BRINGING PEOPLE BACK IN: COLLECTED ESSAYS ON MAJOR ELECTIONS IN TAIWAN AT THE TURN OF THE 21ST CENTURY

Wen-hui TSAI

School of Law University of Maryland
Maryland Series in Contemporary Asian Studies

General Editor: Hungdah CHIU
Executive Editor: Chih-Yu T. WU
Associate Executive Editor: Yufan LI
Associate Editor: Matthew Lyon
David Salem
Managing Editor: Chih-Yu T. WU

Editorial Advisory Board
Professor Robert A. Scalapino, University of California at Berkeley
Professor Bih-jaw LIN, National Chengchi University
Dr. Ying-jeou MA, President of Chinese Society of International Law
Professor Toshio Sawada, Sophia University, Japan
Professor Choon-ho Park, International Legal Studies, Korea University, Republic of Korea

All contributions (in English only) and communications should be sent to:
Professor Hungdah CHIU/or Chih-Yu T. WU
University of Maryland School of Law
500 West Baltimore Street
Baltimore, Maryland 21201-1786, USA

All publications in this series reflect only the views of the authors.
While the editor accepts responsibility for the selection of materials to be published, the individual author is responsible for statements of facts and expressions of opinion contained therein.

Subscription is US $35.00 per year for 4 issues (regardless of the price of individual issues) in the United States and $40.00 for Canada or overseas. Checks should be addressed to MSCAS.

Tel.: (410) 706-3870
Fax: (410) 706-1516

Price for single copy of this issue: US $18.00

ISSN 0730-0107
ISBN 1-932330-02-X

© Maryland Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, Inc.
BRINGING PEOPLE BACK IN: COLLECTED ESSAYS ON MAJOR ELECTIONS IN TAIWAN AT THE TURN OF THE 21ST CENTURY

Wen-hui TSAI*

TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preface</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 1</td>
<td>Introduction: People's Votes Count</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 2</td>
<td>Toward Greater Democracy: An Analysis of the Republic of China on Taiwan’s Major Elections in the 1990s</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 3</td>
<td>The R.O.C.’s 1995 Legislative Election and the Future of the Opposition Parties</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 4</td>
<td>A Giant Step Forward: The 1996 Presidential Election of the Republic of China on Taiwan</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 5</td>
<td>On the Right Track: An Analysis of the December 1998 Elections in Taiwan</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 6</td>
<td>Social Order and a Welfare State: The Domestic Policies of the CHEN Shui-bian Administration</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 7</td>
<td>Continuing Democratic Pluralism: The Elections of December 2002</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Wen-hui TSAI, Professor of Sociology, Department of Sociology/Anthropology, Indiana University-Purdue University at Fort Wayne.
PREFACE

I became interested in the observation of elections in Taiwan in the early 1980s when I was collecting material for my research work on Taiwan's socio-political modernization process. I was convinced that political stability and governmental planning were partially responsible for the creation of Taiwan's economic "miracle." I was also convinced that economic growth would in turn affect the pattern of political governing in Taiwan. Open and fair public elections are one of the true indicators of Taiwan's movement toward full modernization.¹ I began to write and publish papers on Taiwan's election in popular magazines and newspapers and in academic journals.

This volume contains a collection of essays related to discussion and analysis of major elections in Taiwan in the 1990s and early 2000s. With the exception of the introductory chapter and the last essay on the December, 2002 elections of mayors and city council members in Taipei and Kaohsiung, all of the essays have been previously published in various journals. The list includes:

"Toward Greater Democracy: An Analysis of the Republic of China on Taiwan's Major Elections in the 1990s," originally published as Occasional Papers/Reprints Series in Contemporary Asian Studies (The name has been changed to Maryland Series in Contemporary Asian Studies since 2000), Number 6, 1994, by the School of Law, University of Maryland;


¹. A discussion on the impact of electoral votes on Taiwan's political development can also be found in Christian Schafferer, The Power of the Ballot Box: Political Development and Election Campaigning in Taiwan, Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2003.

The purpose of bringing together these previously published essays into a single volume here is to give readers a systematic and chronological view of several major elections that were held in the 1990s and the early 2000s, a period of historical significance in Taiwan’s push toward political democratization. In preparing for this volume, we have corrected a few typographical and minor errors that appeared in the earlier published texts. We have also standardized character fonts to be consistent throughout the entire volume.

The essays contained in this volume show a chronological development of democratic practices through open elections held in Taiwan since the death of President CHIANG Ching-kuo. These elections at times seemed to be chaotic and confused, but they clearly show that people in Taiwan today are now active participants in the formation of government administrations and in the government’s decision-making process. Through the electoral process, people’s voices are heard and participatory politics have begun to take place in Taiwan.

I would like to thank the Center of Asian Studies at St. John’s University, the East Asian Legal Studies at the School of Law of the University of Maryland, and the *American Journal of Chinese Studies* for permission to include these essays in this volume. Over the years, I have had the good fortune to travel with Mrs. Chih-Yu T. WU, Professor Hungdah CHIU, George P. Chen, Peter Chow, Yu-long LING, Winston Yang, and Thomas Bellows to Taiwan to observe elections first hand and to collect information for my work. They all deserve my thanks. My wife, Sarah Tsai, has not only accompanied me to Taiwan, but has also assisted me in compiling election results for statistical analysis. Without her assistance, my enthusiasm would have been greatly undermined.

I would also like to express my appreciation to the Graduate Institute of Indiana University, the CHIANG Ching-kuo Foundation for International Scholarly Exchange, and the Association of Chinese Social Scientists in North America for their grants and financial assistance in support of my research and the field trips that I have conducted to observe the elections first hand.
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION: PEOPLE’S VOTES COUNT

One of the major indicators of a democratic system of government is the election of legislative representatives and of government officials to enact the laws and implement the policies that affect the well-being of the nation’s citizens. Although a number of elections were held during the years of rule by CHIANG Kai-shek and CHIANG Ching-kuo, elections in the Republic of China on Taiwan were tightly controlled by the ruling Kuomintang, known as the Nationalist Party, without the participation of opposition parties. In fact, it was illegal to organize any political party to compete against Kuomintang candidates. Non-Kuomintang candidates on the election ballots ran as independents and faced a great risk of being arrested. Taiwan was a one-party nation ruled by authoritarian leaders. Elections in those years were also frequently marked by cheating, vote buying, and violence sanctioned informally by the ruling party.

Fortunately, the situation began to change during the late 1980s when CHIANG Ching-kuo relaxed restrictions on the organization of political parties and began the process of political democratization in Taiwan. Two remarkable developments have taken place since the death of CHIANG Ching-kuo. First, a direct vote by the populace was held in 1996 that elected LEE Teng-hui to the presidency. Then, in 2000, a non-Kuomintang candidate from the Democratic Progressive Party, CHEN Shiu-bian, won the presidential election to become Taiwan’s new president. Party politics through open elections are at work in Taiwan and people’s voices are now being heard through elections. As of May 2002, a total of 98 political parties had registered with the Ministry of the Interior. Open and competitive elections have been held ever since. Most government posts are now filled by popular election.¹

There are three separate electoral systems currently being employed in Taiwan. In the first system for electing the president, mayors, and magistrates, each voter casts only one vote and the

candidate who receives a plurality is elected. The term of office of the president and vice president of the ROC is four years; they are directly elected by all eligible voters in the free territory of the ROC. The term of mayors and magistrates is also 4 years.

In the second system, which is adopted for the election of members of the Legislative Yuan and county, city, and township councils, each voter still casts only one vote and the candidates who have the greatest number of votes win.

In the third system, adopted by the Legislative Yuan in 1992, a number of seats are proportionally assigned for the representation of national constituencies and overseas Chinese communities. At present, 22 percent of the seats in the Legislative Yuan are filled by proportional representation.

The term of members of the Legislative Yuan is 3 years, while local council members serve for 4 years. Members of the National Assembly and the Control Yuan are now nominated and appointed by the president of the Republic of China with the consent of the Legislative Yuan.

The Central Election Commission is in charge of all elections. The Commission consists of a chairman and 11 to 19 commissioners who serve for a three-year term. The Public Official Election and Recall Law forbids any single political party from holding more than two-fifths of the seats on the commission to ensure the impartiality of the Commission and fair play in elections.

Among the registered political parties in today's Taiwan, only five are active in elections. They are the Kuomintang (KMT), the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), the People First Party (PFP), the New Party (NP), and the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU).

The Kuomintang (KMT), also known as the Nationalist Party, is the oldest and largest party in Taiwan. It was founded in 1894 with the goal of overthrowing the Manchu dynasty. The Kuomin tang became the ruling party in China after the Republic of China was founded in 1912. The KMT had been in control of Taiwan ever since CHIANG Kai-shek retreated to Taiwan in 1949 upon its defeat by the DPP in 2000. Even today, the KMT has approximately 1.08 million members. In March 2001, the KMT held its first ever direct election of its party chairman, and LIEN Chan was elected.

The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) was formed in September 1986, by a group of politicians who called themselves the "tangwai," meaning "outside the KMT." The DPP has an inclination towards Taiwan independence and permanent political separation of Taiwan from China. DPP leaders believe Taiwan is not part
of China and any change of Taiwan's status quo should be determined by the residents of Taiwan. The DPP's CHEN Shui-bian won the presidential election in March 2000, and the party is currently the ROC's ruling party. The DPP currently has approximately 450,000 members.

The New Party (NP) was started by a group of former KMT leaders in 1993 out of their frustration with LEE Teng-hui. The NP is pro-China and opposed to Taiwan independence. It now has approximately 68,000 members. But its membership is declining and its political influence has been diminishing in recent years.

The People First Party (PFP) was formally established by James Soong on March 31, 2000, after he lost as an independent in the presidential election. A number of KMT legislators who supported Soong during the presidential election formed the core group of the PFP. It is now the third most influential party in Taiwan, behind the KMT and DPP.

The Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) was formed on July 31, 2001. Former ROC president and KMT chairman, LEE Teng-hui, is its spiritual leader. The aim of the party is to stabilize the political situation, promote the economy, consolidate democracy, and strengthen Taiwan.

Taiwan is being democratized, not just by the sheer number of political parties currently registered, but also by the increasingly pluralistic nature of the decision-making process. The transformation of power is evident in the winning of the presidential office by the DPP's CHEN Shui-bian in 2000.

In recent years, there have been concerns that elections in Taiwan have been too frequent and too costly. A few scholars have called for consolidation of the number of elections held and for limiting campaign spending. They have also worried that elections may have exacted a social cost in the form of factional and ethnic conflict among various interest groups.

As the March 2004 presidential election approaches, the volume of election-related news carried in newspaper reports and other mass media is increasing. People are watching very closely the moves by any potential candidate from a major political party. The cooperation between LIEN Chan and James Soong is seen as an encouraging sign for future reunification between the KMT and PFP. This cooperative move will without a doubt present a serious challenge to CHEN Shui-bian in his bid for a second term.

Elections in Taiwan are colorful, lively, and exciting. They exemplify the active role citizens play in the ROC on Taiwan. Every
vote counts and every voice is heard. The legitimacy and effectiveness of the government cannot be built without the support of the people. Open and fair elections are indispensable to the survival and growth of Taiwan’s democracy and overall well-being.
CHAPTER 2

TOWARD GREATER DEMOCRACY: AN ANALYSIS OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON TAIWAN’S MAJOR ELECTIONS IN THE 1990s

I. INTRODUCTION

On December 3, 1994, citizens of the Republic of China on Taiwan went to the voting booths to elect candidates for three important political offices on the provincial levels: the Governor of Taiwan Province, and the mayors of the two “special municipalities” of Taipei and Kaohsiung. The election marked the first time that residents of Taiwan have ever directly elected the provincial governor since the current provincial government structure was set up in 1947. Residents of both Taipei and Kaohsiung were allowed to elect their own mayors for the first time since both cities were assigned the status of “special municipalities.”

The December 3, 1994 election clearly exemplified the efforts by the current leadership of the Republic of China on Taiwan toward political democratization. It is well known that Taiwan has enjoyed a remarkable growth in its economy during the past forty years, characterized by a successful transformation from its agriculture-oriented economy to a fast growing industrial economy, a steady GNP growth, increase in national and personal wealth, and overall improvement in the standard of living.1 Without any doubt, Taiwan has become one of the strongest economies in the world today.

Armed with strong personal wealth and national prosperity, the people in Taiwan began to demand political reform from the ruling KMT (the Nationalist Party) (hereafter “KMT”) to allow native-born Taiwanese more political participation in the policy decision-making process. Although the KMT, whose leadership consisted mostly of mainlanders who had escaped from mainland China in 1949 with President CHIANG Kai-shek, has been an ef-

---

1. Wen-hui TSAI, In Making China Modernized: Comparative Modernization between Mainland China and Taiwan, Baltimore, Maryland: University of Maryland School of Law, Occasional Papers/Reprints Series in Contemporary Asian Studies (OPRSCAS, it has been changed to Maryland Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, MSCAS, since 2000), No. 4-1993 (117), pp. 103-125.
fective political administration that to a large degree was responsible for the creation of Taiwan's economic "miracle," its authoritarian style of governing has begun to face strong challenge by those who called for democracy. Several significant measures have been taken in response to the call for more democratic participation in politics.

The most far-reaching development in Taiwan's political reform and democratization was the abolishment of the Martial Law in 1987 with subsequent consent to the organization of opposition political parties. Before the Martial Law was lifted, no new political parties had been allowed to organize. Opposition members were able to participate in national and local elections as individual independent candidates, but not to run collectively as members of any political party. The lifting of the Martial Law thus signified a great political democratization movement that has continued to the present. As of 1993, more than 60 political parties have registered with the Ministry of Interior. The DPP consisted mostly of politicians who were not members of the KMT; they are known as tangwai (Party Outsiders). Even though the activity of political parties were banned, members of the tangwai began to present unified platforms and nominated candidates for elections. Candidates from the tangwai could count regularly on the support of about 20 percent of the electorate in each election during the 1970s. The DPP was officially formed in September 1986 in spite of its illegality under the Emergency Decree. In the 1986 general elections, under the suspicious eyes of the ruling KMT, the DPP won 12 out of 73 seats in the Legislative Yuan, and 11 out of 84 seats in the National Assembly.

After the abolishment of the Martial Law in July 1987, the DPP gained increasing support from the general populace, especially the Taiwanese. The popularity of the DPP is best exemplified


3. In Taiwan today, there are two major ethnic groups: Taiwanese and mainlanders. The Taiwanese in general include those whose parents and ancestors arrived in Taiwan before the end of World War II in 1945. This group is sometimes referred to as native-born Taiwanese. In this paper, I use the two terms interchangeably. The mainlanders in general refer to those who came to Taiwan with CHIANG Kai-shek and his Nationalist government after the War. This latter group also includes offspring even though they may have been born in Taiwan. As a result of increasing inter-ethnic marriages between members of the two groups, ethnic tension is not significant. Nevertheless, the issue of ethnic discrimination is often a very sensitive topic in the political power struggle. It has been charged the CHIANG Kai-shek and CHIANG Ching-kuo were heavily in favor of the mainlanders and discriminated against the Taiwanese.
by the 1989 elections. The election was held on December 2, 1989. The KMT candidates won less than 60 percent of the popular vote, while the candidates representing the DPP won nearly 30 percent of the votes for the first time. More specifically, the KMT candidates won 54 percent of the votes for the Legislative Yuan, while the DPP candidates won 26 percent. In the election for the county magistrates and city mayors, 51 percent voted for the KMT candidates and 38 percent for the DPP. In the election for the provincial assemblymen, 55 percent voted for the KMT and 24 percent for the DPP. In addition, the DPP candidates also captured one-third of the mayoral and magistrate seats, including Taipei County, the largest county in Taiwan and the neighboring county to the capital city of Taipei. Although the DPP was not yet a serious challenger to the KMT in the 1980s, those elections paved the way for the results of the 1990s.

Another significant measure in the democratization process in Taiwan was the election of LEE Teng-hui to succeed the late President CHIANG Ching-kuo as Chairman of the KMT and the President of the Republic of China on Taiwan. LEE Teng-hui is not a mainlander; he was born in Taiwan. Lee is not a party loyalist either; he is a technocrat with an education from Japan and the United States and a Ph.D. degree in agricultural economics from Cornell University. Lee has never been in mainland China and has very little knowledge about the struggle between the Chinese communists and the Nationalists. When the late President CHIANG Ching-kuo appointed Lee as his successor, the intention was clear that he wanted to recruit Taiwanese elite to join the KMT. Although there were a few minor challenges from the KMT hardliners, LEE Teng-hui emerged as the sole leader of the KMT and thus the government of the Republic of China. A truly historical moment has occurred now that a Taiwanese leads Taiwan.

Under President LEE Teng-hui, two proclamations during the early 1990s further advanced the democratization process in Taiwan. One was the convening of an extraordinary session of the First National Assembly on April 8, 1990. The Assembly abrogated the provisional articles and adopted additional articles to the Constitution, which gave the president emergency powers and stipulated how the next delegates to the three parliamentary bodies were to

---

be elected. The other was the announcement by President Lee that "the Period of Mobilization for the Suppression of the Communist Rebellion" would be terminated the following day, May 1, 1991. President Lee also abolished the "Temporary Provisions" and promulgated the additional articles of the Constitution in accordance with the resolution adopted by the second extraordinary session of the First National Assembly. These proclamations not only laid the legal basis for the re-election of members to the parliamentary organs in the future, but also paved the way for the second phase of constitutional reform to be carried out by the Second National Assembly, which was to be seated in 1992.

Faced with increasing challenge from the opposition parties, the KMT also began an internal reform. In the past under CHIANG Kai-shek and CHIANG Ching-kuo, party candidates in elections were handpicked by the central committee of the KMT party, which took orders from the party chairman. In 1989, for the first time, the KMT held primaries to select candidates for elections to be held in November of that year. The winners from these primaries were then nominated as the party's candidates in the general election. Prior to 1989, the KMT had been ruled by the power at the top with little input from lower ranking party members of the general populace.

The KMT decentralization of power that allowed the selection of party candidates from party primaries was indeed a breakthrough and a true indication of democracy at work. As a ruling party, the KMT had successfully transformed itself from an authoritarian political machine to democratic political party. Thus, the stage was set for competition by opposition parties based on popular mass support.

The purpose of this paper is to outline Taiwan's process of democratization through elections held in 1990s. By the end of the 1980's, voters in Taiwan had become more enthusiastic about the election and believed that elections would serve as the means to change Taiwan's political course. A study carried out in 1989 by Dr. HU Fu of National Taiwan University, as reported in Y.C. CHEN's report in Free China Journal, pointed out that those voters who though elections would enhance the political status of native

Taiwanese had surged from 9.1 percent in 1986 to 44.6 percent in 1989.6

An analysis of the elections that took place in the 1990s reflects Taiwan's democratic maturation. The four major elections analyzed here include the December 1991 National Assembly Election, the 1992 Legislative Yuan Election; the election of county magistrates and city mayors in November 1993; and the December 1994 election of the Taiwan Provincial Governor, mayors of Taipei and Kaohsiung, and the provincial and local assemblymen. By analyzing election results, we should be able to see the gradual emergence and development of democracy in Taiwan in the 1990s and to construct a picture of Taiwan's political future.7

II. CONCISE ANALYSIS OF THE MAJOR ELECTIONS IN 1991-1993

A. The 1991 Second National Assembly Election

The first election in the 1990s came on December 21, 1991 with the election of the Second National Assembly. According to the Constitution of the Republic of China, the functions of the National Assembly are: (1) to elect the president and the vice president; (2) to impeach the president and the vice president; (3) to amend the Constitution; (4) to vote in the exercise of its rights of referendum on proposed constitutional amendments submitted by the Legislative Yuan; and, (5) to exercise power of consent to confirm the appointment of personnel nominated by the president of the Republic of China.8

The first National Assembly under the Constitution was elected in November 1947; it had not been re-elected since the Nationalist retreat to Taiwan. At that time, the National Assembly was expected to serve until the recovery of the mainland by the Nationalists. A partial supplementary election was held in 1969 to elect 15 new members to reflect Taiwan's population growth. However,

---


7. As my effort attempt here is to present the December 3, 1994 election results to interested readers in a timely fashion, a thorough literature search was not possible. For a more in-depth analysis and academic discussion of Taiwan's electoral process, readers should refer to works done by John Copper (1990); George P. Chen and John Copper (1984); Wen-cheng WU and I-hsin CHEN (1989); Chung Y. HSU and Parris Chang (1992); Tung-jen CHENG and Stephen Haggard (1992).

under tremendous pressure from native-born Taiwanese and a new leadership after the death of CHIANG Ching-kuo, a National Affairs Conference was called in the summer of 1990 in Taipei to revise the Constitution and accommodate social change and political reality. Then, one week before the opening of the Conference, the Grand Justices Council of the Judicial Yuan rendered its interpretation on the life-tenure of the legislators in the ROC parliamentary bodies—the National Assembly, the Legislative Yuan and the Control Yuan—which states that all life-tenure representatives must resign by December 31, 1991 and be replaced though new elections.9

Events that followed included the adoption of Additional Articles of the Constitution by the Extraordinary Session of the National Assembly on April 23, 1991 and the subsequent April 30 declaration by President LEE Teng-hui of the termination of the “Period of Mobilization for the Suppression of Communist Rebellion,” beginning on May 1, 1991.

The election results showed that the KMT won the majority (254) of the 325 seats in the Second National Assembly; it had better than 71 percent of the votes. The DPP did not have an exceptional showing; it captured only 66 seats with 23.9 percent of the popular vote.10 As shown in Table 1, the percentage of the seats won by the KMT in the Second National Assembly was 78.9 percent, while the DPP’s share was 18.6 percent in the Assembly. A study of the vote distribution shows that overall, “the DPP strongholds were in areas in the south of Taiwan with [the] Tainan area being the strongest. . . . It is also clear the DPP had more support in urban centers than in rural areas.”11

B. The December 1992 Legislative Yuan Election

According to the Constitution of the Republic of China, the Legislative Yuan (Li Fa Yuan) is the highest law-making body. The members of the Legislative Yuan supposedly represent constituen-

---

9. For a detailed discussion of the ROC’s constitutional reform, please refer to Hungdah CHIU, Constitutional Development and Reform in the Republic of China on Taiwan, Baltimore, Maryland: University of Maryland School of Law, OPRSCAS (It has been changed to MSCAS since 2000), No. 2-1993 (115).


cies from all over China. When the Nationalist government relocated itself in Taiwan after the Communist victory on the mainland, majority members of the Legislative Yuan came along with CHI-ANG Kai-shek to Taiwan. Under the “Temporary Provisions Effective During the Period of Mobilization for the Suppression of the Communist Rebellion,” the members elected in 1947 continued to serve.

Table 1. Results from the 1991 Second National Assembly Election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>KMT</th>
<th>DPP</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of voters won</td>
<td>71.17%</td>
<td>23.94%</td>
<td>5.19%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Seats won</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of seats won</td>
<td>78.15%</td>
<td>20.31%</td>
<td>1.54%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of seats in Assembly*</td>
<td>78.91%</td>
<td>18.61%</td>
<td>2.48%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Including 66 Assemblymen elected through the 1986 additional election whose term had not expired.

Source: News reports from various newspapers in Taipei published after the election.

Supplementary elections were held in 1969 to fill vacancies created by natural attrition; new seats also were created to represent the increasing population in Taiwan. In addition, as a compromise to the demands from the Taiwanese, the Kuomintang-controlled Legislative Yuan added 98 new members in 1972. These additional members have stood for re-election regularly in six elections held since the early 1970s. The “old guard” members who had been elected in mainland China in 1947 prior to the Nationalist retreat to Taiwan were finally asked to retire at the end of 1991. The new members of the Legislative Yuan will now all be elected from Taiwan.

Two separate electoral systems are employed in the Republic of China on Taiwan. For the election of administrative heads, such as county magistrates, city mayors, and village chiefs, simple pluralism is applied. For the election of Legislative Yuan and National Assembly members, provincial assemblymen, county or city councilmen, and village board members, the system of multiple constituencies with a single nontransferable vote applies. In this case, each voter casts only one vote, but there are a number of seats available.

in a constituency. The candidates who gain more votes than others get elected.

Because of its historical significance, the 1992 December election of the Legislative Yuan drew tremendous attention. It marked the first time in more than four decades that the ROC's highest lawmaking body was renewed wholly by popular ballot; it was indeed a milestone in Taiwan's push toward democracy. Some 340 candidates from 14 political parties entered the race, including 125 from the ruling KMT party, 59 from the DPP, 22 from the Chinese Social Democratic Party, and over 140 from other minor parties.

The election was held on Saturday, December 19, 1992. With exceptionally warm weather that day, 72 percent of the eligible voters turned out to cast their ballots. A total of 161 members of the new Legislative Yuan were elected and were to be sworn in on February 1, 1993 as the new members of the Second Legislative Yuan. That was the first time the entire Legislative Yuan consisted of only those elected by the residents of Taiwan and of the two offshore islands of Kinmen (Quemoy) and Matsu.

The election involved two electoral processes. Among 161 members of the Legislative Yuan, 125 were elected by direct votes in the election and another 36 were elected by a distribution scheme based on the share of votes each political party received in the election. In the first group, the KMT won 80 seats, the DPP 37 seats, the Chinese Social Democratic Party one seat, and independent candidates seven seats. In the second group, the KMT's share of votes earned them another 23 seats and the DPP 13 seats. In total, the KMT won 101 seats, the DPP 50 seats, the Chinese Social Democratic Party 1 seat, and the independent candidates 7 seats. Table 2 shows the percentage of votes each party received; the KMT's share was 61.7 percent, the DPP's was 36.1 percent, and the others received 2.2 percent. In terms of the percentage of seats in the Legislative Yuan, the KMT's share was 64.0 percent, the DPP's was 31.1 percent, and the others received 4.9 percent.

The election result clearly signified the growing popularity of the opposition party, particularly the DPP. With the DPP's unexpected high rate of voter support and its capture of nearly one third of the seats in the new Legislative Yuan, a sense of panic shocked the leadership of the ruling KMT party. For the first time, the ruling KMT party was to be seriously challenged in the law-making body. The Secretary General of the KMT party, Dr. James Soong, who

---

13. Ibid., p. 136.
was responsible for the KMT's election strategies, immediately submitted his resignation. It was accepted by the party chairman, Dr. LEE Teng-hui.

Election observers in Taiwan were also surprised by such a result. They agreed that, even though the KMT party was still in control of the Legislative Yuan, a two party system was beginning to emerge in Taiwan. The KMT party now had a legitimate challenger in the DPP. Until then, the Legislative Yuan had served merely as a rubber stamp to policies dictated by the Executive Yuan.

Some said the DPP candidates won because of the DPP campaign platform of a "welfare nation," and that people in Taiwan were tired of the KMT's continued lack of attention to welfare of the elderly, women and children, and to environmental protection. However, a closer comparison of the campaign platforms of candidates from both parties showed little difference. In fact, the KMT candidates had as many welfare promises as those of the DPP. In ranking order, the top ten issues in the KMT campaign platform were: (1) labor legislation; (2) environmental protection; (3) health insurance for all citizens; (4) education; (5) women's rights; (6) farmer's rights; (7) public housing; (8) fair taxation; (9) elderly welfare; and, (10) welfare for the handicapped. The top ten issues in the DPP campaign platform were: (1) one China, one Taiwan policy; (2) a tax cut; (3) relaxation of television controls; (4) housing for everyone; (5) labor legislation; (6) social welfare; (7) opposition to the wealthy and to privileged interest groups; (8) a reduced defense budget; (9) women's rights; and, (10) farmers' rights.14

It was clear that the DPP did not win because of its vision of a "welfare nation." What were the reasons, then, that enabled the DPP to secure such a large gain in this election? A general consensus among election observers was that the KMT party lost a relatively large share of seats to the DPP because of problems in its nomination procedures and because of internal factional fights.

---

First, the nomination procedures within the KMT party for this election were a mess. The KMT party officially nominated 97 candidates with party support. It also "permitted" another 27 candidates to enter the race with only the party's blessing, but without organizational backing. An additional 43 KMT members joined the election race in defiance of party regulations. A few from the latter group took away a large share of the traditionally KMT "iron votes," those of the military servicemen and their dependents, as well as those of retired veterans. As a result, several of the KMT-nominated candidates lost the election to this group of KMT "dissidents."

The large number of KMT members entering and winning races in defiance of party rules clearly signified problems in the KMT nomination process. One of the main criticisms came from the KMT's long-standing policy of nominating wealthy candidates. Although vote buying was illegal, the wealthy KMT candidates spent millions of dollars. According to several newspaper estimates, the purchasing price for one vote ranged from NT$800 (approximately US$27) to NT$4,000 (US$150). For instance, the market price for one vote in Taipei was NT$3,500 (US$130), and in Taichung and Chiayi counties, each vote was priced at NT$2,000 (US$75). In addition, various gifts such as watches, calculators, cameras, and office stationery were distributed to voters to sway their votes. Endless banquets were commonplace in many of the candidates' campaign headquarters. Such spending sprees were targets for attack from the non-KMT candidates, especially those of the DPP, even though there was no evidence that the KMT candidates were the only ones who did it.

Another factor that undermined KMT campaign effectiveness was the factional struggle within the party hierarchy. Ever since the inauguration of Dr. LEE Teng-hui as the party chairman, the party leadership has been broken into two major factional camps: the "main stream" faction that gathered around Dr. Lee and the "non-main stream" faction that attempted to take control from Dr. Lee. The "main stream" faction consists of mainly Taiwan-born KMT members who advocated a direct election for the next term of the Presidency of the Republic of China on Taiwan; they campaigned for a Taiwanese President. The members of the "non-main stream" faction are mainly those mainlanders who either came to Taiwan with CHIANG Kai-shek, or are the descendants of those mainlanders. They are against the election of a Taiwanese President and
wanted the election of the President through the old National Assembly, which they still controlled.

The results of the 1992 election indicated that military-supported KMT members had all of their 11 candidates elected; the “non-main stream” faction had 11 of its 12 candidates elected; and the “main stream” won only 20 out of its 30 nominations. Since the military-supported KMT members were mostly mainlanders who were sympathizers of the “non-main stream” faction, the “main stream” faction actually won two fewer seats than the combined 22 seats won by the military and the “non-main stream” faction. As a result, a potential conflict between mainlanders and Taiwanese existed in the new Legislative Yuan.

In this election, the DPP had a unified front in its campaign against a divided KMT party. Even though there were factions within the DPP as well, they somehow were able to forget their differences in support of the party’s candidates. Their chosen target was the Prime Minister, General HAU Pei-sun, who is a mainland and represents the military and authoritarian rule left by Chiang’s legacy. The strategy worked and gained support from a large number of Taiwanese.

A post election re-evaluation of the loss by the KMT disclosed that KMT candidates did poorly in urban areas. In the two major cities, Taipei and Kaohsiung, the KMT share of votes were 41.04 percent and 52.73 percent, respectively, lower than its 53 percent share in the overall Taiwan province and two offshore islands. In comparison, the DPP had a higher share of votes in urban areas than overall in the Taiwan province and two offshore islands. Table 3 shows voter distribution in urban areas between the KMT and DPP. Although the KMT had a higher percentage than the DPP in these major urban areas, with the exceptions of Kaohsiung North, Keelung City and Taichung City, its share was actually lower than the nation-wide share. In fact, KMT candidates won 89.54 percent of the votes in Penghu County, 77.46 percent in Hualien County, 72.13 percent in Miaoli County, 68.63 percent in Changhua County, and 62.21 percent in Taichung County. These are predominately rural counties which are easily influenced by vote buying practices. An analysis of the election result also finds a few interesting trends:

(1) A combination of youthfulness and higher education. Among the newly elected members of the Legislative Yuan, 70 percent were between 30 and 50 years old and 76 percent had college degrees or above. Among them, 15 (or 12 percent) had doctoral
degrees, 32 (25 percent) had master degrees and 48 (38 percent) had degrees from 4-year colleges.

Table 3. Percentage of Urban Votes in the 1992 Election by Party

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Urban Areas</th>
<th>KMT (%)</th>
<th>DPP (%)</th>
<th>Others (%)</th>
<th>Total (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Taipei City</td>
<td>41.0</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>31.5</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>50.8</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaohsiung City</td>
<td>52.7</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>57.5</td>
<td>38.8</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>47.1</td>
<td>31.5</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keelung City</td>
<td>58.0</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hsinchu City</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taichung City</td>
<td>56.2</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chiayi City</td>
<td>49.9</td>
<td>40.1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tainan City</td>
<td>44.8</td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nation-wide vote share</td>
<td>53.0</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


(2) Increasing ethnic conflicts. The success of the DPP in this election was in direct conflict with the “non-main stream” KMT members on the issue of Taiwan independence. The DPP members are mostly Taiwan born, and called for Taiwan independence from mainland China, while the “non-main stream” KMT members consisted of mainlanders who sought to push for a speedy reunification with the PRC. The conflict intensified already-existing ethnic differences.

(3) The necessity of political reform. The prime minister, General HAU Pei-tsun, and his cabinet were the targets of the DPP in the election. With the DPP occupying one third of the seats in the Legislative Yuan, they could call for the resignation of General Hau and his cabinet. A survey of the new Legislative Yuan showed that 84.3 percent of the members supported the call for the resignation of Hau and his cabinet. A new and less military-influenced cabinet would have to be installed after the election.

(4) Increasing influence of wealthy business groups. Even though there was a general consensus against dominance by the wealthy, the vast amount of money needed for the election was evident. There were a number of elected members who had the financial backing of wealthy business groups. Consequently, influence
from these business groups in future policy-making could not be avoided.

(5) Negotiation needed for policy-making. Until the election, the KMT-controlled Legislative Yuan, in general, served as a rubber stamp for decisions handed down by the Executive Yuan and the KMT Central Committee. With the DPP members occupying nearly one third of the seats in the new Legislative Yuan, the KMT could no longer push through its policy decisions without prior negotiation with the DPP. Since all the new members are elected by their constituents, they are likely to be held accountable for their roles in policy-making.

In summary, the surprising results from the December 1992 election of the Second Legislative Yuan sent a shock wave through the ruling KMT party hierarchy. A call for internal reform and reorganization within the KMT leadership was inevitable. At the same time, the DPP has gained tremendous confidence in winning support from the general populace. The DPP leadership began to plan for a final takeover of power from the KMT.

C. The 1993 Election of City Mayors and County Magistrates

After a surprise showing in the December 1992 election of the Legislative Yuan, the leadership of the DPP was confident that the party would do well in the coming election for city mayors and county magistrates in 1993. The strategy was to win over power on the local levels and push positions through the central government. “Encircling the central office by local power” was the slogan claimed by the DPP after the election. The election was held on November 27, 1993.

Entering the 1993 election, DPP chairman HSU Hsin-liang was very confident that his party would win at least 10 city mayorships and county magistrates. Unfortunately, the election results were not what he had planned. The KMT won 15 seats for city mayorships and county magistrates. The DPP won only six seats and the independents won two seats. The number of seats won by the DPP was in fact one less than it had prior to the election. As shown in Table 4, the KMT candidates had a winning combination of 65.21 percent in terms of the numbers of nominations won and 47.47 percent of the votes. The DPP had only 26.09 percent of its nominated candidates win, with a share of 41.03 percent of the total votes.

In comparison with the DPP’s performance in the 1992 Legislative Yuan Election and its pre-election projection, the DPP’s showing in the 1993 election was clearly a resounding defeat. Not
only did the DPP fail to overtake the KMT, it actually lost a seat. Consequently, two of the top ranking DPP leaders, party chairman HSU Hsin-liang and party central committee executive member SHIH Min-teh both submitted their resignations after the election.

Table 4. Results from the 1993 Election of City Mayors and County Magistrates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>KMT</th>
<th>DPP</th>
<th>CNP</th>
<th>IND</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of Candidates (a)</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of elected (b)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of (b)/(a)</td>
<td>65.21%</td>
<td>26.09%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9.0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of vote received</td>
<td>47.47%</td>
<td>41.03%</td>
<td>3.07%</td>
<td>8.43%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Chung-kuo shih-pao (China Times), November 11 and 28, 1993, p. 3.

The DPP's setback was caused by overconfidence from the top leadership and its unrealistic goal of unseating the KMT in local politics. The KMT leadership, on the other hand, was much more careful in conducting its election campaign this time around. The lesson the KMT learned from the election of December 1992 made the KMT more responsive to the wishes of the people with a brand new cabinet under a Taiwanese prime minister, Dr. LIEN Chan.

One new development in this election was the breakaway of the "non-main stream" KMT members from the KMT; this group of KMT dissidents announced the organization of a separate political party, named the "Chinese New Party." Although the "Chinese New Party" (hereafter "CNP") did not do well in this election, it did establish itself as one of the contending rivals to the ruling KMT.

The DPP did not totally lose either. Although the DPP failed to win the majority of the seats of mayorships and county magistrates, it was able to pull in 41.03 percent of the total votes; this was the first time in any election that the DPP received more than 40 percent of the votes, an encouraging sign for the future.

III. THE DECEMBER ELECTION OF 1994

The most important election held in the 1990s was the one held on December 3, 1994. It involved the election of the Provincial

15. A fact-finding team consisting of social scientists from the Association of Chinese Social Scientists in North America traveled to Taiwan to observe the campaign activities. In addition to the author, the team members were Professor George P. Chen,
Governor of Taiwan, the election of mayors of Taipei and Kaohsiung, and elections of provincial assemblymen and local councilmen. No election held in Taiwan has drawn as much attention from the island's 13 million eligible voters as the December 1994 election. Moreover, no election previously held in Taiwan has received so much coverage from foreign media.

The center for all this attention was the election of the Taiwan governor and the two city mayors of Taipei and Kaohsiung. This was to be the first election of the Taiwan governorship in Taiwan's history and the first election for city mayorship in thirty odd years for the two major cities in Taiwan. It has historical significance.

Unlike past elections, a multiparty competition emerged in this current election. The three major players were the KMT, the DPP and the CNP.

The KMT had been the ROC's ruling party for eighty-three years and celebrated its 100th anniversary in November 1994. Until 1987, the KMT did not permit rival political parties to form in Taiwan, with the exception of two minor parties which followed the KMT's line. The party's ideological base was derived from Dr. SUN Yat-sen's "Three Principles of the People." The KMT advocated constitutional reform to accommodate the changing situation in Taiwan and it supported the eventual reunification of China. The party's platforms include numerous policy goals aimed at implementing parliamentary reform, strengthening the local administration, securing social stability, maintaining a strong defense, promoting continuous economic growth, and expanding health and

a political scientist from Augusta College, Professor Peter CHOW, an economist from the City University of New York, Ms. Chih-Yu WU, Executive Editor of the Occasional Papers/Reprints Series in Contemporary Asian Studies (It has been changed to Maryland Series in Contemporary Asian Studies) of the University of Maryland School of Law, and Professor Wen L. LI, a sociologist from Ohio State University. The team attended several campaign rallies in Taipei and Kaohsiung, and traveled to Taichung to visit the headquarters of the candidates from the KMT and DPP. The team also visited the balloting tabulation center on the evening of the election day. The following report is based on the author's observation and numerous discussions with other members of the team. Statistical tabulations on the election results are taken from local newspaper reports in both the Chinese and English language published in Taiwan following the election. Those quoted are the China News (in English), the China Post (in English), Chung-kuo shih-pao (China Times) (in Chinese), Lien-ho wan-pao (United Evening News) (in Chinese), Lien-ho pao (United Daily News) (in Chinese), T'ai-wan shih-pao (Taiwan Times) (in Chinese), Min-sheng pao (in Chinese), Tzu-li chiao-pao (Independent Morning News) (in Chinese), and Tzu-li wan-pao (Independent Evening News) (in Chinese). However, the report is mine and I take responsibility for the observations and comments made in it.
social welfare programs. Changes that have occurred in recent years show the gradual evolution of Taiwanese to the leadership of the party hierarchy.

As previously noted, the DPP, which was formally established on September 28, 1986 by the opposition “tangwai,” received about 31 percent of the popular votes in the 1992 legislative elections and 41 percent in the 1993 election of local offices, making it the largest and most influential opposition party in Taiwan. One of the most controversial policy objectives is the DPP proposal to break away from mainland China and to seek Taiwan independence through self-determination. The party also supports a new constitution, implementation of social welfare programs and maintenance of a free economy. The great majority of DPP members are Taiwanese.

The CNP was founded on August 10, 1993 by a group from the former KMT “non-main stream” faction. According to a declaration issued by the party’s founders, the party’s major policy objectives include improving the ROC’s status in the international community, and working to open direct links with the PRC. The party’s declaration states that the party will work to eliminate special privileges for elite groups and government corruption, as well as eliminate what it calls “money power” and illicit connections between wealthy industrial consortiums and government officials. The CNP members are largely former KMT members, a majority of whom are mainlanders. To its critics, they are seen as advocates of a speedy reunification with mainland China.\(^\text{16}\)

A. The Taiwan Governorship

The eventful election of the first governor by direct vote from the general population was an historical occurrence; it signaled the end of KMT authoritarian rule. Prior to this election, the Governor of Taiwan was appointed by the premier and confirmed by the Provincial Assembly. Since the loss of mainland China following Chiang’s defeat on the mainland, Taiwan is the only province of thirty-five within the Republic of China’s original territory that has remained fully under ROC administration. Although in recent years, Taiwanese have been appointed as governors and served primarily for the interests of the ruling KMT leadership.

Surprisingly, President LEE Teng-hui chose to nominate the incumbent Governor, Dr. James C.Y. Soong, to be the KMT’s can-

didate to run for the new governorship. Soong is a KMT hard-line party loyalist and a mainlander. Soong was born in Hunan in 1942 into a military family. He did post graduate work at the University of California at Berkeley, Catholic University of America, and Georgetown University. He received a Ph.D. degree in international affairs from Georgetown University. He has held a number of key governmental offices in Taiwan, including Director General of the Government Information Office, ROC Government Spokesperson, Director General of the Department of Cultural Affairs in the KMT, Secretary General of the Central Committee of the KMT, a member of the KMT Central Standing Committee, and Governor of Taiwan. Soong has the trust of the ROC President, LEE Teng-hui.

The DPP's candidate for the governorship was Mr. CHEN Ting-nan. Chen was born in Taiwan and had served as the county magistrate of Ilan County. He is an effective bureaucrat. Ilan County was selected as one of the best counties in Taiwan under Chen's leadership. Although Chen's affiliation with the DPP was relatively short, he was deservedly chosen by political merit.

The CNP nominated JU Gau-jeng as the party's candidate for the governorship. Ju is a native Taiwanese who was a member of the KMT early in his career. He later joined the DPP and was elected to the Legislative Yuan. He is well known in Taiwan because of his violent physical acts during sessions of the Legislative Yuan. Ju left the DPP in December 1991 in protest of the DPP's call for Taiwan's independence. Ju then founded a new political party, called The Chinese Social Democratic Party. Ju's new party did poorly in both the December 1991 election for the Second National Assembly and the December 1992 election for the legislators. Ju resigned shortly thereafter as the chairman of the party. In 1994, Ju joined the CNP and was nominated to run for the governorship in December.

Throughout the pre-election campaign, Soong was ridiculed for being a mainlander and for trying to speak the Taiwanese dialect during campaign rallies. In the DPP's campaign literature, Soong was treated as a symbol of KMT oppression against native Taiwanese. In his effort to gain support, Soong visited all 309 villages and townships in Taiwan province and promised improvements in the standard of living of ordinary Taiwanese residents. President LEE Teng-hui went along with Soong in many of those campaign trails and proclaimed his support for Soong. "Soong may be born in mainland China, but he grew up in Taiwan, drank Tai-
wan's water and ate Taiwan's potato, just like you and me," President Lee told his audience.

In the end, the strategy worked. In the election, James Soong received 4,726,012 votes or 56.22 percent of the votes, and nearly one and half million more votes than the DPP candidate, CHEN Ting-nan, who received 3,254,887 votes or 38.72 percent. The other three candidates were far behind; JU Gau-jeng of the CNP received only 362,377 votes (or 4.31 percent) and the two independents had a combined 62,654 votes (or 0.75 percent). The distribution of the votes each candidate received is presented in Table 5.

Table 5. Results from the 1994 Governor Election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SOONG(KMT)</th>
<th>CHEN(DPP)</th>
<th>JU(CNP)</th>
<th>Others(INP)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of votes won</td>
<td>4726012</td>
<td>3254887</td>
<td>362377</td>
<td>62654</td>
<td>8405930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of votes won</td>
<td>56.22%</td>
<td>38.72%</td>
<td>4.31%</td>
<td>0.75%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The landslide success of the KMT candidate surprised almost everyone in Taiwan. With the DPP’s strong showing in two previous elections and with Soong being a mainlander, the pre-election prediction was for a close race with a small margin of victory. Soong’s overwhelming margin was unexpected. One of the explanations for the margin of victory was the fear of ordinary Taiwan residents of the DPP’s support for Taiwan independence. Many Taiwan residents worried that such a radical move toward Taiwan independence inevitably would give Communist China an excuse to use force to attack Taiwan. Soong’s call for unity and calm over change gained a majority support and shifted the campaign attention from ethnic differences to the maintenance of societal stability.

Another factor that contributed to Soong’s landslide victory was the effective use of KMT resources. In comparison with the DPP, the KMT has a better party organizational network and financial backing in an island wide election. Traditionally, the KMT’s party machinery has been relatively effective in pushing through its candidates in rural areas. The voting base in the election did include a large rural region that had been a stronghold of the KMT during past elections. The DPP’s Chen was unable to overcome this obstacle.

The election of Soong has also proved that ethnic background is not an obstacle to a mainlander candidate in rural areas. Al-
though the DPP's call for a Taiwanese to be the first elected governor of Taiwan was very attractive to some, it was not significant enough to offset Soong's strengths. As a result, with the exception of Ilan County, which is Chen's home base, Soong won unanimously.

The election of Soong has, to a certain degree, eased the conspiracy theorists' fear that President LEE Teng-hui holds an ethnic bias against mainlanders and that he is leaning toward a gradual separation from the motherland. Soong is not only a mainlander, but also represents part of Chiang's legacy. Through Soong's election to the governorship, President Lee has shown to the mainlander group within the KMT that he has not abandoned them in favor of native Taiwanese.

In its reflection on the election of Soong as the first elected governor of Taiwan, the China Post, an English language newspaper published in Taipei, commented:

"Perhaps the victory reflected an affection by native-born Taiwanese voters for this mainland-born politician, who, in order to be identified as a true Taiwanese, has been striving to learn the Taiwanese dialect he never tried to speak in all his years growing up here."17

Indeed, a process of ethnic integration has finally taken place in Taiwan, as reflected in this election, which would appear to lessen societal tension.

B. The Mayorship of Kaohsiung

Kaohsiung is one of the two major cities in Taiwan designated as "special municipalities" which submit their budgets to, and receive funds from, the central government. Kaohsiung, which is located in southern Taiwan, gained such status in 1979 when its population reached one million. As a "special municipality," the mayor of Kaohsiung had been appointed by order of the ROC President. The December 1994 election marked the first time the mayor of the Kaohsiung "special municipality" would be elected by direct popular vote.

The KMT's candidate was the incumbent mayor, WU Den-yih. Wu was born in Taiwan and has been a career bureaucrat. He served as a member of Taipei City Council, the Magistrate of Nantou County, and other offices in KMT party organization prior

to his 1990 appointment as mayor of the City of Kaohsiung. As an incumbent, Wu was favored to win re-election.

The DPP's candidate was CHANG Chun-hsiung. Chang is a Taiwanese and a member of the Legislative Yuan representing the DPP. Chang was not well known in Kaohsiung and was not given much chance to win the mayorship.

The CNP's candidate was TANG A-ken, who entered the race at the last minute. He was given no chance at all to present any threat to the incumbent KMT candidate, WU. There were two independents in the race, but no one considered either of them a serious political threat.

The voter turnout on December 3 was high. Over 80 percent of the city's 926,318 eligible voters cast their ballots in 671 polling stations throughout the city. As expected, the KMT's candidate WU Den-yih won the Kaohsiung mayorship by a large margin over the other three candidates. Wu received 400,766 votes, or 54.46 percent of the total vote. The DPP's Chang received 289,100 votes, or 39.29 percent, while the CNP's Tang received 25,410 votes, or 3.45 percent. The two independents had a combined 20,597 votes, or 2.8 percent. Table 6 shows the vote distribution in the 1994 mayoral election of Kaohsiung.

Professor CHU Yun-han of National Taiwan University commented on the Kaohsiung election that Wu was able to win because he did not make any notable mistakes and his principle rival, Chang, was unable to create a new political climate in the campaign. In comparison to the campaigns for the governorship and the Taipei mayorship, the campaign in Kaohsiung was relatively trouble free and less emotional. Candidates who lost in the election expressed disappointment but accepted the results.

C. The Taipei Mayorship

The most heated and contested election was the Taipei mayorship. Taipei was designated as a "special municipality" in 1967. As a "special municipality," the President had appointed the mayor of Taipei prior to the December 1994 election. The election was the first after thirty years of mayoral appointments. All three candidates from the three major parties were well qualified and well known to the citizens of Taipei.

Chosen to run on the KMT ticket was Dr. HUANG Ta-chou. Huang was the incumbent mayor of Taipei and a former student

18. Ibid., p. 12.
and close friend of ROC President LEE Teng-hui. Huang was born in Taiwan and received his Ph.D. degree in agricultural economics from Cornell University, the same university attended by President Lee. Huang held a faculty post at National Taiwan University until 1976 when he received his first political appointment as a member of the Council for Economic Planning and Development in the Executive Yuan. Later, he served as Executive Secretary of the Research, Development and Evaluation Commission of the Taipei City Government, and was Secretary General of the Taipei City Government. He was appointed Mayor of Taipei City in 1990. Huang was a weak mayor and had been under constant attack during the entire tenure of his mayorship. He was regarded as an honest man but was inefficient and lacked charisma.

Representing the DPP in the election was CHEN Shui-bian. Chen was a renowned Taiwan-born lawyer who had been regarded as one of the most effective legislators in the Legislative Yuan. He was always well prepared for his cases and was considered very intelligent and shrewd. Chen gained his reputation 1979 when he defended a group of tangwai who were put on trial after a mass demonstration in Kaohsiung. Chen took part in the Taipei City Council elections in 1981 and was elected easily. In 1985, Chen returned to his hometown in Tainan County, to run for the county magistrate, but lost. During the campaign, Chen’s wife, WU Shuchen, was struck down by a passing car, paralyzing her from the waist down. Although there was no proof of a politically motivated assassination attempt, Chen and his followers claimed it was more than an accident. Chen was elected in 1989 to the Legislative Yuan, and was re-elected in 1992.

Chen emerged as the DPP’s candidate for the mayorship after he defeated his rival, HSIEH Chang-ting. Chen was lovingly referred to by his followers throughout the campaign by his
Taiwanese first name, Ah-bian. Chen's name has been mentioned in several international journals as a future leader in Asian politics.19

In describing Chen's emergence as a candidate, The China Post stated the following:

"[Chen] is the quintessential Taiwan local boy made good, rising from humble beginnings through study and hard work, and the opposition lawyer, arguing for democratization and Taiwan independence. The loving husband, carrying his paraplegic wife in his arms, he is also the fiery orator who mercilessly debates against his opponents and lends his support to radical figures."20

Long before the official campaign started, indications in all the major pre-election public polls showed that Chen was the people's choice. He held a wide margin over his two rivals, the KMT's HUANG Ta-chou and the CNP's JAW Shao-kang from the beginning to the end of the polls conducted. Although Chen did not have the support of the business community, he had strong backing from both intellectuals and the working class.

The CNP's candidate was JAW Shao-kang, a mainlander. Born into a military family of middle rank, Jaw grew up in the so-called "military dependents' quarters," a community that housed all military dependents who came to Taiwan with CHING Kai-shek after their retreat from the mainland in 1949. In most cases, the "military dependents' quarters" are exclusively for mainlanders. Only a few years ago, Jaw was regarded as a rising star among the mainlanders within the KMT party hierarchy and was considered an excellent member of the Taipei City Council and was a strong force in the "non-main stream" faction within the KMT. However, Jaw broke from the KMT in 1993 after he and other KMT mainlanders suspected that President Lee was leaning toward a more independent Taiwan.

Jaw is one of the founders of the CNP and he won the Legislative Yuan seat in December 1992 election by a large margin. He has successfully created a sense of crisis among the mainlanders, charging that they were being neglected by the current Taiwanese controlled KMT leadership. His campaign platforms have included anti-money politics, clean government, social justice, immediate

19. These include two well-known international weekly news magazines: Newsweek and Time, both published in the United States.

talks between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, and final reunification with China.

During the campaign, there were heated policy debates and personal character assassinations. Several times, followers of each candidate clashed in street fights, rallies and demonstrations. Although there was a televised debate broadcast nationwide, the candidates relied mostly on their respective campaign rallies. The line was very clear: Huang had the organizational backing of the KMT and the personal support of President Lee; Chen was the people’s choice with huge mass support from ordinary Taiwan-born citizens; and Jaw clearly represented the mainlander group. The prediction before the day of the election indicated that the race was too close to call.

The voter turnout was very high; approximately 78.53 percent of the eligible voters in Taipei City cast their ballots for mayor. When the final tabulation was complete, around nine o’clock on the evening of December 3, 1994, the DPP’s Chen was a clear winner with a huge margin over both his opponents. In the end, Chen received 615,090 votes or 43.67 percent of the eligible vote; Jaw was second with 424,905 votes, a 30.17 percent share; Huang was third with 364,618 votes and a share of 25.89 percent of the eligible votes. Table 7 shows the distribution of votes among all the candidates in the election for Taipei’s mayor.

### Table 7. Results from the 1994 Taipei Mayoral Election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>HUANG(KMT)</th>
<th>CHEN(DPP)</th>
<th>JAW(CNP)</th>
<th>OTHERS(IND)</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of votes</td>
<td>364,618</td>
<td>615,090</td>
<td>424,905</td>
<td>3,941</td>
<td>1,408,554</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of</td>
<td>25.89%</td>
<td>43.67%</td>
<td>30.17%</td>
<td>0.27%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The landslide win by the DPP’s Chen was an unexpected surprise. Although pre-election polls favored Chen, he was not expected to win by such a large margin. More embarrassing to the incumbent mayor and the KMT’s leadership was Huang’s third-place finish; some 160 thousand votes behind the CNP’s Jaw. Because it was generally believed that President Lee did not want Jaw and the breakaway CNP to win, it was a shattering defeat and a total humiliation for Huang.

A post-election analysis of the vote distribution clearly demonstrated that voters had followed a clear line of ethnic difference. Chen won the overwhelming support of the native-born Taiwanese,
Jaw pulled the votes of the mainlanders, especially the so-called "iron votes" which traditionally had followed the KMT order and were cast for KMT candidates. Huang was unable to halt the desertion of the "iron votes." One KMT high-ranking party official said angrily after the election that these KMT deserters accounted for 300,000 of Jaw's 400,000 votes. The result angered the KMT leadership and a call for "sweeping clean the party membership" subsequently was urged.

Yet, Chen's victory was not without merit. Several factors seemed to contribute to Chen's success in this election. First of all, Chen was a well-known opposition leader. He represents a party, the DPP, that has called for change and for a better government. "Let's clean the city government and eliminate money politics," Chen proclaimed. After thirty years of KMT rule over the city government, people appeared ready for change.

Second, Chen was regarded as one of the best and most effective legislators in the otherwise KMT-dominated Legislative Yuan. During his tenure as a legislator, Chen constantly uncovered evidence of KMT corruption. He was a spokesperson for the powerless masses.

Third, Chen was a seasoned campaigner. Throughout his entire political career, Chen fought many major battles against the odds and won. Even in his defeat in the Tainan county magistrate race, there was suspicious evidence that the KMT manipulated the election results. Chen's campaign rallies were often very emotional and appealed to ordinary Taiwanese working people. Chen often brought his wife to the rally to remind people the oppression and suffering they commonly shared with her.

Fourth, Chen was successful in avoiding the national identity issue. Unlike other radical DPP leaders, Chen downplayed the Taiwan independence issue and made appeals to mainlanders that he would not discriminate against them and would not push for Taiwan independence. Chen emphasized that the city government of Taipei under his mayorship would work within the system in cooperation with the central government. Such a move was aimed at easing the fear of agitating the Communists to take military action against Taiwan.

Fifth, Chen's campaign platform of creating a city of "hope and happiness" was able to gain citizen approval. With terrible traffic congestion, polluted air, waste mismanagement, increasing crime rates and government inefficiency, the city of Taipei has been labeled "the city of sorrow." The Asian edition of Newsweek maga-
zine published in Tokyo called Taipei a “dysfunctional city.” Chen promised that he would make improvements in the city’s traffic problems within the first two years of his tenure as mayor of Taipei and that he would work with YOU Ching, a DPP Taipei county magistrate, to discuss other urban problems collectively in a cooperative manner. Chen told his followers that since he and YOU Ching belonged to the DPP, they were like brothers and could jointly plan the future for the City and County of Taipei.

Sixth, Chen’s victory may be seen as a victory for his position on the issue of elderly welfare. Although political platforms in general did not receive much attention in Taiwan’s prior elections, monthly pensions for the elderly became a bidding war between the KMT and DPP. In Taipei's mayoral race, Chen pledged stipends of NT$5,000 (approximately US$190) per month to each elderly citizen over the age of 65, regardless of his income level. Although the KMT immediately made a higher counteroffer, it was perceived merely as an election campaign trick. Chen’s promise of an elderly pension seemed to win him support from older voters and their immediate families.

Finally, Chen had the support of the DPP power center. Even his major rival, HSIEH Chang-ting, who lost the nomination to Chen in the party’s primary, campaigned wholeheartedly for him. Hsieh served as Chen’s chief campaign manager. The cooperation between these two top DPP leaders was quite impressive.

In the post-election celebration, Chen said:

“We have shown here today that we can win an election and gather for a celebration without violence and without antagonism. . . . As a mayor of Taipei, I vow to continue to be against violence and any kind of combative behavior.”

Chen also vowed to help unify different ethnic groups and make Taipei “a city of hope” and the citizens of Taipei “citizens of happiness.”

A post-election public opinion poll conducted the day after the election reinforced the differences among the three candidates. In a telephone survey of 1,243 Taipei citizens, 45.1 percent said their votes were influenced by the candidates’ personal charm and moral character, educational background, ability, outspokenness and honesty. An additional 23.7 percent were influenced by the candidate’s

---

campaign platform. One question in the survey directly asked respondents the reasons for Huang’s defeat: 37.2 percent said Huang’s performance as city mayor was very unsatisfactory; 22.2 percent pointed to Huang’s lack of personal quality; and, 30.4 percent blamed the disloyalty of the KMT members in the election. These findings are nothing out of the ordinary, for analyses of Taiwan’s elections during the past forty years has constantly shown that the personal charm of candidates has been one of the crucial factors in voters’ decisions, while political views and party affiliation were secondary. Among the three major candidates in the race for Taipei’s mayor, Chen had the most personal appeal.

In the end, the KMT’s humiliating defeat in the capital city is an unequivocal message from highly educated Taipei citizens to the KMT to accelerate party and government administration reform immediately. After years of frustration with a weak KMT mayor, inefficiency and corruption in city politics, the citizens of Taipei have finally had a chance to say something, and have said it loud and clear with their ballots in electing a new mayor from the opposition party.

D. The Election of Provincial Assemblymen and Special Municipal City Councilmen of Taipei and Kaohsiung

With all eyes focused primarily on the elections of governor and two special municipal majors of Taipei and Kaohsiung, the election of provincial assembly members and city council members was turned into a “forgotten event.” There was very little mass media coverage of the race in the December 1994 election.

The results were highly predictable, as well. The KMT was able to hold its majority status in both the provincial assembly and the two city councils of Taipei and Kaohsiung. The KMT won 48 out of a total of 79 seats in the Taiwan Provincial Assembly, 20 seats in the Taipei City Council, and 22 seats in the Kaohsiung City Council. Table 8 shows the vote breakdown in the election of Provincial Assemblymen and the Council members of the two major cities of Taipei and Kaohsiung.

But the election results also showed that for the first time, the KMT failed to control half of the seats in the Taipei City Council.

Table 8. Election Results for Provincial Assembly and Two City Councils of Taipei and Kaohsiung, December 1994

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>KMT</th>
<th>DPP</th>
<th>CNP</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of seats won</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taipei</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaohsiung</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Percentage of votes won</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>51.03%</td>
<td>32.54%</td>
<td>3.74%</td>
<td>12.69%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taipei</td>
<td>39.05%</td>
<td>30.08%</td>
<td>21.68%</td>
<td>9.18%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaohsiung</td>
<td>46.28%</td>
<td>24.85%</td>
<td>4.82%</td>
<td>24.06%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>49.09%</td>
<td>31.67%</td>
<td>6.22%</td>
<td>13.02%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Lien-ho pao (United Daily News), December 5, 1994, p. 4.

As shown in Table 8, the 20 seats the KMT candidates won numbered two more than the seats (18) won by the DPP. With the CNP holding 11 council seats, the Taipei City Council was turned into a three-party Council with no clear-cut majority party. Compromise and coalition will become necessary if any policy is to be enacted.

A background check of the winners from the election shows that both the Provincial Assembly and the two city councils are dominated by members of a younger age group and a higher-educated group. As Figure 1 shows, in age distribution, 36 percent of the newly elected Provincial Assemblymen and city councilmen are between 30 and 39 years old and 37.7 percent are between 40 and 49 years old. In other words, those between ages 30 and 49 have a combined 73.7 percent of the seats. With respect to educational background, 53.7 percent of the newly elected have a college education; 16.6 percent have a master degree, and 5.1 percent have a Ph.D. degree. In other words, 75.4 percent of the newly elected have college or post graduate education. Only 1.7 percent of these newly elected legislators have an education below high school level.

Such a youthful and highly educated orientation in the new Provincial Assembly and the two city councils undoubtedly brings a new working atmosphere into the legislative branch of the Taiwan provincial and local governments and makes them more accountable to the demands of the people.

Perhaps most significantly, the high voter turnout and the peaceful and orderly Election Day voting are evidence that Taiwan already has a mature political climate and environment that will foster the growth of a true democracy.
Figure 1. Age and Education of Members of Provinical and City Schools

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AGE</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>23-29</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-39</td>
<td>36.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-49</td>
<td>37.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-59</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60-69</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EDUCATION</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PH.D.</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MA</td>
<td>16.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COLLEGE</td>
<td>53.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIGH S.</td>
<td>22.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIDDLE S.</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRIMARY S.</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

![Bar chart for age distribution](image1)

![Bar chart for education distribution](image2)
IV. CONCLUSIONS

Judging from the results of these four major elections held in the first half of the 1990s, there has been a gradual decline of KMT dominance. Although the KMT is still the most powerful political party in Taiwan today, with the exception of a temporary upward swing in 1991, the percentage of KMT votes polled has shown a steady decline since 1986, from 69.8 percent in 1986 to 52.05 percent in 1994 (see Table 9). At the same time, the DPP vote has shown an overall upward swing (besides a temporary setback in 1991), from a 22.17 percent share of votes in 1986 to a 39.42 percent share in 1994, while neither the CNP candidates nor the independents have shown any significant improvement.

Until recently, the KMT party apparatus was the only power that counted, but such a pattern of vote sharing clearly demonstrates that Taiwan has become a home for multiple party politics, and a process of democratization has begun. Judging from the 1994 election results, the KMT and the DPP have become viable competitors while the CNP, with its still relatively small constituency, has functioned as a "half party" helping to keep the balance of power in Taiwan. Some observers are worried about an internal confrontation among party lines that would create tension and political instability in Taiwan, but most observers believe a healthy democratization process has begun, which will bring the people of Taiwan pride and unity to withstand any premature reunification effort forced upon Taiwan by the mainland Chinese Communists. Time magazine's assessment of Taiwan's political development, when it nominated CHEN Shui-bian as one of the hundred most promising future young leaders, stated it best: "Taiwan is the only Asian country where democracy has been unfolding since the 1970s with out major violence or instability." The smooth and peaceful December 1994 election is living proof.

The real test will come two years from now in the 1996 election of the ROC president by direct vote. All major parties, including both the ruling KMT and the opposition DPP, favor a directly elected president. The KMT believes that the popular incumbent, LEE Teng-hui, is a sure winner and will continue KMT rule. The

---


Table 9. Comparison of Votes Received between the KMT and the DPP From the Elections Held During the Period 1986-1994

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election Held</th>
<th>KMT</th>
<th>DPP</th>
<th>Others*</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1986a</td>
<td>68.87%</td>
<td>22.17%</td>
<td>8.06%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986b</td>
<td>68.32%</td>
<td>18.9%</td>
<td>12.79%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989a</td>
<td>60.15%</td>
<td>2.52%</td>
<td>17.33%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989b</td>
<td>60.14%</td>
<td>28.28%</td>
<td>11.58%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989c</td>
<td>53.5%</td>
<td>37.59%</td>
<td>6.96%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>71.17%</td>
<td>23.94%</td>
<td>4.89%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>53.02%</td>
<td>31.03%</td>
<td>15.95%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>47.47%</td>
<td>41.03%</td>
<td>11.5%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>52.05%</td>
<td>39.42%</td>
<td>8.53%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
* Include both CNP members and Independents.

Elections held:
1986a = election for additional members of the Legislative Yuan.
1986b = election for additional members of the National Assembly.
1989a = election for city and county councils.
1989b = election for additional members of the Legislative Yuan.
1989c = election for city mayors and county magistrates (except for Taipei and Kaohsiung).
1993 = election for city mayors and county magistrates (except for Taipei and Kaohsiung).
1994 = election for governor of Taiwan, the mayors of Taipei and Kaohsiung, provincial assembly, and city councils of Taipei and Kaohsiung.
Source: Compiled from Chung-kuo shih-pao (China Times), November 28, 1993 and December 4, 1994.

DPP, though it does not yet have an outstanding opposition candidate, sees the vote as an effective declaration of Taiwan’s independence.

The election of Soong as the first elected Governor of Taiwan is a very positive indication that the KMT is still in control of the Taiwan Province, which has more than eleven million eligible voters. Even with the KMT loss in Taipei City, the overwhelming majority of votes from the province of Taiwan likely will enable President Lee to fight off any challenger from any opposition party candidate. If Lee is successfully elected in the expected presidential race, not only will the legitimacy of KMT rule be extended, but the status of Taiwan’s identity as a separate political entity from mainland China will no longer be challenged.

The majority of people still favor the KMT because of the need for stability in Taiwan. Steven Strasser, a reporter for Newsweek, commented on the KMT,
“Once a right-wing authoritarian apparatus organized on Leninist principles, the KMT is now a powerful but mundane centrist political machine selling itself as the party of stability... The KMT offers the status quo; a wondrous level of economic prosperity coupled with a peaceful working relationship with China.”

Taiwan has a large and well-to-do middle class that is interested in maintaining societal stability and in promoting steady economic growth. Thus, so long as the KMT is able to penetrate this vast majority middle class of voters and gain their support, it will continue to stay in power. But the growing influence of the DPP and the CNP will definitely keep the KMT in check in the future.

The American political sociologist, Seymour Martin Lipset, once listed as pre-requisites for democracy the following: an open class system, economic wealth, an egalitarian value system, a capitalist economy, literacy, and a high participation in voluntary organizations. Taiwan has met nearly all the conditions required for democracy on the Lipset list. The four major elections held in the 1990s have clearly demonstrated a healthy trend toward modernization. When the institutionalization of this multiparty system is completed, Taiwan, whether it is the Republic of China on Taiwan or by some other name, will be a nation of both economic and political "miracles."

---

31. As this essay was being completed, the news from Taipei reported that Taipei's new mayor, CHEN Shui-bian, had named CHEN Shu-meng and BAI Hsiu-hsiung as his two deputy majors. CHEN Shu-meng is a mainlander whose grandfather, CHEN Pu-lui, had been a close confidant of CHIANG Kai-shek until his death. A professor of Economics at National Taiwan University, CHEN Shu-meng nevertheless has been very active in the DPP struggle against the KMT. BAI Hsiu-hsiung is a native-born Taiwanese and a long-time member of the KMT with a career in public service. He has served as the director of social affairs in both Taipei City and Kaohsiung City and is currently the section chief of Social Affairs in the Ministry of Interior. Many observers believed that Bai's selection reflected the new mayor's commitment to social welfare reform in that city. This combination of CHEN Shu-meng (a DPP mainlander) and BAI Hsiu-hsiung (a KMT Taiwanese) is a clear indication of the new mayor's effort to patch up the differences between the KMT and DPP and between mainlanders and native-born Taiwanese, a healthy democratic move indeed. In total, the new DPP mayor has appointed sixteen KMT members to top positions in his new administration. One may argue that Chen's appointment of the KMT members to the new city government is inevitable because of the lack of administrative experience of Chen himself and his DPP colleagues. Yet, the move can also be seen as a goodwill gesture by Chen to allay the tension between the KMT and DPP.
CHAPTER 3


By the second half of the 1980s, the stage was set for Taiwan's political democratic development to take off. During the period, we witnessed the emergence of an organized, strong opposition party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which was established in September 1986; the abolition of martial law in 1987; special elections for the purpose of increasing the membership share of the Taiwanese in the National Assembly, Legislative Yuan, and Control Yuan; and the first-ever party primaries for the selection of the ruling party's (the Kuomintang's) candidates for elections to be held in November 1989. Thus, a new political landscape began to take shape in Taiwan in the post-Chiang era.

The 1990s have been as exciting as the 1980s in the process of Taiwan's democratization. Several major elections have been held during the decade, including the elections for the governor of Taiwan, the mayors of the cities of Taipei and Kaohsiung, and the President of the Republic of China.

The purpose of this essay is to discuss the results from the election of the third-term legislative members of the Li-fa Yuan (Legislative Yuan) that was held on December 2, 1995. The essay will also consider the future of the two main opposition parties, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the New Party (NP) in the aftermath of the 1995 election.

I. MAJOR ELECTIONS IN THE EARLY 1990S

With the arrival of the 1990s, Taiwan firmly established a healthy trend of moving toward greater democracy, highlighted by the two proclamations made in 1990 and 1991. One stemmed from the conference of an extraordinary session of the First National Assembly on April 8, 1990, that abrogated provisional articles and adopted additional articles to the Constitution. The other was the announcement in May 1991 to terminate the Period of National Mobilization for Suppression of the Communist Rebellion. These two proclamations not only laid down the legal basis for the future
election of the members of the parliamentary organs, but also paved the way for future constitutional reform.

The opposition party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP hereafter), then scored a major victory in the election of the Second Legislative Yuan held in December 1992. The candidates from the DPP received 36.1 percent of the popular vote, while the KMT won 60.5 percent. As a result, the DPP successfully secured thirty-seven seats in the Second Legislative Yuan, in comparison with the eighty seats won by the KMT. Although the KMT still controlled the Legislative Yuan, the DPP emerged as a powerful opposition party in local and regional politics.

The election also showed several salient characteristics: (1) Among the newly-elected members of the Legislative Yuan, 70 percent were between thirty and fifty years of age and 76 percent had undergraduate college degrees or higher.

(2) There were increasing ethnic conflicts during the election campaigns. The DPP members are mostly Taiwan-born, and called for Taiwan independence from mainland China, while the "non-mainstream" KMT members sought to push for a speedy reunification with the P.R.C. Although the "non-mainstream" KMT members represent a small faction within the KMT, they are a group of mainlanders who are in disagreement with the policy of President LEE Teng-hui on the issue of reunification. They are in struggle against anyone who rejects reunification with China. Heated debates were held between the DPP candidates and the "non-mainstream" KMT candidates throughout the election.

(3) During the election campaign, the Prime Minister, HAU Pei-tsun, and his cabinet were the targets of DPP attacks. Hau is a former military strongman who had a long military career under CHIANG Kai-shek and CHIANG Ching-kuo. He advocated a powerful government with tight control and a speedy reunification with mainland China. After the election, a new and less military-influenced cabinet was installed to replace Hau. As a result, the "non-mainstream" faction gradually lost its influence within the KMT power circle.

(4) There was widespread influence from wealthy individuals. Although there was a general consensus against dominance by the wealthy, the vast amount of money needed for the election was evident. Vote buying was widespread throughout the island.

(5) Interparty negotiation and compromise became necessary after the election. Until the election, the KMT-controlled Legislative Yuan served merely as a rubber stamp for decisions handed
down by the Executive Yuan and the KMT Central Committee. With the DPP members occupying nearly one-third of the seats in the new Legislative Yuan, the KMT could no longer push through its policy decisions without prior negotiation with the DPP.

Entering the 1993 election of city mayors and county magistrates, the DPP was very confident that the party would win about half of the offices. Unfortunately, the DPP suffered a severe setback in the election by winning only six of the twenty-three offices. In comparison with the DPP's earlier performance in the 1992 Legislative Yuan election and its pre-election projection, the 1993 election was a resounding defeat for the DPP. As a consequence, two of the top-ranking DPP leaders, party chairman HSU Hsin-liang and party central committee executive member SHIH Min-teh, both submitted their resignations after the election.

The 1994 elections of the Governor of Taiwan and the mayors of the two largest cities, Taipei and Kaohsiung, became a testing ground in the struggle for power between the KMT and the DPP. The elections have historical significance because it was the first time in Taiwan's history that these offices were elected by direct popular vote. In the eyes of the opposition parties, the DPP and the New Party, the elections of 1994 signaled the end of the KMT's authoritarian rule in Taiwan.

The election results showed that the KMT captured the governorship of Taiwan and the mayoral office of the city of Kaohsiung, while the DPP won the mayoral race in the city of Taipei. In the election of the Governor of Taiwan, the KMT's candidate, James Soong, received 4,726,012 votes, or 56.22 percent of the votes and nearly one and a half million more votes than the DPP candidate, CHEN Ting-nan, who received 3,254,887 votes, or 38.72 percent of the votes that were cast. Although Soong is a mainlander, he had the firm support of President LEE Teng-hui, who is popular among the citizens of Taiwan.

The KMT's victory in the city of Kaohsiung was very impressive. The KMT's candidate was the incumbent mayor, WU Den-yih, who was an effective administrator. As expected, Wu won the mayorship by a large margin over the other three candidates. Wu received 400,766 votes, or 54.46 percent of the votes. The DPP's candidate, CHANG Chun-hsiung, received 289,100 votes, or 39.29 percent. It was a big disappointment to the DPP leadership.

The most heated and contested election in 1994, however, was the election of Taipei's mayor. Dr. HUANG Ta-chou, the incumbent mayor and a close friend of President Lee, was chosen to run
on the KMT ticket. CHEN Shui-bian, a renowned lawyer and member of the Legislative Yuan, represented the DPP in the election. The New Party's candidate was JAW Shau-kong, a mainlander and a KMT defector.

The DPP's candidate, CHEN Shui-bian, won the Taipei mayoralship by a wide margin. Chen received 43.67 percent of the votes, while the KMT's candidate, Dr. Huang, placed far behind in third place, receiving only 25.89 percent of the votes, which was behind the candidate from the New Party.

The KMT's humiliating defeat in the capital city of Taipei was an unequivocal message from highly educated Taipei citizens to the KMT to accelerate party and government administrative reform without further delay. The strong support given to the DPP candidate in the election was a clear indication of the voters' displeasure concerning the KMT's mismanagement of the city government by the former mayor, Dr. Huang.

Judging from the results of these four major elections held in the first half of the 1990s, there is no question that the dominance the KMT once enjoyed has been diminishing. Although the KMT is still the most powerful political party in Taiwan, the percentage of votes won by the KMT has shown a steady decline with the minor exception of the election of 1991. During the same period, the DPP has enjoyed a larger share of election votes. Taiwan's politics have thus shifted from a one-party authoritarian rule to a multiple party system.¹

II. THE 1995 LEGISLATIVE ELECTION

With its strong showing in the earlier elections held in the first half of the 1990s, the DPP emerged as the most powerful opposition party in every legislative session that oversaw policy decisions. The DPP also was very confident that it would increase its share of influence in the lawmaking assembly through another victory in the Third Legislative Yuan to be elected on December 2, 1995.

The vote on December 2, 1995, was to seat lawmakers in two ways: 128 legislators were to be elected by the approximately 13 million eligible voters in the twenty-nine electoral districts in the

¹ For a detailed discussion on the elections held in the first half of the 1990s, please refer to Wen-hui TSAI, Toward Greater Democracy: An Analysis of the Republic of China on Taiwan's Major Elections in the 1990s, OPRSCAS (The name has been changed to MSCAS since 2000), No. 6-1994 (125), Baltimore, Maryland: OPRSCAS (MSCAS since 2000), University of Maryland School of Law, 1994.
Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu areas; and thirty-six seats, of which thirty were at-large seats and six represented overseas Chinese, were to be apportioned to political parties based on each party's share of the overall vote. In total, 400 candidates had registered with the Central Election Commission to run for the new Legislative Yuan.

The leadership of all three major political parties saw the December 2, 1995 election as a prelude to the impending presidential election scheduled for March 23, 1996. The main platform in the ruling KMT Party's election campaign called for stability, welfare, and reform, reminding voters of the KMT's accomplishments in the creation of the "Taiwan miracle."

The theme in the campaign of the DPP candidates was more aggressive in urging people to "give Taiwan a chance," meaning to give the DPP an opportunity to unseat the tight control of the KMT and to run the country. Unlike past elections, the DPP's campaign for the 1995 election attempted to play down the Taiwan independence issue, while stressing national sovereignty, government reform, economic growth, and social welfare.

The main strategy in the New Party's campaign was to prevent the KMT or the DPP from becoming the majority in the new legislature. The party was thus trying to win enough seats to spoil the ruling KMT's bid to hold onto its majority and to thwart any attempt by the DPP to catch up to the KMT. The New Party claimed that if no one party won a majority, the lawmakers would be able to "check and balance" the Administration's power more effectively.

Susan YU outlined five salient characteristics in the December 1995 election that departed from previous elections. First, the 1995 election was a three-party race among the KMT, the DPP, and the New Party. Second, public policy issues replaced the old debates on unification with the mainland and Taiwan independence. Third, cable television, computer bulletin boards, and underground radio stations were used in place of sound trucks, campaign fliers, and newspaper ads. Fourth, campaign speeches were run as small and interactive political forums instead of large political forums. Fifth, all candidates from each political party ran their party's campaign as a collective group effort.

Another significant feature of the 1995 election was the aggressive threat from the mainland. In retaliation for R.O.C. President

---

Lee's visit to the United States in May of 1995 and in an attempt to influence the outcome of Taiwan's domestic election, the mainland Chinese launched continuous verbal attacks against President Lee and his ruling KMT, and scheduled a series of military maneuvers in the Fujian province and in the East China Sea, directly across from Taiwan. The mainland Chinese claimed that the KMT, under the leadership of President Lee, was moving toward Taiwan's independence by means of establishing a "one China, one Taiwan" policy. The mainland's verbal attacks against Lee and its military threat were meant to intimidate Taiwanese voters and cause them to unseat the KMT in favor of candidates who viewed unification with the mainland more favorably.

Although the party campaigns were tense, the December election was calm and smooth. The final vote count showed that the KMT candidates secured eighty-five seats, the DPP candidates fifty-four, and the New Party candidates twenty-one. The KMT barely held its control of the legislature with only two seats above the eighty-three necessary to establish a majority. A post election public opinion polls showed that 61 percent of the respondents were satisfied with the overall election results and that 69 percent expressed relief that the KMT was able to maintain its majority.

The voter turnout rate was 67.5 percent on December 2, slightly lower than the turnout of 72.02 percent in the election of 1992. The post-election vote distribution analysis showed that 46.1 percent of the voters endorsed the KMT candidates, 33.2 percent the DPP candidates, 13.0 percent the New Party candidates, and 7.8 percent the independent candidates. Table 1 gives a detailed account of election results for the Third Legislative Yuan.

In his comments on the election process, James A. Robinson, a U.S. political scientist and longtime observer of Taiwan's elections, said,

"This well may have been the cleanest election in Taiwan's modern history . . . It also appeared to be the least

3. The first military warning to Taiwan was staged on May 21, 1995, when mainland China's military began firing surface-to-surface missiles into the East China Sea about 140 kilometers north of Taiwan. The second demonstration of mainland China's military threat came on August 15, 1995, when the mainland began firing tactical guided missiles and live artillery shells into the sea 136 kilometers north of Taiwan. In addition, mainland China carried out several military exercises in its east coast regions as a warning to those persons in Taiwan who might be favoring Taiwan's independence.

Table 1. 1995 Election Results for the Third Legislative Yuan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of Seats</th>
<th>Political Party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>KMT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Seats</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationwide Seats</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overseas Chinese Seats</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Seats</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Seats Won</td>
<td>51.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Votes Received</td>
<td>46.06</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


subject to violence of any campaign in memory . . . [And] while mainland China's propagandists ridiculed Taiwan's democratic innovations as futile exercises in corruption and violence, Taiwan's voters and politicians conducted a lively but safe and calm campaign."

After the election, one fact became clear. Although the KMT managed to keep a small majority in the Third Legislative Yuan, the election firmly established the New Party as an influential third party. The KMT has, for all practical purposes, lost its dominance in the lawmaking body.

Election results also showed that the KMT suffered substantial losses in urban areas, while winning most of its seats in the less urbanized districts in central and southern Taiwan. In the city of Taipei, the KMT took only four of the eighteen seats, while the DPP won eight seats and the New Party six seats. After the election, it was evident that the KMT had become a minority party, ranking third according to election results in Taipei. Since the DPP's CHEN Shui-bian already had won the mayoral office in the 1994 election; the DPP became the strongest political party in Taipei. In the city of Kaohsiung, the KMT was barely able to hold onto a slight majority, with five seats won in comparison with the DPP's four seats and the New Party's two seats. In other words, the two opposition parties won a combined six seats in Kaohsiung, one more than the number of seats won by the KMT. In addition to the election results in Taipei and Kaohsiung, the KMT did not fare well in other more urbanized districts that included Taipei County, Tao-

yuan County, and the cities of Hsin-chiu, Tai-chung, and Tainan, where the KMT failed to get 50 percent of the votes in the election, as shown in Table 2.

A comparison of the results between the 1995 and 1992 legislative elections clearly shows the decline in the KMT's popularity. As shown in Table 3, the KMT not only was supported by fewer voters, but also it won fewer seats in the 1995 election. Between the two elections, the KMT experienced a decline of 682,170 votes, accounting for a negative growth rate of 13.56 percent of the votes in the 1995 election. At the same time, the DPP benefited from a net gain of 187,961 votes and a 6.38 percent growth rate. Concerning the number of seats the KMT occupied in the Legislative Yuan between these two elections, the KMT lost twenty-six seats, representing a negative growth rate of 15.85 percent, while the DPP had a moderate gain of two seats, reflecting a 3.84 percent growth rate. The biggest winner, without any doubt, was the newly organized New Party that won twenty-one seats in the new Legislative Yuan.

Table 2. 1995 Vote Distribution among Major Parties in Urban Areas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>KMT</th>
<th>DPP</th>
<th>NP</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Taipei City</td>
<td>30.71%</td>
<td>35.94%</td>
<td>28.62%</td>
<td>4.73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaohsiung City</td>
<td>40.89%</td>
<td>32.08%</td>
<td>11.19%</td>
<td>15.84%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taipei County</td>
<td>38.16%</td>
<td>28.54%</td>
<td>17.11%</td>
<td>16.19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tao-yuan County</td>
<td>44.85%</td>
<td>35.29%</td>
<td>18.24%</td>
<td>1.61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hsin-chiu City</td>
<td>43.23%</td>
<td>32.30%</td>
<td>23.16%</td>
<td>1.31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taichung City</td>
<td>43.83%</td>
<td>32.21%</td>
<td>22.85%</td>
<td>1.11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tainan City</td>
<td>34.77%</td>
<td>28.86%</td>
<td>7.78%</td>
<td>29.60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chilung City</td>
<td>31.48%</td>
<td>36.07%</td>
<td>19.26%</td>
<td>13.19%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The KMT blamed the dissents within the party for the shifting of votes in support of the New Party candidates. Two weeks after the election, the KMT Central Standing Committee approved the recommendation of the party's Evaluation and Discipline Committee to revoke the party membership of two maverick vice chairmen, LIN Yang-kang and HOU Pei-tsun, who had campaigned for the New Party candidates and challenged President Lee's candidacy for re-election in March 1996. The charges against Lin and Hou were
Table 3. Comparison of Election Results in 1992 and 1995

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>KMT</th>
<th>DPP</th>
<th>NP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1992 Election</td>
<td>9,666,020</td>
<td>5,031,259</td>
<td>2,944,195</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995 Election</td>
<td>9,704,196</td>
<td>4,349,089</td>
<td>3,132,156</td>
<td>1,222,931</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growth Rate</td>
<td>-13.56%</td>
<td>+6.38%</td>
<td>+100%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Number of Seats</th>
<th>Number of Seats</th>
<th>Number of Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1992 Election</td>
<td>161*</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995 Election</td>
<td>164*</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growth Rate</td>
<td>-15.85%</td>
<td>+3.84%</td>
<td>+100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
*In the 1992 election, eight seats were won by other candidates who did not have party affiliation. In 1995, the number was four.

"violating the party charter, damaging the party’s interests, and viciously attacking a party member."\(^6\)

Another post-election development was the joint proposal of the DPP and the New Party to achieve a grand reconciliation between them and to campaign for a "grand coalition government" in the new cabinet to be formed in February. With their election victories, the DPP and the New Party, although differing sharply on the national identity issue, can jointly push through legislation on domestic public issues by working together. Indeed, the two Opposition parties showed their muscle in late June 1996 when they jointly rejected the nomination of LIEN Chan as the Prime Minister by the President of the Executive Yuan.

In analyzing the election results, Tze-fu HUANG, a political scientist at National Chengchi University, pointed out that,

"From now on the KMT cannot wait until after initial legislative decisions are made to turn or push through measures according to its preference. Interparty consultations are expected to be more frequent and must be more responsive to the opinions of lawmakers themselves."\(^7\)

Although the two opposition parties still do not have control of the new Legislative Yuan, they intend to wield influence. The com-

---


bined power of the DPP and the New Party was felt immediately in the election of the new speaker of the Legislative Yuan on February 1, 1996, when LIU Sung-pan, the KMT candidate, was narrowly re-elected by a one-vote margin. With such a strong showing, non-KMT legislators demanded to be consulted concerning the selection of the new cabinet members in the Executive Yuan.

A public opinion poll conducted in early January 1996 showed that 33.7 percent of the respondents believed there ought to be a new Prime Minister and that only 28 percent supported the incumbent, LIEN Chan, continuing to hold that post. Even among the KMT legislators in the new Legislative Yuan, support for LIEN Chan was waning. Only ten of fifty-seven KMT legislators said they would like Lien to continue as Prime Minister, according to a poll of the legislators conducted by a leading newspaper in Taiwan. However, with the March presidential election nearing, the ruling KMT party decided not to make any drastic change in the formation of a new cabinet. LIEN Chan was asked by President Lee in February to remain as the Premier until the March election. This was approved by the new Legislative Yuan, but only by a slim majority in February of 1996.

Peter Yu, a political commentator, suggested that results from the December 1995 election signaled a warning to the KMT leadership. He said that, although President Lee still enjoyed enormous popularity among the people of Taiwan, he would have to fulfill his campaign promise after his re-election by asking his party members to “totally dissociate themselves from organized crime and illegal moneymaking practices.”

THE FUTURE OF THE OPPOSITION PARTIES

The results of the December 2, 1995, legislative election clearly shed light on the Republic of China’s future political development. The R.O.C. switched from single-party politics to a multiple-party system. Although the KMT was able to maintain its lead in the seats it con trolled in the new Legislative Yuan, negotiation and compromise with the two most prominent minority parties became necessary for any legislative decision. A new era was thus born.

---

On the surface, to the two key opposition parties, the future seemed to be bright. After the 1995 election, the leaders of the DPP were confident in staging a serious challenge in the March 1996 presidential election.

One of the biggest challenges to the DPP in the immediate future is the danger of becoming invisible since its policies are indistinguishable from those of the KMT. Established in 1986, the DPP’s roots lie in the political movement that attacked the authoritarian rule of the KMT. The core of the DPP’s ideological struggles against the KMT was its call for Taiwan independence. This theme worked well for the DPP in its early years of existence, generating strong support from the less privileged groups in society. However, in the 1994 elections for city mayors and Taiwan’s Governor, and in the subsequent election of Legislative Yuan members, the moderate faction within the DPP became concerned about the Taiwan independence issue. The moderates feared that because Taiwan was under military threat from mainland China, the DPP’s call for independence was turning people away from supporting DPP candidates.

Moreover, the KMT-controlled Government has implemented several major political reforms advocated by the DPP. Table 4, taken from a report by Virginia Sheng in the *Free China Journal*, shows the implementation of those changes.

As it is clearly indicated in the Table above, several major political reform issues advocated by the DPP leadership have been adopted and implemented by the ruling KMT Party. After the March 1996 direct presidential election, CHIANG Kai-shek’s style of authoritarian rule of government was completely obliterated and the cause for political discontent erased. Many of the DPP’s platform programs, such as a minimum wage for workers and a national health insurance program, also have been implemented by the KMT administration. Virginia Sheng commented, “Although the DPP now has about 70,000 members and wins about 30 percent of support in district elections, its room to grow has been squeezed by the KMT because the ruling party has worked to improve social fairness, blunting a traditional DPP criticism.”

The DPP is hampered by its own success in changing the Government’s style of governing and its attitude about extensive social welfare for the grass roots. Meanwhile, the New Party is facing a

---

Table 4. Dates DPP Advocated Policy Change and Subsequent Dates of Implementation by KMT-Led Government

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Date DPP Advocated</th>
<th>Date of Government Implementation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lift Martial Law</td>
<td>May 19, 1986</td>
<td>July 15, 1987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elect Governor/Mayors of Two Major Cities</td>
<td>March 12, 1988</td>
<td>Dec. 3, 1994</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


serious image problem of being ethnically oriented. The New Party is generally perceived as a party for the mainlanders. Although it has gained steady growth in the elections in which it participated since its establishment in 1993, the party’s membership largely consists of mainlanders who fell out of the central power circle and their descendants. It is a well-known fact that a large proportion of the votes the New Party candidates received in past elections were cast by those KMT members who opposed President Lee. Consequently, the New Party lacks a grass-roots base for future expansion and growth. It must recruit more Taiwanese and present more dimensions in its platform to appeal to all ethnic groups in Taiwan.

Just as the DPP softened its demand for Taiwan independence, the New Party must also change its stand on the reunification issue. Public opinion polls have repeatedly shown that the majority of the people in Taiwan do not support immediate reunification with mainland China. There is a strong suspicion in the minds of ordinary people in Taiwan that a victory by the New Party would signify the end of Taiwan as a free society; it also would mean the end of Taiwan as a self-governing political entity.

Perhaps the most immediate challenge to both the DPP and the New Party is the expansion of their respective party memberships. The DPP is known as a party that emerged as a grass-roots protest against the authoritarian rule of the mainland-led Kuomintang. The great majority of its members are native working-class Taiwanese. In comparison with KMT members, DPP members
are not economically well-to-do and are less educated. In the future, the DPP needs to recruit new members from other strata of society, especially the active, well-educated, and well-to-do members of the middle class. In order to make the DPP attractive to the middle class in Taiwan, the DPP must change its public image from being a party of violence and organizers of street demonstrations to a party capable of working within a democratic political framework.

The New Party leadership faces a similar problem in the expansion of its party membership. It is well known that the core of the NP consists mainly of ex-KMT members who are dissatisfied with the leadership of President Lee Teng-hui. Most of the votes given to New Party candidates are from "hidden supporters" who still hold KMT membership but share the dissatisfaction of the New Party leadership. It is, however, very likely that these KMT "hidden supporters" will eventually return to the KMT camp once President Lee Teng-hui resolves factional fights within his party. Consequently, the New Party must recruit native Taiwanese into the party. The New Party is generally seen as a party that protects only the interest of the mainlanders in Taiwan and that advocates the return of Taiwan to the Communists. Although the 1995 legislative election made the New Party a legitimate third party, its mainland member membership base is too small to support the party's agenda in the future.

The election of the Legislative Yuan members in 1995 was a prelude to the presidential election of March 1996. Results from the 1995 election pointed to a tough fight for President Lee in seeking his second term. The door seemed slightly open for an opposition party, especially the DPP, winning the presidential election. However, a series of military threats from mainland China changed all that in the spring of 1996, prior to the election. Many election observers agreed that President Lee owed his landslide victory to mainland China's military threats. By giving President Lee a mandate, people in Taiwan showed unity and determination to keep Taiwan free and prosperous.
CHAPTER 4

A GIANT STEP FORWARD: THE 1996 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON TAIWAN

I. INTRODUCTION

Without any doubt, March 23, 1996 is a historical day to every Chinese on the island of Taiwan in the Republic of China. The election of LEE Teng-hui to the presidency in the Republic of China on Taiwan marked this island nation's successful transformation from a political dictatorship to full democracy. This is the creation of a political "miracle" that symbolized the end of political tyranny and the return of power to ordinary citizens. Although the Republic of China on Taiwan and the People's Republic of China on the mainland are two parts of a divided nation, they are both components of Chinese history.

The election thus marked for the first time the top leader of a Chinese nation being chosen by people through open and direct election. Although Taiwan is not officially recognized by the Beijing authority and the international community as a sovereign nation, the achievement is indeed remarkable.

The purpose of this essay is to detail the process of the presidential election in the Republic of China on Taiwan that took place on March 23, 1996. The essay will start with a background check of the political climate in Taiwan in the 1990s, focusing on the emergence of a multiparty system in Taiwan and the shifting of power from authoritarianism to participatory politics. Then, the process of political campaigning will be detailed with an analysis of the backgrounds of all four major presidential candidates and their campaign platforms and promises. The final section of the essay will reassess the impact of the presidential election on the life of the citizens of Taiwan and on the relationship between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait.


With the victory in the earlier election in 1992, the DPP emerged as the most powerful opposition party in every legislative
session that oversaw policy decision still controlled by the KMT ruling party. The DPP also was very confident that it would increase its share of influence in the lawmaking assembly through another victory in the Third Legislative Yuan to be elected on December 2, 1995. The December 2 vote was to seat lawmakers in two ways: one hundred twenty-eight legislators were to be elected by the approximately thirteen million eligible voters in the twenty-nine electoral districts in the Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu area; and thirty-six seats, which included thirty at-large seats and six to represent overseas Chinese, were to be apportioned to political parties based on each party's share of the overall vote. In total, an even number of four hundred candidates had registered with the Central Election Commission to run for the new Legislative Yuan.

The leaderships of all three major political parties saw the December 2 election as a prelude to the impending presidential election scheduled for March 23, 1996. The main platform in the election campaign for candidates from the ruling KMT party called for stability, welfare, and reform that reminded the voters of the KMT's past administrative performances. The common theme in the campaign of the DPP candidates was more aggressive in urging people to "give Taiwan a chance," meaning to give the DPP a chance to unseat the rule of the KMT. Unlike past elections, the DPP's campaign for the 1995 election attempted to play down the Taiwan independence issue, while appealing to people for national sovereignty, government reform, economic growth, and social welfare. The main strategy in the New Party's campaign was to deny both the KMT and the DPP the opportunity to become a majority in the new legislature. The party was thus trying to win enough seats to spoil the ruling KMT's bid to maintain its majority and to deny any attempt by the DPP to catch up to the KMT. The New Party claimed that if no one party won a majority, the lawmakers would be able to "check and balance" the administration's power more effectively.

Susan Yu outlined five salient characteristics in the December 2 election that departed from past elections. First, the 1995 election was a three-party race that included the KMT, DPP, and the New Party. Second, public policy issues replaced the old debate on unification and the Taiwan independence question. Third, cable television, computer bulletin boards, and underground radio stations

were used in place of sound trucks, campaign fliers, and newspaper ads. Fourth, campaign speeches were run as small and interactive political forums instead of large political forums. Fifth, all candidates from each political party ran joint political campaigns as collective groups.

Another significant feature of the 1995 election was the aggressive threat from the mainland. As a retaliation to ROC President Lee's visit to the United States in May 1995 and in an attempt to influence Taiwan's domestic election outcome, the mainland Chinese launched continuous verbal attacks on President Lee and his ruling KMT, and scheduled a series of military maneuvers in Fujian, directly across from Taiwan and in the East China Sea. The mainland Chinese claimed that the KMT, under the leadership of President Lee, was moving toward Taiwan independence with the goal of establishing a policy of one China and one Taiwan. The verbal attacks on Lee and the military threats were aimed to intimidate Taiwanese voters to unseat the KMT in favor of unification with the mainland.

Although campaigns from all candidates were tense, the election on December 2 was calm and smooth. The final vote count showed that the KMT candidates took eighty-five seats, the DPP candidates' fifty-four seats, and New Party candidates' twenty-one seats. The KMT barely held its majority with two seats above the required eighty-three seats. A post-election public opinion poll showed that sixty-one percent of respondents were satisfied with the overall election results and that sixty-nine percent expressed relief that the KMT was able to secure a majority.

The voter turnout rate was 67.5 percent on Election Day, slightly lower than the election of 1992. The voter distribution rate was 46.1 percent for the KMT candidates, 33.2 percent for the DPP candidates, 13.0 percent for independent candidates. Table 1 gives a detailed account of the election results for the Third Legislative Yuan. In his comments on the election process, James A. Robinson,

---

2. The first military warning to Taiwan was staged on May 21, 1995, when mainland China's military began firing surface-to-surface missiles into the East China Sea about 140 kilometers north of Taiwan. The second demonstration of mainland China's military threat came on August 15, 1996, when the mainland began firing tactical guided missiles and live artillery shells into the sea 136 kilometers north of Taiwan. In addition, mainland China carried out several military exercises on its east coast to test its military might as a warning to those in Taiwan against any thought of Taiwan independence.

3. The public opinion poll results were reported in *Shih-chieh jihs-pao* (The World Journal), December 3, 1995, p. A 1.
a U.S. political scientist and long time observer of Taiwan’s elections, said,

“This well may have been the cleanest election in Taiwan’s modern history. . . . It also appeared to be the least subject to violence of any campaign in memory . . . [And] while mainland China propagandists ridiculed Taiwan’s democratic innovations as futile exercises in corruption and violence, Taiwan’s voters and politicians conducted a lively but safe and calm campaign.”

Table 1. 1995 Election Results for the Third Legislative Yuan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of Seats</th>
<th>KMT</th>
<th>DPP</th>
<th>NP</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>District Seats</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationwide Seats</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overseas Chinese Seats</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Seats</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Seats Won</td>
<td>51.82%</td>
<td>32.93%</td>
<td>12.81%</td>
<td>2.44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&amp; of Votes Received</td>
<td>46.06%</td>
<td>33.17%</td>
<td>12.95%</td>
<td>7.82%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


After the election, one fact is clear: although the KMT managed to keep a small majority in the Third Legislative Yuan, the election firmly established the New Party as an influential third party. The KMT ruling party blamed dissent within the party for the shifting of votes in support of the New Party candidates. Two weeks after the election, the KMT Central Standing Committee approved the recommendation of the party’s Evaluation and Discipline Committee to revoke the party memberships of two maverick vice-chairmen, LIN Yang-kang and HOU Pei-tsun, who had campaigned for the New Party candidates and challenged President Lee’s candidacy for re-election, blaming them for “violating the party charter, damaging the party’s interests, and viciously attacking a party member.”

Another post-election development was the joint proposal from the DPP and New Party to achieve a grand reconciliation be-


tween the two opposition parties and to campaign for a "grand coalition government" in the new cabinet to be formed in February. With the election victory, the DPP and the New Party, though they differ sharply on the national identity issue, can easily push through legislation on domestic public issues by working together. In analyzing the election result, political scientist Tze-fu HUANG of National Chengchi University pointed out that,

"From now on the KMT cannot wait until after initial legislative decisions are made to overturn or push through measures according to is preference. Interparty consultations are expected to be more frequent and must be more responsive to the opinions of lawmakers themselves."6

Although the two opposition parties still do not have the control of the new Legislative Yuan, they have expressed a wish to be accounted for. The collective power from these two opposition parties, The DPP and the New Party, was felt immediately in the election of the new speaker of the Legislative Yuan on February 1, 1996, when Mr. LIU Sung-pan, the KMT candidate, was narrowly re-elected by a one-vote margin.7 With such a strong showing, non-KMT legislators now demanded input into the selection of new cabinet members in the Executive Yuan.

A public opinion poll conducted in early January 1996 showed that 33.7 percent of the respondents believed that there ought to be a new prime minister and that only 28 percent would keep the incumbent LIEN Chan in his prime minister post. Even among the KMT legislators in the new Legislative Yuan, support for LIEN Chan had been waning; only ten out of the total of fifty-seven KMT legislators said they would like Lien to continue as the prime minister, according to a poll of the legislators conducted by a leading newspaper in Taiwan.8 However, with the coming of the presidential election in March 1996, the ruling KMT party decided not to make any drastic changes in the formation of a new cabinet. LIEN Chan was asked by President Lee in February to remain as Premier until the March election and was approved by the new Legislative Yuan with a slim majority in February 1996.

One political commentator suggested that results from the December 1995 election served as a warning sign to the KMT. Peter

---

Yu said, although President Lee still enjoys enormous popularity among the people of Taiwan, Lee must deliver his promise that after re-election he will ask his party members to “totally disassociate themselves from organized crime and illegal money-making practices.”

III. THE HISTORICAL BREAKTHROUGH: THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF MARCH 1996

Without any doubt, the election of the President of the Republic of China by popular vote in Taiwan on March 23, 1996, was a historic event. Although the KMT is still the most powerful political party in Taiwan, the internal factional fights and the emergence of both the DPP and the New Party have weakened its absolute dominance. The weak performance of the KMT candidates in the November 1995 election of the members of the Legislative Yuan sent a clear warning to the KMT’s presidential nominee, LEE Teng-Hui and his running mate LIEN Chan for a tough uphill battle in March 1996 election for President and Vice-President.

A. The Candidates

According to the Election and Recall Law of the President and Vice President enacted in July 1995, presidential hopefuls can get their names on the ballot either through nomination by an established political party or through a petitioning process after first collecting 201,318 signatures of endorsement from eligible voters. Nominations by parties produced two presidential candidates, while four hopefuls had taken the independent route. Nominated by the ruling KMT to run for the election was the incumbent LEE Teng-Hui and by the DPP was PENG Ming-min. The four hopefuls were LIN Yang-kang, CHEN Li-an, Kander LEE, and KAO Yu-shu. However, both Kander LEE and KAO Yu-shu failed to collect required valid signatures from eligible voters by the January 13, 1996 deadline and had to drop out of the race.¹⁰

The KMT’s candidate for the presidential election in March 1996 was LEE Teng-hui. The party nominated Lee on August 31, 1995 in the KMT’s fourteenth National Congress. Lee was the incumbent president, and he named Premier LIEN Chan as his run-

---

10. By dropping out of the presidential election, the independent candidates were forced to forfeit their nonrefundable deposit of US $37,000.
NING MATE. LEE Teng-hui was born in Taiwan in 1923. He pursued his undergraduate studies at Kyoto Imperial University in Japan and National Taiwan University, his postgraduate studies for an M.A. degree at Iowa State University, and a Ph.D. in Agricultural Economics at Cornell University in the United States. While Lee was holding a faculty position at National Taiwan University from 1948-1978, he lent his expertise on rural economy to various financial and rural development agencies in Taiwan during that period. Lee was appointed as the Mayor of the City of Taipei in 1978, and the Governor of Taiwan in 1981. He became Vice President of the Republic of China in 1984, and the President in 1988. Lee is the incumbent President of the Republic of China and Chairman of the Kuomintang (the Nationalist Party).

The DPP nominated PENG Ming-min on September 25, 1995, as its presidential candidate after a fifteen week primary; Peng later named Mr. Frank HSIEH as his running mate. Peng was born in Ta-chia, Taichung County, Taiwan, in 1923. He was educated in Japan and was admitted to the Tokyo Imperial University for study. He returned to Taiwan after the war in 1945 and enrolled in National Taiwan University majoring in political science. After receiving a B.A. degree in political science, Peng went to Canada and France for his postgraduate studies and was awarded a doctoral degree by the University of Paris. He then returned to Taiwan to accept a faculty position at National Taiwan University. He served there as the chairman of the Department of Political Science and also as an advisor in the Republic of China United Nations delegation. However, in 1964, Peng was sentenced to be jailed for eight years for his involvement in the Taiwan Independence movement. Peng was smuggled from Taiwan in 1970, and moved to Sweden and the United States. During his exile in the United States, Peng was actively involved in the Taiwan independence movement and served as the Chairman of the Headquarters of Taiwan Independence Unions. In 1992, Peng was allowed to return to Taiwan and he joined the DPP in the same year. Among all the presidential candidates, Peng was seen as the spokesperson for the Taiwan independence movement and for a total separation from mainland China.

Control Yuan President CHEN Li-an announced on August 15, 1995, that he would run for the presidency as an independent candidate and the next day he quit his forty-two year KMT membership. Chen later chose WANG Ching-feng, a female Control Yuan member, as his running mate. Chen is the son of CHEN Cheng, the Vice President of the Republic of China under CHIANG Kai-shek. He
was born in Chekiang Province on the mainland in 1937. After a brief stay in Taiwan, Chen traveled to the United States for his college and postgraduate studies and received a Ph.D. degree from New York University. Chen held a number of positions at U.S. academic institutions and industries before returning to Taiwan to take an administrative position at a technological junior college in 1970. Chen’s political appointments include several official posts in both governmental and KMT party apparatus that include Minister of the Department of Education, Deputy Minister of the Department of Economics, Minister of the Department of Defense, Director General of the KMT’s Organization Department, and Deputy Secretary General of the KMT’s Central Committee. Chen also served as the Vice President of the Legislative Yuan and the President of the Control Yuan.

LIN Yang-kang was a vice chairman of the KMT when he announced his intention to run in the presidential election as an independent. Lin chose another KMT vice-chairman, HAU Pei-tsun, as his running mate. Both Lin and Hau were later expelled by the KMT for running as independents. Lin was born in Taiwan in 1927. He received his education at National Taiwan University. Lin has a long distinguished civil service career in Taiwan. He was the Magistrate of Nantou County, Chairman of the Youth Corps, Mayor of the City of Taipei, Governor of Taiwan Province, Minister of the Interior, Vice Premier of the Executive Yuan, and President of the Judicial Yuan. In addition, Lin also held several key positions in the KMT party organization. Among all candidates, Lin has the least education, for he never studied abroad for postgraduate work; but he has the most extensive administrative experience and has risen from local and district ranks through direct elections by popular votes. Although neither Lin nor Hou are members of the New Party, the New Party endorsed the Lin Hou ticket as the party’s unofficial nominees.

Among the candidates’ running mates, LEE Teng-hui’s choice of LIEN Chan is of most significance. Lien is the current Prime Minister in the Executive Yuan and is extremely wealthy and well educated, highlighted by a doctoral degree of political science from the University of Chicago. Lien has long been regarded as LEE Teng-hui’s ideal successor. With his wealth, education, and political resources at his disposal, Lien is a tremendous asset to Lee’s campaign for presidency. LIN Yang-kang’s selection of HAU Pei-Tsun as his running mate is an odd choice. Hau is a strong mainlander with a long and distinguished military career. Although Hau served
once under LEE Teng-hui as the Prime Minister of the Executive Yuan, he and Lee do not share the same idea of the appropriate directions for Taiwan. Hau is a strong-minded military leader, advocating that Taiwan return to the CHIANG Kai-shek style of political dictatorship. As such, Hau is the leader of the mainlander faction in Taiwan. However, many political observers see Hau as a liability to Lin’s candidacy due to Hau’s pro-mainlander stand. Table 2 gives a summary of the background of all the candidates in the presidential election.

Clearly, the two candidates from the ruling KMT have the most educational qualification, for both Lee and Lien have doctoral degrees awarded by universities in the United States; they also have extensive administrative experience. Although the DPP’s presidential candidate Peng received a Ph.D. degree in political science, his running mate Hsieh is educated domestically and did postgraduate studies in Japan. Moreover, Peng was a long-time leader of the Taiwan Independence movement and was in exile abroad. But Hsieh is known as an experienced and effective campaigner in local elections. The independent candidate Chen also has a doctoral degree awarded by an American university, but his running mate Wang only has a college degree from Taiwan and has the least name recognition among all the candidates. LIN Yang-kang, the arch rival of President Lee, and his running mate, Hau, are the least educated. Lin has come up through party and governmental ranks in local and regional offices, and, thus, has the most complete career in political administration and extensive grass-roots support. Lin’s running mate, Hau was a career military officer and received only military related education.

B. The Campaign Platforms

The stage of a society’s democratic process can be measured, in large part, by the degree to which various political parties respond to problems of most concern to the public. In an election year, the issues addressed in a party’s campaign reflect such concerns.

“Dignity, Vitality, and Grand Development” was the KMT’s campaign slogan during the presidential campaign. LEE Teng-hui called for “five consensuses”: (1) working for a greater Taiwan and building a new center of China; (2) molding a new sense of togetherness and utilizing the power of collectiveness; (3) respecting personal freedom and exhibiting the vitality of Taiwan’s society; (4) following the spirit of legal rules and creating modern civilization; and (5) searching for national dignity and establishing Taiwan’s in-
Table 2. Candidates in the 1996 Presidential Election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Experience</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LEE Teng-hui</td>
<td>KMT</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>Ph.D.</td>
<td>1978-81 Taipei Mayor 1981-84 Taiwan Governor 1984-88 Vice President 1988-President</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PENG Ming-min</td>
<td>DPP</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>LL.M.</td>
<td>1954-62 Political Science Professor 1962-1991 Exile in U.S. 1991 returned to Taiwan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIEN Chan</td>
<td>KMT</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>Ph.D.</td>
<td>1981-87 Transportation and Communication Minister 1988-90 Foreign Minister 1990-93 Taiwan Governor 1993- Premier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAU Pei-tsun</td>
<td>Ind.</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>1978-81 Chief of Staff, ROC Army 1989-90 Defense Minister 1990-1993 Premier 1993- Senior Adviser to the President, Vice Chairman of the KMT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WANG Ching-feng</td>
<td>Ind.</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>LL.M.</td>
<td>1989-93 President of Taipei Woman's Rescue Foundation 1992-1993 Control Yuan Member</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


ternational status. Lee and the KMT promised to make reforms in the following five areas: (1) judicial system, (2) administrative performance, (3) education, (4) finance, and (5) constitution. Lee and the KMT also set five developmental goals if they won the election:
(1) liberalization and globalization of the economy; (2) scientific transformation of Taiwan’s industry; (3) clarification of the trade between mainland China and Taiwan; (4) effective use of Taiwan’s resources; and (5) extending availability of social welfare to children, youth, women, and the elderly.  

The DPP targeted the KMT candidates as its main enemies. The DPP presidential candidate, PENG Ming-min, and his running mate Frank Hsieh, labeled the ruling KMT “a foreign regime,” and the KMT’s candidates “collaborators of money politics and corruption.” Their campaign theme was “Promise to the Land.” In a televised debate among all non-KMT presidential candidates sponsored by China Time, Peng told his supporters that Taiwanese may be Chinese in race, but Taiwan is not part of China, either geographically or politically. Peng pointed out the fact that, for the past one hundred years, Taiwan has been separated from China, geographically, politically, legally, economically, and educationally. As a result, the achievements that Taiwan has been able to realize are independent of mainland China. Peng urged his supporters not to think of themselves as part of a pseudo Great China, but as members of a beautiful, active and prosperous small island nation.

The independent candidate LIN Yang-kang structured his campaign platform around a five-count motif: “one” president, relations between the “two” sides of the Taiwan Strait, reconciliation among the “three” main political parties, “four” ethnic groups, and coordination of the “five” branches of government. His campaign slogan was “New Leadership, New Order, New Hope.” Lin told his supporters that if he won the election, he would fulfill the following campaign promises: (a) negotiations with the authority from the mainland and the signing of a peace treaty with the PRC, (b) union of all the ethnic groups residing in Taiwan; (c) direct trade, transportation, and mail service with the mainland; (d) the cleanup of air and water pollution and restoration of “Taiwan the beautiful”; and (e) solutions for Taiwan’s social problems.

Another independent candidate, CHEN Li-an, and his running mate, WANG Ching-feng, issued a campaign pamphlet titled “Responsibility and Benevolence.” Chen and Wang proposed to reduce

---

11. Quoted from the KMT campaign pamphlet entitled, “Consensus, Reform, and Grand Development,” prepared and circulated by the Central Propaganda Department of the KMT.
the power of the President and to increase the at-large legislative seats to be more representative of the people's will. Chen told his supporters that Taiwanese needed to live with dignity and happiness and that the president and all political leaders must guarantee good quality of life to all the residents of Taiwan. He also promised to end government corruption and to reduce concentrated central power if he won the election in March.

C. The China Factor

One disturbing factor in the presidential election was the threat from Beijing. The leadership of the People's Republic of China in Beijing saw Taiwan's March 23 presidential election as the attempt to justify Taiwan's independence from the motherland through an electoral process of popular mandate.

Cross-Strait relations have been soured since President Lee Teng-hui made a private trip to the United States to address his alma mater, Cornell University, in June of 1995. The PRC authority viewed the trip as Lee's move to create the illusion of two Chinas. As a result, Beijing suspended scheduled talks with Taipei, launched two rounds of missile tests in the East China Sea, and published a series of critical editorials in the Chinese press attacking the ROC's "dangerous game." With the anticipated presidential election in March of 1996, Beijing then intensified its attack on Lee and Taiwan's effort to expand its international recognition. Beijing is especially uneasy about Taiwan's bid for a membership in the United Nations. Beijing saw both the KMT's candidate, Lee Teng-hui, and the DPP's candidate PENG Ming-Min, as the leading advocates for Taiwan independence. Newspapers on the mainland carried daily verbal attacks on both Lee and Peng and portrayed them as traitors of a unified China. Because Lee maintained the lead in pre-election public opinion polls during the presidential race, PRC authorities made a serious effort to undermine Lee's support and popularity.14

Meanwhile, a series of military exercises in the second half of 1995 and the first three months of 1996, were staged in the East China Sea and the region directly across the Taiwan Strait. The New York Times reported on January 24, 1996 that the PRC's military

---

had completed preparations for invading Taiwan. The Ming Pao of Hong Kong reported on February 7, 1996, that the PRC's People's Liberation Army would conduct combined maneuvers along China's southeastern coastline during the weekend of February 10-11. The paper said that the exercise would involve 40,000 to 50,000 troops. Another report in the February 5 issue of the Washington Post cited unidentified U.S. intelligence officials as saying that Beijing planned to conduct a large-scale military exercise in the lead-up to the ROC's March 23 presidential election. The military exercise was said to involve 40 navy vessels and more than 100 aircraft in an orchestrated simulation of an amphibious landing operation. On March 5, 1996, the PRC fired two missiles within fifty miles of Taiwan's two largest seaports, Keelung and Kaohsiung. Between August 1995 and March 1996, Beijing fired four rounds of missiles near Taiwan coasts.

Beijing escalated its intimidation of Taiwan on March 12 when it began nine days of live-ammunition military exercises in the waters of southwest Taiwan. The exercises involved the navy and the air force and covered a rectangular sea area of about 17,000 square kilometers near Taiwan's defense outposts of Kinmen and Matsu. Beijing authorities made it known that these military exercises were aimed at influencing the outcome of Taiwan's March 23 election.

Political analysts considered Beijing's military maneuvers "psychological warfare," with the view that Beijing hoped their efforts to intimidate would reduce voter support for both Lee and Peng in the March 23 election and help the independent candidate, LIN Yang-kang, and his running mate, HAU Pei-tsung, win the election. In the mind of the PRC authorities, Lin and Hau were believed to support immediate reunification with mainland China, while Lee was leading Taiwan toward a separation from the motherland.

Beijing's threat has created uneasiness among people in Taiwan. There have been reports of increasing transfer of monetary capital to foreign banks and of high-tech industries being relocated in foreign countries, especially in Southeast Asia. The reports on mainland China's military exercises sent the Taiwan stock market into a tailspin; the stock index plunged 169.30 points in one day in early February of 1996. The housing market also was affected by the report of China's military threat to the effect that few investors

---

were willing to purchase real estate at a time when the military threat form the mainland was present. Economists also attributed Taiwan's current economic recession, characterized by lower than expected trade activities, to mainland China's military threat.

While all the non-KMT presidential candidates blamed the tension between the mainland and Taiwan on the KMT candidate, LEE Teng-hui, and attacked Lee for his lack of leadership, the ROC government under Lee was well prepared for any military attack from the mainland. Lee also told his supporters that he would be willing to meet withJIANG Zeming after the election to ease the tension and to promote understanding as a basis for eventual reunification with the mainland.

D. The Election Results

On March 23, 1996, over 76 percent (76.036 percent) of the 14 million plus (14,313,288) eligible voters cast ballots to elect their president. Defying even his own party's predictions, LEE Teng-hui took 53.9 percent of the vote, soundly defeating his three challengers and fulfilling his dream to become China's first democratically elected president. The final vote count shows that Lee received 813,699 votes, or 53.99 percent of the votes, the DPP's PENG Ming-min gathered 2,274,586 votes for a 21.13 percent vote share, the New Party-supported LIN Yang-kang had 1,603,790 votes or 14.90 percent, and the independent candidate, CHEN Li-an, received 1,074,044 votes or 9.98 percent. Table 3 gives a detailed account of the vote distribution.

### Table 3. Results from the March 23 Presidential Election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Votes Received</th>
<th>Vote Share</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LEE Teng-hui</td>
<td>KMT</td>
<td>5,813,699</td>
<td>53.99%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PENG Ming-min</td>
<td>DPP</td>
<td>2,274,586</td>
<td>21.13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIN Yang-kang</td>
<td>Ind.</td>
<td>1,603,790</td>
<td>14.90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHEN Li-an</td>
<td>Ind.</td>
<td>1,074,044</td>
<td>9.98%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Judging from the distribution of votes in the presidential election as shown in Table 3, it is clear that the election has not altered the political map among the three major political parties in Taiwan. The KMT maintains its rule as the leading political party, the DPP holds second place, while the New Party remains in a distinct third position.
What is remarkable from the election results is that LEE Teng-hui won more than half of the votes. Up until two weeks before the election date, a consensus seemed to emerge from all general public opinion polls that Lee would win the election by a slim margin with less than 40 percent of the votes. Political analysts in Taiwan attributed the lower popularity of Lee prior to the election to two important factors: (1) reports of highly publicized government corruption involving banking regulatory agencies and underground mob figures that had undermined Taiwan's economic stability, and (2) the defection of key KMT high ranking politicians such as LIN Yang-kang, HAU Pei-tsung; and CHEN Li-an to run against LEE Teng-hui. Moreover, the support for the KMT had been declining in recent years, which was reflected in major elections throughout the first half of the 1990s.

Then, why was LEE Teng-hui able to win by such a large margin? To explain Lee's victory, one does not have to travel far to find the answer: Lee is a charismatic leader. He is well educated and he is not part of the tyranny of the iron rule of CHIANG Kai-shek and CHIANG Ching-kuo. Most importantly, LEE Teng-hui is a Taiwanese born and raised in Taiwan. Lee is the people's choice because of his personal charismatic quality. Even people who do not support the KMT could identify with Lee because he is the first Taiwan-born President of the Republic of China.

Another important factor that contributed to the overwhelming victory of LEE Teng-hui was that the military threat from mainland China backfired. Under the cloud of mainland China's aggressive military exercises, people in Taiwan felt immediate urgency in showing their unity to Beijing authorities. Thus, instead of being intimidated by mainland China, people in Taiwan rallied around LEE Teng-hui and gave him a mandate for any future talks with Beijing. Voters in Taiwan were worry about the radical Taiwan independence call from the DPP candidate, PENG Ming-min, and they also rejected the reunification with mainland China advanced by the independent candidate LIN Yang-kang's running mate, HAU Pei-tsun. The election results clearly showed that Lee's mainland China policy had more support form Taiwanese citizens than the alternatives advanced by other candidates.

The third important factor in LEE Teng-hui's favor was the desire for stability and continuity among the majority of people in Taiwan. The KMT has been the ruling party in Taiwan for the entire period following the end of World War II and LEE Teng-hui has been the president of the Republic of China since the death of CHI-
ANG Kai-shek's son, CHIANG Ching-kuo. Although the alternatives advanced by non-KMT candidates seemed to be attractive, stability and continuity were, in the minds of the people in Taiwan, crucial to the rebuilding of Taiwan's economy and society. The vote for Lee, then, was a vote for stability and continuity.

A comparison of the vote distribution of the election for the presidency and of the election for the National Assembly men clearly shows that, while political party members voted for their respective party candidates for seats in National Assembly, many of them crossed party lines to vote for LEE Teng-hui in the presidential ballot. Table 4 shows the comparative election results between the KMT and the DPP.

Table 4. Comparison of Vote in the Two Elections on March 23, 1996

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>KMT</th>
<th>DPP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Votes Received</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Assembly</td>
<td>5,180,714</td>
<td>3,112,688</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential</td>
<td>5,813,699</td>
<td>2,274,568</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% vote share</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Assembly</td>
<td>49.68%</td>
<td>29.85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential</td>
<td>53.99%</td>
<td>21.13%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


From Table 4, one can see that the KMT received 632,985 more votes or (4.31 percent) in the presidential election than it had in the election for the National Assembly, while the DPP lost 838,120 votes (or 8.72 percent) in the presidential election in comparison with its share in the election for the National Assembly. The discrepancy clearly demonstrates that voters crossed party lines in the presidential election to vote for Lee. To a large degree, the election can be seen as more a personal triumph for President Lee than an affirmation of the rule of the KMT. By giving Lee a mandate, it is clear that people in Taiwan have placed strong trust and hope in Lee to lead the nation.

IV. CONCLUSION: LOOKING AHEAD

The smooth election held on March 23, 1996 and the election of LEE Teng-hui as the new President of the Republic of China is, without any doubt, a great accomplishment realized by the twenty-one million people in Taiwan. Post-election public opinion reflected
confidence and satisfaction, as three-fourths of the voters polled said the election was either fair or very fair and the voters graded the election 76 out of a total of 100 points for satisfaction (See Appendix 1).

The results from the election also showed the setbacks of the two opposition parties. They, nevertheless, pointed to the emergence of a three-party system of politics in Taiwan. If we examine the election results from major elections since 1989, as shown in Table 5, with minor deviations in 1991, the election for the Legislative Yuan, and in the current presidential election, voter shares between the two main political parties of the KMT and the DPP have been stable and consistent; slightly less than 50 percent for the KMT and around 30 percent for the DPP. During the same period, the New Party has been the only party showing relatively faster growth. With such a pattern of vote sharing, all three major parties can be expected to play an active role in the reshaping of Taiwan’s future political landscape.

What was China’s reaction to Lee’s victory? Lee’s landslide victory in the presidential election is a clear indication that China’s military intimidation did not scare voters in Taiwan from supporting Lee. Most of the election observers and analysts in fact believe that mainland China’s military threat inadvertently helped Lee to climb above the 50 percent mark. Immediately after the election, Beijing responded that Lee was leading Taiwan into an “abyss of misery,” and that mainland China would never give up the use of force to invade Taiwan so long as Taiwan was moving toward separation from the motherland and independence.16 Beijing said it was now up to Lee and the Taiwan authorities to reopen the door for negotiation with mainland China. Judging from the above-mentioned public opinion poll, the majority of people in Taiwan believed Lee would be willing to repair damaged relations with the mainland and that relations with the mainland would be improved during Lee’s new presidency.

Thus, two crucial tasks lie ahead in Lee’s presidency: externally re-establishing the link with mainland China and domestically improving Taiwan’s socio-economic environment. These are not easy

---
16. It was reported in Chinese newspapers that the series of military exercises had cost approximately four billion People’s Dollars and had created serious disagreements between party and military leaders in mainland China. See reports in Macroview Weekly (Chinese edition), April 3, 1996, pp. 5-6; Shih-chieh jih-pao (The World Journal), April 7, 1996, p. A12.
Table 5. Comparative Election Results among Three Political Parties Since 1989

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year*</th>
<th>KMT</th>
<th>DPP</th>
<th>New Party**</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1989a</td>
<td>60.83%</td>
<td>28.29%</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>10.88%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989b</td>
<td>52.67%</td>
<td>38.24%</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>9.09%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>69.11%</td>
<td>23.24%</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>7.65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>61.67%</td>
<td>36.09%</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>2.24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>47.32%</td>
<td>41.16%</td>
<td>3.08%</td>
<td>8.45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>56.22%</td>
<td>38.72%</td>
<td>4.31%</td>
<td>0.75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>46.06%</td>
<td>33.17%</td>
<td>12.95%</td>
<td>7.82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996a</td>
<td>49.68%</td>
<td>29.85%</td>
<td>13.67%</td>
<td>6.80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996b</td>
<td>53.99%</td>
<td>21.13%</td>
<td>14.90%</td>
<td>9.98%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
** Although the New Party did not have a party candidate, it did officially endorse the ticket of LIN Yang-kang and HAU Pei-tsung in the presidential election.

tasks, but they need to be done, for the future of Taiwan depends heavily on them.

The March 23, 1996, presidential election is indeed a historical landmark in China's long history. Lee is the first Chinese president peacefully elected by a direct vote from the citizens. Taiwan may be small in territory and in population, nevertheless, the election points to a bright future for all the Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. Through the election, the seed of democracy has been successfully planted in Taiwan and, hopefully it will spread to the mainland. Mainland China is currently enjoying an impressive economic transformation that is paving the way for later political modernization. The creation of both economic and political miracles has been completed in Taiwan. It is now time for mainland China to follow in Taiwan's footsteps by expanding its current economic success into a future political democracy.
## APPENDIX I. RESULTS FROM THE MARCH 1996 POST-ELECTION POLL

1. In general, are you satisfied with the fairness of this election?
   - Very Fair ......................................................... 23.2%
   - Fair ................................................................. 51.1%
   - Not Fair ............................................................ 9.0%
   - Very Unfair ........................................................ 1.4%
   - Don't know ....................................................... 15.0%
   - Refuse to answer ............................................... 0.4%

2. From your personal point of view, what will be the relation between China and Taiwan after this election?
   - Change for the better ............................................ 39.5%
   - About the same .................................................. 14.1%
   - Change for the worse .......................................... 4.2%
   - Depends on situation .......................................... 14.0%
   - Don't know ...................................................... 28.0%
   - Refuse to answer ............................................... 0.1%

3. From your personal point of view, will the domestic political situation change for the better or for the worse?
   - Change for the better ............................................ 55.2%
   - About the same .................................................. 10.7%
   - Change for the worse .......................................... 5.5%
   - Depends on situation .......................................... 9.0%
   - Don't know ...................................................... 19.5%
   - Refuse to answer ............................................... 0.1%

4. From your personal point of view, will the nation's economy change for the better or for the worse?
   - Change for the better ............................................ 51.6%
   - About the same .................................................. 11.0%
   - Change for the worse .......................................... 7.2%
   - Depends on situation .......................................... 10.0%
   - Don't know ...................................................... 20.0%
   - Refuse to answer ............................................... 0.1%

5. What do you think is most important for the new President to focus on?
   - Solve constitutional problems ................................. 2.3%
   - Stabilize relations between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait ................................. 29.1%
   - Seek international recognition ................................ 8.2%
   - Promote economic growth ..................................... 22.0%
   - Strengthen national defense capacity ........................ 4.7%
   - Improve domestic living conditions .......................... 16.1%
   - Don't know ...................................................... 16.7%
   - Refuse to answer ............................................... 0.8%

Source: *Chung-kuo shih-pao* (China Times), March 25, 1996, p. 5.
CHAPTER 5

ON THE RIGHT TRACK: AN ANALYSIS OF THE DECEMBER 1998 ELECTIONS IN TAIWAN*

I. INTRODUCTION

The elections held on December 5, 1998, were commonly known as the “three-in-one” elections; they included the election of the mayors of Taipei and Kaohsiung, the election of the councilpersons in the two cities and the election of the Legislative Yuan. These were three of the many direct elections held in Taiwan in the 1990s. Although the Kuomintang won a landslide victory in the legislative election, the defeat of the two incumbent mayors in the cities of Taipei and Kaohsiung showed the maturing of Taiwan’s democratization.2

Taiwan began its process of democratization in the mid-1980s under the late President CHIANG Ching-kuo. This process began through a series of political changes promoting openness that included the abolishment of martial law, the permission of visitation to the mainland, the formation of opposition political parties, the release of political prisoners, and the reorganization of the Nationalist government to encourage participation from Taiwan-born citizens. These reforms continued into the 1990s, with a number of elections held to select candidates for various political offices and legislatures. There are more than 300 political parties registered in Taiwan today, and opposition parties are active and quite visible on the political scene. The highlight of this process of political democratization was the first-ever election of the President of the Republic of China by direct popular vote, held in March 1996. Dr. LEE

---

* The author would like to thank the Association of Chinese Social Scientists in North America for providing a travel grant to allow him to carry out field observation and data collection in Taiwan on the eve of the election in December 1998.

1. The term “three-in-one” in Taiwanese usage refers to an instant coffee; each package contains a mixture of instant coffee, sugar, and cream. The term was used to refer to the three elections held on the same day of December 5, 1998.

2. For a brief report on the elections, please refer to James A. Robinson and Deborah A. Brown, “Taiwan’s December 5, 1998 Elections: Their Implications for the DPP, the KMT, and CCP,” The American Asian Review, XVII:1 (Spring), 1999, pp. 145-152. Although the title of the essay includes the CCP, the essay never included the CCP in its discussion.
Teng-hui, a Taiwan-born agricultural scholar who was a handpicked successor of the late President Chiang, was elected as the new President.³

The election of a Taiwan-born President had its historical significance. For the first time in over one hundred years of rule by outsiders (first the Japanese from 1895 to 1945 and then the mainlanders from 1945 to 1987), Taiwan was finally directly governed by Taiwanese. Nevertheless, there still was a feeling of incompleteness to Taiwan's democratization, because LEE Teng-hui is the party chairman of the mainlander dominated Kuomintang (also called the Nationalist Party, and hereafter as the KMT). With the winning of the city mayorship of Taipei in 1995, the opposition party, the Democratic Progressive Party, built upon support from Taiwan-born residents, continued to push for the unseating of the Kuomintang from all major political offices.

Thus, the three elections held on December 5, 1998 were seen as a crucial step for the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP hereafter). Taiwan-born politicians would control the two largest cities in Taiwan with a total of over five million people and would prepare a future challenge in the Presidential election scheduled to be held in March, 2000. In the mind of many Taiwanese political observers, the completion of Taiwan's political democratization can only be accomplished with the unseating of the Kuomintang from the Presidential Office.

The purpose of this essay is to discuss the election results from these "three-in-one" elections held on December 5, 1998. It will also discuss implications for Taiwan's future political development in the 21 century.

II. THE CANDIDATES

From the very beginning of the preparations for the 1998 elections, all eyes were on the elections for the two mayorships in Taipei and Kaohsiung, the two largest cities in Taiwan. Taipei City is the capital city of the Republic of China on Taiwan; it is located in the northern tip of the island with a population of over three million (3,476,310). Taipei City has been the center of Taiwan's politi-

cal and economic lives since the middle of the 19 century and has become the temporary capital for the Nationalist government, which retreated from the Mainland in 1949. The city is a symbol of the dominance and legitimacy of the Nationalist government and its ruling party, the KMT. However, the incumbent mayor for the four years before the December election in 1998 was a member of the opposition party, Mr. CHEN Shui-bian.

The city of Kaohsiung is located in the southern region of Taiwan with a population of nearly 2 million (1,935,700). Although it does not have a long history of political and economic significance, it is the largest industrial city and sea cargo shipping port in Taiwan. The city is the economic and transportation center of southern Taiwan. The KMT has held the mayoral office for the past four years under the newly approved direct election rules.

A. Candidates for the Mayorship of Taipei

Three strong candidates were nominated by their respective political parties to run for the office of the mayor of Taipei: CHEN Shui-bian of the DPP, MA Ying-jeou of the KMT and WANG Chien-shien of the New Party (hereafter NP). All three candidates were highly qualified and nationally known.

CHEN Shui-bian was the incumbent mayor of Taipei. He was born in Tainan in 1951 and did his undergraduate studies at the National Taiwan University, majoring in law. He was awarded an Honorable Doctoral Degree of Laws by the Kyungnam University of South Korea and an Honorable Doctoral Degree in Economics by the Plekhanov Russian Academy of Economics in 1995.

CHEN Shui-bian had a distinguished career in law and politics. He was the Chief Attorney-at-Law of the Formosa International Marine & Commercial Law Office from 1976 to 1979. He was also one of the chief attorneys in the defense of the highly publicized trial case of the Beautiful Formosa Incident in the 1980s. Chen was also active in political opposition movements against KMT authoritarian rule in the 1980s. He was elected to the Taipei City Council in 1981 and the Legislative Yuan in 1989. During his service in these organizations, he was regarded as one of the most effective leaders of both legislative branches of the city and central governments.

Chen was a powerful figure in the DPP in the 1980s and the 1990s. He held several important posts in the party that included the Executive Director of the DPP Caucus and the Chairman of the Formosa Fund. Chen successfully secured the DPP's nomination as the party's candidate in the election of the Taipei City mayorship in
1994. He staged a great upset by defeating Dr. HUANG Ta-chou, the incumbent KMT mayor, to win the mayoral election.

Chen’s election to the mayorship of the City of Taipei sent a shockwave throughout this island nation. Taipei City is the nation’s capital and had been under the control of the ruling KMT for most of the post-World War II era. The loss of the mayorship was seen as a strong signal of the continuing decline of the dominance of the KMT. Chen was hailed by many political observers as a rising star among new political leaders in Taiwan. Since then, Chen has been seen as a strong challenger to all KMT candidates in the Presidential Election scheduled for March 2,000.

The KMT’s recovery of the Taipei mayorship it had lost four years earlier was now put on the shoulder of Dr. MA Ying-jeou, a reluctant choice. Born in Hunan Province in 1950, Ma carried the hopes of a return to power of both the KMT and the mainlanders residing in Taiwan. Ma was well educated with an undergraduate degree from National Taiwan University and a S.J.D. from Harvard University Law School. Upon his return from the United States in 1981, he was appointed to the post of the Deputy Director of the First Bureau of the Office of the President of the Republic of China. He held that office for the eight years between 1981 and 1988. He was promoted to be the Senior Secretary of the Office of the President in 1988. Ma reached his career high point in 1993 when he was named Minister of Justice and Concurrent Minister of State. His high profile efforts at cracking down on illegal election practices earned him the respect of the general populace, but alienated a few top KMT leaders. He resigned from both posts in 1996 under pressure.

MA Ying-jeou was a reluctant candidate because he felt he did not have the full support of the KMT party machine and the President. He also felt the chance to win an election against the incumbent DPP mayor, CHEN Shiu-bian, was very slim because Chen’s job approval rate from Taipei residents had been consistently high during his four-year term. Moreover, Ma’s mainland ethnic identity also was perceived as a liability in campaigning to win support from the Taiwan-born majority. Ma eventually agreed to the KMT nomination in May 1998 after much soul searching and tremendous pressure from the party’s inner circle. Two public opinion polls conducted by the United Daily News and the China Times respectively
shortly after Ma entered the race showed Ma led Chen by more than 10 percentage points.\textsuperscript{4}

The NP's candidate was Mr. WANG Chien-shien, a prominent figure in Taiwan's political scene. Wang has held several distinguished government posts in his career. Like MA Ying-jeou, Wang was born in mainland China in the Province of Anhui in 1938. Wang did his undergraduate studies at National Cheng-kong University with a major in accounting. Later, he received a M.A. degree in finance from National Chengchi University and had some training in international taxation and finance at Harvard University in 1971. After his return to Taiwan, he held several posts in the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Economics. In 1990, he was appointed to be the Minister of Finance; he held this position for two years. Wang was elected to the Legislative Yuan in 1993 and at the same time held several powerful offices in the newly established NP. At the time of his nomination to run for the mayorship of Taipei City, he was the Secretariat General of the NP.

Wang received high marks for his insistence to run a clean election and, if elected, a clean government. He was a strong critic of KMT management under the leadership of Dr. LEE Teng-hui. As a mainlander, he advocated immediate and direct political negotiations with the Chinese Communist Party. He was against Taiwan independence and favored reunification with mainland China. As one of the most prominent leaders of the NP, Wang was seen as a protector of the mainlander ethnic group residing in Taiwan and a savior of the NP.\textsuperscript{5}

B. Candidates for the Mayorship of Kaohsiung

Unlike the election in Taipei, the run for the mayorship of the City of Kaohsiung was expected to be smooth and quiet. The incumbent mayor, WU Den-yih, was seen as a sure win for the ruling KMT. In the past, forty some years since the Nationalist government retreated to Taiwan in 1949, KMT mayors have run the city either by direct appointment from the national Executive Yuan or through direct election, with a short interruption of rule by one non-KMT mayor.


WU Den-yih was born in Taiwan in 1948 and received his undergraduate education at National Taiwan University. He was a writer and journalist for the *China Times* from 1971 to 1973. Wu began his political career as a Taipei city councilman in 1973 and served there until 1981 when he was elected magistrate of Nantou County. In 1989, Wu was appointed the Chairman of the Taipei Municipal Committee of the KMT. Wu was elected to the mayorship of the City of Kaohsiung in 1994 with a landslide win against other non-KMT candidates.

Wu was a company man, quiet and bureaucratic. Since he was not born or raised in Kaohsiung, he did not have the full support of local leaders. His administration in Kaohsiung was built on his previous long civil service experience in Taipei and Nantou and his willingness to follow the instructions handed down to him by the KMT central committee. In the eyes of the KMT leadership, Wu was a loyal party man and a true follower of President LEE Teng-hui. Unfortunately, Wu's quiet personality and devoted loyalty to President Lee and the KMT party machine made him a forgotten man and the city an invisible city.

Wu's strongest challenger was the DPP's candidate, Mr. HSIEH Chang-ting (also known as Frank Hsieh). Hsieh was born in Taipei in 1946. He received his B.A. degree in law from National Taiwan University and did his graduate studies in Kyoto University in Japan. He practiced law after he returned to Taiwan and was one of the defense lawyers in the trial of the "Formosa the Beautiful" incident leaders. He served as a Taipei city council member between 1981 and 1989 and as a member of the Legislative Yuan from 1990 to 1996. He was instrumental in securing the release of the hostages held in the Embassy of the South Africa in Taipei; this gained Hsieh nationwide praise.

The NP's candidate, WU Chien-kuo, was less known than either WU Den-yih or HSIEH Chang-ting. WU Chien-kuo and an independent candidate CHENG Teh-yao were given no chance to win the election and were totally ignored by both the voters and the mass media. WU Chien-kuo was born in Kiangsu Province of mainland China. He graduated from National Taiwan University with a B.S. degree in mathematics. He went on to do his graduate studies at University of California at Berkeley and received a Ph.D. degree in material science in 1978. He came back to Taiwan in 1980 to take the chairmanship of the Department of Electronic Engineering at Chung-san University in Kaohsiung. Later, he was selected as President of Kaohsiung Technical Junior College. He entered politics in
1992 when he was elected to the National Council. Wu was a scientist with limited experience in politics and had very little resources to be an effective campaign challenger. The NP nominated Wu Chien-Kuo just to show its existence as the "Third Largest Party" and as representative of the mainlanders.

C. Candidates for the Legislative Yuan and City Council of Taipei and Kaohsiung

The ROC's Fourth Legislative Yuan was to have 225 seats, of which 176 were to be elected from the special municipalities, cities, counties and aboriginal communities throughout Taiwan. Some 403 candidates had registered to compete for seats in the lawmaking body. The remaining 49 legislative seats were to be distributed among the parties according to their final vote shares. Among these were 41 national constituency seats and eight seats representing overseas Chinese.

The KMT fielded 115 candidates in the race for the members of the Legislative Yuan. The number of the candidates nominated by the DPP was 79, while the NP nominated 36 candidates. The KMT's goal was to capture at least 120 seats so that it could control the lawmaking body. The target goal for the DPP was to maintain the status quo as the largest opposition party by winning about one third of the seats in the Legislative Yuan, while the NP was targeted at 15 percent of the total votes, or approximately 30 seats in the legislative body.6

As for the city council elections, 110 candidates had registered to run for the 52 posts in Taipei and another 105 hopefuls were competing for the 42 posts in Kaohsiung. Due to the heavy attention given to the other elections, the election of city council members went largely unnoticed.

III. ANALYSIS OF ELECTION RESULTS

A. The Mayoral Elections of Taipei and Kaohsiung

In 1994, CHEN Shui-bian won the Taipei mayorship over the KMT incumbent mayor Dr. HUANG Ta-chou by a wide margin. Chen received 43.67 percent of the votes, while Huang received only 25.89 percent. It was a stunning upset win for Chen and his DPP, while a humiliating defeat for Huang and his KMT. The

---

strong support given to the DPP candidate in the 1994 mayoral
election was seen as a clear indication of the voters’ displeasure
concerning the KMT’s mismanagement of the city. Chen was an
effective mayor. During his four-year term he successfully com-
pleted two major sections of the mass transit system in Taipei and
improved the city’s traffic problem. He was young and energetic in
tackling problems in the city; this was highlighted by his crackdown
on houses of prostitution, the demolition of illegally built houses,
the construction of riverside parks, and the hosting of an interna-
tional conference with the purpose of raising Taipei’s international
visibility. Chen’s job approval rate was consistently in the 70 per-
cent plus range during this four-year term, so high that his second
term was seen as a sure thing and he was perceived as unbeatable.

Chen’s charisma and strong performance discouraged many
potential challengers from the KMT. For several months in the
early 1998, the KMT leadership could not find a strong nominee
who could match Chen’s appeal. MA Ying-jeou entered the race on
May 30th after heavy pressure from the KMT party’s top leaders.
Ma was handsome and has a youthful personality that appeals to
women voters. He was also well educated with a law degree from
Harvard University. He was regarded as the best candidate the
KMT had to unseat the incumbent mayor, CHEN Shui-bian.

Public Opinion polls taken between Ma’s entry in June and
Election Day on December 5 predicted a neck to neck race be-
tween Chen and Ma. Political analysts believed Chen had strong
support from Taiwan born voters and a large group of middle class
residents, while Ma had the backing of the powerful KMT party
machine and the mainlanders. The tight race in Taipei caught the
attention of the entire nation, making the other elections in the so-
called “three-in-one” elections almost unnoticeable.

December 5, 1998 was a cool and shinning day. The tense
drama of the mayoral race in Taipei sent its residents to voting
booths in large numbers; the voter turnout rate was 83 percent. Ta-
ble 1 shows the election results.

Although there were pre-election signs that CHEN Shui-bian
was in trouble, the election result was still a shock to Chen’s sup-
porters. The fact that Ma led by a relatively large margin of 78,305

7 For detailed analysis of the 1994 and 1995 elections, please refer to Wen-hui
TSAI, “The R.O.C.’s 1995 Legislative Election and the Future of the Opposition Par-
ties,” pp.1-18 in The Republic of China on Taiwan in the 1990s, ed. by Winston L. Yang
and Deborah A. Brown, New York: Center of Asian Studies, St. John’s University,
1997.
votes was a surprise to those political observers who had predicted a tight race finish. Post-election analysis by political observers found that the following factors were responsible for Chen’s loss:

First, MA Ying-jeou was a highly qualified political candidate. Ma’s Harvard background appealed to many people and his youthful look made him the choice of the city’s women voters. Unlike Ma’s KMT colleagues, Ma was also seen as incorruptible and clean for he previously had served as the Minister of Justice in the Cabinet. Ma was very likeable and easy to talk to, in sharp contrast to Chen’s sharp and forceful personality.

Second, President LEE Teng-hui’s endorsement was a major asset. Although Ma was not President Lee’s first choice, Lee did come out to campaign for Ma. Lee urged voters to ignore Ma’s mainland background. Lee proposed a “new Taiwanese” identity that included everyone who was born in Taiwan and grew up in Taiwan. Lee attacked Chen’s distinction between Taiwan-born and Mainland-born residents as a separatist plot to create hatred between people. Ma might not have been born in Taiwan, Lee asserted, but Ma was definitely a “new Taiwanese.” Realizing any internal conflict would weaken Taiwan’s resistance to the Communists on the mainland, citizens of Taipei City rallied behind Lee’s plea and voted for Ma in the election.

Third, CHEN Shui-bian’s strong personality was a flaw. Chen was the first non-KMT Taipei mayor since the mayorship was reopened to public vote, and he was free to manage the city without interference from the KMT party hierarchy. As the high job-performance rating had reflected, Chen was seen as an effective mayor. Nevertheless, Chen’s authoritarian style of administration was not appreciated by all the residents in Taipei. In pushing through his reform of the Taipei City administration, Chen alienated many

---

8. A post-election public opinion poll found the respondents rated President Lee as one of the most effective campaigners in the election. Governor Soong was rated as the most effective ahead of Lee. See Chung-kuo shih-pao (China Times), December 7, 1998, p. 4.
lower and lower-middle class voters who had been his strongest supporters in the 1994 mayoral election. These voters turned against him in this election.

Fourth, the support Ma received from members of the NP made the difference. Although the NP’s candidate, WANG Chien-shan, was still in the race, several heavy-weight party leaders publicly supported Ma and urged party members to vote for Ma. In the 1994 mayoral election, NP candidate, JAW Shao-kang received 450,000 votes and a 21 percent share. But in the 1998 election, its candidate, WANG Chien-shien carried only 51,000 votes, a mere 2.22 percent share. A post-election poll showed approximately 80 percent of the NP members voted for MA Ying-jeou.⁹ Although Chen did receive more votes in 1998 than he did in 1994, he simply was unable to overcome such a large defection of NP members in support of Ma.

MA Ying-jeou’s victory in Taipei City was hailed by the KMT’s party machine as a clear indication of the party’s return to power. But the jubilation and the victory dance was dampened by the unexpected loss of Kaohsiung to the DPP’s HSIEH Chang-ting. No one expected KMT’s candidate in Kaohsiung, the incumbent mayor WU Den-yih, to lose. The election result sent a shock wave throughout the nation. Table 2 shows the vote distribution.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidates (Party Affiliation)</th>
<th>Number of Votes</th>
<th>Vote Share %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WU Den-yeh (KMT)</td>
<td>383,232</td>
<td>48.13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HSIEH, Chang-ting (DPP)</td>
<td>387,797</td>
<td>48.71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WU Chien-kuo (NP)</td>
<td>6,457</td>
<td>0.81%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHENG Teh-yao (Independent)</td>
<td>18,699</td>
<td>2.31%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As one can see from the above table, the difference between the winner HSIEH Chang-ting and the loser WU Den-yih was a mere 4,535 votes, less than 1 percent of the vote. Without a doubt, Hsieh’s winning of the Kaohsiung mayoral seat was a stunning upset. According to some newspaper accounts, President Lee, after being informed about the loss in Kaohsiung, kept asking “Why? Why?” and returned to his presidential residency immediately with-

---

out staying for an all night celebration party to congratulate Ma’s Taipei victory.\(^{10}\)

Unlike MA Ying-jeou in Taipei, WU Den-yih was President Lee’s choice. In fact, it was through the President’s insistence that Wu finally agreed to run for reelection. In the mind of President Lee, the KMT had already lost Taipei and with the incumbent Chen riding a very high performance rating prior to Election Day, he simply could not afford to lose Kaohsiung City. President Lee saw Wu as a sure win to secure the party’s control of the city.

Political analysts however believed President Lee’s plan had backfired. By nominating Wu, they reasoned that the KMT alienated all the influential regional power families and clans in the city and prompted the latter not to campaign whole-heartedly for Wu. Some newspaper reports even hinted that Hsieh received secret support from these regional power families and clans in defiance of President Lee’s wishes.

Some attributed Wu’s loss to bad campaign strategies. Wu had been the city mayor for the eight years prior to the 1998 election. He felt very confident citizens of the city would re-elect him for another term to ensure continuity. As a result, Wu’s campaign lacked excitement and enthusiasm. The worst campaign tactic was Wu’s decision to distribute a video tape made by the mother of a kidnapped and murdered girl.\(^{11}\) Because Hsieh represented the defendant in the murder trial earlier, the mother accused Hsieh of being not a “human.” The message in the tape was so negative, it angered many voters who eventually turned against Wu and sympathized with Hsieh.\(^{12}\) Many political observers believed the tape incident was the turning point in Hsieh’s winning the election.

HSIEH Chang-ting himself was a well-known politician and a very effective political campaigner. He was constantly rated as one of the best legislators when he served in the Legislative Yuan. He was very sharp in all his presentations of arguments and very criti-

---


11. The kidnapping and murder case occurred in 1997. The daughter of actress BAI Bing-bing, BAI Shao-yen was kidnapped by three men for ransom money. The girl was later murdered by her kidnappers. The incident triggered a nationwide mass demonstration to protest the government inability in controlling crime in Taiwan. Two of the kidnappers were killed and the third was captured by the police later. Mr. Hsieh served as a defense lawyer for the captured kidnapper.

12. The incident was known as the “BAI Bing-Bing Video Tape Incident” The KMT campaign headquarters distributed the tape to radio and television stations two days before the election and instructed public schools to show it to students in class to undermine Hsieh’s credibility and character.
cal in opposing the KMT dominance in the legislative body. Hsieh was also largely responsible for CHEN Shui-bian's winning the mayorship of Taipei in 1994, for Hsieh was Chen's campaign manager at the time. In his Kaohsiung campaign, Hsieh reminded the citizens of Kaohsiung that Wu's eight-year rule of the city did not improve the city's quality of life and that Wu had turned the city into a second-class city. Hsieh urged citizens of Kaohsiung to make changes and elect him as their new mayor.

Hsieh's victory completed the DPP's dominance in the Southern region of Taiwan; the DPP was now in total control of all the cities and counties in Southern Taiwan. They now formed a strong alliance in seeking their fair share of political and financial resources from the central government.13

B. The Election of New Members of the Legislative Yuan

In the past, the fight for the control of the legislative body of the nation was the focal point of all the elections. However, with all the attention centered on the two mayoral elections, the campaigns for the election of new members of the Legislative Yuan were largely ignored by the mass media and public. The overall voter participation rate for the election of this legislative body of a turnout rate of 54% was lower than that of the mayoral elections. The results did not produce any major surprises either. Table 3 shows the results in the election of the members of the Legislative Yuan in December 1998.

As shown in the above table, the KMT's performance was very impressive in winning more than half of the seats in the new Legislative Yuan. It won 123 seats compared to the 81 combined seats of the other two opposition parties. This was indeed an improvement over the last election in 1995 in which the KMT failed to take the majority.14 The result was also particularly encouraging after the KMT suffered another terrible showing in the 1997 elections of the city and county magistrates in Taiwan Province.

A background check of the newly elected members of the Legislative Yuan found that 19.11 percent were female, an improvement of 5.09 percent over the last term. The average age of these

13. In the election held in 1997, the DPP candidates won all the provincial, county, and city mayoral seats in the southern region of Taiwan. As a special municipality, Kaohsiung City did not participate in that election.
14. In the 1995 election, the seat distribution was 85 for the KMT, 54 for the DPP, 21 for the NP, and 4 were independents.
Table 3. The Election Results of the Legislative Yuan Members

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elected Seats</th>
<th>KMT</th>
<th>DPP</th>
<th>NP</th>
<th>Others*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Taipei</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaohsiung</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan Province</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuchien Province</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aboriginals</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote Share Percentage</td>
<td>46.43%</td>
<td>29.56%</td>
<td>7.06%</td>
<td>16.95%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Non-elected Seats</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-district seats</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overseas seats</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Including candidates of the Chienkuo Party, New United Nation Party, United Democrats and those who were not affiliated with any political party.

newly elected members was 48.44, including 13.78 percent under age 40, 10.67 percent over age 60, and 75.55 percent between age 40 and 59. In addition, 85.33 percent of these newly elected members had a college education or above, including 40.44 percent having a postgraduate degree. 15 Without any doubt, this was a highly educated group of legislators.

The biggest loser in the election of members of the Legislative Yuan was the NP. In the 1995 election, candidates from the NP received 12.95 percent of the vote and won 21 seats, which prompted political analysts to name the NP as the Third Party with enough seats to swing decisions on policies. However, in the 1998 election, the NP candidates received only 7.06 percent of the vote and legislative seats were reduced to only 11. Combined with the poor showing of the NP’s two mayoral candidates, many now called it a “bubble party,” meaning it was like a bubble on the surface of water with no significant effect on the movement of water.

C. The Elections of the City Councilmen of Taipei and Kaohsiung

KMT candidates were the big winners in the elections of the city councilmen in both Taipei and Kaohsiung. They had a vote

share of 40.08 percent in Taipei and 45.18 percent in Kaohsiung. Although they did not gain control of the Taipei city council, they would make the new KMT mayor’s job easier. On the other hand, the KMT council members in Kaohsiung would definitely make the job more difficult for the newly elected DPP mayor. The results also showed that the KMT was still the strongest political party in Taiwan.

Since no one single party had the majority in either city, the tension between the sitting mayor and the city council can be expected to be high. This is particularly true in the case of Kaohsiung where the KMT holds the largest block of council seats, though not the majority, while the DPP mayor won the election by a slim margin.

Table 4. City Councilmen Elections of Taipei and Kaohsiung

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Taipei</th>
<th></th>
<th>Kaohsiung</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Seats</td>
<td>% of Votes</td>
<td>Seats</td>
<td>% of Votes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KMT</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>40.08</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>45.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPP</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>30.96</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>26.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NP</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>18.56</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>22.30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


IV. CONCLUSION: LOOKING AHEAD

The KMT leadership felt some relief after the elections, knowing that it again ruled the capital city in Taiwan, Taipei, and that it now controlled the majority of seats in the Legislative Yuan. The unexpected loss of the mayoral office of Kaohsiung was a blow to the KMT confidence. But taking all into account, the KMT was a winner in the 1998 “three-in-one” elections.

What is more important to the leadership of the KMT is a regained confidence leading into the next election, the presidential election scheduled in March 2000. The defeated Taipei mayor, CHEN Shui-bian, who was long regarded as the strongest challenger from the DPP against the apparent KMT candidate, LIEN Chan, was beatable. Chen’s charismatic momentum for presidency was thus temporarily put on hold.

To the leadership of the KMT, the most serious challenge may come from within. The popularity of the former Taiwan Provincial Governor, Dr. SOONG Chu-yu, may pose a serious threat to the
integrity of the party. Soong was the first elected Governor of Taiwan until President Lee dismantled the Provincial Office of Taiwan. He was a seasoned political bureaucrat and very popular with ordinary citizens. In the 1998 election of the members of the Legislative Yuan, 28 of Soong’s allies successfully won their bids to enter the Legislative Yuan, a reflection of Soong’s popularity. Soong is not well liked among the top KMT leadership and is being treated as a party traitor for his intended run against the KMT chosen candidate, LIEN Chan.

The 1998 election clearly demonstrated a strong trend toward maturity in Taiwan’s growing democracy. A post-election poll showed that a great majority of people surveyed expressed comfort with the election result and satisfaction with the election process (see Appendix 1). The defeat of the Taipei mayor, CHEN Shui-bian was an indication that people not only wanted a high performance mayor but also wanted the mayor to be in close contact with people. Chen did an excellent job in his administration of the city of Taipei, but his style of governing alienated him from various segments of the city’s residents.

Taiwan has been doing well even with the constant threat from the Chinese Communists on the mainland. Entering the 21st century, Taiwan is moving forward smoothly in its effort to become an open and democratic society characterized by a high quality of life and broad participation in the public decision-making process. The December 5, 1998 elections clearly demonstrated that Taiwan is on the right track toward such a goal.
APPENDIX 1. PUBLIC EVALUATION OF THE DECEMBER 5TH 1998 ELECTIONS*

a) Generally speaking, do you think this election is helpful to Taiwan's democratic political reform?

- Very helpful ......................................................... 9.4%
- Somewhat helpful .............................................. 51.0%
- Somewhat harmful .............................................. 8.5%
- Very harmful ................................................... 1.6%
- Don't know ....................................................... 29.4%

b) What grade would you give to this election? Please assign 100 points as very satisfied and 0 as totally not satisfied. 60 points are a passing grade.

- 90 points and above ............................................. 7.9%
- 80 points ........................................................... 19.4%
- 70 points ........................................................... 22.1%
- 60 points ........................................................... 26.0%
- 50 points ........................................................... 6.6%
- 40 points and below ............................................. 3.7%
- Don't know ....................................................... 14.3%

c) What is your opinion about the violence situation in the campaign?

- Very serious ....................................................... 2.3%
- Serious .............................................................. 3.3%
- Not serious ....................................................... 26.0%
- No violence ....................................................... 60.3%
- Don't know ....................................................... 8.1%

d) What is your opinion about dirty campaigning in the election?

- Very serious ....................................................... 22.8%
- Serious .............................................................. 14.4%
- Not serious ....................................................... 28.0%
- No dirty campaigning ......................................... 22.8%
- Don't know ....................................................... 11.9%

* The poll was conducted by the China Times newspaper on December 6, 1998 with a sample of 817 respondents.
## APPENDIX 2. VOTE SHARES BY POLITICAL PARTIES IN MAJOR ELECTIONS IN TAIWAN SINCE 1989

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elections</th>
<th>KMT</th>
<th>DPP</th>
<th>NP*</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1989 County/City Mayors</td>
<td>60.83%</td>
<td>28.29%</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>10.88%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991 National Assembly</td>
<td>71.20%</td>
<td>23.90%</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>4.90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992 Legislative Yuan</td>
<td>61.67%</td>
<td>36.09%</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>2.24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993 County/City Mayors</td>
<td>47.32%</td>
<td>41.15%</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>11.53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994 Governor/Mayors of Taipei and Kaohsiung</td>
<td>45.50%</td>
<td>40.56%</td>
<td>11.53%</td>
<td>1.30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994 City/County Assemblymen</td>
<td>51.03%</td>
<td>32.54%</td>
<td>12.64%</td>
<td>3.74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995 Legislative Yuan</td>
<td>49.91%</td>
<td>35.95%</td>
<td>12.69%</td>
<td>0.11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996 National Assembly</td>
<td>49.68%</td>
<td>29.85%</td>
<td>14.03%</td>
<td>6.80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996 ROC President</td>
<td>54.00%</td>
<td>21.13%</td>
<td>14.90%</td>
<td>9.98%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997 County/City Mayors</td>
<td>43.32%</td>
<td>42.12%</td>
<td>12.95%</td>
<td>1.61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998 Legislative Yuan</td>
<td>46.43%</td>
<td>29.56%</td>
<td>14.74%</td>
<td>8.51%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The New Party was formed on August 25, 1993.
CHAPTER 6

SOCIAL ORDER AND A WELFARE STATE: THE DOMESTIC POLICIES OF THE CHEN SHUI-BIAN ADMINISTRATION

I. INTRODUCTION

The election of CHEN Shui-bian to the presidency of the Republic of China on March 18, 2000 is a great historical landmark in Taiwan’s move toward democracy. The magnificent election result has not only changed Taiwan’s political landscape by dramatically ending a half-century of Kuomintang rule (one newspaper headline read, “Once mighty Kuomintang suffers humiliating defeat.”) but also has sent a shock wave to countries in Asia, especially the People’s Republic of China on the Chinese mainland where demand has been increasing for political decentralization. In his Inauguration speech given on May 20, 2000, the new President declared:

“On the eve of the 21st century, the people of Taiwan have completed a historic alternation of political parties in power. This is not only the first of its kind in the history of the Republic of China, but also an epochal landmark for Chinese communities around the world. Taiwan has not only set a new model for the Asian experience of democracy, but has also added an inspiring example to the third wave of democracy the world over. The election for the 10-term president of the Republic of China has clearly shown the world that the fruits of freedom and democracy are not easy to come by. Twenty-three million people, through the power of determined will, have dispelled en-


mity with love, overcome intimidation with hope, and con-
quered fear with faith.”

Mr. Chen is a member of the opposition party, the Democratic
Progressive Party (also known as the DPP). His climb to the presi-
dency is a clear demonstration of the growth of a grass-roots move-
ment in Taiwan after the death of CHIANG Kai-shek and
CHIANG Ching-kuo. Mr. Chen came from a poor family in rural
Tainan County and he was the only presidential candidate without a
foreign education in this election. Mr. Chen earned a law degree
from National Taiwan University and was the youngest lawyer in
Taiwan when he entered law practice. Mr. Chen’s involvement in
the democracy movement started when he became involved in the
infamous Kaohsiung Incident in 1979 by serving as a defense lawyer
for the editors of the Formosa Magazine who were being prose-
cuted for inciting an anti-government riot during the Incident. For
his effort in defending those accused, he was framed by the authori-
ties and was put in jail for eight months in 1986-87. Chen’s wife,
Mrs. WU Shu-jen, was run over three times by a truck in what
many believe was a politically motivated murder attempt in 1985.
She has been paralyzed ever since.

As a member of the DPP Mr. Chen’s political credentials in-
clude service as a Taipei City councilor, as a member of the national
legislature and as the Mayor of the capital city of Taipei. In his ser-
dvice in the national Legislative Yuan, he was ranked as one of the
most effective legislators. During his mayorship in Taipei City, he
received an unprecedented 70 percent job approval rate from his
constituents. Even though Mr. Chen lost in his re-election four
years later to Mr. MA Ying-jeou, his superb performance never-
theless left a lasting mark on the public. His nickname “A-bian” has
become the symbol of a down-to-earth grass-roots political move-
ment in Taiwan.³

This paper will focus on Mr. Chen’s campaign for presidency
and the fact that it was built upon the general support of ordinary
people in Taiwan. Central to Mr. Chen’s campaign are his domestic
policies that address the needs of these ordinary people. The strong
support Mr. Chen received from the South in the election reflects
the success of his campaign. The paper will also examine the new
administration’s effort after the election in fulfilling his campaign

³ For a detailed biographical account of Mr. CHEN Shui-bian, please refer to
Richard C. Kagan, CHEN Shui-bian, Building a Community and a Nation. Taipei: Asia-
promises: the restoration of law and order and the expansion of social welfare to all citizens of the Republic of China on Taiwan.

II. REGIONAL VOTE DISTRIBUTION IN THE ELECTION

The result of the Year 2000 presidential election shows that Mr. CHEN Shui-bian from the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) won the election by receiving 39.30 percent of the total votes or 4,977,737 votes. The sitting Vice President, LIEN Chan from the incumbent Kuomintang received only 23.10 percent and placed a distant third, while the independent candidate, James Soong, who in 1996 was the first Taiwan Provincial Governor elected by majority votes, had a strong showing with 36.84 percent of the vote.

Speculation on the factors that have contributed to Mr. CHEN Shui-bian’s triumph are many. Some observers attribute Mr. Chen’s popularity to his past performance as mayor of Taipei City; others believe mainland China’s strong stand against Mr. Chen backfired and pushed Taiwanese residents to rally behind Mr. Chen as a show of solidarity; and still others reason that Mr. Chen’s victory was the direct result of the power struggle between inner party leaders within the Kuomintang. Many also believe that the show of support from Dr. LEE Yuan-tseh, a highly respected Nobel laureate and the President of the Academia Sinica, made a huge difference in attracting intellectuals and undecided voters to elect Mr. Chen.

Although all the above-mentioned factors are widely believed to have made a difference in Mr. Chen’s being able to win the election, they are nothing more than speculation and it is hard to measure their actual impact. In analyzing the post-election vote distribution, however, one fact stands out in no uncertain terms: Mr. Chen owes his victory to the overwhelming support the people in Southern Taiwan gave to him. The large margin between Mr. Chen and other candidates in the South was the difference that allowed Mr. Chen to win the election.

Table 1 gives a regional comparison of vote distribution among major candidates. In the capital city of Taipei, the Independent candidate Mr. Soong received the most votes, Mr. Chen of the DPP was the close second, while Mr. Lien of the ruling KMT was a distant third. Mr. Lien and his KMT were expected to do well in the city of Taipei due to two important facts: the city is the capital of the nation and the city is currently under a KMT mayor, Mr. MA Ying-jeou. However, Mr. Soong who was expelled by the KMT and ran as an independent received 283,974 votes more than Mr. Lien did.
In the southern city of Kaohsiung, Mr. Lien of the KMT did not do well either. Mr. Chen of the DPP was way ahead of the other two candidates. This is no surprise, for Mr. Chen had the support of the city’s current mayor, Mr. Chang-ting HSIEH who is a member of the DPP. The inability of Mr. Lien of the KMT to generate votes was a clear indication that the KMT was no longer the choice of people in the cities.

If we take a look at the percentage of votes received by each of these three major candidates as presented in Table 2, it clearly shows Mr. Lien’s lack of support. In the two major cities, Mr. Lien received only 21.89 percent of vote in Taipei and 21.52 percent of the vote in Kaohsiung. Although Mr. Soong was the lead vote getter in Taipei, the DPP’s Chen was able to stay close to Mr. Soong. The vote distribution was 39.79 percent for Mr. Soong and 37.64 percent for Mr. Chen. But in the city of Kaohsiung, Mr. Chen’s votes were more than double those of Mr. Lien and 16 percent more than those received by Mr. Soong.

An analysis of votes after the election showed that the Independent candidate, Mr. Soong, was dominant in the regions north
Table 2. Share of Votes by Cities and Counties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>% of Vote Share</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Soong-Chang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taipei City</td>
<td>39.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaohsiung City</td>
<td>29.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taipei County</td>
<td>40.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keelung City</td>
<td>47.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ilan County</td>
<td>33.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taoyuan County</td>
<td>43.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hsinchu County</td>
<td>51.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hsinchu City</td>
<td>42.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hualien County</td>
<td>58.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miaoli County</td>
<td>49.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taichung County</td>
<td>38.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taichung City</td>
<td>41.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nantou County</td>
<td>46.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changhua County</td>
<td>33.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yunlin County</td>
<td>27.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chiayi County</td>
<td>26.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chiayi City</td>
<td>29.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tainan County</td>
<td>21.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tainan City</td>
<td>27.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaohsiung County</td>
<td>28.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taitung County</td>
<td>52.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pengtung County</td>
<td>39.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kinmen</td>
<td>81.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machu</td>
<td>73.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>36.84</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


of the Chou-Shui River, while Mr. Chen of the DPP was the choice of voters in the southern region. As presented in Table 3, the difference between Mr. Soong and Mr. Chen in the northern region was in favor of Mr. Soong for he received 487,340 votes more than Mr. Chen. However, the southern region showed a different story for Mr. Chen received 803,220 more votes than Mr. Soong. In other words, the big lead Mr. Chen had in the southern region was able to make up for his loss in the northern region. As Table 3 shows, the difference for Mr. Chen between southern and northern regions
was a surplus of 315,880 votes. Although in the three offshore islands Mr. Soong had a commanding lead, their total votes were too small to make any significant difference. In the end, Mr. Chen won the election with a 313,345 vote margin over Mr. Soong. Thus, it is fair to say that support from the southern region won the presidential election in March 2000 for Mr. Chen.

Table 3. Comparative Vote Distribution between North and South Regions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Geographical Regions</th>
<th>Number of Votes</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Soong</td>
<td>Chen</td>
<td>Chen-Soong</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Independent)</td>
<td>(DPP)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Region</td>
<td>3,470,397</td>
<td>2,983,057</td>
<td>-487,340</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Region</td>
<td>1,155,250</td>
<td>1,958,470</td>
<td>+803,220</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South-North</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>+315,880</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


There are several reasons that Mr. Chen was favored in the southern region. First of all, Mr. Chen was born in Tainan County, one of the major counties in southern Taiwan. Mr. Chen won 53.78% of votes in his own hometown, and the two neighboring counties also gave huge support to Mr. Chen with 46.06 percent of votes from Tainan City and 49.49 percent from Chiayi County.

Another reason for Mr. Chen’s appeal in the southern region was the fact that traditionally the southern region has been anti-KMT rule. From the “228 massacre” in 1947 to the “Formosa the Beautiful Incident” in 1979, the south has been the center of all major protest movements against KMT rule. Even during the early years of the authoritarian rule of CHIANG Kai-Shek of Taiwan, the south was able to elect a few non-KMT city mayors and county magistrates from time to time.

Mr. Chen also benefited from the fact that his party, the DPP, controlled the regional politics in the south. All mayoral and magisterial positions south of the Chuo-shui River were taken by DPP candidates in an election held in 1998. These men formed a strong grass-roots base for Mr. Chen and were able to rally their constituencies to support Mr. Chen in the presidential election.

The newly elected President, Mr. Chen, has a reputation as a tough and effective administrator. A public opinion poll after the election showed that more than 80 percent of people in Taiwan are confident that the new President will be able to clean up the gov-
Major Elections in Taiwan

ernment and lead Taiwan to a new era. Although China is still a threat, Mr. Chen will more likely be judged by his administrative skill concerning domestic affairs than by his handling of China's threat. People in the south are more concerned with day to day life than with the issue of reunification with China. Mr. Chen's domestic policies will be closely watched by people in the south who gave him the win in this Year 2000 presidential election.

The strong support given to Mr. Chen from southern Taiwan will create a significant policy implication in the new administration that will call for improvement of the people's quality of life. Although the China issue will undoubtedly be among the new president's concerns, his performance will nevertheless be judged more by his administration's ability to manage domestic affairs, especially the demand to expand social welfare programs to women, children and the elderly.

III. THE DPP POLICY MANIFESTO: ACTIVE CIVIL SOCIETY

The new president is a leading member of the Democratic Progressive Party. The Party has a long established domestic policy that calls for the creation of an active civil society in Taiwan and for the promotion of an extensive social welfare program to all citizens in Taiwan. In the DPP Policy Manifesto, the Party states that

"Internationally, Taiwan faces the challenge of globalization and the vigorous competition of new technology innovation. Domestically, Taiwan is experiencing a social transformation that includes an aging society, changing family structure and adjusting industrial policy, etc. If we expect to meet these challenges, then we need to develop every citizen's potential in order to enhance Taiwan's competitiveness."

The Policy Manifesto further states that "The core solution to the problem of social transition lies in three steps: First, improving the equality of education; second, providing equal and fair opportunity for individual development; third and finally, providing an environment for a diverse and self-confident civil society."

4. The public opinion poll was conducted on April 11. The result was reported at <http://www.chinatimes.com.tw/news/papers/online/politics/c8942420.htm>.
In education, the DPP stresses the following four points: 1) people must have sufficient access to educational resources with mandatory preschool education and greater access to college education for everyone; 2) there is a need to decrease the people’s burden of educational spending and to provide support to the disadvantaged with financial incentives through fellowships and scholarships; 3) educational content should be stimulating and the desire to learn should be fostered by relaxing current stringent academic standards to allow a more creative curriculum in school; and 4) the effective use of educational resources shall be increased. Through these measures, the *Policy Manifesto* states, “we could cultivate creative citizens who are capable of independent thinking.”

In the area of social welfare, the DPP wants to guarantee the citizens’ livelihood and invest in their human capital. In order to reach this goal, the DPP advocates cooperation among the government, families, businesses, and communities. The *Policy Manifesto* lists two proposals:

1. Satisfy basic needs and allow unhindered individual development through the establishment of a fair and stable system of social security, a proper pension administration system, a national health insurance program, and a housing subsidy for those in need.

2. Level the disparities of housing and living standards between rich and poor and between Min-nan Taiwanese and the aboriginals.

In the area of welfare for labor, the DPP wants to protect the basic rights and safety of the worker regardless of gender, ethnicity, age, or nationality and encourage individual self-improvement in order to seek social development. Three measurements were mentioned in the *Policy Manifesto*:

1. Encourage full employment, re-evaluate policies covering foreign labor, and protect employment security.

2. Remove the KMT’s influence from state-run enterprises, and realize the co-existence of employer and employee within an executive committee. Reform the labor law to protect the rights of workers.

3. Adapt responses to economic and social changes. Faced with the changing labor force, the public sector, employers and the workers must work together to guarantee “workers compensation in the event of financial loss due to malignant layoffs, unemployment, or occupational injury.”

---

7. *Id.*, p. 111.
8. *Id.*, p. 117.
On the issue of family life, the *Policy Manifesto* proposes three important measurements to "make families gardens of individual growth":

1. Develop a support system to provide assistance programs for children, senior citizens, and women.

2. Establish a fair society where both genders have equal opportunity to develop their potential.

3. Support all forms of families and address each family's specific concerns. "The DPP proposes that all forms of families, whether unwed, divorced, single parent, or same-sex, reflect different aspects of society. There should be no opposition or hostility toward them but rather support should be offered through education, social assistance and labor policies."

On the issue of civil participation, the DPP believes that people should be able to participate beyond the confines of the government system and ethnic affiliation. It proposes to:

1. Comprehensively push for the building of the community's cohesion by promoting and maintaining its local heritage, encouraging its cultural activities, establishing community mutual support programs, and fostering local economic development and employment opportunities.

2. Improve the living environment to suit the community.

3. Push for a welfare society that will integrate community participation.

4. Improve the quality of life by promoting native and multifaceted community culture.

The *Policy Manifesto* also emphasizes the importance of law and order in society. The DPP proposes several urgent measures that include the following:

1. Decentralize police power.

2. Improve crime control techniques.

3. Reeducate police and other law enforcing agencies to protect the civil rights of the people.

4. Establish a community watch-guard system to assist the police.

The DPP *Policy Manifesto* served as a campaign platform in CHEN Shui-bian's run for the presidency. Consistent with the Party's listed goals in the *Policy Manifesto*, Mr. Chen promised in

---

10. *Id.*, p. 119.
his campaign that his new administration would take steps to provide “universal welfare.” The DPP proposes to: 1) encourage full employment, re-evaluate policies covering foreign labor and protect employment security; 2) turn state-run enterprises over to private hands and reform the labor law to give all employees the right to form unions; 3) protect women in the labor force from discrimination in the form of gender-based hiring and workplace sexual harassment and create a safe and friendly work environment for women; 4) build a support network in order to gain cooperation from the government, the business sector and communities to provide assistance programs for childcare and senior citizens; 5) encourage people to actively participate in public affairs and reduce disparities between urban and rural areas; and 6) improve public security by re-educating the police in protecting the citizen’s civil rights and by improving relations between the police and people in the community. Mr. Chen said, “The government should share the responsibility of looking after children and the elderly, instead of unfairly placing the burden entirely upon the shoulders of women.”

The election of Mr. Chen to the presidency marks the end of an authoritarian government that was preoccupied with a vision of economic growth at all costs. For the next four years Mr. Chen and his Democratic Progressive Party will rule the government and hopefully they will move Taiwan beyond economic development into a modern state with a higher and greater quality of life. Mr. Chen is the first non-KMT president in the history of the Republic of China; his every move will likely be closely watched by both Taiwanese citizens and Chinese authorities on the mainland. He now has the support of his citizens with a high degree of legitimacy; he needs to demonstrate in the future a high degree of effectiveness in managing the new government. Without any doubt, the future of Taiwan is now firmly in the hands of Mr. Chen, the “son of Taiwan.”

IV. DOMESTIC POLICIES IN THE NEW ADMINISTRATION

During the presidential campaign, Mr. Chen promised to make his government “a government for all people” and the “rule by the clean and upright.” Five months have passed since the inauguration of Mr. CHEN Shui-bian to the presidency. What has President Chen and his new administration done in fulfilling their campaign

11. Id., pp. 110-120.
promises to restore law and order and to extend the availability of social welfare to all citizens? In this section, we shall make a brief examination of several main domestic policies of the new administration. Many of these measures set forth by the administration stem from promises Mr. Chen made during the presidential election campaign.

A. "A Government for All People": Social Welfare Policies

In his presidential Inauguration speech, President Chen said he wanted to be a "president for all people." He declared,

"The spirit of "a government for all people" lies in the fact that "the government exists for the people." The people are the masters and shareholders of the state. The government should rule based on the majority of public opinion. The interests of the people should reign supreme over those of any political party or individual."\(^{12}\)

Moving the nation to a welfare state is the new president's attempt to serve "all people." There are two basic principles in social welfare programming, according to President Chen: the principles of "fairness and universalism" and "priority to minority groups." In the following, we shall give a brief introduction to the new administration's efforts to create welfare programs for women and the elderly and in crime control.

B. Welfare for Women

Although women have contributed greatly in Taiwan's push toward industrialization and economic growth, women are a subordinate minority in Taiwanese society. Gender equality is a hot discussion topic at many public forums. The protection of women's rights ranks high on President Chen's list of priorities for improving the quality of life in Taiwan. During the presidential election campaign, he proposed a "new middle road" policy that would strengthen the woman's point of view in government decision-making. He said his new administration would develop a more efficient daycare and education system for preschoolers and children in primary school. The government hopes that the programs "will in-

crease the labor participation rate of women by encouraging them to pursue careers after they get married and have children.\textsuperscript{13}

The most significant change in the issue of gender equality can be found in the appointment of several women to the new administration. President Chen chose a feminist movement leader, Ms. Annette Lu (LU Hsiu-lien), as his running mate in his presidential campaign. Ms. Lu studied law at both National Taiwan University and Harvard University. Her political awareness runs the gamut from feminism to the democratic movement. For her involvement in the Kaohsiung Incident in 1979, she was given a 12-year jail sentence.

Ms. Lu also founded the Taiwanese Women's Association in North America, the Association to Promote Taiwan's Entry into the U.N., Taiwan International Alliance, and ran a publishing house devoted to feminist literature in Taiwan. When Ms. Lu was tapped as CHEN Shui-bian's running mate in December of 1999, she declared, "the time has come when women will divide the political burden with their male counterparts after paying half the taxes for so many years."\textsuperscript{14} When CHEN Shui-bian won the election, Ms. Lu became the first woman to hold the office of the Vice-President of the Republic of China on Taiwan, the highest office a woman has ever held in Taiwan's political arena. In the formation of his new administration, President Chen has also appointed nine women to cabinet posts in the Executive Yuan. They are: CHANG Po-ya, (Minister of the Interior), YEH Chu-lan, (Minister of Transportation and Communication), CHEN Yu-chiou, (Chairwoman of the Council for Cultural Affairs), CHEN Chu, (Council of Labor Affairs Chairwoman), TSAI Ing-wen, (Mainland Affairs Council Chairwoman), CHANG Fu-mei, (Chairwoman of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission), LIN Fang-mei, (Chairwoman of the National Youth Commission), CHAO Yang-ching, (Chairwoman of the Fair Trade Commission), and CHUNG Chin, (Government Information Office Director-General).

Together with Vice President Annette Lu, this is the largest-ever group of women occupying high offices in the central government of Taiwan. As far as the history of political development in Taiwan is concerned, May 20, 2000, not only saw the peaceful transition of political power from the Kuomintang to the DPP, it also


\textsuperscript{14} Quoted in Andrew Huang, "Pioneering Feminist Annette Lu Takes Vice Presidential Seat," \textit{The China Post}, March 19, 2000, p. 16.
marked a very important step toward gender equality in politics. President Chen thus fulfilled his campaign promise of recruiting women into the new administration.\footnote{15}

The new household registration law will allow newborn children to choose their surname from either the father’s or the mother’s side. Traditionally, children in Taiwan must take their father’s name as their surname. The new law has now made it possible for children to adopt the mother’s name as their surname. Moreover, a number of laws have been introduced to reduce sex crimes against women such as rape, wife abuse and child prostitution.\footnote{16}

C. Elderly Welfare

Taiwan’s elderly population has expanded quite significantly in both number and proportion compared to the total population. In 1946, the elderly population aged 65 and over numbered 1,552,443 persons. However, in 1999 this number was 1,865,472, an increase of 1,710,229 in 53 years. Consequently, the elderly population’s share of Taiwan’s population has also increased, from 2.55 percent of its population 65 years old or over. Taiwan has clearly achieved that distinguished status, and its aged population is expected to reach 20.5 percent by the year 2036. The 1999 index of aging was 39.44 percent, compared to 6.16 percent in 1966, and the dependency ratio between the economically productive age group (15-64) and the dependent age group (0-14 and 65+) is expected to be 5 to 1 by the year 2036.\footnote{17}

As a consequence, the need to provide relief to the elderly in Taiwan has become necessary and urgent. The newly elected President has proposed a “three-three-three special agenda” that calls for a monthly stipend of NT$3,000 for each elderly citizen, free medical care for children under age three, and a low mortgage interest rate of three percent for first time house buyers. The most far-reaching welfare program for the elderly, however, will come when the new administration enacts its newly passed bill to establish an Elderly Pension system that will guarantee financial security.

\footnote{15. For a detailed biographical account of these ten women leaders, please refer to the cover story, “Women at the Top . . . A VP and the Nine Ministers,” Sinorama, Vol. 25, No. 7 (July 2000), pp. 32-52.}
\footnote{16. Http://udnnews.co.tw/special issue/focusnews/abian/b1storyl.htm.}
for the elderly (Chow, 1999). A National Annuity Program was initially scheduled to be effective by the end of Year 2000, but it is now being delayed due to budgetary constraints Taiwan has experienced after last year's earthquake. One major emergent goal in these welfare programs is to assist the elderly in managing their time actively without fear of financial insecurity. In the view of the government, the family still bears most of the responsibilities in taking care of the elderly. The public, by involving governmental agencies and private charity organizations, will function in a supplementary manner in assisting the family to provide complete care for the elderly in Taiwan.

D. "Rule by the Clean and Upright": Political Corruption and Crime Control Measures

One of the major problems in Taiwan's politics under the rule of Kuomintang was widespread political corruption that linked government officials with organized crime. President Chen believes that Taiwan's law and order cannot be restored if government officials continue to be associated with organized crime. He made a pledge in his campaign that he would run a clean government. He expressed a desire to establish a government that is clean, efficient, far-sighted, dynamic, highly flexible and responsive. In his Inauguration speech, the new president declared,

"Rule by the clean and upright has as its topmost priority the elimination of "black gold" — the involvement of organized crime and moneyed interests in politics — and the eradication of vote-buying. For a long time, the Taiwanese people have been deeply repelled by moneyed politics and the interference of organized crime. . . . Today, I am willing to promise hereby that the new government will eliminate vote-buying and crack down on "black gold" politics, so that Taiwanese can rise above such sinking forces and ensure rule by the clean and upright. We must give the people a clean political environment."18

Immediately after President Chen took office, he launched several investigations into fraud in Taiwan's military weapon programs committed by military personnel, the "black gold" connection between former KMT legislators and organized crime figures, and political corruption schemes committed by government officials in

---

public construction projects. In carrying out these investigations, President Chen is sending out his message that the new administration will not tolerate any corruption and that all the offenders will be punished regardless of their political connection and social status.\(^{19}\)

V. CONCLUSION

In his Inauguration speech, President Chen proclaimed "the government should not necessarily play the role of a 'leader' or 'manager.' It should be the 'supporter' and 'service provider.' "\(^{20}\) As the new administration is shifting toward a policy of strengthening the people's quality of life, spending on social welfare programs takes up the biggest share in the proposed budget for the fiscal year of 2001. The US$9.7 billion appropriated for social welfare represents 18.8 percent of the total government expenditure projected for the year 2001. Proposed social-welfare spending is 20 percent higher than the amount budgeted for year 2000.

However, budgetary restraints may create difficulties in the implementation of social welfare programs. CHEN Po-chih, chairman of the Council for Economic Planning and Development, says a tax hike will be unavoidable if the government decides to put the new welfare program into force. One economist warns, "The existing national debt has almost reached the limit, and carrying out the proposed welfare schemes will only worsen the government's financial burden."\(^{21}\)

Others worry about the lack of a long-term welfare policy. They call for the authorities to draw up a priority list on social welfare goals so that each area can be addressed one at a time as the budget permits. CHU Hai-yuan, a member of the Taipei Association (known as Cheng She) that functions as a watchdog group, has openly expressed dissatisfaction with the new government because of its ineffectiveness and the slow pace of its reforms. In a news conference at the release of a report the Taipei Association on the first one hundred days of the new administration, Chu said, "Chen

---

19. As the anti-corruption campaign seems to imply the involvement of high-ranking KMT officials, one conspiracy theory has emerged to suggest that the current attempt by the KMT party machine and other opposition party leaders to recall the president is intended to divert the nation's attention away from focusing on the corruption investigation, at <http://top.ms/2097>.
20. Id., p. 3.
was elected for his reform ideals, and we feel obligated to push him to realize his campaign promises."

The biggest challenge facing Chen's new administration is a lack of support on the part of the legislature in the Legislative Yuan. Chen's DPP is a minority party in the Legislative Yuan, where the KMT still holds a majority of seats. Currently, the KMT retains its majority with 123 seats out of a total of 225, while the DPP only has 70 seats. Early indication shows that members of the KMT legislators will block most of Chen's proposals in an attempt to make Chen look weak and ineffective. One news magazine reports, "The legislature changed the Cabinet's version of a bill to shorten the working week and did so in such a way as to pose a threat to local industry. It then revamped the executive's proposals for a senior citizens' welfare provision, making it prohibitively expensive in the process." The re-election of members of the Legislative Yuan is scheduled to be held in November 2001. Until then, the new administration will need strong support from the general public that would put pressure on the KMT-led legislature to cooperate with the new administration. "To establish a partnership relations with the people" as proclaimed in President Chen's Inauguration speech will be the key to his success in the management of the new administration.

One gets the impression that the DPP platform reads like that of a government backed by a majority party with an overwhelming mandate for change. Unfortunately, the DPP is still a minority party in the legislature that does not have enough votes to pass such an ambitious platform. It would be interesting to see how the Chen administration could govern in this context by garnering bipartisan support.

President Chen owes his election victory a large extent to the people of Southern Taiwan. Domestic policy, not the issue of mainland China relations, will be more closely watched by this group of down-to-earth people from Southern Taiwan. The restoration of social order and the implementation of universal welfare are the two keys that will ensure a harmonious society in Taiwan. Chen's legacy rests on his ability to promote and execute his domestic policy. Calling himself "the son of Taiwan," President Chen must rebuild Tai-

---


wan from a KMT-styled semi-authoritarian state to a "fair and just" nation under a new partnership with the people of Taiwan.

As President Chen has taken the presidential office, people in the south are hoping that their voices will be heard in the halls of the central government. One reporter said, "To them, Chen epitomizes the southern spirit."24 Chen promised during his campaign that the needs of the people of the south would not be neglected by the new administration. Two early indications that he intends to fulfill this promise are that Chen hosted a separate celebration in Kaohsiung the day after his May 20 inauguration ceremony at the Presidential Office in Taipei and a separate national Double-Tenth Day celebration on October 10, 2000 to recognize the establishment of the Republic of China that was founded in 1912. It can be expected that Chen will pay more attention to the problems of quality of life in southern Taiwan than his predecessors have ever done. The domestic policy in Chen's new administration will undoubtedly reflect such a new shift of the "southern interest."

REFERENCE

Bureau of Statistics, Ministry of Interior

Central News Agency

Chen, Shui-bian

China Times

Democratic Progressive Party

Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan


Hsu, Joe


Huang, Andrew


Internet


Kagan, Richard C.


Lu, Myra


Ministry of the Interior


Sinorama


Taipei Review


Tsai, Wen-hui


United Daily News


Yang, Hsin-hsin

CHAPTER 7

CONTINUING DEMOCRATIC PLURALISM: THE ELECTONS OF DECEMBER 2002

I. INTRODUCTION

When CHEN Shui-bian won the presidential election in March 2000, it was hailed as a historical breakthrough in modern Chinese politics. Chen's victory was particularly meaningful to citizens of the Republic of China on Taiwan, for it signaled the end of one-party authoritarian rule in Taiwan and the change of power from the mainlander-dominated Kuomintang (KMT) to the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which was organized around Taiwan-born members. Taiwan thus began to see the fruit of its democratization movement. There were heightened expectations that the new president and his DPP would enable Taiwan to enjoy more political freedom and a higher quality of life, both socially and economically.

Unfortunately, the new administration under President Chen encountered serious obstacles from the very beginning. In domestic national affairs, Chen and his new administration were unable to advance any new economic or social policy initiatives as the KMT still controlled the majority of seats in the Legislative Yuan, effectively undermining Chen's attempts at reform. In international trade, Taiwan's market share in the world economy declined, resulting in lower GNP growth and a higher unemployment rate during Chen's first two years as president. Although Taiwan's trade with mainland China was active, the tide gradually shifted in China's favor as more and more Taiwanese businesses moved their production lines and plants to the mainland. Consequently, Chen's acceptance rate showed a steady decline in several public opinion polls.¹

Election observers in Taiwan saw the 2002 December elections as a confidence vote on President CHEN Shui-bian and his new administration and as a stepping stone for the KMT to regain

¹ For a thorough analysis of President Chen's performance in the first two years, please refer to George P. Chen and Wen-hui TSAI, eds., She-hui ke-hsueh ti yin-yung: Tai-wan ti kun-ching yu wei-lei (The Application of Social Sciences: Taiwan's Dilemma and Future), Taipei: Wu-nan Publisher, 2003.

(113)
power in the next presidential election scheduled for March, 2004. As the two municipalities of Taipei and Kaohsiung carry great weight in Taiwan’s political arena, the 2002 mayoral elections were thus looked at as an indicator of the relative strength of the two parties and their respective leaders.

The December 2002 elections were for the mayors and city council members of Taipei and Kaohsiung, the two largest cities in Taiwan, each with over one million in population. The elections were held on December 7, 2002. This essay will analyze the election results and their implications for Taiwan's future political landscape. The data were collected mostly from official government reports, newspaper accounts, and internet sources.

II. THE CANDIDATES IN THE MAYORAL ELECTIONS

A. Candidates for Taipei Mayorship

Only two candidates registered to run for mayor of the city of Taipei in the December, 2002 election. They were MA Ying-jeou of the KMT and LEE Ying-yuan of the DPP.

MA Ying-jeou was the incumbent Taipei mayor and was selected by the KMT to seek a second term. Ma was born in Hong Kong in 1950 after the Chinese Communists took over mainland China and CHIANG Kai-shek’s Nationalist government retreated to Taiwan. MA is thus categorized as a mainlander in Taiwan’s ethnic grouping. Ma did his undergraduate study at National Taiwan University and his postgraduate work in the United States. He earned the Doctor of Juridical Science degree from Harvard University in 1981. As a second-generation mainlander in Taiwan, MA was recruited into the KMT party organization and the Nationalist government upon his return from the United States in 1981. Between 1981 and 1998, MA held a number of important positions in the KMT party organization and in the Nationalist central government administration that included the Deputy Secretariat of the Central Committee of the KMT (1984), Deputy Director of the Nationalist government’s Mainland China Affairs Council (1991), and Minister of the Department of Justice in the Executive Yuan (1993). In 1999, MA was elected mayor of the City of Taipei.²

Ma’s performance as Taipei city mayor received high praise from its citizens. In his first term as mayor, he completed the construction of a mass transit network that had been delayed by man-

agement inefficiency and corruption. He set up effective emergency assistance programs in assisting victims of the September 21, 2000, earthquake and of the typhoon that hit Taiwan in November 2001. Ma also made all prostitution illegal in the city of Taipei and completed the cleanup of sex businesses in October 2001. Over the years of his first term as mayor, Ma consistently received high performance ratings from citizens, averaging above 70 percent in the last two years.³

LEE Ying-yuan was the choice of the DPP to challenge Ma in the mayoral election in Taipei. Lee was born in Yuanlin County. He received an undergraduate degree in public health from National Taiwan University 1976 and studied in the United States, earning a Master's degree in hospital management at Harvard University in 1981 and a Ph.D. in medical economics from the University of North Carolina in 1986. Because of his activities against the KMT government while in the U.S., he was placed on the government's black list and prohibited from returning to Taiwan. However, Lee was smuggled back to Taiwan in 1990. After being released from jail, Lee was elected to the Legislative Yuan in 1995 and re-elected in 1998. While in the Legislative Yuan, Lee was the DPP's party spokesman and chief representative. Lee was appointed Deputy Director of the Taipei Economic and Cultural Affairs Office in Washington, D.C. in 2000 after the DPP won the presidential election that year. In 2002, Lee was appointed to the post of Chief Secretariat of the Executive Yuan, the Cabinet of the Republic of China on Taiwan.⁴

Lee was not well-known in Taiwan and was not a core member of the DPP. However, he was placed on the Taipei mayoral election ballot because no heavyweight DPP leader was willing to challenge the ever popular incumbent Mayor Ma. Although President Chen and other DPP leaders eventually came out to campaign for Lee, they knew the DPP's chances of defeating Ma were extremely slim in a region with a heavy concentration of mainlanders and high popularity of the incumbent mayor.

---


⁴ Ibid.
B. Candidates for the Kaohsiung Mayorship

Five names were on the ballot in the mayoral election in Kaohsiung: HSIEH Chang-ting of the DPP, HUANG Jun-ying of the KMT, and the three independent candidates SHIH Min-teh, CHANG Po-ya, and HUANG Tien-sheng. The larger pool of mayoral candidates in Kaohsiung thus made the election more competitive than it was in Taipei.

The incumbent mayor of Kaohsiung, HSIEH Chang-ting, was the DPP's choice in the December, 2002 mayoral election. Hsieh was born in Taiwan in 1946. Although his family was poor, he was able to concentrate on his studies in high school and successfully pass the college entrance examination to enroll at National Taiwan University (NTU). After graduation from NTU and successfully passing the bar examination, Hsieh became a lawyer and did some post graduate work at Kyoto University in Japan. Hsieh first got involved in Taiwanese politics in 1981 when he became a defense attorney for one of the accused opposition leaders at the trial of the infamous “1979 Beautiful Formosa Incident.” Hsieh ran for and won a city council seat in 1981, holding that position until 1989, when he won a seat in the Legislative Yuan. Hsieh was nominated by the DPP as its vice presidential candidate in the 1996 presidential election, which the DPP lost. In 1998, Hsieh was elected mayor of the city of Kaohsiung with a surprising victory over the incumbent KMT mayor, WU Den-yi.5

Hsieh had been very active within the DPP organization. He was one of the founding members of the DPP when it was first organized in 1987. He was also the leader of the Welfare State faction of the DPP and served as campaign manager in CHEN Shui-bian’s successful run for the Taipei mayorship in 1994. Hsieh was very bright and received high praise as a DPP organizational leader within the party hierarchy. While serving as a member of the Legislative Yuan, Hsieh was rated the most effective by Taiwan’s major newspapers. During his first term as mayor of Kaohsiung, Hsieh upgraded the city’s quality of life with his “Kaohsiung the Beautiful” campaign that included the establishment of the new National Kaohsiung University, the cleaning of the Love River in the city,

---
the improvement of city utilities, and the beginning of the construction of a mass transit system around the city.⁶

For a while prior to the start of the official campaign, the KMT was unable to come up with a formidable candidate as a result of in-house fighting among a number of interested factions within the party. It finally settled on HUANG Jung-ying, a business management professor and vice-president of a local university. Huang was born in Yun-lin County in 1941. He did his undergraduate study at National Taiwan University with a BA degree in business management and did his postgraduate studies at Michigan State University and Iowa State University. Huang returned to take a teaching position at National Chung-san University in Kaohsiung after receiving his Ph.D. degree from Iowa State University. While most of his career in Taiwan had been in academia, he had held a few minor positions in the government over the years.⁷

CHANG Po-ya was born in Chia-yi County. She held an undergraduate degree from the College of Medicine, Kaohsiung Medical University and a master’s degree in public health from Johns Hopkins University in the United States. She received a Ph.D. from a university in Japan. Although Chang was a practicing physician, she came from a powerful local political family in Chia-yi. Chang was well known in her home district. She was elected three times as mayor of the city of Chia-yi and served one term in the Legislative Yuan. Chang also held a number of offices in the national government, including Chief of the National Health Administration, Minister of the Department of the Interior, and Advisor to the President of the ROC. Chang’s entry in the Kaohsiung mayoral election as an independent candidate was a surprise to many observers.⁸

Among the five candidates in this mayoral election, SHIH Min-teh was the only candidate who was born in the city and the only candidate without a postgraduate degree earned abroad. His highest education was graduation from the Army’s Artillery School. Nevertheless, Shih was a well-known figure in Taiwan’s pro-democracy and anti-KMT movements, having been jailed quite a few times. After the DPP was organized, Shih served as a member of its central committee and was the 6th chairman of the party. Shih

---

claimed that he entered the mayoral race to call attention to the
deteriorating quality of electioneering. Without financial re-
resources or a major party affiliation, Shih stopped his election cam-
paign a few days prior to the election date.

HUANG Tien-sheng was relatively unknown. Huang ran on
the DPP ticket twice in the 1990s and held a seat in the Legislative
Yuan. After he lost his re-election for a third term in the Legisla-
tive Yuan in 1996, he dropped out of the public eye completely.
Although he entered the race as an independent candidate for ma-
JOR of Kaohsiung in the election of December 2002, his candidacy
was completely ignored by both the media and the populace.

The race for the Kaohsiung mayorship was in reality between
the DPP’s HSIEN Chang-ting and the KMT’s HUANG Jun-ying.
They were the two heavyweights in this election looking for a fight,
while the other three independent candidates just came for the show.

III. THE ELECTION RESULTS

The election was held on December 7, 2002. Voter turnout was
not as high as it had been in the elections of previous years. Only
70.6 percent of eligible voters in Taipei City and 71.4 percent of
candidate votes in Kaohsiung cast their votes. The lower voter par-
ticipation was probably the result of the nation’s poor economy and
a seemingly predictable outcome in a midterm election. The elec-
tion results indeed showed no big surprises, as both incumbent
mayors retained their offices in their respective cities. In Taipei,
MA Ying-jeou of the KMT received a total of 872,102 votes, or 64.1
percent of the vote, while his challenger, LEE Ying-yuan, received
488,811 votes, or 35.9 percent. In Kaohsiung, HSIEH Chang-ting of
the DPP had a total of 386,384 votes, or 50.0 percent of the vote,
followed by the KMT’s HUANG Jun-ying, who received 361,546
votes, or 47 percent. The three other minor candidates in Kaohsi-
ung split the other 24,227 votes, or 3 percent of the vote. 10 Table 1
gives detailed vote distributions of all the candidates in these two
cities.

The strong showing of MA Ying-jeou was no surprise, as it was
a citizen response to his high performance ratings throughout his
first term as mayor. It was generally accepted by both election ob-
servers and the citizens of Taipei that Ma was an effective adminis-

Table 1. Vote Distribution in the Mayoral Elections of Taipei and Kaohsiung

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidates</th>
<th>Party Affiliation</th>
<th>Number of Voters</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Taipei Election</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MA Ying-jeou</td>
<td>KMT</td>
<td>873,102</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEE Ying-yuan</td>
<td>DPP</td>
<td>488,811</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaohsiung Election</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HSIEH Chang-ting</td>
<td>DPP</td>
<td>386,384</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUANG Jun-ying</td>
<td>KMT</td>
<td>361,546</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHANG Po-ya</td>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>13,479</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHIH Min-teh</td>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>8,750</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUANG Tien-sheng</td>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>1,998</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>772,157</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Central Election Commission, data posted on its website: <http://www.cec.gov.tw>.

The mayoral election in Taipei had a new mayor, Ma Ying-jeou, as the victor, who had made Taipei more livable and more international in appearance. With only one opposing candidate competing against him in this election, Ma received a higher percentage of voter support than he did in 1998 when he had a 51 percent voter share against three other candidates.

Although Ma’s personal qualities of youth, good-looks, effectiveness, and freedom from corruption appealed to a large group of Taipei voters, election observers also viewed Ma’s win as the fruitful result of cooperation between the KMT and the PFP. The PFP was organized by James Soong and his followers after Soong’s loss in the 2000 presidential election. Soong and most of the members of the PFP were former KMT mainlanders. Soong, placing a strong second behind CHEN Shiu-bian in that election, and blamed the KMT for losing the presidency. The two parties have been at odds with each other ever since. The cooperation between the KMT and the PFP in support of Ma thus was seen as a positive sign for a future alliance in the campaign against Chen in the 2004 presidential election. The two parties were affectionately called the “Pan-Blue Camp,” distinguishable from the DPP and TSU’s (Taiwan Solidarity Union) “Pan-Green Camp.”

One popular conspiracy theory even suggested that President Chen wanted Ma to win the mayoral election instead of the DPP’s own candidate Lee. The speculation was that Ma could not run for the presidency in the 2004 presidential election to challenge Chen so long as Ma continued to be the mayor of the capital city. Although President Chen and other DPP heavyweights all came out in support of Candidate Lee throughout the entire campaign, they wanted Ma to win and stay on as mayor. During the election cam-
campaign, DPP leaders frequently urged Ma to publicly promise the citizens of Taipei that if he were to win, he would stay on as the mayor of the city and not seek nomination in the 2004 presidential election.

The mayoral election in Kaohsiung was more competitive than it was in Taipei. Unlike Ma in Taipei, HSIEH Chang-ting did not have the majority support in Kaohsiung. Hsieh’s win four years ago was a surprise for he scored a big upset win over the incumbent mayor by a small margin. Some sectors of the city still refused to believe that Hsieh deserved to be mayor. During his first term as mayor, Hsieh encountered quite a few challenges from the KMT-controlled city council and his combatant administrative style also made him a lot of enemies in the city.

One of the main tasks Hsieh faced during his first term as mayor of Kaohsiung was to upgrade the city to stand on the same footing as Taipei. Although Kaohsiung is the second largest city in Taiwan and the most important industrial port in Taiwan’s international trade economy, it had long been neglected by the central government under the rule of the KMT. The city suffered poor quality of life caused by industrial air and water pollution, an underdeveloped city traffic system, and a more labor-intensive economic structure. Hsieh wanted to change all that with a “Kaohsiung the Beautiful” campaign during his first term as mayor.

Throughout the years under the KMT, Taipei was the center of the island’s development. It became the focus of attention because it was the island nation’s capital, and thus the location of the central government, where mainlanders dominated every sphere of city life with distinguished “Chinese” characteristics. Kaohsiung, on the other hand, was located in the south. “Taiwanese” characteristics were the core of its lifestyle, which was viewed by mainlanders in the north as being less civilized and uneducated. Consequently, Taipei enjoyed more attention; more resources were expended on its development, while Kaohsiung fell behind.

Hsieh’s effort to upgrade Kaohsiung’s status got a big boost in 2000 when the DPP’s CHEN Shiu-bian took over the nation’s presidency from the KMT. Hsieh and Chen had worked together in the DPP from the very beginning of its establishment. After Chen became president, he began to shift his attention more to the south where he had the strongest support and thus distributed more resources to Hsieh for the development for Kaohsiung. Chen even moved the “Double Ten” celebration of the founding of the nation, which traditionally had been held in Taipei, to Kaohsiung as a ges-
ture of his support of the south in general and of the city of Kaohsiung in particular. With such strong support from the DPP-led national government, Hsieh indeed had made good on his promise to make Kaohsiung more "beautiful".

But Hsieh’s election to a second term as the city’s mayor was not a sure thing. He faced a strong challenge from powerful local clans which had controlled local politics in Kaohsiung for many years. Before his winning of the mayorship in 1998, Hsieh’s ties to Kaohsiung were minimal. His working relations with the city council were also tense and unfriendly in his first term as mayor, as the KMT held a majority of the seats in the council. Fortunately, the KMT and PFP could not agree on a candidate whom both parties might support. Although the KMT’s HUANG Jun-ying did receive support from the PFP at the last minute, it was too little too late to do any good for Huang. In the end, the election results showed that Hsieh won over Huang by a mere 24,000 votes.

In the shadow of the mayoral elections, the elections of city council members in these two cities were also held on December 7, 2002. Table 2 presents the distribution of newly elected seats won by each political party. As shown, the KMT led all other parties by winning 20 seats. Together with 8 seats won by the PFP, the two parties could form a joint alliance to support Mayor Ma’s agenda during his second term.

**Table 2. Statistical Analysis of Taipei City Councilor Election**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party Affiliation</th>
<th>Seats Won</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KMT</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>38.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPP</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>32.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFP</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>15.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NP</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Central Election Commission, as posted on its website: <http://www.cec.gov.tw>.

A background check of the newly elected council members shows their average age to be 42.75, with 67.31 percent male and 32.68 percent female. They are also a highly educated group, with 50 percent of the newly elected members having receiving postgraduate degrees and another 42.31 percent having undergraduate degrees.

In Kaohsiung, the DPP emerged as the dominant party, winning 14 seats, or 31.82 percent of the council seats, with the KMT coming in second with 12 seats, or a 27.27 percent share. Although
a joint alliance of the KMT and PFP was likely to undermine the DPP’s dominance in the newly elected council, the DPP’s position in the council showed some improvement. Table 3 gives a breakdown of the number of seats each party won and their shares in the new council.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party Affiliation</th>
<th>Seats Won</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DPP</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>31.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KMT</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>27.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFP</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSU</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>20.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Central Election Commission as posted on its website: <http://www.cec.gov.tw>.

As shown in the above table, a relatively large number (9) of city council seats in Kaohsiung were won by independents or those who claimed no party affiliation. These independents will play a crucial role in checking and balancing inter-party fights between the DPP and the joint forces of the KMT and PFP. The election results also show a very disappointing performance by LEE Teng-hui’s TSU (Taiwan Solidarity Union) in a city where Lee has received considerable support in the past.

A background check of the newly elected city council members in Kaohsiung shows their average age to be 48.2 years, with 77.3 percent male and 22.7 percent female. Of these council members, 68.2 percent have received college or postgraduate education. In comparison with their counterparts in Taipei, city council members in Kaohsiung are older and less educated.

In contemporary Taiwanese politics, local elections are assuming a lesser role as the center of attention shifts to the national level. The legislative power of municipal and county-level councils is quite limited. With the exception of the mayorships of Taipei and Kaohsiung, success or failure in local elections serves as nothing more than a morale booster.

IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE POLITICS

The ruling DPP has downplayed the significance of the December elections. The DPP has repeatedly stressed that the December elections must not be seen as a reflection of President Chen’s political performance and they should not be seen as a prelude to the next presidential election. The KMT and others in the “Pan-Blue
Camp" nevertheless saw these elections as midterm exams for the ruling party and called for voters to deliver a vote of no-confidence to Chen's government.

To political observers, these elections have some political implications for the next presidential election in 2004. Since MA Ying-jeou is a rising star in the KMT, posing a potential threat to Chen's re-election, and given the fact that the DPP cannot afford to fall in Kaohsiung, where Chen has his strongest support, the elections must be observed very closely. Consequencely, the loss of the DPP candidate, LEE Ying-yuan, to the incumbent mayor, MA Ying-jeou, was thus viewed as a "crucial defeat" to President Chen. Nevertheless, the DPP was able to hold on to the mayorship of Kaohsiung where its incumbent mayor, HSIEH Chang-ting, won a second term over four other challengers.

The election results clearly boost MA Ying-jeou's stock in the KMT as he emerges victorious. A post election public opinion poll conducted by the Untied Daily News on December 7, 2002, showed that 43.3 percent of voters supported a possible presidential bid by Ma in 2004 and 35.4 percent opposed it. The poll also found that a majority of KMT and PFP supporters would back a presidential bid by Ma.

Unfortunately, given the political reality in Taiwan today, it is an undeniable fact that neither the KMT's LIEN Chan nor the PFP's James Soong, the supreme leadership of the two parties, would yield their power or their opportunity to be the next party nominees for the nation's highest office to Ma, a junior in the party hierarchy.

As a consequence, Ma has no choice but wait for his turn in 2008. As Lien and Soong are expected to form a joint alliance in the next presidential election, any premature run from Ma at this time in opposition to the wishes of the two party elders would likely be fatal to Ma's future career in party politics.

For President Chen, the victory of Hsieh in Kaohsiung ensures the continuing dominance of the DPP in the south. Chen won the presidency in 2000 with strong support from the south. Thus, DPP

---

14. Indeed, Lien and Soong announced in March 2003 that the KMT and the PFP would cooperate in the next presidential election with themselves as the nominees on a joint ticket. The joint announcement has virtually sealed Ma's fate for the time being.
leaders were worried that if Kaohsiung fell, Chen would fall with it. Hsieh has worked very closely with President Chen and his win will also undoubtedly enhance his role in the DPP.

Moving beyond immediate political implications, the conclusion of the December elections will allow Chen’s government to shift its attention from election campaigning to economic development. From the perspective of business and industrial leaders, Taiwan’s economy is in a deep recession that will require the government to develop a massive rescue plan in order to boost production and international trade. WANG Ling-lin, chairman of the ROC General Chamber of Commerce, said that the end of the elections should mark the beginning of national construction and that he and leaders of major business and industry organizations will call legislative caucuses of major political parties for a faster passage of bills related to economic development and the people’s livelihood in order to speed up economic recovery. HUAN Chung-jen, Chairman of the Taipei Computer Association, suggested that all political parties now bury their election grudges and join hands to fight for Taiwan’s economic future.15 Political observers agree that Taiwan’s economy must be improved if Chen is going to win a second term as president in 2004.

The December 2002 elections of mayors and council members of the two largest cities in Taiwan were billed as “mid-term” elections. They were a mid-term check of the performance of President Chen and his DPP, as well as a mid-term check of the KMT’s effort to return to power. The election results did not show any significant reversal of fortune in the political landscape in Taiwan heading into preparation for the next presidential election in March 2004.

REFERENCES

Bellows, Thomas L.
2000 Taiwan and Mainland China: Democratization, Political Participation and Economic Development in the 1990s, New York: Center of Asian Studies, St. John’s University.

Chen, George P. and Wen-hui TSAI, eds.,
2003 She-hui ke-hsueh ti yin-yung: Tai-wan ti kun-ching yu wei-lei (The Application of Social Sciences: Taiwan’s Dilemma and Future), Taipei: Wu-nan Publisher.

Chu, Wei-yu, ed.  

Lin, Eric  

Robinson, James  

Teng, Sue-fen  
2002  “Lessons Learned from Taiwan’s Democratization,” *Kwang-hwa* (Sinorama,) Vol. 27. No. 9 (September), pp. 67-69.

Tsai, Wen-hui  

Yang, Winston L. and Deborah A. Brown, eds.  
1998  *Taiwan and Mainland China toward the Twenty-First Century*, New York: Center of Asian Studies, St. John’s University.

**INTERNET SOURCES**

http://news.sina.com.tw  
http://tw.news.yahoo.com/vote  
http://www.cec.gov.tw  
http://www.chinapost.com.tw  
http://www.chinatimes.com  
http://www.cia.gov/publications/factbook/geos  
http://www.dpp.org.tw  
http://www.gio.gov.tw  
http://www.moi.gov.tw  
http://www.jamestown.org  
http://www.roc.taiwan.org.uk  
http://www.taipeitimes.com  
Maryland Series
in Contemporary Asian Studies
(Formerly Occasional Papers/Reprints Series

500 West Baltimore Street
Baltimore, Maryland 21201-1786
U.S.A.
Tel: (410) 706-3870
Fax: (410) 706-1516
(For back issues, new prices effective from October 1, 1991)

1977 Series

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>ISBN</th>
<th>ISSN</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Pages</th>
<th>Price</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>0-942182-00-6</td>
<td>0730-0107</td>
<td>Chinese Attitude Toward Continental Shelf and Its Implication on Delimiting Seabed in Southeast Asia (Hungdah Chiu)</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>$3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>0-942182-01-4</td>
<td>0730-0107</td>
<td>Income Distribution in the Process of Economic Growth of the Republic of China (Yuan-Li Wu)</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>$3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>0-942182-02-2</td>
<td>0730-0107</td>
<td>The Indonesian Maoists: Doctrines and Perspectives (Justus M. van der Kroef)</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>$3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>0-942182-03-0</td>
<td>0730-0107</td>
<td>Taiwan's Foreign Policy in the 1970s: A Case Study Adaptation and Viability (Thomas J. Bellows)</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>$3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>0-942182-04-9</td>
<td>0730-0107</td>
<td>Asian Political Scientists in North America: Professional and Ethnic Problems (Edited by Chun-tu Hsueh)</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>$6.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>0-942182-05-7</td>
<td>0730-0107</td>
<td>The Sino-Japanese Fisheries Agreement of 1975: A Comparison with Other North Pacific Fisheries Agreements (Song Yook Hong)</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>$5.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
No. 7 - 1977
ISSN 0730-0107
Foreign Trade Contracts Between West German Companies and the People's Republic of China: A Case Study (Robert Heuser), 22 pp.
$3.00

No. 8 - 1977
ISSN 0730-0107
ISBN 0-942182-07-3
$3.00

No. 9 - 1977
ISSN 0730-0107
ISBN 0-942182-08-1
$5.00

No. 10 - 1977
ISSN 0730-0107
ISBN 0-942182-09-X
Legal Aspects of U.S.-Republic of China Trade and Investment — Proceedings of a Regional Conference of the American Society of International Law (Edited by Hungdah Chiu and David Simon), 217 pp. Index
$8.00

No. 11 - 1977
ISSN 0730-0107
ISBN 0-942182-10-3
$3.00

No. 12 - 1977
ISSN 0730-0107
ISBN 0-942182-11-1
$3.00

1978 Series

No. 1 - 1978 (13)
ISSN 0730-0107
ISBN 0-942182-12-X
$3.00

No. 2 - 1978 (14)
ISSN 0730-0107
ISBN 0-942182-13-8
Normalizing Relations with the People's Republic of China: Problems, Analysis, and Documents (Edited by Hungdah Chiu, with contribution by G. J. Sigur, Robert A. Scalapino, King C. Chen, Eugene A. Thieroux, Michael Y.M. Kau, James C. Hsiung and James W. Morley), 207 pp. Index
$5.00

No. 3 - 1978 (15)
ISSN 0730-0107
ISBN 0-942182-14-6
$5.00

No. 4 - 1978 (16)
ISSN 0730-0107
The Societal Objectives of Wealth, Growth, Stability, and Equity in Taiwan (Jan S. Prybyla), 31 pp.
$3.00
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. 5 - 1978 (17)</th>
<th>ISSN 0730-0107</th>
<th>ISBN 0-942182-16-2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Role of Law in the People's Republic of China as Reflecting Mao Tse-Tung’s Influence (Shao-chuan Leng), 18 pp.</td>
<td>$3.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. 6 - 1978 (18)</th>
<th>ISSN 0730-0107</th>
<th>ISBN 0-942182-17-0</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Criminal Punishment in Mainland China: A Study of Some Yunnan Province Documents (Hungdah Chiu), 35 pp.</td>
<td>$3.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A Guide to the Study of Japanese Law (Lawrence W. Beer and Hide-nori Tomatsu), 45 pp.</td>
<td>$4.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. 8 - 1978 (20)</th>
<th>ISSN 0730-0107</th>
<th>ISBN 0-942182-19-7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Pueblo, EC-121, and Mayaguez Incidents: Some Continuities and Changes (Robert Simmons), 40 pp.</td>
<td>$4.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. 9 - 1978 (21)</th>
<th>ISSN 0730-0107</th>
<th>ISBN 0-942182-20-0</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Two Korea's Unification Policy and Strategy (Yong Soon Yim), 82 pp. Index</td>
<td>$4.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**1979 Series**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. 1 - 1979 (22)</th>
<th>ISSN 0730-0107</th>
<th>ISBN 0-942182-21-9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Asian Immigrants and Their Status in the U.S. (Edited by Hungdah Chiu), 54 pp.</td>
<td>$4.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. 2 - 1979 (23)</th>
<th>ISSN 0730-0107</th>
<th>ISBN 0-942182-22-7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social Disorder in Peking After the 1976 Earthquake Revealed by a Chinese Legal Documents (Hungdah Chiu), 20 pp.</td>
<td>$4.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Dragon and the Eagle — A Study of U.S.-People's Republic of China Relations in Civil Air Transport (Jack C. Young), 65 pp.</td>
<td>$5.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. 4 - 1979 (25)</th>
<th>ISSN 0730-0107</th>
<th>ISBN 0-942182-24-3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chinese Women Writers Today (Edited by Wai-lim Yip and William Tay), 108 pp.</td>
<td>$5.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. 5 - 1979 (26)</th>
<th>ISSN 0730-0107</th>
<th>ISBN 0-942182-25-1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Certain Legal Aspects of Recognizing the People's Republic of China (Hungdah Chiu), 49 pp.</td>
<td>$4.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. 6 - 1979 (27)</th>
<th>ISSN 0730-0107</th>
<th>ISBN 0-942182-26-X</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China's Nationalization of Foreign Firms: The Politics of Hostage Capitalism, 1949-1957 (Thomas N. Thompson), 80 pp. Index</td>
<td>$5.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
No. 7 - 1979 (28)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-942182-27-8
U.S. Status of Force Agreement with Asian Countries: Selected Studies
(Charles Cochran and Hungdah Chiu), 130 pp. Index  $4.00

No. 8 - 1979 (29)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-942182-28-6
China's Foreign Aid in 1978 (John F. Copper), 45 pp.  $4.00

1980 Series

No. 1 - 1980 (30)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-942182-29-4
The Chinese Connection and Normalization (Edited by Hungdah Chiu
and Karen Murphy), 200 pp. Index  $7.00

No. 2 - 1980 (31)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-942182-30-8
(James C. Hsiung), 17 pp.  $3.00

No. 3 - 1980 (32)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-942182-31-6
Policy, Proliferation and the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty: U.S. Strate-
gies and South Asian Prospects (Joanne Finegan), 61 pp.  $4.00

No. 4 - 1980 (33)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-942182-32-4
A Comparative Study of Judicial Review Under Nationalist Chinese
and American Constitutional Law (Jyh-pin Fa), 200 pp. Index (out
of print)  $6.00

No. 5 - 1980 (34)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-942182-33-2
Certain Problems in Recent Law Reform in the People's Republic of
China (Hungdah Chiu), 34 pp.  $4.00

No. 6 - 1980 (35)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-942182-34-0
China's New Criminal & Criminal Procedure Codes (Hungdah Chiu),
16 pp.  $3.00

China's Foreign Relations: Selected Studies (Edited by F. Gilbert Chan
& Ka-che Yip), 115 pp. (out of print)  $5.00

No. 8 - 1980 (37)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-942182-36-7
Annual Review of Selected Books on Contemporary Asian Studies
(1979-1980) (Edited by John F. Copper), 45 pp.  $4.00

1981 Series

Structural Changes in the Organization and Operation of China's Crimi-
nal Justice System (Hungdah Chiu), 31 pp.  $3.00
Readjustment and Reform in the Chinese Economy (Jan S. Prybyla), 58 pp. $3.00

No. 3 - 1981 (40)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-942182-39-1
Symposium on the Trial of Gang of Four and Its Implication in China (Edited by James C. Hsiung), 118 pp. $5.00

No. 4 - 1981 (41)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-942182-40-5
China and the Law of the Sea Conference (Hungdah Chiu), 30 pp. $4.00

No. 5 - 1981 (42)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-942182-41-3
China’s Foreign Aid in 1979-80 (John Franklin Copper), 54 pp. $4.00

No. 6 - 1981 (43)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-942182-42-1
Chinese Regionalism: Yesterday and Today (Franz Michael), 35 pp. $4.00

Elite Conflict in the Post-Mao China (Parris H. Chang), 40 pp. $4.00
(Out of print, please order No. 2 - 1983 (55) for a revised version of this issue.)

No. 8 - 1981 (45)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-942182-44-8
Proceedings of Conference on Multi-system Nations and International Law: International Status of Germany, Korea, and China (Edited by Hungdah Chiu and Robert Downen), 203 pp. Index (out of print) $8.00

1982 Series

Socialist Legalism: Reform and Continuity in Post-Mao People’s Republic of China (Hungdah Chiu), 35 pp. $4.00

No. 2 - 1982 (47)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-942182-46-4
Kampuchea: The Endless Tug of War (Justus M. Van der Kroef), 51 pp. $4.00

Social Change on Mainland China and Taiwan, 1949-1980 (Alan P.L. Liu), 55 pp. (out of print) $5.00

No. 4 - 1982 (49)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-942182-48-0
Taiwan’s Security and United States Policy: Executive and Congressional Strategies in 1978-1979 (Michael S. Frost), 39 pp. $4.00
No. 5 - 1982 (50)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-942182-49-9
Constitutional Revolution in Japanese Law, Society and Politics (Lawrence W. Beer), 35 pp. $4.00

No. 6 - 1982 (51)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-942182-50-2
Review of Selected Books on Contemporary Asian Studies, 1981-1982 (Edited by David Salem, Roy Werner and Lyushen Shen), 67 pp. $4.00

No. 7 - 1982 (52)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-942182-51-0
Chinese Law and Justice: Trends Over Three Decades (Hungdah Chiu), 39 pp. $4.00

No. 8 - 1982 (53)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-942182-52-9
Disarmament and Civilian Control in Japan: A Constitutional Dilemma (Theodore McNelly), 16 pp. $4.00

1983 Series

Essays on Sun Yat-sen and the Economic Development of Taiwan (Maria Hsia Chang and A. James Gregor), 60 pp. $3.00

Elite Conflict in the Post-Mao China (Revised version of No. 7-1981 (44)) (Parris H. Chang), 48 pp. $3.00

No. 3 - 1983 (56)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-942182-55-3
Media-Coverage on Taiwan in The People’s Republic of China (Jörg-M. Rudolph), 77 pp. $4.00

No. 4 - 1983 (57)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-942182-56-1
Transit Problems of Three Asian Land-locked Countries: Afghanistan, Nepal and Laos (Martin Ira Glassner), 55 pp. $3.00

No. 5 - 1983 (58)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-942182-57-X
China’s War Against Vietnam: A Military Analysis (King C. Chen), 33 pp. $3.00


No. 7 - 1983 (60)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-942182-59-6
### 1984 Series

**No. 1 - 1984 (60)**  
**ISSN 0730-0107**  
**ISBN 0-942182-60-X**  
*China's Nuclear Policy: An Overall View* (Shao-chuan Leng), 18 pp.  
$3.00

**No. 2 - 1984 (61)**  
**ISSN 0730-0107**  
**ISBN 0-942182-61-8**  
$3.00

**No. 3 - 1984 (62)**  
**ISSN 0730-0107**  
**ISBN 0-942182-62-6**  
*Legal Problems of Seabed Boundary Delimitation in the East China Sea* (Ying-jeou Ma), 308 pp. Index (paperback out of print)  
$10.00  
$15.00

**No. 4 - 1984 (63)**  
**ISSN 0730-0107**  
**ISBN 0-942182-64-2**  
$3.00

**No. 5 - 1984 (64)**  
**ISSN 0730-0107**  
**ISBN 0-942182-65-0**  
*Taiwan's Elections: Political Development and Democratization in the Republic of China* (John F. Copper with George P. Chen), 180 pp.  
Index  
$5.00  
$10.00

**No. 6 - 1984 (65)**  
**ISSN 0730-0107**  
**ISBN 0-942182-67-7**  
$5.00

### 1985 Series

**No. 1 - 1985 (66)**  
**ISSN 0730-0107**  
**ISBN 0-942182-68-5**  
$3.00

**No. 2 - 1985 (67)**  
**ISSN 0730-0107**  
**ISBN 0-942182-69-3**  
*The Legal System and Criminal Responsibility of Intellectuals in the People's Republic of China, 1949-1982* (Carlos Wing-hung Lo), 125 pp. Index  
$5.00

**No. 3 - 1985 (68)**  
**ISSN 0730-0107**  
**ISBN 0-942182-70-7**  
*Symposium on Hong Kong: 1997* (Edited by Hungdah Chiu), 100 pp.  
Index  
$4.00
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>ISSN</th>
<th>ISBN</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Pages</th>
<th>Price</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>0730-0107</td>
<td>0-942182-71-5</td>
<td>The 1982 Chinese Constitution and the Rule of Law (Hungdah Chiu), 18 pp.</td>
<td></td>
<td>$3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>0730-0107</td>
<td>0-942182-72-3</td>
<td>Peking's Negotiating Style: A Case study of U.S.-PRC Normalization (Jaw-Ling Joanne Chang), 22 pp.</td>
<td></td>
<td>$3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>0730-0107</td>
<td>0-942182-73-1</td>
<td>China's Marine Environmental Protection Law: The Dragon Creeping in Murky Waters (Mitchell A. Silk), 32 pp.</td>
<td></td>
<td>$3.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**1986 Series**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>ISSN</th>
<th>ISBN</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Pages</th>
<th>Price</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>0730-0107</td>
<td>0-942182-74-X</td>
<td>From Tradition to Modernity: A Socio-Historical Interpretation on China's Struggle toward Modernization Since the Mid-19th Century (Wen-hui Tsai), 76 pp.</td>
<td></td>
<td>$4.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>0730-0107</td>
<td>0-942182-75-8</td>
<td>Peace and Unification in Korea and International Law (Byung-Hwa Lyou), 205 pp. Index.</td>
<td></td>
<td>$8.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>0730-0107</td>
<td>0-942182-76-6</td>
<td>The Hong Kong Agreement and American Foreign Policy (Hungdah Chiu), 18 pp.</td>
<td></td>
<td>$3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>0730-0107</td>
<td>0-942182-77-4</td>
<td>United States-China Normalization: An Evaluation of Foreign Policy Decision Making (Jaw-ling Joanne Chang), copublished with Monograph Series in World Affairs, University of Denver, 246 pp. Index. (out of print)</td>
<td></td>
<td>$8.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>0730-0107</td>
<td>0-942182-79-0</td>
<td>Communications and China's National Integration: An Analysis of People's Daily and Central Daily on the China Reunification Issue (Shuhua Chang), 205 pp.</td>
<td></td>
<td>$8.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>0730-0107</td>
<td>0-942182-80-4</td>
<td>Since Aquino: The Philippine Tangle and the United States (Justus M. van der Kroef), 73 pp.</td>
<td></td>
<td>$3.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1987 Series

An Analysis of the U.S.-China Nuclear Energy Cooperation Agreement (Benjamin Chin), 40 pp. $3.00

No. 2 - 1987 (79)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-942182-82-0
Survey of Recent Developments in China (Mainland and Taiwan), 1985-1986 (edited by Hungdah Chiu, with the assistance of Jaw-ling Joanne Chang), 222 pp. Index $8.00

No. 3 - 1987 (80)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-942182-83-9
Democratizing Transition in Taiwan (Yangsun Chou and Andrew J. Nathan), 24 pp. $3.00

No. 4 - 1987 (81)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-942182-84-7
The Legal Status of the Chinese Communist Party (Robert Heuser), 25 pp. $3.00

No. 5 - 1987 (82)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-942182-85-5
The Joint Venture and Related Contract Laws of Mainland China and Taiwan: A Comparative Analysis (Clyde D. Stoltenberg and David W. McClure), 54 pp. (out of print) $4.00

No. 6 - 1987 (83)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-942182-86-3
Reform in Reverse: Human Rights in the People's Republic of China, 1986/1987 (Ta-Ling Lee and John F. Copper), 150 pp. $8.00

1988 Series

No. 1 - 1988 (84)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-942182-87-1
Chinese Attitudes toward International Law in the Post-Mao Era, 1978-1987 (Hungdah Chiu), 41 pp. $3.00

Chinese Views on the Sources of International Law (Hungdah Chiu), 20 pp. $3.00

No. 3 - 1988 (86)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-942182-89-8
People's Republic of China: The Human Rights Exception (Roberta Cohen), 103 pp. (out of print) $5.00

No. 4 - 1988 (87)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-942182-90-1
Settlement of the Macau Issue: Distinctive Features of Beijing's Negotiating Behavior (with text of 1887 Protocol and 1987 Declaration) (Jaw-ling Joanne Chang), 37 pp. $3.00
No. 5 - 1988 (88)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-942182-91-X
The Draft Basic Law of Hong Kong: Analysis and Documents (edited by Hungdah Chiu), 153 pp.  $5.00

No. 6 - 1988 (89)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-942182-92-8
Constitutionalism in Asia: Asian Views of the American Influence (edited by Lawrence W. Beer), 210 pp. (out of print)  $10.00

1989 Series

No. 1 - 1989 (90)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-925153-00-1
The Right to a Criminal Appeal in the People’s Republic of China (Margaret Y.K. Woo), 43 pp.  $3.00

No. 2 - 1989 (91)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-925153-01-X
The Status of Customary International Law, Treaties, Agreements and Semi-Official or Unofficial Agreements in Chinese Law (Hungdah Chiu), 22 pp.  $3.00

No. 3 - 1989 (92)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-925153-02-8
One Step Forward, One Step Back, Human Rights in the People’s Republic of China in 1987/88 (John F. Cooper and Ta-ling Lee), 140 pp.  $6.00

No. 4 - 1989 (93)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-925153-03-6
Tibet: Past and Present (Hungdah Chiu and June Teufel Dreyer), 25 pp.  $3.00

No. 5 - 1989 (94)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-925153-04-4
Chinese Attitude toward International Law of Human Rights in the Post-Mao Era (Hungdah Chiu), 38 pp.  $4.00

No. 6 - 1989 (95)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-925153-05-2
Tibet to Tiananmen: Chinese Human Rights and United States Foreign Policy (W. Gary Vause), 47 pp.  $4.00

1990 Series

No. 1 - 1990 (96)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-925153-06-0
The International Legal Status of the Republic of China (Hungdah Chiu), 20 pp. (Out of print, please order No. 5-1992 (112) for a revised version of this issue)  $3.00
No. 2 - 1990 (97)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-925153-07-9

No. 3 - 1990 (98)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-925153-09-5
Nationality and International Law in Chinese Perspective (Hungdah Chiu), 37 pp. $4.00

No. 4 - 1990 (99)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-925153-10-9
The Taiwan Relations Act after Ten Years (Lori Fisler Damrosch), 27 pp. $3.00

No. 5 - 1990 (100)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-925153-11-7
The Taiwan Relations Act and Sino-American Relations (Hungdah Chiu), 34 pp. (out of print) $4.00

No. 6 - 1990 (101)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-925153-12-5
Taiwan's Recent Elections: Fulfilling the Democratic Promise (John F. Copper), 174 pp. Index (out of print) $8.00

1991 Series

Legal Aspects of Investment and Trade with the Republic of China (Edited by John T. McDermott, with contributions by Linda F. Powers, Ronald A. Case, Chung-Teh Lee, Jeffrey H. Chen, Cheryl M. Friedman, Hungdah Chiu, K.C. Fan and Douglas T. Hung), 94 pp. $6.00

No. 2 - 1991 (103)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-925153-14-1

Freedom of Expression: The Continuing Revolution in Japan's Legal Culture (Lawrence W. Beer), 31 pp. $5.00

No. 4 - 1991 (105)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-925153-16-8
The 1989 US-Republic of China (Taiwan) Fisheries Negotiations (Mark Mon-Chang Hsieh), 84 pp. $6.00

No. 5 - 1991 (106)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-925153-17-6
Politics of Divided Nations: China, Korea, Germany and Vietnam—Unification, Conflict Resolution and Political Development (Edited by Quansheng Zhao and Robert Sutter), 198 pp. Index (out of print) $12.00
1992 Series

Judicial Review of Administration in the People’s Republic of China
(Jyh-pin Fa & Shao-chuan Leng), 37 pp.  $5.00

China’s Ministry of State Security: Coming of Age in the International
Arena (Nicholas Eftimiades), 24 pp.  $4.00

No. 3 - 1992 (110)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-925153-21-4
Libel Law and the Press in South Korea: An Update (Kyu Ho Youm),
23 pp.  $5.00

No. 4 - 1992 (111)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-925153-22-2
Tiananmen Aftermath: Human Rights in the People’s Republic of
China, 1990 (John F. Copper and Ta-ling Lee), 133 pp. Index  $15.00

No. 5 - 1992 (112)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-925153-23-0
The International Legal Status of the Republic of China (Revised ver-
sion of No. 1-1990 (96)) (Hungdah Chiu), 37 pp.  $4.00

No. 6 - 1992 (113)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-925153-24-9
China’s Criminal Justice System and the Trial of Pro-Democracy Dissi-
dents (Hungdah Chiu), 21 pp.  $3.00

1993 Series

Can One Unscramble an Omelet? China’s Economic Reform in Theory
and Practice (Yuan-li Wu and Richard Y. C. Yin), 34 pp.  $4.00

Constitutional Development and Reform in the Republic of China on
Taiwan (With Documents) (Hungdah Chiu), 61 pp.  $6.00

No. 3 - 1993 (116)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-925153-27-3
Sheltering for Examination (Shourong Shencha) in the Legal System of
the People’s Republic of China (Tao-tai Hsia and Wendy I. Zeldin),
32 pp.  $4.00
No. 4 - 1993 (117)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-925153-28-1
In Making China Modernized: Comparative Modernization between Mainland China and Taiwan (Wen-hui Tsai), 281 pp. Index (out of print, please order No. 5 - 1996 for 2nd ed.) $18.00

No. 5 - 1993 (118)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-925153-30-3
Hong Kong's Transition to 1997: Background, Problems and Prospects (with Documents) (Hungdah Chiu), 106 pp. $7.00

No. 6 - 1993 (119)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-925153-31-1
Koo-Wang Talks and the Prospect of Building Constructive and Stable Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (with Documents) (Hungdah Chiu), 69 pp. $5.00

1994 Series

Statutory Encouragement of Investment and Economic Development in the Republic of China on Taiwan (Neil L. Meyers), 72 pp. $7.00

No. 2 - 1994 (121)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-925153-33-8
Don't Force Us to Lie: The Struggle of Chinese Journalists in the Reform Era (Allison Liu Jernow), 99 pp. $7.00

No. 3 - 1994 (122)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-925153-34-6
Institutionalizing a New Legal System in Deng's China (Hungdah Chiu), 44 pp. $5.00

No. 4 - 1994 (123)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-925153-35-4

Taiwan's Legal System and Legal Profession (Hungdah Chiu and Jyh-pin Fa), 22 pp. $3.00

No. 6 - 1994 (125)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-925153-37-0
Toward Greater Democracy: An Analysis of the Republic of China on Taiwan's Major Elections in the 1990s (Wen-hui Tsai), 40 pp. $6.00

1995 Series

Relations between the Republic of China and the Republic of Chile (Herman Gutierrez B. and Lin Chou), 31 pp. $5.00
The Tibet Question and the Hong Kong Experience (Barry Sautman and Shiu-hing Lo), 82 pp.  $10.00

No. 3 - 1995 (128)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-925153-40-0
Mass Rape, Enforced Prostitution, and the Japanese Imperial Army: Japan Eschews International Legal Responsibility? (David Bowling), 56 pp.  $5.00

No. 4 - 1995 (129)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-925153-41-9
The Role of the Republic of China in the World Economy (Chu-yuan Cheng), 25 pp.  $3.00

No. 5 - 1995 (130)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-925153-42-7
China's Economy after Deng: A Long-Term Perspective (Peter C.Y. Chow), 43 pp.  $5.00

No. 6 - 1995 (131)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-925153-43-5
An Entrepreneurial Analysis of Opposition Movements (Ching-chane Hwang), 179 pp. Index  $18.00

1996 Series

Taiwan's 1995 Legislative Yuan Election (John F. Copper), 39 pp.  $6.00

No. 2 - 1996 (133)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-925153-45-1
Russian-Taiwanese Relations: Current State, Problems, and Prospects of Development (Peter M. Ivanov), 76 pp.  $10.00

No. 3 - 1996 (134)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-925153-46-X
Recent Relations between China and Taiwan and Taiwan's Defense Capabilities (Hungdah Chiu & June Teufel Dreyer), 28 pp.  $4.00

No. 4 - 1996 (135)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-925153-47-8
Intellectual Property Protection in the Asian-Pacific Region: A Comparative Study (Paul C.B. Liu & Andy Y. Sun), 183 pp. Index.  $25.00
(Hardcover edition: ISBN 0-925153-48-6)  $32.00

No. 5 - 1996 (136)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-925153-49-4
In Making China Modernized: Comparative Modernization between Mainland China and Taiwan (2nd ed.) (Wen-hui Tsai), 297 pp. Index.  $30.00
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>ISSN</th>
<th>ISBN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. 6 - 1996 (137)</td>
<td>ISSN 0730-0107</td>
<td>ISBN 0-925153-51-6</td>
<td>A Study of the Consular Convention between the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China (Stephen Kho), 68 pp.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**1997 Series**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>ISSN</th>
<th>ISBN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 2 - 1997 (139)</td>
<td>ISSN 0730-0107</td>
<td>ISBN 0-925153-54-0</td>
<td>The External Relations and International Status of Hong Kong (Ting Wai), 72 pp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 3 - 1997 (140)</td>
<td>ISSN 0730-0107</td>
<td>ISBN 0-925153-55-9</td>
<td>Sheltering for Examination (Shoushen) in the People’s Republic of China: Law, Policy, and Practices (Kam C. Wong), 53 pp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 4 - 1997 (141)</td>
<td>ISSN 0730-0107</td>
<td>ISBN 0-925153-56-7</td>
<td>Legal Aid Practices in the PRC in the 1990s — Dynamics, Contents and Implications, (Luo Qizhi) 68 pp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 5 - 1997 (142)</td>
<td>ISSN 0730-0107</td>
<td>ISBN 0-925153-57-5</td>
<td>The KMT’s 15th Party Congress: The Ruling Party at a Crossroads (John F. Copper), 38 pp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 6 - 1997 (143)</td>
<td>ISSN 0730-0107</td>
<td>ISBN 0-925153-58-3</td>
<td>From Pirate King to Jungle King: Transformation of Taiwan’s Intellectual Property Protection (Andy Y. Sun), 138 pp.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**1998 Series**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>ISSN</th>
<th>ISBN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. 1 - 1998 (144)</td>
<td>ISSN 0730-0107</td>
<td>ISBN 0-925153-59-1</td>
<td>From “Multi-System Nations” to “Linkage Communities”: A New Conceptual Scheme for the Integration of Divided Nations (Yung Wei), 20 pp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 3 - 1998 (146)</td>
<td>ISSN 0730-0107</td>
<td>ISBN 0-925153-61-3</td>
<td>The Nationalist Ideology of the Chinese Military (Xiaoyu Chen), 45 pp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volume</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>ISBN</td>
<td>Title and Authors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 4</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>0730-0107</td>
<td>ISSN 0730-0107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 6</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>0730-0107</td>
<td>ISSN 0730-0107</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**1999 Series**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Volume</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>ISBN</th>
<th>Title and Authors</th>
<th>Pages</th>
<th>Price</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. 1</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>0730-0107</td>
<td>ISSN 0730-0107</td>
<td>ISBN 0-925153-65-6</td>
<td>An Analysis of the Sino-Japanese Dispute over the T'iaoyutai Islets (Senkaku Gunto) (Hung-dah Chiu), 27 pp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 2</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>0730-0107</td>
<td>ISSN 0730-0107</td>
<td>ISBN 0-925153-66-4</td>
<td>Taiwan’s 1998 Legislative Yuan, Metropolitan Mayoral and City Council Elections: Confirming and Consolidating Democracy in the Republic of China (John F. Copper), 53 pp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 3</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>0730-0107</td>
<td>ISSN 0730-0107</td>
<td>ISBN 0-925153-67-2</td>
<td>The Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands Dispute: Its History and an Analysis of the Ownership Claims of the P.R.C., R.O.C., and Japan (Han-yi Shaw), 148 pp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 4</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>0730-0107</td>
<td>ISSN 0730-0107</td>
<td>ISBN 0-925153-68-0</td>
<td>Election and Democracy in Hong Kong: The 1998 Legislative Council Election (Shiu-hing Lo &amp; Wing-yat Yu), 68 pp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 6</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>0730-0107</td>
<td>ISSN 0730-0107</td>
<td>ISBN 0-925153-70-2</td>
<td>Party Primaries in Taiwan: Trends, Conditions, and Projections in Candidate Selection (Julian Baum and James A. Robinson), 39 pp.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**2000 Series**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Volume</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>ISBN</th>
<th>Title and Authors</th>
<th>Pages</th>
<th>Price</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No. 1</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>0730-0107</td>
<td>ISSN 0730-0107</td>
<td>ISBN 0-925153-71-0</td>
<td>United States-Taiwan Relations: Twenty Years after the Taiwan Relations Act (Edited by Jaw-Ling Joanne Chang &amp; William W. Boyer), 309 pp. Index</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(Hardcover edition: ISBN 0-925153-72-9)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Taiwan’s 2000 Presidential and Vice Presidential Election: Consolidating Democracy and Creating a New Era of Politics (John F. Copper), 66 pp. $9.00

Legal Eligibility of Taiwan’s Accession to GATT/WTO (CHO Hui-Wan), 22 pp. $6.00

No. 4 - 2000 (159) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-75-3
Russia’s Northeast Asia Policy: Challenges and Choices for the 21st Century (Sharif M. Shuja), 22 pp. $6.00

No. 5 - 2000 (160) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-76-1
East Asia and the Principle of Non-Intervention: Policies and Practices (Linjun WU), 39 pp. $7.00

No. 6 - 2000 (161) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-77-X
The Association of South East Asian Nations’ Confidence and Security Building with the People's Republic of China: Internal Constraints and Policy Implications (Kwei-Bo HUANG), 61 pp. $9.00

2001 Series

No. 1 - 2001 (162) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-78-8
Socio-economic Changes and Modernization in an Age of Uncertainty: Taiwan in the 1990s and Its Future Challenge (Wen-hui TSAI), 35 pp. $7.00

No. 2 - 2001 (163) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-79-6
Implementation of Taiwan Relations Act: An Examination after Twenty Years (Edited by Hungdah CHIU, Hsing-wei LEE and Chih-Yu T. WU), 267 pp. $27.00

No. 3 - 2001 (164) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-80-X
The Diplomatic War between Beijing and Taipei in Chile (Lin CHOU), 61 pp. $9.00

No. 4 - 2001 (165) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-81-8
Reforming the Protection of Intellectual Property: The Case of China and Taiwan in Light of WTO Accession (Andy Y. SUN), 46 pp. $8.00

No. 5 - 2001 (166) ISSN 0730-0107 ISBN 0-925153-82-6
Arbitration of Commercial Disputes in China (Vai Io LO), 26 pp. $6.00
Building a Democratic State in Modernizing Taiwan: The 2001 Legislative Election and the Push for Pluralism (Wen-hui TSAI and George P. Chen), 24 pp. $6.00

2002 Series

No. 1 - 2002 (168)
ISSN 0730-0107
United States and Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea: A Study of Ocean Law and Politics (Yann-huei SONG), 321 pp. $35.00

No. 2 - 2002 (169)
ISSN 0730-0107
ISBN 0-925153-85-0
The Politics of Racial Discrimination in Hong Kong (Barry Sautman and Ellen Kneehans), 83 pp. $10.00

No. 3 - 2002 (170)
ISSN 0730-0107
ISBN 1-932330-00-3
The Social and Political Bases for Women’s Growing Political Power in Taiwan (Cal Clark and Janet Clark), 40 pp. $7.00

No. 4 - 2002 (171)
ISSN 0730-0107
ISBN 1-932330-01-1
The U.S.-Taiwan Free Trade Agreement: A Bridge for Economic Integration in the Asia-Pacific Region (Peter C.Y. Chow), 62 pp. $9.00

2003 Series

No. 1 - 2003 (172)
ISSN 0730-0107
ISBN 1-932330-02-X
Bringing People Back In: Collected Essays on Major Elections in Taiwan at the Turn of the 21st Century (Wen-hui TSAI), 125 pp. $18.00
MARYLAND STUDIES IN EAST ASIAN LAW AND POLITICS SERIES

(The following books are published under the auspices or co-auspices of the East Asian Legal Studies Program of the University of Maryland School of Law. The views expressed in each book reflect only those of the author. All books published in hard cover edition, unless otherwise indicated.)


5. Hungdah Chiu and Shao-chuan Leng, editors, *China: 70 Years After the 1911 Hsin-hai Revolution*. Charlottesville, Virginia: University Press of Virginia, 1984. 600 pp. (Published under the co-auspices of the Committee on Asian Studies, University of Virginia) ISBN 0-8138-1027-7 $35.00


* Occasional Papers/Reprints Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, Inc. (It has been changed to Maryland Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, MSCAS), 500 West Baltimore St., Baltimore, Maryland 21201-1786. (Tel. 410-706-3870)


ORDER FORM

Mail this order form to Maryland Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, University of Maryland School of Law, 500 West Baltimore Street, Baltimore, Maryland 21201-1786, U.S.A. Or e-mail to eastasia@law. umaryland.edu or fax to (410)706-1516

Check One:

☐ Please Send:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ISBN</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>No. of Copies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

☐ Please start my subscription of the MSCAS: Starting year _________

Subscription price is U.S. $35.00 per year for 4 issues in the U.S. and $40.00 for Canada, Mexico or overseas (regardless of the price of individual issues).

My check of U.S. $ ___________________________ is enclosed.

_________ copy(s) of invoice/receipt required. (Institution/library may request billing before making payment)

Please add postage/handling of $4.00 for one copy and $1.00 for each additional copy. Make checks payable to MSCAS.

Please send books to:

Contact Name
Corporation/Library/Institution
Address (Please include zip code)
Country