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THE DIPLOMATIC WAR BETWEEN BEIJING AND TAIPEI IN CHILE

Lin CHOU

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. Introduction .............................................. 2
II. Chile and China in the Cold War .......................... 2
   1. Chile and China at the start of the Cold War .... 2
   2. The Foreign Policy of Chile, the PRC and the ROC .......................... 7
III. The People’s Republic of China’s Offensive in Chile (1951-1965) .................. 15
    1. Cultural Diplomacy .......................... 15
    2. Commercial Diplomacy ...................... 23
    3. Activities of the People’s Republic of China in Connection with the Chinese Colony .............. 35
IV. Efforts by the Republic of China to Maintain Relations with Chile .................. 39
    1. Efforts to persuade Chile to Re-Establish its Mission in Taipei .................. 39
    2. Diplomatic Measures to Counteract the PRC Offensive .......................... 45
    3. Commercial, Technical-Agricultural and Cultural Measures ...................... 52
    4. The Dispatch of a Technical Agricultural Mission to Chile ..................... 54
    5. Cultural and Academic Activities .................. 56
V. Conclusion .............................................. 59
Appendix: List of Acronyms .................................... 61

* Editorial Note: Due to a great quantity of original government documentation of the Republic of China cited in this article, the date format adopted here is European date style, which is used by the ROC government documentation, instead of in American style we normally use.

1. This paper summarizes part of the author’s doctoral dissertation: “Chile y China: Inmigración y Relaciones Bilaterales (1845-1970)” (August 2001, 678 pp.) at Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, under the insightful and inspiring supervision of Professor Dr. Juan Ricardo Couyoumdjian. The Chiang Ching Kuo International Scholarly Exchange of the ROC helped the author with a scholarship during his preparation of the dissertation, for which the author is sincerely grateful.

2. B.A. and M.A. from the Tankang University, Taiwan; Diplomado in International Relations, University of Chile. ROC career diplomat. He is currently Political Counselor at the ROC Embassy in Costa Rica.
I. INTRODUCTION

From 1949, Chile was the scene of a diplomatic war between Taipei and Beijing. The latter resorted to a cultural and commercial offensive against Taipei, as well as overtures to the Chinese colony. The government of the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan employed a variety of diplomatic, commercial and techno-agricultural means in its attempts to maintain diplomatic relations with Chile. However, Taipei lost its diplomatic bulwark in Santiago as a result of the increasingly adverse international situation, the growing power of Beijing, and the election of Salvador Allende as President in 1970. This paper analyzes the foreign policy of the three players in question between 1950 and 1970, as well as their relations with each other.

II. CHILE AND CHINA IN THE COLD WAR

1. Chile and China at the start of the Cold War

Shortly after the end of the Second World War, the Soviet Union (USSR) used its advantage as one of the victors to extend its influence in Western Europe. In 1946, it offered its collaboration to a rebel group in Greece attempting to establish a socialist government, an action that provoked the declaration of the Truman Doctrine in March 1947. This marked the start of the so-called Cold War. In Asia, during the final stages of the war, the USSR delivered the Chinese communists a huge quantity of weapons and munitions that had been surrendered by the Japanese troops in Manchuria. This support and other factors enabled the Chinese communists to achieve victory in the civil war and found the People's Republic of China (PRC) in Beijing on 1 October 1949, while the nationalist government of the Republic of China moved to the island of Taiwan in December, along with some two million military and public officials who supported it.

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3. Yun Wu She Hui Ke Xue Zhi Dien (Dictionary of Social Sciences Yun Wu), t. XII, (History), Taipei: Commercial Printing, 1974, p. 408.
4. Many factors caused the total failure of the nationalists in mainland China, foremost among them the U.S. administration's loss of confidence in CHIANG Kai-shek; his military defeats; the resistance of the Kuo Min Tang (KMT) to political reform; the corruption of the KMT's political and military leaders, and Chiang's political and military negligence resulting from his stubborn character. See the commentaries by political and military leaders of the KMT gathered at the end of 1949 by the ambassador of the ROC in Washington, Wellington V. K. KOO, in The Memoirs of Wellington Koo, Beijing, t. V1a, 1989, pp. 615-625. Dictionary of Social Sciences Yun Wu, t. IV, (International Relations), Taipei, Taiwan Commercial Printing, 1974, pp. 110, 189.
In August 1949, several months before the nationalist government left mainland China, the United States government published a White Paper, *The Relations of the United States and China*, which blamed the government of Generalismo CHIANG Kai-shek for its defeat by the communists. To the U.S. government, the outcome of China's civil war was prompted by forces that were not under Washington's control, an unfortunate but unavoidable reality. In fact, the U.S. ambassador to China, John Leighton Stuart, had met with a representative of Communist China in April to discuss the possibility of diplomatic recognition, but the plan failed due to lack of interest on the part of Beijing. It was only after that, in December 1949, that Washington sent a chargé d'affaires to Taipei to establish its embassy there. The delay underscored the United States' reticence towards Nationalist China, which placed the government of Taipei in a very delicate and precarious situation.

As to bilateral relations with the rest of the world, by December 1949 the ROC maintained diplomatic relations with 47 nations, though only three of these had their missions in Taipei, and only one, the Republic of Korea, had a resident ambassador. In 1949, the USSR, the People's Democratic Republic of Korea, the People's Republic of Mongolia, and eight socialist Eastern European countries recognized Beijing. In 1950, Burma, Denmark, Finland, Great Britain, India, Israel, Norway, Pakistan, Sweden, Switzerland and Vietnam recognized the Mainland government, a diplomatic setback for the ROC since all these countries, except for Israel, had maintained official relations with Taipei.

---

5. John Gittings, researcher of the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London, claimed that in April of 1949 the United States rejected a proposal by the Chinese communists to discuss their eventual recognition, and showed its hostility from the outset towards Mao's new government. John Gittings, "¿Tiene China una politica exterior?" ("Does China have a foreign policy?") in Francisco Orrego Vicuña ed., *Ensayo sobre el Pacífico*, Santiago (Chile): Ed. Universitaria, 1980, pp. 145-146.


7. The three Missions were South Korea, the United States and the Philippines, and these last two sent their second secretaries as chargés d'affaires in Taipei. See Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "The Evolution of the Vicissitudes in the Diplomatic Relations of the Government since the Transfer to Taiwan," Taipei: MOFA, mimeo, 15/1/1986.

At the beginning of 1949, the nationalist government maintained 135 missions abroad, manned by some 1,100 officials. By the end of that year, only 52 missions remained, 19 of which had the rank of embassies, with around 450 diplomats in total. A foreign service officer at the time, who had worked in Chile, recalled that many diplomats were persuaded to accept retirement in exchange for a small sum of money, leaving fewer than 100 officials in that Ministry. Those who wished to continue working in the foreign service received diplomatic passports and were able to continue in their posts in the diplomatic missions abroad, but for a while without a salary.

The People’s Republic of China, in turn, adopted a policy of “leaning towards” the USSR, which had recognized it the day after its foundation, and also through the signing of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance on 23 February 1950. The PRC obtained from the USSR a loan of $300 million during an official visit by MAO Zedong. Aside from ideological factors, this rapprochement was prompted by national security considerations, since China was conscious of the danger of a land attack from the north and therefore tried to remove this risk by establishing a firm alliance with the USSR. This same fear of invasion by warlike nomadic tribes from the interior of Asia had been shared by successive Chinese rulers throughout history.

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10. Senba P. W. SENG, *Sun Bang Hua Hui Yi Lu*, (Memoire of Senba P. W. Seng), Taichung (Taiwan): Tunghai U., 1992, p. 53. Seng worked in the Chinese legation in Chile during the 1930s and 1940s. At the end of 1949 he was dismissed by the Foreign Ministry. Later he left Taiwan and returned to Chile where he worked as counselor ad honorem at the ROC embassy for a period. Subsequently, when the ROC’s situation stabilized, he rejoined the Foreign Service and served as ambassador in Peru, Bolivia, and the Dominican Republic.

11. The three basic principles of the PRC announced by ZHOU Enlai were: first, the New China should establish diplomatic relations on a new basis; second, before developing foreign relations, it was necessary to consolidate internal power; and, third, total inclination towards the USSR. See words of Zhou, 30/4/1950, quoted by ZHAO Quan-shen, *Jie Du Zhong Guo Wai Jiau Zheng Ce*, (Interpreting the foreign policy of China), Taipei: Yue Dan Press, 1999, pp. 90-92.


Diplomatic War Between Beijing & Taipei in Chile

This situation changed drastically with the outbreak of the Korean War on 25 June 1950.\textsuperscript{15} As a result of the conflict, the United States changed its policy in East Asia and Taiwan’s geo-strategic importance was given serious consideration. The dispatch of the U.S. Seventh Fleet to the Strait of Taiwan to defend the island against an aggression by communist China angered Beijing and indirectly prompted its intervention in that war.\textsuperscript{16} The PRC’s military action also had a strategic objective: to consolidate its influence in the Korean peninsula. This military action not only gave Taipei an unequalled opportunity to survive the risk of imminent attack, but also offered a brighter outlook for its diplomacy through which Taipei would gradually consolidate its national security. By contrast, the PRC, by freezing its relations with the United States and becoming even more dependent on the USSR, found itself in a diplomatic difficulties. From the spring of 1950 until the middle of 1955, no new country except for Indonesia and Nepal recognized the Beijing government.\textsuperscript{17}

Although there was a clear U.S. presence in Chile in the 1910s and 1920s, from 1938 on a growing political and economic penetration on the part of the United States began to take place.\textsuperscript{18} World War II increased Chile’s dependence on the U.S. economy in such areas as copper exports and the supply of weapons. Towards 1945, large mining companies, particularly Anaconda and Kennecot, invested growing amounts of capital in Chilean copper.\textsuperscript{19} Starting in 1946, the United States government included Chile in its list of nations receiving military advice. At the start of the Cold War, anti-communist policy strengthened the links between the two countries.\textsuperscript{20} In 1948, the Chilean parliament passed the Law for the Permanent Defense of Democracy, which banned parties “of

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\textsuperscript{16} Kao, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 23.
\textsuperscript{17} Klein, \textit{loc. cit.}
\textsuperscript{19} China’s chargé d’affaires in Chile, Dr. TANG Wu, reported to his government in December 1944 that a large number of Chile’s copper mines were owned by U.S. corporations. In \textit{AMOFA}, 501, letter from Tang to Deputy Minister Hu, 18/12/1944.
\textsuperscript{20} On United States-Chile relations at the time, see Mario Barros Van Buren, \textit{La Diplomacia Chilena en la II Guerra Mundial [Chilean Diplomacy during World War II]}, Santiago (Chile): Arquen, 1998.
totalitarian inspiration.” The Chilean Communist Party (PC)—the largest and best organized in Latin America—was dealt a harsh blow.\(^{21}\)

The Law for the Permanent Defense of Democracy was repealed on 31 July 1958, restoring the PC’s legal status. News of this political event immediately reached Taipei.\(^{22}\) A few months later, Salvador Allende made his second bid for the presidency as the joint candidate of the PC and the Socialist Party (PS). Allende won 28.5% of the total vote in 1958, and 38.6% during a third bid in 1964. This unequivocally showed growing support for the Left, a trend that culminated with Allende’s electoral triumph in 1970.\(^{23}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>% of votes</th>
<th>Political parties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>PS and PC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>FRAP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>UP</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Alan Angell, *Chile de Alessandri a Pinochet: en busca de la utopía (Chile from Alessandri to Pinochet: In Search of Utopia)*, Santiago (Chile): Ed. Andrés Bello, 1993, pp. 37, 46, 59.

In fact, the ROC embassy was not the only institution concerned about its increasingly adverse situation in Chile. A number of merchant seamen who were members of KMT, the ruling party of the ROC, informed their party in 1960 of what they saw during their stay in Valparaíso and Tocopilla. They reported seeing many political leaflets from Communist China, photos of Mao, as well as graffiti quoting PC propaganda. The KMT hurried to inform the ROC’s Foreign Ministry.\(^{24}\)

The following year, the ROC embassy in Washington informed the Foreign Ministry of Taipei that Chile’s communists had already won more than twenty seats in Parliament and suggested that it

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22. *AMOFA*, 505.1(1), Telegram 325, 2/8/1958, EmbaChina Santiago to MOFA.


consider more carefully the possibility of sending an ambassador to Chile. This proposal was approved.

2. The Foreign Policy of Chile, the PRC and the ROC

According to Manfred Wilhelmy, there is a subculture within the international political culture of Chile that could be termed the "moderate dominant subculture," which in his view prevailed from 1946 to 1970. This subculture had certain features:

1) With regard to its status, Chile was perceived as a relatively secondary country in the international sphere, but as a significant one at the regional level.

2) The democratic system was valued as a distinctive characteristic of Chile's political system.

3) A distinct openness to various foreign influences prevailed, with a relative absence of nationalist tendencies.

4) A "Western" orientation, a strong identification with Europe and with the West in general, also prevailed.

5) A legalistic attitude towards the structure of the international system and the resolution of conflicts among countries was another characteristic.

Walter Sánchez notes that Chile's foreign policy consists of furthering the following goals: 1) Pan-Americanism; 2) nationalism; 3) legalism; and, 4) the search for autonomy in the international system. As to Pan-Americanism and nationalism, another Chilean academic has stressed that these have been the foundations of Chilean diplomacy throughout history. Wilhelmy, in his comments on the book by Mario Barros, noted two outstanding features of Chilean foreign policy that the book emphasized: "the search for balance in the South American sub-system, more especially in the Southern Cone," and "a cautious attitude towards the institutions


of the Inter-American system." These may be considered the two main objectives pursued by Chilean foreign policy.

There are some discrepancies among Chilean diplomats regarding Pan-Americanism. Ambassador Luis Melo Lecaros believes that Spain’s bombardment of Valparaíso in colonial times might have been prevented had it not been for the almost hysterical idealism of the Pan-Americanists. Ambassador Enrique Bernstein Carabantes considers that Chile has adopted a sincerely Pan-Americanist diplomatic line, not because of idealism, but out of national security concerns.

Another feature of Chilean foreign policy, ignored or seldom mentioned by Chilean academics, has been the principle of non-intervention. Veteran diplomat Bernstein placed special emphasis on this point. He believes that Chile has adopted non-intervention as a rule of its international policy since its inception as a republic. In practice, when he began negotiations to establish diplomatic relations at the end of 1970 with the ambassador of the PRC in Paris, HUANG Chen, Bernstein relayed the following to his Ministry:

[I insisted on] putting on the record the principle of non-intervention in the internal and external affairs of the States, explaining the reasons why Latin America had struggled for years [to further this principle... ]

The Chilean representative’s position coincided with the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence advocated by the PRC, and found immediate acceptance.

At Bernstein’s suggestion, following the coup of 11 September 1973, Chile’s military government broke off relations with Cuba within the following 24 hours in response to Fidel Castro’s “indisputable intervention in [Chile’s] internal affairs.” Subsequently, the

30. Ministry of Foreign Relations of Chile, Anales de Diplomacia, op. cit., passim.
32. Enrique Bernstein C., “Chile y el principio de no-intervención,” in Anales de Diplomacia, op. cit., pp. 119-124. In this article, the author rejects the intervention exercised by the international community against the Chilean military regime.
34. Bernstein did not specify how Cuba had intervened in Chile’s internal affairs, but the charge presumably refers to material assistance, moral support and even Cuban collaboration with Chile’s left-wing parties during Allende’s administration.
Santiago government broke with North Korea for the same reason.  

A feature of Chilean diplomacy that appears not to have been emphasized, but which is patently obvious, is its effort not to injure the national dignity of other countries. Although this is a general feature of all diplomacy, Chile's exertions in this regard have been notable. In the 1910s, the Chilean press vigorously opposed Chinese immigration, but the government delayed quite a long time before adopting restrictive measures. The press commented:

_Chile has never had the courage to openly dictate a law like Peru's [to prevent immigration], perhaps not wishing to injure [China's] susceptibilities._

In 1914, a query by the Chilean legation in Tokyo as to whether the government wanted Japanese immigration met with this reply from the Foreign Ministry:

_... the government does not want this immigration and intends to avoid it as far as possible, attempting in all cases, not to injure susceptibilities or awaken the mistrust of the Japanese government._

In 1933, Chile maintained an attitude of neutrality to the Japanese invasion of China, although aware that China was legally in the right and the majority of Latin American countries condemned Japan at the League of Nations. Commercial considerations aside, the Chilean government felt the League should find solutions acceptable to both sides, "not imposed formulas that may injure national self-esteem." It is likely that Chile's decision was prompted by a wish not to strengthen the League's powers to intervene in third-party conflicts such as Bolivia's claims to an outlet to the sea.

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36. The daily _El Mercurio de Valparaíso_, 15/2/1918, p. 3; _El Mercurio_ (Santiago), 14/2/1918, p. 5.


38. _AGMRE_, vol. 1930, "Memo on Chile's attitude to the China-Japan conflict," 22/2/1933.

The PRC’s foreign policy objectives, meanwhile, were three-fold. First, to achieve effective control of the territories under its jurisdiction. Its unconditional alliance with the USSR immediately after its foundation was proof of this. Second, to recover territories that had traditionally been part of China—to reincorporate Taiwan, for instance, and exert control over Tibet. The island of Taiwan, some one hundred sea miles from mainland China, would pose a constant threat if it were controlled by an unfriendly power; the island’s strategic importance meant that Beijing could not afford to ignore it.38 Third, the PRC sought to become one of the world’s great powers, to guarantee its right to be consulted on the main international issues, particularly those concerning East Asia and general disarmament.41

In fact, being imbued with the “Middle Kingdom complex,”42 and affected by the humiliations that China suffered in the past 150 years, Beijing was very concerned about remaining “large and powerful.” An academic from New Delhi commented: There is no other country in the world that is so obsessed with its own grandeur. The status of a power is the primordial concern of the Beijing regime.43

The PRC adopted strategies that were the corollaries of the above.44 First, it sought recognition by the international community as a world power, while employing all means at its disposal to isolate the ROC. In 1955, for instance, during the Bandung Conference in Indonesia, attended by 29 African and Asian countries, the PRC set out to court the Third World. Foreign Minister ZHOU Enlai convinced several African countries of China’s respect for the 10 principles of Bandung, five of which later became the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence”: mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-aggression, non-intervention in internal affairs, respect for mutual equality and reciprocal benefit, and peace-

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38. Taiwan is situated in an area pivotal to the regions of Southeast and Northeast Asia. During the Second World War, Japan used Taiwan as its forward base of operations to launch military attacks against southern China and southeast Asia. See Vidya Prakash Dutt, *China and the World. An Analysis of Communist’s China Foreign Policy*, New York: Praeger, 1966, pp. 24-25.


42. From time immemorial, the Chinese have believed that they were the political, social and economic center of the world. And this idea has been institutionalized and preserved almost as an official State myth for more than two thousand years. See Mueller and Ross, *op. cit.*, pp. 7-8.

43. Dutt, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

ful coexistence.\textsuperscript{45} This helped Beijing gain the sympathy of developing nations, especially former European colonies eager for relations of equality and dignity with an emerging world power.

Second, Beijing sought the review or re-negotiation of unfair agreements signed by previous governments in order to recover territories lost to foreign powers. A great deal of effort was expended in this respect; Beijing had even reached some degree of understanding with the USSR, although much remained to be done.

Third, the PRC regards the territorial re-incorporation of Taiwan as one of the greatest challenges of its foreign policy. After failing to achieve this objective by military means in the 1950s and 1960s, Beijing changed its strategy and began to employ diplomacy to erect a diplomatic fence around Taiwan to press for its surrender. In its negotiations with Canada to establish diplomatic relations, at the end of 1970, the PRC began to demand that all countries wishing to establish official relations should accept three conditions:

1) Recognize that there is only one China;
2) Recognize the government of the People’s Republic of China as the only legitimate government of China;
3) Recognize Taiwan as an inalienable part of China’s territory.

Although the great majority of countries that currently maintain diplomatic relations with Beijing have accepted the first two conditions, only the following nations have expressly recognized the third: Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Botswana, Lesotho, the Maldives and Portugal.\textsuperscript{46}

As for the ROC’s foreign policy, its principles are contained in Article 141 of the Constitution of 1947:

\textit{The foreign policy of the Republic of China shall be conceived in a spirit of independence and self-reliance and based on the principles of equality and reciprocity to promote friendly relations with other nations and abide by treaties and the Charter of the United Nations so as to protect the rights and interests of Chinese citizens residing


\textsuperscript{46} Hungdah Chiu, “Special State-State relations and the question of national unification,” \textit{United Daily} (Taipei), 13/7/1999, p. 15.
abroad, foster international cooperation, advance international justice, and insure world peace.47

After its military defeat and loss of territory on mainland China, resulting in its flight to Taiwan, the nationalist government found it difficult to maintain its autonomy as it would have wished. Nevertheless, there is evident exaggeration in what Chile’s charge d’affaires in Taipei conveyed to the Santiago government: “Nothing is done or undone unless the order comes from the United States embassy.”48 CHIANG Kai-shek stated in those years:

We must still resolve the problem of China by relying on our own strength; we will not allow the future of the Nation and the destiny of our people to rest with the vicissitudes of the international situation.49

His opinions revealed a profound mistrust of external factors, which called for an independent foreign policy. Then-foreign minister SHEN Chang-huan, following these instructions, outlined foreign policy objectives:

1) To consolidate the status of the ROC in the United Nations and prevent the entry of the PRC;
2) To improve relations with the United States in order to obtain greater military and economic assistance;
3) To urge those democratic countries with which the ROC maintains diplomatic relations to send their diplomats and establish their missions in Taiwan, preventing their recognition of the PRC;
4) To oppose the “international intrigue” aimed at creating “two Chinas,” and break off diplomatic relations with the countries that establish relations with the PRC.50

48. Marcial Rivera Marambio said: “... their attitude (the Americans) is that of lord and master ... the aid they grant to Taiwan is three times greater than that for Latin America as a whole ... for them, we Latin Americans only represent a vote in the UN ...” It is clear that, aside from a markedly “anti-gringo” tone, Rivera conveyed incorrect information. While the ROC received US$1,465.4 million between 1951 and 1965 (14 years), during the Frei government (1964-70) Chile received US$836.60 million in economic and military aid. Heraldo Muñoz, Las relaciones exteriores del gobierno militar Chileno, Santiago (Chile): U. de Chile, 1981, p. 33. See AGMRE, vol. China 1967, Confidential RIO 207/11, 20/10/1967, EmbaChile Taipei to MRE. Neil H. Jacoby, U. S. Aid to Taiwan, New York: Praeger, 1966, p. 40. Cited by Kao, op. cit., pp. 248-249.
50. Speech by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, SHEN Chan-huan at the National Defense Institute, 30/4/1964. Cited by Kao, op. cit., p. 28.
Walter Sánchez noted that prior to 1970 Latin America was not a strategic priority for the PRC. Between 1949 and 1960, few contacts took place, except for some activities within the context of Beijing's "cultural diplomacy." After the great schism between the PRC and the USSR, Beijing's two main foreign policy objectives were to neutralize Moscow internationally and isolate Taipei in the region. The PRC did believe that Latin America could be useful to its "anti-imperialist" and "anti-colonial" struggle against Washington, given U.S. dependence on Latin American natural resources and the region's presumed anti-American sentiments as a result of the Monroe Doctrine. But these considerations paled beside the goal of achieving diplomatic recognition and support to acquire a seat at the UN.

During the 1950s and 1960s, communist China was unable to wage a major diplomatic offensive in Latin America because of the Cold War; its actions were limited to cultural exchanges and radio propaganda.

The PRC invited representatives of Latin America's communist parties, including Chile's to the October 1952 Asia-Pacific Peace Conference, which was held in Beijing. In that same year, the Chilean-Chinese Cultural Institute (ICCC) was founded—the first in Latin America. Until 1970, "cultural institutes" or "friendship associations" were the main expression of the PRC's presence in the region. As Fernández Larrain noted,

51. Beginning in 1951, the PRC launched a massive "cultural diplomacy" program, inviting between 75,000 and 100,000 foreigners to visit mainland China, and half that number of Chinese communists went abroad, in both cases with the aim of promoting Chinese policy and its position in the world. Because of its organizational capacity, the PRC was fairly successful in its objectives. Latin America had less participation in this, though a certain number of leaders also went to Beijing. See Herbert Passin, China's Cultural Diplomacy, London: The China Quarterly, 1962, pp. 1-2, 9.


56. National Security Council, Zhong Gong Zai Zhong Nan Mei Zhou Kuo Zhang Zh Tan Tau (Study on the expansion of Communist China in Central and South
. . . these entities, created for cultural, scientific, and artistic purposes, have captured the support of many elements extraneous to communist ideology. It goes without saying that in all of them communism—in the final analysis, their creator—has loyal militants and activists.57

From 1957, the PRC began producing radio propaganda in Spanish, and from 1961 also in Portuguese. During the same period, several offices of the “Xin Hua” News Agency were established in the region.58 Magazines such as Revista de Beijing [Beijing Review], Ciencia China [Chinese Science] and Mujer China [Chinese Woman] began circulating at very low prices. A Chinese opera group gave performances in 1956; in 1959, a Chinese acrobatic group toured the region for 10 months. Chinese union representatives participated in congresses in Cuba, Chile and, in late 1959, Uruguay.59

Such isolated incursions aside, Taiwan’s nimble diplomacy and the better training of its diplomats—one-third of whose Heads of Mission held doctorates—secured greater success for the Island government.60 For a long time, many Latin American nations maintained diplomatic ties with Taipei. From 1957 to 1960, Taipei maintained diplomatic relations with all 20 countries of the region. It was not until 1960 that Fidel Castro’s Cuba established relations with Beijing, the first Latin American country to do so. Such was the status quo until early 1971, when Allende’s Chile followed suit.61

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57. Fernandez, op. cit., p. 78.
60. Klein, op. cit., p. 103. In the case of the mission in Chile, of the seven Heads of Mission between 1945 and 1970, six held doctorates: four from universities in the United States, one from Great Britain and one on whom we do not yet have information.
Table II. Diplomatic relations between China and Latin American countries (1950-1971)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total No. of countries</th>
<th>With the ROC</th>
<th>With the PRC</th>
<th>Without relations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950-55</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957-59</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: KAO Lang, op. cit., pp. 70-71.*

III. THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA'S OFFENSIVE IN CHILE (1951-1965)

1. Cultural Diplomacy

In 1950, the People's Republic of China launched a cultural offensive abroad with the establishment of the Chinese People's Association for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries. The PRC's cultural diplomacy in Chile began in 1951 with an invitation to Pablo Neruda, the renowned poet and member of the Communist Party of Chile, which strongly supported the PRC prior to the rift between Beijing and Moscow in the 1960s. Neruda was invited on a tour by the two Communist giants, and his visit to mainland China coincided with the second anniversary of the Beijing government. On the eve of his departure from China to Moscow, Neruda delivered a farewell speech:

. . . The reason (Latin) American governments, manipulated by the imperialists, cannot provisionally establish diplomatic relations with this great Nation, is due to their intention of isolating the People's Republic of China, preventing it from establishing commercial ties so that our countries will have no other alternative than to depend on the North Americans. . .

Neruda's visit boosted cultural contacts between Chile and the PRC. The founding of the ICCC in Santiago at the Hotel Crillon on

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1 October 1952 coincided with the third anniversary of the PRC. The Institute was the first of its kind in Latin America.

The following year, the PRC sent a delegation to Santiago to participate in the Continental Cultural Congress, held between 26 April and 2 May of 1953—Beijing's first mission to the region since the founding of the People's Republic. The delegation consisted of the economist LEE I-mang, the philologist CHENG Ting-ming, and an interpreter, CHENG Kuang.64 In 1954, several Beijing intellectuals visited Chile to celebrate Neruda's fiftieth birthday, including Emi Siao, CHEN Yung-i, AI Ching and MING Chao.65 The Sino-Latin-American Friendship Association was established in 1960 "for the purpose of fostering relations, promoting understanding and friendship with the peoples of Latin America, and paving the way for future official relations."66

This Institute was founded by members or sympathizers of Chile's left-wing parties and several pro-Beijing Chinese residents. It played a significant role in the absence of an official PRC mission to Santiago prior to 1961.67 Several of the institute's founding members were prominent cultural, artistic and political figures. Aside from Pablo Neruda, they included Senator Salvador Allende, Deputy Clodomiro Almeida, former Vice-president Guillermo del Pedregal, the novelist Luis Durand, the poet Pablo de Rokha, and the painter Jose Venturelli, as well as members of the Chinese community. On this occasion, Neruda recited his poem "El viento en el Asia" ("The Wind in Asia"), a tribute to China's Communist revolution. Records of Chinese music sent from Beijing were played, including "The Chinese Workers' March," "the Liberation March" and a choir that performed the piece "Joy in the Heart."68 A few days later, Venturelli organized an event at the University of Chile. These activities were criticized by the Santiago daily paper El Mercurio, which noted that the Institute was not a legally consti-

64. Fernandez Larrain, op. cit., p. 101.
65. Ibid.
tuted body and accused it of engaging in political propaganda cam-
ouflaged as culture.69

In 1954, Allende himself assumed the presidency of the Institu-
teh and, henceforward, on several occasions, expressed his in-
tention to establish diplomatic relations with Beijing if he were elected
President of Chile.70

Venturelli was invited to China by the Beijing government,
where he spent two years getting treated for lung disease. Before
his departure, he told the Communist Party daily El Siglo that Chile
should establish diplomatic relations with the PRC, that Beijing de-
served a seat at the UN, and that Chile should help it achieve these
goals. The ROC embassy reported these comments to Taipei,
though it considered that the artist's opinions were not widely held
in China.71 While in the PRC, Venturelli belonged to the so-called
"Foreign Resident Corps," established by the communist authori-
ties to attend to foreign visitors at important events.72

Another member of the Institute also gave his firm support to
Beijing: Guillermo Del Pedregal, a former Interior Minister and
Vice-president of Chile during the two administrations of Carlos
Ibañez. In 1957 he told El Siglo that Chile should establish com-
mercial ties with the PRC, a country of 600 million inhabitants.73 In
June 1959, he visited Beijing at the invitation of the communist gov-
ernment, and on his return expressed the view that Chile should sell
salt peter (salitre) and copper to the People's Republic of China in
exchange for its tea, edible oil, chemical products and sewing ma-
machines. He also suggested student exchanges as a way to forge cul-
tural ties,74 an idea that was put into practice the following year by
the president of the University of Chile, Juan Gomez Millas. In

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70. AMOFA, vol. 505.1 (2), Telegrams, 321, 26/6/1958 & 323, 15/7/1958 EmbaChina to MOFA. Also De la Fuente, op. cit., p. 31. The embassy reported that it had obtained
a promise from the Chilean authorities that the Institute would not be granted legal
status, and that they would express their position on this matter in the media. However,
no such documents have been found, which raises questions about the credibility of this
version. See Of. unsigned, 6/7/1956, EmbaChina Santiago to MOFA.
71. El Siglo, 12/1/1956. See AMOFA, vol. 505.1. (1). According to De la Fuente,
Venturelli was a true master of color and form; his work was certainly painting without
borders. Neruda commented: "Venturelli added his moving engravings to my poems,"
see De la Fuente, op. cit., pp. 25-26, 32.
72. Chin-ha Suk, op. cit., p. 111.
73. RRDNC, No. 3425, 15/11/1957.
74. El Siglo, 3/7/1059, p. 5; La Nación, 12/7/1959.
1964, at a celebration of the PRC's fifteenth anniversary held at the Teatro Baquedano, Del Pedregal called for establishing diplomatic relations with Beijing, while Almeyda stated that Chile should establish a communist regime as the PRC had done.\textsuperscript{75} The following year, Del Pedregal told \textit{El Mercurio} that Chile should open a trade office in Beijing, since the PRC had already opened its office in Santiago. The fact that no country would help the PRC, he added, might exacerbate its nationalism, with dangerous consequences.\textsuperscript{76} This idea later would be used as an argument by Foreign Minister Gabriel Valdes, starting in 1965, to support Beijing's entry into the UN. The Allende government also used this argument in 1970 to establish relations with the PRC.

Some Chinese residents were among the directors of the ICCC. The first Board included Ricardo Chansan, vice-president; Wladimir Chi, treasurer; and Enrique Kong, Antonio Yi, Antonio Chan, Gilberto Bockfang and Lorenzo Yong.\textsuperscript{77} Prior to the founding of the PRC in 1949, relative harmony had prevailed among the Chinese colony in Chile, since its members were originally from Canton (Guangdong), and many of them, if not relatives, had been neighbors or at least fellow countrymen. After 1949, a rift began to emerge that would widen over time. In fact, after the "division" of China, many Chinese residents in Chile lost their patriotic fervor for the Republic of China. It was especially difficult for those who had family members or relatives on mainland China to express a preference for Nationalist China, founded by their fellow Cantonese, Dr. SUN Yat-sen, but whose government was now headquartered in Taiwan. As a result of this, they gradually lost interest and became indifferent towards the China issue.\textsuperscript{78}

The Institute's activities were of deep concern to the ROC embassy, which asked the Chilean government to intervene. However, when the embassy sent an official letter denouncing the Institute's activities to the Investigative Police without previously consulting the Chilean Foreign Ministry, the latter reacted with annoyance:

\ldots the existence of that group of persons remains subject to the exclusive vigilance and control of national legislation, without any interference from another country.\ldots. The

\textsuperscript{75} AMOFA, vol. Of. 270, 16/11/1964, EmbaChina to MOFA.
\textsuperscript{76} El Mercurio and El Siglo, both 9/6/1965.
\textsuperscript{77} De la Fuente, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 14.
\textsuperscript{78} AMOFA, 561 (3), Report for the month of December 1966, EmbaChina Santiago to MOFA.
Foreign Ministry does not recognize the so-called “Chilean-Chinese Cultural Institute.”

It is clear that Chilean Foreign Ministry was upset by the embassy's action, which implied an “interference” in its internal affairs—another sign of the great importance that Chile attaches to the principle of non-intervention.

The Taipei embassy was disturbed by the Institute’s numerous activities. Its concern is evident in two notes dated 1957. One informed the Chilean Foreign Ministry that a clandestine organization was intending to celebrate the anniversary of China's communist regime, which might confuse public opinion. It reiterated that this was “a rebel regime condemned by the UN as an aggressor; [which] is not recognized by the government of Chile.” The second letter expressed concern at the news published in El Siglo, emphasizing that “such manifestations may be construed as support for a regime in rebellion against a country that is a friend of Chile’s.” It asked the Foreign Ministry to have the situation corrected. However, it appears that there was no response.

Prior to the establishment of the PRC's trade office in Santiago in 1965, the Institute acted as a “liaison office” between Beijing and Santiago. In 1957, the Institute and several Chilean parliamentarians arranged contacts for the visit of a PRC trade mission to Chile.

Every year, the ICCC celebrated the PRC's anniversary by inviting numerous personalities to mark the event, and used the occasion to make political propaganda. At first, the meetings were held at the Teatro Baquedano on the eve of the anniversary; from 1957, celebrations took place on 1 October in the Honor Hall of the University of Chile and, from 1959, at the Teatro Caupolicán. Parliamentarians of the left-wing parties, such as the Communist Party, the Socialist Party and the Radical Party, were invited to the celebrations. From 1953, the ICCC also organized near-annual exhibitions and film screenings until 1965, when the PRC's trade office was opened in Santiago and took over these activities.

On 29 September 1963, for instance, some 700 people gathered at the Teatro Baquedano to hear Pablo Neruda read another poem in praise of the Chinese revolution. On 1 October, more than 500 people attended a ceremony at the University of Chile where the
Institute’s president, Lautaro Yankas, expressed the need to “restore” its UN seat to the PRC.\textsuperscript{82} The fact that two meetings were held that year was due to a conflict between the PS and the PC, resulting from the schism between Beijing and Moscow. The Central Committee of the PS warned its militants not to attend any meetings in honor of Beijing’s anniversary, but Senator Alejandro Chelen and Deputy Clodomiro Almeyda ignored the ban. In addition, the PC’s secretary general, Luis Corvalan, delivered a speech near the Teatro Baquedano with the aim of neutralizing the effects of the pro-Beijing meeting. As a result of this brouhaha, seven PS members were expelled.\textsuperscript{83}

On behalf of the Beijing government, the ICCC also issued invitations to visit China to leaders of all sectors in Chile. The most important of these visits was the delegation headed by Salvador Allende and his wife, together with Venturelli and others, in October 1954. During their visit, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister ZHOU Enlai said that China was interested in acquiring copper and saltpeter from Chile.\textsuperscript{84} However, no information in this regard has been found in the archives of Taipei. It appears that the ROC embassy did not inform its government of the matter—if true, a case of grave negligence.

The ICCC even served as a channel to send donations to the Chilean government. Following the earthquake of March 1960 in Chile, the Institute handed over £6,673 (pounds sterling) on behalf of a theater group, as well as U.S.$4,800, disbursed by a Beijing mining company to the Chilean government.\textsuperscript{85}

In October 1956, a performance by Beijing’s Chinese Opera Group at the Municipal Theater of Santiago caused major diplomatic frictions between the ROC embassy and the Foreign Ministry of Chile. The government of Taipei was unable to prevent the arrival and presentation of that group, despite support from Washington and the Vatican.

Although the Chilean government did not always accede to requests by the embassy of Taipei, it sometimes addressed its concerns. In May 1964, the Chilean Foreign Ministry refused to allow the entry of a basketball team from Beijing, perhaps to avoid upset-

\textsuperscript{82} The use of the word “restore” was incorrect, since Communist China never occupied that seat. Regarding the celebration, see \textit{Peking NCNA in English}, 2/10/1963.
\textsuperscript{84} De la Fuente, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 30.
\textsuperscript{85} \textit{AMOFA}, vol. 505.1 (3), Of. 107, 1/4/1965, EmbaChina Santiago to MOFA.
Diplomatic War Between Beijing & Taipei in Chile

...ting Taipei any further while the PRC was holding its first trade exhibition in Santiago.\textsuperscript{86} In October 1965, the Chilean government refused once again to grant visas to a group of artists from Beijing in response to several requests by the embassy of Taipei, even though Beijing had already donated more than U.S. $60,000 in disaster relief after the earthquake.\textsuperscript{87}

In March 1960, the president of the University of Chile, Juan Gomez Millas,\textsuperscript{88} visited the PRC, the USSR, India and Japan in the company of two colleagues.\textsuperscript{89} Given the importance of that visit, the U.S. government suggested to Taipei that it should invite Gomez Millas to visit Taiwan after his tour of mainland China. The ROC embassy in Santiago supported the idea, but acted too late.\textsuperscript{90} Gomez Millas' visit had a very unfavorable effect for Taipei. During his stay, the president offered three scholarships to Chinese students in Beijing to study in Chile. The exchange contributed considerably to the rapprochement between the two countries during the students' three-year stay in Santiago.

LIU Hsiao-pei,\textsuperscript{91} CHOU Keng-chang, and WU Shou-lin arrived in June 1960; the latter was summoned back to Beijing shortly after his arrival and was replaced by TONG Yuan-chin. All were assistants at the Beijing Institute of Foreign Languages and already had a good command of Spanish. They registered at the Pedagogic Institute of the University of Chile. During their stay they organ-

\textsuperscript{86} AGMRE, vol. China 1956-1964, Aide Memoire No. 22104, EmbaChina Santiago to the MRE.

\textsuperscript{87} AMOFA, vol. 505.1 (3), Of. 397, 15/10/1965; AGMRE, vol. China 1965, Note 14235, MRE to EmbaChina, and note M65/45, 8/10/1965 from EmbaChina thanking the MRE.

\textsuperscript{88} According to the renowned Chilean historian Ricardo Krebs, Juan Gomez Millas was a prominent historian of the second half of the 20th century of Chile, one of the central figures of the Pedagogic Institute of the U. of Chile. Ricardo Krebs W., Vivir lo que tiene más vida, Santiago (Chile): Ed. U. Católica de Chile, 1998, p.100.

\textsuperscript{89} Two colleagues of theirs were Francisco Walker Linares, president of the Chilean Commission for Intellectual Cooperation and a professor of the University of Chile, Stitchkin Oyarzun, as well as the Liberal Deputy Jorge Errázuriz.

\textsuperscript{90} AMOFA, vol. 505.1 (1), Of. 65, 16/3/1960; Telegrams 873, 25/3/1960; 441, 30/3/1960, EmbaChina Santiago to MOFA.

\textsuperscript{91} Subsequently, Liu became a teacher. He served as associate professor and dean of the Faculty of Spanish of the Foreign Languages Institute of Beijing. In his article “I remember my Chilean friends," he recalled "...they helped me constantly, both inside and outside the university... How sweet it is to relive the days spent in that far away and affectionate land!" in LUO Xianru et al. China y América Latina, un mismo destino (China and Latin America, a common destiny), Beijing: Great Wall Books, 1984, p. 19. In his article “Nostalgia for a faraway but affectionate land,” also recalled his stay with pleasure. Revista China Hoy, November 1990. See De la Fuente, op. cit., p. 100.
ized many political activities, at first on their own, later under LEE Yen Nien after his arrival in June 1961. [HS] This is about trade, not culture.

Invoking the principle of the “universalization” of foreign policy, “determined only by national interests and removed from ideological frameworks,” the Chilean government authorized the opening of China’s Trade Mission in Santiago in October 1961.92 At the time, neither Taipei, which still maintained its embassy in Santiago, nor Beijing, which took advantage of the Radical Party’s leftist tendencies, especially those of Foreign Minister Carlos Martinez, regarded LEE Yen Nien, nominally press officer of the Chinese Council for the Promotion of International Trade, as a PRC representative.

In May 1963, the Chinese students were surprised by the police as they distributed anti-Soviet leaflets, and would have been expelled had it not been for the intervention of Senator Angel Faivovich, Deputy Juan Martinez Camps, and Gomez Millás himself, then Minister of Education.93 The matter was widely discussed in the press.94 Finally, the administrative measure dictated by Interior Minister Sotero del Rio was suspended thanks to the good offices of these politicians. An officer of the Investigative Police confided to the embassy of Taipei that his office was unable to deal with the case as it would have wished because it lacked the necessary autonomy.95

Beijing’s cultural offensive was not always successful. After a visit to mainland China in October 1959, the Chairman of the Chamber of Deputies’ Foreign Relations Committee, Jorge Errázuriz Echenique, of the Liberal Party remarked that “Communism has annulled the personality of the citizens throughout mainland China . . . There is no possibility of relations with that country. [That country] has nothing to offer.”96 Two years later, Maximo Pacheco, a Law professor at the University of Chile, after a visit to Beijing, thought that the people’s living conditions were very poor. He noted that the situation of the Catholic Church in

92. See the speech “The foreign policy of President Alessandri,” in Carlos Martinez Sotomayor, Reflexiones y Testimonios Políticos. Santiago (Chile): CIDEI, 1987, pp. 119-123.
93. AMOFA, 505.1 (2), Of. 105, 16/5/1963, EmbaChina Santiago to MOFA.
94. El Diario Ilustrado, 12/5; El Mercurio, 13/5; La Nación, 14/5, all from 1963.
95. AMOFA, 505.1 (2), Of. 116, 2/5/1963, EmbaChina Santiago to MOFA.
96. La Nación, 1/12/1959; El Diario Ilustrado, 1/12/1959; El Mercurio, 1/12/1959. For the list of the delegation, see De la Fuente, op. cit., p. 41.
China had been the most dramatic in the world. Many bishops had been imprisoned or persecuted, and there was no possibility of criticizing or opposing the communist regime, which had denied men the right to freely build their destiny.  

2. Commercial Diplomacy

According to Walter Sánchez, after efforts to achieve a rapprochement during the 1950s, especially on the part of the government of Beijing, Latin America and the PRC recognized that cultural diplomacy was not enough and began to develop economic relations as another way to advance toward their goal of establishing diplomatic relations. Although it was several years before the first results were seen, Sánchez commented that Chile’s case may have been “the first in the region.”

In October 1952, a company from the PRC signed a trade agreement with a private Chilean body, the first with a Latin American country. By 1955, it was already rumored that Chile was selling saltpeter to Beijing. Taipei expressed its deep concern to the Chilean government, which gave assurances that President Carlos Ibáñez would not change his firm anticomunist position.

Given that trade between Chile and Taiwan was very limited after 1949, and Chile always suffered a deficit, the Chilean Foreign Minister, Osvaldo Saint-Marie, decided to visit Taiwan in April 1957 to remedy the situation. Saint-Marie was the first and also the last Chilean Foreign Minister to visit the ROC prior to 1971.

On arrival in Taipei, he announced that the main purpose of his visit was trade. In conversations with his counterpart, George Yeh, he expressed the hope that both nations might develop trade links on the basis of cordial diplomatic relations. The Chilean Foreign Minister repeatedly expressed his interest in increasing sales of Chilean products to Taiwan to improve the balance of trade; he mentioned the possibility of selling saltpeter, copper, steel and other products. He also mentioned his interest in importing raw sugar and tea from Taiwan, and the need to establish regular ship-

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99. *AMOFa*, vol. 501. 2, Telegram 166, 14/9/1955, EmbaChina Santiago to MOFA.
100. Between 1949, the year when the ROC government moved to Taiwan, and 1956, (except for 1952), Chile suffered a deficit in its trade with Taiwan.
ping between both countries. This official visit generated great interest in the Santiago press because of expectations of increased trade. The Chilean press gave much coverage to the activities of the Foreign Minister in Taiwan. But although the Foreign Minister himself publicly expressed optimism over future trade through the exchange of the aforementioned Chilean and Taiwanese products, he did not get a sufficiently encouraging response from Taipei, even though his reception had been warm and cordial.

As a result of the apparently meager outcome of this official visit, Chile began to change its policy towards Beijing and Taipei. In July 1957, a friend of Foreign Minister Saint-Marie, Fernando Canessa, sent him a confidential note with an attached memorandum describing prices and conditions for the sale of saltpeter to mainland China. The Corporación de Ventas del Salitre y Yodo (COVENSA, Corporation for the Sale of Saltpeter and Iodine) informed the Minister of Mines of efforts by its representatives in Japan to sell saltpeter to the Mainland, given that Beijing had entered the fertilizer market at that time, and described the difficulties that prevented them from satisfying Beijing's conditions. In September, a PRC mission traveled to Chile to assess the possibilities for trade between the two nations. The delegation expressed interest in acquiring copper, saltpeter and manufactured goods through barter or purchase in dollars. Despite the significance of this mission, it appears that the embassy of the ROC neglected to inform Taipei of its presence.

105. The government of Taipei sent several combat planes to escort the plane carrying the Chilean Foreign Minister. In addition to a prolonged audience with CHIANG Kai-shek and Madame Chiang, he was invited to witness military maneuvers.
106. The Chilean party later reported that Taiwan already had a factory of synthetic fertilizers, and even had sufficient production capacity for export. With respect to the sugar required by Chile, Taiwan could not supply this since there was too much demand for it abroad.
108. De la Fuente, op. cit., p. 35.
In March 1958, a Chilean general consulate was opened in Hong Kong, since, according to the Foreign Ministry of Chile, that port was

*The most active trade center in the Far East, for which reason the government of Chile decided to open (the consulate) so that it may serve as a serious and stable base for eventual transactions of basic Chilean products.*\(^{109}\)

Despite the Chilean government’s statement, the U.S. State Department felt that its real intention was to promote trade with Beijing and issued a warning to Taipei. The ROC embassy in Santiago relayed a similar opinion to its government after talks between its chargé d’affaires and the Chilean Foreign Minister, though it added that President Alessandri had expressed little interest in trading with communist countries and said that Chile’s anti-communist policy would not undergo any change.\(^{110}\) Despite these statements, the ROC’s general consulate in Hong Kong reported frequent contacts between the consul general of Chile, Francisco Jose Oyarzun, and individuals and traders sympathetic to Beijing, and added that U.S. agents watched them closely.\(^{111}\)

Oyarzun paid close attention to PRC activities. In December 1958, he conveyed to Santiago the opinions of several American academics who supported establishing trade links with Beijing, expressing his agreement and urging his government to carefully consider the matter.\(^{112}\) Furthermore, he observed and analyzed the political situation in Beijing and its relations with other countries, and informed his Ministry with such extraordinary frequency on political affairs that he gave the impression of being a political counselor rather than a consul general.\(^{113}\)

With the decline of Chilean exports, President Alessandri advocated free trade from the start of his administration. His speech to Congress on this matter in May 1959 awoke the keen interest of

\(^{109}\) *MMRE* 1958 (1), p. 75.

\(^{110}\) *AMOFA*, vol. 510.3, Telegram 500, 25/11/1958, EmbaChina Santiago to MOFA.

\(^{111}\) *AMOFA*, vol. 501.2, Of. unsigned, 5/5/1959, ROC consulate general in HK to MOFA.


\(^{113}\) *AGMRE*, vol. 5649. In 1960, he sent reports to Santiago with such headings as “On the first ten years of Beijing's new regime,” “Friendship and Border Treaty between China and Burma,” “Sino-Soviet Relations,” “Difference in Sino-Soviet doctrines,” “Political affairs: Sino-Cuban accord,” “Diplomatic and consular corps in Mainland China,” and “Chou Enlai clarifies China's foreign policy” on trade relations between Beijing and other countries.
several left-wing leaders. Senator Angel Faivovich of the Radical Party and Guillermo del Pedregal visited Moscow and Beijing in June and July, respectively, and upon their return stressed the importance of establishing commercial ties with the two communist giants. Months later, the political and economic pressures to trade with the communist countries increased. The Chilean ambassador in Washington, Walter Müller, confirmed these pressures. In October, the United States embassy in Taipei informed the Foreign Ministry of Taipei of this situation, and stated that although President Alessandri had already decided to send a trade mission to Beijing, the U.S. ambassador in Santiago had advised him not to go about lightly establishing trade links with Beijing. The Foreign Ministry of Taipei attached great importance to this news, and passed it on to the Presidential Office.

In fact, in March 1959, the Chilean general consulate in Hong Kong had informed Santiago of the Bank of China’s keen interest in buying 30,000 tons of Chilean saltpeter through COVENSA, in exchange for Chinese tea or rice. Consul general Oyarzun showed similar enthusiasm for this operation and asked Santiago to send the most favorable estimate possible “in order to ensure potentially significant volumes of trade.”

The Bank of China told Oyarzun that Canada already had offered China synthetic nitrate under exceptionally favorable terms, but that the Chilean offer remained a priority for Beijing. In addition, it offered to pay in transferable pounds sterling and other favorable terms. Oyarzun therefore sent cables on repeated occasions urging a response from his Ministry, to “avoid loss [of] efforts made to date [in] opening the Asian market whose access is China.” Finally, the Chinese side revealed its true intention: to invite the Chilean consul to Beijing to discuss practical steps for a

114. Americo Castro said that Alessandri asked Congress to give him dictatorial powers to freely manage the economy for one year, a request that was granted. A. Castro, Iberoamérica. Su historia y su cultura, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1971, p. 140.
118. Id., Telegram 4, 21/5/1959; Telegram 6, 2/6/1959; Telegram 8, 19/6/1959; Telegram 9, 29/6/1959.
greater commercial exchange. However, it appears that the consul did not travel there, nor did this plan fully materialize.\textsuperscript{119}

In 1960, Beijing proposed organizing an exhibition of Chinese crafts and industrial products in Chile to commemorate the latter's 150th anniversary of national independence. To help the project materialize, Beijing's representative in Hong Kong told Consul General Oyarzún that the samples would be adjusted to the requirements of the [Chilean] authorities.\textsuperscript{120} The Chilean Foreign Ministry consulted the Interior Ministry, which replied that "in principle there would be no difficulty in agreeing to the request," and therefore a bill was sent to Congress.\textsuperscript{121}

Although the 1959 operation did not fully succeed, consul general Oyarzun proposed in 1960 a triangular trade between the PRC, Chile and Europe. The idea was to sell saltpeter to mainland China while promising to buy, for equivalent sums, tea, clothing and cotton textiles that a European consortium would then purchase against an open credit for machinery or products that might interest Chile. Beijing accepted this as a favor to Santiago.\textsuperscript{122} In 1960, Oyarzún informed his Ministry of the large imports of fertilizer purchased by the PRC in 1958 and 1959, of which Chilean saltpeter only represented a meager percentage (see Table III). This aroused great interest in Chile, as proven by the posture of the government regarding the visit of a PRC trade delegation on a tour of Latin America at the beginning of 1961.

On a visit to Brazil, a trade delegation headed by NAN Hanchen,\textsuperscript{123} Chairman of the Chinese Council for the Promotion of International Trade, learned of the good will expressed by Foreign Minister Enrique Ortuzar, who had said that if the Chinese delegation should wish to visit Chile he would provide the necessary facilities.\textsuperscript{124} Highly alarmed, the Foreign Ministry of Taipei issued

\textsuperscript{119} Id, Telegram 10, 14/7/1959.
\textsuperscript{120} AGMRE, vol. 5649, Of. No. 18/5, 13/1/1960.
\textsuperscript{121} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{122} Id, Of. No. 146/33, 24/3/1960. In 1959, a shipment of 10,000 tons of saltpeter was delivered to China in a similar operation, for which Chile requested 18,000 pounds of tea, about 2% of the total operation.
\textsuperscript{123} He was mayor in the province of He Nan; President of the Chinese People's Bank; President of the Bank of China; President of the Chinese Council for the Promotion of International Trade; permanent member of the People's Assembly of the People's Republic of China. This Council sent its representatives to Chile prior to establishing diplomatic relations. SHAU Yen-miau, Xin Hai Yi Lai De Ren Wu (Celebrities from the 1911 Revolution), Jiansu (PRC): Jiansu Education Ed., 1993, p. 734.
\textsuperscript{124} The China News (Taipei), 13/5/1961, p. 3.
### Table III. Imports of Fertilizers by the People’s Republic of China (1958-1959)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of origin</th>
<th>Amount (tons)</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>500,000</td>
<td>1959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>356,238</td>
<td>1959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>327,713</td>
<td>1959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>313,393</td>
<td>1958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Germany</td>
<td>128,108</td>
<td>1958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>118,396</td>
<td>1959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holland</td>
<td>93,123</td>
<td>1959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>15,400</td>
<td>1958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>10,100</td>
<td>1959</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: *AGMRE*, vol. 5649, official letter 288/44, 23/5/1960, Consulate General of Chile in HK to MRE.

instructions to its embassy in Washington to seek help from the United States to prevent the visit. However, the State Department considered that, due to the pressures exercised by Chile’s opposition, U.S. intervention would be counterproductive. The Beijing delegation’s visit in May 1961 was “low profile,” but it planted a seed that would later bear the fruits Beijing had long hoped for.

A member of that delegation, LEE Yen Nien, returned to Chile clandestinely the following June, thanks to the intervention of Senator Faivovich and with the consent of Foreign Minister Ortuzar. He obtained a temporary residence permit for one year to conduct a “market study,” and worked as Press Director of the Chinese Council for the Promotion of International Trade. The embassy of Taipei warned its government that commercial ties were already being forged between Beijing and Santiago and there was even the possibility of a bilateral trade and cultural agreement. In fact, this trend was now uncontrollable, especially after the new Radical Party Foreign Minister, Carlos Martinez Sotomayor, as-

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126. *Id*, Telegram 668, 16/5/1961, EmbaChina Washington to MOFA.
127. We have found no information about this visit. We believe that, had there been significant activities, the propaganda organs of the PRC would have given broad coverage to these events, as usual.
128. *AMOFA*, vol. 505.24(2), Telegram 581, 30/8/1961, EmbaChina Santiago to MOFA.
sumed his post, and his party had adopted a resolution in January
1961 to support the entry of mainland China to the UN and estab-
lish diplomatic relations with all the countries of the world.129

Lee was not the only trade official of a communist country.
The USSR and several Eastern European countries also sent their
representatives to Santiago. It was a sign of the importance that the
Chilean government attached to foreign trade, and of its policy of
separating commerce from international politics. Although Lee did
not make much progress in his "studies," he did make contacts with
various sectors and instructed the three Chinese students at the
University of Chile and several pro-Beijing Chinese residents to or-
ganize political activities in pursuit of the ultimate and true objec-
tive: diplomatic relations.130

Until 1960, trade between Chile and the PRC had been very
limited. By contrast, the volume of trade between Chile and Taiwan
was much greater, as shown in the following tables on trade with
both countries. However, Chile had growing expectations for its
commercial relations with the PRC. This may have been due to
Beijing's active propaganda and the constant flow of information
sent by Chile's consulate general in Hong Kong, while there was
virtually no commercial information on Taiwan since there was no
Chilean mission there, despite the fact that the ROC had always
maintained its mission in Chile. Interest in mainland China was re-
lated to the size of its market, inducing many other countries to
make concessions to Beijing.

In 1963, LEE Yen Nien signed a contract to purchase 10,000
tons of refined copper, of which 8,000 tons would be delivered in
Hamburg, Germany, and the other 2,000 in Chile. The news caused
deep unease at the Foreign Ministry in Taipei.131 Over the following
years, the PRC purchased Chilean copper and saltpeter, though the
volumes were not large.132

129. Ibid, Telegram 582, 30/8/1961, EmbaChina Santiago to MOFA.
130. Just one month after his return to Chile, Lee invited the president of the ICCC,
Deputy Juan Martinez Camps, and Deputy Raul Juliet Gomez and their respective
wives, to visit Beijing, see De la Fuente, op. cit., p. 42.
of AFP, Santiago, 27/11/1963. The two telegrams were dispatched to the Presidential
Office, in compliance with the instructions of the Foreign Minister.
132. The figures do not agree with different sources. Compare TABLE IV: "Sales of
Chilean copper and saltpeter to the People's Republic of China (1963-1966)" from the
Central Bank of Chile, with TABLE V: "Bilateral Trade Chile-PRC and Chile-ROC
(1957-1971).
Table IV. Sales of Copper and Saltpeter by Chile to the People's Republic of China (1963-1966) In US$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Copper</th>
<th>1963</th>
<th>1964</th>
<th>1965</th>
<th>1966</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>167.4</td>
<td>1,251.1</td>
<td>12,530</td>
<td>11,964.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saltpeter</td>
<td></td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1,214.3</td>
<td>1,204.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Central Bank of Chile. In AMOFA, 505.24.(1-3).

The trade exhibition that Beijing had attempted to organize in September of 1960 through the Chilean consulate general in Hong Kong finally took place in June 1964. It triggered a very hard-fought diplomatic struggle between the ROC and the PRC in Chile. The exhibition served to highlight the Beijing's presence, which had a very decisive impact on formal relations between Taipei and Santiago.

In December 1963, the ROC embassy informed Taipei of the proposed exhibition to be held in February of the following year, and was instructed by its government to "use every means to prevent the exhibition." Immediately, extensive instructions were issued, which may be summarized as follows:

1) Reveal the political intrigues of Beijing and their impact on friendly relations between Chile and the ROC;
2) Ask our anti-communist friends in Chile to help prevent it;
3) Obtain the support of the press;
4) Gather information about the subversive activities of Beijing in Chile;
5) Organize the Chinese colony so that it will express its opposition by sending memos to the Chilean authorities.133

Ambassador TANG Wu analyzed the situation and noted that, due to the extremely difficult economic situation in Chile, as well as the upcoming presidential elections in September, the Right would have to bow to the wishes of the Left. He suggested that Taipei ask for help from the United States in negotiating with the Mexican

133. AMOFA, vol. 505.24 (1), Telegram 778, 19/12/1963, EmbaChina Santiago to MOFA and Telegram 442, 19/12/1963, MOFA to EmbaChina. For the instructions, see Of. 018041, 27/12/1963, MOFA to EmbaChina Santiago.
Table V. Bilateral Trade Chile-PRC and Chile-ROC (1957-1971)  
(In U.S. dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Imp.</th>
<th>Exp.</th>
<th>Balance Chile-PRC</th>
<th>Imp.</th>
<th>Exp.</th>
<th>Balance Chile-ROC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>584,545</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>—584,545</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1,396,042</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—1,396,042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>28,606</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—28,606</td>
<td>55,777</td>
<td>336,531</td>
<td>—215,246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>11,708</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—11,708</td>
<td>657,536</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>—657,525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>37,871</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—37,871</td>
<td>35,197</td>
<td>1,559</td>
<td>—33,638</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>25,849</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—25,849</td>
<td>741,312</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—741,312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>5,502</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—5,502</td>
<td>2,526,286</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—2,526,286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>16,048</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—16,048</td>
<td>1,905,120</td>
<td>4,469</td>
<td>—1,900,651</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>51,274</td>
<td>6,358,309</td>
<td>6,307,035</td>
<td>63,087</td>
<td>123,226</td>
<td>60,139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>211,633</td>
<td>1,204,522</td>
<td>992,889</td>
<td>218,359</td>
<td>182,186</td>
<td>—36,173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>199,643</td>
<td>391,696</td>
<td>192,053</td>
<td>105,216</td>
<td>261,547</td>
<td>156,331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>378,980</td>
<td>396,590</td>
<td>17,610</td>
<td>147,152</td>
<td>3,613</td>
<td>—143,539</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>205,344</td>
<td>850</td>
<td>—204,494</td>
<td>168,445</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>287,281</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—514,889</td>
<td>183,606</td>
<td>—331,283</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>337,960</td>
<td>—2,046,997</td>
<td>72,821</td>
<td>—1,974,176</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


government to prevent the transfer of exhibition products to Chile. This proposal was rejected with the argument that one should not rely on the United States for everything.\(^{134}\)

The Taipei embassy then made the following requests to Chile's Foreign Ministry:

That no official support or recognition be given to the exhibition;

That no flag of Beijing be hoisted;

That no official recognition be given to LEE Yen Nien.\(^{135}\)

The Chilean Foreign Ministry replied that, according to Chilean Law, no one could be prevented from holding a trade fair; in addition, the exhibition related to Chile's overall foreign trade pol-

\(^{134}\) Id. Of. 5, 6/1/1964; Telegram 783, 10/1/1964, EmbaChina Santiago to MOFA.  
Deputy Minister H. K. YANG wrote in the telegram: "we should not rely on the United States for every matter; negotiating with the Chilean government is, in effect, the responsibility of that embassy." Foreign Minister Shen accepted the suggestion.  
\(^{135}\) Memo from EmbaChina Santiago to MRE, 22/1/1964.
icy and would not affect friendly bilateral ties. It later told the embassy that the fair was not of an international character and reiterated that in no case would it affect cordial relations. Afterwards, the Foreign Ministry added that its government never lent its support or recognition to the fair or to Lee, but if government officials of the PRC were to visit Chile on a personal basis the government had no means to prevent it; the raising of the flag would be forbidden. Furthermore, the Chilean government issued a statement making it clear that it was not sponsoring the trade fair; the exhibition must abide by the existing laws and regulations, and there should be no political activities.\textsuperscript{136}

Meanwhile, the embassy of Taipei organized the Chinese colony to express its objections to the celebration of the fair,\textsuperscript{137} inevitably deepening the colony's existing rifts. Prompted by a lobbying campaign by the ROC embassy, the Chilean press published many news stories and commentaries on the trade fair, nearly all of them negative.\textsuperscript{138} On the diplomatic front, Taipei's embassy gained the support of the Mexican government, certainly as the result of efforts by U.S. diplomats. According to confidential information from the U.S. ambassador in Santiago, the Mexican Customs Office decided to hinder the PRC's plan for several months by claiming that the samples introduced did not correspond to those included on the list.\textsuperscript{139} Thanks to their efforts, the trade fair in Santiago was postponed until June.

The trade show, the first to be organized by Beijing in Chile, was inaugurated on 7 June 1964 in Street Exposición 1398, covering an area of 2,500 square meters. The displays ranged from postage stamps to light and heavy industrial machinery, mainly for textiles, manufactured in the PRC.\textsuperscript{140} The head of the delegation, CHANG Kuang-tou, expressed the hope that this exhibition would promote friendship and trade relations between Santiago and Beijing. Guil-

\textsuperscript{136} AMOFA, vol. 505.24, note 06871, 24/1/1964, MRE to EmbaChina; Of.53/27; 31/1/1964, and Telegram 801, 16/2/1964, both from EmbaChina to MOFA; also La Nación; El Mercurio, both of 15/2/1964.

\textsuperscript{137} El Diario Ilustrado, "Chinese residents oppose Red China exhibition"; El Mercurio, "Disagreement over forthcoming Chinese exhibition in the capital"; La Nación, "Resident Chinese colony protests over exhibition sponsored by Beijing," all dated 19/1/1964.

\textsuperscript{138} El Diario Ilustrado, 26/1, 30/1, 31/1, 8/2, 10/2, 11/2; La Nación, 11/2, all from 1964.

\textsuperscript{139} AMOFA, vol. 505.24 (1), Strictly confidential Telegram 792, 25/1/1964, EmbaChina Santiago to MOFA.

\textsuperscript{140} De la Fuente, op. cit, p. 45.
lermo del Pedregal, one of the event's sponsors, proclaimed that China would provide a large market for Chilean saltpeter and especially for its copper.\footnote{141} Despite the delay, the fair had an enormous propaganda effect and aroused keen interest, in part due to all the news published in advance—a result not anticipated by the ROC embassy. According to estimates, between 460,000 and 500,000 Chileans, mostly residents of Santiago, visited the fair, and 62,000 watched the Chinese films.\footnote{142} Chinese journalists reported that visitors had praised the quality of the products displayed at the fair.\footnote{143}

The raising and lowering of the Beijing flag was another controversial matter. At the inauguration, the flags were raised against the Chilean government's wishes, and then lowered by police officers at the request of the embassy of Taipei.\footnote{144} But in the four days that followed, the flags were raised again, prompting the embassy to express its deep concern to the Chilean Foreign Ministry.\footnote{145} *El Diario Ilustrado* commented that the fair was held with the aim of intervening in internal affairs in support of the communist candidate to the presidency.\footnote{146}

Indeed, the fair had a political purpose. The PRC delegation visited the Ministers of the Interior, Mines, Trade and Finance, as well as the Deputy Minister of Foreign Relations, among other authorities. Nevertheless, the embassy of Taipei felt that the negative effects of the fair were not too great. Neither the President nor senior government officials had visited the fair, and a basketball team from Beijing had been refused entry into the country during the period of the exhibition, so in the end, the fair did not achieve its purpose of "politically infiltrating Chile, nor did it affect the presidential elections."\footnote{147} In fact, the fair paved the way for Beijing to open a trade office in Chile the following year, and aroused great expectations at the prospect of trading with a market of 700 million. The enthusiasm was roused by the repeated statements by Chinese agents and their Chilean supporters to the effect that 5,000 tons of

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142. According to the Xin Hua Agency, between 16 June and 6 July, some 460,000 people visited this fair. According to the Chilean-Chinese Cultural Institute, the figure was around 500,000. De la Fuente, *op. cit.*, p. 45. In addition, in the first ten days, more than 30,000 people watched the Chinese propaganda films. *RRDBC*, Nos. 389 and 394, 28/5; 30/5 /1964.
copper and 20,000 tons of saltpeter had been purchased at the fair. The PRC delegation said it would buy an additional 100,000 tons of saltpeter,\textsuperscript{148} which undoubtedly helped to win over the sympathies of Chile's saltpeter producers, or at least attracted the interest of the local business community.

On 4 April 1965, LIN Ping led a trade delegation on a visit to Chile.\textsuperscript{149} During his stay he purchased 40,000 tons of saltpeter; 48 tons of iodine; 6,000 tons of copper ingots, and 1,500 tons of refined copper, worth a total of $11,050,000.\textsuperscript{150} The purchases were made on very favorable terms to Chilean sellers, and were therefore well received.\textsuperscript{151} Lin also announced plans to purchase 100,000 tons of saltpeter during that year.\textsuperscript{152} News of Beijing's plans aroused great interest among the countries of the continent, and even Quito's \textit{El Comercio} published the news in the days that followed.\textsuperscript{153}

On 3 June, Lin, in the company of Guillermo del Pedregal, visited Foreign Minister Gabriel Valdes after meeting with other economic and trade authorities and with Deputy Foreign Minister Oscar Pinochet.\textsuperscript{154} A few days later, Lin held a press conference to announce the opening of the office of the Chinese Council for the Promotion of International Trade, of which he would be the director; LIU Chang-heng was to be the deputy director. The event was attended by Senators Salvador Allende and Renan Fuentenalba, Minister of Education Juan Gomez Millas, Guillermo del Pedregal,

\textsuperscript{148} De la Fuente, \textit{op. cit}, p. 46.

\textsuperscript{149} Lin is Cantonese. He received a secondary education, and joined the Chinese Communist Party at a very young age. In 1960 he became sub-director general of the PRC's Foreign Ministry's Department for America and Oceania. In 1971 he became the PRC's first ambassador to Chile. National Cheng Chi University, \textit{Zhong Gong Ren Min Lu (Biographical Dictionary of Communist China)}, Taipei: Institute of International Relations, National Cheng Chi University, 1989, p. 349.


\textsuperscript{151} According to a report sent by the EmbaChina in Santiago, the terms of the PRC purchases were as follows: 1) buy copper produced exclusively by medium-sized Chilean companies; 2) accept delivery of merchandise in accordance with the productive capacity of the Chilean companies; 3) pay better prices; 4) make sure its purchasing volume is the highest among communist countries; 5) pay with hard currency. From 1965 to 1968, Beijing suffered a deficit. See \textit{AMOFA}, vol 505.24 (2), Of. 074, 25/2/1966.

\textsuperscript{152} News from \textit{AFP} (Santiago), 15/4/1965.

\textsuperscript{153} \textit{El Comercio} (Quito), 12, 17, 25 April 1965.

and Jorge Gass, political advisor to the President,\textsuperscript{155} as well as several Chinese residents, for a total of around 350 people. It is likely that the office had the approval of Foreign Minister Valdes, who was interested in promoting bilateral trade with Beijing.\textsuperscript{156}

The visit by the PRC delegation and the opening of the trade office were widely reported in the Chilean press.\textsuperscript{157} The ROC embassy once again played down the importance of this event in its report to the Taipei government, perhaps to elude or at least reduce its share of responsibility.\textsuperscript{158}

3. Activities of the People’s Republic of China in Connection with the Chinese Colony

With the founding of the People’s Republic of China and the de facto existence of “two Chinas,” the Chinese colony in Chile also divided into two groups: one identified with Communist China and its government in Beijing, the other with Nationalist China in Taipei. As a result, several members of the Chinese Charitable Association in Valparaíso publicly expressed their hopes that Chile would recognize Beijing and proposed to display the flag of the People’s Republic of China in its entity building.\textsuperscript{159} Subsequently, a photo of MAO Zedong was placed next to that of CHIANG Kai-shek at the association’s headquarters, causing constant arguments among the institution’s 20 or so members. In October 1953, a branch of the Chilean-Chinese Cultural Institute was also established in the port of Valparaíso. Its Vice-president was Fosan Ho Yone and its director was Carlos Chay Chan.\textsuperscript{160} In 1952, the association refused to receive the visit of the ROC’s Minister for Chinese Overseas, CHENG Yen-fen.\textsuperscript{161} In 1967, a Chinese-Chilean institute, similar to the ICCC in Santiago, was established in the port of San Antonio. Its offices displayed leaflets with photos of Mao.\textsuperscript{162}

\textsuperscript{155} Johnson, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 22.
\textsuperscript{156} \textit{RRDBC}, No. 775, 15/6/1964.
\textsuperscript{157} \textit{El Diario Ilustrado}, 10/4; \textit{La Nación}, 10/4; 2/6; 3/6; \textit{El Mercurio}, 2/6, all from 1965.
\textsuperscript{158} EmbaChina reported that very few people had attended the inauguration of the office, and that no senior official was present. In addition, it noted that there was little press coverage and that there was no plaque showing the name of the office. See \textit{AMOFA}, vol. 505.24.(3), Of. 258, 9/7/1965.
\textsuperscript{159} \textit{AMOFA}, vol. 505.1, Of., unsigned, 6/7/1956, EmbaChina Santiago to MOFA.
\textsuperscript{160} De la Fuente, \textit{op. cit.}, also mentioned in \textit{La Nación}, 4/10/1965, p. 9.
\textsuperscript{161} \textit{AMOFA}, vol. 561, Of. 185, 4/7/1957, EmbaChina Santiago to MOFA.
\textsuperscript{162} Johnson, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 24.
Many Chinese lost their love for the ROC after its government moved headquarters to Taiwan. From the time of the Frei government, which proclaimed a neutral position vis-à-vis the two blocks of nations, this problem of identity intensified, especially for Chinese-Chileans, who considered themselves Chileans and felt that they too should remain neutral.\footnote{AMOFA, vol. 561 (3), Report for the month of December 1966; Of. 45, 4/3/1967, EmbaChina Santiago to MOFA.}

On the eve of the founding of the ICCC, on 1 October 1952, a group of Chileans and several Chinese residents, including Benjamin Sun, assembled at the “Centro Chung Wah” (Chinese Club) of Santiago,\footnote{De la Fuente, op. cit., p. 13.} apparently indicating that a certain number of the colony already supported the communist regime. From 1954, several members of that colony whose sympathies lay with Beijing tried to take control of the board. However, they were unsuccessful because the KMT since 1909 had developed a strong and efficient organization in all cities with some Chinese populations. In January 1956, KMT members fought violently against the left-wing partisans and managed to retain their dominant influence in the colony’s leadership in Santiago.\footnote{AMOFA, vol. 561, Of. No. 45/30409 from KMT to Foreign Minister George Yeh, 4/1/1956.}

Alarmed by the change of attitude among some colony members, Taipei’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs tried to reinforce its lukewarm relations with the colony. At the beginning of 1957, the First Secretary, Dr. Chin-yung CHAO,\footnote{He was born in Manchuria and was a Doctor of Law, U. Of London. He was Personnel Director and Director of Treaties at the Foreign Ministry; later the Ambassador to Malawi. Now, aged nearly 90, he lives in retirement in Taipei.} was sent to Chile to take charge of consular affairs and the Chinese colony. On the eve of his departure, the director of the American Department of his Ministry, HSU Shau-chan, instructed him as follows:

Our embassy is separate from the colony and the two have had little contact. Therefore, your main task when you get there must be to provide more services to the colony.\footnote{AMOFA, vol. 561, letter from director Hsu to Chao, 22/7/1957.}

Soon after his arrival, Chao visited the Chinese colony in Valparaíso, in the company of the President of the Chinese Charitable Association in Santiago, Demetrio Loris, its secretary, Jorge Luy, and a teacher from the Pei Yen Chinese School. They visited several of their left-wing countrymen and convinced them to remove
the photo of Mao, leaving those of SUN Yat-sen and CHIANG Kai-shek in the Chinese Club. After that successful effort, the colonies in Iquique and Antofagasta, where the majority of the Chinese resided in, felt very encouraged and pleased.

Prior to LEE Yen Nien's arrival in Chile in 1961, pro-Beijing activities were already under way among Chile's Chinese colonies. Benjamin SUN, who acted as liaison between Beijing and the Chinese colony, had been secretary of the Communist Party in the county of Zhong Shan in Guangdong province, where many of the Chinese community in Chile came from. He arrived in Chile in 1934, and was a member of the governing board of the Chinese Club and also of the Pei Yen Chinese School in Santiago. He expressed his support for the PRC as soon as it was founded. Later he spent many years in Arica, where he engaged in propaganda in support of Communist China. He arrived in Valparaíso in 1962 and imported leaflets from Communist China to distribute to members of the local Chinese colony.168

LEE Yen Nien visited northern Chile in March 1962, in the company of his interpreter SUN Pao-chung and Benjamin SUN, and through the help of the latter, he invited members of the colony to a banquet, which was attended by nine people. Lee used the occasion to explain to them the situation of the "New China." The following month he visited Iquique and Antofagasta, where he invited the leaders of the local Chinese colony to a banquet but failed in his objective, since nobody went. The ROC embassy confidentially asked the Investigative Police to deport Sun, but was told he was protected by the democratic system and various left-wing politicians. Nevertheless, the police promised the embassy that in future they would try to insist that Sun inform them of his activities in Chile.169

Yuman LY, a young Chinese-Chilean, was invited to visit Mainland China by LEE Yen Nien on behalf of the PRC government, along with five other young people of Santiago's Chinese colony. The delegation was headed by Ly, who later took charge of selling propaganda magazines from Beijing. He subsequently

worked as cashier at the “Danubio Azul”\textsuperscript{170} (“Blue Danube”) Restaurant and used his position as Public Relations Officer of the “Cheng Nien Hui,” or Youth Association (the Youth Section of the Chinese colony) to make contacts for Beijing.\textsuperscript{171}

Benjamin Sun, in turn, organized pro-Beijing activities in Valparaíso and had frequent contacts with several left-wing Chinese. They opened a restaurant, “the Beijing,” and held meetings there. Another Chinese, Alfonso Kao, a partner of the restaurant, was vice-president of the Chilean-Chinese Cultural Institute, and CHOU Chuan was a founding member of the ICCC. Kao was also the owner of the Danubio Azul restaurant in Santiago, which was called the “red restaurant” as the regular meeting place of pro-Beijing elements. The “China” and “Canton” Restaurants also maintained contacts with elements of Communist China.\textsuperscript{172}

A publishing firm called Espartaco Editores shared an office with the Xin Hua News Agency. It was in charge of selling and distributing at very low prices, almost as gifts, communist propaganda magazines such as Beijing Informa [Beijing Reports], China Construye [China Builds], Cine y Arte de China [China’s Cinema and Art] and Mao’s Red Books.\textsuperscript{173} In 1960, the editor of the daily El Siglo, Manuel Hernan Uribe Ortega, was hired to work for the Xin Hua Agency. In March 1961, the agency opened an office without the authorization of the Chilean government.\textsuperscript{174} The Santiago Xin Hua office, headed by Jorge Palacios Calman, also distributed mimeographed transcripts of radio news on the PRC.\textsuperscript{175}

\textsuperscript{170} It was located in Merced 564 street, in downtown Santiago, but is not the one that is currently located in Calle Reyes Lavalle, behind the Municipality of Comuna de Las Condes.

\textsuperscript{171} AMOFA, vol. 561 (3), Of. 45, 4/3/1967, EmbaChina Santiago to MOFA.


\textsuperscript{174} AMOFA, vol. 505.1, Of. 194, 11/5/1962, EmbaChina Santiago to MOFA.

\textsuperscript{175} AMOFA, vol. 561(2), Report “Subversive activities by communists in Chile,” 27/9/1962, EmbaChina Santiago to MOFA.
IV. EFFORTS BY THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA TO MAINTAIN RELATIONS WITH CHILE

1. Efforts to Persuade Chile to Re-establish Its Mission in Taipei

The Chilean government had withdrawn its mission from mainland China before the government of Nationalist China moved to Taiwan at the end of 1949. In February of that year, Chile's ambassador to China, Oscar Blanco Viel, was transferred to Egypt. As Minister Plenipotentiary, Blanco reached Cairo before 31 March. The First Secretary, Dr. Juan Marin, arrived in that same city before Blanco as chargé d'affaires.176 Meanwhile, the ROC government maintained its mission in Santiago with the aim of preventing Chile from recognizing Beijing and helping it to join the UN.

One of the main objectives of the ROC's foreign policy was to persuade allied countries to reopen their missions in Taipei. In 1957, a year of intense diplomatic activity, then-Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs SHEN Chang-huan undertook a good will tour to 18 Latin American countries as Special Representative of President CHIANG Kai-shek with the rank of Plenipotentiary Ambassador Extraordinaire. He visited Chile between 25 September and 2 October, and was received by President Carlos Ibañez del Campo. He also met with Foreign Minister Osvaldo Saint-Marie, who had visited Taiwan in April of that same year, and was invited to lunch at the Palacio Cousiño.177 During his audience with the Chilean President, Shen requested that Chile re-establish its embassy and accredit its diplomat in Taipei, something that was promised.178 For his part, the ROC's Minister Plenipotentiary and chargé d'affaires in Santiago, Dr. Yin Pao-yü,179 tried to convince Enrique Bernstein Carabantes, Acting Under-secretary of Foreign Relations, and Fernando Illanes, the Foreign Ministry's Director of Economic Affairs,

176. ANFRE, vol. 1949, Consulate in Cairo, Shanghai, etc., and vol. Alphabetic Decrees 1949; Copies of Decrees 1949. In addition, according to the memo by the Chilean Foreign Ministry of 1949, there were no members of Chile's foreign service in China. See p. 368.
177. AGMRE, vol. 3531. Aerogram 14, 13/7/1957, MRE to EmbaChile Tokyo, and MMRE 1957, p. 89.
of the need to reopen the embassy based on the principle of reciprocity. He was told that an argument of a commercial nature would have more effect on the government and Congress. The Chinese minister informed Taipei, suggesting the idea of purchasing Chilean saltpeter. However, his proposition was not successful that year, when Chile’s exports totaled only 320 dollars, while its imports from Taiwan reached U.S.$584,545.

In April 1958, Minister Yin approached the Chilean Foreign Ministry to raise the matter once again. The Foreign Ministry replied that it would be up to the next Chilean government, which took office in November, to decide on the appointment of a representative in Taipei. Minister Yin left Chile in September 1959 without accomplishing his task. Yin’s successor, Minister Plenipotentiary and chargé d’affaires, Dr. Yi-seng KIANG, finally persuaded the Chilean government to send its ambassador to Japan, Roberto Suárez Barros, to Taipei as chargé d’affaires. Suárez did not arrive in Taipei until 26 January 1961. As soon as he had presented his credentials to the ROC’s Foreign Minister and made formal visits to some authorities, he hurried back to Tokyo. Meanwhile, Kiang informed Taipei that the Chilean government had hinted that if Taipei sent an ambassador to Santiago, Chile might consider more favorably the timely dispatch of an ambassador to Taipei.

After the resignation of Ambassador Chaucer Wu in March 1950, Taipei did not send a replacement to Chile until 1961. In December of that year, Kiang suggested to his government that it should send an ambassador. The Foreign Ministry of Taipei had already received a note from its embassy in Washington warning that, given the growing strength of the PC, which now had 19 members in the Congress, the Chilean government was unable to maintain a

180. AMOFA, vol. 532.2, Of. 203, 18/7/1957, EmbaChina Santiago to MOFA.
183. Master Degree in Law, U. Soochow; Dr. in Juridical Sciences (S. J. D.), U. South California, United States; Consul General in Los Angeles. Author of the book *Boycott International Law: Judicial Enforcement of Restrictive Covenants in the U. S.* See China Yearbook, *op. cit.*
185. AMOFA, vol. 510.13, Telegram 466, 14/7/1960, EmbaChina Santiago to MOFA.
firm anti-communist position.\textsuperscript{186} If Taipei did not send an ambassador to Chile in time, it would run the risk of not being accepted in future if the situation in Chile should become less favorable to the ROC.\textsuperscript{187} Alarmed, the Taipei government sent Dr. TANG Wu\textsuperscript{188} to Chile for the second time. Tang presented his credentials on 16 March 1962 to President Jorge Alessandri, who told him that CHI-ANG Kai-shek was a great man of the Far East and asked Ambassador Tang to convey his greetings and esteem.\textsuperscript{189}

Tang immediately began to promote the issue. He made appeals both to diplomats and to Chilean parliamentarians. He later informed Taipei that the Chilean Foreign Ministry had welcomed the idea, but staffing and budget constraints prevented this action in the short term.\textsuperscript{190} Despite the embassy’s efforts, the Ministry replied at the beginning of 1964:

\begin{quote}
... the government of Chile is studying with the greatest interest the possibility ... As to the appointment of an ambassador, we can advise that, being a direct representative of H.E. the President of the Republic, it is unlikely that such an appointment will be made at the end of his presidential mandate.\textsuperscript{191}
\end{quote}

Ambassador Tang raised the matter again in February 1965, but the Chilean Foreign Ministry replied that “reasons of an administrative nature have prevented us from proceeding immediately ..., though we hope to consolidate this decision soon.”\textsuperscript{192}

In January 1966, Ambassador Tang sent yet another note with a more emphatic tone:

\begin{quote}
... in reiterating this submission [sic], the Chinese ambassador is of the conviction that the “reasons of an administrative nature” existing at the beginning of 1965 have now
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{186} AMOFA, vol. 501.1, Telegram 592, 7/4/1961, EmbaChina Washington to MOFA.
\textsuperscript{187} Id, Report of the American Affairs and Personnel Departments, to the Foreign Minister, 13/12/1961.
\textsuperscript{188} Born in 1906. B.A. in Law, Washington U.; Dr. in Law (S. J.D.), U. of Oregon (1932). Before assuming the ambassador’s post in Chile, he was professor of Soochow U.; chargé d’affaires’ in Egypt (1942-44); chargé d’affaires’ in Chile (1945); ambassador to Liberia. China Yearbook, op. cit., p. 775.
\textsuperscript{189} AMOFA, vol. 510.13, Telegram 643, 16/3/1962, EmbaChina Santiago to MOFA.
\textsuperscript{190} Id, Telegram 734, 30/4/1963 and Of. 212, 9/9/1963, EmbaChile Santiago to MOFA.
disappeared, in view of the universally-known fact that the distinguished government of President Eduardo Frei has already achieved the most rapid and effective expansion of services both in the interior of the country and abroad. . . . We earnestly hope that the government of Chile will give the matter under discussion its most sympathetic consideration.  

In response, the Chilean Foreign Ministry stated the following:

. . . Indeed, the matter has been considered with special interest for some time, with the heartfelt wish to satisfy the kind request of the government of the Republic of China. . . . Nevertheless . . ., the Ministry of Foreign Relations regrets to confirm that administrative reasons, insuperable for now, of a budgetary nature, do not yet allow us to make this a reality . . ., it hopes to find a prompt and satisfactory solution . . . [and this] cannot, in any way, cast any doubts regarding the feelings of true friendship that unite China and Chile.

Ambassador Tang, like his predecessor, left Chile in May of 1966 without accomplishing his mission.

The new ambassador, Dr. LI Ti-Tsun, presented his credentials in June. He approached the Under-secretary for Foreign Relations, Oscar Pinochet, who stated the Chilean government’s willingness to accept Ambassador Li’s proposal to appoint the Chilean ambassador in Japan as concurrent ambassador in the ROC, extending his jurisdiction to Taipei. In a note to the Foreign Ministry, Ambassador Li emphasized that the ROC government had always attached the greatest importance to its friendship with Chile and for a long time had maintained diplomatic representatives exclusively accredited to the Chilean government. He pointed out that Chile planned to establish an embassy in Manila even though the Philippines did not have a resident representative in Santiago, and expressed the hope that Chile would appoint an ambassador in

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195. Ph.D. (in Political Science) from the U. of Wisconsin; Minister Plenipotentiary in Cuba, Venezuela, Dominican Republic; Ambassador to Brazil, to Turkey; university professor, etc. China Yearbook, op. cit., and AGMRE, China 1966.
Taipei, or a concurrent ambassador and a chargé d'affaires based in Taipei.\textsuperscript{197}

It is not known whether this note had any effect, but a conversation between Ambassador Li and President Frei at a special audience granted on 22 September certainly did. The Chinese ambassador recalled the contents of the note and stressed that he would be unable to explain the situation to his government if Chile should first establish an embassy in Manila without that Asian country having established its own mission in Santiago. After the meeting, President Frei gave confidential instructions to the Foreign Ministry to transfer Minister Marcial Rivera Mambrio to Taipei.\textsuperscript{198}

Minister Rivera arrived in Taipei on 22 December 1966 as chargé d'affaires, amid a flurry of news reports from the Taipei media. On 31 December, Rivera presented his diplomatic credentials to Foreign Minister WEI Tau-min. A daily revealed the secret of Rivera's transfer from Manila to Taipei, to the annoyance of the ROC's Foreign Ministry.\textsuperscript{199} Nevertheless, Rivera's arrival put an end to the prolonged absence of Chilean diplomats in the Republic of China.

Minister Rivera left his post in April 1969. Prior to his departure, the mayor of Taipei, Henry Y. S. KAO, presented him with the Golden Key of the City, and declared him an honorary citizen of Taipei.\textsuperscript{200} A few days later, the Political Vice Minister of the Foreign Ministry, H.K. YANG, awarded him the condecoration of the "Order of the Brilliant Star" as a tribute to his efforts as Chile's first diplomatic representative in Taipei, and gave a banquet at the Foreign Ministry in his honor.\textsuperscript{201} The government of Taipei honored Minister Rivera without knowing that he had given a very negative report of its government to Santiago. In 1967, Rivera described his impressions of the ROC government as follows:


\textsuperscript{198} AMOFA, vol. 501.2. Telegram 106, 21/10/1966, EmbaChina Santiago to MOFA.

\textsuperscript{199} Among the news articles referring to his arrival are the following: United Daily News, 13/12/1966 and 16/12/1966; "Chile appoints Riva (sic) Minister to Free China," China Post, 16/12/1966; Central Daily News, 22/12/1966 and 24/12/1966. The latter relates the anecdote of his transfer from Manila to Taipei, which upset the Foreign Ministry of Taipei, and as a result of this a press communiqué was issued to "clarify" the matter.

\textsuperscript{200} AGMRE vol. China, 1969, Of. DSC 652/9, 8/4/1969, EmbaChile Taipei to MRE.

\textsuperscript{201} AGMRE, vol. China, 1969, Of. SCA 663/12, 18/4/1969, EmbaChile Taipei to MRE.
nothing is done or undone unless the order arrives from the United States embassy. . . . The aid that [the United States] grants Taiwan is three times greater than what the whole of Latin America receives, but this country is neither democratic nor sovereign. . . . The key posts . . . more than 90%, are distributed among a group of family members and friends of generalismo Chiang Kai-shek. . . . They regard other Taiwanese all with much contempt. . . . For them, we Latin Americans represent a vote at the UN and nothing more.\textsuperscript{202}

The Chilean Foreign Ministry replied:

The Department considers the information sent by Your Excellency to be very valuable and interesting, along with your personal comments and observations, allowing us to understand the real situation in Taiwan.\textsuperscript{203}

After Rivera's departure, Julio Lagarini assumed his functions as counselor and chargé d'affaires on 2 June 1969.\textsuperscript{204} Although his arrival did not arouse as much interest as Rivera's, it was reported by two English language newspapers of Taipei.\textsuperscript{205} Lagarini informed Santiago of his negative observations of Nationalist China's anti-communist position:

\textit{To combat communism and recover the mainland territory . . .—this fantasy, which is absurd to the outside world, is politically necessary . . . for internal reasons, since it constitutes the basis of this government's mystique and one of the}

\textsuperscript{202} AGMRE, vol. China 1967, Conf. RIO 207/11, 20/10/1967, EmbaChile Taipei to MRE.

\textsuperscript{203} AGMRE, vol. China 1967, Confidential Of. RIO 9, 1/12/1967, MRE to EmbaChile Taipei.

\textsuperscript{204} Master in Political Science, U. de Chile. He was secretary of the Chilean embassy in Brazil; sub-director of Protocol of the Foreign Ministry. He maintained frequent and good relations with the ROC embassy. He was to have been assigned to South Korea to occupy the post of chargé d'affaires. Because of the sudden resignation of Minister Rivera, he was transferred to Taipei, in part thanks to the efforts of Ambassador Li. See AMOFA, vol. 501.2, Telegram 17, 2/5/1969, EmbaChina Santiago to MOFA. Lagarini was first secretary and consul of the 5th category, but was authorized by the MRE to present himself before the government of Taipei as counselor. AGMRE, vol. China 1969, Telegram SCA 10, 21/6/1969; Telegram 13, 2/6/1969, EmbaChile to MRE; Aerogram SCA 43, 24/9/1969, EmbaChile Taipei to MRE.

\textsuperscript{205} China News, 29/5/1969; China Post, 6/6/1969, with a photo of Lagarini.
psychological elements that allows a small Chinese minority to lead nearly 10 million rich and proud Taiwanese.206

From the time Chile established its diplomatic mission in Taipei, Chilean diplomats were warmly welcomed, confirming the importance that the ROC government attached to its relations with Chile.207

In 1968, the ROC government reopened an honorary consulate in Iquique, with jurisdiction over the provinces of Tarapaca, Antofagasta and Atacama. It appointed Simon Lonking to this post for three years, later gaining the official recognition of the Foreign Ministry of Chile. Before the three years were up, however, Sino-Chilean diplomatic relations were suspended on 5 January 1971.

2. Diplomatic Measures to Counteract the PRC Offensive

From the time the PRC launched its offensive in Chile, the ROC embassy went on the alert and made all possible diplomatic efforts to get Chile’s Ministry of Foreign Relations to neutralize them. The ROC embassy in Santiago faithfully obeyed Taipei’s instructions, even though the situation was becoming increasingly difficult. Prior to the month of October each year, this embassy, as was customary, would send a note to Chile’s Foreign Ministry asking it to restrict the activities of the supporters of the Chinese communists to celebrate the anniversary of the People’s Republic of China, “a country described as an aggressor at the UN and not recognized by Chile.” However, these celebrations became increasingly important and were attended by more and more prominent figures.208

A troupe from the Beijing Chinese Opera, headed by CHU Tunan, performed at the Municipal Theater of Santiago in October 1956, causing diplomatic frictions between Taipei and Santiago that in the end involved the United States. Having heard about the planned performance by the artistic group, the embassy of Taipei began diplomatic efforts to prevent it taking place. In one single month, the embassy sent four notes to the Chilean Foreign Ministry. The Chinese chargé d’affaires personally contacted the mayor of Santiago, and visited the undersecretary and the Foreign Minis-


207. AGMRE, vol. China 1969, Of. RIO 868/37, 24/9/1969, EmbaChile Taipei to MRE. It reported that the Vice-president and Prime Minister, secretary general of the Presidency and the Foreign Minister, among other prominent figures of Taipei, attended the reception to mark the 159th anniversary of Chile’s independence.

ter to discuss the matter. All efforts were in vain, even though the embassy vigorously claimed that this was

. . . a political group organized and financed by the rebel communist regime in China. It is an instrument of political propaganda and of contacts with international communism. . . . Its aim is to undermine the legal and moral position of the government of the Republic of China; and [achieve] the alienation and breaking of the friendly ties between our countries. . . .

The chargé d'affaires expressed his disappointment and dismay that Chile should be the first country to open its doors to communist activities and their penetration in Latin America. He vehemently conveyed his surprise to the Chilean government and requested a timely and renewed declaration of its unaltered policy of friendship, since "such measures would be of great significance, both moral and practical, in the Republic of China's struggle against international communism." The Chilean Foreign Ministry replied this was a group of high artistic merit and therefore of interest to Chile. It also stressed that the travel permit, granted as an exception to members of the group, could not be interpreted as rapprochement with the regime in mainland China.

The acting Foreign Minister told the chargé d'affaires, YIN Pao-yü, that given existing political pressures, if the Chilean government should yield too much to a foreign government, particularly the United States, this would cause resentment in the entire country and be harshly criticized by the opposition. Yin was informed of "the impossibility of revoking the Chilean decision" at the request of the U.S. ambassador, who had spoken to the afore-mentioned Chilean official. Yin did not give up, and asked for the collaboration of the U.S. ambassador, who in turn asked the State Department to ask the Chilean ambassador in Washington to intercede. At the same time, Yin asked the Papal Nuncio to use his good offices with Catholic political leaders. He urged the Chinese colony to send confidential letters to the members of the artistic group to

210. *AGMRE*, vol. China 1956-1964, notes C-2, C-3, C-4 and 1033, from 18 July to 21 August 1956. The embassy stated: "The Chinese Government cannot understand the failure of the Government of Chile to sufficiently appreciate the importance and significance of the political implications involved. It cannot see strong enough reasons to accord official recognition to passports that are regarded as illegal by Chinese Law," in note C-4.
persuade them to desert. Despite the enormous efforts made by the embassy of Taipei, the President of Chile granted Chu an audience.\textsuperscript{212} Later, the President and the Foreign Minister, both accompanied by their wives, attended the performance. Faced with complete failure, the ROC embassy informed Taipei that it did not understand how the Chilean government could have resisted joint pressure exerted by Washington, the Vatican and Taipei, and proposed a serious and profound review of its policy towards Chile.\textsuperscript{213} This incident underscored once again the high value assigned by Chile to non-intervention in its internal affairs, even when the pressure came from a big power such as the United States.

Following orders from Taipei to express deep concern at the repeated visits by Chilean public figures to mainland China, Minister Yin visited Chile's Foreign Minister, German Vergara Donoso, in June 1959. Vergara replied that, according to Chilean law, his government could not prevent its nationals from traveling abroad. Regarding visits by PRC citizens, however, he promised that they would not be allowed to enter Chile in the near future.\textsuperscript{214} Despite these assurances, a women's delegation from the People's Republic of China arrived in Santiago in November to participate in the Latin American Women's Congress. The three women delegates carried official passports. On this occasion, the Foreign Ministry of Taipei gave instructions to its embassy to persuade "our Chilean friends and Chinese residents to express their objections to this delegation." In December 1959, the ROC embassy asked the Foreign Ministry not to issue visas to representatives of the Confederation of Workers of Communist China who had been invited by the Chilean Workers Confederation, but the Ministry explained that the list of visa applications included the names of representatives of the USSR and several Eastern European countries, so it could not exclusively reject the Chinese delegates. The four members of the Beijing delegation arrived in Santiago bearing diplomatic passports.\textsuperscript{215}

Prior to the arrival of the three scholarship students from the PRC who had been invited by President of the University of Chile,
Juan Gomez Millas, the ROC embassy had made repeated requests to the Chilean Foreign Ministry to refuse their entry. The Minister replied that, given the new Law on Aliens, they could not be denied entry. He added that, due to the pressures exerted by left-wing parties within the Chilean democratic system, as well as the importance that Chile attached to cultural exchange, the Chilean government could not refuse the entry of Chinese students. Having received the relevant reports from its embassy, the ROC's Foreign Ministry was unable to conceal its deep concern and immediately relayed this to the Offices of the Prime Minister and the President. Foreign Minister SHEN Chang-huan gave the following instructions:

*The infiltration by Communist China in Central and South America has become increasingly intense, and it is therefore necessary to gather information and suggest concrete proposals to counteract them, and immediately discuss with the United States ways to adopt joint measures.*

Minister Yi-seng KIANG left Chile in July 1960 and was replaced by Dr. Ching Yung CHAO as chargé d'affaires for just three months. Subsequently, Dr. T. K. KUEI arrived from Havana, following the break-off of diplomatic relations with Cuba in September 1960. Counselor and chargé d'affaires Kuei arrived in Santiago at the end of the month and immediately made substantial efforts to denounce Beijing's actions to the Chilean Foreign Ministry. In January and March 1961, Kuei asked the Ministry to be mindful of the subversive activities of mainland China and requested that it ban the entry of communist elements. The Ministry promised to pay more attention to this matter and carefully monitor the situation, but added that it was very difficult to hinder the activities of the Chinese communists exclusively, since members of other communist countries were often involved.

In May 1961, Kuei asked the Ministry not to grant visas to a trade delegation led by NAN Han-chen. The under-secretary of

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216. *Id.*, Of. 122, 9/5/1960 and Of. 138, 8/6/1960, both from EmbaChina Santiago to MOFA.
217. Handwriting instructions of Foreign Minister Shen in Telegram 502, 24/10/1960, EmbaChina Santiago to MOFA.
218. Dr. in Political Science and Economics. He was a career diplomat and served in Spain, Peru and Cuba before being assigned to Chile. He was subsequently director general of the Department of Central and South America of MOFA, and ambassador in Honduras. See SHAU Yen-miu, *op. cit.*, p. 826.
Foreign Relations replied that this delegation had been invited by Senator Angel Faivovich and not by the government of Chile, so it was very difficult for the Ministry to prevent the visit, but he promised that the government would not to have any contact with the delegates. The delegation met with the vice-president of the Central Bank, Fernando Illanes, and with the vice-president of the State Bank of Chile, Agustin Pinto, as well as with the President of the Chamber of Deputies, Jacobo Schaulshon, and Senator Salvador Allende. That same month, Kuei failed once again to prevent the entry of three representatives of the PRC’s agriculture sector to participate in the National Agricultural Congress. The Foreign Ministry’s explanations were the same: the government of Chile regretted its inability to collaborate because of its lack of a majority in Congress.

In fact, Kuei was very active in drawing the Chilean Foreign Ministry’s attention to Beijing’s activities in Chile. He informed it of the contacts made by Nan’s trade delegation with pro-communist Chinese residents. He also sent a memorandum on “litigation activities of the Beijing trade office and the three Chinese students.”

The report stated:

... the students sent to Chile are nothing but young agents prepared in mind and spirit ... [to] perform the task of providing Beijing with the names of people known for their efforts against international communism. ... They are true coordinators and executors of a mature plan of systematic penetration.

Kuei energetically denounced the work of the Chilean-Chinese Cultural Institute in supporting and financing Communist China’s penetration in Chile, as well as the University of Chile’s support for its activities. His successor, Ambassador Tang, was very familiar with Chile. He noted that the Christian Democrat government was fairly permissive towards the PRC’s trade office and that it categorically opposed any foreign intervention in its internal affairs. For this reason it was essential to proceed with great caution on this...
matter. He proposed the following measures to reinforce relations with Chile:

1) Promote technical cooperation in agriculture;
2) Invite more Chilean representatives to visit Taipei;\textsuperscript{225}
3) Gradually implement the commercial cooperation program between both countries, as agreed in 1964.\textsuperscript{226}

In 1966, Beijing showed keen interest in participating in the International Fair of Santiago (FISA). In response, the ROC embassy complained to the Chilean Foreign Ministry that “yet another exhibition by Communist China is contrary to the wishes of the Chilean public.” The petition had the desired effect, and the Ministry informed the PRC’s trade office in Santiago that it could not have a stand at the fair.\textsuperscript{227}

Aside from political measures, Taipei tried to improve its relations with Chile through a program of exchange visits by authorities of both nations. In 1959, the ROC embassy began urging Taipei to allow it to invite three to five Chilean political leaders to visit Taiwan in order to counteract the PRC offensive. It was aware of the financial constraints, but argued that funds problem should be set aside for that purpose. However, due to a lack of available funds, the exchange visits were few in number, particularly when compared with those promoted by the PRC. Between October 1951 and May 1966, Beijing invited more than 106 Chileans of different sectors to visit mainland China, whereas Taipei invited only 40 Chileans between April 1957 and March 1970. In addition, the delegations from Beijing were far more numerous than those arriving from Taipei.\textsuperscript{228}

Although the ROC embassy, with its small staff, made energetic efforts to accomplish its difficult task, there was some misjudgment or negligence with respect to Communist China’s offensive.\textsuperscript{229}

\textsuperscript{225} Prior to June 1965, only Foreign Minister Osvaldo Saint-Marie, five parliamentarians and few others had visited Taiwan.

\textsuperscript{226} AMOFA, vol. 505.1 (2), Of. 226, 18/6/1965, EmbaChina Santiago to MOFA.

\textsuperscript{227} Id, vol. China 1966, Aide Memoire from EmbaChina Santiago to MRE in May 1966.

\textsuperscript{228} See AMOFA, vol. 505.1, of. 293, 28/10/1959 and Of. 332, 1/12/1959, EmbaChina Santiago to MOFA.

\textsuperscript{229} From 1961, the embassy never had more than two Chinese diplomats. In 1961, the chargé d’affaires, T. Y. KUEI, had a third secretary and two local employees, one of whom was very elderly and half-blind. Kuei informed Taipei that he worked from the early morning until one or two a.m. every day. See AMOFA, vol. 501.1, of. 269, 14/12/1961. Kuei was recalled to Taipei en March 1962 to occupy the post of Director General of the Department of Central and South America of MOFA. In 1966 Kuei said that
Soon after the founding of the Chilean-Chinese Cultural Institute, the ROC embassy told Taipei that the Institute would not have much of a future given its limited acceptance by the Chilean government and local society in general. The embassy never imagined the numerous activities and the enormous influence that the institute would have. Subsequently, the director general of the Department for Central and South America of Taipei's Foreign Ministry, T. K. KUEI, described the ICCC as an organization of even greater concern than the PRC's trade office itself, because of its intense cultural and artistic activities at least once every three or four months.

The ROC embassy also miscalculated and underestimated the extent of influence exercised by certain friends of Beijing. When the painter Jose Venturelli made public his views regarding his visit to mainland China, the embassy told Taipei government that his ideas had little effect except among left-wing circles. With respect to Guillermo del Pedregal, the embassy believed that he was a passé politician whose opinions had no influence and whose actions were also unlikely to have much effect.

Even more serious was the embassy's unwillingness to establish contacts with left-wing leaders, even if this was the policy of the Taipei government at the time. In October 1960, Beijing invited a delegation of twenty judges and lawyers to visit mainland China. The Foreign Ministry of Taipei asked its embassy in Santiago to find out whether they were leftists and, having been informed that a good number of them were, declined to invite them to Taiwan. This anti-leftist attitude did not change until the end of 1970. Said Ambassador Li: "The PS and the PC regard us with contempt, just as we regard them with hostility." By the time Allende won the elections in September 1970, it was already too late to build a bridge between the two positions.

Beijing's trade office had more staff and a larger budget and therefore posed a constant threat to relations between the ROC and Chile.

230. AMOFA, Of., unsigned, 20/1/1953, EmbaChina Santiago to MOFA.
232. Id., Of. 32, 12/3/1956, EmbaChina Santiago to MOFA.
233. Id., Of. 308, 10/11/1959, EmbaChina Santiago to MOFA.
234. AMOFA, vol. 505.1(3), Telegram 374, 28/10/1960, EmbaChina to MOFA.
3. Commercial, Technical-Agricultural and Cultural Measures

Between 1950 and 1970, commercial ties between Chile and Taiwan were weak. From 1950 until the end of 1957, Chile exported almost nothing to the island. Up until 1958, 90% of Taiwan's exports to Chile consisted of black tea.236 According to figures from the Taiwanese Customs Office, between 1949 and 1958, there were five years during which Chilean exports to Taiwan were non-existent.237 On an official visit to Taipei in 1957, Foreign Minister Saint-Marie asked the ROC government to consider the possibility of improving the balance of trade by purchasing Chilean saltpeter and copper. Taipei's Economics Minister acknowledged the need to balance bilateral trade; he expressed interest in buying copper, iron and steel, and a willingness to consider the possibility of purchasing saltpeter, despite the fact that Taiwan's production of synthetic fertilizers had increased.238 Shortly after returning to Santiago, the Chilean delegation was already aware of Taipei's lack of enthusiasm for Chilean saltpeter.239

Prior to 1948, Chile imported tea from India and Ceylon, but that year the Chilean government adopted measures to fix prices in order to control foreign exchange. As a result, the teas from India and Ceylon, which were of better quality, were unable to compete in a context of fixed prices. The ROC embassy in Santiago took advantage of these circumstances to create the Chinese-Chilean Trade Consortium Ltd., along with Senator Esteban Bayer and a deputy. From that time, it imported "Class OP" (Orange Pekoe) black tea from Taiwan, having as its counterpart the Taiwan Agricultural and Forestry Company. For nine years, Chile was the largest importer of Taiwanese black tea. Ambassador Chaucer Wu resigned his post to dedicate himself to the business and invited his Taiwanese business friends to Chile to join the business. After the venture failed, the ROC Foreign Ministry rejected his re-incorporation, ending his diplomatic career.240

Taiwan ceased to be the main tea supplier to the Chilean market in 1958, mainly due to the economic liberalization policy adopted by the new government of President Alessandri, whose

237. See TABLE V: "Foreign Trade of Chile with PRC and Chile with ROC (1949-1971)."
239. AMOFA, vol. 232.2, Of. 203, 18/7/1957, EmbaChina Santiago to MOFA.
240. Seng, op. cit., p. 58.
Table VI. Tea Exports from Taiwan to Chile (1948-1956)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Kg of black tea</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>320,420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>186,682</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>1,413,181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>1,716,440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>22,861</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>550,215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>1,507,944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>173,729</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>775,629</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 1) Archives of “Taiwan Agricultural and Forestry Co.” 2) AGMRE, vol. 3531.

aim was to create adequate conditions for the private sector to participate in the national economy.\textsuperscript{241} China tea or Formosa tea had acquired a reputation for bad quality, precisely because the cheapest tea had been imported to economize on foreign exchange. As soon as the import business was liberalized, Chileans opted for alternative sources.

In the following years, trade between the two countries remained static. In September 1958, possibly to counter Beijing’s trade offensive, the Taipei government dispatched a Trade, Shipping and Fishing Mission to Chile “to study the possibility of commercial exchange.” The delegation held talks with officials at the ministries of Foreign Relations, Trade and Agriculture, and also with COVENSA and the Central Bank, but the visit was futile.\textsuperscript{242} Chilean exports to Taiwan in 1961 totaled a mere U.S.$1,500 and during the next two years were nil.

In May 1964, a Chinese Economic Mission headed by the governor of the Central Bank of Taipei, P. Y. HSU, visited Chile as part of a tour of Latin America. The delegation met with Foreign Minister Julio Philippi, Finance Minister Luis Mackenna, and Trade Minister Manuel Pereira. Hsu expressed his government’s interest in buying Chilean products and said he hoped these visits would serve to strengthen commercial ties.\textsuperscript{243} Foreign Minister Philippi told Hsu that Chile attached great importance to its trade links and

\textsuperscript{241} Angell, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 38-39.
\textsuperscript{242} \textit{MMRE} 1961, p. 338.
\textsuperscript{243} \textit{Central Daily News} (Taipei), 7/5/1964.
its friendship with the Republic of China, and hoped to further strengthen bilateral relations.244 Thanks to previous efforts by the ROC embassy, a trade agreement was signed. The first article stipulated:

The Contracting Parties shall apply all the necessary measures to facilitate and promote trade relations between both countries, in accordance with their existing legal provisions.

At the signing ceremony, the Chilean Foreign Minister stated that the agreement would mark a new beginning for bilateral trade.245 In an audience with President Frei, Hsu said his government was committed to strengthening economic and cultural relations. Frei replied that, thanks to his good relations with Ambassador Tang, these efforts would be successful.246 The Chilean press gave considerable coverage to the visit: between 3 and 12 May, more than 30 news articles were published in Chile’s leading daily newspapers. Chilean-Taiwanese trade did increase in the following three years, with a considerable balance in favor of Chile.

During the second semester of 1969, Chile’s chargé d’affaires Julio Lagarini negotiated the export of Chilean wine to Taiwan, and the Undurraga Vineyard sent its representative to Taipei to test the market. The Taiwan Wines and Tobacco Monopolies Bureau, thanks to the good offices of the Foreign Ministry of Taipei, decided to import 200 cases of red and white wine on an experimental basis in 1970.247 However, bilateral relations were disrupted by the electoral triumph of Allende, delaying the import of Chilean wines into the Taiwanese market for several more years.

4. The Dispatch of a Technical Agricultural Mission to Chile

Given Chile’s high levels of food imports for a country with such agricultural potential, the Frei government made agrarian reform one of its priorities.248 The ROC embassy offered Chile technical cooperation in agriculture in 1965, arousing considerable

244. Press Release from MOFA, 7/5/1964.
246. AMOFA, vol. S31.8, Telegram 849, 9/5/1964, EmbaChina Santiago to MOFA.
interest by the Chilean government. In April 1967, Taipei’s Vice minister of Foreign Affairs, Sampson SHEN, visited Chile as a Special Envoy and was received by his colleague, Oscar Pinochet de la Barra. During Shen’s audience with President Frei, the latter praised the achievements of Taiwanese agriculture. Shen immediately seized the initiative and offered to share his country’s experience in that field with Chile. As a result, the visit ended with the signing of a joint declaration with the Minister of Agriculture, Hugo Trivelli. On that occasion, both sides expressed their wish to consolidate these plans by signing a technical cooperation agreement in the field of agriculture. During his stay in Chile, Shen sent two technicians to Talca for a reconnaissance visit.

On 13 September 1967, the Agreement on Agricultural Technical Cooperation was signed in Santiago between the Council for International Cooperation and Economic Development of the Republic of China, represented by Ambassador Li, and the Agriculture and Livestock Service (SAG) of the Republic of Chile, represented by its director, Emilio Ortega Riquelme. The main objective was to cultivate rice and soybeans on an experimental, demonstrative basis. The Agricultural Technical Mission, consisting of two experts and four experienced farmers, arrived on 23 October 1967 and received an effusive welcome. Even the newspaper of northern city Iquique covered its arrival. Minister Trivelli publicly declared that that Chinese-Chilean agricultural cooperation was an important step in putting into practice the “Revolution in Freedom.” “No debt goes unpaid,” he said; “hopefully, in the future, Chile will be able to repay this favor by the Republic of China.” These words of appreciation, according to Ambassador Li, were the first uttered by the Frei government in support of the government of Taipei and therefore merited wide publicity in Taiwan, but the Taiwanese media did not carry them.

On 9 March 1968, President Frei, Ambassador Li and Minister Trivelli traveled by helicopter to Talca to visit the Experimental Farm set up as part of the program. President Frei praised its

253. AMOFA, vol. 531.3 (3), Telegram 100, 13/9/1967; Of. 313, 12/12/1967. both from EmbaChina Santiago to MOFA.
achievements and expressed his gratitude to the ROC government. The embassy informed Taipei that the Agricultural Technical Mission had won admiration and respect.\textsuperscript{254} 

The cooperation agreement was renewed in April 1969 for another two years, but before the term expired the Mission was withdrawn in February 1971 as a result of the break-up in diplomatic relations.

The above-mentioned relationship seems to indicate that the Frei government was less interested in maintaining abstract relations than in obtaining its practical support from Taiwan.

5. \textit{Cultural and Academic Activities}

The government of Taipei did almost nothing in the realm of cultural and academic activities before the 1960s, except for routine cultural contacts with the Liceo Miguel Luis Amunategui, a high school that had been “adopted” by the ROC and had displayed its national flag since 1938. The ROC embassy offered scholarships to the best students, while the school played the ROC national anthem and taught its students to sing it.\textsuperscript{255} Alarmed by the PRC’s cultural offensive, the embassy suggested that the government of Taipei invite teachers from the school to visit Taiwan and increase the number of scholarships to strengthen bilateral cultural exchange—an initiative that was not pursued due to budgetary constraints.\textsuperscript{256} In June 1962, a teacher from the school, Leonilda Bonta Costa, expressed interest in learning Chinese painting in Taipei and requested a one-year scholarship. Although the application was accepted, nothing materialized due to the teacher’s personal problems.\textsuperscript{257}

A young man of Chinese descent and a History graduate of the University of Chile, Fernando Hanshing CHEN, was encouraged by chargé d’affaires T. Y. KUEI to study in the ROC. He arrived in


\textsuperscript{255} Cheng-jin TANG, \textit{Cheng Jin Zha Ji (Memoire of Cheng Jin Tang)}, Taipei: Ed. Cheng Chung Books, 1988, pp. 141-142. The wife of Ambassador Tang was quite scholarly. In Santiago she attended several courses at the U. of Chile. In her books she gives a general account of the history and cultural life of Chile and the Chinese community in Chile, but does not analyze Sino-Chilean relations.

\textsuperscript{256} AMOFA, vol. 550, Of. 210, 13/9/1959, EmbaChina Santiago to MOFA; Of. 019958, 12/12/1960, MOFA to EmbaChina Santiago.

\textsuperscript{257} \textit{Id}, Of. 12243, 10/9/1962, Ministry of Education to EmbaChina Santiago; Of. 330, 31/12/1962 as reply.
Taiwan at the beginning of 1964 to learn Chinese language and culture. The ROC’s Commission on Overseas Chinese provided some assistance. He was admitted to National Taiwan Normal University, but soon abandoned his studies after finding the Chinese language too difficult. He left Taiwan for the United States. According to Hanshing, while he was in Taiwan he communicated with people in English: instead of learning Chinese, his English improved considerably. He left Taiwan after having only learned how to consult a Chinese dictionary, and still lives in New York.

The ROC embassy also organized exhibitions of Chinese art during those years. In November 1961, an exhibition of paintings by Chinese artist LIU Shi took place at the University of Chile. In June 1962, more than 500 people attended a show of 'Traditional Chinese Ladies’ Costumes at the Club Unión. It was a great success, and another show was organized for the Chinese colony. In January 1965, an exhibition of contemporary Chinese painting was held in Iquique to coincide with the Second Cheng Ning Hui Congress. First secretary of the embassy Thomas KAO was dispatched to that event. In January 1968, more than 300 people attended a performance of traditional Chinese music sponsored in Talca by the ROC embassy. Ambassador Tang sometimes gave lectures on Chinese culture and his government’s policies, achieving a certain cultural and political impact. Tang could have done more, since he had a good command of Spanish and extensive knowledge of Chinese culture. Ambassador Li was less interested in disseminating Chinese culture, possibly due to the political problems he encountered from the time of his arrival.

258. Ibid, Of. 32348, 9/8/1964, Commission of Overseas Chinese to the Ministry of Education, with copy to MOFA.
262. The daily newspaper Cavancha, 18/1, p. 5; 19/1, p. 5; 22/1, p. 5; 23/1, p. 5, all from 1965.
263. Id, Of. 00044, 12/2/1968, EmbaChina Santiago to MOFA; La Mañana (Talca), 30 and 31 of January, 1968.
264. Id. In June he gave a lecture on Chinese art and culture in Curico, and in February 1964, have a speech on the policies of the ROC government at the Rotary Club in the capital. See press article, El Diario Ilustrado, 6/2/1964; El Mercurio and La Nación, 7/2/1964.
To counteract the offensive launched by the Chilean-Chinese Cultural Institute, the ROC embassy promoted the creation of the Circle of Friends of Free China in 1963, presided by Alfonso Guerrero, chairman of the National Association of Fine Arts. Although the Foreign Ministry of Taipei praised its work, it seems to have stopped functioning shortly thereafter, perhaps because of the heterogeneous nature of its members—journalists, doctors, businessmen, schoolteachers, artists and many other professions. The ROC embassy also created the Chinese-Chilean Cultural Association in September 1969, presided by Senator Francisco Bulnes with several parliamentarians as its vice-presidents. Little is known of its activities, perhaps due to lack of support by the ROC government. The pro-Beijing ICCC had been founded in 1952. By contrast, the government of Taipei did not establish a similar body to counteract the PRC’s “political penetration” until 11 years later.

CHEN Lin-shan, a graduate of the Catholic University of Fu Jen in Taiwan, was the first exchange student in Chile, thanks to the efforts of University president Archbishop YU pin who visited Chile in July 1963. Chen arrived in February 1964 on a scholarship to the University of Concepción. As the ROC embassy later realized, Chen had been planning all along to go to the United States, and soon left Chile.

Only two Taiwanese students attended the University of Chile on scholarships, thanks to the efforts of professor Eugenio Pereira Salas after he visited Taiwan at the invitation of the government of Taipei. Antonio T.S. TSAI and LAN Chih-min arrived at the University’s Pedagogic Institute in April 1965 to study the History of Chile and Latin America. Before beginning their studies, Ambassador Tang warned them not to become involved in Chile’s complex internal politics. The two students obeyed and concentrated fully on their studies. In addition, they learned Spanish with determination. Years later, both became senior diplomats of great importance in the Hispanic sphere of Taipei’s Foreign Ministry. Lan was

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265. Id, Of. 214, 12/9/1963, EmbaChina to MOFA; Of. 014125, 8/10/1963, MOFA to EmbaChina Santiago.
266. AMOFA, vol. 550 (1), Telegram 043, 5/9/1969, EmbaChina Santiago to MOFA.
268. AMOFA, loc. cit., Of. 3037, 1/3/1965, Ministry of Education to MOFA. The two were exempt of all tariffs. In addition, they received 310 escudos, the Chilean currency at the time, on which they were able to live comfortably. Letter from Tsai to the sub-director of the Department of Central and South America of MOFA, 5/8/1965, Of. 128, 4/4/1965, EmbaChina to MOFA.
director of the Far East Trade Office in Chile between 1984 and 1990, the year he was appointed director general of the Department of Central and South American Affairs of the Foreign Ministry. Later he served as representative in Mexico. From 1998, he served as ambassador to Panama and in 2001 was promoted to the post of Vice Foreign Minister. Tsai was the official representative of his government in Colombia, Bolivia, and Ecuador, and, since 1999, he has been the ambassador to Nicaragua.

V. CONCLUSION

In 1951, the People’s Republic of China launched a cultural and trade offensive in Chile and worked hard to gain the support of the country’s Chinese community. The ICCC organized a good number of art exhibitions and film screenings, as well as lectures and seminars, to disseminate Beijing’s political and cultural policies. It advocated establishing relations between Chile and the PRC and supporting Beijing’s entry into the UN. Under the protection of the Left, Beijing created a very solid base from which to make subsequent inroads in Chile.

Prior to 1970, bilateral trade between Chile and Taiwan was always greater than that between Chile and Beijing. The fact that Taiwan never considered buying Chilean saltpeter and copper gave Beijing a great opportunity to gain Chile’s friendship. The ROC’s cultural efforts in Chile were minimal compared to those organized by the ICCC. And, while agricultural cooperation with Chile was an intelligent strategy, it was implemented belatedly, was of limited scope, and its effects could not be compared with Beijing’s saltpeter and copper imports.

Although Taipei sent its best diplomats in the Latin American sphere to Chile, such as ambassadors TANG Wu and T.T. LI, it is clear that Taipei was unable to resist the strong Beijing offensive in Chile. The ROC embassy did not have the resources to invite Chile’s leaders in different fields to tour the country, or sufficient staff to organize more cultural activities. Prior to the 1970s, the ROC was a poor country, for its economy had not yet taken off. Moreover, the flexibility and pragmatism with which Beijing conducted its diplomacy eased the development of its relations with Chile, as confirmed by Beijing’s hospitality to the painter Venturrelli for a period of two years and to the wife and daughter of Salvador Allende for two months. Taipei lacked those attributes in its diplomacy.
Even if Taipei had been able to, it is not certain that it would have been willing to maintain relations at any cost with a Latin American country such as Chile, since Argentina, Brazil and Mexico still maintained diplomatic relations with the ROC, a full and permanent member of the UN Security Council prior to 1971. Even so, Beijing’s cultural and trade offensive made it possible for the Allende government, aside from its evident ideological position, to break diplomatic relations with Taipei and recognize Beijing instead as the sole legitimate government of China.
# APPENDIX

## LIST OF ACRONYMS

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<td>0-942182-67-7</td>
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**1996 Series**

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