Taiwan's 2006 Metropolitan Mayoral and City Council Elections and the Politics of Corruption

John F. Copper

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* John F. Copper is the Stanley J. Buckman Professor of International Studies at Rhodes College in Memphis, Tennessee. He is the author of more than twenty books on China and Taiwan. His most recent book is entitled Playing with Fire: Looming War with China over Taiwan (2006).
I. INTRODUCTION

On December 9, 2006, voters in the Republic of China, otherwise known as Taiwan, went to the polls to elect the mayors and city councils of the nation's two metropolitan cities: Taipei and Kaohsiung. Though technically local, these elections have long been nationally important, and still are. They determine the executive leadership of Taipei, the capital city, and Kaohsiung, Taiwan's largest city in the south and its largest port. Voters in these elections constitute nearly one-fifth of the nation's electorate. The results of these elections set political trends and decide leaders for yet higher offices. In the case of the Taipei mayorship, two presidents (LEE Teng-hui and CHEN Shui-bian) used it as a springboard for attaining the nation's highest office. MA Ying-jeou, the odds-on favorite for many to win the presidential election in 2008, was the current mayor of Taipei, and Frank Hsieh, a contender for the Taipei mayorship and also likely to be in the race for the presidency, was formerly the mayor of Kaohsiung.

The elections of 2006 resulted in a Nationalist Party or Kuomintang (KMT) victory. The KMT took the Taipei mayorship and made meaningful gains in seats in both city council races. Yet many

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2. Taipei was made a metropolitan city in 1967; Kaohsiung received that designation in 1979. The two cities were so categorized because of their size and importance. The population of Taipei in 2005 was 2.62 million; Kaohsiung was 1.5 million. See Taiwan 2005 Yearbook, Taipei: Government Information Office, 2005, p. 66.

3. Lee Teng-hui was mayor of Taipei from 1978 to 1981; Chen was mayor from 1994 to 1998. Frank Hsieh was mayor of Kaohsiung from 1998 to 2005.
commentators questioned whether it was really a KMT win. Some even called it a setback. KMT leaders had expected a bigger take, namely a sweep. But, the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) won the Kaohsiung mayoral race. The DPP also made minuscule gains in the city council races. The other parties and independents fared poorly. So did some notable leaders, including James Soong.

After the election both the DPP and KMT engaged in serious reflection and self-examination. Leaders of both parties felt they had to learn from this election to win the coming legislative and presidential elections in 2007 and 2008 respectively. Some expressed doubts about the leadership quality of each party.

The prevailing issue throughout the campaign was corruption involving DPP officials, in particular President CHEN Shui-bian and his family and friends. Scandals impacted voters' perceptions of DPP candidates and the ruling party during the campaign and affected the election results. But how much so is not clear. It appeared the DPP, and even President Chen himself, whom many speculated would resign from office if his party did poorly (meaning losing both mayorships), trumped the corruption issue in the Kaohsiung mayoral race with localism and the ethnic card. If true, what did it mean? This was the conundrum that challenged pundits analyzing the results of this election.

There were other questions: How would the election otherwise affect the president? Was he a lame duck? Could the ruling Democratic Progressive Party still effectively lead the country? What could it do to refurbish its image? Who would lead the party? Who would be the DPP's candidate for president in 2008? What about the KMT? MA Ying-jeou? They needed to take stock. Why didn't the KMT do better? Was the KMT defeated by a tougher DPP? Was playing to voters' emotions a better campaign strategy than talking about issues? Were the smaller parties now dead?

Economic and social issues didn't have much resonance with voters at least in Kaohsiung. Were they not important? How will the issues play in the next election campaigns? External factors, namely the United States and China, did not have much impact on the results of election. The U.S. affected the last election (or two) in favor of pan-blue; that was not the case of this election. China re-

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4. There is a proposal being considered to hold the two elections at the same time. It is uncertain, however, if this will pass, or at least pass soon enough to bring these two elections together.
mained quiet in order to avoid creating a backlash that would help the DPP. Would this situation remain?

Finally, did the election further the development of Taiwan's democracy? The system worked in spite of the strain over corruption and the extreme polarization exhibited during the campaign. Yet ethnic voting prevailed in Kaohsiung. The campaign and the results were very different in the north and the south. Is Taiwan two very different nations?

II. POLITICAL TRENDS AND PREVIOUS ELECTIONS

It would be axiomatic to say that Taiwan's elections have contributed in a vital way to the country's political modernization. In fact, many scholars argue elections have created Taiwan's democracy.\(^5\) Counterpointwise, the nature of its democratization to a large degree explains how Taiwan's elections work, including the parties' strategies and tactics.\(^6\) That is a matter at issue here. Two factors in this process are especially pertinent to understanding this election: the opposition's (before 2000) evolution through the rough and tumble of local politics during an era of authoritarianism, and the argument that voters should favor the DPP for democracy to succeed.

The DPP was built of independent politicians who opposed Taiwan's one-party system controlled by the KMT after World War II. They became loosely organized in the 1970s in the form of tangwai (literally "outside the party" or not KMT) aspirants to political office. The DPP, founded in 1986, was tangwai's successor. Many of its members were organizers of opposition protest or the lawyers that defended them. After they successfully entered politics, a considerable number became "insiders" and a gulf grew between them and others that remained essentially in opposition. In fact, whether to win power through the system or through protest and even revolution, seriously divided the DPP.\(^7\)

Whether the DPP would strive to win the election and become the ruling party or remain in opposition was certainly a dilemma

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6. For a fairly comprehensive view on Taiwan's democratization that the author connects to opposition politics and elections, see Jaushieh Joseph Wu, *Taiwan's Democratization: Forces Behind the New Momentum*, Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1995.

that vexed the party during election campaigns and often produced dysfunctional tactics, especially the issue of Taiwan’s legal independence. Some thought it was resolved when CHEN Shui-bian won the presidency in 2000. But the DPP continued to act in many ways as an opposition party; in many respects and the KMT behaved as if it still governed. The DPP maintained its tough mien; the KMT was genteel. Both had to change. In office, the DPP needed to be conservative and was not. Out of office, the KMT needed to be more radical and aggressive, and wasn’t.

The second topic of relevance to this election: During its rise, one of the opposition’s central campaign themes was that a vote for the opposition was a vote for democracy, since democracy presumably required a two-party system, and the opposition, even after the DPP formed, was but a weak force for change. A significant portion of the electorate agreed and voted for DPP candidates for this reason. In short, voters’ hopes and expectations for democratization succored the Democratic Progressive Party at the polls.8

This “democratic argument” for a two-party system and a vote for the underdog favored the DPP up until 2000 or 2001. In 2000, CHEN Shui-bian won the presidential election and his party became the ruling party. In 2001, the Democratic Progressive Party prevailed in a legislative election and became the largest party in the Legislative Yuan, in some part by claiming that it needed to control a second branch of government for democratic change to be fully realized. After this, the DPP could no longer make the democratic argument.9

Meanwhile, after the 2000 election, the new opposition, the Nationalist Party together with the People First Party (PFP), formed by James Soong immediately after CHEN Shui-bian’s victory, argued that the DPP, instead of bringing about the consolidation of Taiwan’s democracy, had rather caused its devolution. In addition, pan-blue, as the alliance of the two parties, plus the New Party (NP), was called, declared that if a competitive party system

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8. Citizens of Taiwan have long favored a two-party system. However, forming a new political party is easy. This, and the fact that there soon developed factions in both the Nationalist Party and the Democratic Progressive Party, plus Taiwan politics being in flux meant that Taiwan had the potential of being a multi-party system as well. Hence, though a two-party system evolved it was punctuated by the emergence of new parties, small party alliances, party factions, and independent candidates.

9. The DPP, however, made the pitch that it should be credited with bringing genuine democracy to Taiwan or that it enabled Taiwan to reach the final stage of the democratizing process and that Taiwan’s democratic polity would be strengthened and solidified if the party received still more voter support.
were deemed a *sine qua non* for the development of a genuine working democracy, or if a change of ruling parties was desirable, then pan-blue should be returned to power.\textsuperscript{10}

Pan-blue should also be put back into office, they said, because the new government under CHEN Shui-bian had failed to institute reforms (though pan-blue often blocked reform efforts or put forth their own agenda that contradicted President Chen’s), manage the economy (the country fell into recession just half a year after Chen assumed office), maintain social stability (crime and ethnic ill-will grew at this time), or improve upon the nation’s foreign and security policies (which the Chen administration didn’t, perhaps couldn’t do, because of lack of talent and its inability to work well with the military and intelligence agencies due to disagreements with their personnel and goals—especially Taiwan’s independence versus unification with China). Pan-blue’s message had considerable resonance since the populace defined democracy’s “consolidation” mainly in these terms rather than by a change of ruling parties.\textsuperscript{11}

In reaction, the Chen administration resorted to wielding power through executive fiat and playing to its Fukien Taiwanese (the largest of the ethnic groups) base.\textsuperscript{12} Chen nurtured local nationalism (or a Taiwan identity) and encouraged ethnic discrimination by officials in his administration. Many of Chen’s people anyway felt that it was proper to settle scores with the previous authoritarian and oppressive “Mainlander KMT.” Thus Chen administration personnel labeled pan-blue “Chinese” (as opposed to Taiwanese), traitors, and enemies. In 2001, the DPP was joined by former president Lee Teng-hui, who founded a new political party, the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU), to entice KMT members loyal to Lee, especially Taiwanese who supported localization. The two parties became known as pan-green. Taiwan’s politics became badly polarized into two blocs.

Two non-domestic factors strongly influenced Taiwan politics: cross-strait relations (or relations with China) and ties with the


\textsuperscript{11} See John F. Copper, *Consolidating Taiwan’s Democracy*, Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2005, Chapter 4.

\textsuperscript{12} Taiwan’s population is approximately 65 percent Fukien Taiwanese, 15 percent Hakka, 14 percent Mainland Chinese, and 1 percent Aborigines. The ancestors of the first two groups came to Taiwan centuries ago. The Mainland Chinese came after World War II and governed the island. The Aborigines are the original inhabitants.
United States. Both camps sought to mold their very different political views to China and U.S. policies and, thereby, make political gains vis-à-vis the other bloc.

CHEN Shui-bian had promised better relations with China during the 2000 campaign. He toned down his independence views and in his inauguration speech promised not to go the way of separation. But this did not fit with his administration’s views on what was needed to stay in power, and his actions spoke very differently: Chen brought independence advocates into his administration and put them in key positions. He launched efforts to rewrite Taiwan’s history (emphasizing its separateness), while overseeing discrimination in hiring and elsewhere against other ethnic groups, especially Mainland Chinese who favored unification or at least closer ties with China.\textsuperscript{13}

A recession in Taiwan in 2001 put pan-green and the Chen administration in a serious dilemma. Some in pan-green, especially those who wanted to win support (and, of course, campaign contributions) from the business community, wanted to expand economic ties with China. Others (former president LEE Teng-hui and Vice President Annette Lu, for example) felt such ties would undermine Taiwan’s hopes for real independence. Pan-blue argued that President Chen and his government had destroyed the Taiwan “economic miracle,” which they had created, and the only way to get Taiwan’s economic growth back on track was to end restrictions on commerce with China. They used this against pan-green at election time.\textsuperscript{14} As time passed and it seemed more and more evident that Taiwan faced grave challenges economically and pan-blue had it right.

In fact, China’s economic might seemed to constrain how far Taiwan’s separate national identity could go. With a reported one million of Taiwan’s citizens living in China doing business, so many traveling back and forth each year, and an increasing number of students studying there, the old argument of natural cultural links to China reappeared. With it there came feelings of resignation due to the fact that China’s economic success had provided its military with more money to build missiles and other weapons to intimidate


\textsuperscript{14} Pan-blue’s criticism of the Chen administration for its incompetence in managing the economy didn’t play too well in the 2001 legislative election; it resonated much more in 2004.
Taiwan so that it “could not declare separation without declaring war.”

The Chen administration’s answer was that it had good relations with the United States and the U.S. would protect Taiwan. This seemed to be a good riposte, as ties with Washington got better after George W. Bush was elected president. Some pundits even said that relations had never been better with Washington. America would thus shield Taiwan from China’s military threats and guarantee its sovereignty and self-determination.

But the situation changed after 9/11 as Beijing signed on to the war against terrorism and Washington became distracted by military actions in Afghanistan and Iraq. In this milieu, the United States needed cordial relations with China. The North Korea problem, nuclear proliferation, and a number of other issues further increased the need for the U.S. and China to work together. Thus, President Chen provoking China did not set well in Washington, and the Bush administration made its concerns known. Relations with America turned from being an asset to President Chen and the DPP into being a liability.

This was, in brief, the political context in which the election under study here transpired. To understand in greater depth why these elections produced the results they did it is also necessary to examine Taiwan’s previous elections, especially its recent ones and in particular two past metropolitan mayors and city council races. This puts this election in clearer perspective while elucidating candidates’ strategies and much more.

As noted above, beginning in the 1950s, elections were one of the major forces behind Taiwan’s democratization. At first there was electoral competition only in local elections. By the 1960s, independent candidates gave voters some choices in national elections. In the 1970s, tangwai politicians organized and afforded some national electoral competition. In 1980, Taiwan witnessed its first national competitive election. Another followed in 1983. After the DPP formed in 1986, the country had two-party competition. In 1989, the DPP performed well enough that some observers thought it might grasp power in the near future. This view faded in 1991

17. Ibid.
when the KMT won an impressive victory in the National Assembly election, but reappeared in 1992 when the DPP performed well in a Legislative Yuan election.\textsuperscript{18} During this period, the opposition learned how to campaign effectively.

The results of Taiwan's 1994 metropolitan mayors and city council elections, in particular the Taipei mayoral race, were very instructive for the parties and voters alike. The Taipei contest was a three-way race.\textsuperscript{19} The New Party's popular JAW Shao-kong and the DPP's energetic CHEN Shui-bian both challenged the incumbent KMT mayor of Taipei, HUANG Ta-chou. Most voters did not see Huang as having done a very good job in office; thus he was not advantaged by incumbency. In fact, just the opposite. Jaw was well known and admired and was thought by most observers to be the likely winner. However, his party, the New Party, being an erstwhile faction of the KMT there was extreme bitterness between them. The KMT-NP feud resulted in the two campaigning against each other, rather than against the DPP's candidate; this gave Chen the victory.\textsuperscript{20}

In 1998, this situation did not reoccur. MA Ying-jeou was the KMT's nominee. He was young, well educated, polished and clean. The New Party did not have a popular candidate. CHEN Shui-bian by most accounts had been a good mayor; certainly he was a popular one. But this didn't matter; Chen lost in a two-way race.\textsuperscript{21} There was a lesson in this: If one camp splits their vote the opposing side will win. This applied more specifically to the KMT since its voting base was bigger. After he lost the election, Chen perceived that doing a good job was less important than other variables.\textsuperscript{22}

\textsuperscript{18} See note 1 for sources on these elections.
\textsuperscript{19} In the past, the citizens of Taipei and Kaohsiung elected their mayors. But in 1964 and 1997 the mayors of the two cities were made appointed offices. The rationale was that these cities were special and important; the opposition, however, claimed that the ruling Nationalist Party feared these positions might become springboards whereby a popular mayor might enter national politics and challenge the ruling party. There was also concern that the city mayors might represent ethnic Taiwanese or advocate Taiwan's independence and this would be a problem. In 1992, the Constitution of the Republic of China was amended to make these positions once again elective. Legislation was passed to this effect in 1994. That year mayoral races where again held.
\textsuperscript{20} For details, see Copper, "Taiwan's Mid-1990s Elections," supra note 1, Chapter 2.
\textsuperscript{21} It is noteworthy that Chen won 43 percent of the popular vote in 1994 when he was elected mayor. In 1998, he got 46 percent of the vote and lost.
\textsuperscript{22} See CHEN Shui-bian (translated by David J. Roman), The Son of Taiwan: The Life of Chen Shui-bian and his dreams for Taiwan, Taipei: Taiwan Publishing Co., 1999, for the president's own account.
In 2000, a replay of the 1994 Taipei mayoral race happened in the presidential election. Early on in the campaign James Soong was far-and-away the leading candidate for president. His poll numbers bested those of both CHEN Shui-bian, who got the DPP's nomination, and LIEN Chan, President Lee's vice president. The sticking point was that President Lee did not support Soong's candidacy. Lee then orchestrated the party's nomination of LIEN Chan. He apparently calculated that popularity as measured by opinion polls didn't matter; or he hated Soong so intensely that he would not consider him to be the next president. In any event, Soong ran as an independent—without a party, organization, talent or money. He still would have won, but the KMT released documents showing Soong had absconded with party funds when he was secretary-general of the party. This severely damaged Soong's heretofore-clean image. KMT strategists went a step further: They told party members and the public that Soong had no chance of winning (when they knew he was still ahead in the polls) and instructed their constituency to "dump Soong and support Lien." Meanwhile, President Lee gave up on Lien and helped Chen, or so many alleged.23

Chen thus won the election and became president because the split in the KMT vote. Otherwise, as in 1994, he would not have been elected. After the election, Soong and his newly formed party mended fences with the KMT now led by LIEN Chan and joined against their common enemy now in office, the Chen administration. Together they controlled the legislature and blocked Chen's agenda. This resulted in Taiwan politics becoming badly stalemated. Chen labeled the KMT and PFP obstructionists; they said he did not have a mandate (winning less than forty percent of the popular vote and holding only a third of the seats in the Legislative Yuan). Pan-blue leaders also argued Taiwan's polity should nonetheless be a parliamentary system, rather than a presidential one.24 Had Taiwan adopted a parliamentary system, Chen would have been marginalized.

23. See Copper, Taiwan's 2000 Presidential and Vice Presidential Election, supra note 1, p. 47.

24. For details on this point, see Wu Yu-shan, "The ROC's Semi-Presidentialism at Work: Unstable Compromise, Not Cohabitation," Issues and Studies, September-October 2000, pp. 1-40. President Chen states in his book that "under the current constitutional structure of the Republic of China, the president is barely subject to the scrutiny of congress, giving him power without attendant responsibility." See Chen, The Son of Taiwan, supra note 22, p. 144.
Chen’s recourse was to ignore constitutional arguments and promote localism and ethnic tensions while boasting of his consolidating democracy by ending the KMT’s “white terror” and dictatorship. President Chen had an ace in the hole: He could provoke Chinese leaders in Beijing to stir up feelings of local nationalism when he needed to rally his base and attract votes. Chen’s and the DPP’s approach worked better to win votes than pan-blue’s platform of fixing the economy, getting along with China, restoring social tranquility, and lowering the crime rate. It appeared after the 2001 election that “hard politics” and playing on voters’ emotions again worked better than addressing issues.  

In 2004, Lien and Soong joined forces and formed a single ticket to challenge Chen in a presidential race. They told voters they could fix the economy and govern better. As usual Chen played on ethnic ill will, localism, and the China threat to shore up his base. But the political situation had changed. Leading up to the Election Day it seemed issues mattered as pan-blue led in the polls. Also, the odds makers gambling on the election and the stock market (companies with pan-blue connections went up while pan-green companies fell) forecasted a pan-blue win. But on the eve of the election, President Chen and Vice President Lu were shot, which generated a critical sympathy vote. Furthermore, Chen ordered the police and military (who were likely to vote pan-blue) to remain at their posts. Chen won a very narrow victory. Lien and Soong claimed the election had been stolen from them and organized protest rallies to express their supporters’ chagrin. They tried to get the judiciary to overturn the results, but this did not work; the judiciary was in Chen’s pocket (according to pan-blue at least).

In December 2004, though seemingly in disarray after MA Ying-jeou took over leadership of the KMT in a hard battle with legislative speaker WANG Jyng-ping, pan-blue “won” the legislative election. It was a blue victory mainly in the sense that the ruling party was expected to win and it reversed the spate of election wins since 2000 for pan-green. Notably, President Chen was a not an asset to DPP candidates as he was in previous elections. The main reason for this was that he and his administration were no longer seen as clean. Issues also proved important. And, the United States, unhappy with Chen provoking China, showed its displeasure, and

25. For details, see Copper, Taiwan’s 2004 Presidential and Vice Presidential Election, supra note 1.
26. Ibid.
this likely influenced the election a bit in pan-blue’s favor.\textsuperscript{27} Local elections in 2005 saw a bigger win for pan-blue. Even more than in the 2004 legislative election, President Chen hurt his party because of his perceived corruption. And again the U.S. didn’t favor pan-green.\textsuperscript{28}

Looking at this background it is understandable that pan-blue perceived that the issues of ethnic identity and localization favored the DPP. Social stability, the economy, and relations with the United States, they thought, advantaged their candidates. They saw they needed to counter pan-green’s strategy. Corruption, they calculated, might be the winning issue as it favored pan-blue. Generally they were correct in these assumptions. Yet the political situation in Taiwan was obviously more complex than these issues alone suggest.

\textbf{III. THE CORRUPTION ISSUE}

The salient political topic during the months leading up to this election was corruption. Many said it was \textit{sui generis} a driving force during the campaign. For months prior to the election, President Chen was preoccupied with one serious scandal after another. His relatives and a number of members of his administration and/or his party had resigned, were under subpoena, or had been indicted.

The corruption issue was especially disabling for the DPP because it and President Chen had long excoriated the Nationalist Party for its shady activities: using its huge ill-gotten treasury (reported to be the richest political party in the world) to hire talent, keep its members loyal to the party, buy votes (and thus elections), and much more. In contrast, DPP leaders portrayed their party as poor and clean. Condemning corruption worked quite well; it helped President Chen win the presidency in 2000 and assisted the DPP to gain seats in the 2001 legislative election and become the largest party in the Legislative Yuan.\textsuperscript{29}

When CHEN Shui-bian and the DPP became seriously infected with corruption is difficult to say. Some say it had early roots, since its top leaders and even lower echelon functionaries had careers beginning in local politics where corruption was worse than in

\textsuperscript{27} See Copper, \textit{Taiwan’s 2004 Legislative Election}, supra note 1.


\textsuperscript{29} See Copper, \textit{Taiwan’s 2000 Presidential and Vice Presidential Election}, supra note 1, p. 57.
national politics. Some analysts say that all of Taiwan's political parties including the DPP, contrary to its statements otherwise, have been "affiliated with gangs and tycoons" and have corrupt roots. CHEN Shui-bian reportedly received donations from the Celestial Alliance gang to run for Taipei mayor in 1994 and may have even gotten money from the notorious leader of the criminal world in Taiwan, LO Fu-chu. Others say the DPP's association with LEE Teng-hui and/or the fact the Chen administration inherited Lee's legacy, brought it. Still others say corruption became serious in 2000 after the DPP became the ruling party and had access to government money.

In any event, the Chen government became widely seen as a corrupt regime sometime between midway through Chen's first term and 2004, when a spate of reports appeared in the media about Chen administration and the first lady’s financial shenanigans. At the time of the 2004 election the media reported that President Chen and a host of personnel in his administration perceived they would lose the election and felt they had to "cash in" while they could. Public opinion shifted at this time or shortly


31. The New Party was not one that was viewed as corrupt. Some said it was too idealistic in this way and that is why it failed.

32. See Ko-lin CHIN, Heijin: Organized Crime, Business, and Politics in Taiwan, Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2003, p. 155 and 181. Lo was for several years a member of the Legislative Yuan with close ties to organized crime. He even said, "they needed representation too." According to the author an independent legislator overheard Lo ask CHEN Shui-bian if he had gotten his financial help. Lo was also considered one of the leaders of the Celestial Alliance, which was known to have supported Chen's election to Taipei mayor.


34. The first lady, who had been an asset to Chen earlier, no longer was. See Edward Cody, "Chen's battle: survival," Asian Wall Street Journal, November 8, 2006, p. 11.

35. Nationalist Party legislator Chiu Yi reportedly had evidence that President Chen diverted campaign money into a secret account and used his daughter's name on bank accounts to hide funds at this time. See SHIH Hsiu-chuan, "Chiu keeps up attack on president's 'secret' account," Taipei Times, August 7, 2006, p. 3. It does seem quite evident that Chen and many in his party thought they would lose the 2004 election judging from the opinion polls and other indicators at the time.
after about which was more corrupt, the KMT or the DPP.\footnote{Kissings Contemporary Archives, a widely used reference source, in mid-2002 cited a poll taken in Taiwan in which more respondents said the DPP was more corrupt than the KMT. In October, six months after the 2004 election, an opinion poll showed that 49% of respondents said the DPP was corrupt (more than KMT), 56% expressed dissatisfaction with the DPP and even more said the DPP had lost its core values. See United Daily News, October 7, 2004.}

Corruption was clearly a negative for the DPP during the 2004 legislative election campaign. The ruling party had anticipated that it would make gains in legislate seats. It doubtless would have, but a rash of scandals hurt DPP candidates. As a matter of general campaign strategy DPP planners could not make charges of corruption against the KMT stick because their party was seen as worse.\footnote{For details, see Copper, Taiwan's 2004 Legislative Election, supra note 1. It is noteworthy that bad publicity about the First Lady’s extravagant spending began to appear at this time. See, for example, Cody, “Chen’s battle: survival,” supra note 34, p. 11.} This situation was also present in the December 2005 local elections. This time it was crystal clear that President Chen, because of the image of corruption that surrounded him, was a drag on the party, and it suffered a major setback as a result.\footnote{See Copper, “A Referendum on President Chen,” supra note 28, pp. 38-40 and Rigger, “Taiwan’s Voters Bring Back the Blues,” supra note 28, pp. 34-38.}

The specific evidence is revealing. In August, four months before the election, a major scandal broke when Thai construction workers helping build the Kaohsiung Mass Rapid Transit (KMRT) rioted over oppressive working and living conditions. An investigation of the incident exposed bribery and other official corruption dealing with labor brokers. The top official involved was CHEN Che-nan, President CHEN Shui-bian’s deputy secretary general (though not a relative). He and twenty others were subsequently implicated in the corrupt scheme.\footnote{CHEN Che-nan was later convicted of receiving bribes a few days after the election and was sentenced to 12 years in jail and barred from holding office for ten years after he is released from jail. “Chen’s Former Aide Gets 12 Years for Graft,” Associated Press, December 14, 2006 (online at www.taiwansecurity.org).} Some high DPP officials resigned, including CHEN Che-nan’s son; CHEN Chi-mai, acting Kaohsiung mayor; and CHEN Chu, head of the Council of Labor Affairs.\footnote{See Rigger, “Taiwan Voters Bring Back the Blues,” supra note 28, for details. The Presidential Office, which defended CHEN Chen-nan, was thoroughly embarrassed by this and things got worse when Taiwan’s media published his pictures from a security camera in a South Korean gambling house, which showed he was there when he had sworn he wasn’t.}
The next month, Chen orchestrated a vote for his ally, YU Shyi-kun, to take the reins of leadership of the party. The process revealed serious party opposition to the president’s leadership, owing to the Chen administration’s perceived venality. The turnout was less than 20 percent and anti-Chen opposition became very visible—composed of Vice President Lu, former premier Frank Hsieh, former party chairman LIN Yi-hsiung, and others, and a portion of the New Tide Faction (the party’s largest). Some observers saw this as the beginning of a “proxy war.”

The Chen administration’s scandals got much worse. In April CHEN Che-nan was officially detained on suspicion of accepting bribes. This was not fresh news, but it did remind the public of President Chen’s vice. At nearly the same time, the Presidential Office opened an investigation of MA Yung-cheng, who had resigned amid accusations he had interfered in the appointment of members of the Hu Nan Commercial Bank board, and for his services had received a payment of NT$ 1 million. Then it was reported First Lady WU Shu-chen had received vouchers for helping in the takeover bid of the SOGO Department Store in Taipei. Pictures of her spending the certificates were shown on TV, thus bringing suspicion of corruption into the Chen family.

The first lady was long rumored to have been involved in insider trading in Taiwan’s stock market. Reports of this appeared repeatedly in the media. There were similar reports about President Chen’s son-in-law, CHAO Chien-min, doing the same thing. Subsequently, authorities detained Chao and the office and the residence of his parents were searched. Chao was accused of profiting from privileged information about the Taiwan Development Corporation, which had received a large loan from the Bank of Taiwan, after which its stock grew from NT$2 to NT$18 within a year. The opposition charged that President Chen was aware of Chao’s actions and also accused Minister of Finance Joseph Lyu, an associate of the president, for complicity in the matter.

Subsequently, the Chen administration hurt its reputation for supporting press freedom by revoking the license of the TV station that broke the story.

42. “Presidential Office may investigate Ma Yung-cheng,” China Post, April 21, 2006, p. 4.
The end of April, the first lady came under attack in the Legislative Yuan, and the accusers were not just members of the opposition parties. Several DPP members said that she had “cheated the voters”—referring to a promise President Chen and she made before the 2004 presidential election to put their assets in trust. Family money went into a trust, but not a blind trust, and the first lady invested in a real estate deal worth NT$40 million. A TSU legislator charged that the trust was a “fake trust.” Opposition lawmakers said that almost everyone believes she had been engaging in manipulating the boards of companies, making millions from insider trading, and evading taxes.45

Meanwhile, the Taiwan Railway Administration announced that the procurement of trains valued at NT$17 billion was suspended. This followed a report in the press that a top engineer was being held incommunicado for his involvement in bidding irregularities. HSU Chung-jung, responsible for the contracts, was then detained by the Changhua District Prosecutor’s Office. The media reported that the scandal was linked to the former minister of transportation and communications, thus implicating President Chen by association.46

In early May, DPP leaders discussed adding an anti-corruption provision to the party platform. Chairman YU Shyi-kun said he hoped in this way to win back public confidence. The proposed rules would ban moonlighting, require officials to put their personal assets into trust while in office, and more strictly define conflict of interest.47

But President Chen took a different tack. He announced that his wife had not received gift vouchers from SOGO and that he was suing LEE Chuan-chiao (who made the claim) for libel. He also promised he would resign from office if the charges against his wife were found to be true.48 But this did little to end the problem.

At a party meeting, DPP leaders chided the president for his “pomp and arrogance that alienated the electorate.” A DPP member of the Taipei city council said the first family was “smearing the clean image of the party.” In addition to the first lady’s corruption he mentioned President Chen’s son driving around in a Jaguar and

members of the first family using a government plane to take them to Taichung when Chen’s son got engaged. Another lawmaker cited the first family’s lawyer, doctor and accountant for not reporting stock transactions, their meteoric promotions, mixing politics and business, and other dishonest practices. A few days later, DPP lawmakers called on Chen’s in-laws to apologize and leveled charges against CHAO Chien-ming’s mother for making “at least NT$100 million through insider trading.”

At this time, the Taiwan Solidarity Union, the DPP’s ally party, conducted an opinion poll of Taiwan’s civic organizations in Taiwan. The survey showed that only 5.8 percent of such groups were satisfied with President Chen’s performance (as opposed to 88.4 percent that were not). A total of 91.3 percent of the groups said President Chen should be held responsible for the scandals in the government and the DPP. Chen’s performance as president, just ahead of his sixth anniversary in office, was scored at 57.5 percent—a failing grade. TSU Chairman SU Chin-chiang said the results of the survey were “shocking to see.” He said, “Chen’s behavior had totally let down the people.”

Attempting damage control, President Chen announced he supported a judicial investigation into Chao’s insider trading. But this was not enough; DPP leaders demanded that he be expelled from the party. Still this didn’t seem to help the president’s dire situation as a local university poll put his approval rating at 16 percent—the lowest ever recorded for Chen. Some observers said that there had grown a critical mass. The Chao issue was worse than the others since it tainted President Chen personally.

Then, a scandal broke involving the well-known Taiwan Sugar Corporation revealing its improper ties to a private foundation. This led to the indictment of KONG Jaw-sheng, chairman of the government’s Financial Supervisory Commission, an agency created in 2004 by President Chen. Recognizing the scandal could escalate,

DPP leaders quickly demanded that Kong resign. The cabinet shortly after relieved him of his post.

Adding to the DPP's woes in terms of the coming election, the Control Yuan at this time published records of political donations in the last election. LUO Wen-jia, the DPP's candidate for magistrate of Taipei, according to their records, took in over $NT118 million, or 12.4 percent of the total received by all candidates, and still lost the election. Another DPP candidate was the second largest recipient. So much for the KMT buying elections.

At this juncture, President Chen announced that he was relinquishing power over domestic affairs to Premier SU Tseng-chang. According to local political analysts, Chen hoped to separate his scandals from the DPP to avoid staining the party beyond repair. The decision put Premier Su in a leading position to be the party's nominee for president in 2008, assuming Chen lasted until then. On the other hand, Su was in the unenviable position of having to work with Chen (or under him, assuming he had not really turned over power) while running the country. In addition, Su had to cope with other contenders in the party who also wanted the nomination and Vice President Lu, who would become president if Chen resigned.

The month of August began with more corruption accusations. Pan-blue and pan-green lawmakers alike criticized President Chen when it was discovered the Presidential Office had paid household help for CHAO Chien-ming and Chen's daughter. While seemingly a petty amount, legislators nevertheless demanded that the money be returned to the treasury. Exacerbating the situation, the China Times reported that receipts submitted to the Presidential Office for reimbursements by family and friends amounting to NT$20 million were fakes and that NT$15 million had been spent on SOGO Department Store vouchers. KMT legislator CHIU Yi, who was leading the charge in exposing the Chen administration, stated that

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58. Lawrence Chung, "Chen's woes give power to premier," South China Morning Post, June 2, 2006 (online at www.lexis-nexis.com).
NT$100 million from the Presidential slush fund was unaccounted for and suggested that President Chen had embezzled it.\textsuperscript{60} The next day President Chen showed legislative speaker WANG Jyng-ping receipts for money from the fund; but Wang didn’t say whether this resolved the problem or not, thus leaving the issue hanging.\textsuperscript{61} Wang later said that it would not be good to release information about this, as some of the money had been used to conduct Taiwan’s secret diplomacy. Still, the scandal hurt the president. A Global Views Monthly poll done at this time showed 62 percent of respondents did not believe Chen’s explanation about the use of the fund, compared to only 18.2 percent that believed him.\textsuperscript{62}

CHIU Yi continued his attack on the president. He cited a bank account Chen opened during the 2004 presidential election campaign, saying it was to hide money to be taken abroad after Chen lost reelection. Presidential spokespersons said the account was a campaign account. Chiu responded with evidence that deposits were made by Chen’s children; he said it was unlikely they made campaign contributions to him.\textsuperscript{63}

At this juncture, Minister of Transportation and Communications, KUO Yao-chi, tendered her resignation after only 195 days on the job. Kuo’s replacement said that her quitting might have related to the electronic toll collection scandal that had broken earlier. But there was also speculation that she discovered too much corruption in the ministry and got little cooperation from above to do anything about it, and was expected to cover it up.\textsuperscript{64}

IV. SHIH MING-TEH’S ANTI-CORRUPTION MOVEMENT

Disgusted by the above-mentioned events, former DPP chairman SHIH Ming-teh organized a mass campaign to pressure President Chen to resign from office.\textsuperscript{65} Shih’s move was devastating

\textsuperscript{60} SHIH Hsiu-chuan and Rich Chang, “Chiu alleges Chen embezzled money from special fund,” \textit{Taipei Times}, August 1, 2006, p. 3.

\textsuperscript{61} SHIH Hsiu-chuan, “Chen shows Wang fund receipts,” \textit{Taipei Times}, August 2, 2006, p. 3.


\textsuperscript{63} SHIH Hsiu-chuan, “Chiu keeps up attack on president’s ‘secret account,’” \textit{Taipei Times}, August 7, 2006, p. 3.


\textsuperscript{65} Shih first wrote a letter to President Chen asking him to resign. For the text of Shih’s letter, online at www.zoneeuropa.com/20060811_2.htm.
because of who he was and what he represented. Under KMT rule, Shih had been sentenced to prison for a total of twenty-five years (including a death sentence not carried out) basically for opposing one-party authoritarianism. This was the most of any of Taiwan’s opposition figures. He was labeled “Taiwan’s Nelson Mandela.” When he got out of prison, Shih joined the DPP and served a term as chairman. In that position he was respected by both pan-green advocates of democratization and independence and by pan-blue for his willingness to forget the past and compromise to get things done, and for his concern for bettering Taiwan.66

Professor HUANG Guang-kuo, who had earlier organized a group of academics against Chen, and social movement leader CHEN Tsu-chi, joined Shih, as did Vice President Annette Lu’s doctor, CHEN Yao-chang. Jerry Fan, who was reputed to have been the publicity brains behind CHEN Shui-bian’s successful 2000 presidential election campaign became the main spokesperson for Shih’s movement. Fan had earlier led a campaign to get citizens to write letters to judicial officials, asking them to act with probity to get rid of corruption and make Taiwan’s political system work. He and a large portion of the public viewed the judiciary as loyal to President Chen rather than independent.67

Fan placed advertisements in Taiwan’s major newspapers that included a template letter. He said that his mail campaign had in mind the experience of South Korea where citizens wrote tens of thousands of letters to the Seoul district court; eventually former presidents CHUN Doo-hwan and ROH Tae-woo were ousted and convicted of treason, mutiny, corruption, and were imprisoned. Former finance minister and well-known politician WANG Chien-shiun supported Fan, saying the prosecutors and judicial system were at fault as they allowed Chen’s corruption. A number of Tai-

67. See Kathrin Hille, “Probe into Chen’s son-in-law seen as a test for Taiwan,” Financial Times, May 31, 2006 (online at www.lexis-nexis.com). Kao Yung-chen, head of the Judicial Reform Foundation seconded Fan’s view. In addition, the American Chamber of Commerce in its annual white paper released at this time was highly critical of corruption in Taiwan and found the judiciary wanting.
wan’s famous Olympic athletes joined in the chorus. Scholars that sympathized with Shih’s goals opined that since the legislature could not recall the president due to the partisan deadlock there and since President Chen controlled the judiciary, there was no democratic means to get Chen to step down.

Shih said when he launched the movement that arousing the public was necessary and that he sought to raise NT$100 million from a million people (NT$100 each). The movement was labeled the “one million person movement against corruption.” It was soon reported that people on the streets in Taipei were greeting others, instead of saying hello, by asking if they had contributed yet. According to an opinion poll done at the time by the China Times, 68 percent of respondents supported Shih’s initiative. Moreover, 30 percent of those who joined his movement were former Chen supporters.

Some called Shih’s effort historic. It was the first time in Taiwan’s history that a major protest movement was supported by both pan-green and pan-blue. It was also the first anyone called on participants to contribute money, and Shih reached his goal of a million donors ahead of schedule.

Shih’s successes prompted Chen backers to organize counterdemonstrations. The first took place on August 26 led by political commentator WANG Ben-hu. At a rally, reportedly attended by

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68. “‘Anti-graft’ campaign now targets judicial officials,” China Post, August 31, 2006, p. 4. Taekwondo silver medalist HUANG Chih-hsiung, weightlifter TSAI Wen-yi and boxer KUO Chih-lai were among those that spoke out at this time.
70. ONG H wee Hwee, “Drive to Oust Chen: Target Hit in a Week,” Straits Times, August 23, 2006 (online at www.taiwansecurity.org).
71. Ibid. There were, of course, dissenting voices. Some called Shih a “gravedigger of Taiwan’s democracy,” who was riding on a tiger without the reins in his hands. See “Democracy Needs Deeping Not Destruction,” (editorial), Taiwan News, August 23, 2006 (online at www.taiwansecurity.org). There was also considerable doubt that Shih’s efforts would pressure President Chen to step down. One reason cited was that the top two contenders for power in the DPP, SU Tseng-chang and Frank Hsieh, did not have strong reputations for supporting Taiwan’s independence, as does President Chen. See Jane Rickards, “Shih’s Campaign Won’t Have Direct Impact on Chen,” China Post (editorial), August 24, 2006, p. 2.
73. “Salute Shih Ming-teh,” China Post (editorial), August 23, 2006, p. 2. Others, though, called Shih a romantic and some said a lunatic.
74. Ibid. It is noteworthy that one of the pan-green leaders of the movement addressed the crowd as “citizens of the Taiwan Republic.” Pan-blue participants didn’t like this but continued to support the movement anyway.
20,000 supporters, Wang tried to stir up emotions by attacking the “Chinese dogs” (meaning the Mainland Chinese ethnic group); “DPP traitors” like Shih and Sissy Chen (a former well-known DPP activist and now TV program host); and HSU Hsin-liang (a former chairperson of DPP).\(^{75}\) Wang’s efforts got attention, but the momentum was still with Shih.

The media reported at this time that former president LEE Teng-hui, Vice President Annette Lu, and Legislative Yuan speaker WANG Jyng-ping had formed an alliance to oust Chen. Behind this speculation was the belief Premier SU Tseng-chang, a close associate of Chen, would fall with Chen and the DPP would devolve into chaos if something were not done. Also it was thought that Speaker Wang was still angry over his defeat by MA Ying-jeou for the chairmanship of the KMT and would join and become premier in the new government. But Wang categorically denied there was any alliance or that he had any interest in such a plan. Moreover, many DPP lawmakers were reported to be opposed to such an idea.\(^{76}\) Yet the fact many observers took the scenario seriously seemed to indicate how difficult the situation was for pan-green.

Late August and early September saw SHIH Ming-teh’s efforts to force Chen to resign continue to dominate Taiwan’s political scene. Shih called for a large mass demonstration in Taipei on September 9. Shih stated in the days leading up to the rally that Chen was a “flawed” president. He said his efforts were aimed at rebuilding core values and harmony in the society.\(^{77}\) Shih also expressed sorrow about what he was doing, saying that he had strongly supported Chen in 2000 and after, but the allegation that Chen had pocketed diplomatic funds was the last straw. Shih’s detractors, including two former wives, said Shih had ulterior motives and that the opposition had bought him off.\(^{78}\)

A Time/CNN survey published at the time revealed that 64 percent of Taiwan’s population wanted Chen to step down as opposed to only 19 percent who said he should not. What was especially significant about the poll, 53 percent of those who called for

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77. “‘Anti-Graft’ Drive to Rebuild Values: Shih,” *China Post*, September 8, 2006
78. SNG Hwee Hwee, “Shih Insists He’s a Reluctant Protestor,” *Straits Times*, September 9, 2006 (online at www.taiwansecurity.org).
him to resign said they had no political affiliation. This seemed ominous for the DPP in the coming election.

The day before a smaller September 4 rally, MA Ying-jeou, who had been fairly reticent about Chen resigning, declared his strong support for Shih. Ma called on the DPP not to become an "accomplice in corruption," saying that it would not be good for Taiwan if the DPP collapsed. He asked DPP leaders to join in another recall against Chen in the legislature. But James Soong was notably a stronger advocate of Chen being ousted. According to some pundits, Ma did not really want Chen to resign and knew that DPP legislators would not join pan-blue in another recall effort. Soong's view was different.

On September 9, on schedule, protestors took to the streets in Taipei wearing red shirts or carrying red balloons as a sign of their anger and their commitment to see Chen quit. Pundits said the protest might compel the judiciary, which Chen controlled, to do their work more thoroughly. There were hugely different estimates of how many people participated. The figures ranged from 350,000 to 500,000. In any event, it was well attended, especially given the fact that neither political bloc sponsored it.

Shih then held a "circle the city" (Taipei) demonstration on September 15. On this occasion the police estimated the number attending at 280,000, but later revised that to 360,000. The Broadcasting Corporation of China reported there were 500,000. During the demonstration the Depose-Chen Headquarters said the number


81. Several Taiwan scholars expressed this view to the author. The reasoning was that Ma did not want Annette Lu to become president and knew that top DPP leaders didn't either. Ma also calculated that Chen would never regain his reputation and would be a weak leader until 2008 and this was a "very acceptable" situation. Ma, in an interview with *Time* magazine in July, said that if Chen stayed on it "would be to our benefit." See "10 Questions: Ma Ying-jeou," *Time* (Asia edition), July 10, 2006 (online at www.taiwansecurity.org).


83. One newspaper said that the turnout was over 100,000 in the main city of the protest. See "Rally to Oust Chen kicks off," *China Post*, September 10, 2006, p. 1. Another paper put the number at 100,000. See "Protest turnout lower than expected," *Taipei Times*, September 10, 2006, p. 1. Rain that day just as the rally started probably made the turnout less.
was 750,000, but afterwards said the number had exceed one million. The foreign press reported several figures, but noted the number was very large, considering it was raining and the protesters walked 5.5 kilometers.

Rumors spread that the protest might turn violent. Several unions vowed to strike and to block highways and airports. More than 3,800 riot police were mobilized. Some said that the movement's activists planned to break into the Presidential Palace and hoped guards would shoot them, which would spark a revolution. Or, they expected the guards to refuse to use weapons against them and would join the opposition, at which time President Chen would have no choice but to step down and leave the country. The media reported that the president and his family were taken to Taiwan's military command center for protection. Rumors then spread of a coup. SHIH Ming-teh at this time said that he feared that he would be assassinated.

Supporters of President Chen, led by the Taiwan Society that had long advocated an independent Taiwan, organized a counterdemonstration. But Premier Su refused to attend, saying that he had other business. Frank Hsieh did not go, offering as the reason that he could not encourage chaos in Taipei when he was running for the office of mayor. Vice President Annette Lu was not invited. The Taiwan Society said she "showed an ambition to usurp the presidency and noted that some of her staff had assailed Chen in public (even on TV) and that her brother, a lawyer, had said publicly that Chen had "tarnished the image of the legal profession with his scams and those of his aides and family." The leadership of the DPP was obviously in a serious quandary about what to do.

President Chen chose to be away during most of the protest activities. Observes said he did not want to further energize the movement with his presence. Instead Chen put on a humble and conciliatory face. After the September 4th gathering he said that he was praying for Shih and others in the movement. Subsequently,

86. Ibid. The Presidential Office issued a statement denying that the president and his family had sought refuge.
Chen called for his “former comrade in arms” to take a break as he was suffering from bad health. DPP leaders called for a dialog with Shih.  

Pro-Chen forces put forward the view that the protest movement threatened Taiwan’s democracy because there was no evidence that Chen himself was corrupt or had engaged in any illegal acts and that Shih’s movement was turning the island into mob rule. They also charged the movement was having a bad effect on the economy. Some pro-Chen activists tried to put the Taiwan independence issue on the agenda to win back Taiwanese support and divert attention away from the corruption issue.

Academics who defended the protest noted that democracy was not being devolved; rather, the protest, they contended, happened because Chen had gained too much power, the judiciary was not independent, and prosecutors did not do anything until the media exposed Chen administration corruption. They said further that the Legislative Yuan was paralyzed and could not deal with the situation and that the parties (in this case the DPP) did not enforce its rules against corruption. They said the political issues were too vital to worry about the economy at the moment and that Chen’s record as president showed that if he were to leave office the economy would probably improve.

Shih and his advisors subsequently decided not to take the demonstrations to other parts of Taiwan, apparently thinking that President Chen could, and would, organize counter-demonstrations and the two sides would clash and violence would result. But Shih could not control his movement’s people and demonstrations were launched in Kaohsiung and Tainan. There followed clashes between pro-Shih and pro-Chen forces in both cities. In Kaohsiung, anti- and pro-Chen forces clashed, resulting in arrests and injuries to two people.

91. Benjamin Yeh, “Anti-Chen Campaign Concentrates on Taipei,” Agence France Presse, September 18, 2006 (online at taiswansecurity.com). The Anti-Chen Movement’s spokesperson, WANG Li-ping, said that it would “generate uncertain factors” and that with limited manpower and logistics we cannot “guarantee peace in the rallies.”
In the meantime, in Taipei DPP Chairman YU Shyi-kun, who finally appeared at a pro-Chen rally, said the anti-Chen movement was an effort “by Chinese to bully Taiwanese.” He further said that the anti-Chen demonstrators, wearing red “symbolized support for Red China and the 700 missiles China had aimed at Taiwan.” Yu also said that Shih was “blabbering like a madman.” Shih replied with a promise to besiege the Presidential Palace on National Day, October 10.93

On September 25, KMT Chairman MA Ying-jeou called for another recall motion, which he emphasized would lead to a referendum “so the people could decide President Chen’s fate.” However, it was uncertain whether the DPP would support the recall; if not, it was almost certain to have the same fate as the June recall attempt. Ma said if the recall failed the legislature should vote a motion of no confidence (which should be easier since it required only a majority vote as opposed to a two-thirds vote).

The problem with this was that it did not seem justified to remove Premier Su since he was not implicated in any corruption; further, constitutionally President Chen could simply replace him rather than call an election.94 In any event, the PFP proceeded with a motion to vote on recalling the president. It passed by a vote of 106 to 82. There would be a vote to recall Chen on October 13.95 Political observers at this time opined that MA Ying-jeou was in a dilemma: He had to look like a strong leader, yet he did not really want Chen recalled.

On September 28, around-the-island anti-Chen convoy departed from Taipei for Hsinchu on an eight-day tour. The media reported that pro-Chen forces planned to disrupt its activities and that “blood may be shed.”96 The DPP, trying to undermine Shih’s movement, released photos of Shih meeting a financier on Taiwan’s ten-most-wanted list in Bangkok. The pictures implied that Shih had gotten money for his movement from other sources than the million people who donated.97 There were also rumors that Shih

95. “Taiwan Lawmakers Vote to Proceed with Second Chen Recall Motion,” Bloomberg, September 29, 2006 (online at www.taiwansecurity.org).
was trying to provoke the kind of street protests that brought down presidents in the Philippines or a military coup that had recently removed the government in Thailand. Shih denied this was his intent.98

President Chen looked for other means to counter Shih’s efforts. He proposed writing a new constitution, joining the United Nations using the name “Taiwan,” and holding a referendum to decide whether the KMT should return its “stolen” assets. But this had little effect. At the DPP’s twentieth anniversary, rumors circulated to the effect that Vice President Lu might use the occasion to “make a move” against Chen. In what appeared to be a defensive mode Chen spoke about the party’s history of correcting the wrongs of the authoritarian era.99 He declared that Taiwan and China are two different countries, going further, some said, than LEE Teng-hui did in 1999 when Lee incensed Chinese leaders with his “two countries” statement.100 But Chen’s words did not stimulate much controversy; most assumed he was trying to divert attention away from his problems.

China kept noticeably silent about the protests and Chen’s provocations so as to not help Chen, though Beijing registered some warnings about Taiwan writing a new constitution.101 The U.S. Department of State warned Chen, saying it took very seriously Chen’s previous commitments not to allow constitutional reform to touch on the sovereignty issue.102 This appeared to cut Chen’s options.

At the last on-the-road (meaning outside of Taipei) rally, held in Taichung, Shih attracted a crowd of 20,000. At a nearby gathering, supporters of President Chen attracted little more than 500. Shih said that a consensus had been formed about ridding Taiwan of corruption and that he expected 2 million people would turn out for his rally on National Day, October 10.103

98. Ibid.
100. “Taiwan, China are two different countries: Chen,” China Post, September 29, 2006 (online at www.chinapost.com.tw).
Leading up to National Day, Shih boasted of confidence in Taiwan’s democracy and said he expected his movement to force President Chen out of office. Its success on the journey south, he said, destroyed the “Choshui River myth” (the line south of which is allegedly Chen territory). Meanwhile rumors spread that President Chen would not attend the holiday ceremony.\textsuperscript{104}

But President Chen was not to be cowed. He appointed a “referendum screening committee” to initiate a national vote on the KMT’s assets.\textsuperscript{105} He also made an effort to look presidential by visiting opinion leaders, military bases, and foreign guests. The Ministry of Defense at this juncture told military personnel to stay out of the rallies, though some attended anyway. Chen contacted DPP members of the Legislative Yuan in an effort to bolster DPP solidarity. In response, Shih promised to push a recall movement against legislators that do not support Chen’s recall.\textsuperscript{106}

V. OFFICIAL REACTION TO CHEN’S CORRUPTION

In advance of National Day on October 10, President Chen devised plans to counter Shih’s “grand finale.” He appointed a referendum screening commission that would meet on October 13 to formalize a national vote against corruption. Some opponents called this a diversion; but Chen got support for establishing the commission from other political parties.\textsuperscript{107} Some said Chen was trying to lull the opposition while readying his loyal supporters. Two days before National Day, some activists of the anti-Chen, anti-graft movement announced publicly they indeed planned to besiege the Presidential Palace. Five thousand police were made ready for the event.\textsuperscript{108} The two sides prepared for a face-off.

The major universities in Taipei declined invitations to attend the celebration, as did a number of other organizations; 4,300 invitees in all decided not to go. Most feared violence. The police, legislative speaker WANG Jyng-ping, MA Ying-jeou, and others called

\textsuperscript{104} “Chen attendance at celebration undecided,” \textit{Taipei Times}, October 6, 2006 (online at www.taipeitimes.com).
\textsuperscript{105} \textit{Ibid}.
\textsuperscript{106} “Campaign broadens target to include DPP legislators,” \textit{Taiwan News}, October 7, 2006 (online at www.taiwannews.com.tw).
\textsuperscript{108} “Siege set to kick off at 9 a.m. on Tuesday,” \textit{China Post}, October 8, 2006 (online at www.chinapost.com.tw).
for a peaceful demonstration.\textsuperscript{109} Shih promised restraint and said he would end his campaign if the legislature would authorize the holding of a national referendum.\textsuperscript{110} Just before the National Day there were reports that the ceremony would be cancelled. Security forces, in fact, made this recommendation. Many top officials said they expected it to turn violent. It was also reported Chen would not appear.

The president and his close advisors meanwhile formulated a secret strategy for the day’s ceremony. The president arrived and gave his National Day speech amidst tens of thousands of demonstrators clad in red and/or carrying red balloons shouting “down with A-Bian” (his nickname) and making thumbs down gestures. President Chen, looking unflappable, said in his speech that he wanted to “promote democracy and fight corruption.” Opponents called this the ultimate hypocrisy. Chen said that the people should have faith in the judiciary.\textsuperscript{111} Leaders of the demonstrators said that was a joke, as Chen controlled the judges and prosecutors, otherwise his cronies and members of his family would be in jail and he would already be out of office. Shih said that the DPP was acting like Hitler, Mussolini, and the Chinese government. He said his camp would be peaceful and non-violent. But, one protestor threatened to set herself on fire. Others attacked a ruling party legislator. DPP legislators attacked and beat a KMT lawmaker, apparently according to plan.\textsuperscript{112}

President Chen was embarrassed by what happened. Foreign guests were aghast by the events. Chen admitted that it was “messy.” The situation was chaotic; it seemed at times about to get out of control. But in its wake, most pundits said Chen had “survived the crisis.” Some said he had “defeated Shih.” Chen certainly appeared less close to resigning after National Day. Why? Shih had promised non-violence and was restrained. This, it appeared, was a mistake, as violence was the only way to get Chen. Shih’s supporters were obviously split on this issue. Some said Chen and his party were tougher or more ruthless than their opposition. When the


\textsuperscript{110} “Shih: Drive to end if people can decide Chen’s fate,” \textit{China Post}, October 9, 2006 (online at www.chinapost.com.tw).

\textsuperscript{111} “Taiwan's Chen Calls for Unity as Opponents Demand His Resignation,” Agence France Press, October 10, 2006 (online at www.taiwansecurity.org).

\textsuperscript{112} “Taiwan President Slams Ouster Bill Amid Protests,” Reuters, October 11, 2006 (online at www.taiwansecurity.org).
fighting among legislators broke out the DPP was prepared. The DPP didn’t break ranks. SU Tseng-chang and Frank Hsieh didn’t want Chen to resign: they did not want Annette Lu to become president. That would lessen their chances in 2008.

Four days later, the KMT declined to support a PFP-sponsored motion in the legislature that would force Premier Su’s resignation by a no-confidence vote. The PFP and the KMT were clearly at odds. CHENG Chin-ling, a PFP legislator, called MA Ying-jeou a “spineless jellyfish” for not supporting the move. She said the KMT did nothing except protect its chairman and that Ma’s “do nothing-ism” was the reason Shih’s movement was a spent force and HAU Lung-bin’s ratings in the polls had plummeted from 50 to 34 percent. She also said Ma could not be expected to win the presidential race in 2008. Meanwhile, another matter plagued the KMT: whether or not Soong would get into the Taipei mayor’s race and further split pan-blue.

In early November it seemed that the anti-corruption, anti-Chen movement had indeed petered out and President Chen’s situation had improved. Then new charges appeared. LIN Chung-cheng, a member of the cabinet-level Financial Supervisory Commission, was detained on charges of taking bribes. Lin was a member of the DPP and a legislator before his current appointment. Party chairman YU Shyi-kun turned the case over to the Central Advisory Committee. President Chen was not directly implicated in this case, but he was in another scandal involving one of Taiwan’s largest banks, China Trust. When Chen met Jeffrey Koo, head of the China Trust Financial Holding Company, at a meeting of the Asia-Pacific Chamber of Commerce and Industry, reporters raised the question whether Chen would try to help Jeffrey Koo’s two sons, whom the press reported would soon be subpoenaed for involvement in financial wrongdoing. Chen was known to have had close ties with the Koo family.

A devastating event for President Chen and the DPP occurred the next day. Prosecutor Eric Chen, a supporter of pan-green but also an advocate of clean government, announced that First Lady WU Shu-chen and three former presidential aides were being in-

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dicted on charges of embezzlement, forgery and perjury. Chang declared that between 2002 and 2006 the first lady had stolen NT$14.5 million (US$450,000) from the government. Chang added that there was sufficient evidence to indict President Chen on corruption charges associated with his secret diplomatic fund—though he would not do so, because, according to the constitution the president cannot be indicted for crimes other than sedition. However, he seemed to indicate Chen would be charged when he left office and that there would be increasing pressure for him to resign.¹¹⁶

At this point the TSU announced that it would support a recall referendum against President Chen. MA Ying-jeou called for Chen to resign immediately.¹¹⁷ SHIH Ming-teh’s movement, the “Million Voices against Corruption” rallied at Taipei Railroad Station and in Kaohsiung. Some in the group yelled “We have succeeded.” Meanwhile, Ma and James Soong met and called for Chen to step down in the face of a “national crisis.” Some said Chen now “had nowhere to go.” Premier Su admitted that the country was facing a “big test.”¹¹⁸

There was more bad news for President Chen and the DPP. Former president LEE Teng-hui issued an open letter saying he did not support President CHEN Shui-bian, his corrupt regime, or the ruling party. TSU chairman, SU Chin-chiang, declared again his party might vote for recall if it came up again. Su said also that Lee had shown support for recall.¹¹⁹

The following day President Chen called a press conference to explain and refute the allegations. He said that he had submitted false receipts for reimbursement and had lied to prosecutors about how he had spent the money; but he said he had done so in the national interest.¹²⁰ He pledged he would leave office if the charges against him or his wife were proven. He politely thanked the investigators and prosecutors and blamed the rules, which, he said, are “confusing and difficult to understand.” Chen also apologized to his party and to the people. Some observers said cynically that by the

time the cases went through the judicial process Chen would be out of office.\textsuperscript{121}

On November 7, the KMT and PFP launched another recall motion against Chen. The TSU had earlier said that it might support recall, but then changed its position. The TSU’s candidate for Taipei mayor, Clara Chou, however, stuck to the old position and called for Chen’s recall. This prompted the TSU’s Central Executive Committee to expel Chou.\textsuperscript{122} It was uncertain what the DPP would do, and especially whether it would split on the issue.

The next day, DPP Chairman YU Shyi-kun, following a party Central Executive Committee meeting, announced that the DPP “supports President Chen against a third recall” and that any member acting against the decision will be punished by the party.\textsuperscript{123} Frank Hsieh expressed his personal opposition to the recall motion, saying that the “alleged misuse of the state affairs fund is not corruption and resulted from a lack of . . . rules and systems.”\textsuperscript{124}

Then still more unfavorable news: On November 9, Nobel laureate LEE Yuan-tseh, who was instrumental in helping President Chen get elected in 2000, wrote a public letter saying it was his opinion that “if President Chen wants to act according to the will of the people and safeguard Taiwan’s democracy,” he must “carefully consider whether he should tender his resignation.” The letter stunned DPP leaders.\textsuperscript{125}

Three days later, former Presidential Office secretary-general CHEN Shih-meng and former national security advisor Luis Kuo said that Chen should step down at least temporarily.\textsuperscript{126} Then two DPP legislators, LIN Cho-shui and LEE Wen-chung, tendered their resignations in protest of their party’s handling of the affair and its refusal to suspend President Chen’s party membership. Lin was a five-term legislator and a staunch advocate of Taiwan’s indepen-

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item George Liao, “Chou ejected from TSU over stance on recall bid,” \textit{Taiwan News}, November 11, 2006, p. 1 (online at www.taiwannews.com.tw). Later Chou’s loss of party membership was made only temporary.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
idence. Lee had been in the Legislative Yuan for three terms. Their decisions caused further trauma to the DPP.127

But, on November 24, the third recall motion against President Chen failed. The motion got 118 votes (from members of the Nationalist Party and the People First Party, plus six from the Non-Partisan Solidarity Union and one independent). More than half of the legislature voted for the motion, but 28 more votes were needed for a two-thirds majority. After the vote, opposition lawmakers declared that they would continue to press Chen to step down. They charged that President Chen was no longer fit to lead the country. TSAI Chin-lung, a KMT legislator, said that “sadly the DPP and TSU caused the recall motion to fail and denied the people the right to decide Chen’s fate.” Both KMT and PFP legislators promised to hold another recall and/or call for a no-confidence vote in the cabinet.

At this juncture the DPP was suddenly given a good issue. Prosecutors reported they were investigating KMT chairman and Taipei Mayor MA Ying-jeou for possibly misusing city funds. DPP leaders jumped on the report and accused Ma of embezzlement, noting this was the same charge that had been made against the first lady and President Chen. This seemed to even the playing field. Ma said that he would resign as KMT party chairman if he were indicted over charges about the mayoral special allowance fund.128 The KMT asserted that this was nothing but an election ploy and launched a defamation suit against DPP Chairman YU Shyi-kun.129

The case against MA Ying-jeou would not go away, or the DPP would not let it fade. Defending Ma, KMT leaders said that Ma had not broken any rules. Others in the KMT charged that the DPP was pressuring prosecutors to indict Ma in revenge and for political advantage. However, independent candidate for Taipei mayor, LI Ao, said that Ma should step down in order to pressure President Chen to resign.130 Other KMT leaders called on the prosecutor’s office to decide whether there was evidence to indict Ma before the election. That, to the disadvantage of the KMT, didn’t happen.

Elsewhere, President Chen's son, who was living in leisure in New York with his wife, threatened to sue the media in Taiwan for defaming him and his wife. A television station in Taiwan had reported that CHEN Chih-chung had been living in New York, he was not a student, and was not working. The station further reported the younger Chen lived in an apartment on the Hudson River that rented for US$7,600 per month and was seen often eating with his wife in very expensive restaurants and riding in a Mercedes-Benz. The station also reported that he was there so the child would have U.S. citizenship. Other media outlets mentioned Chen’s son had transferred large sums of money to the U.S. in the expectation that his father and mother and other relatives would live there after they fled the country. The younger Chen replied, however, that he had been interning at a law firm and was riding the subway.131

A few days later, President Chen’s son filed a defamation suit against KMT legislator CHIU Yi. The suit claimed that Chiu’s allegations that Chen and his wife had bank accounts of NT$544.5 million and NT$610.5 million were not factual. Chiu said he welcomed the suit and planned to file a suit against them for filing false charges against him for political reasons.132 Meanwhile, critics said that President Chen would become a “grandpa of an American” if his son's wife remained in the U.S., and that this contradicted Chen’s “love Taiwan” slogan.133

At the end of November, a fortnight before the election, the DPP suspended the first lady's party membership for eighteen months. Party members feared that not taking such action would hurt party candidates on December 9.134 The same day, it was reported Jeffrey Koo Jr. might be put on the wanted list in Taiwan.135

VI. PICKING CANDIDATES AND EARLY CAMPAIGNING

Selecting candidates began early and revealed splits within both the pan-green and pan-blue camps as well as big differences between candidates on the two sides. The process made observers think the campaign would be a tough and dirty one. The corruption issue and its accompanying scandals would, it appeared, play a front and center role.

DPP strategists wanted Frank Hsieh to run for Taipei mayor. He was their best hope based on his experience as mayor of Kaohsiung and his recently holding high office including, the premiership. He had name recognition and was considered capable. On the other hand, he was tainted by scandal (the Thai workers riot and possible bribery involving the Kaohsiung subway system when he was mayor). Yet, DPP strategists noted, he was not linked to President Chen’s corruption, and the fact he had been widely reported not to be in the president’s favor may help.136 But Hsieh was hesitant. It was no secret he wanted to run for president in 2008. Should he run for Taipei mayor? President Chen’s situation signaled it was a bad time for the DPP.

After spending two months at Harvard University in the U.S., Hsieh returned to Taiwan in April and spoke publicly of forming a new political party.137 Hsieh said he was determined not to run for mayor of Taipei.138 A few days later, he said he was hoping to campaign for the DPP’s Taipei mayoral candidate. However, some observers opined that Hsieh wanted to be drafted by the party.139

Meanwhile, James Soong, who had for some months given hints of running, told the media that “the time is not right” to decide. Legislative speaker WANG Jyng-ping said “Taipei would consider itself lucky if Soong were elected.” Ma, it was reported, would

136. Pan-blue legislators in September had demanded Hsieh step down as premier over the Thai worker’s scandal and even disrupted a session to prevent his administrative report to the Legislative Yuan. Hsieh stood firm and said if he stepped down the opposition would not be satisfied. See Jacky Hsu, “Fracas as Taiwan's legislature opens,” South China Morning Post, September 14, 2006 (online at www.lexis-nexis.com).
not make a deal with Soong, as this would handicap possible KMT contenders. A serious pan-blue split seemed to be in the offing.

In early May, DPP registration for Taipei mayoral candidates closed without any candidate. Frank Hsieh did not register. Former legislator SHEN Fu-hsiung had said earlier he would register, but failed to meet the deadline. Legislator YOU Ching registered, but his application was rejected because it lacked proper documentation. DPP legislators questioned the process, saying that Shen and You were pressured not to run because party leaders wanted Frank Hsieh. In Kaohsiung the DPP had two registered candidates: former Council of Labor Affairs Chairwoman, CHEN Chu (not related to President Chen), and Legislator KUAN Bi-ling. Acting Kaohsiung Mayor YEH Chu-lan did not register.

On the pan-blue side, HAU Lung-bin, former premier HAU Pei-tsun’s son and head of the Environmental Protection Agency early in the Chen administration, was the KMT’s leading candidate. Still, the nomination was in contention. Supporters of YEH Chin-chuan, another KMT candidate, bought an advertisement that caricatured Hau as having a “superpower father” who was implicated in the Lafayette (ship purchase) scandal of some years earlier. Hau replied that his father was cleared of any charges and the DPP government had never bothered him over the matter. Hau said it was a “sad day” when his friends said such things about him.

Shortly after this, Yeh withdrew from the race, saying his decision was “for the sake of party unity,” Legislative Speaker WANG Jyng-ping and Nationalist Party Chairman (and mayor of Taipei) MA Ying-jeou supported his decision. Hau soon surged ahead of all other candidates in the polls. However, whether James Soong would enter the race still caused consternation for pan-blue.

Later in the month, the DPP’s KUAN Bi-ling withdrew from the Kaohsiung race. With acting mayor YEH Chu-lan still saying she would not run, CHEN Chu seemed certain to be the DPP’s

144. Yeh was Mayor Ma’s deputy and Ma had earlier supported him, though he had not campaigned for him. Ma’s sister, though, did. Both Wang and Ma were probably pleased about the fact the party seemed much more unified at this point. See “Yeh’s withdrawal improves KMT’s changes of winning,” (editorial) China Post, May 11, 2006, p. 2.
standard-bearer. In a public opinion survey, Chen won almost 80 percent of DPP members’ support.\textsuperscript{145} On the pan-blue side, HAU Lung-bin won the KMT’s nomination. Hau immediately called for using public opinion polls to decide whether he or James Soong would be pan-blue’s candidate; he also called for talks between KMT and Soong’s People First Party to decide the issue.\textsuperscript{146} But nothing happened. In early June, in Kaohsiung, the KMT set a date for a second primary after none of eight contenders won 30 percent of the vote.\textsuperscript{147} HUANG Chun-ying, who had lost the race four years previous by a small margin, was the favorite.

Meanwhile, the media reported that Premier Su wanted Frank Hsieh to run, to keep him out of contention for the presidency in 2008. (The DPP had an unwritten regulation against a sitting mayor running for the presidency.) There was also speculation Su felt the seriousness of the corruption issue would grow and damage Hsieh to his advantage in getting the party’s presidential nomination. Confirming reports of contention between the two top DPP leaders, backers of Su and Hsieh engaged in some bitter accusations about the other’s leader engaging in cronyism and other malfeasance in office.\textsuperscript{148}

In any event, in mid-June, Frank Hsieh accepted the DPP’s draft. Party chairman YU Shyi-kun presented Hsieh a plaque lauding his “devotion to duty” at Hsieh’s unofficial campaign office. HAU Lung-bin commented that Hsieh is “trying to save his party” and Taipei voters will not accept him.\textsuperscript{149} Given pan-blue’s larger support base in Taipei it seemed Hsieh faced an uphill battle. Hsieh evidently calculated that his party’s strong support for him meant that if he made a good showing it would help him get support for the presidential nomination later.\textsuperscript{150}


\textsuperscript{146} “Hau says he would like to join Soong in public opinion polls,” China Post, May 29, 2006, p. 4.

\textsuperscript{147} “Date set for 2nd KMT Kaohsiung primary,” China Post, June 5, 2006, p. 4.

\textsuperscript{148} “DPP head Yu calls for end to party infighting,” China Post, May 23, 2006, p. 4. Hsieh supporters accused Premier Su of recently appointing a crony minister without portfolio. Su backers said Hsieh, when premier, brought buddies into the cabinet, including Pasuya Yao, head of the Government Information Office. Premier Su reversing a number of Hsieh’s former policies, especially on licensing TV stations, was also a sore point between the two sides.


\textsuperscript{150} It was said that if Hsieh could keep his loss below 100,000 votes (since pan-blue has a three to two voter support advantage) he would keep the support of his party and
In early July, there were signs James Soong would soon make a decision to run. Soong’s popularity had recently increased due to his aggressive stance to unseat President Chen. Still, opinion polls showed Hau held a substantial lead over both Soong and Frank Hsieh. The question was: Would Hau’s lead last? And what about Wang’s support for Soong? In August, upon the release of Soong’s biography entitled *Ninety Percent Secret*, legislative speaker WANG Jyng-ping praised Soong’s success as provincial governor, describing him as an “affectionate, righteous and reasonable leader.” Wang seemed to be exacerbating the split in the pan-blue camp. Some KMT members expressed concern that Wang was violating party rules against campaigning for a candidate from other parties and for dividing pan-blue.

Meanwhile, DPP legislators attacked former premier Hau Pei-tsun for allegedly lying about the Lafayette frigate scandal and for illegally occupying a military residence. The accusations were obviously aimed at weakening HAU Lung-bin’s candidacy. HAU Lung-bin answered saying that his father had done nothing wrong and the charges represented “green terror.” Hau’s lead in the polls did not seem to be affected.

For a while, Shih’s anti-Chen movement captured so much attention the news media paid little attention to the candidates running for office. In Taipei, Shih’s movement was clearly hurting Frank Hsieh’s candidacy. However, it seemed to have a negative impact on the KMT’s recently picked candidate for Kaohsiung mayor, HUANG Chun-ying. A poll taken on October 5 by the *United Daily News* showed support for Huang had dropped from 38 percent in April to 32 percent. The same poll showed voter support for the DPP’s candidate, CHEN Chu, had risen from 24 to 28 percent.

It seemed at this point that the KMT would win the Taipei mayorship and the DPP the Kaohsiung mayor’s job, resulting in a split that experts considered normal, Taipei being a KMT stronghold and Kaohsiung a DPP support base. Or would the cor-

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153. Flora Wang, “DPP legislators continue Hau attacks,” *Taipei Times*, October 8, 2006 p. 3. Also see *ibid*.
ruption issue hurt the DPP enough to give the mayoral election to the KMT?

On October 16, LI Ao announced his candidacy for Taipei mayor. LI was a well-known writer once nominated for the Nobel Prize in literature, and social and political critic, and who ran for president in 2000 representing the New Party. His entering the race attracted considerable press attention even though he was not a serious candidate. He stated that he was the "real first ancestor" of pan-blue and that the KMT-sponsored candidate, HAU Lung-bin, was really pan-green because he served the Chen administration for two years, from 2001 to 2003, as head of the Environmental Protection Administration.

LI offhandedly declared that, at 69 years of age, he was younger than French President Charles de Gaulle and U.S. President Ronald Regan when they were elected. LI also stated he did not plan to canvass or use posters to advertise his candidacy. Instead he would appear on talk shows and promote himself on his own talk show as he did when he won a seat in the legislature in 2004. 155 It appeared he would split the pan-blue vote, but perhaps not seriously.

In mid-October, after months of speculation, James Soong announced that he would be a candidate for Taipei mayor. He said he would leave his job as chairman of the PFP and run as an independent "transcending party affiliations." Soong pledged to visit all of the city's districts regularly if elected. He dismissed speculation that he would run for president in 2008, saying that being mayor would be the conclusion of his political career. Soong's announcement stirred serious apprehension in the pan-blue camp. KMT chairman MA Ying-jeou expressed concern that the emergence of three pan-blue candidates would destroy the alliance. Ma cited splits in the 1994 mayoral race and the 2000 presidential election. 156 It did appear that pan-blue votes would be split.

On October 19, the Central Election Commission announced the candidates for both mayoral elections and the city council races. For Taipei mayor, Frank Hsieh represented the DPP; HAU Lung-bin the KMT; James Soong and LI Ao ran as independents; and Clara Chou, a talk show host represented the TSU. In the Kaohsi-

ung race, HUANG Chun-ying, for the KMT; CHEN Chu of the DPP; and LO Chih-ming of the TSU were the main candidates. For the Taipei City Council 103 candidates registered; for the Kaohsiung City Council 78 were on the list.157

In late October, the campaign heated up with various candidates flinging accusations against others. HAU Lung-bin threatened to file a lawsuit against Frank Hsieh for saying that his father’s utility bills had been paid by the government. Hau then asked Hsieh to explain his involvement in corruption involving the KMRT. Clara Chou blasted Hsieh for trying to get her to drop out of the race by offering her (through a third party) a position in the city government if he were elected, helping her to run for the legislature later, and campaigning for TSU city council candidates. She said that Hsieh had insulted her and accused him of involvement in the mass rapid transit system scandal, concluding that he should not be mayor of Taipei.158

Meanwhile, tension between the KMT and PFP escalated as a result of the latter supporting the Chen administration’s efforts to bring the KMT to task over its alleged “stolen assets.” According to two of the largest Chinese newspapers, the United Daily News and the China Times, the PFP had a special reason to shift its position: MA Ying-jeou had given an interview to a foreign news outlet during which he said that he had held a secret meeting with Soong about his running for mayor, or not, but could not meet the conditions he demanded not to run. Ma, however, denied this. Complicating things further the Liberty Times reported that Soong’s foundations were established with funds he had taken from the KMT when he was secretary general.159

The DPP continued its attack on HAU Lung-bin, saying that he had rigged a public bid for an incinerator project in 2002 when he headed the EPA.160 Meanwhile, Premier Su announced, while campaigning for CHEN Chu, that the government would build an underground railway system and a convention center in the city. Pan-blue leaders cried foul, saying Su was using public money to

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160. SHIH Hsu-chuan and MO Yan-chih, “DPP continues attack on HAU Lung-bin,” Taipei Times, October 27, 2006 (online at www.taipeitimes.com).
campaign for a DPP candidate.\textsuperscript{161} Indicating the campaign was getting dirty pan-green hurled accusations at the PFP, which it called a "personality cult party for James Soong," for promoting the interests of the Chinese Communist Party and SHIH Ming-teh, it called a political has-been, for helping Beijing.\textsuperscript{162}

Meanwhile, LI Ao declared that his sole purpose in running for Taipei mayor was to "fight the central government." He said he would sell government buildings and build more public parks and would turn the parking lot next to the Presidential Palace into a funeral parlor and a place where monks and nuns could chant. He took a strong stand against the military procurement bill and in October created an incident when he sprayed the legislature with tear gas to prevent the Procedure Committee from acting on the bill. He said he would stop tax money from the city going to the central government and expected to be sued if he were elected and did this. Li was critical of the DPP run government, which he said was inept; but he supported its proposal to move the capital out of Taipei to central Taiwan.\textsuperscript{163}

Clara Chou attacked Frank Hsieh, saying that their conflict was between a clean and a corrupt pro-independence candidate. She visited Hsieh's headquarters daily for a while, accusing Hsieh of lack of integrity citing scandals about the KMRT. It was reported that top members of the TSU tried to get her to stop and some contacted former president LEE Teng-hui, who had recommended her, to get his approval to get her to quit the race.\textsuperscript{164}

\section*{VII. THE FORMAL CAMPAIGN}

While there are formal dates designated for campaigning in these elections (15 days before the election for mayoral candidates and 10 days for city council candidates), the closing of candidate registration on October 19 signaled the campaign was in full swing. By this time the election contest had become for all intents and purposes a race between DPP and KMT candidates, except for

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{162} "The People First Party's red agenda," \textit{Taipei Times}, October 28, 2006 (online at www.taipeitimes.com).
\bibitem{163} "Lee plans bizarre, says Taipei can do without state buildings," \textit{Taiwan News}, October 30, 2006, p. 2 (online at www.www.taiwannews.com.tw). (Note: Li's family name is sometimes spelled Lee, as it is here.)
\end{thebibliography}
James Soong; the other candidates hardly seemed to matter in terms of affecting voters or predicting the results.165

HAU Lung-bin led in the polls in the Taipei race by a considerable margin. A China Times poll put Hau at 36 percent and Hsieh at 18 percent. A United Daily News poll had Hau ahead of Hsieh by 20 points. Commentators said Hau's political pedigree and his clean image in the context of public concern over corruption were his positives. Changing parties (joining the New Party in the 1990s and the KMT only last year), having served with the Chen administration as the head of the Environmental Protection Agency, his youth, and lack of experience were negatives. In addition, some said Hau lacked charisma and energy.

Many predicted Hau's lead in the polls would drop, some said seriously, with James Soong in the race. Observers cited Soong's experience in office and his ability to campaign. Pundits estimated Soong would get 10 to 15 percent of the vote. Some thought Hsieh would go up in the polls as his campaign skills showed and as the DPP united behind him.166 In fact, one poll showed HAU Lung-bin's support had fallen from 50% to 34%, with Hsieh getting 14% support and Soong 9% and LI Ao 5%. MA Ying-jeou expressed concern, saying that history shows that when pan-blue splits the other side benefits.167

The Kaohsiung mayor's race got tighter and there was more intensity in the campaign there even though it lacked big names. A United Daily News poll showed HUANG Chun-ying leading by four points, though CHEN Chu had closed the gap considerably in the last month. Experts explained that the Chen corruption scandal had not influenced voters in Kaohsiung nearly as much as voters in Taipei, though there was fear the TSU candidate might divide the pan-green vote to the advantage of the KMT.168 Speculation that a DPP loss would compel President Chen to resign seemed to help CHEN Chu.

The end of October, the United Daily News reported that secret KMT polls showed DPP candidate CHEN Chu had been catching up with HUANG Chun-ying fast. So, the DPP, thinking it could

166. Ibid.
win this race, sent heavyweights SU Tseng-chang and Annette Lu to campaign for CHEN Chu. Even Frank Hsieh left his campaign in Taipei to help. 169

At this juncture pan-blue took a hit when Stephen Young, the U.S. "unofficial ambassador" to Taiwan, stated publicly that the United States was not happy about the arms sales issue. His statement obliquely criticized MA Ying-jeou, WANG Jyng-ping, and pan-blue generally for obstructing the sale. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice backed Young's words. 170 Some pundits commented that if the U.S. had hurt pan-green in the previous election this was not going to be the case this time.

After the National Day activities SHIH Ming-teh's movement seemed to fade. The DPP appeared to have weathered the anti-corruption, anti-Chen movement and its hopes rose considerably. But, if that were the case, the formal indictments of President Chen's wife and three aides in early November turned the DPP's new momentum around. It badly hurt DPP's candidates and split the party between reform-minded young Turks and older, especially elected, DPP leaders. The former wanted to expel its members indicted for corruption. 171

On November 11, the five candidates for mayor of Taipei participated in a televised debate. All five focused on the corruption issue. HAU Lung-bin promised to put his assets in trust and require other key officials to do likewise and set up an anti-corruption department under the city government. Pointing to Frank Hsieh, he said corruption allegations under DPP administrations are countless and Hsieh would probably be indicted over the KMRT. Hsieh countered saying that Hau had failed to pay his utilities for some years because his father was a former premier and the family had cheated the government to the tune of NT$10 million. Hau attacked Soong by bringing up corruptions charges made during the 2000 election. Soong questioned Hau's loyalty to the KMT and noted that he had not sincerely supported MA Ying-jeou for mayor in 2002. LI Ao attacked all of the party candidates for corruption.

Clara Chou noted that the problem of corruption involved men and promised to do something about childcare and female issues.\textsuperscript{172}

On November 12, Frank Hsieh announced that he would leave the DPP if James Soong received more votes in the mayor’s race than he did. Critics said that the move showed Hsieh was trying to split pan-blue and described Hsieh as desperate since most opinion surveys indicated he was far behind HAU Lung-bin. As one writer put it: “If Soong splits pan-blue Hsieh can win; if he doesn’t then Hsieh will get more votes than Soong and will not have a promise to keep.”\textsuperscript{173}

If the indictments of the First Lady and President Chen’s aides damaged the DPP’s chances in the elections, news of prosecutors investigating MA Ying-jeou a fortnight later for diverting part of his Mayor’s special account into his personal account had the opposite effect. Ma tried to contain the impact of the ill news by donating money to charity, calling for the KMT’s Probity Committee to investigate, and promising to step down from his party leadership position if indicted. KMT supporters charged that the prosecutor had responded to Chen administration pressure to indict Ma without good evidence just before the December election so as to influence the voting. The prosecutor denied the accusation.\textsuperscript{174} Clearly the story hurt the KMT candidates and there was little the party could do about it.

The event came at a very bad time for another reason: KMT and other pan-blue candidates were pushing issues, but voters were not getting their messages very well. One was the economy. KMT candidates on the stump were “informing the public” that six years previous, when CHEN Shui-bian became president, Taiwan’s gross national product was 30 percent of China’s. Last year, they noted, it was 18 percent. South Korea’s per capita income, which was two-thirds of Taiwan’s less than a decade ago, had recently passed Taiwan’s. When Chen became president, Kaohsiung was the second busiest port in Asia; now it is number seven.\textsuperscript{175}


\textsuperscript{173} “Frank Hsieh’s low risk gamble,” (editorial), \textit{Taipei Times}, November 15, 2006 (online at www.taipeitimes.com).

\textsuperscript{174} “Prosecutor Denies Pressure Existed to Indict Ma,” \textit{Taiwan News}, November 27, 2006 (online at www.taiwannews.com.tw).

On November 25, the candidates for Taipei mayor engaged in a second televised debate. HAU Lung-bin, who was leading by more than double digits in most polls, promised to clean up the Tamsui River at a cost of NT$ 12 billion and build parks along the river if elected. He said this would restore Wanhu and other districts of Taipei that have suffered from neglect in recent years. Frank Hsieh said that Hau’s promises could not be realized within the time frame he promised. Hsieh pledged, if elected, to restore the night markets and close Songshan Airport (domestic airport) in Taipei and use the land for a park and commercial complex. James Soong disagreed with Hsieh’s plan and proposed that Taipei should be made an international city like Seoul, Tokyo and Shanghai. LI Ao promised to raise the city's stature. Clara Chou said she would improve the lot of female residents in the city. KO Szu-hai said he would ban the killing of stray dogs if elected.\(^{176}\)

In Kaohsiung a week before the election candidates spent most of their time stumpng and trying to get their grass roots supporters energized. HUANG Chun-ying was in the lead by three to nine points in the major polls. His main campaign issues were DPP sleaze and the economy. Huang hit the Chen administration daily for corruption. He mentioned frequently the scandals regarding the Thai workers riots in 2005 and bribery and other malfeasance in the construction of the Kaohsiung mass transit project. This was aimed in part at Frank Hsieh, who was campaigning for his opponent. Though Kaohsiung is a stronghold for the DPP, the corruption issue seemed to be affecting many non-party and undecided voters.\(^{177}\)

Pundits were uncertain, though, how much the corruption issue was really hurting CHEN Chu or the DPP. Chen was labor minister at the time of the Thai workers' riots and resigned to take responsibility for the matter. But, she was not involved directly in the scandal. To her credit, she did not avoid the issue, but instead challenged Huang's charges about Hsieh's corruption and his poor performance when he was mayor of Kaohsiung. She even boasted of her respect for Hsieh.\(^{178}\)

CHEN Chu in the meantime made a strong emotional pitch to Taiwan independence advocates. She and her strategists calculated

\(^{176}\) Crystal Hsu, “Taipei City mayoral contest heats up,” Taiwan News, November 26, 2006, p. 2. (online at www.taiwanews.com.tw).

\(^{177}\) Austin Ramzy, “Welcome to Taiwan’s Swing City,” Time, December 1, 2006 (online at www.taiwandc.org/time-2006-03.htm).

this was a major voting bloc. She certainly had the credentials to attract independence supporters having spent time in prison after the Kaohsiung Incident in 1979. At the same time, she distanced herself from President Chen, finding herself busy elsewhere when Chen came to visit Kaohsiung.  

But when President Chen attracted a large number of participants to form a human chain along the Love River, which former mayor Frank Hsieh had done well in cleaning up, CHEN Chu changed her strategy. She now saw President Chen as an asset. At this juncture it was reported that the DPP was putting most of its resources into the Kaohsiung race, having given up on Frank Hsieh in the Taipei contest. Then CHEN Chu got another boost: She got the support of five hundred civic groups that promised to help her campaign.

On “super Sunday” before Election Day, DPP and KMT heavyweights campaigned in Kaohsiung for their respective candidates. President Chen asked those who “love Taiwan” to vote for CHEN Chu. He labeled the opposition “unpatriotic.” He further declared that the election was not a vote of confidence or no confidence in him, but rather a vote of confidence in former mayor Frank Hsieh.  

Former KMT chairman LIEN Chan appeared and accused the Chen administration of being a “corrupt and false indigenous regime.” He further stated that former KMT mayor WU Den-yih had launched the Love River cleanup and the KMRT was started when he was premier. Party Chairman MA Ying-jeou and speaker WANG Jyng-ping, especially Ma, appeared often to help Huang. Both talked about Chen administration corruption and the economy.

In the Taipei campaign, Frank Hsieh, apparently still desperate to split his rivals, told the press that MA Ying-jeou and James Soong had met secretly to discuss abandoning Hau to save Soong. DPP campaign banners soon after appeared reading “Help Ma get into the Presidential Office and help Soong get into the city govern-

179. Austin Ramzy, “Welcome to Taiwan’s Swing City,” Time, December 1, 2006 (online at www.taiwandc.org/time-2006-03.htm).
ment.” Ma said that others were present at the meeting and could vouch for the fact Hsieh’s charge was not true. HAU Lung-bin said he not take the report seriously.\textsuperscript{183} Shortly after Soong filed lawsuits for slander against Hsieh and DPP chairman YU Shyi-kun.\textsuperscript{184}

Three days before the voting, DPP chairman Yu launched a telephone campaign to get supporters to cast ballots for DPP candidates. He called upon them to “give Taiwan progress and justice.” Yu said that the DPP candidates were behind but close. He said that CHEN Chu was trailing by just three to five points and that Frank Hsieh had cut the margin to ten points. However, polls done by the \textit{China Times} and the \textit{United Daily News} indicated that in Taipei Hau was ahead by a large margin. The pro-DPP paper, \textit{Liberty Times}, meanwhile published a poll indicating that in the Kaohsiung race Huang was ahead of Chen by only a fraction of a point and that twenty-five percent of voters remained undecided.\textsuperscript{185}

At a critical point, former DPP chairman LIN Yi-hsiung, who had broken with the party in January over the corruption issue, came out in support of DPP candidates, saying the DPP was the best party. Lin’s change of mind had consequence since he was a well-known and respected leader and was liked by many voters. Lin also energized the pro-independence voters.\textsuperscript{186} LIN Cho-shui, who had resigned his seat in the legislature to protest the party’s refusal to take disciplinary action against President Chen, also “came back into the fold.” He lauded Hsieh as a good administrator and the best candidate.\textsuperscript{187} This gave evidence the DPP was not suffering from lack of unity, as it had seemed earlier.

A KMT spokesperson said that MA Ying-jeou was popular in Kaohsiung and had made fifteen trips there to campaign for HUANG Chun-ying and that while Huang was ahead of Chen in the opinion polls by a good margin the DPP was good at bringing in the vote at the end of campaigns. Ma lauded Huang’s knowledge of economics needed to deal with high local unemployment and

\footnotesize{
\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{183} Patty Lu, “Ma denies helping Soong in election,” \textit{Taiwan News}, November 12, 2006 (online at www.taiwannews.com.tw).
  \item \textsuperscript{185} Dennis Engbarth, “DPP launches telephone campaign,” \textit{Taiwan News}, December 7, 2006 (online at www.taiwannews.com.tw).
  \item \textsuperscript{186} Lin was sentenced to twelve years in prison for his role in the Kaohsiung Incident at which time his mother and daughters were killed. In 1989, he wrote a draft law for a “Republic of Taiwan.” Later he was chairman of the DPP.
  \item \textsuperscript{187} Crystal Hsu, “DPP rallies behind its candidates,” \textit{Taiwan News}, December 7, 2006 (online at www.taiwannews.com.tw).
\end{itemize}
}
praised Huang's proposals to start direct commercial flights to China and turn Kaohsiung Harbor into a free trade zone. Meanwhile, TSU candidate LO Chih-ming vowed to finish the race in spite of DPP calls for him to drop out. Lo even showed a tape of former president LEE Teng-hui saying that the DPP's call for unity was ridiculous since the party had divided itself.188

The last day of campaigning, both the KMT and the DPP put most of their efforts into the Kaohsiung race. President Chen stirred up ethnic and local nationalist sentiment, saying that Kaohsiung would become a "Chinese Kaohsiung" if the KMT won. Other DPP leaders spoke of progress when Frank Hsieh was mayor and called for preventing "backsliding." MA Ying-jeou called on voters to "expel the corrupt DPP from the city."

VIII. ELECTION RESULTS

In the Taipei mayoral race, HAU Lung-bin won election by a significant margin, getting 53.81 percent of the votes cast. Frank Hsieh received 40.89 percent. James Soong got just 4.14 percent. LI Ao, Clara Chou and KO Szu-hai each received less than one percent of the ballots. In the Kaohsiung contest, CHEN Chu won with 49.41 percent of the vote. HUANG Chun-yung got 49.25 percent. Just over one thousand votes separated the two. Three other candidates, LIN Chih-sheng, LIN Ching-yuan and LO Chin-ming, each got less than one percent of the votes.189

In the Taipei city council race, the KMT took 43.65 percent of the votes and got 24 of its candidates elected. The DPP got 30.77 percent of the popular vote and elected 18. The New Party elected four candidates and the PFP and TSU each two. Others got two. In the Kaohsiung City Council race, the KMT won 35.95 percent of the vote, taking 17 seats. The DPP got 30.49 percent for 15 seats. The PFP got 6.78 percent of the vote and the TSU 5.74 percent for four and one seat each. Others got seven. The KMT won sufficiently to chair both councils.190

The voter turnout in Taipei was 64.52 percent; in Kaohsiung it was 67.93 percent, both down from the previous election (70.61 percent in Taipei and 71.38 percent in Kaohsiung in 2002).191 However,

190. Ibid.
the voter turnout was higher than anticipated and probably helped the winners in both mayoral races.

Most observers saw Hau's victory as an impressive one. He won against five other candidates, two of them seasoned politicians and good campaigners. Two other candidates took away pan-blue votes. He was the target of political attacks that questioned his loyalty to the party, his honesty, and the reputation of his father. He represented the party out of power, not the ruling party. He was not an incumbent. Still, he got more than half of the votes cast.

Putting a different spin on Hau's victory, he won ten percent less of the popular vote than MA Ying-jeou in the previous Taipei mayoral election.192 He benefited from considerable strategic voting, getting pan-blue votes that would have otherwise gone to James Soong; voters wanted to avoid what happened in 1994 and 2000. Soong thus did not split the conservative vote to any extent and, of course, LI Ao didn't either. Hau had name recognition, a clean reputation, experience, and strong support from his party's leaders (most importantly MA Ying-jeou and WANG Jyng-ping). In view of these facts, Hau's victory was to have been expected, was smaller than many expected, and is one the KMT could celebrate only with reservations.193

The bottom line: The KMT won the most important election of the group and will continue to control the executive branch of Taiwan's largest city and its capital. Hau's win was in part, perhaps a considerable part, a result of the KMT's cleaner image and the DPP's soiled reputation. It proved that corruption mattered.194

Frank Hsieh lost his bid for the mayor's job, getting a significantly lower portion of the popular vote than Hau—more than 13 percent less. After the election he forthwith conceded defeat. Some said he should have won. He was more experienced than Hau, having served as mayor of Kaohsiung. He had also been prominent in national politics, serving recently as premier. He was a good campaigner and had a good organization. Some said it was a career breaker for Hsieh.195

192. Ma got 63.5 percent of the popular vote in 2002.
193. See Lawrence Chung and Minnie Chan, "Taiwan's ruling party wins poll despite scandals," South China Morning Post, December 10, 2006 (online at www.lexis-nexis.com).
195. Some pundits said this from the very beginning and noted Hsieh's failed efforts to split pan-blue, shed his image as a former member of the Chen administration, or to
On the other hand, Hsieh’s defeat was not viewed by most observers as a serious loss if setback at all. In fact, the election may have enhanced Hsieh’s political future. He got more votes than expected, given the corruption scandals involving those in his party and President Chen. Also, in a sense Hsieh ran as an independent (certainly without President Chen’s help), though of course he had DPP support throughout the campaign. Hsieh got more votes than DPP’s candidate Lee Ying-yuan got in the last election (just over 35 percent). He outperformed DPP city council candidates by 10 percent. After the election, his supporters said he was a strong candidate for the presidency in 2008. Most pundits agreed.196

James Soong lost the mayoral contest badly. Most predicted that he would receive at least a credible portion of the popular vote—10 to 15 percent. Soong had been a very popular governor. He was the only governor of Taiwan ever elected. He might have won the presidential election in 2000. He had his own party and certainly did not lack name recognition. Working against him was the belief that his political career was long over and that in this election he was simply a spoiler. Many thought his motive in running was to leverage his candidacy into a future appointment to high office. Most important, pan-blue voters recalled what had happened in the 1994 Taipei mayoral contest and thus “strategically” did not vote for Soong.197 After the election, Soong stated that he was retiring from politics.198

An alternative theory is that Soong did not try as hard during the campaign as he might have and got something in return (a promise?) for this and not disclosing KMT secrets, perhaps information about the Lafayette ship purchasing scandal that might have implicated former premier HAU Pei-tsung and hurt HAU Lung-bin’s chances of winning. Thus Soong does not intend to retire and may have a position in a future Ma administration.199

Clara Chou performed poorly, below expectations. She had name recognition and, at first, the backing of a political party. Not

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198. “Soong bows out of politics after his defeat,” *China Post*, December 12, 2006 (online at www.chinapost.com.tw). Soong said “starting today I will keep away from politics and live a carefree life with my wife for the rest of our days.”
199. The writer heard this view was expressed by a number of scholars in Taiwan.
abandoning her advocacy of President Chen stepping down and thus losing her party's support and her antics during the campaign no doubt hurt her. In short, she alienated both her party supporters and voters. During the campaign she slapped MA Ying-jeou in the face in public and on one occasion grabbed the breasts of anther female to underscore the problem of sexual harassment against women in Taiwan. This demeaned her campaign in the eyes of many voters. Strategic voting no doubt also hurt her. LI Ao and KO Szuhai were not serious candidates from the beginning. Li added some issues of debate to the campaign. Ko made the campaign more interesting, or at least added some humor to it. ²⁰⁰

In the Kaohsiung mayoral race, CHEN Chu won by a very slim margin. The corruption issue no doubt explains to a large extent why she was behind in the polls during virtually all of the campaign. However, both of these statements deserve some elaboration. Pundits opined after the election that they are not necessarily true assumptions. The opinion surveys indeed showed CHEN Chu lagged behind HUANG Chun-ying during most of the campaign. But most of the polls were conducted and published by pan-blue or by newspapers sympathetic to pan-blue. The DPP on occasion doubted these polls, but did not say much. It may be then that she didn't actually trail by so much during the campaign. It is also possible that she did not win more votes than Huang. In such a close race, the likelihood of miscounting or cheating influencing the results is high. The Central Election Commission noted before the election that there were a large number of "phantom voters." In fact, there were 7,944 new voters registered compared to a year earlier. ²⁰¹ This was an unusual increase and some could not be accounted for. President Chen accusing the KMT of vote buying at a very critical time in apparent violation of Taiwan's election laws probably influenced voters enough to have made a difference. Huang said this during and after the campaign; so did MA Ying-jeou. ²⁰²

Right after the election Huang challenged the results, but a subsequent official investigation did not produce evidence of DPP

²⁰² Ma Ying-jeou called President Chen's actions unethical and said the DPP and Chen should issue an apology. See MoYan-chih, "Elections 2006: Ma attributes Kaohsiung result to 'unethical' DPP," Taipei Times, December 10, 2006 (online at www.taipeitimes.com).
wrongdoing. Huang charged there was vote buying, but this was not proven. In fact, the DPP’s charge of the KMT of vote buying did produce evidence.\textsuperscript{203} Thus it may be that CHEN Chu won by a bigger margin than reported. Alternatively, the DPP was better at manipulating the results and controlled the investigations afterwards.\textsuperscript{204} President Chen’s accusation seems to have violated the election law and may result in the president being charged and punished. But this will have to await judicial action and will not likely result in changing the outcome of the election.

Why did Chen win a come-from-behind victory, if that is what really happened? There are a host of explanations.

The corruption issue was obviously less important in Kaohsiung and was offset by other factors. Kaohsiung voters are less educated. They are more provincial. Localism is stronger in Kaohsiung than Taipei. Kaohsiung voters are more biased against the KMT and remember its past authoritarian rule. As one pundit noted, they “look back more than forward compared to Taipei voters.” Many remembered the Kaohsiung Incident.\textsuperscript{205}

Thus voters in Kaohsiung were thus much more forgiving of President Chen and his relatives and associates’ wrongdoing. Many more voters in Kaohsiung believed Ma was also guilty of corruption, said just as much as Chen, even though the evidence was very different—weaker and last minute in the case of Ma. President Chen had promised not to campaign. Yet he did. Voters in Kaohsiung didn’t care much that he broke a promise, as reflected by the large turnouts to see Chen during his campaign visits. They also didn’t care, much at least, that President Chen may have violated the country’s Election Law when he accused the KMT of vote-buying. He is seen in a different light in Kaohsiung because he is Taiwanese and a southerner. Thus, the corruption issue was to a large extent trumped by localism and the ethnic card.\textsuperscript{206}


\textsuperscript{204} KMT leaders charged that the DPP had a pre-taped video used as evidence of Huang’s supporters engaging in vote-buying and that buses said to transport them had not been registered.

\textsuperscript{205} In December 1978, a protest movement organized a demonstration in Kaohsiung on Human Rights Day. Violence broke out and a number of police officers were injured. Those instigating the incident were arrested and sentenced to jail. Many people in Kaohsiung sympathized with them and blamed the KMT.

The impression was widespread that the corruption scandals and what resulted, the question of whether President Chen should resign, badly divided the DPP. It did; but the DPP in the end was unified. The party, its leaders and even those that had left the party wanted to win the election. They put the issue of CHEN Shui-bian’s reputation aside. They also proved to be tougher than the KMT. They used last minute surprises to their advantage much better: MA Ying-jeou’s scandal, the vote buying issue in Kaohsiung, and other events. They played to the emotions of their constituency very well.207

Many former and present DPP figures campaigned for CHEN Chu. Several gave a lot of time and effort to help her. Premier Su and DPP chairman Yu spent considerable time helping her, especially during the last days of the campaign. LIN Yi-hsiung, a well-known former DPP leader, campaigned for her. This made a difference. Frank Hsieh also stumped for CHEN Chu. Hsieh had garnered a good reputation when he was mayor and CHEN Chu’s supporters used that; they often cited his accomplishments, including cleaning up the Love River and building the subway system.208 The DPP also put a lot of resources into CHEN Chu’s campaign, noticeably more during the last days of the campaign.

President Chen helped CHEN Chu, notwithstanding his scandals and the fact he pledged not to campaign. Voters in Kaohsiung didn’t care so much about the corruption issue; certainly they didn’t care that Chen had said he would stay out of the campaign. Shih’s anti-Chen movement did not have nearly the turnout or the impact in Kaohsiung as in Taipei. In fact, it created a backlash to some degree and unified DPP supporters.209 Further, Shih had little or no impact on the campaign in the last days. Many voters perceived that there was little difference between President Chen and Ma, even though Ma was only being accused of taking money from the mayor’s fund and there was no indictment.

CHEN Shui-bian won the hearts of many in Kaohsiung and diverted attention from his corruption scandals when he said that if CHEN Chu were elected he would later move to Kaohsiung. He also dealt deftly with another serious accusation against him. Pan-blue had charged that Chen’s son and his seven-month pregnant

209. Ibid.
wife were in the U.S. so that the child would get U.S. citizenship. The media also connected Chen’s son being in the U.S. to rumors that the president and his wife had huge foreign bank accounts and would flee the country in the future. Chen’s son and his wife returned to Taiwan. The president’s son even appeared to campaign for CHEN Chu.

Then there is the matter of ethnicity. It was perhaps the biggest factor of all in explaining CHEN Chu’s win. Some called it the DPP’s “super weapon” in the campaign. President Chen and DPP campaign planners stoked this sentiment quite effectively. The president and others said the election was a “choice between Taiwan and China.” They also made the argument that the survival of the party hinged on this election, something akin to the argument they used in the past that voting for the DPP was voting for democracy. Most voters certainly did not want the DPP to disappear, as that would mean a return to one-party rule.

MA Ying-jeou was less effective in Kaohsiung and helped Huang much less than he helped Hau because he is Mainland Chinese. WANG Jyng-ping, who is Taiwanese, campaigned for Huang; but he spent much less time in Kaohsiung than Ma. It was also widely known that he and Ma were not exactly friends.210

CHEN Chu proved to be a good campaigner: energetic, charismatic, etc. Being in the Chen administration tainted her; but this is not the same as being corrupt herself. She also had a good record for being effective in office. The fact that she was arrested and incarcerated after the Kaohsiung Incident in 1979 added to her credentials with those who opposed the KMT. She was one of two women convicted; the other was Annette Lu. Her background complemented efforts made by President Chen and DPP campaigners to play on local Taiwanese sentiment and use the ethnic card.211

CHEN Chu also had the benefit of money from the DPP-governed city government. Finally, she was advantaged by a high voter turnout—68 percent. This was lower than in the past, but higher than expected and high given the trend of voter turnout in Taiwan’s elections dropping over the past several years.212

212. LI Chung-pai, “Why the DPP won in Kaohsiung,” Taipei Times, December 10, 2006, p. 8. The voter turnout was 71.4 percent in the previous election.
HUANG Chun-ying had a reputation for honesty and being a good administrator. He ran a good campaign. But he was not as dynamic as CHEN Chu. He stood for diversity and a multi-ethnic party and government. But that counted for little. He was often seen with Mainland Chinese, which was more a curse than a benefit. DPP activists during the campaign often referred to “hated Chinese Mainlanders.” MA Ying-jeou campaigned strenuously for him and the two were together during many campaign events. Ma generally had a good reputation in Kaohsiung. But Ma is a Mainland Chinese. Kaohsiung is a city of mostly Taiwanese and where many voters saw the election in those terms. Ma could not cope effectively with the DPP tactic of making the election a Taiwanese nationalist issue.

In the city council races the KMT made significant gains, and for that reason it may be said to have won that part of the election in both cities. It increased its representation on the Taipei City Council by four seats. In Kaohsiung its seats grew by five. This may be viewed as a DPP setback, and that is probably in most senses accurate, though the DPP also increased its numbers on both councils—by one each. In the popular vote column the KMT made large gain in Taipei—from 32.08 percent in 2002 to 43.68 percent in this race, for a gain of more than ten percent. In Kaohsiung, the KMT made a similar large advance—from 25.76 percent to 35.95 percent, also more than ten percent. The DPP’s popular vote virtually stayed the same in the Taipei contest and gained just a bit in Kaohsiung, from 25.03 percent to 30.49 percent.213

There are other reasons to view the election resulting in a KMT victory and corruption the reason why. Shifts in party identification among voters going into the election had strongly favored the KMT. Identification with the DPP had fallen from 26 percent in 2004 (when, as noted earlier, corruption started to become a serious problem for the ruling party) to 17 percent in mid-2006, while identification with the KMT rose from 22 percent to 38 percent.214 The KMT won the most seats in city council races in Kaohsiung. It is unlikely that KMT candidates would have gotten so many seats and made such gains had many voters not been influenced by the corruption issue. Second, a much larger turnout for the city council races than the mayoral race, suggests many voters didn’t vote for

214. Data are from the Election Study Center at National Cheng Chi University, online at http://esc.nccu.edu.tw/eng/data/data01.htm.
mayor because they were turned off by President Chen's scandals. Some voters certainly associated CHEN Chu with the CHEN Shui-bian administration. The corruption issue alienated some voters who would not vote for a KMT candidate and simply did not vote.215

The small parties and independents lost. The PFP was the biggest loser. Its strength in the Taipei City Council fell from eight to two; in Kaohsiung it fell from seven to four. The TSU elected only two candidates to the Taipei City Council and dropped from six to one in Kaohsiung. The New Party's chairman, YOK Mu-ming, said before the election that if all of the NP's candidates lost their bids for the four seats the party had on the Taipei City Council, the party would consider disbanding. The NP won four.216

IX. CONCLUSIONS

Post-election, the big question pondered by the pundits was: How big was the corruption issue in determining the outcome of the voting? No doubt it was a big issue. Yet numerous commentators said it didn't matter as much as many was thought it would and, moreover, made little difference in the case of the Kaohsiung mayoral race.217 There will probably be two voices about this issue for some time.

There is no doubt that DPP candidates would have done much better had there been no corruption scandals that tainted President Chen, his family, and aides. DPP leaders and candidates definitely acted like it was a problem. The fact President Chen has been a consummate campaigner and helped his party's candidates in past elections (except the last one or two when the DPP did not do well), but was absent in this campaign, save the Kaohsiung mayor's race at the last moment, is convincing evidence.

President Chen and his scandals clearly hurt Frank Hsieh badly in the Taipei election. Hsieh said Chen's corruption cost him seven percentage points.218 He did not want to be seen with Chen. He avoided him, even mention of him. His campaign strategists let it be

217. See for example, Michael Fahey, "Taiwan first, clean government second," South China Morning Post, December 15, 2006 (online at www.lexis-nexis.com).
known that Hsieh’s relationship with President Chen was not a good one. Some advertised the point that President Chen had fired him from the premiership. Hsieh’s campaign staff tried to portray him as different from Chen, meaning not corrupt. Hsieh even called for President Chen to resign just days before the election.\textsuperscript{219}

After the election Hsieh’s supporters made much of the fact he did much better than expected. What they meant by this is mainly that he had done well in spite of the corruption mess involving the president, his aides, his family, and the party. They mentioned the fact Taipei is a blue city, that the DPP seemed in disarray about who its candidate should be going into the election, SHIH Ming-teh’s movement had strong support in Taipei, that the DPP shifted its resources to the Kaohsiung race late in the campaign, and other factors. But they mentioned more often Hsieh doing well in spite of the scandals.\textsuperscript{220}

Yet, the DPP’s candidate, CHEN Chu, won in Kaohsiung with President Chen’s help. The scandals mattered. CHEN Chu did not deny that Chen and his family were corrupt. She avoided him until the very end of the campaign. No one said during the campaign that he and his wife were not guilty of embezzling public funds, perjury, etc. No one said the DPP was cleaner than the KMT. Talk of President Chen’s past struggle against the KMT and for democracy was almost absent.

That corruption wasn’t important at all, or barely so, was the DPP’s interpretation of the election results \textit{post facto}, intended to exonerate the party and President Chen. It was to the DPP’s advantage to do that for a number of reasons, especially looking ahead to the coming elections.

The DPP’s take on the corruption issue also relates to its view of the media. The media in Taiwan is not controlled by pan-green, as are the judiciary, the police, and various organs of the government. In fact, the media is largely pan-blue. Also it is prone to sensationalism and, therefore, loves to report on the corruption issue. It may have reported too much on corruption and created a backlash, at least among DPP voters. Some DPP officials said this and certainly many believed it. After the election they argued that the

\textsuperscript{219} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{220} See Lawrence Chung, “Former premier strengthens his hand,” \textit{South China Morning Post}, December 11, 2006 (online at www.lexis-nexis.com).
media did not influence voting as much as many (especially the media and pan-blue) thought it would. It does seem that the media overreached on the corruption issue and created some listener fatigue. It may also have generated the impression that pan-blue would so badly defeat pan-green that the future of the DPP and thus Taiwan's two-party system and its democracy were in danger. Hence, it may have strengthened the "democracy factor" and helped DPP candidates.

Clearly the huge discrepancy in opinion polls the media published helps explain the election results, especially in the Kaohsiung mayoral race. Leading up to the election, even the last day, the pro-pan blue media reported Huang Chun-yin leading by a sizeable margin. The pro-green media suggested a draw between Huang and CHEN Chu. The gambling syndicates had Huang favored by ten to twenty thousand votes early on, but made the odds even at the end. The publishing of polls showing Huang far ahead may have helped CHEN Chu since many people did not believe them and wanted to prove them false.

What about issues? Pan-blue candidates ran on issues. The economy was the big one. Pan-blue candidates blamed the DPP for mismanaging the economy and for blocking closer commercial ties with China, which many people feel, if enhanced would help Taiwan grow faster economically. They blasted the DPP and the TSU in particular for opposing investment in China. They cited the high unemployment rate, especially in Kaohsiung. They argued for globalism.

HUANG Chun-ying said that Kaohsiung has suffered economically under Chen and his fundamentalism and anti-Chinese sentiment were part of the reason. Voters must have been listening. Otherwise why did Kaohsiung voters reject the TSU, which clearly opposes economic ties with China? Why didn't CHEN Chu oppose the rapid rise of investment in China (up 40 percent in the first six months of 2006)? After the election one scholar said: "People want

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221. See Ku Chung-hwa, " Taiwanese media, too, need to take a step back," Taipei Times, December 11, 2006 (online at www.taipeitimes.com).

222. The latest poll before the election published by the China Times had Hung leading by 43 percent to 29 percent. United Daily News showed Huang in the lead by 57 percent to 40 percent. Era TV said Huang led by 59 percent to 37 percent Liberty Times, which is pan-green, indicated the race was a tie. See zonaeuropa.com/20061209_1.htm for details. Apple Daily reported at the time that opinion polls are manipulated in Taiwan and that makes them "lies and jokes." This was mentioned in the article cited above.
better relations with China, not formal relations." Pan-blue, especially HUANG Chun-ying, may have spent too much effort on economic matters this being a local election and winning candidates would have little influence on national economic policy. But economic issues mattered.

Pan-blue candidates mentioned crime, social instability, education, medical care and other bread-and-butter issues. These issues resonated in Taipei much better than Kaohsiung where emotional factors were more important. They cited the Chen administration's bad record in foreign policy, but here they pulled their punches. Pan-blue strategists apparently thought Taiwan's isolation began under KMT rule and the DPP would counter with this point. Alternatively, the Chen administration could turn it into an anti-China issue. Noticeably little weight was given to the loss of diplomatic relations with Chad during the run-up to the election.

Pan-green's strategy was to counter the KMT's issues with appeals to the voters' emotionalism, specifically their dislike of the KMT, their antipathy toward China, and their positive sentiments about localism and Taiwan nationalism. Meanwhile, President Chen called for the KMT to report on the sources of its assets, pushed a new constitution, and appealed to his ethnic group. These tactics worked in past elections; they worked in this one—though certainly better in Kaohsiung and with less success in Taipei.

After the election, pundits ruminated about how the elections affected top leaders' images and their future. Some had believed President Chen would resign if the DPP lost the mayoral elections in both Taipei and Kaohsiung. That didn't happen so, naturally, there was less talk after the election of Chen stepping down. For a number of reasons, though, it was doubtful the president would have resigned had the results been different in Kaohsiung. Top leaders in his party didn't want him to resign; that would put Annette Lu in the presidency. They perceived that, not being liked by many top party leaders, she would badly split the party. Alternatively, she would perform well and as an incumbent she would get

225. Ong Hwee Hwee, "Heads to roll if Taiwan's ruling party loses polls," Straits Times, December 8, 2006 (online at www.lexis-nexis.com).
the nomination to run in 2008 and they wouldn't. MA Ying-jeou
didn't want her to be president either. He preferred to not to battle
a sitting president. One could argue that she would fracture pan-
green and Ma would easily win; but that was not the stronger
argument.

Was MA Ying-jeou helped or hurt politically by this election?
This was widely debated after the election. Most commentators
seemed to think that his image suffered.227 He appeared weak and
indecisive. He spent considerable time in Kaohsiung trying to bol-
ster the campaign of Huang, and Huang lost. Some said this proved
that Ma's support base is in the north only and he cannot be a na-
tional candidate. Some said Ma lost his magic image. His approval
rating dropped from an earlier high of 80 percent to 54 percent af-
ter the election. There was also talk that WANG Jyng-ping might
challenge Ma for the presidential nomination; this had not been
heard before.228

Ma's ethnicity was no doubt a liability in Kaohsiung. Ma, how-
ever, was also hurt by the accusations of taking or misusing the
Mayor's funds.229 This accusation came at a time when Ma could do
little to refute it; nor was there time. The prosecutor hurt Ma's ef-
effectiveness in campaigning for KMT candidates by not clarifying
whether there was meaningful evidence or not (assuming there was
not). Ma's ability to campaign effectively was also hurt by KMT
infighting and residual opposition to Ma's leadership for pushing
party reform too fast.230

Having said all of this, one needs to compare the futures of the
mild-mannered Ma and the tougher, more aggressive James Soong
and CHEN Shui-bian. Most political analysts say Soong's political
career is over. Chen will probably finish his term, but as a very lame
duck.

Ma was specifically criticized for not taking a hard enough
stance regarding Chen resigning; but if Ma didn't really want Chen
to step down, as many observers suggested, then he could not have

227. See Lawrence Chung, "KMT seen as the loser despite victory in capital," South
China Morning Post, December 10, 2006 (online at www.lexis-nexis.com).
228. Lawrence Chung, "Ma faces KMT battle for the president," South China Morn-
ing Post, December 22, 2006 (online at www.lexis-nexis.com).
229. In an opinion poll done by United Daily News 41 percent of respondents said
this as opposed to 40 percent who said otherwise. See "Ma expected to beat Premier Su
230. One can also argue that Ma's efforts to get support from party conservatives
and unite the party alienated some reformists that earlier supported Ma.
aggressively demanded Chen's resignation. Ma took a strong stance for Chen stepping down when it appeared Chen might resign. At times Ma took a hard stand; at other times he didn't. He could be accused of inconsistency. But, Ma had to choose between being politically smart and showing aggressive leadership; was his choice the wrong one? Likely not. Ma's leadership qualifications were also brought into question because he did not strongly support Shih's movement. He twice ordered the movement's dispersal in Taipei. This made him look conflicted and weak. Yet as mayor of Taipei at the time he was responsible for public safety and order in the city. Ma was in a dilemma.

Taiwan's citizenry seemed to understand Ma's situation. In an after election poll, 50 percent of those surveyed said they would vote for Ma for president, compared to 21 percent who said they would vote for Premier Su and 28 percent that had not decided. In the same poll, more DPP members preferred Hsieh to Su, suggesting the DPP may have some difficulty picking a candidate.231

What about the status of Taiwan's top DPP leaders? During the campaign Premier Su Tseng-chang had a difficult time running the government while trying to deal with the scandals surrounding the president and the party. He had to make choices that could have hurt him politically and to some extent did. But he remains one of the favorites of pan-green, perhaps the mostly likely get the DPP's presidential nomination in 2008.

Frank Hsieh definitely did not hurt his chances by losing the race for Taipei mayor. Few expected him to win; most said he did well given the situation. He remains a favorite. Some have speculated that he gained on Su because of the election.232 Clearly he is a strong contender for the party's presidential nomination.233

President Chen's corruption scandals made Annette Lu, who was corruption free, look good. But many party members do not like her and feel she would not be a good party leader or presidential candidate. Party head YU Shyi-kun managed dealt with the corruption crisis and handled party matters during the campaign as


well as can be expected. Still he is less popular than Su or Hsieh. No new leaders appeared, though there was talk of CHEN Chu being a future national figure; it is no doubt too early to say very much of weight about that. 234

The KMT’s WANG Jyng-ping saw his stature rise even though he had spoken highly of James Soong during the campaign, to the degree that some questioned his loyalty to the party. The reality of ethnic voting and the belief that Ma didn’t show leadership qualities strengthened Wang’s position. Some people said that, had Wang run for mayor of Kaohsiung, he would have won. 235 Others said that what happened in Kaohsiung proved that the KMT must run a Taiwanese for president in 2008 or lose, or at least put Wang on the ticket with Ma.

What about the variables that may influence future elections? The issues, plus the U.S. and China are most deserving of commentary.

The issues did not prove as very vital in this campaign because of the corruption issue and President Chen and the DPP’s reaction to it. The DPP will no doubt use local nationalist sentiment, ethnicity, and the “China enemy” to their advantage in the coming elections. It seems likely, however, that this strategy will work less well if there is no special issue or event to distract voters from the issues. Issues did become more important during President Chen’s first term and were important during the 2004 presidential campaign even though pan-blue lost.

The United States, at least the State Department, shifted its view of Chen several months before the voting. State took the view too that it would rather deal with Chen than Lu. Thus it was less critical of Chen’s provocative (toward China) nature. Washington’s pseudo-ambassador in Taipei even criticized Taiwan’s “partisan concerns” (meaning pan-blue) on the arms issue at a news conference. James Soong and some other pan-blue leaders reacted with anger, creating a mini-spat with the United States. This probably hurt more than it helped pan-blue candidates during the election. Overall, the “U.S. factor” may have helped pan-green in this election; certainly it did not help pan-blue as it did in the previous election or elections.


235. This is only a hypothetical as Wang currently holds a more important position. However, Wang is from Kaohsiung County and might have changed his residence to the city earlier and ran for mayor and it is likely he would have won.
China for the most part kept silent during the campaign. Chinese leaders condemned, though perfunctorily, President Chen’s proposals to write a new constitution. Otherwise they said little. They did not want to help pan-green by creating a backlash as they had in some previous elections. China, of course, was a factor insofar as cross-strait commercial relations, transportation and other links were on the minds of voters.\(^{236}\) This helped pan-blue, while creating a contradiction for pan-green candidates. Some wanted to reduce ties with China; others held the opposite opinion. DPP candidates risked the support of Taiwan’s business people if they were too opposed to economic relations with China. This, naturally, was a much bigger factor in Taipei than in Kaohsiung, where local nationalism to a considerable degree negated this issue.

Perhaps reducing the “China factor” in this election, or at least as some experts think, hatred for China is stronger among the older generation. A portion of this generation has passed. While there is no voting data to support this idea, it is noteworthy that DPP leaders have not exhibited this as much as during past election campaigns and both Hsieh (who pundits say did better than expected) and CHEN Chu (who won) are generally considered moderates on the independence issue.

Finally, how did the elections affect Taiwan’s democracy? Elections normally validate a democratic system, which this election successfully accomplished. Ethnic voting was a blight on the system, as were antics and lawsuits. But these things are not very abnormal. Whether President Chen violated the country’s election law by making accusations of vote buying at a critical juncture has yet to be determined. So too its seriousness. Likewise it has yet to be determined whether the prosecutors will say if there was a valid case against MA Ying-jeou. The judiciary was shown to be a weak link in Taiwan’s democracy during the campaign,\(^{237}\) Though the indictment of the First Lady and President Chen’s aides suggest that there is hope that his situation will change.

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GLOSSARY

Names

Chao, Chien-min  趙建銘
Chen, Chen-nan  陳哲男
Chen, Chi-hung  陳致中
Chen, Chi-mai  陳其邁
Chen, Chu  陳菊
Chen, Eric  陳瑞仁
Chen, Shih-meng  陳師孟
Chen, Shui-bian  陳水扁
Chen, Sissy  陳文茜
Cheng, Chin-ling  鄭金玲
Cheng, Tsun-chi  鄭村淇
Chen, Yao-chang  陳耀昌
Chiu, Yi  邱毅
Chou, Clara  周玉蔻
Chun, Doo-hwan  全斗煥
Fan, Jerry  范可欽
Hao, Pei-tsun  郝柏村
Hau, Lung-bin  郝龍斌
Hsieh, Frank  謝長廷
Hsu, Hsin-liang  許信良
Huang, Chun-ying  黃俊英
Huang, Kuang-kuo  黃光國
Huang, Ta-chou  黃大洲
Hsu, Chung-jung  徐重榮
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Lyu, Joseph  呂桔誠
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Roh, Tae-woo  盧泰愚
Shen, Fu-hsiung  沈富雄
Shih, Ming-teh  施明德
Soong, James 宋楚瑜
Su, Chin-chiang 蘇進強
Su, Tseng-chang 蘇貞昌
Tsai, Chin-lung 蔡錦隆
Wang, Ben-hu 汪笨湖
Wang, Chien-shien 王建煊
Wang, Jyng-ping 王金平
Wu, Den-yih 吳敦義

Wu, Shu-chen 吳淑珍
Yeh, Chin-chuan 葉金川
Yeh, Chu-lan 葉菊蘭
Yok, Mu-ming 郁慕明
You, Ching 尤清
Young, Stephen 楊甦齡
Yu, Shyi-kun 游錫堃

Terms

Bank of Taiwan 臺灣銀行
China Times 中國時報
China Trust Financial Holding 中國信託控股公司
Choshui River 濁水溪
Control Yuan 監察院
Democratic Progressive Party (DDP) 民進黨
Financial Supervisory Commission 金管會
Kaohsiung Mass Rapid Transit (KMRT) 高雄捷運系統
Kuomintang (Nationalist Party, KMT) 國民黨
Legislative Yuan 立法院

Liberty Times 自由時報
Love River 愛河
New Party (NP) 新黨
pan-blue 藍營
pan-green 綠營
People First Party (PFP) 親民黨
Taiwan Society 臺灣社
Taiwan Development Corporation 臺灣開發公司
Taiwan Railway Administration 臺鐵
Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) 臺聯

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