyzing Chinese.


A British newspaper columnist wrote with amazement at the uproar in Hong Kong over mainland small children relieving themselves. She and other parents had on occasion had no other choice but to have their small children urinate publicly and without repercussion; “but a woman who let[sl] her two-year-old have a pee in one of the world’s biggest shopping districts in Hong Kong has caused a huge culture clash and divided China.” \[357\]

Anti-mainlandization forces have evinced concern only about Chinese mainlander migrants and visitors. Like anti-immigrant forces in many parts of the world, they are not typically opposed to immigrants per se, but to those from certain regions. For example, in Britain, there is a clear hierarchy in terms of opposition to migrants, with hostility overwhelmingly aimed at non-whites; thus, “no political movement has ever mobilized in opposition to the settlement of Irish, European or Australian immigrants, despite their often larger numbers and presumably equal ability to compete for economic resources.” \[358\]

After the Mong Kok “street toilet” confrontation, 30 anti-locust campaigners staged a “mock pooping,” with some dressed as Mao-era mainland cadres. Hong Kong Secretary for Food and Health KO Wing-man reinforced their campaign by “call[ing] upon mainlanders not to re-

\[357\] Sue Nelson, “Wee Problem is now a Big Story,” *York Press* (UK), May 6, 2014.

lieve themselves in public,” implying that the government believed that the phenomenon was widespread. Commerce Secretary Greg So Kam-leung (蘇錦樑) urged Hong Kongers “to persuade [mainlanders] to act in a civilized way.” This was an idea in accord with that of anti-locust campaign leader Eric Leung Kin-cheng (樑金正), who has said that, “There is no one to teach people from the mainland how to behave. So it is up to us in Hong Kong to educate them.”

Ironically however, Shenzhen strictly enforces, with heavy fines, laws against public spitting, littering, smoking, and jaywalking. Hong Kong also fines people for such offenses and since 2003 has had a “marking scheme” of hygiene-related offences in public rental housing (PRH) estates, covering 28 “misdeeds.” From August 1, 2003-December 31, 2011, there were 6,200 citations for smoking in an estate common area and 5,700 for littering, 1,412 for spitting in public areas, and 11 for public urination or defecation. The citations only involved PRH tenants—less than a third of them Hong Kong people—and only involved tenants caught in flagrante delicto (in the act).

VII. LOCALIST LEADERS AND THEIR FRIENDS

Localism’s main theorist is the former Home Affairs Department Research Director (2002-2008) and now Lingnan University Chinese Studies scholar CHIN Wan Kan (陳雲根), a specialist in Cantonese folklore. His detachment from government coincided with the emergence of the localist movement, which at first represented one tendency within a much more ecumenical trend of academic interest in local issues; this was signaled from 2008-2012 by the publication of The Journal of Local Discourse (本土論述). By 2012, Chin had become bitterly opposed to “leftists” (social democrats) interested in local matters and advanced the slogan “Hong Kong Priority, Hong Kong First,” but usually rendered in English by localists as “Forget China. Hong Kong Comes First.”

361. “Row over Urinating Toddler Spills onto Hong Kong’s Streets,” RFA, May 1, 2014.
364. “Spat has Already Gone Too Far,” TS, Feb. 6, 2012.
365 See e.g. “香港城邦論,” Dec. 21, 2014 http://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E9%A6%99%E6%B8%AF%E5%9F%8E%E9%82%A6%E8%AB%961.
Chin has said that “locust” is an “accurate literary metaphor” in referring to those who cross borders to harm a place, which mainlanders do to Hong Kong. He terms the mainland “a mixture of rotten Chinese culture plus Soviet colonialism,” while “Hong Kong has a quality of ‘purity.’” Chin is “hoping that the current hostility [between the Hong Kong people and the mainlanders] would show that the divide between Hong Kong and China is too wide to bridge — and thus support his push for the territory to be given self-autonomy [sic], one step below independence.” He has said that, “A line must be drawn between Hong Kong and the mainland . . . The spirit of Hong Kong should never be about loving the country, or the countrymen.” He goes onto say that, “We need to drop the identity of ‘Chinese’ from this moment on,” and that “[m]ainlanders who identify themselves as Chinese are not entitled to it - they are merely barbarians under the communists’ colonial rule.”

Under his nom-de-plume of CHEN Yun (陳雲), Chin has penned a book advocating that Hong Kong become a city-state and articles on the ‘invasion’ of mainland Chinese. He led the Hong Kong Autonomy Movement (香港自治運動, HKAM) from its inception in 2011 to 2013 and then founded the Hong Kong Resurgence (香港復興會) in 2014. HKAM self-referenced as the “right-wing” of the localist movement and is associated with notions of “de-Sinicization” (去中國化) in opposition to “Greater China sympathizers” (大中華派) who are the pan-democrats who seek the Hong Kong people’s help in bringing about regime change in the mainland. Chin has said that “Locusts come in groups. When they come as individuals, it doesn’t matter. [But] when they come in thousands and thousands, it looks like a swarm of lo-

372. Chin Wan-Kan, Hong Kong City-State Theory (Hong Kong: Enrich Publishing, 2011).
custs”375 and “mainlanders ‘swarming’ to small and congested Hong Kong are felt with pain.”376 Chin’s works inspired the localists and he was arrested weeks after the end of Occupy Central. But his work has appeared on its sites only a couple times and “has always focused on the ‘propagation of theories.’” His opponents thus satirically nickname him the “keyboard fighter.”377

Another academic leader of HKAM and Hong Kong Resurgence is Chapman Chen (曾焯文), a Chinese literature and translation specialist who heads the online Local Press, a donation-supported publisher. He asserts that “only Hong Kong is the real China,” as it inherits Chinese traditional culture dead in the mainland, including pronunciation, characters, festivals, and Confucian ethics: “We Hong Kong people share the same values, i.e. traditional Chinese values. We inherit Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism. These are the traditional moral values. Also, we respect the sense of law, freedom and democracy. These values are absent or bad in the Mainland.”378 Chen emphasizes that learning in Hong Kong must be in Cantonese, the “traditional elegant language,” and all efforts to teach in Putonghua should be rejected. Primary and secondary education should focus on Hong Kong, not China. He stresses the ethnic distinctiveness of Hong Kong people.

Hong Kong people and mainland Chinese are two different ethnic groups. We have different languages, different norms, different ethical codes and different cultural identities. Regarding atrocities of unspeakable savagery in China, Hong Kong people can only be sympathetic, while river water and well water are not supposed to interfere with each other.379 In fact however, many localists seek the overthrow of the CCP. For example, in Wan Chai at the outset of Occupy Central in fall 2014, hundreds of demonstrators chanted “‘overthrow the party’ and ‘down with the central government.’”380 “Patriotic” non-localist pan-democrats also seek the CCP’s downfall. Legco member and League of Social Demo-

378. Chapman Chen interview; Chapman Chen, “An Introduction to the Hong Kong Autonomy Movement,” June 29, 2012, YouTube, /www.youtube.com/all_comments?lc=lVzU793UA9mLEoaQv_5LQWoScuD- VNGuLFZ1z7E58U&v=LBElYmKVYV.
crats leader LEUNG Kwok-hung (梁國雄), often shouts “Down with the one-party dictatorship!” and has said that “What happens in China politically is one-party rule. So, if Hong Kong makes a significant change in its political system, of course it will affect Beijing. Just like what happened in eastern Europe – the satellite republics had an impact on the USSR.”

Chapman Chen holds that anti-communism matters only for Hong Kong because

Hong Kong is so small; the Mainland is so big. We cannot control its affairs. They should fight for themselves and by themselves. It is not practical to overthrow the one-party dictatorship. Hong Kong people do not have the duty and capability to do so. Even if China becomes democratic in a short period, it may not be a good thing. They may then cancel ‘One country, two systems.’

He also argues that mainlanders in Hong Kong are colonists, because “Hong Kong has its own currency, financial control, national finance, stamps and civil service and is more like a country than China.” Moreover, “[v]ery few Hong Kong women will marry Mainland men; only Mainland women would want to marry Hong Kong men, in order to get Hong Kong residency. As Prof. CHIN Wan said, when the CCP asks Chinese women from the Mainland to do something. They cannot refuse. They are actually spies.” In fact, 34% of Hong Kong men, but also almost 14% of Hong Kong women who married in 2013 wed mainlanders, even though the latter, on average, must wait four years to migrate to Hong Kong.

Chapman Chen has praised the British colonial preservation of Chinese culture and argues that unlike mainland Chinese culture, British culture is compatible with Hong Kong culture. He agreed that Hong Kong

383. Chapman Chen interview. See also Chin Wan-Kan, “香港城邦論: 160-161. In 2013, 7,444 Hong Kong women married mainlanders; 19,600 Hong Kong men did so. Some 38% of all marriages registered in Hong Kong involved such unions, while 52% had two Hong Kong residents. Census and Statistics Bureau, “Marriage and Divorce Trends in Hong Kong, 1991 to 2013,” 2015: 9, www.censtatd.gov.hk/hkstat/sub/sp160.jsp?productCode=FA100055.
localism is akin to the opposition to Muslim immigration in the UK and acknowledged that localism has been said—e.g. by LEUNG Kwok-hong and City University labor sociologist Chris Chan King Chi (陳敬慈)—to promote fascism. In 2015, journalist Alex Lo said Civic Passion and other localists’ “bigotry and chauvinism make them borderline fascists” or “quasi-fascists” or “fascists.” Hong Kong localism shares with fascism a selective anti-immigrant ultra-nationalism—based on protecting a putative “Hong Kong nation” from being polluted and overwhelmed. It is vituperatively anti-communist and opposes one section of business based on perceived ethnic differences (“Red capitalists”). Like other ultrarightists, such as the FN, localists such as Chin Wan and Chapman Chen, attack both “Reds” and the liberal democratic US as “colonizers.” Civi-
ic Passion leader WONG Yeung-tat, followed the same path from liberalist to social democratic to ultra-rightist; and as did British fascist leader, Sir Oswald Mosley. He has acknowledged emphasizing charismatic leadership to the point of a cult of personality.

Chapman Chen calls for “vastly reduc[ing] the (mainland visitors’) number as only famous brand shops can benefit from them. The social loss is large, e.g. transportation, public security and medical care.” To Chen, Hong Kong should control who comes from the mainland. Chen marched in the 2014 anti-locust protests, but said that they were “too peaceful,” adding that the “Hong Kong people are too peaceful and obedient, like the Jews in the concentration camps. Not many Hong Kong people realize that China relies on Hong Kong more than Hong Kong relies on China. They will not use tanks in Hong Kong unlike in Tibet.”

Several other nativist groups have protested mainland migrants, visitors and parallel traders. The Faculty of Orchid Gardening (蘭花系), founded in 2012 by estate agent Barry Ma (馬健賢), “aims to de-

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385. 陳敬慈, “警惕極右勢力的冒起 倡導新的階級團結”(Be vigilant toward the far right’s rise; support new class unity), 明報, Apr. 1, 2011. http://life.mingpao.com/cfm/basi-
cref3b.cfm?File=20110401/braa02c/ faa1.txt.
389. 元氣堂：出獄政治犯 皇上驚到, (Political prisoner out: emperor arrives), 苹果日报, June 5, 2012.
390. Chapman Chen interview.
fend local values and [is] against Beijing’s interference in local politics.”

The problem is not just housing or education or our hospital and medical system—it is our whole environment; it is just so crowded now... We just receive so many people coming down from Shenzhen. Even people who don’t care about politics are starting to complain—they are starting to hate mainland people. Catching a train used to take just five minutes but now you need an hour to organize it; there are just so many people.

Roy Tam Hoi-pong (譚凱邦), convenor of the Population Policy Concern Group (PPCG), seeks a means test for family members of Hong Kong people who want to migrate to the SAR for family reunions, and to compel them to prove they will not become public charges. He deplores stores that sell milk powder to mainland visitors and demands abolition of the IVS and MEPs, which he refers to as “torture for Hong Kong people” because “everyday there are large numbers of visitors dragging shopping trolleys on the streets and forcing Hong Kong people... to shop elsewhere.” The PPCG took part in the anti-mainlander rallies in 2014. Tam supported Occupy Central and has asked why if Taiwan wants independence, Hong Kong does not.

Ronald Leung Kam-shing, a warehouse supervisor for an eyeglass firm, has mainly protested parallel traders in the northern New Territories. There was a two-day “Reclaim Sheung Shui Station” (光復上水站) occupy protest near the border in 2011. The North District Parallel Imports Concern Group (NDPICG) was formed in October 2012 by 21-year old LAW Tsz Yeung (羅梓洋). It claims to not oppose other mainland visitors and consists of local residents from ordinary backgrounds, but also students. NDPICG’s main goal is cancellation of the MEP and strict border luggage weight checks (at 15 kg.).

Leung estimated that only 20% of mainlanders who come to Hong Kong are “real tourists” and the rest are parallel traders, but admits that some parallel traders are Hong Kong residents, though most are from Shenzhen. His group staged a protest in 2014 and he joined those organized by other groups in 2015. Leung claims mainlanders “only want to buy, buy, buy” and do not want to know about Hong Kong culture. He ties their buying “cosmetics and daily necessities” to the demise of long-established stores. If the MEP is withdrawn, some shops catering to mainlanders will close, but others catering to Hong Kong people will remain open. Leung suggests seeking increased visits by non-Chinese to take the place of mainlanders. He complains that the mainlanders’ quality is low and NMMs lack the economic means. Moreover, the behavior of mainland visitors, such as smoking and public urination, had not improved over the years. Asked whether it is proper to call mainlanders “locusts,” LEUNG Kam-shing responded with “What’s wrong with calling them ‘locusts’? . . . They are exploiting our resources. That’s why we call them locusts . . . It would be unfair if calling them locusts is illegal . . . Hong Kong is different from China. We are not Chinese.”

LEUNG Kam-shing was an organizer of the February 2014 anti-locust demonstration “to mock mainland visitors” in Tsim Sha Tsui and later initiated a competition to photograph mainlanders using Hong Kong streets as a public toilet. He holds that the mainland is colonizing Hong Kong, but sees no need to argue over whether it should become independent. Yet, Leung also holds that a key part of autonomy – Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong (港人治港) – does not exist and the government forces people to believe in the CCP and communism. Leung averred that CHIN Wan’s Hong Kong City-State Theory “is the only solution I have seen so far . . . We just care about Hong Kong’s prospects. Even if Hong Kong is independent, we still do not need China to follow us.” He sees Hong Kong’s situation as similar to that of Europe in

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399. The number of cosmetic shops in Hong Kong increased from 90 in 2004 to 1,440 in 2013. In Need.
facing an unwanted migrant influx and opposition to NMMs as similar to Europeans’ opposition to Muslim and other immigrants.

[NMMs] are not immigrants at all; they are colonists. Immigrants should have economic power. The mainland immigrants only want to get social welfare [and are] bringing their bad behavior to Hong Kong and forcing Hong Kong culture to follow their cultures . . . If we have autonomy, we can stop them from coming [and] approve whomever we want.402

In fact, only about 130 of the 150 daily quota are used and 98% involve family reunions. From 2004-2011, more than 74% of the 310,000 Chinese OWP holders arriving in Hong Kong were Hong Kong men’s wives.403

Leung has been an “organizer” for the Neo-Democrats (新民主同盟), headed by Gary Fan Kwok-wai (范國威), who he says is most supportive of his anti-parallel trading effort, with People Power also supportive.404 Leung and Fan placed an ad in a pro-independence Taiwan newspaper in March 2014 advising Taiwan not to go the way of Hong Kong because it is “preferable to be marginalized than to be mainlandized” (寧被邊緣化勿被中國化).405 Leung has conceded that opponents of parallel traders in the northern New Territories “had stopped differentiating between traders and bona fide tourists . . . since both types of visitors packed MTR [Mass Transit Railway] facilities with suitcases.”406

Besides ostensibly campaigning against parallel traders, in 2014 localists involved themselves in opposing construction of new towns in the northeast New Territories sought by the Hong Kong Government. They argued that the construction would result in dissolving the Hong Kong/mainland border by allowing mainlanders to enter parts of Hong Kong without a visa. According to CHIN Wan Kan, that would undermine the border’s role as a defense for Hong Kong if China collapses and large numbers of refugees try to enter the SAR.407

402. Leung Kam-shing interview.
404. Siu, I Don’t Hate; Leung Kam-shing interview.
406. In Need.
The nativists also garnered some support among erstwhile leaders of Occupy Central. It began in September 2014 with a student strike, kicked off by a rally at which the deputy head of the Hong Kong Student Federation, Lester Shum (岑敖暉) shouted, “Resist colonial [rule]” . . . Self-determination for Hongkongers.” 408 “Self-determination” appeared on a large banner on stage at the rally. The HKUSU’s official publication also had several articles in 2013-2014 in which contributors advocated “self-determination” for the “Hong Kong ethnic group.” 409

The January 2015 Undergrad contained an article claiming that the Hong Kong people faced genocide, and that they can only save themselves through anti-Red revolution and must fight the violence with militant struggle. It held up the overthrow of Ukraine’s president as an example for Hong Kong people, condemned the student leaders of Occupy Central for betraying the “frontline warriors,” and asserted that, “The people of Hong Kong must be clearly aware that this is a popular localist war to defend Hong Kong sovereignty and resist Communist sinicization . . . Localists will need to shoulder the important mission of leading the anti-Communist revolution.” 410

Another well-known anti-locust activist is Alpais Lam Wai Sze (林慧思), a teacher at Pui Ling School of the Precious Blood in Fanling. She has been involved in Hong Kong politics for some twenty years and her verbal altercation with police in defense of the anti-communist sect Falung Gong, during a confrontation between its members and opponents, created a stir in Hong Kong in 2013. Lam has visited the mainland only once, in 1997 for a Putonghua course, but said that urinating in the street is seen as normal there and that among mainlanders, there are “only one or two good people.” She avers that mainlanders are “very dirty and not concerned about hygiene,” unlearned, unwilling to learn foreign languages, generally not well-educated, lacking in ethics and morals, and plagued by corruption. In contrast, “As Hong Kong was the colony of Britain, Hong Kong people cultivated some good values in their living habits . . .” The Basic Law thus must be changed to curb migration and mainlanders should only be allowed one visit.

LAM Wai Sze has said that flying Hong Kong’s colonial flag is fine and that the British listened to Hong Kong people’s problems, while the Beijing-controlled SAR government ignores them. With complaints against her by parents and political opponents, she holds that, “The reason why I can still teach now is that I am protected by the policy left behind by the British colonial government.” A political party that seeks to stem the mainlander influx is needed. It would be best if Hong Kong had a two-party system, but presently it lacks even one good party. The best group is the mainly secondary school student-based Scholarism (學民思潮), led by Joshua Wong Chi Fung (黃之鋒), the mainstay of 2012’s successful anti-national education movement (反國情教育運動). As for Occupy Central, Lam said that because she is a radical, it is too mild for her, as is the Legco independent anti-communist WONG Yuk Man (黃毓民). In general, the Hong Kong people are too mild and afraid to act against the law. Her main concern is that the CCP only sees Hong Kong as a place to make money and “destroys Chinese culture” by promoting “empty” simplified Chinese characters. Hong Kong faces a cultural clash between migrants and locals that resembles what Europe faces with the Muslim migrant influx. Visitors should speak Cantonese and Hong Kong people should not speak Putonghua to them. Asked about the anti-locust movement, Lam said that the responsibility lies with the Hong Kong government because

The tourist policy is bad. Some protestors are not well educated and only want to express their views; some may use a rude way, like insulting [Chief Executive] LEUNG Chun Ying (梁振英), but all this is because the government ignores Hong Kong peoples’ views. The Anti-locust campaign is launched because Hong Kong people really get angry. I can accept the campaign . . . It is real that most Hong Kong people dislike Mainlanders. It is a fact.

As for Hong Kong’s status, she favors “First autonomy, then Independence,” if China collapses. She added however,

Of course I think it is very difficult to become independent, but if the CCP steps down in the future, the possibility will be higher . . . Actually, most Hong Kong people do not want Hong Kong to become independent, because they are afraid of
China and the CCP. I was born in Hong Kong, so I love Hong Kong, but I do not love China.411

According to a conservative UK newspaper, after Occupy Central, “[c]ommentators . . . said there was now a stronger ‘localist’ view, which regards Hong Kong as distinct and therefore politically separate from the mainland.”412 A liberal UK newspaper has averred that “groups like Civic Passion . . . have galvanized more clout and sympathy” than before Occupy Central.413 A US newsweekly said it is “perhaps the most recognizable of the vocal, insistent groups at the fringes of Hong Kong’s democratic movement.”414 Founded in 2012 by WONG Yeung-tat (黃洋達), Civic Passion (CP)’s Facebook page has been “liked” by over 300,000 people. It is known for its manga, newspaper and Twitter, livestream and YouTube postings.415

WONG Yeung-tat, whose Guangdong-originated father had been imprisoned for ten years during the Cultural Revolution,416 graduated in film from Hong Kong Baptist University. He worked as a TV writer from 2001 and an online radio host from 2010.417 Wong had been a League of Social Democrats member, but ran for a Legco geographical constituency seat in 2012 as a People Power member with CP as his support group. It initially was mainly middle class, but recruited more plebian young people who were disappointed with mainstream parties, the difficulty of buying a flat—attributed to the government locking up and propping up the property market, by tying it to mainland economic interests—and the lack of upward mobility. Wong himself was disappointed with pan-democrat policies on political reform and concluded that ques-

411. Notes, Barry Sautman, notes Julian Cheung, interview with Lam Wai Sze, Hong Kong, Aug. 18, 2014.
412. “Hong Kong’s Umbrella Revolution is Brought to an End,” Times (UK), Dec. 11, 2014.
tions of mainlanders and political reform were the same issue because “the Hong Kong government lacks power to keep out the colonialists.”

Self-proclaiming himself as the “rather extreme radical end of the pan-democrats,” Wong is the publisher of *Passion Times* (熱血時報) which proclaims “cultural resistance against Communists” (文化抗共). An academic and CP leader described *Passion Times* as pro-active as compared to the passive mainstream pan-democratic parties and that it is produced by “comic writers, graphic designers, etc.,” . . . “it use[s] different media to help enhance its political propaganda [like through] . . . comic books, drama, online radio, social radio and Facebook pages.” CP participated in anti-locust demonstrations in 2014 and 2015 and was key at one of the two main Occupy Central outposts.

WONG Yeung-tat argues that the mainland is colonizing Hong Kong by replacing locals with mainlanders, who are sent to Hong Kong for a “political mission.” According to Wong, the CCP controls pro-establishment parties such as the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong (民主建港協進聯盟, DAB, 民建聯), it is replacing local tycoons and financial groups with “red capitalists,” and has CCP members inside the SAR’s legal institutions, making Hong Kong a “red” rather than “white” area. Wong’s view coincides with that of Hong Kong’s “Father of Democracy” Martin Lee Chu-ming—that Hong Kong is being “Tibetanized” as the Chinese government turns Hong Kong-raised people into a minority by sending mainland migrants. Influential US media makes the same point.

Wong holds that “We are Hong Kongers, not Chinese.” CP “claims several hundred committed members and a larger following online” and in Occupy Central “urged more aggressive street actions

418. Wong Yeung-tat interview.
421. Author’s interview, Dr. Cheng Cheung-tai, Hong Kong, Sept. 10, 2014.
422. Wong Yeung-tat interview.
427. Buckley and Wong, Factions.
and openly distance[d] itself from student groups and their allies.\textsuperscript{428} At an Occupy rally Wong was described as a “firebrand party leader . . . screaming anti-Chinese-government epithets into a microphone, the mildest being ‘Drop dead, Communist Party!’”\textsuperscript{429} In an interview with one of the authors he stated:

[R]egarding the Hong Kong-Mainland conflict, Hong Kong people will fight against new migrants from the Mainland. They are actually not migrants, but colonists, because we cannot decide who can enter Hong Kong. So we will fight against them . . . [T]he individual visitors, they exert bad influences on Hong Kong’s environment. I oppose the MEP and mainly oppose parallel goods traders using MEPs.

Wong agrees that CP is like the European parties seeking to curb Muslim immigration, except mainlanders are not immigrants, but colonists. The problem is not so much a cultural difference between migrants and receiving peoples, as in Europe, but Beijing’s attempt to destroy Hong Kong’s culture: “Hong Kong people always welcome (cultural) influence from other regions including Japan and Korea. We do not try to block the culture. But what the Beijing government is doing is destroying Hong Kong values like Cantonese and traditional Chinese characters.” Wong holds that Beijing believes that if Hong Kong’s culture is destroyed, it will be easier to control:

First . . . northern people do not understand the Canton region and its cultures. This makes them afraid. One national policy is to unify languages in China. Second, the Beijing government is concerned how Hong Kong culture influences mainland thinking and values. In the opening policy of the 1990s, Hong Kong pop culture, such as movies, had much influence on mainlanders’ values, because Hong Kong people have distinct points of view. The Beijing government thus highly controls Hong Kong’s culture industry because it may have impact the mainland. Third, in the Beijing government’s view, many Hong Kong people are obsessed with the colonial period and its governance. This view is equal to the separatism . . . If the mainland government allows Hong Kong to become independent and have autonomy, other places which have the tendency to

\textsuperscript{428} “Hong Kong Protesters, Facing Divisions, Wait for Police to Act,” McClatchy, Nov. 19, 2014.

\textsuperscript{429} “Hong Kong Protestors Pour into Streets as Police Pull Back,” Los Angeles Time (LAT)s, Sept. 29, 2014.
separate from the Mainland including Xinjiang, Tibet, Inner Mongolia and Guangxi may follow Hong Kong.

Many Hong Kong localists are in fact sympathetic to the idea of Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang breaking away, as that would weaken the central government. Conversely, in 2012, some people in Taiwan, taking their cue from Hong Kong localists, started to refer to mainlanders as “locusts,” especially in a movement to bar mainlanders studying in Taiwan from accessing its public health system, like foreign students do.431

Wong says Hong Kong lacks the power to become independent. CP publications however resound with pro-independence pronouncements. He states that after 1989 the CCP was no longer entitled to govern the mainland and that “one country, two systems does not exist.” For Wong, localists, unlike mainstream pan-democrats, are not “betraying Hong Kong people” by trying to convince the CCP to make a “democratic turn.” Instead, localists do not believe CCP rule can last long. During Occupy Central, Wong alleged that the “[p]an-democrats have formed a united front with police and labeled the strugglers thugs.”

Dr. CHENG Chung-tai, a localist intellectual leader, participated in the 2010 fight against building a high-speed railway in Hong Kong and was recruited to the CP during WONG Yeung-tat’s 2012 Legco election run. As a Hong Kong Polytechnic University undergraduate from 2002-2005, he had been involved in the Democratic Party and Civic Party, but went to Beijing University from 2005-2010 as a PhD student. There, in sports competitions, Hong Kong students were placed on teams with foreigners, causing Cheng to conclude that “China and Hong Kong do not share the same settings.” As a Hong Kong Poly faculty, he became interested in localism. Cheng followed Legco member WONG Yuk Man’s Online Radio promotions of a “local social movement” in opposition to the CCP and sees the 2012 Dolce & Gabana protest as having “awakened Hong Kong people to fight for their local values.”
Cheng associates the fight for “genuine universal suffrage” – elections allowing anti-CCP candidates to run for SAR Chief Executive – with localism: “Universal suffrage is a basic framework for localism. Local values will come after universal suffrage. Politicians will automatically protect local culture.” He acknowledges that localists are accused of steering Hong Kong toward fascism and that the central government believes that Hong Kong localists intend to overthrow the CCP, but argues localism is mainly about Hong Kong wresting the right to determine who comes from the mainland. Hong Kong localism needs to be independent in political, social and economic aspects and is similar to ethnic minority localism (少数民族地方主义) in the mainland. To that end, CP launched one of the three 2014 anti-locust demonstrations, which Cheng described as 200 people in Mong Kok protesting big-spending mainland tourists who have come with money obtained through corruption.435

In early 2015, a new nativist group, Hong Kong Indigenous (本土民主前線), was set up with about 50 core members. It holds that “One Country, Two System is just a scam under the Communist Party rule” and that mainstream opposition groups are “pseudo-democrats.” Its leader, Ray Wong Toi-yeung (黃大愷) stated that, “We want to highlight the problems related to mainland travellers. Parallel-goods trading is only one of the problems . . . Hong Kong is so small. Our capacity is already overwhelmed.”436

A number of Legco members also promote aspects of localism. The pressure they can rouse through mobilizing other members may be one reason the Hong Kong government implemented in 2013-2014 several measures that accord with localist ideology, including restrictions on the amount of infant formula that can be taken out of Hong Kong, a “zero quota policy” (零配額政策) for “doubly non-permanent resident” (双非) mainland mothers to give birth in Hong Kong, a restriction on selling certain residential properties to non-Hong Kong people (“Hong


Kong land for Hong Kong people”; HK4HK; 港人港地)\(^{437}\) and a buyer stamp duty (買家印花稅) imposed on non-Hong Kong residents acquiring property in the SAR. The government also indicated in 2012 that it would like to refer Basic Law Article 24, the provision on Hong Kong permanent residence, to the central government’s National People’s Congress Standing Committee for interpretation, to eliminate the right of abode in Hong Kong for children born there of mainland parents.\(^{438}\)

Pro-establishment” (建制派 or “pro-Beijing” 親北京派) groups also back these measures, even while criticizing localists.

In 2013, two Legislative Councilors, Neo-Democrats head Gary Fan Kwok-wai and Civic Party leader Claudia Mo Man-ching (毛孟靜), co-launched Hong Kong First (香港本土) in order to defend the city’s culture from “mainlandization.”\(^ {439}\) Fan has said NMMs are the root of Hong Kong housing problems and that he seeks to reduce the IVS and change the Hong Kong Basic Law provision of 150 OWPs to 30-40.\(^{440}\) He denounces the use by Hong Kong restaurants of simplified Chinese characters rather than the complex ones.\(^ {441}\) Yet, most Hong Kong people can read simplified characters, while most Hong Kong people did not object to the British colonial use of English before 1997.\(^ {442}\) Mo has said that, “We are trying to differentiate ourselves from mainlanders - not just the people are different, but also our cultural spirit and political identity.”\(^ {443}\) In 2015, she criticized as mainlandization the government’s statement that the phrase “China/Hong Kong relations” should not be used.\(^ {444}\) Mo and Fan also sponsored an ad calling on the Hong Kong government to solve the housing problem by taking over approval rights for OWPs. It also stated that IVS visitors

\(^{437}\) Non-Hong Kong residents were 2% of buyers of Hong Kong residential property sold in 2013.”Chan Denies Home Policy End,” TS, Apr. 3, 2014.

\(^{438}\) See Michael Davis, “An NPC Interpretation is not the Answer to Hong Kong’s Immigration Problems,” SCMP, Dec. 18, 2012.


\(^{444}\) “Unequal Footing,” SCMP, Mar. 6, 2015.
have plagued Hong Kong. In MTR train compartments, in various urban areas, Tuen Mun and Sheung Shui, there are many Putonghua-speaking people. With a different cultural quality, they have ruined the civilization and upset law and order of Hong Kong.445

Mo and Fan appeared with CHIN Wan Kan at a HKAM seminar calling for the scaling back of mainland migrants.446 Chin later renounced his “allies” however,447 as he disfavors Hong Kong people participating in events like the annual June 4, 1989 commemoration, because he believes that they should not have any attachment to China. WONG Yeung-tat also dismissed the Neo-Democrats as a “regional organization” mainly concerned with problems of northern New Territories residents and not “concepts” like CP.448 Mo and Fan object to proposals to extend the scope of the RDO as “excessive and unnecessary” protection to new immigrants and mainland tourists.449 In late 2014, they put forward a motion and series of measures to require Legco to “put Hong Kong people first” when formulating policies.450 Mo and Fan participated in a March 2014 anti-locust demonstration.451

Legco member and head of the “radical pro-democracy” People Power party Albert Chan Wai-yip (陳偉業) has engaged in anti-locust diatribes. Complaining about a rise in mainland undergraduates (UG) in Hong Kong, from five in 1997 to 4,500 in 2013, Chan said “Mainland students are like locusts with an increase of 900 times in number.”452 Chan did not reveal however that 4,500 constituted 5% of the 88,600 UG students in 2013-2014, a much lower proportion, for example, than the more than 20% of non-Californian new UG students who enrolled at the University of California in fall, 2014, the 30% at UC’s flagship campuses, UC Berkeley and UCLA, and the still higher proportions of non-

448. Wong Yeung-tat interview.
locals at other major public US universities, such as Michigan and Virginia. Some 55% of Hong Kong students who take the local Diploma of Secondary Education examination are offered UG places at Hong Kong public universities and 15% more can first get a two-year associate degree and then transfer to a university, so that 70% of qualified locals can study at public universities. Mainlanders are 70% of post-graduate students at Hong Kong’s universities, but only 10% of mainland applicants are admitted; compared to 25% of local applicants.

CHAN Wai-yip’s “anti-locust” remarks came just before a group of Hong Kong students, through a Facebook page, raised money for a newspaper ad to “oppose the mainlandization of HK universities and demand the rights of education and jobs returned to Hong Kongers.” They claimed that mainland students “grab degrees, they grab jobs” and rhetorically queried “Do Hong Kongers deserve to be the lower class forever?” Among their demands were to “decrease the number of mainland [students] at all levels, restrict policies for mainland graduates to work in Hong Kong; sponsor more local students; nurture local scholars; promote local research; examine the recruiting method of self-sponsored graduate students; and find out whether the percentage of mainland teachers and staff is too high.”

In 2014, 19 year-old Betty Wong (黄嘉慧), a mainland-born HKU medical student with a Hong Kong father, wrote on Facebook that although she had a right of abode in Hong Kong, because her parents had violated the mainland “one-child policy” and thus could not get permission for her to leave, she was smuggled into Hong Kong at age eight and HKU helped her gain Hong Kong permanent residence. Wong was deluged with abuse, accused of not being “a proper Hong Kong person when she applied to university,” stealing local resources by attending HKU, and participating in mainland effort to colonize Hong Kong. Pro-Hong Kong independence group Hongkongese Priority [a.k.a. Hong Kong Comes First 香港優先], which displayed banners at-
tacking mainlanders as “locusts,” demonstrated at City University to
demand a curb on university admissions of mainlanders. Four mem-
bers of that group, bearing a colonial-era flag, had previously been ar-
rested for breaking into the People’s Liberation Army Central barracks in
Hong Kong in 2013. Group members later gathered at the British Con-
sulate in Hong Kong to demand the UK declare its 1984 treaty with Chi-
na, the Joint Declaration, void, because Hong Kong allegedly did not
have the high degree of autonomy the treaty proclaims. One demonstra-
tor, Billy Chiu Hin-chung, urged Britain to take back Hong Kong, but
also stated that, “Hong Kong should be made an independent state. Hong
Kong is our country. We are not Chinese.” Chiu later came to lead a
Self-Determination Party of Tibet and Hong Kong.

CHAN Wai-yip has also stated that “Hong Kong used to be a city
for tourism but now has become a city for locusts.” His party proposed
an arrival tax of HK$100 (US$13), a seemingly nationality-neutral
measure, but aimed at mainland visitors. The Democratic Party agreed in
principle, but proposed a tax of $20-50.

Independent, “radical liberal Christian” Legco member WONG
Yuk-Man (黃毓民), was a Dean of Professor of Journalism at a Taiwan-
affiliated college, then a radio commentator, before becoming a legislator
in 2006. Popularly called “Mad Dog” (瘋狗) and “Rogue Professor” (流
氓教授) because of his scathing anti-communist speeches, he founded
the “Proletariat Political Institute” (PPI; 普羅政治學苑) while still a
member of People Power. PPI jointly organized with CP the 2014 al-
ternative to the pan-democrats’ annual June 4th commemoration in Vic-
toria Park, under banners of “Localism, Democracy, and Anti-
Communism” (本土,民主,反共) and “I Want the Demise of the Com-

munist Regime” (我要中共倒台). 467 WONG Yeung-tat stated at the rally that, “Today we are Hong Kongese, not Chinese. We must fight the murderous regime.” 468 Reportedly, among localists, “[s]ome have gone so far as to call those who attended the Victoria Park vigil as ‘Chinese,’ in contrast to the true Hong Kongers who went to the alternative events.” 469 Legco member LEE Cheuk-yan, head of the Hong Kong Confederation of Trade Unions and the Alliance In Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements in China, which sponsors the June 4th event, did not raise political disagreements with localist demonstration organizers, but instead asked rhetorically, “What’s the difference [between us and Wong’s] anti-Communist stance?” 470

A Taiwan political scientist who initiated the Democratic Alliance of Hong Kong and Macau Students in Taiwan has stated that “the Civic Party and Democratic Party . . . have recently voiced readiness to include localist considerations in their political agenda.” 471 The leader of the Civic Party, Alan Leong Ka-kit (梁家傑), has spoken, in localist terms, of the “Hong Kong ethnic group (香港民族).” 472 The head of the Democratic Party, Emily Lau Wai-hing (劉慧卿) has said that in Hong Kong “people are angry and bitter” at mainlanders. 473 Almost all mainstream pan democrats in fact differ with the “one country, two systems” idea, by favoring regime change in the mainland, but are unlikely to endorse Hong Kong independence, as doing so would complicate their relations with their overseas allies. Some mainstream pan-democrats may come to back localism more broadly however, through scapegoating and vilifying mainlanders. Because pan democrat parties command the support of about a third of the Hong Kong people, punishing vilifiers becomes politically problematic, whether or not it is legally required.


471. Leung Man-to, Behind.

472. 崇洋， “公民黨議改黨徽加重「港獨」色彩” (Civic Party plan to change party program sharpens “Hong Kong independence” coloration), Feb. 2015: 35-37.

473. Hong Kong Economy.
VIII. CONCLUSION: PUNISHING THE VILIFIERS?

Though this nation has proudly thought of itself as an ethnic melting pot, in things racial we have always been and I believe continue to be, in too many ways, essentially a nation of cowards.

US Attorney General Eric Holder, 2009\textsuperscript{474}

In a 2015 video, white University of Oklahoma (UO) Sigma Alpha Epsilon (SAE) fraternity brothers chanted “there’ll never be a nigger in SAE. You can hang them from a tree, but they’ll never hang with me.” UO’s president, who had been Oklahoma’s governor and US Senator, expelled two students who led the chant and shut their fraternity house. An African-American writer for a leading US newspaper averred that, “This kind of clarity, and heart, feels rare.”\textsuperscript{475} Soon after, in the US state of Florida, several police were fired after being caught “exchanging a series of racially offensive text messages.”\textsuperscript{476}

Hong Kong localists, in ethnicizing and vilifying mainlanders, are like the UO “frat boys” or Florida police, who were punished even in very conservative parts of the world’s only country with virtually absolutist free speech. It remains unclear however whether the Hong Kong government has the “clarity, and heart” to punish “anti-locusts.” The prerequisite to that is the recognition that anti-locust agitation is indeed ethnic vilification.

In 2006, before the RDO’s adoption, an NGO, Hong Kong Human Rights Monitor, proposed to have the law encompass discrimination against mainlanders by explicitly stat[ing] in its Ordinance that, for the purpose of the Ordinance, “Mainland Chinese” is deemed to be a racial group —this would be similar to Irish legislation, which states that “Irish Travellers” are a racial group for the purpose of Northern Ireland’s racial discrimination legislation, even though


\textsuperscript{476} “Four Florida Police Officers Out after Racist Text Messages,” CNN, Mar. 21, 2015.
Irish Travellers may not seem like an obviously discrete racial demographic.477

The most serious vilifications in Hong Kong are analogous to racism, based on the victimizers’ unilateral perception of ethnic difference. In pre-Holocaust Germany, most Jews did not see themselves as a separate ethnic group, but as “Germans of the Jewish faith.”478 A minority held that they were “Germans of the Jewish stamm [tribe].”479 Because however anti-Jewish forces saw Jews as ethnically different, vilification of Jews was racism, despite non-Jews and Jews common identity as Germans. In Rwanda, Hutus and Tutsis have the same language and religion and often inter-marry. That they are separate ethnic groups is questionable; yet, the Rwandan genocide was racist.480 Because localists regard the mainlanders and the Hong Kong people as distinct ethnic groups, anti-locust agitation is racial.

A Discrimination Law Review was held in Hong Kong in 2014.481 Equal Opportunities Commission (EOC) Chairman York Chow Yat-ngok (周一嶽) said that the EOC would consider changing the law to allow for government action against vilification based on the “geographical origin of an individual,” “immigration status” or “year of entry into Hong Kong.”482 The EOC held public consultation hearings in summer 2014 on proposed changes. Localists opposed that change. For example, Hong Kong Autonomy Movement spokesman Vincent Lau “cautioned that Hongkongers’ freedom of speech could be limited and any amendment to protect those with different immigration or residency status would be an attempt to protect mainlanders.”483 WONG Yeung-tat has

482. “Anti-Discrimination Laws may be Extended to Cover Mainlanders,” CD, Mar. 25, 2014. This has also been phrased as “nationality, citizenship and Hong Kong residency.” Author’s notes, Aug. 23, 2014 EOC public consultation, Tai Koo Shing.
said protecting mainlanders against vilification would be done for a political purpose: if what is being said about mainlanders is called discrimination, Hong Kong people will not be able to campaign against them.484 Speaking for CP at a public consultation hearing, Jerome Chiu stated that:

[W]hen mainlanders seem to be singled out to represent the queue-jumpers and public defecators, the only reason for that is because they are truly outstanding . . . [S]ee the suitcase-hoarding gangs rush in and get the best seats—or indeed all the seats—in front of and in full view of the queue . . . [T]he bulk of them come here with the attitude of colonial masters and often act exactly that way. They are not the meek and the powerless who need protection, they come to Hong Kong from a position of great power. Don’t try to give them even more power than they already have, for if you do, they will strip us bare and crush us even more mercilessly and brutally than they’ve already done.485

CP member Christine Wong denied Hong Kong has the rule of law for 3 reasons: first, the CCP is “flooding in people [to Hong Kong] to become influential”; second, mainlanders are destroying Hong Kong’s social order; and lastly, Hong Kong law is used to favor mainlanders.486 Localists turned out in numbers for the public consultations. At the second one, they surrounded and shouted down NGO representatives with a differing view, especially social worker SZE Lai-Shan of SOCO, which favored modifying the law. As Hong Kong Baptist University journalism professor Cherian George, analyzing hate speech regulation in Asia, observed

[M]any Asian states are not interventionist enough when it comes to protecting minority rights and creating common ground. Siding with the majority culture often translates into impunity for right wing groups that attack minorities (whether based on race, religion, national origins or sexual orientation) . . . Their defenders within the majority community –

484. Wong Yeung-tat interview.
486. Notes, B. Sautman and Julian Cheung, Aug. 23, 2014 EOC public consultation Tai Koo Shing
such as human rights workers, inter-faith organizers and independent media – are also vulnerable to mob action.\textsuperscript{487}

The Hong Kong Government appears unlikely to press for RDO amendments. Within weeks after the 2014 anti-locust protests, York Chow Yat-ngok stated that, “Legislation is necessary if it [discrimination] becomes a trend in a society, but if the problem is not serious or does not deteriorate, it may not be necessary.”\textsuperscript{488} Reportedly, “[t]he commission’s chief legal counsel, Herman Poon Lik-hang (潘力恆), said it was unlikely that shouting abuse on a street would be considered incitement to racial hatred”\textsuperscript{489} and that “shouting ‘locust’ in the street is unlikely to be regarded as incitement to racial hatred.”\textsuperscript{490} EOC counsel Peter Redding stated that “we [the EOC] don’t want to inhibit people’s freedom of speech” and thus “calling someone a locust is not vilification,” which can only be found where violence is threatened.\textsuperscript{491} Making the threat of violence a precondition of vilification is however unsound, as argued by Australia’s Race Discrimination Commissioner in 2014, because it wholly ignores the psychological and psycho-physical effects of racism on victims.

There is now a considerable volume of research that highlights the serious health effects racism can have on individuals. The stress of racial abuse can trigger physiological symptoms such as fear in the gut, rapid pulse rate, difficulty in breathing. Repeated exposure to it can undoubtedly contribute to conditions such as hypertension, nightmares, post-traumatic stress disorder, even psychosis and suicide . . . Racist speech can also cause more insidious harm. In a modern society, our identity - our sense not only of who we are, but also of our worth and dignity - is something that is shaped by its recognition by those around us. Where society mirrors back to someone a demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves, this can inflict pro-


\textsuperscript{489}. “Should it be Illegal to call Someone ‘Locust’?” SCMP, Aug. 10, 2014.


\textsuperscript{491}. Notes, Barry Sautman, EOC Public Consultation, Aug. 23, 2014.
found harm. Again, the psychological harms caused by racial insults are well-documented.492

The United Nations Committee for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), which oversees that application of the ICERD, in a famous decision concerning Norway, expressly rejected the idea that incitement to violence is necessary for prosecution for racial vilification.493 After the ruling, Norway adopted an anti-discrimination law specifying criminal sanctions for participating in or incitement to discrimination.494

The CERD has indicated that “the prevailing economic, social and political climate” is one element that should be considered in determining whether certain conduct should be criminally proscribed under the ICERD.495 The High Court in an Australian case also ruled that the ICCPR does not just bar acts of hatred and racial discrimination, but also “offensive racial prejudice that might lead to acts of hatred and discrimination.”496

Late 2013 and early 2014 surveys showed that a third of Hong Kong people had “negative” feelings toward mainlanders.497 One-fourth supported protests against mainlanders and 32% supported a “Hong Kong independence” campaign, which requests “total autonomy.”498 More than half the population wants to reduce the number of mainland


498. “Majority Angry at Hong Kong Protest Poll;,” GT, Feb. 25, 2014, www.globaltimes.cn/content/ 844566.shtml#.U1uq_4Nt9A. It would have been counterproductive for Global Times to inflate the proportion of Hong Kong people supporting anti-mainlander protests: reporting that a high percentage of people support bias actually increases bias. Adam Grant and Sheryl Sandberg, “When Talking about Bias Backfires,” NYT, Dec. 6, 2014. “Pro-Beijing” media also claim anti-locust protests are “the behavior of a few extremists” opposed by most Hong Kong people. “Growing Danger of Mob Politics in a Moderate City,” CD, Feb. 21, 2014; “Most People Both Sides of the Border Oppose Anti-Mainlander Protests, Finds Survey,” SCMP, Feb. 25, 2014.
migrants. A March 2015 Chinese University poll indicated that about 17% of Hong Kong people supported “the actions recently taken by the public against individual travellers’ from the mainland,” i.e. about 1 million of Hong Kong’s 6 million adults. Nearly 55% were opposed. The “supporters of protest action against the individual visit scheme were mainly young people of varying education attainment. . .” Moreover, “63 per cent said the number of individual travellers from the mainland had exceeded the city’s capacity.” About two-thirds of respondents wanted to restrict travel by IVS holders and 70% wanted to revoke MEPs.

Legeco thus may not want to enact changes in the RDO. Some legislative councilors’ dislike for the CCP may be matched by their scorn for mainlanders, while other legislators may deem their electoral interests would be best served by “supporting [the] Hong Kong people” against NMMs and mainland visitors. A Hong Kong newspaper has editorialized that the government should not “tighten the law” because anti-locust protestors only represent a minority view, although that is also the case in every country that has laws against vilification.

Even if the RDO is deemed to protect mainlanders, it may not be applied. York Chow has indicated that racism against recognized Hong Kong minorities is common and that most Hong Kong minorities are dehumanized. As of 2014 however, no one had been prosecuted under the RDO, which came into effect more than five year earlier. Michael Chugani has observed that the Hong Kong government condemns anti-locust protestors, but has not acted against vilifiers of recognized ethnic minorities such as South Asians. There is however a notable difference: “Hong Kong, which prides itself on being Asia’s World City . . .

499. Lai, Hong Kong Accepting.
504. “Hong Kong may Amend its Race Law to Protect Mainland Visitors,” SCMP Feb. 20, 2014. The failure to prosecute in Hong Kong mirrors the situation in parts of the SAR’s model for all things legal, Britain. “A recent report by the Northern Ireland Commission for Ethnic Minorities [stated] that just 12 of 14,000 race-related crimes reported over the past five years ended in a successful prosecution.” Douglas Dalby, “In Northern Ireland, a Wave of Immigrants is Met with Fists,” NYT, Nov. 29, 2014.
apparently also fosters extreme prejudice against certain minority groups," but it is against mainlanders, not recognized minorities, that demonstrations are staged and invective against mainlanders far surpasses that used against other groups.

With the Government not acting against anti-mainlander vilification, “[i]t is not surprising there are scuffles” at anti-locust demonstrations.507 Protestors in 2014 pushed and shoved visitors508 and a Hong Kong academic stated that then anti-mainlander vilification was “quite visible, quite open and quite public; it may not be violent, but all it takes is one or two incidents . . .”509 There was low-level violence at 2015 anti-mainlander protests where NDPICG leader LEUNG Kam-shing reportedly “warned of further violence if the government doesn’t abolish multiple-entry permits,” CP’s CHENG Chung-tai is said to have stated that “being abusive is the only way to be ‘effective.’”510 Two men were charged with attempted arson after lighting a fire near Sheung Shui shops that sold to parallel traders and another store was firebombed.511 As Nelson Mandela observed, “When we dehumanize and demonize our opponents, we abandon the possibility of peacefully resolving our differences, and seek to justify violence against them.”512

Other violence may yet come, either from vilifiers or as self-defense against them. In fact, hitting back may be excusable. The US does not criminalize hate speech, but under its “fighting words doctrine” an act of speech is unprotected when the words are a direct, personal, face-to-face insult and likely to provoke the average addressee and actual addressee to an immediate violent response.513 This is not an unlikely scenario where “insect language” is used. Indeed, the campaigners themselves

508. Young, Hong Kong Must.
509. Ramzy, Death in Hong Kong
have more or less invited a violent response to their vilifications. The online invitation to their February 2014 demonstration stated the following:

[W]e hold this “Drive Out Individual Travel Scheme Tourists” protest to drive out locusts and show how we are unhappy with Chinese tourists. If violence happens in this protest, it is all because of the government ignoring the will of the people!514

A mainland woman visitor who was among the targets of an anti-locust protest regarded it as “uncivilized” and [took] exception to the suggestion that she and other visitors from across the border are like locusts: "I think the protest is a humiliation to mainlanders.” 515 Barrister and Civic Party leader Ronny Tong Ka-wah (湯家驄) has noted that something like the “fighting words” doctrine applies in Hong Kong, as the Government could prosecute anti-locust campaigners who “used threatening or humiliating words.” 516

As of spring 2015, Hong Kong politicians were still undecided about whether to act on discrimination against mainlanders 517 and there are doubtless those who surmise that the more liberal democracy in Hong Kong will guarantee against racialized violence. Yet, though the Scandinavian countries have long been considered model social democracies, today the third-largest political party in Sweden has the support of racists and neo-Nazis. The leading political party in Denmark is not only anti-immigrant but also anti-Muslim. And the finance minister of Norway, a member of the right-wing Progress Party, once suggested that all Romany people in her country should be deported by bus.

Racialized violence moreover need not be organized. Ultra-rightist Anders Brevik, who murdered 77 fellow Norwegians in a single day in 2011, told police he had acted because “The country is being invaded by foreigners.” 518

Those who want to avoid confrontation know what needs to be done: to not act as a “nation of cowards” in the face of racial incitement. Because the odds of action are slim however, the words of African-

American abolitionist Frederick Douglass should be taken to heart by those people in Hong Kong not afraid to act: “The whole history of the progress of human liberty shows that all concessions yet made to her august claims have been born of earnest struggle. . . . This struggle may be a moral one; or it may be a physical one; or it may be both moral and physical; but it must be a struggle. Power concedes nothing without a demand.”519