COMBATING CORRUPTION
SINGAPORE-STYLE: LESSONS FOR
OTHER ASIAN COUNTRIES

Jon S.T. Quah

School of Law
University of
Maryland
Maryland Series
in Contemporary Asian Studies

General Editor: Hungdah CHIU
Executive Editor: Chih-Yu T. WU
Associate Executive Editor: Yufan LI
Associate Editor: Matthew Lyon
Managing Editor: Chih-Yu T. WU
Assistant Editor: Aaron H. CHIU

Editorial Advisory Board
Professor Robert A. Scalapino, University of California at Berkeley
Professor Bih-jaw LIN, National Chengchi University
Dr. Ying-jeou MA, Chinese Society of International Law
Professor Toshio Sawada, Sophia University, Japan
Professor Choon-ho Park, International Legal Studies, Korea University, Republic of Korea

All contributions (in English only) and communications should be sent to:
Professor Hungdah CHIU/Chih-Yu T. WU
University of Maryland School of Law
500 West Baltimore Street
Baltimore, Maryland 21201-1786, USA

All publications in this series reflect only the views of the authors.
While the editor accepts responsibility for the selection of materials to be published, the individual author is responsible for statements of facts and expressions of opinion contained therein.

Subscription is US $40.00 per year for 4 issues (regardless of the price of individual issues) in the United States and $45.00 for Canada or overseas. Checks should be addressed to MSCAS.

Tel.: (410) 706-3870
Fax: (410) 706-1516

Price for single copy of this issue: US $12.00

ISSN 0730-0107
ISBN 1-932330-19-4

© Maryland Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, Inc.
COMBATING CORRUPTION SINGAPORE-STYLE: LESSONS FOR OTHER ASIAN COUNTRIES

Jon S.T. Quah*

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. Introduction ................................................. 1
II. Singapore's Policy Context ............................... 4
III. Causes of Corruption during the Colonial Period .... 9
IV. Ineffectiveness of the Anti-Corruption Branch ...... 14
V. Singapore's Anti-Corruption Strategy .............. 16
VI. Prevention of Corruption Act ......................... 19
VII. The Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau ........ 21
VIII. Improving Salaries of Political Leaders and Civil Servants ............................................. 27
IX. Evaluating Singapore's Anti-Corruption Strategy .... 30
X. Lessons for Other Asian Countries .................. 35
XI. Conclusion ...................................................... 46
    List of Abbreviations ........................................ 48
    Glossary of Chinese Names .............................. 49
    Selected Bibliography ..................................... 50

I. INTRODUCTION

Corruption is a serious problem in many Asian countries, judging by the rankings and scores of the 23 Asian countries on Transparency International's 2007 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) as shown in Table 1. However, corruption is not a serious problem in Singapore, which has been consistently perceived as the least corrupt Asian country with the highest score on Transparency International's CPI from 1995-2007, as indicated in Table 2. Why has

* Jon S.T. Quah, Ph.D., is an Anti-Corruption Consultant based in Singapore. He was Professor of Political Science at the National University of Singapore and Co-editor of the Asian Journal of Political Science until his retirement in June 2007. He has published extensively on anti-corruption strategies and civil service reforms in Asian countries and is the author of Curbing Corruption in Asia: A Comparative Study of Six Countries (Singapore: Eastern Universities Press, 2003). Email: jonstquah@gmail.com.

Editorial note: The exchange rate between the U.S. dollar and the Singapore dollar has fluctuated over the years. In 1959, US$1 = S$3, while in 2007 US$1 = S$1.5. The author has provided contemporary exchange rates for the years that the data was collected for most of the tables included in this article.
Singapore been effective in curbing corruption when many other Asian countries have failed to do so? Can these countries improve their anti-corruption strategies by learning from Singapore’s success in minimizing corruption?

This monograph addresses these two questions by first describing Singapore’s policy context in terms of its geography, history, economy, demography, and political system. Singapore’s favorable policy context is important, as it is conducive for the effective implementation of the anti-corruption measures. Following this analysis, the causes of corruption during different periods can be properly identified.

Before proceeding to discuss Singapore’s policy context, it is necessary to define corruption. According to Arnold J. Heidenheimer, corruption has been defined in terms of its emphasis on the public office, market, or public interest.¹ This monograph adopts the United Nations Development Programme’s definition of corruption as “the misuse of public power, office or authority for private benefit—through bribery, extortion, influence peddling, nepotism, fraud, speed money or embezzlement.”² This definition has been chosen for two reasons: it identifies the major forms of corruption and is applicable to both the public and private sectors.

Corruption is a way of life in a country when it is rampant, occurs at all levels, and is the norm rather than the exception. In contrast, corruption is a fact of life in a country when cases of corruption are the exception rather than the rule. Apart from its extent, corruption can also be classified according to its level: grand corruption or corruption by political leaders and senior civil servants; and petty or “survival” corruption, which is practiced by underpaid junior civil servants demanding bribes from those who wish to expedite their applications or perform other favors.³

Singapore’s comprehensive anti-corruption strategy is analyzed first by explaining the history of the Singaporean government’s efforts in combating corruption. This history begins with the Opium Hijacking Scandal of October 1951, which led to the formation of the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) in October


1952. By the end of the decade, however, it became evident that the CPIB was handicapped by its lack of resources and powers, so the freshly empowered People’s Action Party (PAP) government enacted the Prevention of Corruption Act (POCA) in June 1960 to enhance the CPIB’s effectiveness. The PAP government’s political will is reflected in the impartial enforcement of the POCA and

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>CPI Rank</th>
<th>CPI Score*</th>
<th>No. of Surveys**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>4th</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>14th</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>17th</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macao</td>
<td>34th</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>34th</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>43rd</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>43rd</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhutan</td>
<td>46th</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>72nd</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>72nd</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>84th</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>94th</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongolia</td>
<td>99th</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>123rd</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>131st</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>131st</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>138th</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>143rd</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>162nd</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>162nd</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laos</td>
<td>168th</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>172nd</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>179th</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*The score ranges from 0 (most corrupt) to 10 (least corrupt).

**To be included in the CPI, a country must have at least three independent surveys.
other anti-corruption legislation by the CPIB in the 48 years since the initial execution of the POCA.

After evaluating Singapore’s anti-corruption strategy, this monograph identifies the four lessons that other Asian countries can learn from Singapore’s experience in curbing corruption. Even though Singapore’s policy context is more favorable than those of other Asian countries, the critical ingredient for an effective anti-corruption strategy remains the political will of the incumbent government. This is followed in greater detail with other lessons that countries can use in their anti-corruption policies.

### Table 2. Singapore’s Ranking and Score on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, 1995-2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>CPI Rank</th>
<th>CPI Score</th>
<th>No. of Countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>3rd</td>
<td>9.26</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>7th</td>
<td>8.80</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>9th</td>
<td>8.66</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>7th</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>7th</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>6th</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>4th</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>5th</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>5th</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>5th</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>5th</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>5th</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>4th</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>5.5th</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### II. SINGAPORE’S POLICY CONTEXT

Singapore has changed a great deal during the past five decades since its attainment of self-government from the British on June 3, 1959. Table 3 summarizes the major changes in the country’s policy context during 1959 to 2007 which are relevant for the analysis of Singapore’s anti-corruption strategy.
Table 3. Changes in Singapore’s Policy Context, 1959-2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Policy Context in 1959</th>
<th>Policy Context in 2007</th>
<th>Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Land Area</td>
<td>581.5 sq km</td>
<td>704 sq km</td>
<td>+ 122.5 sq km (x 0.21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>1.58 million</td>
<td>4.58 million</td>
<td>+ 3 million (x 2.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross Domestic Product per capita</td>
<td>S$1,330 (US$443)*</td>
<td>S$52,994 (US$35,163)</td>
<td>+ S$51,664 (x 40)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment Rate</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
<td>– 1.9% (x –0.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Official Foreign Reserves</td>
<td>S$1,151.4 million** (US$383.8 million)</td>
<td>S$234,545.6 million (US$155,627.1 million)</td>
<td>+ S$233,394.2 million (x 203)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population living in Public Housing</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>82%***</td>
<td>+ 73% (x 9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Expenditure on Education</td>
<td>S$63.39 million (US$21.13 million)</td>
<td>S$6,966 million (US$4,384.2 million)</td>
<td>+ S$6,902.61 million (x 110)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extent of Corruption</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Minimized</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*Exchange rate: US$1 = S$3 (1959 and 1963); S$1.58(2006); S$1.50 (2007)
**1963 figure ***2006 figure

Geography: The Advantages of Small Countries

Geography can be an obstacle if the physical location, size, or topography of a country hinders the implementation of policies. When Singapore attained self-government from the British in June 1959, its land area was only 581.5 sq km. Because of land reclamation, its size has increased during the past 48 years though its total land mass is still only 704 sq km. Singapore’s small territorial boundaries are advantageous for the formulation and implementation of policies, as communication is not a serious problem and often facilitates political control by the leadership. A second advantage is that Singapore’s small size enhances administrative coordination and promotes responsiveness by public officials. In contrast to larger Asian countries like India and Indonesia, Singapore’s compactness has contributed to a highly centralized public bureaucracy, which does not face the same problems afflicting a federal civil service in its interaction with the state, provincial or local-level
bureaucracies. Indeed, the absence of a large rural sector in Singapore not only reinforces the centralized nature of its civil service, but also means that it is not burdened by problems arising from implementing reforms in the rural areas or provinces.4

**History: The Enduring Legacy of British Colonial Rule**

The British colonial government introduced two important reforms during the early 1950s which have strengthened the contemporary civil service tremendously. First, in January of 1951, the British introduced a system of meritocracy to Singapore with the establishment of the Public Service Commission (PSC). This commission was established with the dual purposes of keeping politics out of the civil service by rejecting the spoils system, and accelerating the localization of the civil service by recruiting qualified local candidates. The PAP government has retained the PSC, which has attracted the “best and brightest” Singaporeans to join the civil service by awarding scholarships to the best students in each cohort.5

Second, the British colonial government was also responsible for creating the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) in October 1952 to replace its ineffective predecessor, the Anti-Corruption Branch (ACB) of the Criminal Investigation Department in the Singapore Police Force (SPF). After the highly publicized Opium Hijacking Scandal involving the SPF, the British colonial government realized the folly of relying on the ACB to curb corruption when there was extensive police corruption, and corrected its mistake by establishing the CPIB as an agency independent of the SPF.

**Economic Growth: From Poverty to Affluence**

A country’s economy can hinder national development if financial resources are scarce and if there are inadequate trained personnel. Indeed, scarcity of resources is the most important economic obstacle to development which requires the investment of much time, effort and resources. On the other hand, an affluent country will have less difficulty in implementing development programs as it has the required financial and human resources.

---

Singapore’s tremendous improvement in its standard of living and growth in its GDP per capita during the past 48 years and its transformation from a Third World country to a First World country has been an asset in implementing development programs. The housing shortage inherited by the government of the People’s Action Party has been solved by the Housing and Development Board’s effective public housing program which has increased the proportion of the population living in public housing from 9% in 1959 to 82% in 2006. The lack of natural resources has also compelled the PAP government to focus on education to improve the quality of human resources in Singapore. Accordingly, it is not surprising that government expenditure on education has increased by 110 times from S$63.39 million in 1959 to S$6,966 million in 2006.

Thus, Singapore’s economic affluence means that the PAP government will be able to allocate sufficient personnel and budget to the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau to enable it to implement the anti-corruption measures effectively.

**Demography: A Multi-Racial Society**

In June 2007, Singapore had a total population of 4,588,600 persons, with 3,583,100 of them (78%) as residents and a population density of 6,518 persons per sq km.\(^6\) Singapore’s population is heterogeneous in terms of ethnic group, language, and religion. The Chinese constitute 75.2% of the resident population, followed by the Malays (13.6%), Indians (8.8%), and Others (2.4%).\(^7\) Apart from the four official languages of English, Mandarin, Malay and Tamil, there are several Chinese dialects and a few languages among the Indians. In terms of religion, 51% of the population were Buddhist or Taoist in 2000, 14.9% were Muslims, 14.8% had no religion, 14.6% were Christian, 4% were Hindu, and 0.6% belonged to other religions.

The population’s heterogeneity in race, language and religion, imposes on the PAP government two important obligations to its citizens. First, it must promote nation building in Singapore by formulating and implementing policies to ensure racial harmony. The second obligation of the PAP government is to prevent and minimize discrimination against the minority groups by ensuring that

---


both public and private organizations are fair and impartial in their
treatment of all citizens, regardless of their ethnic origin, language
or religion. This means that anyone found guilty of corruption in
the multiracial country of Singapore is punished, regardless of his
or her ethnic group, language or religion.

**Political Stability and Continuity of the PAP Government**

The government of the People’s Action Party has been in
power for the 49 years since it first assumed office in June 1959
after winning the May 1959 general election. It was re-elected for
the 11th time when it won the May 2006 general election. The PAP
government’s predominance in Singapore politics can be attributed
to four factors. First, it ensured Singapore’s survival after separa-
tion from Malaysia in August 1965 by minimizing the economic ef-
teffects of the withdrawal of the British military forces in 1971 by
encouraging foreign investment; and by strengthening the country’s
armed forces through the introduction of compulsory military ser-
vice and the acquisition of military hardware. Second, the PAP gov-
nernment gained legitimacy among Singaporeans through its
effective response to the communist and communal threats and the
problem of corruption. It introduced the Prevention of Corruption
Act in 1960 to strengthen the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bu-
reau and enabled it to curb corruption effectively. Third, the vast
improvement in living standards by the PAP government during the
past 48 years demonstrates clearly that it has the ability to ade-
quately perform its role to the satisfaction and benefit of its people.
Finally, the PAP government has dominated Singapore politics be-
cause the many opposition political parties are weak and ineffective
and are not viewed as viable alternatives.

Singapore’s political stability and continuity is an important as-
set for the PAP government as it is highly conducive for attracting
foreign investment and for enhancing the effective implementation
of public policies as the political leaders can focus on meeting the
long term goals instead of being constrained by short-term consid-
erations. The continuity of the PAP government and its commit-

Multi-Racial City-State,” in Ahmed Shafiquel Huque, Jermain T.M. Lam and Jane C.Y.
Lee, eds., *Public Administration in the NICs: Challenges and Accomplishments*, Basing-

ernment and Politics in Southeast Asia*, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies,
Combing Corruption Singapore-Style

ment to curbing corruption for the past 48 years has certainly enhanced the effectiveness of its anti-corruption strategy.

In sum, Singapore has a favorable policy context as its small size and population, commitment to meritocracy and racial harmony, economic affluence, and political stability, have contributed to the successful implementation of many public policies, including the anti-corruption policy.

III. CAUSES OF CORRUPTION DURING THE COLONIAL PERIOD

Singapore's battle against corruption began in 1871, when corruption was made illegal with the enactment of the Penal Code of the Straits Settlements of Malacca, Penang and Singapore. In 1879, a Commission of Inquiry into the causes of inefficiency of the Straits Settlements Police Force found that corruption was prevalent among the European inspectors and the Malay and Indian junior officers. Similarly, the 1886 Commission of Inquiry into the extent of public gambling in the Straits Settlements confirmed the existence of systematic corruption in the police forces in Singapore and Penang. An analysis of the 172 reported cases of police corruption in Singapore during 1845-1921 found that bribery was the most common form (63.4%), followed by direct criminal activities (24.4%), opportunistic theft (5.8%), corruption of authority (5.2%), and protection of illegal activities (1.2%).

Low Salaries

The most important factor responsible for police corruption in colonial Singapore was the low salaries of members of the Singapore Police Force, especially those in the lower ranks. Table 4 shows the range of salaries for both European and local members of the SPF in 1887. The discrimination in monthly salary between the European and non-European local policemen is clearly demonstrated in Table 4 as the European officers earned much more than their local counterparts. For example, the monthly salary of the most junior rank of constable among the European contingent was S$40 or nearly three times that of the monthly salary of the highest rank of sergeant (S$15) for the local contingent.

11. Ibid., p. 24, Table 6.
Apart from the discrepancy between the two sets of salaries, the local policemen were not fully provided with local rations. In contrast, all the European policemen except for those with the rank of Inspector 1st Class, received between S$5-S$10 worth of rations. The lack of provision of rations for the local policemen made life more difficult for them with the increase in food prices. Furthermore, the local policemen had to pay for their own uniforms, which were relatively expensive in view of their low salaries. For example, a peon (1st class) had to pay S$3.50 for his uniform from his monthly salary of S$5. With such conditions prevailing in the SPF, it is not surprising that the Straits Times observed that: “It is at once evident that the native constables and the European police of the Inspector class are so underpaid that scandals are unavoidable.”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Monthly Salary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>European Contingent</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspector 1st Class</td>
<td>S$100 (no rations)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspector 2nd Class</td>
<td>S$80 (S$5 rations)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspector 3rd Class</td>
<td>S$60 (S$10 rations)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergeant</td>
<td>S$50 (S$10 rations)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constable</td>
<td>S$40 (S$10 rations)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Local Contingent</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergeant</td>
<td>S$15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporal</td>
<td>S$12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constable 1st Class</td>
<td>S$10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constable 2nd Class</td>
<td>S$9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constable 3rd Class</td>
<td>S$8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peon 1st Class</td>
<td>S$5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peon 2nd Class</td>
<td>S$4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Ample Opportunities for Corruption**

In addition to low salaries, the lack of control over the police force in areas that were most susceptible to corruption also provided many opportunities for policemen to engage in corrupt practices. Indeed, the many cases of police involvement in illegal

12. Straits Times (Singapore), July 6, 1878.
13. Straits Times (Singapore), May 13, 1848.
14. Straits Times (Singapore), October 4, 1887.
gambling reflected the lack of control over those inspectors and constables who accepted bribes from the gambling house owners. In April 1846, a European constable, Charles Cashin, was convicted of receiving bribes from illicit gambling dens and sentenced to 18 months imprisonment and a fine of S$1,000. Cashin reported that for the past three years all the SPF constables had received S$20 each monthly, and that the constable who had brought the charge against him had also received bribes himself. The Deputy Superintendent of Police, Thomas Dunman, admitted in court that the police were in the regular pay of gambling promoters and that it was difficult to rectify the situation.\(^{15}\) Three years later, the \textit{Straits Times} revealed that the police did not take action to suppress gambling activities conducted within 50 yards of a police station in town because the policemen were paid for their silence.\(^{16}\) Finally, it is surprising that even though the 1886 Commission of Inquiry had confirmed the existence of widespread police corruption in gambling activities, nothing was done by the SPF to prevent the policemen from getting involved in such activities.

Another reason why the local policemen had ample opportunities for corruption during the colonial period was that though they were not legally permitted to take on second jobs in addition to their policemen duties, their low salaries forced them to seek alternative sources of income to supplement their meager salaries from the police force. Many of the local policemen who owned buffalo carts and food stalls were unable to perform their official duties impartially as they were exposed to more opportunities for misbehavior.\(^{17}\)

In addition to the Singapore Police Force, other government agencies in colonial Singapore including the customs, immigration and internal revenue departments, provided more opportunities for corruption than those public agencies that had limited contact with members of the public, did not issue licenses or permits, and collected fees or taxes. A former Director of the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau, YOONG Siew Wah, observed that “the areas in which corruption was widespread were in almost all the licensing activity, food and price control action, the protection racketeers con-

\(^{16}\) \textit{Straits Times} (Singapore), June 13, 1849.
\(^{17}\) Quah, “Police Corruption in Singapore,” \textit{supra} note 10, pp. 29 and 31.
nected with the smuggling of gold bars and opium, and gambling.\textsuperscript{18} Furthermore, the Singapore Improvement Trust’s failure in providing low-cost public housing could be attributed in part to the corruption of its senior expatriate officers and local junior officers in contracts procedure, planning and development control, and the allocation of housing units.\textsuperscript{19} Thus, corruption in colonial Singapore was not confined to the SPF, but was widespread throughout the entire public bureaucracy.

\textit{Low Risk of Detection and Punishment}

As an illegal offense in virtually all countries, individuals found guilty of corruption should be punished accordingly. However, in reality, the probability of detection and punishment of corrupt offenses varies in different Asian countries. Corruption typically thrives in Asian countries where the public perceives it to be a “low risk, high reward” activity, as corrupt offenders are unlikely to be detected and punished. Meanwhile, corruption is a far less serious problem in Asian countries where corruption is perceived as a “high risk, low reward” activity, as those involved in corrupt behavior are likely to be caught and severely punished.\textsuperscript{20} In Singapore, corruption thrived during the colonial period when it was perceived by the public to be a low risk, high reward activity, as corrupt offenders were unlikely to be detected and punished.

The British colonial government’s efforts to curb corruption failed because its existing Prevention of Corruption Ordinance (POCO) policy was ineffective. Even though corruption was made illegal in 1871, the British colonial government took another 66 years to introduce the first anti-corruption law with the enactment of the POCO in December 1937. The POCO’s aim was to prevent “bribery and secret commissions in public and private business.” However, the POCO was ineffective for two reasons: its offenses were not seizable and limited the powers of arrest, search and investigation of police officers as warrants were required before arrests could be made; and the penalty of imprisonment for two years and/or a S$10,000 fine for those found guilty of corruption did not


\textsuperscript{20} Quah, \textit{Curbing Corruption in Asia}, supra note 3, p. 13.
deter corrupt behavior. It took another nine years before the POCO was amended in 1946 to increase the penalty to a prison term of three years, thus making corrupt offenses seizureable and automatically giving police officers "much wider powers of arrest, search and investigation."22

The problem of corruption deteriorated during the Japanese Occupation (February 1942 to August 1945) because the rampant inflation made it difficult for civil servants to live on their low wages. Trading in the black market seemed to be a "way of life" as LEE Gek Boi describes everyone to have been "surviving on some sort of black marketing."23 Furthermore, nepotism and corruption were "perfectly acceptable," as everyone resorted to "connections, friends and relatives" in order to get jobs.24

The Japanese Occupation bred corruption into Singaporean society, as practices of "bribery, blackmail, and extortion grew out of the violence and fear" that the Japanese used to rule their occupied territories.25 As LEE Gek Boi further recounted:

Bribery worked wonders. From generals to the ordinary soldier, gifts and money smoothed the way. Nothing was transparent and everything was about connections and payoffs. Nothing was impossible with the right connections. . . . Shortages created the black market and a culture of thievery to fuel the market. Everyone—the Japanese included—did black marketing. The Japanese Occupation culture brought out the basic survival instincts in people and produced a society where all manner of evils could be justified because it was all about survival. . . . It would take years to undo the corruption and address the social evils that Japanese military occupation bred in Singapore.26

Conditions worsened after World War II and corruption spread among civil servants as a result of their meager salaries and inflation, as well as their inadequate supervision by their superiors.

24. Ibid.
25. Ibid., p. 205.
26. Ibid.
which provided them with many opportunities for corruption with a low probability of being caught.\textsuperscript{27} Corruption had become a way of life for many Singaporeans to enable them to cope with their low salaries and rising inflation during the post-war period.\textsuperscript{28} Thus, it is not surprising that the British Military Administration (BMA), which took over after the Japanese surrender in August 1945, was also referred to derisively as the “Black Market Administration.”

\section*{IV. THE INEFFECTIVENESS OF THE ANTI-CORRUPTION BRANCH}

The Anti-Corruption Branch (ACB) was established within the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) in December 1937 by the British colonial government to curb corruption in Singapore. However, the ACB was ineffective in combating corruption in Singapore, which can be explained by three reasons. First, as a small police unit, the ACB was clearly inadequate in performing the difficult task of eradicating corruption in the Singapore Civil Service, including the Singapore Police Force. In her speech to the Second Legislative Council on February 20, 1952, Mrs. Elizabeth Choy, expressed her surprise to find that the ACB only had four officers, and thirteen rank and file, to handle the “vice” of corruption, which she described had “gripped, and is waxing fat on the Government, and, in some instances, commercial enterprise.”\textsuperscript{29} Because the CID was mainly concerned with the detection and solving crimes deemed to be more serious, such as murder and kidnapping, the elimination of corruption was accordingly given much lower priority. This meant that the ACB had to compete with other branches of the CID for limited manpower and other resources.\textsuperscript{30}

Second, the ACB was ineffective because the CID had many priorities, and the function of minimizing corruption was only one of the 16 duties of the Assistant Commissioner of the CID in May 1952. Thus, in addition to curbing corruption, he was also responsible for the following duties: secret societies, gambling promoters, fraud (commercial crime), anti-vice (traffickers), pawnshops, second-hand dealers, narcotics (traffickers), criminal records, banish-


\textsuperscript{28} YOONG “Some Aspects of Corruption,” \textit{supra} note 18, pp. 55-56.

\textsuperscript{29} Quoted in Quah, \textit{Administrative and Legal Measures for Combating Bureaucratic Corruption in Singapore}, \textit{supra} note 21, p. 14.

\textsuperscript{30} Ibid., p. 15.
ment, naturalization, missing persons, fingerprints, photography, Police Gazette, and house-to-house and street collections.\textsuperscript{31} Accordingly, it was not surprising that corruption control was not the CID’s top priority especially when the police was corrupt itself.

Finally, the most important reason for the ACB’s ineffectiveness was the prevalence of rampant corruption within the Singapore Police Force (SPF). As indicated earlier, the 1879 and 1886 Commissions had confirmed the existence of widespread corruption in the SPF. In his 1950 Report, the Commissioner of Police, J.P. Pennefather-Evans, stated that corruption was rife in government departments in Singapore. A few days later, the ACB Chief admitted that the problem of corruption was “getting worse.”\textsuperscript{32} In view of the ACB’s ineffectiveness in curbing corruption in Singapore, it was not surprising that Mrs. Elizabeth Choy had criticized the British colonial government for its “weak and feeble attempt” to fight corruption in Singapore. In her speech to the Second Legislative Council on February 20, 1952, she urged the government to implement quickly the following proposals by the ACB:

... amendments to the Prevention of Corruption Ordinance to allow Police Officers above the rank of A.S.P. [Assistant Superintendent] to investigate into the bank and Post Office accounts of any public servant; to use such findings as evidence in Court; to divorce the Anti-Corruption Branch from the Police; to increase the strength of the Branch considerably.\textsuperscript{33}

However, the triggering mechanism\textsuperscript{34} for the CPIB’s formation was the discovery by the British colonial government that some police officers were implicated in the Opium Hijacking Scandal in October 1951. As described by former CPIB Deputy Director TAN Ah Leak, a gang of robbers hijacked a shipment of 1,800 pounds of


\textsuperscript{32} Quoted in Quah, \textit{Administrative and Legal Measures for Combating Bureaucratic Corruption in Singapore}, supra note 21, p. 14.

\textsuperscript{33} Quoted in ibid., emphasis added.

\textsuperscript{34} Larry N. Gerton has defined a triggering mechanism as “a critical event (or set of events) that converts a routine problem into a widely shared, negative public response.” See Larry N. Gerton, \textit{Public Policy Making: Process and Principles}, Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1997, p. 23.
opium worth about S$400,000 [US$133,330]. Three police detectives were among the hijackers, and investigations by the ACB later revealed that some senior police officers were involved not only with the hijackers, but also with the importers of the opium.

Despite the conclusion of this report, the ACB investigation only led to the dismissal of an assistant superintendent of police, and the pressured retirement of another officer. The colonial government was unhappy with the results of this investigation, and thereby formed its own “special team,” which submitted its own inquiry in September 1952. Satisfied by the results of this second inquiry, the government ultimately decided to replace the ACB with this team, which then became the CPIB.

In sum, the ineffectiveness of the ACB in curbing corruption during the colonial period and the prevalence of police corruption made the British colonial government realize that it had made a serious mistake by relying on the ACB to minimize corruption. Accordingly, it established the CPIB as Singapore’s first independent anti-corruption agency in October 1952, almost 15 years after the ACB’s formation.

V. SINGAPORE’S ANTI-CORRUPTION STRATEGY

The People’s Action Party won the May 1959 general election and assumed office on June 3, 1959, when Singapore was granted self-governing status by the British government. As corruption was a serious problem when the PAP government took over the reins of government, it realized that the problem of corruption had to be curbed to ensure that the Singapore Civil Service and the statutory boards would attain Singapore’s development goals. Former Prime Minister LEE Kuan Yew expressed being “sickened” by the greed, corruption, and decadence” of many of the leaders of Asia when his party originally took office in 1959. In a symbolic gesture that the new government would make it a mission to establish a clean and effective government, each member of the PAP government wore white shirts and white pants to demonstrate their purity and hon-

36. Ibid.
37. Ibid.
esty when they took their oaths of office in June of that year. LEE recounted in later years that on this occasion, the PAP government "made sure from the day [they] took office in June 1959 that every dollar in revenue would be properly accounted for and would reach the beneficiaries at the grass roots as one dollar, without being siphoned off along the way." Furthermore, the PAP government also realized that it was futile to curb corruption by relying on the British colonial government's incremental anti-corruption strategy for two reasons. First, the existing legislation—the Prevention of Corruption Ordinance—was inadequate because of its limited scope and powers as it had only 12 sections and imposed a penalty of three years imprisonment (after the 1946 amendment) and/or a fine of $10,000 for those found guilty of corruption. Second, while the decision to transfer the task of corruption control from the ACB to the CPIB in October 1952 was correct, the problem was that the CPIB also lacked both staff and enforcement powers to perform its duties effectively.

At the time that the PAP government assumed office, corruption was a way of life and perceived by the population as "a low risk, high reward" activity. Indeed, it faced a daunting task of trying to minimize corruption and to change the public perception of Singaporeans of corruption to "a high risk, low reward" activity.

Accordingly, the PAP government initiated a comprehensive anti-corruption strategy in 1960 by enacting the Prevention of Corruption Act (POCA) and strengthening the CPIB. This new strategy was based on the "logic of corruption control": as corruption is caused by both the incentives and opportunities to be corrupt, "attempts to eradicate corruption must be designed to minimize or remove the conditions of both the incentives and opportunities that make individual corrupt behavior irresistible." When the PAP government assumed office in June 1959, it inherited a budgetary deficit of $14 million, which it sought to reduce by removing the variable allowances of senior civil servants.

39. Ibid., p. 183.
40. Ibid., p. 184.
As it could not afford to raise the salaries of the civil servants, the PAP government began by strengthening the existing legislation to reduce the opportunities for corruption and to increase the penalty for corrupt offenses. Its commitment to curb corruption was unequivocally stated by ONG Pang Boon, the then Minister for Home Affairs, in the Legislative Assembly on February 13, 1960, when he moved for the second reading of the Prevention of Corruption Bill:

The Prevention of Corruption Bill is in keeping with the new Government’s determination to stamp out bribery and corruption in the country, especially in the public services. The Government is deeply conscious that a Government cannot survive, no matter how good its aims and intentions are, if corruption exists in its ranks and its public services on which it depends to provide the efficient and effective administrative machinery to translate its policies into action.

... Therefore, this Government is determined to take all possible steps to see that all necessary legislative and administrative measures are taken to reduce the opportunities of corruption, to make its detection easier and to deter and punish severely those who are susceptible to it and who engage in it shamelessly.

Therefore, in this bill, the government is asking for new and wider powers to fight bribery and corruption. As stated in the Explanatory Statement, the object of this bill is to provide for the more effective prevention of corruption by remedying various weaknesses and defects which experience has revealed in the existing Prevention of Corruption Ordinance. The bill, while directed mainly at corruption in the public service, is applicable also to corruption by private agents, trustees and others in a fiduciary capacity.43

The PAP government’s anti-corruption strategy focuses on reducing both the opportunities and incentives for corruption. The aim of the POCA and CPIB is to curb corruption by reducing the opportunities for corruption and by increasing the penalty to be paid for corrupt behavior if one is caught. Accordingly, the follow-

ing two sections will focus on the POCA and CPIB respectively, before discussing the PAP government’s reliance on periodic salary revision to reduce the incentive for corruption.

VI. PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT

The Prevention of Corruption Act (POCA) was enacted on June 17, 1960, and had five important features which removed the deficiencies of its predecessor, the Prevention of Corruption Ordinance (POCO), and gave the CPIB additional powers for performing its functions. First, the POCA’s scope was broader, as it had 32 sections in contrast to the POCO’s 12 sections.\(^44\) Second, corruption was explicitly defined in terms of the various forms of “gratification” in section 2, which also identified for the first time the CPIB and its Director. Third, to increase the deterrent effect of the POCA, the penalty for corruption was raised to imprisonment for five years and/or a fine of S$10,000 (section 5).\(^45\) Fourth, a person found guilty of accepting an illegal gratification had to pay the amount he had taken as a bribe in addition to any other punishment imposed by a court (section 13).

Finally, the fifth and most important feature of the POCA was that it gave the CPIB more powers and a new lease of life. Section 4 gave the CPIB’s Director the power to appoint senior special investigators and special investigators. Section 15 granted CPIB officers powers of arrest and search of arrested persons as they did not have such powers during the first eight years of the CPIB’s operation. Section 17 empowered the Public Prosecutor to authorize the CPIB’s Director and senior special investigators to investigate “any bank account, share account or purchase account” of any person suspected of having committed an offense against the POCO. Section 18 provided for the inspection by CPIB officers of a civil servant’s banker’s book and those of his wife, child or agent, if necessary.

Police officers and CPIB officers were given powers of search and seizure by section 20 which enabled them to enter any suspected place and search, seize and detain incriminating documents under a warrant issued by a magistrate or the CPIB’s Director. Section 20 also empowered the court to require those charged with an

\(^{44}\) The POCA has 37 sections now as a result of subsequent amendments. See “Prevention of Corruption Act (Chapter 241)” Revised edition 1993, Singapore: Government Printer, 1993.

\(^{45}\) The fine was increased to S$100,000 in 1989. See ibid., p. 4.
offense under the POCA to appear as witnesses for the prosecution. Section 27 enabled the CPIB to deal with offenders more swiftly and effectively as it specified that all offenses under the POCA would be seizable offenses. Finally, the CPIB was also assisted by section 31, which protected informers by keeping their identities confidential.46 In short, the POCA gave the CPIB a new lease of life by entrusting it with additional powers for performing its duties.

The PAP government ensures that the POCA is effective by introducing, whenever necessary, amendments or new legislation to deal with unanticipated problems. In 1963, the POCA was amended to give CPIB officers the power to require the attendance of witnesses and to examine them. The aim of this amendment was to enable the CPIB officers to obtain the cooperation of witnesses to help them in their investigations. In 1966, two important amendments were introduced to strengthen the POCA. First, section 28 indicated that a person could be found guilty of corruption even though he did not actually receive the bribe, as the intention to commit the offense would provide sufficient grounds for his conviction. Second, section 35 was directed at those Singaporeans working for their government in embassies and other government agencies abroad as Singapore citizens would be prosecuted for corrupt offenses committed outside Singapore and would be dealt with as if such offenses had occurred within Singapore.47

In 1981, the POCA was amended a third time in order to increase its deterrent effect by requiring those convicted of corruption to repay all the money received in addition to facing the usual court sentence. Those who were unable to make full restitution would be given heavier court sentences.48 In 1989, the penalty for corrupt offenses was further enhanced when the original fine of S$10,000 was increased by ten times to S$100,000.

A complicated issue arose on December 14, 1986, when the Minister for National Development, TEH Cheang Wan, committed suicide 12 days after he was interrogated for 16 hours by two senior CPIB officers. He was accused of accepting two bribes amounting to S$1 million in 1981 and 1982 from two developers to enable one of them to retain his land which had been acquired by the govern-

47. Ibid., p.13.
ment, and to assist the other developer to purchase State land for private development.  

Following Teh's suicide, the Singaporean government enacted the Corruption (Confiscation of Benefits) Act 1989 on March 3, 1989. Section 4 indicated that the court should issue a confiscation order against the defendant in respect of "benefits derived from him from corruption if the court is satisfied that such benefits have been so derived." If a defendant is deceased, the court would still issue a confiscation order against the deceased defendant. Finally, a deceased defendant is considered to have derived benefits if he had held any property or interest "disproportionate to his known sources of income, the holding of which cannot be explained to the satisfaction of the court" at any time in the six years prior to his death.

VII. THE CORRUPT PRACTICES INVESTIGATION BUREAU

The CPIB is the anti-corruption agency responsible for enforcing the POCA in Singapore. More specifically, it performs three functions: (1) to receive and investigate complaints concerning corruption in the public and private sectors; (2) to investigate malpractices and misconduct by public officers; and (3) to examine the practices and procedures in the public service to minimize opportunities for corrupt practices.

The Corrupt Practices Investigation Program is described in the Budget as the administration of the CPIB, the investigation of corruption and malpractices, and the review of administrative weaknesses in the public sector that "provides avenues for corruption and the screening of officers for appointment in the public sector." Thus, in addition to the three functions mentioned above, the CPIB also ensures that candidates selected for positions in the Singapore Civil Service and statutory boards in Singapore are

---

50. This Act was expanded and renamed as the Corruption, Drug Trafficking and Other Serious Crimes (Confiscation of Benefits) Act, Chapter 65A in 1999.
52. Ibid.
53. Ibid., pp. 128-129.
screened to ensure that only those candidates without any taint of corruption or misconduct are actually recruited.

**Personnel, Organizational Structure and Budget**

The CPIB has grown by 16 times from a small staff of five officers in 1952 to its current strength of 82 officers. Even though the CPIB has increased its manpower during the last 56 years, it is still a relatively small agency on two counts: first, in proportion to the overall size of the Singapore Civil Service in 2005 (62,792), as the CPIB's personnel constitute only 0.13%; and secondly, compared to Hong Kong's Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC), which has 1,194 personnel, the ICAC has 15 times more staff members than the CPIB. Yet despite its heavy workload, the CPIB does not need a staff size that is comparable to the ICAC, as both the CPIB's location within the Prime Minister's Office as well as its own legal powers enabled the CPIB to obtain the required cooperation from both public and private organizations.

The CPIB's organizational structure was originally divided into three branches. The largest branch was the Investigation Branch, which consisted of four units, each headed by a director, who was responsible for directing and supervising the investigations undertaken by his subordinates. Investigation papers prepared by the investigators were submitted to the director, who reviewed the evidence and made appropriate recommendations to the Public Prosecutor, whose consent was required for prosecution under the POCA. When there was insufficient evidence to prosecute civil servants in court, these officials were referred to their head of department for disciplinary action.

The Data Management and Support Branch managed the CPIB's Computer Information System, which enabled the CPIB to formulate its corruption prevention strategies and to screen candidates for public appointments, promotions, scholarships and training courses, applicants for citizenship, and contractors competing for government contracts. The Research Unit of this Branch re-

---

viewed the work procedures of corruption-prone departments to reduce the opportunities for corruption and examined completed cases to identify the modus operandi of corrupt civil servants.\textsuperscript{60} The Administration Branch provided secretarial support to the other two branches and was responsible for the financial and personnel administration of the CPIB.\textsuperscript{61} Unlike the ICAC of Hong Kong, the CPIB does not have a Community Relations Department to publicize its activities or educate the public on the negative consequences of corruption.

The CPIB is currently divided into the Operations Division and the Administration and Specialist Support Division. The Operations Division is sub-divided into the Operations Branch and the Operations Support Branch, which includes the Intelligence Unit. The Operations Branch consists of the Special Investigation Team, which handles major and complex cases, and three other units. The Administration and Specialist Support Division has four units: Administration Unit, Prevention and Review Unit, Computer Information System Unit, and the Plans and Projects Unit.\textsuperscript{62}

In terms of resources, the CPIB’s budget has grown by 19 times from S$1,024,370 in 1978 to S$19,788,317 in 2003. Table 5 shows that the CPIB’s budget increased gradually from S$1,024,370 in 1978 to S$4,147,230 in 1987, to S$10,225,463 in 1997, and to S$19,788,317 in 2003. However, the CPIB’s budget was reduced to S$13,447,079 in 2004 and to S$12,726,405 in 2005.

\textit{Independence of the CPIB}

When the CPIB was formed in October 1952, it came under the jurisdiction of the Attorney-General. From 1959-1962, the CPIB was under the purview of the Ministry of Home Affairs. The CPIB was then moved under the jurisdiction of the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) from 1963-1965 and under the purview of the Attorney-General again from 1965-1968. However, since 1969, the CPIB has been under the supervision of the PMO.\textsuperscript{63} Because the CPIB’s Director reports to the Prime Minister in Singapore, policymakers who are interested in adopting Singapore’s anti-corruption strategy are concerned with the CPIB’s independence and the pos-

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{60} Ibid., p. 4.
  \item \textsuperscript{61} Ibid., p. 3.
  \item \textsuperscript{62} \textit{Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau}, supra note 54, pp. 3-4.
\end{itemize}
### Table 5. Budget of the CPIB, 1978-2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Budget (S$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>$1,024,370 (US$474,245)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>$2,256,900 (US$1,079,856)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>$4,147,230 (US$1,974,871)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>$5,094,613 (US$2,612,622)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>$6,525,834 (US$4,053,313)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>$8,087,308 (US$5,735,679)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>$10,225,463 (US$6,909,097)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>$15,357,665 (US$8,579,701)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>$19,788,317 (US$11,372,595)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>$13,447,079 (US$7,956,851)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>$12,726,405 (US$7,666,509)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*The exchange rate for the US$ has declined from US$1 = S$2.16 in 1978 to US$1 = S$1.66 in 2005. Details of the exchange rates of the US dollar from 1984 to 2005 are available from the Monetary Authority of Singapore website at https://secure.sgs.gov.sg/apps/msbs/exchangeRatesForm.jsp

In 1973, the Anti-Corruption Advisory Committee (ACAC) was formed on the Prime Minister’s advice to enhance the CPIB’s efforts to curb corruption in the Singapore Civil Service (SCS). The ACAC was chaired by the Head of the SCS and included all of the permanent secretaries as its members. Then in 1975, the ACAC was dissolved but later revived in 1996 on the recommendation of the Anti-Corruption Review Committee (ACRC) to review the CPIB’s investigative and preventive measures. The ACRC was itself only established in 1996 to review Singapore’s anti-corruption measures. Like the ACAC, it consists of senior civil servants and is chaired by the Head of the SCS.64

There are two committees which review the CPIB’s activities. In 1973, the Anti-Corruption Advisory Committee (ACAC) was formed on the Prime Minister’s advice to enhance the CPIB’s efforts to curb corruption in the Singapore Civil Service (SCS). The ACAC was chaired by the Head of the SCS and included all of the permanent secretaries as its members. Then in 1975, the ACAC was dissolved but later revived in 1996 on the recommendation of the Anti-Corruption Review Committee (ACRC) to review the CPIB’s investigative and preventive measures. The ACRC was itself only established in 1996 to review Singapore’s anti-corruption measures. Like the ACAC, it consists of senior civil servants and is chaired by the Head of the SCS.65

---

64. These questions were posed to the author by some Mongolian policy-makers during his visit to Ulaanbataar in October 1998 as the lead consultant for the UNDP mission to Mongolia.

As the CPIB has been under the PMO's purview since 1969, it has investigated all allegations of political corruption in Singapore as the PAP government is committed to minimizing corruption. Indeed, the CPIB has not hesitated to investigate allegations of corruption against political leaders and senior civil servants in Singapore. For example, the CPIB has investigated and prosecuted these political leaders and senior bureaucrats:

1. TAN Kia Gan, the Minister for National Development, who was investigated in 1966 for assisting his close friend to clinch the sale of Boeing aircraft to Malaysian Airways. However, as the witnesses did not give evidence against him, he was only punished by being stripped of all his public appointments by the government.

2. WEE Toon Boon, a Minister of State, was investigated in 1975 for accepting bribes from a property developer, and was later sentenced to four years and six months imprisonment.

3. PHEY Yew Kok, a Member of Parliament and a senior trade unionist, was investigated in 1979 and charged in court for criminal breach of trust and other offenses. However, he jumped bail by fleeing abroad and is still a fugitive.

4. TEH Cheang Wan, the Minister for National Development, was investigated in 1986 for accepting bribes from two property developers. However, he committed suicide before he could be charged in court.

5. Glen Jeyasingham Knight, a senior state counsel, and the Director of the Commercial Affairs Department, was investigated in 1991 and jailed and fined after being charged for corruption and cheating.

6. YEO Seng Teck, the Chief Executive Officer of the Trade Development Board, was investigated in 1993 and charged in court for corruption, cheating and forgery. He was sentenced to four years' imprisonment.

7. CHOY Hon Tim, the Deputy Chief Executive of the Public Utilities Board (PUB), was investigated in 1995 and charged for accepting bribes of S$13.85 million (US$9.82 million) from PUB contractors. He was sen-
tenced to 14 years imprisonment and ordered to pay back the S$13.85 million that he accepted in bribes.66

In his speech to Parliament on March 30, 1993, then Prime Minister GOH Chok Tong declared:

I have every intention to make sure that Singapore remains corruption free. . . . And everybody should know that corruption in any form will not be tolerated. I expect all Ministers, all MPs and all public officers to set good examples for others to follow. . . . If there is any allegation against any MP [Member of Parliament] or Minister of assets wrongfully gained or corruptly gained, the CPIB will investigate. If the MP concerned is unable to explain how he had acquired these assets, or why he had not declared them, he will be charged for corruption.67

The introduction of the Elected President in 1991 has enhanced the CPIB's independence, as article 22G of the Constitution of Singapore empowers the CPIB's Director to continue his investigations of ministers and senior civil servants even if he does not have the Prime Minister's consent to do so if he obtains the consent of the Elected President.68 LEE Hsien Loong, who was then Deputy Prime Minister highlighted this provision in his speech to Parliament on March 13, 2003, as he stated that the Prime Minister was responsible for the integrity of the entire civil service, public sector, Judges, and Ministers. With this Constitutional provision in place, Lee felt that Singapore had a proper safeguard for preventing a corrupt Prime Minister from rising to power, as the CPIB could even investigate the Prime Minister if it received permission to proceed its case by the Elected President.69

In short, while the CPIB's Director can obtain the consent of the Elected President to investigate allegations of corruption against ministers, members of parliament, and senior civil servants if the Prime Minister withholds his consent, the fact remains that the CPIB is not immune from the Prime Minister's influence and control as it comes under his jurisdiction. While the PAP govern-

---

66. For more details of these and other cases, see CPIB, Swift and Sure Action, supra note 63, pp. 6.45-6.52.
67. Quoted in ibid., p. 2.17, emphasis added.
69. Quoted in CPIB, Swift and Sure Action, supra note 63, p. 2.16.
ment has remained committed to minimizing corruption and has not used the CPIB as a weapon against opposition political leaders during the past 49 years, the CPIB’s lack of complete independence from the Prime Minister’s Office makes it an unattractive model for those Asian countries which are concerned about the possibility of their political leaders using a CPIB-style agency against their political foes. In other words, the concern is whether the political leaders in other Asian countries will resist the temptation of employing the CPIB-style agency against their political rivals.

VIII. IMPROVING SALARIES OF POLITICAL LEADERS AND CIVIL SERVANTS

As indicated earlier, the PAP government could not afford to increase the low salaries of the political leaders and civil servants when it assumed office in June 1959. Instead, it had to reduce the budgetary deficit by removing the variable allowances of the senior civil servants, which resulted in a savings of S$10 million (US$3.33 million).70 The government restored the variable allowances of the senior bureaucrats in September 1961 as the budgetary situation had improved.71

In 1968, the Harvey Report on public sector salaries recommended salary increases for five grades in the Division I superscale salaries. However, the government did not implement this recommendation until 1973 for two reasons: the economy could not afford a major salary revision; and at that time, there was not a serious exodus of talented civil servants to the private sector. As the economy improved in the 1970s, the higher salaries in the private sector contributed to a greater number of employees leaving the civil service for the private sector.

In February 1972, the PAP government formed the National Wages Council (NWC) to make recommendations on wage policies and annual wage adjustments. The NWC recommended the payment of the Annual Wage Supplement (AWS) of one month’s salary to all civil servants to reduce the gap between salaries in the public and private sectors. The aim of the AWS was not to curb


corruption but to minimize the loss of qualified individuals from the Singapore Civil Service to the private sector.

Because the low salaries of civil servants of both Singapore during the colonial period and other Asian countries was a major cause of corruption, Singapore's anti-corruption strategy also relies on reducing the incentive for corruption among political leaders and civil servants by paying them adequate salaries. On March 22, 1985, the then Prime Minister LEE Kuan Yew urged Parliament to increase the salaries of the cabinet ministers. He argued that political leaders should be paid the top salaries that they deserved in order to ensure a clean and honest government. Meanwhile, he warned that if they were underpaid, they would succumb to temptation and indulge in corruption. Singapore needed a corruption-free administration and an honest political leadership to preserve its most precious assets. Lee concluded that the best way of dealing with corruption was "moving with the market," which he felt was an "honest, open, defensible and workable system" instead of hypocrisy, which resulted in duplicity and corruption. 72 In his memoirs fifteen years later, he reiterated the importance of paying capable leaders competitive salaries to attract them to assume political office by saying that as underpaid ministers and public officials have "ruined many governments in Asia," it was vital to provide "adequate remuneration" to ensure "high standards of probity" in both political leaders and senior civil servants. 73

Since Singapore was unable to raise the salaries of the political leaders and civil servants until 1972, it is interesting to note that the PAP government succeeded in curbing corruption during this period by ensuring that the CPIB had enforced the POCA impartially. Accordingly, the PAP government raised salaries periodically beginning from March 1972 to January 1994 not to curb corruption but to stem the brain drain from the civil service to the private sector. In October 1994, a White Paper on Competitive Salaries for Competent and Honest Government was presented to Parliament to justify the pegging of the salaries of ministers and senior civil servants to the average salaries of the top four earners in six private sector professions: accounting, banking, engineering, law, local manufacturing companies, and multi-national corporations. The White Paper recommended the introduction of formal salary benchmarks for ministers and senior civil servants, additional salary

72. Straits Times (Singapore), March 23, 1985, pp. 14-16.
73. LEE, From Third World to First, supra note 38, p. 193.
grades for political appointments and annual salary reviews for the Singapore Civil Service. 

An International Labor Office expert, David Chew, indicated that Singapore's high salaries for its civil servants sent a clear signal to both the civil servants and society in general that the government "values greatly and is prepared to pay very generously a few key bureaucrats for their services to the country." Table 6 provides details of the salaries of the Prime Minister, Minister, Permanent Secretary, and Deputy Secretary after the June 2000 salary revision.

**Table 6. Salaries of Selected Ministers and Civil Servants in Singapore, June 2000**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>Monthly Salary</th>
<th>Annual Salary</th>
<th>Revised Monthly Salary</th>
<th>Revised Annual Salary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
<td>S$85,000</td>
<td>S$1.69 million</td>
<td>S$85,300</td>
<td>S$1.94 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(US$49,419)*</td>
<td>(US$982,558)</td>
<td>(US$49,593)</td>
<td>(US$1.13 million)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister Staff Grade II</td>
<td>S$48,900</td>
<td>S$1.13 million</td>
<td>S$55,700</td>
<td>S$1.42 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(US$28,430)</td>
<td>(US$656,977)</td>
<td>(US$32,384)</td>
<td>(US$825,581)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>S$49,900</td>
<td>S$1.27 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(US$29,012)</td>
<td>(US$738,372)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>S$44,600</td>
<td>S$1.13 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(US$25,930)</td>
<td>(US$656,977)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister Staff Grade I</td>
<td>S$37,800</td>
<td>S$861,000</td>
<td>S$47,400</td>
<td>S$1.21 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(US$21,977)</td>
<td>(US$500,581)</td>
<td>(US$27,558)</td>
<td>(US$703,488)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>S$37,900</td>
<td>S$968,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(US$22,035)</td>
<td>(US$562,791)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permanent Secretary</td>
<td>S$28,000</td>
<td>S$638,000</td>
<td>S$39,800</td>
<td>S$1.01 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>S$28,800</td>
<td>S$736,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(US$16,744)</td>
<td>(US$427,907)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Secretary Superscale G</td>
<td>S$13,400</td>
<td>S$242,000</td>
<td>S$18,800</td>
<td>S$390,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(US$7,791)</td>
<td>(US$140,698)</td>
<td>(US$10,930)</td>
<td>(US$226,744)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>S$17,500</td>
<td>S$363,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(US$10,174)</td>
<td>(US$211,047)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: *Straits Times* (Singapore), June 30, 2000, p. 53.
*The U.S. exchange rate in 2000 was US$1 = S$1.72

---


However, it should be noted that these salaries were later reduced by 17% as a consequence of the 2001 recession.

In short, the PAP government’s policy of ensuring competitive pay for ministers and senior civil servants by benchmarking their salaries with those of six private sector professions has enabled the Singapore Civil Service to minimize the loss of talented civil servants to the private sector as well as reinforce its commitment to reducing the incentive for corruption.

IX. EVALUATING SINGAPORE’S ANTI-CORRUPTION STRATEGY

The effectiveness of Singapore’s anti-corruption strategy is reflected not only in Singapore’s consistently high ranking and score on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index from 1995-2007 (Table 2), but also in its high ranking by the Hong Kong-based Political and Economic Risk Consultancy (PERC), and the World Bank on its sixth governance indicator, the control of corruption.

In 1996, PERC ranked Singapore as the third least corrupt country in the world, after Switzerland and Australia, and the least corrupt of the 12 Asian countries surveyed in the study.76 Singapore’s high ranking was attributed by PERC to its effectiveness in applying laws strictly and consistently as corrupt officials, particularly high-ranking ones, were dealt with a “severity rarely seen elsewhere.”77 Since then, Singapore has consistently retained its rank of being the least corrupt country in Asia on the PERC ranking.

Since 1996, the World Bank has provided data on the governance of 212 countries according to their percentile ranks for these six indicators: voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption.78 Table 7 indicates that Singapore’s percentile rank on the governance indicator on the control of corruption from 1996-2006 ranges from 97.6 to 100, with an average percentile rank of 99. Not surprisingly, Singapore’s percentile rank

---

76. *Straits Times* (Singapore), April 9, 1996, p. 3.
77. Ibid.
on the control of corruption is also the highest among all the Asian
countries included in the World Bank's survey on governance
indicators.

Table 7. Singapore's Percentile Rank on the World Bank's
Governance Indicator on the Control of Corruption, 1996-2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Percentile Rank</th>
<th>Number of Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>97.6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>99.5</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>99.5</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>99.0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>99.5</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>99.0</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>98.1</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Percentile Rank</td>
<td>99.0</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Singapore's effectiveness in curbing corruption can be attributed to a large extent to the CPIB's effectiveness in impartially enforcing the POCA as reflected in its performance indicators and data during 1997-2002 in Table 8. Furthermore, Table 9 summarizes the major findings of the October 2002 public perception survey of a random sample of 1,000 Singaporeans between 16 to 60 years old conducted by Forbes Research for the CPIB. Table 9 shows that first, 13% of the respondents rated corruption control in Singapore as excellent, 42% as very good, 39% as good, and only 7% as fair, indicating a favorable public perception of Singapore's anti-corruption policies.

Second, it can be seen that 71% of the respondents agreed or strongly agreed that the CPIB had done well in solving corruption offenses; 61% of them trusted the CPIB to keep Singapore corruption free; and 56% of them agreed or strongly agreed that the CPIB was world-class in curbing corruption. Third, when the respondents were asked whether the CPIB was impartial or fair in its investigations, Table 9 shows that 69.9% said that it was impartial or fair, 5.6% said that it was partial or not fair, and 24.5% did not know or did not have an opinion.
Table 8. CPIB’s Performance Indicators and Data, 1997-2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Performance Indicator</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Performance Data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Cycle time</td>
<td>Time taken to complete an investigation</td>
<td>Exceeded target of completing 62% of its investigations within 30 days by an average of 31.3% during 1999-2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Completion rate</td>
<td>Percentage of cases completed in a year</td>
<td>Exceeded target of completing 90% of cases in a year from 1999-2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Prosecution rate</td>
<td>Percentage of cases resulting in prosecution</td>
<td>Increased from 47% in 2000 to 60% in 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Conviction rate</td>
<td>Percentage of cases convicted in court</td>
<td>Increased from 97% in 2000 to 99% in 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Attendance to visitors</td>
<td>Target is to attend to 80% of its visitors within five minutes</td>
<td>Exceeded target by 1% to 6% from 1997 to 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Proportion of reports investigated</td>
<td>Percentage of reports investigated</td>
<td>Average of 60% during 1998-2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Number of persons charged and disciplined</td>
<td>Number of persons charged and the number of public officers disciplined</td>
<td>680 persons were charged and 293 public officers were disciplined from 2000-2002</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Similarly, when the respondents were asked whether the CPIB had abused its investigation powers, it can be seen from Table 9 that 65% of the respondents said that it had not, 7.2% said that it had done so, and 27.8% had no opinion or did not know. Finally, 66% of the respondents believed that the CPIB would keep the corruption reports it received confidential and only 10% said that it would not do so.

In December 2005, the CPIB commissioned its second public perception survey covering 1,000 Singapore citizens, permanent residents and non-residents who have stayed in Singapore for at least one year and aged between 16 to 60 years. The 2005 survey confirmed the positive public assessment of the CPIB as in terms of the perceived level of corruption control, 89% of the respondents observed that corruption was very much under control in Singapore, and 48% of them agreed that the level of corruption control had improved during the past three years. Furthermore, 86% of the re-
Table 9. Public Perceptions of CPIB’s Performance in 2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Survey Item</th>
<th>Survey Findings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. How would you rate corruption control in Singapore?</td>
<td>Excellent = 13%; Very Good = 42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Good = 39%; Fair = 7%; Poor = 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. CPIB has done well in solving corruption offences</td>
<td>Strongly agree = 20%; Agree = 51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not sure = 28%; Disagree = 2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strongly disagree = 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. CPIB can be trusted to keep Singapore corruption-free</td>
<td>Strongly agree = 24%; Agree = 37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not sure = 32%; Disagree = 6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strongly disagree = 1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. CPIB is world-class in fighting corruption</td>
<td>Strongly agree = 17%; Agree = 39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Not sure = 36%; Disagree = 7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strongly disagree = 1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Do you think CPIB is impartial/fair in its investigations?</td>
<td>Yes = 69.9%; No = 5.6%; Don’t know/no opinion = 24.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Do you think CPIB has abused its investigation powers?</td>
<td>No = 65%; Yes = 7.2%; Don’t know/no opinion = 27.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Do you think CPIB will keep corruption reports it receives confidential?</td>
<td>Yes = 66%; No = 10%; Don’t know/no opinion = 24%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Respondents felt that corruption control in Singapore was better than other countries. According to the respondents, the low level of corruption in Singapore could be attributed to the political will to keep corruption under control; the heavy punishment for corruption offenses; and the effectiveness of the anti-corruption law.79

However, both the 2002 and 2005 surveys had identified the CPIB’s neglect of public relations as an area requiring improvement. When the 2002 respondents were asked: “What new services relevant to CPIB’s role should it be providing?” the 79 respondents who answered the question made nine suggestions, seven of which focus on the need for the CPIB to educate the public and to improve its relationship with them. Furthermore, when these respondents were asked whether they would report corruption if they were aware of it, only 39.2% said they would, 13.6% would not do so, 19.9% were unsure, and 27.3% had no opinion. This important finding that only 39% of the respondents would report corruption if

they were aware of it shows that the CPIB’s policy of adopting a low profile and neglecting public relations is a mistake and should be rectified immediately. The CPIB has responded to these survey findings by stressing that it would play “a more active role in promoting the organization and its work to the general public” so that the public would understand its work and role and be “more forthcoming in reporting corruption and more willing to co-operate with the bureau in solving cases.”

However, the 2005 survey also found that while most of the respondents said that the CPIB was adequate in providing services, they also felt that the CPIB could be more active in publicly advertising its work and role in society through the mass media, leaflets, and the “Crimewatch” television program. These respondents argued that corruption would be reduced by enhancing public awareness and educating the population.

Indeed, an analysis of the CPIB’s expenditure on public relations from 1986-2005, as shown in Table 10, confirms that the CPIB has not devoted adequate resources to public relations as the amount spent by it on public relations is the least for its other operating expenditure. Table 10 also shows that in 1986, the amount spent by the CPIB on public relations was S$240 or 0.016% of its other operating expenditure. The highest amount devoted to public relations by the CPIB was S$11,221 (or 0.417% of other operating expenditure) in 1999. In short, the CPIB should modify its primary emphasis on investigation and enforcement and focus also on educating the public on its role in curbing corruption by improving its public relations.

82. Before 1986, there was no provision for public relations in the other operating expenditure of the CPIB.
Table 10. CPIB’s Expenditure on Public Relations, 1986-2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Financial Year</th>
<th>Amount spent on Public Relations</th>
<th>Other Operating Expenditure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>S$240 (0.016%)</td>
<td>S$1,431,670</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>S$190 (0.012%)</td>
<td>S$1,482,960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>S$306 (0.018%)</td>
<td>S$1,675,269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>S$306 (0.016%)</td>
<td>S$1,827,782</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>S$225 (0.011%)</td>
<td>S$2,044,848</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>S$384 (0.017%)</td>
<td>S$2,153,963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>S$354 (0.016%)</td>
<td>S$2,211,956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>S$281 (0.011%)</td>
<td>S$2,446,941</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>S$529 (0.020%)</td>
<td>S$2,593,168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>S$425 (0.011%)</td>
<td>S$3,628,299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>S$1,360* (0.036%)</td>
<td>S$3,721,210*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>S$7,121 (0.192%)</td>
<td>S$3,701,009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>S$3,290 (0.108%)</td>
<td>S$3,042,143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>S$11,221 (0.417%)</td>
<td>S$2,688,508</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>S$6,500** (0.201%)</td>
<td>S$3,221,580**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>S$5,299 (0.156%)</td>
<td>S$3,391,746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>S$7,205 (0.184%)</td>
<td>S$3,895,815</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>S$2,815 (0.064%)</td>
<td>S$4,349,299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>S$3,910 (0.088%)</td>
<td>S$4,442,265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>S$5,940 (0.098%)</td>
<td>S$6,044,729</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*Revised figure**Estimated figure

N.B. The exchange rate for the US$ has declined from US$1 = S$2.17 in 1986 to US$1 = S$1.66 in 2005.

X. LESSONS FOR OTHER ASIAN COUNTRIES

Why has the CPIB been effective in minimizing corruption in Singapore where the anti-corruption agencies in other Asian countries have failed to do so? TAN Ah Leak, a former CPIB Deputy Director, has attributed the CPIB’s success in curbing corruption to these five factors: Singapore’s cultural climate which opposes corruption; a well-paid civil service which discourages civil servants from being corrupt; effective administrative measures such as disci-
plinary proceedings by the Public Service Commission, careful scrutiny of government expenditures by the Auditor-General’s Department and the Public Accounts Committee of Parliament, and the Ministry of Finance’s control of public spending; a highly literate and sophisticated society, which readily reports corrupt behavior with no fear of reprisal; and the CPIB’s ability to investigate prominent persons, which in turn has enhanced its credibility among Singaporeans.  

More importantly, Singapore’s success in minimizing corruption can be attributed to the political will of the PAP government to impartially implement its comprehensive anti-corruption strategy of reducing both the opportunities and incentives for corruption. Former Prime Minister LEE Kuan Yew identified the five factors responsible for Singapore’s effective anti-corruption strategy in his statement to Parliament in January 1987 during the TEH Cheang Wan Commission of Inquiry. Among these factors included (1) the law against corruption contained in Prevention of Corruption Act; (2) a “vigilant” public that was ready to report all suspected corruption; (3) a CPIB which was “scrupulous, thorough, and fearless” in its investigations; (4) the fact that the CPIB had the “full backing” of the Prime Minister; and (5) a public opinion that “censures and condemns” corruption that brands a guilty party with a stigma of corruption that “cannot be washed away by serving a prison sentence.”

What lessons can other Asian countries learn from Singapore’s experience in curbing corruption? Two important aspects must be considered before answering this question. First, whether it is desirable for other Asian countries to adopt Singapore’s anti-corruption strategy. A comparative study of the anti-corruption strategies of Asian countries shows that the first pattern of relying on a single, independent anti-corruption agency is the most effective if the political leaders are committed to curbing corruption, as in the cases of Singapore and Hong Kong. On the other hand, the second pattern of relying on multiple anti-corruption agencies in Cambodia, China, Philippines and Vietnam is less effective as their anti-corruption efforts have been diluted and hindered by the competition between the separate agencies for the same pool of resources, as well

84. TAN, “The Experience of Singapore in Curbing Corruption,” supra note 35, p. 64.

85. Quoted in Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Investigations Concerning the Late Mr. TEH Cheang Wan, supra note 49, p. 2.
as lack of coordination, and substantial overlap among these agencies.\textsuperscript{86}

The second important aspect is that, assuming that the political leaders of other Asian countries find it desirable to introduce Singapore’s anti-corruption strategy to their own countries, one must consider the feasibility of doing so. Richard Rose has written that even if a policy appears desirable and action is demanded by the people, there are still three prerequisites before a country can adopt the policy lesson. First, there must be room in the already crowded set of government commitments to introduce the policy. Secondly, the government must have the resources to seriously implement the strategy. Finally, there must not be cross-cultural misunderstandings that lead to a “mismatch between what a lesson requires and the beliefs and practices of the government adopting it.”\textsuperscript{87}

Bearing these twin concerns of the desirability and feasibility\textsuperscript{88} of adopting Singapore’s anti-corruption strategy in other Asian countries in mind, what lessons can they learn?

\textit{Lesson No. 1: Political Will is the Critical Ingredient for Success}

The political leaders in other Asian countries must be sincerely committed to the eradication of corruption by demonstrating exemplary conduct, adopting a modest life-style, and avoiding corrupt behavior themselves. Anyone found guilty of corruption must be punished, regardless of his or her position or status in society. If the “big fish” (rich and famous persons) are protected from prosecution for corruption, and the anti-corruption agency focuses its energies on catching only “small fish” (ordinary people), the anti-corruption strategy lacks credibility and is doomed to failure.\textsuperscript{89}

In addition to the impartial enforcement of the anti-corruption laws by the anti-corruption agency, there are two other indicators of a government’s political will in curbing corruption. First, there must be comprehensive anti-corruption legislation to prevent loopholes and periodic review of such legislation to introduce amendments whenever necessary. Second, the anti-corruption agency


\textsuperscript{88} For an excellent analysis of these two concerns, see ibid., pp. 90-116.

\textsuperscript{89} Quah, “Controlling Corruption in City-States,” \textit{supra} note 58, p. 408.
must be provided with sufficient legal powers, personnel and budget to perform its functions effectively. Indeed, Richard Rose has stressed the critical importance of resources in lesson-drawing as the application of a policy lesson requires "a multiplicity of resources involving legislation, money, personnel, and organizations."90

Table 11 shows that of the eight anti-corruption agencies with published data on their budgets and personnel in 2005, Macao's Commission Against Corruption (CAC) fares the best with a per capita expenditure of US$21.72, followed by Hong Kong's ICAC (US$12.32), and Singapore's CPIB (US$1.71). The CAC's staff-population ratio of 1:4,358 is also the most favorable. On the other hand, the other five anti-corruption agencies of this study are all poorly funded and understaffed, with Indonesia's Corruption Eradication Commission (CEC) at the bottom with a per capita expenditure of US$0.08 and a staff-population ratio of 1:729,836. The per capita expenditure for the other four anti-corruption agencies is also low: US$0.37 for the Korea Independent Commission Against Corruption (KICAC); US$0.28 for India's Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI); US$0.15 for the Tanodbayan or Ombudsman in the Philippines; and US$0.14 for the National Counter Corruption Commission (NCCC) in Thailand. Similarly, their staff-population ratios are also unfavorable, with a ratio of 1:234,146 for the KICAC; 1:229,505 for the CBI; 1:90,585 for the NCCC; and 1:85,057 for the Tanodbayan.

The comparative data on the personnel and budget of the anti-corruption agencies in South Korea, India, Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia show that the political leaders in these countries must demonstrate their political will in curbing corruption by increasing substantially the legal powers, personnel, and budget of their anti-corruption agencies. In the example of South Korea, the KICAC is not a full-fledged anti-corruption agency as it does not perform the major function required of an anti-corruption agency which is the investigation of corruption offences. The KICAC's second limitation is that its scope is restricted to dealing with public sector corruption only.91 The political leaders in South Korea must remove these two serious obstacles to the KICAC's effective per-

---

90. Rose, Learning from Comparative Public Policy, supra note 87, p. 103.
Table 11. Comparative Analysis of the Personnel and Budgets of Eight Anti-Corruption Agencies in Asian Countries in 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACA</th>
<th>Personnel</th>
<th>Budget</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Staff-Population Ratio</th>
<th>Per Capita Expenditure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Macao CAC</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>US$10.6 m</td>
<td>488,100</td>
<td>1:4,358</td>
<td>US$21.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong ICAC</td>
<td>1,194</td>
<td>US$85 m</td>
<td>6.9 m</td>
<td>1:5,779</td>
<td>US$12.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore CPIB</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>US$7.7 m</td>
<td>4.5 m</td>
<td>1:55,556</td>
<td>US$1.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea KICAC</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>US$17.8 m</td>
<td>48 m</td>
<td>1:234,146</td>
<td>US$0.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India CBI</td>
<td>4,711</td>
<td>US$30.3m</td>
<td>1,081.2 m</td>
<td>1:229,505</td>
<td>US$0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines Tanodbayan</td>
<td>957</td>
<td>US$12 m</td>
<td>81.4 m</td>
<td>1:85,057</td>
<td>US$0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand NCCC</td>
<td>701*</td>
<td>US$8.6 m*</td>
<td>63.5 m</td>
<td>1:90,585</td>
<td>US$0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia CEC</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>US$18 m</td>
<td>222.6 m</td>
<td>1:729,836</td>
<td>US$0.08</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*2004 data for the NCCC in Thailand as the 2005 data are not available.

Performance if they are committed to minimizing corruption in their country.

Lesson No. 2: The Anti-Corruption Agency must be Independent from the Police and from Political Control

As discussed above, the history of fighting corruption in Singapore clearly shows the importance of not allowing the police force to be solely responsible for corruption control. In other words, the police force was the biggest obstacle to curbing corruption in Singapore before the establishment of the CPIB in October 1952 because
of the prevalence of police corruption within its own ranks. Accordingly, the CPIB's success in combating corruption has proven that an effective practice in curbing corruption is simply to not let the police handle the task of controlling corruption, as this would be like giving candy to a child and expecting him or her not to eat it.92

Singapore has taken 15 years (1937-1952) and Hong Kong has taken 26 years (1948-1974) to learn this important lesson. Unfortunately, many Asian countries like India, Japan and Mongolia have still not learnt this lesson yet as they continue to rely on the police to curb corruption. For example, the CBI in India is still not presently independent of the police as the CBI's Director is also the Inspector-General of Police. In view of the prevalence of police corruption in India, it is surprising that the government has continued to rely for the past 45 years on the CBI (established in 1963) to curb corruption even though this traditional British method of relying on the police for corruption control has been shown to be ineffective. Thus, the political leaders in India must demonstrate their political will in curbing corruption by removing the CBI from the jurisdiction of the police.

Apart from independence from the police, the anti-corruption agency must also be independent from control by the political leaders as well. First, the political leaders must not interfere in the daily operations of the anti-corruption agency. Second and more importantly, the anti-corruption agency must be able to investigate all political leaders and senior civil servants without fear or favor. As discussed earlier, the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau's location within the Prime Minister's Office since 1969 has raised concern that Asian political leaders who are not committed to curbing corruption can use the CPIB-style agency against their political rivals.

However, this concern is unwarranted in Singapore's case as the CPIB has investigated all allegations of political corruption in Singapore during the past 48 years. Indeed, as shown earlier, the CPIB has not hesitated to investigate allegations of corruption against political leaders and senior civil servants in Singapore. Even though the CPIB's Director can obtain the consent of the Elected President to investigate allegations of corruption against ministers,

MPs and senior civil servants if the Prime Minister withholds his consent, it should be noted that the CPIB is not immune from the Prime Minister's influence and control as it comes under his jurisdiction.

However, so far the PAP government has remained committed to minimizing corruption and has not used the CPIB as a weapon against the opposition political leaders during the past 48 years. Nevertheless, the CPIB's lack of complete independence from the Prime Minister's Office makes it a less attractive model for those Asian countries which are concerned that their political leaders might be tempted to use the CPIB-style agency against their political foes. In other words, corrupt political leaders will use the powerful anti-corruption agency as a weapon against their political opponents instead of strengthening their countries' anti-corruption strategies.

Lesson No. 3: The Anti-Corruption Agency must be Incorruptible

The anti-corruption agency must be incorruptible for two reasons. First, if the anti-corruption agency's personnel are corrupt, its legitimacy and public image will be undermined as its officers have broken the law by being corrupt themselves when they are required to enforce the law. Second, corruption among the anti-corruption agency's staff not only discredits the agency but also prevents them from performing their duties impartially and effectively. For example, the Board of Inspection and Follow-up of Government Operations, Thailand's first anti-corruption agency, was dissolved after one year in October 1973 because all five of its members were found guilty of corruption.93

A second example is provided by the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) in the Philippines, which was established by President Corazon Aquino in February 1986. However, the PCGG became a target for charges of corruption, favoritism, and incompetence, and by June 1988, five agents within the PCGG itself faced graft charges, while 13 more were under investigation.94

To ensure its integrity, the anti-corruption agency must be staffed by honest and competent personnel. Overstaffing should be avoided and any staff member found guilty of corruption must be

punished and dismissed. Details of the punishment of corrupt staff must be widely publicized in the mass media to serve as a deterrent to others, and to demonstrate the anti-corruption agency’s integrity and credibility to the public. For example, after a senior CPIB officer was caught cheating a businessman in Singapore in 1997, the CPIB’s Director, CHUA Cher Yak, ordered polygraph tests for all his staff, including himself, to demonstrate their integrity. Indeed, the CPIB’s reputation remained untainted as Chua and his staff passed the polygraph tests.95

Lesson No. 4: Minimize Corruption by Tackling its Major Causes

Corruption is often caused by the low salaries of civil servants and politicians, providing ample opportunities for corruption in vulnerable government agencies and the low probability of detection and punishment of corrupt offenders. Corruption can only be minimized in a country if its government introduces reforms to remove these major causes.

Improving Salaries

Civil servants and political leaders are more vulnerable to corruption if their salaries are meager or not commensurate with their positions and responsibilities. It is unrealistic to expect them to remain honest if they are paid low salaries which are inadequate for meeting their daily needs. Accordingly, they should be paid decent salaries instead of “starvation wages” to insulate them from bribery and patronage. However, three qualifications must be made.

First, raising salaries is expensive, and only countries that have sustained economic growth can afford to do. In Singapore’s case, it should be noted that the PAP government could not afford to raise the salaries of the political leaders and civil servants from June 1959 to February 1972. Accordingly, the focus of Singapore’s anti-corruption strategy during this period was the impartial enforcement of the Prevention of Corruption Act by the CPIB, which has enhanced the credibility of both the PAP government and the CPIB.

Singapore’s experience shows that it is possible to curb corruption by impartially enforcing the anti-corruption laws without raising the salaries of civil servants and politicians. As was discussed earlier, salaries of the bureaucrats and political leaders in Singapore

were raised from March 1972 onwards in order to prevent the brain drain of talented civil servants to the private sector, rather than as a mechanism to curb corruption. However, the PAP leaders have emphasized the need to pay senior bureaucrats and ministers competitive salaries to attract the “best and brightest” and to keep those who have been attracted to the Singapore Civil Service and the government honest and incorruptible.

Second, increasing salaries minimizes petty corruption as it reduces the incentive for corruption among junior officials but does not eliminate grand corruption among senior civil servants and politicians. In other words, salary revision is ineffective in curbing grand corruption which is motivated by greed and not need, when it is prevalent among the political leaders and senior bureaucrats.

Third, raising salaries alone is ineffective in solving the problem of corruption if the incumbent government lacks the political will to do so, if the anti-corruption agency is ineffective, if corrupt officials are not punished, and if opportunities for corruption are not reduced in vulnerable public agencies. Thus, salary revision is a necessary but insufficient condition for curbing corruption if other reforms are not undertaken also.

*Cutting Red Tape*

The role of the public bureaucracy in national development in many Asian countries has also increased the opportunities for administrative discretion and corruption as regulations governing access to goods and services can be exploited by civil servants in extracting “rents” from groups “vying for access to such goods and services.” To minimize the opportunities for corruption created by the growing public bureaucracy, the incumbent government should streamline the bureaucracy by reducing red tape and reviewing the cumbersome administrative procedures in corruption-prone agencies.

Corrupt civil servants in many countries love the complicated bureaucratic processes because it provides them with opportunities to solicit or accept bribes from business persons or the public to expedite the processing of their applications or to “jump the queue.” Corruption can be minimized in the civil service if red tape is cut and its efficiency is improved. The Singapore Civil Service

---

(SCS) has initiated these measures to reduce bureaucratic process and improve its productivity and efficiency:

1. The Productivity Movement was launched on October 7, 1971 with the formation of the Central Productivity Steering Committee and Work Improvement Teams in the ministries and departments.97

2. The Civil Service Computerization Program was introduced in September 1981 to improve the efficiency and productivity in the SCS by promoting the widespread use of computers among civil servants.98

3. The Service Improvement Unit was formed in April 1991 to improve the quality of service in the SCS and statutory boards by obtaining public feedback on the removal of unnecessary regulations.99

4. Public Service for the 21st Century (PS21) was initiated on May 5, 1995 to improve the quality of service and prepare the SCS to welcome and accept change. As part of PS21, the Cut Waste Panel was formed on September 1, 2003 “to receive suggestions from the public on where the government can cut waste, remove frills and make savings in the delivery of public services.”100

All the above measures have enabled the SCS and statutory boards to reduce bureaucratic practices and improve their efficiency and productivity. Singapore’s success in cutting red tape is clearly reflected in its number 1 ranking among 178 countries in the World Bank’s Doing Business Survey in 2008.101 By implementing these measures, the PAP government has reduced the opportunities


98. Ibid., p. 160.


for corruption through the elimination of red tape and the streamlining of cumbersome administrative procedures.

As not all public agencies are equally vulnerable to corruption, a realistic anti-corruption strategy requires the identification of those agencies that are prone to corruption so that the opportunities for corruption in such agencies can be reduced by cutting unnecessary red tape and improved monitoring of their operations. Apart from the police, the other vulnerable public agencies are the customs, immigration, education, health, public works, and tax departments.

_Punishing the Corrupt Offenders_

As corruption is a crime, the most effective way to curb it is to punish those found guilty of corrupt offences. Indeed, Singapore’s experience demonstrates the importance of punishing corrupt offenders, regardless of their status or position, in order to deter others from being involved in corruption. During the British colonial period, corruption was perceived by the population as a “low risk, high reward” activity as the probability of being detected and punished for corrupt offences was low because of the ineffectiveness of the Anti-Corruption Branch. However, the empowerment of the CPIB by the enactment of the POCA in 1960 by the PAP government, which was committed to eradicating corruption, led to the transformation of the public perception of corruption in Singapore to a “high risk, low reward” activity. In short, Singapore has succeeded in curbing corruption during the past 48 years because the CPIB enforces the POCA impartially so that those found guilty of corrupt offenses are punished, regardless of who they are.

Thus, to minimize corruption and to deter those who are not involved in corrupt practices from doing so, honesty and incorruptibility among civil servants and political leaders must be recognized and rewarded instead of being punished. The lack of punishment of corrupt civil servants and political leaders in a country sends the wrong signal to their honest counterparts and the population at large as it makes a mockery of the anti-corruption laws and encourages others to become corrupt as the probability of being caught and punished is low. In other words, the political system in a country plagued with corruption rewards those who are corrupt and punishes those who are honest. Needless to say, this system of reward and punishment must be reversed by punishing the corrupt offenders and rewarding those who have abstained from being corrupt.
Summarizing, the fourth important lesson which other Asian countries can learn from Singapore’s effective anti-corruption strategy is the need to deal with the major causes and not the symptoms of corruption by improving the salaries of civil servants and political leaders (if the country can afford to do so), by reducing red tape and the opportunities for corruption in corruption-prone public agencies, and by punishing those who are guilty of corruption, no matter who they are.

XI. CONCLUSION

In his perceptive study on the anti-corruption policies of various governments, Ian Senior has astutely observed that:

The principal people who can change a culture of corruption if they wish to do so are politicians. This is because they make the laws and allocate the funds that enable the laws to be enforced. If, however, politicians at the top of the hierarchy have routinely worked their way up by accepting bribes to fund their parties and themselves, there is little prospect that they will wish to cleanse their colleagues or their nation of corruption. . . . The very people who are the greatest beneficiaries of corruption have the greatest power and use the corrupt nature of government to maintain that power. 102

This means that if an incumbent government is committed to curbing corruption in the country, it should demonstrate its political will by providing the anti-corruption agency with adequate staff and funding to enforce the anti-corruption laws impartially. On the other hand, Ian Senior has also correctly indicated that corrupt political leaders are unlikely to demonstrate the required political will to curb corruption as they would be “killing the goose that lays the golden eggs.”

Singapore’s experience shows that curbing corruption is not an impossible dream but an attainable reality if the political leaders have the political will to establish an independent anti-corruption agency with the required legal powers, personnel and budget to enforce impartially the comprehensive anti-corruption laws. Unlike many Asian countries, Singapore has a favorable policy context and

political leaders who have been committed to combating corruption for the past 48 years.

Can those Asian countries with unfavorable policy contexts and corrupt political leaders escape from the tentacles of corruption? Or are these countries condemned to an endless quagmire of rampant corruption? In his analysis of the systemic corruption in Cameroon, Tim Hartford has admitted that “these problems cannot be fixed overnight.”

Nevertheless, he has also expressed optimism that there are simple reforms that some poor countries like Cameroon could take in order to move their country in the right direction. For example, by cutting the red tape and allowing small businesses to be legally established, it would make it easier for the entrepreneurs of the country to expand and borrow money. Hartford further adds that the necessary legal reforms are often trivial, and that “a single minister with his head and his heart in the right place” could easily implement such reforms.

Sharing Hartford’s optimism, it is possible for other Asian countries to follow Singapore’s experience in curbing corruption if their citizens do not tolerate corruption and if they show such intolerance by electing into public office honest political leaders who are committed to clean and honest government. So far, however, the record of these countries in fighting corruption has not been impressive as “many leaders have adopted ‘hopeless’ strategies that perpetuate corruption instead of stifling it.” Whether these Asian countries will succeed in curbing corruption in the future will depend on how committed their political leaders and citizens are in attaining this objective. In the final analysis, Singapore has been effective in minimizing the scourge of corruption because its political leaders and citizens have demonstrated the political will to do so. Similarly, without political will, the political leaders and citizens of other Asian countries will not be able to combat corruption effectively.

104. Ibid., pp. 201-202.
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACAC  Anti-Corruption Advisory Committee
ACRC  Anti-Corruption Review Committee
ACB   Anti-Corruption Branch
BMA   British Military Administration
CAC   Commission Against Corruption
CBI   Central Bureau of investigation
CEC   Commission Eradication Commission
CID   Criminal Investigation Department
CPI   Corruption Perceptions Index
CPIB  Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau
ICAC  Independent Commission Against Corruption
KICAC Korea Independent Commission Against Corruption
MP    Member of Parliament
NCCC  National Counter Corruption Commission
NWC   National Wages Council
PAP   People’s Action Party
PCGG  Presidential Commission for Good Government
PERC  Political and Economic Risk Consultancy
POCA  Prevention of Corruption Act
POCO  Prevention of Corruption Ordinance
PMO   Prime Minister’s Office
PSC   Public Service Commission
PS21  Public Service for the 21st Century
PUB   Public Utilities Board
SCS   Singapore Civil Service
SPF   Singapore Police Force
UNDP  United Nations Development Programme
GLOSSARY OF CHINESE NAMES*

Choy, Hon Tim 蔡韩定 (蔡韓定, 音译)
Chua, Cher Yak 蔡子益
Goh, Chok Tong 吴作栋 (吳作棟)
Lee, Geok Boi 李玉美
Lee, Hsien Loong 李显龙 (李顯龍)
Lee, Kuan Yew 李光耀
Phey, Yew Kok 彭国 (彭由國)
Seah, Chee Meow 佘志森
Tan, Ah Leak 陈亚烈 (陳亞烈, 音译)
Tan, Kia Gan 陈家彦 (陳家彥)
Teh, Cheang Wan 郑章远 (鄭章遠)
Thio, Li-ann 张丽安 (張麗安)
Wee, Toon Boon 黄循文
Yeo, Seng Teck 杨成德 (楊成德)
Yoong, Siew Wah 熊修华 (熊修華, 音译)

* The author would like to thank Professor Leo Suryadinata, Director of the Chinese Heritage Centre in Singapore for preparing this glossary of Chinese names.
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY ON CORRUPTION IN SINGAPORE


Lee, Kuan Yew. “No kickbacks, no donations, simply clean and effective.” *Straits Times*, September 23, 2003, p. 18. This is the full text of Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew’s speech at his 80th
birthday dinner organized by the People’s Action Party on September 21, 2003.


Maryland Series
in Contemporary Asian Studies
(Formerly Occasional Papers/Reprints Series

500 West Baltimore Street
Baltimore, Maryland 21201-1786
U.S.A.
Tel: (410) 706-3870
Fax: (410) 706-1516
(For back issues, new prices effective from October 1, 1991)

1977 Series

No. 1 - 1977
ISSN 0730-0107
ISBN 0-942182-00-6
Chinese Attitude Toward Continental Shelf and Its Implication on De-
limiting Seabed in Southeast Asia (Hungdah CHIU), 32 pp. $3.00

No. 2 - 1977
ISSN 0730-0107
ISBN 0-942182-01-4
Income Distribution in the Process of Economic Growth of the Repub-
lic of China (Yuan-Li WU), 45 pp. $3.00

No. 3 - 1977
ISSN 0730-0107
ISBN 0-942182-02-2
The Indonesian Maoists: Doctrines and Perspectives (Justus M. van der
Kroef), 31 pp. $3.00

No. 4 - 1977
ISSN 0730-0107
ISBN 0-942182-03-0
Taiwan's Foreign Policy in the 1970s: A Case Study Adaptation and
Viability (Thomas J. Bellows), 22 pp. $3.00

No. 5 - 1977
ISSN 0730-0107
ISBN 0-942182-04-9
Asian Political Scientists in North America: Professional and Ethnic
Problems (Edited by Chun-tu HSUEH), 148 pp. Index $6.00

No. 6 - 1977
ISSN 0730-0107
The Sino-Japanese Fisheries Agreement of 1975: A Comparison with
Other North Pacific Fisheries Agreements (SONG Yook Hong), 80
pp. $5.00
Foreign Trade Contracts Between West German Companies and the People's Republic of China: A Case Study (Robert Heuser), 22 pp. $3.00

No. 8 - 1977  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-942182-07-3
Reflections on Crime and Punishment in China, with Appended Sentencing Documents (Randle Edwards, Translation of Documents by Randle Edwards and Hungdah CHIU), 67 pp. $3.00

No. 9 - 1977  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-942182-08-1
Chinese Arts and Literature: A Survey of Recent Trends (Edited by Wai-lim YIP), 126 pp. $5.00

Legal Aspects of U.S.-Republic of China Trade and Investment — Proceedings of a Regional Conference of the American Society of International Law (Edited by Hungdah CHIU and David Simon), 217 pp. Index $8.00

No. 11 - 1977  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-942182-10-3
Asian American Assembly Position Paper: I. A Review of U.S. China Relations, 62 pp. $3.00

No. 12 - 1977  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-942182-11-1
Asian American Assembly Position Paper: II. A Review of U.S. Employment Policy, 24 pp. $3.00

1978 Series

Indian Ocean Politics: An Asian-African Perspective (K.P. Misra), 31 pp. $3.00

No. 2 - 1978 (14)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-942182-13-8
Normalizing Relations with the People's Republic of China: Problems, Analysis, and Documents (Edited by Hungdah CHIU, with contribution by G. J. Sigur, Robert A. Scalapino, King C. Chen, Eugene A. Theroux, Michael Y.M. Kau, James C. Hsiung and James W. Morley), 207 pp. Index $5.00

No. 3 - 1978 (15)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-942182-14-6
Growth, Distribution, and Social Change: Essays on the Economy of the Republic of China (Edited by Yuan-li WU and Kung-chia YEH), 227 pp. Index $5.00

No. 4 - 1978 (16)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-942182-15-4
The Societal Objectives of Wealth, Growth, Stability, and Equity in Taiwan (Jan S. Prybyla), 31 pp. $3.00
No. 5 - 1978 (17)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-942182-16-2
The Role of Law in the People’s Republic of China as Reflecting Mao Tse-Tung’s Influence (Shao-chuan Leng), 18 pp.  $3.00

No. 6 - 1978 (18)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-942182-17-0
Criminal Punishment in Mainland China: A Study of Some Yunnan Province Documents (Hungdah Chiu), 35 pp.  $3.00

A Guide to the Study of Japanese Law (Lawrence W. Beer and Hidenori Tomatsu), 45 pp.  $4.00

No. 8 - 1978 (20)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-942182-19-7
The Pueblo, EC-121, and Mayaguez Incidents: Some Continuities and Changes (Robert Simmons), 40 pp.  $4.00

No. 9 - 1978 (21)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-942182-20-0
Two Korea’s Unification Policy and Strategy (Yong Soon Yim), 82 pp.  $4.00
Index

1979 Series

No. 1 - 1979 (22)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-942182-21-9
Asian Immigrants and Their Status in the U.S. (Edited by Hungdah Chiu), 54 pp.  $4.00

No. 2 - 1979 (23)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-942182-22-7
Social Disorder in Peking After the 1976 Earthquake Revealed by a Chinese Legal Documents (Hungdah Chiu), 20 pp.  $4.00

The Dragon and the Eagle — A Study of U.S.-People’s Republic of China Relations in Civil Air Transport (Jack C. Young), 65 pp.  $5.00

No. 4 - 1979 (25)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-942182-24-3
Chinese Women Writers Today (Edited by Wai-lim Yip and William Tay), 108 pp.  $5.00

No. 5 - 1979 (26)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-942182-25-1
Certain Legal Aspects of Recognizing the People’s Republic of China (Hungdah Chiu), 49 pp.  $4.00

No. 6 - 1979 (27)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-942182-26-X
China’s Nationalization of Foreign Firms: The Politics of Hostage Capitalism, 1949-1957 (Thomas N. Thompson), 80 pp.  Index  $5.00
No. 7 - 1979 (28)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-942182-27-8  
U.S. Status of Force Agreement with Asian Countries: Selected Studies (Charles Cochran and Hungdah CHIU), 130 pp. Index $4.00

No. 8 - 1979 (29)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-942182-28-6  
China's Foreign Aid in 1978 (John F. Copper), 45 pp. $4.00

1980 Series

No. 1 - 1980 (30)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-942182-29-4  
The Chinese Connection and Normalization (Edited by Hungdah CHIU and Karen Murphy), 200 pp. Index $7.00

No. 2 - 1980 (31)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-942182-30-8  

No. 3 - 1980 (32)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-942182-31-6  
Policy, Proliferation and the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty: U.S. Strategies and South Asian Prospects (Joanne Finegan), 61 pp. $4.00

No. 4 - 1980 (33)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-942182-32-4  
A Comparative Study of Judicial Review Under Nationalist Chinese and American Constitutional Law (Jyh-pin FA), 200 pp. Index $6.00

No. 5 - 1980 (34)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-942182-33-2  
Certain Problems in Recent Law Reform in the People's Republic of China (Hungdah CHIU), 34 pp. $4.00

No. 6 - 1980 (35)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-942182-34-0  
China’s New Criminal & Criminal Procedure Codes (Hungdah CHIU), 16 pp. $3.00

China’s Foreign Relations: Selected Studies (Edited by F. Gilbert Chan & Ka-che YIP), 115 pp. $5.00

No. 8 - 1980 (37)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-942182-36-7  
Annual Review of Selected Books on Contemporary Asian Studies (1979-1980) (Edited by John F. Copper), 45 pp. $4.00

1981 Series

Structural Changes in the Organization and Operation of China’s Criminal Justice System (Hungdah CHIU), 31 pp. $3.00
Readjustment and Reform in the Chinese Economy (Jan S. Prybyla), 58 pp. $3.00

No. 3 - 1981 (40)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-942182-39-1
Symposium on the Trial of Gang of Four and Its Implication in China (Edited by James C. Hsiung), 118 pp. $5.00

No. 4 - 1981 (41)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-942182-40-5
China and the Law of the Sea Conference (Hungdah CHIU), 30 pp. $4.00

No. 5 - 1981 (42)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-942182-41-3
China’s Foreign Aid in 1979-80 (John Franklin Copper), 54 pp. $4.00

No. 6 - 1981 (43)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-942182-42-1
Chinese Regionalism: Yesterday and Today (Franz Michael), 35 pp. $4.00

Elite Conflict in the Post-Mao China (Parris H. Chang), 40 pp. $4.00
(Please order No. 2 - 1983 (55) for a revised version of this issue.)

No. 8 - 1981 (45)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-942182-44-8
Proceedings of Conference on Multi-system Nations and International Law: International Status of Germany, Korea, and China (Edited by Hungdah CHIU and Robert Downen), 203 pp. Index $8.00

1982 Series

Socialist Legalism: Reform and Continuity in Post-Mao People’s Republic of China (Hungdah CHIU), 35 pp. $4.00

No. 2 - 1982 (47)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-942182-46-4
Kampuchea: The Endless Tug of War (Justus M. Van der Kroef), 51 pp. $4.00

Social Change on Mainland China and Taiwan, 1949-1980 (Alan P.L. Liu), 55 pp. $5.00

No. 4 - 1982 (49)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-942182-48-0
Taiwan’s Security and United States Policy: Executive and Congressional Strategies in 1978-1979 (Michael S. Frost), 39 pp. $4.00
| No. 5 - 1982 (50) | ISSN 0730-0107 | ISBN 0-942182-49-9 |
| No. 6 - 1982 (51) | ISSN 0730-0107 | ISBN 0-942182-50-2 |
| No. 7 - 1982 (52) | ISSN 0730-0107 | ISBN 0-942182-51-0 |
| No. 8 - 1982 (53) | ISSN 0730-0107 | ISBN 0-942182-52-9 |

**1983 Series**

| No. 3 - 1983 (56) | ISSN 0730-0107 | ISBN 0-942182-55-3 |
| No. 4 - 1983 (57) | ISSN 0730-0107 | ISBN 0-942182-56-1 |
| No. 5 - 1983 (58) | ISSN 0730-0107 | ISBN 0-942182-57-X |
### 1984 Series

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Year (Code)</th>
<th>ISSN</th>
<th>ISBN</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Pages</th>
<th>Price</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1984 (60)</td>
<td>0730-0107</td>
<td>0-942182-60-X</td>
<td>China’s Nuclear Policy: An Overall View (Shao-chuan LENG), 18 pp.</td>
<td></td>
<td>$3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1984 (61)</td>
<td>0730-0107</td>
<td>0-942182-61-8</td>
<td>The Communist Party of China: Party Powers and Group Politics from the Third Plenum to the Twelfth Party Congress (Hung-mao TIEN), 30 pp.</td>
<td></td>
<td>$3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1984 (62)</td>
<td>0730-0107</td>
<td>0-942182-62-6</td>
<td>Legal Problems of Seabed Boundary Delimitation in the East China Sea (Ying-jeou MA), 308 pp. Index</td>
<td></td>
<td>$10.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>1984 (63)</td>
<td>0730-0107</td>
<td>0-942182-64-2</td>
<td>A New Direction in Japanese Defense Policy: Views from the Liberal Democratic Party Diet Members (Steven Kent Vogel), 63 pp.</td>
<td></td>
<td>$3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>1984 (64)</td>
<td>0730-0107</td>
<td>0-942182-65-0</td>
<td>Taiwan’s Elections: Political Development and Democratization in the Republic of China (John F. Copper with George P. Chen), 180 pp. Index</td>
<td></td>
<td>$5.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>1984 (65)</td>
<td>0730-0107</td>
<td>0-942182-67-7</td>
<td>Cankao Xiaoxi: Foreign News in the Propaganda System of the People’s Republic of China (Jörg-Meinhard Rudolph), 174 pp. Index</td>
<td></td>
<td>$5.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 1985 Series

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Year (Code)</th>
<th>ISSN</th>
<th>ISBN</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Pages</th>
<th>Price</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1985 (66)</td>
<td>0730-0107</td>
<td>0-942182-68-5</td>
<td>The Political Basis of the Economic and Social Development in the Republic of China (Alan P. L. Liu), 22 pp.</td>
<td></td>
<td>$3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1985 (68)</td>
<td>0730-0107</td>
<td>0-942182-70-7</td>
<td>Symposium on Hong Kong: 1997 (Edited by Hungdah CHIU), 100 pp. Index</td>
<td></td>
<td>$4.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Author(s)</td>
<td>Pages</td>
<td>ISBN</td>
<td>Price</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>The 1982 Chinese Constitution and the Rule of Law</td>
<td>Hungdah CHIU</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0-942182-71-5</td>
<td>$3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>China's Marine Environmental Protection Law: The Dragon Creeping in Murky Waters</td>
<td>Mitchell A. Silk</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>0-942182-73-1</td>
<td>$3.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**1986 Series**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Pages</th>
<th>ISBN</th>
<th>Price</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>From Tradition to Modernity: A Socio-Historical Interpretation on China's Struggle Toward Modernization Since the Mid-19th Century</td>
<td>Wen-hui TSAI</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>0-942182-74-X</td>
<td>$4.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>Peace and Unification in Korea and International Law</td>
<td>Byung-Hwa LYOU</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>0-942182-75-8</td>
<td>$8.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>The Hong Kong Agreement and American Foreign Policy</td>
<td>Hungdah CHIU</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0-942182-76-6</td>
<td>$3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>United States-China Normalization: An Evaluation of Foreign Policy Decision Making</td>
<td>Jaw-ling Joanne CHANG</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>0-942182-77-4</td>
<td>$8.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| 5   | 1986 | Communications and China's National Integration: An Analysis of People's Daily and Central Daily on the China Unification Issue | Shuhua CHANG | 205 | 0-942182-79-0 | $8.00 |
| 6   | 1986 | Since Aquino: The Philippine Tangle and the United States | Justus M. van der Kroef | 73 | 0-942182-80-4 | $3.00 |
### 1987 Series

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>ISBN</th>
<th>Title and Authors</th>
<th>Pages</th>
<th>Price</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. 2 - 1987 (79)</td>
<td></td>
<td>ISSN 0730-0107</td>
<td>ISBN 0-942182-82-0</td>
<td>Survey of Recent Developments in China (Mainland and Taiwan), 1985-1986 (edited by Hungdah CHIU, with the assistance of Jaw-ling Joanne CHANG), 222 pp. Index</td>
<td>$8.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 3 - 1987 (80)</td>
<td></td>
<td>ISSN 0730-0107</td>
<td>ISBN 0-942182-83-9</td>
<td>Democratizing Transition in Taiwan (Yangsun CHOU and Andrew J. Nathan), 24 pp.</td>
<td>$3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 4 - 1987 (81)</td>
<td></td>
<td>ISSN 0730-0107</td>
<td>ISBN 0-942182-84-7</td>
<td>The Legal Status of the Chinese Communist Party (Robert Heuser), 25 pp.</td>
<td>$3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 5 - 1987 (82)</td>
<td></td>
<td>ISSN 0730-0107</td>
<td>ISBN 0-942182-85-5</td>
<td>The Joint Venture and Related Contract Laws of Mainland China and Taiwan: A Comparative Analysis (Clyde D. Stoltenberg and David W. McClure), 54 pp. (out of print)</td>
<td>$4.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 1988 Series

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>ISBN</th>
<th>Title and Authors</th>
<th>Pages</th>
<th>Price</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. 2 - 1988 (85)</td>
<td></td>
<td>ISSN 0730-0107</td>
<td>ISBN 0-942182-88-X</td>
<td>Chinese Views on the Sources of International Law (Hungdah CHIU), 20 pp.</td>
<td>$3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 4 - 1988 (87)</td>
<td></td>
<td>ISSN 0730-0107</td>
<td>ISBN 0-942182-90-1</td>
<td>Settlement of the Macau Issue: Distinctive Features of Beijing's Negotiating Behavior (with text of 1887 Protocol and 1987 Declaration) (Jaw-ling Joanne CHANG), 37 pp.</td>
<td>$3.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
No. 5 - 1988 (88)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-942182-91-X
The Draft Basic Law of Hong Kong: Analysis and Documents (edited by Hungdah CHIU), 153 pp.  $5.00

No. 6 - 1988 (89)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-942182-92-8
Constitutionalism in Asia: Asian Views of the American Influence (edited by Lawrence W. Beer), 210 pp.  $10.00

**1989 Series**

No. 1 - 1989 (90)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-925153-00-1
The Right to a Criminal Appeal in the People's Republic of China (Margaret Y.K. Woo), 43 pp.  $3.00

No. 2 - 1989 (91)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-925153-01-X
The Status of Customary International Law, Treaties, Agreements and Semi-Official or Unofficial Agreements in Chinese Law (Hungdah CHIU), 22 pp.  $3.00

No. 3 - 1989 (92)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-925153-02-8
One Step Forward, One Step Back, Human Rights in the People's Republic of China in 1987/88 (John F. Cooper and Ta-ling LEE), 140 pp.  $6.00

No. 4 - 1989 (93)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-925153-03-6
Tibet: Past and Present (Hungdah CHIU and June Teufel Dreyer), 25 pp.  $3.00

No. 5 - 1989 (94)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-925153-04-4
Chinese Attitude toward International Law of Human Rights in the Post-Mao Era (Hungdah CHIU), 38 pp.  $4.00

No. 6 - 1989 (95)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-925153-05-2
Tibet to Tiananmen: Chinese Human Rights and United States Foreign Policy (W. Gary Vause), 47 pp.  $4.00

**1990 Series**

No. 1 - 1990 (96)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-925153-06-0
The International Legal Status of the Republic of China (Hungdah CHIU), 20 pp. (Please order No. 5-1992 (112) for a revised version of this issue)  $3.00
No. 2 - 1990 (97)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-925153-07-9

Tiananmen: China’s Struggle for Democracy—Its Prelude, Development, Aftermath, and Impact (Winston L. Y. Yang and Marsha L. Wagner), 314 pp. Index (paperback out of print)  $8.00


No. 3 - 1990 (98)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-925153-09-5

Nationality and International Law in Chinese Perspective (Hungdah CHIU), 37 pp.  $4.00

No. 4 - 1990 (99)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-925153-10-9

The Taiwan Relations Act after Ten Years (Lori Fisler Damrosch), 27 pp.  $3.00

No. 5 - 1990 (100)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-925153-11-7

The Taiwan Relations Act and Sino-American Relations (Hungdah CHIU), 34 pp. (out of print)  $4.00

No. 6 - 1990 (101)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-925153-12-5

Taiwan’s Recent Elections: Fulfilling the Democratic Promise (John F. Copper), 174 pp. Index (out of print)  $8.00

1991 Series


Legal Aspects of Investment and Trade with the Republic of China (Edited by John T. McDermott, with contributions by Linda F. Powers, Ronald A. Case, Chung-Teh LEE, Jeffrey H. Chen, Cheryl M. Friedman, Hungdah CHIU, K.C. Fan and Douglas T. Hung), 94 pp.  $6.00

No. 2 - 1991 (103)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-925153-14-1

Failure of Democracy Movement: Human Rights in the People’s Republic of China, 1988/89 (Ta-ling Lee and John F. Copper), 150 pp. Index  $10.00


Freedom of Expression: The Continuing Revolution in Japan’s Legal Culture (Lawrence W. Beer), 31 pp.  $5.00

No. 4 - 1991 (105)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-925153-16-8

The 1989 US-Republic of China (Taiwan) Fisheries Negotiations (Mark Mon-Chang Hsieh), 84 pp.  $6.00

No. 5 - 1991 (106)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-925153-17-6

Politics of Divided Nations: China, Korea, Germany and Vietnam — Unification, Conflict Resolution and Political Development (Edited by Quansheng ZHAO and Robert Sutter), 198 pp. Index  $12.00
No. 6 - 1991 (107)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-925153-18-4
Lawyers in China: The Past Decade and Beyond (Timothy A. Gelatt), 49 pp. $5.00

1992 Series

Judicial Review of Administration in the People's Republic of China (Jyh-pin FA & Shao-chuan LENG), 37 pp. $5.00

China's Ministry of State Security: Coming of Age in the International Arena (Nicholas Estimaiides), 24 pp. $4.00

No. 3 - 1992 (110)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-925153-21-4
Libel Law and the Press in South Korea: An Update (KYU Ho Youm), 23 pp. $5.00

No. 4 - 1992 (111)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-925153-22-2
Tiananmen Aftermath: Human Rights in the People's Republic of China, 1990 (John F. Copper and Ta-ling LEE), 133 pp. Index $15.00

No. 5 - 1992 (112)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-925153-23-0
The International Legal Status of the Republic of China (Revised version of No. 1-1990 (96)) (Hungdah CHIU), 37 pp. $4.00

No. 6 - 1992 (113)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-925153-24-9
China's Criminal Justice System and the Trial of Pro-Democracy Dissidents (Hungdah CHIU), 21 pp. $3.00

1993 Series

Can One Unscramble an Omelet? China's Economic Reform in Theory and Practice (Yuan-li WU and Richard Y. C. Yin), 34 pp. $4.00

Constitutional Development and Reform in the Republic of China on Taiwan (With Documents) (Hungdah CHIU), 61 pp. $6.00

No. 3 - 1993 (116)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-925153-27-3
Sheltering for Examination (Shourong Shencha) in the Legal System of the People's Republic of China (Tao-tai HSIA and Wendy I. Zeldin), 32 pp. $4.00
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>ISSN</th>
<th>ISBN</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Price</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>0730-0107</td>
<td>0-925153-28-1</td>
<td>In Making China Modernized: Comparative Modernization between Mainland China and Taiwan (Wen-hui TSAI), 281 pp. Index (out of print, please order No. 5 - 1996 for 2nd ed.)</td>
<td>$18.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>0730-0107</td>
<td>0-925153-30-3</td>
<td>Hong Kong's Transition to 1997: Background, Problems and Prospects (with Documents) (Hungdah CHIU), 106 pp.</td>
<td>$7.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>0730-0107</td>
<td>0-925153-31-1</td>
<td>Koo-Wang Talks and the Prospect of Building Constructive and Stable Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (with Documents) (Hungdah CHIU), 69 pp.</td>
<td>$5.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**1994 Series**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>ISSN</th>
<th>ISBN</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Price</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>0730-0107</td>
<td>0-925153-32-X</td>
<td>Statutory Encouragement of Investment and Economic Development in the Republic of China on Taiwan (Neil L. Meyers), 72 pp.</td>
<td>$7.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>0730-0107</td>
<td>0-925153-34-6</td>
<td>Institutionalizing a New Legal System in Deng's China (Hungdah CHIU), 44 pp.</td>
<td>$5.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>0730-0107</td>
<td>0-925153-36-2</td>
<td>Taiwan's Legal System and Legal Profession (Hungdah CHIU and Jyh-pin FA), 22 pp.</td>
<td>$3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>0730-0107</td>
<td>0-925153-37-0</td>
<td>Toward Greater Democracy: An Analysis of the Republic of China on Taiwan's Major Elections in the 1990s (Wen-hui TSAI), 40 pp.</td>
<td>$6.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**1995 Series**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>ISSN</th>
<th>ISBN</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Price</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>0730-0107</td>
<td>0-925153-38-9</td>
<td>Relations between the Republic of China and the Republic of Chile (Herman Gutierrez B. and Lin CHOU), 31 pp.</td>
<td>$5.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>ISSN</td>
<td>ISBN</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Pages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 2</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>0730-0107</td>
<td>0-925153-39-7</td>
<td>The Tibet Question and the Hong Kong Experience (Barry Sautman and Shiu-hing LO), 82 pp.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 3</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>0730-0107</td>
<td>0-925153-40-0</td>
<td>Mass Rape, Enforced Prostitution, and the Japanese Imperial Army: Japan Eschews International Legal Responsibility? (David Boling), 56 pp.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 4</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>0730-0107</td>
<td>0-925153-41-9</td>
<td>The Role of the Republic of China in the World Economy (Chu-yuan CHENG), 25 pp.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 5</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>0730-0107</td>
<td>0-925153-42-7</td>
<td>China’s Economy after Deng: A Long-Term Perspective (Peter C.Y. Chow), 43 pp.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 6</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>0730-0107</td>
<td>0-925153-43-5</td>
<td>An Entrepreneurial Analysis of Opposition Movements (Ching-chane HWANG), 179 pp.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**1996 Series**

| No. 1 | 1996  | 0730-0107 | 0-925153-44-3| Taiwan’s 1995 Legislative Yuan Election (John F. Copper), 39 pp. |       | $6.00 |
| No. 2 | 1996  | 0730-0107 | 0-925153-45-1| Russian-Taiwanese Relations: Current State, Problems, and Prospects of Development (Peter M. Ivanov), 76 pp. |       | $10.00|
| No. 3 | 1996  | 0730-0107 | 0-925153-46-X| Recent Relations between China and Taiwan and Taiwan’s Defense Capabilities (Hung-dah CHIU & June Teufel Dreyer), 28 pp. |       | $4.00 |
| No. 4 | 1996  | 0730-0107 | 0-925153-47-8| Intellectual Property Protection in the Asian-Pacific Region: A Comparative Study (Paul C. B. Liu & Andy Y. Sun), 183 pp. |       | $25.00|
|       |       |           |              | (Hardcover edition: ISBN 0-925153-48-6) $32.00 |       |       |
| No. 5 | 1996  | 0730-0107 | 0-925153-49-4| In Making China Modernized: Comparative Modernization between Mainland China and Taiwan (2nd ed.) (Wen-hui TSAI), 297 pp. |       | $30.00|
No. 6 - 1996 (137)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-925153-51-6
A Study of the Consular Convention between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China (Stephen Kho), 68 pp. $6.00

1997 Series

No. 1 - 1997 (138)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-925153-52-4
Tiananmen to Tiananmen, China under Communism 1947-1996 (Yuan-Li WU), 348 pp. Index $35.00
(Hardcover edition: ISBN 0-925153-53-2) $45.00

No. 2 - 1997 (139)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-925153-54-0
The External Relations and International Status of Hong Kong (Ting Wai), 72 pp. $8.00

No. 3 - 1997 (140)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-925153-55-9
Sheltering for Examination (Shoushen) in the People's Republic of China: Law, Policy, and Practices (Kam C. WONG), 53 pp. $6.00

No. 4 - 1997 (141)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-925153-56-7
Legal Aid Practices in the PRC in the 1990s — Dynamics, Contents and Implications, (LUO Qizhi) 68 pp. $8.00

No. 5 - 1997 (142)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-925153-57-5
The KMT's 15th Party Congress: The Ruling Party at a Crossroads (John F. Copper), 38 pp. $5.00

From Pirate King to Jungle King: Transformation of Taiwan's Intellectual Property Protection (Andy Y. Sun), 138 pp. $18.00

1998 Series

No. 1 - 1998 (144)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-925153-59-1
From "Multi-System Nations" to "Linkage Communities": A New Conceptual Scheme for the Integration of Divided Nations (Yung WEI), 20 pp. $4.00

The Impact of the World Trade Organization on the Lack of Transparency in the People's Republic of China (Stephen Kho), 63 pp. $7.00

No. 3 - 1998 (146)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-925153-61-3
The Nationalist Ideology of the Chinese Military (Xiaoyu CHEN), 45 pp. $6.00
Convergence and the Future of Reunification between Mainland China and Taiwan: A Developmental View (Wen-hui TSAI), 33 pp. $5.00

Chinese Patent Law and Patent Litigation in China (Xiang WANG), 61 pp. $8.00

The Development of Banking in Taiwan: The Historical Impact on Future Challenges (Lawrence L.C. Lee), 39 pp. $6.00

1999 Series

An Analysis of the Sino-Japanese Dispute over the T'iaoyutai Islets (Senkaku Gunto) (Hungdah CHIU), 27 pp. $6.00

Taiwan’s 1998 Legislative Yuan, Metropolitan Mayoral and City Council Elections: Confirming and Consolidating Democracy in the Republic of China (John F. Copper), 53 pp. $7.00

The Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands Dispute: Its History and an Analysis of the Ownership Claims of the P.R.C., R.O.C., and Japan (Han-yi SHAW), 148 pp. $20.00

Election and Democracy in Hong Kong: The 1998 Legislative Council Election (Shiu-hing LO & Wing-yat YU), 68 pp. $9.00

The ROC on the Threshold of the 21st Century: A Paradigm Reexamined (Edited by Chien-min CHAO & Cal Clark), 189 pp. $24.00

Party Primaries in Taiwan: Trends, Conditions, and Projections in Candidate Selection (Julian Baum and James A. Robinson), 39 pp. $6.00

2000 Series

United States-Taiwan Relations: Twenty Years after the Taiwan Relations Act (Edited by Jaw-Ling Joanne Chang & William W. Boyer), 309 pp. Index. $28.00 (Hardcover edition: ISBN 0-925153-72-9) $42.00
Taiwan’s 2000 Presidential and Vice Presidential Election: Consolidating Democracy and Creating a New Era of Politics (John F. Copper), 66 pp.  $9.00

Legal Eligibility of Taiwan’s Accession to GATT/WTO (CHO Hui-Wan), 22 pp.  $6.00

No. 4 - 2000 (159)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-925153-75-3
Russia’s Northeast Asia Policy: Challenges and Choices for the 21st Century (Sharif M. Shuja), 22 pp.  $6.00

No. 5 - 2000 (160)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-925153-76-1
East Asia and the Principle of Non-Intervention: Policies and Practices (Linjun WU), 39 pp.  $7.00

No. 6 - 2000 (161)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-925153-77-X
The Association of South East Asian Nations’ Confidence and Security Building with the People’s Republic of China: Internal Constraints and Policy Implications (Kwei-Bo HUANG), 61 pp.  $9.00

2001 Series

No. 1 - 2001 (162)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-925153-78-8
Socio-economic Changes and Modernization in an Age of Uncertainty: Taiwan in the 1990s and Its Future Challenge (Wen-hui TSAI), 35 pp.  $7.00

No. 2 - 2001 (163)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-925153-79-6
Implementation of Taiwan Relations Act: An Examination after Twenty Years (Edited by Hungdah CHIU, Hsing-wei LEE and Chih-Yu T. WU), 267 pp.  $27.00

No. 3 - 2001 (164)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-925153-80-X
The Diplomatic War between Beijing and Taipei in Chile (Lin CHOU), 61 pp.  $9.00

No. 4 - 2001 (165)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-925153-81-8
Reforming the Protection of Intellectual Property: The Case of China and Taiwan in Light of WTO Accession (Andy Y. SUN), 46 pp.  $8.00

No. 5 - 2001 (166)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-925153-82-6
Arbitration of Commercial Disputes in China (Vai Io LO), 26 pp.  $6.00
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>ISSN</th>
<th>ISBN</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Pages</th>
<th>Price</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>0730-0107</td>
<td>0-925153-83-4</td>
<td>Building a Democratic State in Modernizing Taiwan: The 2001 Legislative Election and the Push for Pluralism (Wen-hui TSAI and George P. Chen)</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>$6.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>0730-0107</td>
<td>0-925153-84-2</td>
<td>United States and Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea: A Study of Ocean Law and Politics (Yann-huei SONG)</td>
<td>321</td>
<td>$35.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>0730-0107</td>
<td>0-925153-85-0</td>
<td>The Politics of Racial Discrimination in Hong Kong (Barry Sautman and Ellen Kneehans)</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>$10.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>0730-0107</td>
<td>1-932330-00-3</td>
<td>The Social and Political Bases for Women's Growing Political Power in Taiwan (Cal Clark and Janet Clark)</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>$7.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>0730-0107</td>
<td>1-932330-01-1</td>
<td>The U.S.-Taiwan Free Trade Agreement: A Bridge for Economic Integration in the Asia-Pacific Region (Peter C.Y. Chow)</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>$9.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>0730-0107</td>
<td>1-932330-02-X</td>
<td>Bringing People Back In: Collected Essays on Major Elections in Taiwan at the Turn of the 21st Century (Wen-hui TSAI)</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>$18.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>0730-0107</td>
<td>1-932330-03-8</td>
<td>Taiwan: The Commercial State (Arthur I. Cyr)</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>$10.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>0730-0107</td>
<td>1-932330-04-6</td>
<td>New Rules to the Old Great Game: An Assessment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization's Proposed Free Trade Zone (Leland Rhett Miller)</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>$6.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>0730-0107</td>
<td>1-932330-05-4</td>
<td>The Republic of China Legislative Yuan: A Study of Institutional Evolution (Thomas J. Bellows)</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>$7.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## 2004 Series

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. 1 - 2004 (176)</th>
<th>ISSN 0730-0107</th>
<th>ISBN 1-932330-06-2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan's 2004 Presidential and Vice Presidential Election: Democracy's Consolidation or Devolution? (John F. Cooper), 80 pp.</td>
<td>$10.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. 2 - 2004 (177)</th>
<th>ISSN 0730-0107</th>
<th>ISBN 1-932330-07-0</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peace, Reunification, Democracy and Cross-Strait Relations (Zhao Hui HONG and Yi SUN), 16 pp.</td>
<td>$5.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. 3 - 2004 (178)</th>
<th>ISSN 0730-0107</th>
<th>ISBN 1-932330-08-9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Judicial Discretion in Dispensing with the Service of Process Requirement in Hong Kong under Order 45, Rule 7(7): Moving towards a Doctrine? (Simon Teng), 27 pp.</td>
<td>$7.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. 4 - 2004 (179)</th>
<th>ISSN 0730-0107</th>
<th>ISBN 1-932330-09-7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan's 2004 Legislative Election: Putting it in Perspective (John F. Cooper), 75 pp.</td>
<td>$13.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## 2005 Series

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. 1 - 2005 (180)</th>
<th>ISSN 0730-0107</th>
<th>ISBN 1-932330-10-0</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan: The Commercial State (revised version of No. 2-2003 (173)) (Arthur I. Cyr), 81 pp.</td>
<td>$13.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. 2 - 2005 (181)</th>
<th>ISSN 0730-0107</th>
<th>ISBN 1-932330-11-9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Retracing the Triangle: China's Strategic Perceptions of Japan in the Post-Cold War Era (Danielle F. S. Cohen), 74 pp.</td>
<td>$13.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. 3 - 2005 (182)</th>
<th>ISSN 0730-0107</th>
<th>ISBN 1-932330-12-7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Putting Things into Perspective: The Reality of Accountability in East Timor, Indonesia and Cambodia (Suzannah Linton), 90 pp.</td>
<td>$13.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. 4 - 2005 (183)</th>
<th>ISSN 0730-0107</th>
<th>ISBN 1-932330-13-5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan and the Soviet Bloc, 1949-1991 (Czeslaw Tubilewicz), 85 pp.</td>
<td>$13.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## 2006 Series

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. 1 - 2006 (184)</th>
<th>ISSN 0730-0107</th>
<th>ISBN 1-932330-14-3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japan's Changing Security Policy: An Overall View (Sharif Shuja), 32 pp.</td>
<td>$7.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. 2 - 2006 (185)</th>
<th>ISSN 0730-0107</th>
<th>ISBN 1-932330-15-1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China in ASEAN-LED Multilateral Forums (Serene Hung), 102 pp.</td>
<td>$14.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Year (Code)</td>
<td>ISSN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>2006 (186)</td>
<td>0730-0107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>2006 (187)</td>
<td>0730-0107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**2007 Series**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Year (Code)</th>
<th>ISSN</th>
<th>ISBN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2007 (188)</td>
<td>0730-0107</td>
<td>1-932330-18-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>National Identity, Ethnic Identity, and Party Identity in Taiwan (Chang-Yen TSAI), 34 pp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>2007 (189)</td>
<td>0730-0107</td>
<td>1-932330-19-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Combating Corruption Singapore-Style: Lessons for Other Asian Countries (Jon S.T. Quah), 56 pp.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
MARYLAND STUDIES IN EAST ASIAN LAW AND POLITICS SERIES

(The following books are published under the auspices or co-auspices of the East Asian Legal Studies Program of the University of Maryland School of Law. The views expressed in each book reflect only those of the author. All books published in hard cover edition, unless otherwise indicated.)


* Occasional Papers/Reprints Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, Inc. (It has been changed to Maryland Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, MSCAS), 500 West Baltimore St., Baltimore, Maryland 21201-1786. (Tel. 410-706-3870)


ORDER FORM

Mail this order form to Maryland Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, University of Maryland School of Law, 500 West Baltimore Street, Baltimore, Maryland 21201-1786, U.S.A. Or e-mail to eastasia@law.umaryland.edu or fax to (410)706-1516

Check One:

☐ Please Send:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ISBN</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>No. of Copies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

☐ Please start my subscription of the MSCAS: Starting year ________

Subscription price is U.S. $40.00 per year for 4 issues in the U.S. and $45.00 for Canada, Mexico or overseas (regardless of the price of individual issues).

My check of U.S. $ ____________________________ is enclosed.

___________ copy(s) of invoice/receipt required. (Institution/library may request billing before making payment)

Please add postage/handling of $5.00 for one copy and $2.00 for each additional copy. Make checks payable to MSCAS.

Please send books to:
Contact Name
Corporation/Library/Institution
Address (Please include zip code)
Country

__________________________________________

__________________________________________

__________________________________________