RUSSIAN-TAIWANESE RELATIONS: CURRENT STATE, PROBLEMS, AND PROSPECTS OF DEVELOPMENT

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Occasional Papers/Reprint Series in Contemporary Asian Studies

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Subscription is US $30.00 per year for 6 issues (regardless of the price of individual issues) in the United States and $35.00 for Canada or overseas. Check should be addressed to OPRSCAS.

Tel.: (410) 706-3870
Fax: (410) 706-4045

Price for single copy of this issue: US $10.00.

ISSN 0730-0107
ISBN 0-925153-45-1

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Dr. Peter M. Ivanov**

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* This research project was initially carried out with the assistance of the Pacific Cultural Foundation of the Republic of China and finalized at the Graduate Institute of Russian Studies of the National Chengchi University in Taipei, ROC.

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I. INTRODUCTION

The late 1980s witnessed sudden and speedy changes in relations between the Republic of China on Taiwan (ROC) and the USSR. The long-lasting animosity inherited from the cold war period seemed to be eternal, and the rapprochement gave rise to anxiety, interest and incredible speculations all around the world. The disbandment of the Soviet Union did not preclude the newly independent states, especially Russia, from establishing closer and diversified ties with the ROC. At present, the bilateral relations have already passed through quite a lengthy period of formation, surmounted different obstacles and matured into quite a steady process, which can be analyzed as such, regardless of the setbacks and disappointments in its development.

This article mostly deals with the current state and trends of change in the Russian-Taiwanese bilateral relationship. However, these ties cannot be divided from either the last years of Soviet history or from the Chinese mainland factor. While acknowledging that Russian-Taiwanese and Russian-Chinese mainland contacts constitute separate subjects of research, one may observe a certain level of mutual influence or even interdependence. For this reason, it seems useful at certain points to inquire into Russian-ROC-PRC relations as a combined issue. This article will examine Russian-ROC relations in this manner, focusing on current Russian-ROC relations within their broader historical context.

II. EARLY ROC-USSR RELATIONS

A. Continuing Contacts

Unlike Russian-Chinese mainland (or Soviet-Chinese mainland) relations, very little has ever been said about the Russian-Taiwanese relationship as a phenomenon with its own history. Many sinologists just state that a complete breach of contacts occurred between the Soviets and the Kuomintang (KMT or Nationalist) Government after 1949. Actually, this is not true for several reasons. First, occasional meetings of representatives still occurred from time to time, for example at the United Nations and at other international organizations, or in the capitals where the diplomatic agents for both sides were stationed. In the autumn of 1990 the Vice-Foreign Minister of the ROC Chang Hsiao-yen told the press about his numerous contacts with the Soviets in Washington in the
early 1970s. Nearly two years later, the ROC Minister of Foreign Affairs, Chien Fu, in an interview with a Russian newspaper, acknowledged that while representing his country in the US capital, he had “close ties” with Soviet Ambassador A. Dobrynin.

In May 1995, the Taipei China News and the Lien-ho Pao publicized excerpts from the diary of Wei Ching-meng or Jimmy Wei, the former Director of the ROC Government Information Office (GIO). The notes relating to the late 1960s - early 1970s precisely narrated the contacts between the ROC officials and the notorious Soviet KGB agent, Victor Louis.

In 1968 the “Cultural Revolution” in mainland China continued to develop. Moscow-Beijing relations deteriorated drastically, while the US started secret negotiations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) about the possibility of normalizing relations. Under the circumstances, the USSR leadership was worried about the potential alliance between the Chinese Communists and the Americans. The menace of Chinese aggression also kept plaguing Soviet politburo members. The ROC was anxious about US overtures to the PRC, and deemed it proper to seek alternative allies too. It still remains to be learned from the Russian secret archives who actually ordered V. Louis to approach the Taiwanese with the cooperation proposal.

V. Louis arrived from Tokyo in October 1968 under the name of “Wang Ping.” He had extensive contacts with the ROC officials, including Chiang Ching-kuo, then Minister of Defense. V. Louis mainly discussed the possibility of Taiwan attacking the mainland and restoring KMT rule there. He promised Soviet neutrality, or even limited cooperation (e.g., providing Soviet bombers so that the Taiwanese could extinguish the Communist atomic installations in Xinjiang) in case of military conflict. Both sides also touched upon the following topics: the viability of an anti-Mao Chinese Communist Party (if organized abroad); the KMT guarantees of not allowing the US to use Chinese territory for military bases; and, the

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1. Lien-ho Pao (United Daily News), November 3, 1990, p. 2. He reported also about the similar activities of another Taiwanese diplomat, now highly positioned in the KMT hierarchy, Chen Chien-jen. However, the results supposedly were not reported by Ambassador Shen Chien-hung back to Taipei. Obviously such diplomacy was not favored by many in the ROC leadership, as well as by the American side, from which it had been skillfully concealed. Nevertheless it is hard to imagine that Chang Hsiao-yen acted on his own; it is more likely, that orders had been taken directly from his father, Chiang Ching-kuo. See also Chung-kuo Shih-pao (China Times), October 4, 1988, pp. 1, 2.

future exchange of secret information on the latest developments in the PRC. V. Louis stated that he represented the "hawk" faction in the Soviet leadership, which insisted on strong action against Mao Zedong. It was expected that the USSR and the ROC could cooperate in the Northeastern and Northwestern parts of China, once it was overtaken by Chiang Kai-shek. Military supplies were offered by the Moscow emissary, who also asked for a commission, which seriously embarrassed his hosts. There was a strong James Bond flavor in the whole affair, as V. Louis proposed to transport a Taiwanese representative to negotiations in Moscow on a Soviet submarine. Whatever the details of the Soviet agent's journey to Taiwan, the result was most important: During a certain period of time, the secret services of the USSR and the ROC intensively exchanged information. According to Lo Chi, then GIO Deputy Director, between 1968 and 1969, more than thirty contacts of a similar type took place; they then became scarcer, ceasing altogether by the middle of 1970. Three or four times, V. Louis passed over letters from Russian relatives of Chiang Ching-kuo's wife, Faina Chiang Fang-liang.

The early 1970s were an unhappy period of time for the ROC. US President R. Nixon visited mainland China, signifying the forthcoming normalization of American-Chinese Communist relations. And, in 1971 Taiwan had to withdraw from the United Nations Organization, since the PRC was admitted as a member. By that time, Moscow probably saw no further reason to cooperate with Chiang Kai-shek, as the international relations composition had changed, and the possibility of an ROC counter-attack against the PRC decreased to a minimum. The influence of A. Shelepin, a young rival of L. Brezhnev in the Soviet politburo, was declining, and that might have been another important reason for the breakdown of the Moscow-Taipei entente.

Chiang Kai-shek was obviously disappointed with the Americans and the Soviets, but the US still remained his important ally. When Minister of Foreign Affairs, Chou Shu-kai, stated in 1970 that "for the cause of the state's survival he would not hesitate to deal

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5. Lien-ho Pao (United Daily News), May 23, 1995, p. 39. A. Shelepin had strong positions in the KGB, of which he had once been head. V. Louis insisted that he was among the architects of this Taiwanese adventure.
with the devil” (meaning possible future contacts with Moscow), he was curtly sent to retirement.\(^6\) The short-lived Soviet Russia-Taiwan relationship was over.

Apart from the cases depicted above, other “contacts” known to the mass media include the following:

1. As reported by the foreign press agencies, the former ROC Minister of Education, Ku Shu-hsu, visited Moscow in October 1968;

2. According to the message received from mainland China, President Chiang Kai-shek turned down the Soviet request to use the Pescadores as a naval refueling base in late 1970;

3. In May 1975, several ships of the Soviet Pacific Navy passed through the Taiwan Straits;

4. In July 1976, a Greek newspaper reported that the ROC had not completely abandoned the plan of providing the Soviets with the Pescadores base;

5. In 1978, rumors spread in Moscow about the possible diplomatic recognition of the ROC by the Soviet Union;

6. In November 1978, Soviet ships visited the port of Makung for repairs;

7. In August 1982, eighteen Taiwanese cardiologists arrived in Moscow to participate in an international medical congress;\(^7\) and

8. The ROC women’s basketball team took part in Moscow competitions in 1987. The delegation included the then Chairman of the Taipei Municipal Council and member of the KMT Central Standing Committee, Chang Chien-pang. As he later recollected, the permission was personally granted by late President Chiang Ching-kuo.\(^8\)

Despite the controversial character of this information, and its sometimes questionable reliability, one has to admit the fact that both sides had been “probing” each other (probably even with false news leakage) on the issue of conditioned cooperation.

\(^6\) *Lien-ho Pao* (United Daily News), October 31, 1990, p. 3.

\(^7\) *Lien-ho Pao* (United Daily News), March 27, 1989, p.3

\(^8\) *Chung-kuo Shih-pao* (China Times), February 10, 1990, pp. 4, 6.
B. "Relations without Relations"

Apart from the secret and rare exchange of opinions or consultations, there existed another sphere of bilateral interaction. It can be qualified as "relations without relations" or mutual influence without direct contact. On the Soviet side, communist propaganda was interminably involved in the anti-KMT agitation at home and abroad,9 while the diplomatic corps spared no effort to terminate the ROC membership in the United Nations.10 The Soviet Communist Party (CP) leadership received detailed information from Beijing about the subversive activities of the Chinese Communists against Taiwan and their plans to occupy the island. Though not proven by historical documentation, it seems probable that Moscow (both under Stalin and after) was tangibly interested in securing the Chiang Kai-shek government as a means of keeping Mao Zedong from making friendly advances towards the US. Recently published

9. Every truthful information about the ROC was blocked by severe censorship. Foreign books telling about Taiwan were all sent to the reading rooms with limited access. Soviet publications on the topic were labeled "for internal circulation only" or "distributed to special subscribers". It meant, that only bureaucrats or personnel involved in propaganda or political studies had access to both foreign and Russian language sources of information about Taiwan. The author himself has published several articles on current developments in the ROC in the "closed" bi-monthly of the Institute of Oriental Studies (Zarubezhny vostok i sovremennost [Foreign Orient and Our Time]), a brochure on contemporary Taiwan - Tavain - (together with V.I. Kulikov) ["for internal circulation"], and Zhizneopisaniye tzian tsing - an abridged translation of Chiang Nan's "Chiang Ching-kuo Biography" (together with S.N. Goncharov) [for distribution among the highest leadership of the country]. All "open" publications about Taiwan mostly were superficial, full of propaganda and primitive animosity towards the "puppets of American imperialism." Such information was boring for the general public, which had no idea of the ROC realities. As for the governmental offices, they were provided with more truthful information.

10. Numerous pamphlets about American occupation of Taiwan filled the bookstalls of the Soviet Union in 1950s, which later became part of a plot of a satiric novel by dissident writer V. Voinovich, Ivankiada (The adventures of Ivanko), Ann Arbor: Ardis Publishers, 1976. The Sino-Soviet rift of the 1960s did not influence the tone of propaganda as far as the Taiwanese topic was concerned: anti-KMT accent remained, despite the secret attempts to reach rapprochement.

In the 1970s, disappointment with the Communist regime in the USSR started growing. Dissident/emigree writer V. Aksionov reflected the dream about free and democratic Russia and fears about the feebleness of democracy in the face of totalitarianism in a fantastic novel Ostrov Krym (The Island of Crimea), Ann Arbor: Ardis Publishers, 1981. The story tells that after the 1917 revolution the Crimea Peninsula stayed under the rule of Write Russians, and in the course of time turned into a prosperous democratic state. The end was pessimistic - after a period of "peaceful negotiations" communist tanks entered Crimea. The writer obviously wrote about Russia keeping certain elements of the Taiwanese experience in mind.
Soviet archives testify that Mao requested Stalin’s assistance in attacking Taiwan as early as 1949, but he did not receive any positive response. However, prolific political rhetoric in support of the “right cause” of the PRC appeared on the surface of events. More than that, the government of N. Krushchev supplied Mao Zedong with all necessary armaments needed to conquer Taiwan in 1958 and spared no effort to convince the United States of Moscow’s will to support the Chinese Communists in case of American attack. Later, during the Sino-Soviet rift, many politologists in the USSR tried to prove that the Taiwan Straits battle was started by Mao in order to provoke a Soviet-American conflict. The latest publications by V. Usov clearly testify that in 1958 there existed full accord between Moscow and Beijing.

On the ROC side, the government closely watched international activities and domestic developments in the USSR. Those were taken to be vitally important for the future of Taiwan, because the close alliance between Moscow and Beijing constituted the main threat to the existence of the ROC. Soviet Russia was an enemy and had to be harshly treated as such. The most well-known, and probably the only serious, example of open hostile action of Taiwan against the USSR, was the detention of the “Tuapse” oil tanker on June 23, 1954.

13. In the period of 1949-1954, the ROC had intercepted 111 vessels on their way to Communist China. The “Tuapse” was charged with violation of international embargo, forced upon the PRC in the course of the Korean war. The action was successful due to the reconnaissance data, supplied by the US. Such information was no longer provided after July 1954, as the detention of the “Tuapse” gave rise to additional tension in Soviet-American relations and was not welcome. Secret documentation of the US State Department on the incident and its aftermath were made public in the late 1980s. See Chien-chung Fu, “Look at the “Tuapse” Incident as Reflected in the US State Department Secret Diplomatic Documents”, *Chung-kuo Shih-pao* (China Times), March 30, 1988, p. 5. The Soviet government forwarded numerous protests to the United Nations Organization and to the US. Prior to 1955, Foreign Minister V. Molotov had three times discussed that question with US Secretary of State J.F. Dulles, demanding the release of the tanker and its crew. Of 49 arrested sailors, 29 finally decided to return to the USSR; as for the others, 9 moved to the US, 4 to Brazil, and 7 remained in Taiwan (of whom three died in 1975, 1984 and 1986, respectively). *Chung-kuo Shih-pao* (China Times), March 21, 1988, p. 5; *Chung-yang Jih-pao* (Central Daily News), October 26, 1988, p. 16.
Even superficial analysis of the writings and speeches of Presidents Chiang Kai-shek\textsuperscript{14} and Chiang Ching-kuo shows intense interest in Soviet activities. One may not discount the importance of the "Soviet experience" (to be broadly understood) of both above-mentioned Chinese leaders and the KMT as a party in general. Despite the anti-Communist ideological platform, many aspects of political life in Taiwan formally resembled Soviet patterns (be that propaganda, methods of mass mobilization or political surveillance in the army).

While proving that "relations without relations" existed between the ROC and the Soviet Union, we are at the same time compelled to admit that by the end of the 1980s neither side possessed full-scale and adequate data about the other. No apparent interest in starting bilateral contacts could be witnessed. For the USSR leadership, the very idea of sustaining a relationship with the ROC was not attractive given Moscow's primary policy goal for the Far East in those days - normalization with Beijing (inter-Communist party ties included). In Taipei, the USSR was viewed in the spirit of a book by the late President Chiang Kai-shek titled \textit{Soviet Russia in China}, in which the USSR was portrayed as a cunning enemy, a treacherous ally, and a bereaving occupant.

However, the internal developments in both countries laid the groundwork for a new relationship, or at least for initial rapprochement. A steady process of political democratization in the ROC provided the chance for the emergence of strong interest groups, which pursued their specific goals with increasing independence from the authority of the state. Such was the case with the Taiwan Provincial Union of Export-Import Chambers of Commerce (TPUEICC). The leadership of the Union expressed outward dissatisfaction with the exemption of the Soviet Union, along with Albania, from the Executive Yuan's decision to liberalize trade with East European countries. (This was announced by Premier Yuh Kuo-hwa on February 23, 1988.\textsuperscript{15} Lin Tzu-ching, President of the TPUEICC, declared his intention to organize a delegation in order to visit the Soviet Union and inquire into the possibilities of trade expansion, and the Taiwanese press lavishly reported about the new

\textsuperscript{14} See the paper presented by the author at the Scholarly Conference in Commemoration of President Chiang Kai-shek at the Institute of Asian and African Countries of the Moscow State University, April 1995 - "President Chiang Kai-shek's Ideology in Taiwan Period of His Life". Manuscript.

\textsuperscript{15} \textit{Lien-ho Pao} (United Daily News), October 14, 1988, pp. 2, 13. Limited exchange of goods was allowed as early as 1979-1980.
undertaking. Concurrently, there were various analyses of the possible benefits from trade with the USSR.16

III. INITIAL “UNOFFICIAL” ROC-USSR RAPPROCHEMENT

Notwithstanding Beijing’s priority status in Soviet’s China policy, there were heard evident encouragements of trade with Taiwan. For example, Moscow’s official TASS news agency representative in New York, A. Belousov, made enthusiastic pronouncements on absolute consistency of future trade links with Taiwan and M. Gorbachev’s policy of economic reform.17

However, the position of the ROC Government remained temporarily unchanged; this position was reiterated on March 23, 1988 by Vice-Minister of Economic Affairs, Li Mo, who connected the ban on Soviet trade with the limitations of commercial ties with mainland China.18 Ideological relics of the old “fight Communism, resist Soviet Russia” concept can be suspected here, and not groundlessly, as we shall see later.

A. An ROC Trade Mission to the USSR

Despite official disapprobation, the designers of the trade mission to the USSR, mentioned above, continued to prepare for the trip. As it turned out later, the semi-official China External Trade Development Council (CETRA) rendered assistance in elaborating the details of the journey. By the end of March 1988, the list of participants was ready, and the Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA) was duly notified about the delegation’s intention to leave for the Soviet Union in the middle of September. Policy leaders reacted with blunt disapproval and even banned the project in general, but sudden changes occurred in the government’s position. As reported by the press, it was decided to lift the prohibition, but at the same time to proceed without excessive publicity. The Execu-

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18. Chung-yang Jih-pao (Central Daily News), March 24, 1988, p. 3.
tive Yuan even approved the inclusion of two officials in the delegation of the TPUEICC.\textsuperscript{19}

There was one more important aspect of the preparation stage - the American reaction. The ROC side seemed a bit nervous about the potential dissatisfaction of the United States with the establishment of Taiwanese-Soviet contacts, which could have resulted in technological transfers to the Communist block prohibited by the Coordinating Committee for Export Control (COCOM). Prof. Parris Chang, who actively promoted bilateral ties at the very initial stage, argued that there was no reason for the US to oppose the ROC's trade with the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{20} In May 1988, an indirect message from the American side expressing no objections was received. Probably that gave Taipei additional freedom to maneuver.\textsuperscript{21}

After a period of uncertainty about the Soviet invitation documents and the size of the delegation,\textsuperscript{22} the TPUEICC mission at last flew to Moscow via Bangkok on October 2, 1988. A special visit to Taipei of the Soviet Aeroflot agent in Hong Kong, who instructed the group about the details of the journey inside the USSR, testified as to the serious attention paid by Moscow authorities to the forthcoming visit.\textsuperscript{23}

As it became known somewhat later, in the summer of 1988, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) had been intensively negotiating the repatriation of three “Tuapse” tanker sailors (V. Sabin, V. Kniga and B. Pisanov), who had expressed the wish to return to the Soviet Union. The talks on the subject were conducted with the friendly assistance of the Singapore government and resulted in the sailors' departure from Taiwan in the second half of August 1988.\textsuperscript{24} The three sailors had been detained in secrecy, and not

\textsuperscript{19} Lien-ho Pao (United Daily News), October 14, 1988, p. 2. According to the instruction of February 19, 1980, government officials had the right to travel to the Communist countries only on approval of the Executive Yuan.

\textsuperscript{20} Tzu-lih Tsao-pao (The Independence Morning Post), May 31, 1988, p. 2.

\textsuperscript{21} Similar assurances had been received from the US side more than once. See Chung-kuo Shih-pao (China Times), October 14, 1988, pp. 2, 13. The Taiwanese side spared some effort to stress that no attempt to "play the Soviet card" was being made. See for example Chung-yang Jih-pao (Central Daily News), October 15, 1988, p. 3.

\textsuperscript{22} The Soviet side requested to decrease the number of participants from 70 to 15; however, later the figure of 58 was negotiated. Chung-kuo Shih-pao (China Times), July 8, 1988, p. 6; Lien-ho Pao (United Daily News), October 1, 1988, p. 3.

\textsuperscript{23} Chung-yang Jih-pao (Central Daily News), September 29, 1988, p. 3.

\textsuperscript{24} Lien-ho Pao (United Daily News), August 20, 1988, p. 3; Tzu-lih Tsao-pao (The Independence Morning Post), August 14, 1988, p. 1; see also I. Lagunina, M. Hrobofov,
much was known to the public about their life in Taiwan. In the spring of 1988, the story of "Tuapse" appeared in the newspapers, and the government was even questioned in Parliament by legislators Tsai Chung-han and Huang Huang-hsiung about the future fate of the captives. It was in May that the Executive Yuan announced the decision to repatriate them through the third country's mediation. The ROC considered that move to be a good-will gesture, and Taipei was astounded by the reports which came out of Moscow immediately after the sailors' return home, which complained of brutal interrogations and harassment by the Taiwanese authorities.

The truthfulness of that statement was questionable. Quite probably it was provoked by the Soviet authorities. The fact that the last sailor, remaining alive in Taiwan, applied for ROC citizenship, which was granted in early 1989 after some bureaucratic red tape, testifies that the opposite was true. The government publicized information about the sailors' lives in the ROC along with their accommodations and installments received. Unfortunately that did not help stop the wave of the opposition's criticism, as the very fact of detention deserved being deplored. Only several months later, Moscow's Izvestiya published an article about the sad fate of several "Tuapse" crew members, who in 1958 returned to the USSR via Brazil and Uruguay only to be sent to a concentration camp as traitors. In comparison, the life of the Russians in Taiwan, who had been frolicking girlie bars under the surveillance of the secret service and departed for home with a handsome financial compensation, seemed less unpleasant. Whatever the embarrassing temporary propagandistic effects of the Soviet-Taiwanese communication on the issue of the sailors, it showed the possibility of further cautious probing in the sphere of bilateral contacts. Probably for this reason, the TPUEICC delegation received the green light.

Friendly reception at the Soviet Embassy in Bangkok en route to Moscow, as well as numerous contacts of the mission in Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev and Minsk aroused great interest in Taiwan. The newspapers were full of amazingly inaccurate reports dispatched by correspondents escorting the team. For example, Lien-ho Pao told the readers that “Memorial Hall of Peter the Great” (something absolutely fantastic and non-existent) was one of the main tourist attractions of Moscow, a city in which “every apartment” consisted of exactly two rooms. Putting aside the curious lapses, we should pay attention to the wave speculations about mutual economic cooperation projects. The period of “Soviet infatuation” had started. Having returned, the delegation members announced the intention to establish an association for promotion of Sino-Soviet trade.

The delegation’s Soviet trip incurred disapproval and even fury from two different directions. On the one hand, Beijing, closely watching all the developments in the external ties of the ROC, accused Taipei of searching for something more than a trade relationship under the guise of an economic mission. On the other hand, the KMT elders severely criticized the government for lack of vigilance and for abandonment of basic political principles. At the KMT Central Standing Committee meeting on October 12, 1988, the Secretary General of the Presidential Office, Shen Chang-huan, expressed profound indignation with the “irresponsible” attitude of Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lien Chan, and Minister of Economic Affairs, Chen Lih-an, towards the trade mission trip to the hostile country. “Not feeling the enemy, how can you govern the country,” he exclaimed, shaking in his hands a volume of Chiang Kai-shek’s Soviet Russia in China. The Executive Yuan was obliged to submit a prompt report on the issue in seven days. On October 19, after the explanations presented by Chen Lih-an, the KMT ruling body decided to consider the TPUEICC mission as an unofficial delegation, proclaimed the anti-Communist stance unchanged, and allowed only indirect trade with the Soviet Union.

29. There was even a seminar devoted to the problems of bilateral trade relations. For the Soviet side, it was hosted by the Chamber of Foreign Trade. See Chung-kuo Shih-pao (China Times), October 7, 1988, pp. 1, 2.
32. Ta Kung Pao, October 17, 1988, p. 5.
simultaneously came under attack from the Legislative Yuan representatives, who criticized the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and of Economic Affairs for the subservience to the outdated views of the ruling party conservatives.\textsuperscript{35}

B. **ROC Attitudes towards ROC-USSR Contacts**

It is of special interest to inquire into the different points of view expressed by the ROC political scientists and specialists on the Soviet Union about the prospects and viability of Taiwanese-Soviet contacts. Leading expert of the National Chengchi University (NCCU) Institute of International Relations (IIR), Prof. Pih Ying-hsien, pointed out that trade with the Soviet Union could have helped to diversify export markets and receive cheap raw materials, thus increasing the competitiveness of Taiwanese goods on the world market. At the same time, he cautioned against over-enthusiastic expectations, as Taiwanese business lacked proper information about the economic conditions in the Soviet Union; the latter having limited hard currency resources, which demanded barter exchange (quite uncommon and outdated for the ROC commercial practice).\textsuperscript{36} Director of the NCCU East Asian Institute, Prof. Chao Chun-shan, found it natural that the business circles were actively searching for new markets and in some respects “walking ahead of the government.” He argued that the communist essence of the Soviet regime had not yet changed, and called for further research of realities in order to cool down groundless euphoria. The then Assistant Professor of NCCU International Relations Department, Dr. Su Chi, stressed the important interdependence between ROC-PRC and ROC-USSR relations. He contended that contacts of the Taiwanese trade mission with the Soviet officials might have uselessly infuriated Beijing and precluded newly emerging cross-the-strait ties from constructive development.\textsuperscript{37} Prof. Hung Mao-hsiung, Director of the Institute of Europe (Tamkang University), and Prof. Kau Ying-mau of Brown University agreed that any expectations of boosting relations with the USSR were premature, but at the same time argued (together with Prof. Parris Chang of Pennsylvania State University) in favor of any attempts to overcome in-

\textsuperscript{35} *Chung-kuo Shih-pao* (China Times), October 18, 1988, pp. 2, 3.

\textsuperscript{36} *Tsu-yu Shih-pao* (The Liberty Times), September 20, 1988, p. 6.

\textsuperscript{37} *Chung-yang Jih-pao* (Central Daily News), October 13, 1988, p. 2.
ternational isolation. It is important to note that the Russian message was not at all enthusiastic. As seen from various interviews of Soviet officials and scholars by the Taiwanese press, the USSR did not in the least admit any cooperation with the ROC at the expense of Beijing's amiability.

Despite the criticisms of the KMT elders, the Taiwanese mission finally played a positive role in fostering the development of trade links with the USSR. At first, the position of different offices in the ROC was disparate. In late October 1988, the MOEA spread the news that when the proper moment came, it would recommend to the Executive Yuan to lift the restrictions on trade with the Soviet. Several days later, Government Information Office (GIO) Director, Shaw Yuh-ming, bluntly stated that friendly reception rendered to the ROC businessmen did not mean that the former country-occupant and supporter of Beijing's encroachments on Taiwan had turned into a friendly state. Entry visas continued to be denied to Soviet nationals, though granted to the participants of international events as in the case of the world beauty contest in March 1989.

Taiwanese intellectuals criticized the government for conservatism and lack of flexibility. Whatever the disagreements within the administration, public opinion was strongly in favor of an immediate breakthrough. Two conferences were held in Taipei in the autumn of 1988: one by the 21st Century Foundation and the other by CETRA. In both cases the participants demanded liberalization of trade and were extremely enthusiastic about its prospects. The idea of “dividing politics from economic cooperation,” expressed by the Soviet Academy Sinologist, Dr. A. Salitsky, in an interview with Tokyo Shimbun, became the motto of the day. According to a public opinion survey, 61% of the respondents anticipated growth

38. Chung-kuo Shih-pao (China Times), October 13, 1988, p. 2; October 19, 1988, p. 2; Chung-yang Jih-pao (Central Daily News), October 13, 1988, p. 2; October 19, 1988, p. 3.
39. See for example the interview with the Institute of Far Eastern Studies Deputy Director Dr. A. Morozov. Chung-kuo Shih-pao (China Times), October 12, 1988, p. 2.
41. However, the authorities did not allow the “Communist flag” to hover. Lien-ho Pao (United Daily News), March 27, 1989, p. 3.
42. See opinion of by then Visiting Prof. of Wisconsin University Chen Chi-nan. Lien-ho Pao (United Daily News), March 27, 1989, p. 3.
43. Chung-kuo Shih-pao (China Times), October 30, 1988, p. 2; Lien-ho Pao (United Daily News), November 8, 1988, p. 2; March 27, 1989, p. 3.
in bilateral trade, though most were not sure about the extent of Soviet friendliness towards Taiwan.\textsuperscript{44}

In the following months, two parallel attitudes - pessimistic and optimistic - towards relations with the USSR coexisted in the ROC. As for the pessimistic attitude, the stance of the ROC MOFA remained unchanged.\textsuperscript{45} This seemed reasonable, as no positive response to Taiwanese private overtures had been received. More than that, Moscow informed Taipei through a third party about the impossibility of direct trade because of the Beijing factor.\textsuperscript{46} When interviewed by \textit{Chung-kuo Shih-pao} in Beijing, Dr. M. Titarenko, Director of the Institute of Far Eastern Studies (IFES), made it clear that all Soviet contacts with Taiwan were closely monitored by the PRC with much disapproval. He cautiously mentioned the possibility of unofficial communication. Director of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IWEIR), Academician E. Primakov, was even more harsh, stating that no rapprochement was possible until the unification of China under communist rule.\textsuperscript{47} Both scholars arrived at the PRC capital to prepare M. Gorbachev's state visit. Under those particular circumstances, any mention of Taiwan sounded embarrassing and improper for them. While in Beijing, M. Gorbachev himself acknowledged that he touched upon the question of Taiwan during the talks with PRC leaders and reiterated Soviet adherence to the "one China" principle in Beijing's understanding of it.\textsuperscript{48}

In September 1989, the ROC government held lengthy discussions about granting entry visas to a group of Soviet journalists touring East Asia. On September 21, Premier Li Huan announced consent of the Executive Yuan, but in the final outcome Moscow cancelled the visit under pressure from Beijing.\textsuperscript{49} As reported by a Soviet diplomat, CCP Chairman Jiang Zemin addressed M. Gorbachev in 1989 with a special letter, asking to curtail contacts with the ROC.\textsuperscript{50}

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\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{44} \textit{Lien-ho Pao} (United Daily News), October 16, 1988, pp. 1, 2.
\item \textsuperscript{45} \textit{Ching-chi Jih-pao} (Economic Daily News), May 19, 1989, 2.
\item \textsuperscript{46} \textit{Lien-ho Pao} (United Daily News), February 28, 1989, 2.
\item \textsuperscript{47} \textit{Chung-kuo Shih-pao} (China Times), May 14, 1989, p. 3; May 15, 1989, p. 3.
\item \textsuperscript{48} \textit{Chung-kuo Shih-pao} (China Times), May 18, 1989, p. 1.
\item \textsuperscript{50} Deputy Director of the Diplomatic Academy in Moscow Prof. E. Bazhanov in 1992 started writing columns for the \textit{Chung-yang Jih-pao} under the pen-name N. Kor-
Rare Soviet visitors to Taipei also showed outward restraint. In May 1989, Dr. V. Ivanov of IWEIR and Yu. Ahremenko of the Soviet National Committee for Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation arrived as observers to the Pacific Basin Economic Conference. The former demonstratively abstained from applauding President Lee Teng-hui, who greeted the participants of the forum, thereby expressing Soviet "unrecognition" of his presidential status. Both delegations mostly concentrated their efforts on attracting the attention of Japanese and South Korean businessmen, obviously remaining cool to local proposals.\textsuperscript{51}

As more and more Taiwanese delegations inquired into the Soviet situation, more sober attitudes started to spread: (1) Soviet economic reform was at the initial stage and any investment plans would have been premature; (2) the Soviet economy was over-influenced by the military, quality of machinery was low, and raw materials production declined; (3) lack of a civilized means of communication precluded effective commercial operations in the USSR; and, (4) Soviet foreign trade was monopolized by the Japanese and Finnish firms, which left little space for competition.\textsuperscript{52}

As for the optimistic attitude, it had different adherents. Despite the limited perspectives of political interaction with Moscow, by the summer of 1989 certain representatives of the KMT started to think that any links with the USSR would help to deter the Chinese Communists.\textsuperscript{53} Soviet publications were meticulously scrutinized in order to find mention of "the ROC Government." These cases should have been attributed to the inaccuracy of Soviet editors, but were interpreted as a sign of covert sympathy towards Taiwan.\textsuperscript{54}

Through American counterparts, Soviet authorities let the Taiwanese know about their interest in ROC investments. The USSR Embassy in Thailand started discussions about possible joint ventures, or even the exchange of trade representatives.\textsuperscript{55} It is not completely clear to what extent the statements of Soviet diplomats


\textsuperscript{53} Hsing-tao Jih-pao (Sing Tao Daily), June 21, 1989, p. 2.

\textsuperscript{54} Lien-ho Pao (United Daily News), March 27, 1989, p. 3.

reflected serious intentions of their government, but they were definitely perceived as the official point of view in Taipei. Sometimes new Soviet bureaucrats, inexperienced in diplomacy, stated that the USSR was on the edge of establishing official relations with the ROC and that the PRC would be compelled to swallow the bitter pill. Afterwards, the Foreign Ministry press attache would be bound to clarify the Soviet position, disallowing any intergovernmental contacts with Taiwan.57

Public opinion in the ROC was sympathetic to the perestroika reforms of M. Gorbachev. Taiwanese willingness to establish friendly relations was manifested by more than US $40,000 of private donations to victims of the 1989 devastating earthquake in Armenia.58 The Taiwanese press published many interviews with Soviet scholars who were not bound by official positions and were quite enthusiastic about the development of bilateral cooperation. Of course, the opinions differed in details. If Dr. A. Maksimov and Dr. S. Shilovtsev of the Institute of Oriental Studies praised Taiwanese economic success and welcomed its presence in the USSR, then Dr. A. Yakovlev of IFES advocated the establishment of economic and cultural ties only under the condition of their being unofficial and not invoking Beijing's objections.59 The newspapers were full of intriguing and sometimes false information about the incredible volume of Soviet orders to Taiwanese panty-hose producers or about secret negotiations on the possible opening of an air-link between Moscow and Taipei.60

The necessity of educating Russian language experts was considered evident by those who foresaw the future improvements in bilateral relations. Tamkang University inaugurated the Post Grad-

56. For example, one may question the accuracy of Tai Wan-ching's report about Soviet Foreign Ministry representative V. Gerasomiv stating that he saw no obstacles for opening a Taiwanese commercial representative office in Moscow. Chung-kuo Shih-pao (China Times), February 13, 1990, p. 3. Apparently something else, other than the trade mission was meant, because at the same time V. Gerasimov considered it improper to accredit Taiwanese correspondents in the USSR.


uate Institute of Soviet and East European Studies in the autumn of 1989.\textsuperscript{61} Due to the activities of Prof. Ming Chi of the Chinese Culture University, arrangements for language practice for Taiwanese students in Moscow, Leningrad and Kiev were initiated.\textsuperscript{62}

Despite the difference in attitudes towards the USSR and disparate opinions about eventual contacts with it, the moderately optimistic approach became prevailing. In January 1990, the MOEA Board of Foreign Trade submitted to the Executive Yuan a report titled "Analysis of the Question on Direct Trade with the USSR" which favored trade liberalization. Minister Chen Lih-an also forwarded respective recommendations. As explained by the then Chairman of the Council for Economic and Development, Chien Fu, the abandonment of a one-party system in the USSR in early 1990 was perceived by the ROC as a positive sign, opening the way towards closer ties.\textsuperscript{63} After a short discussion on whether to allow only trade or to admit investments too, it was agreed to approve both. In March 1990, the Executive Yuan lifted the ban on direct trade with the USSR.\textsuperscript{64} Visa processing for Soviet nationals was simultaneously simplified.\textsuperscript{65}

Taiwanese businessmen immediately took advantage of the decision and participated in the international computer exhibition, COMTEK'90, held in Moscow that same month. On March 30, 1990, CETRA opened its exhibition center in Moscow where more than 300 companies displayed their products.\textsuperscript{66} The developments were so pronounced that the Minister of Foreign Affairs Lien Chan made a report to the Control and Legislative Yuans (on April 17 and 28 respectively) on the current state of relations with the USSR and East European countries. He did not exclude the possibility of

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext{61}{Ching-chi Jih-pao (Economic Daily News), October 21, 1989, p. 7.}
\footnotetext{62}{Chung-yang Jih-pao (Central Daily News), February 6, 1991, p. 2.}
\footnotetext{63}{Chung-kuo Shih-pao (China Times), January 21, 1990, p. 1; Chung-yang Jih-pao (Central Daily News), January 15, 1990, p. 2; Lien-ho Pao (United Daily News), February 9, 1990, p. 6.}
\footnotetext{64}{Chung-kuo Shih-pao (China Times), February 13, 1990, p. 3; February 16, 1990, p. 4; Lien-ho Pao (United Daily News), March 24, 1990, p. 1. The prospective investments were to be screened by the MOEA Investment Commission, and could not be targeted at Soviet government supported or military technologies.}
\footnotetext{65}{Ching-nien Jih-pao (Youth Daily News), March 30, 1990, p. 2.}
\footnotetext{66}{Ching-chi Jih-pao (Economic Daily News), March 16, 1990, p. 10; Chung-kuo Shih-pao (China Times), March 31, 1990, p. 5.}
\end{footnotes}
establishing diplomatic relations with Moscow, but emphasized trade as a primary goal. 67

C. Salience of the Chinese Mainland Influence

Communist China, however, moved without delay to preclude any further development of ROC-USSR contacts. During Premier Li Peng’s visit to Moscow in late April 1990, for the first time in many years the joint communiqué comprised a statement of the Soviet Union’s recognition of the PRC’s position on the Taiwan issue. 68 Moscow’s stubborn subservience to Beijing disappointed Taipei. Many unilateral steps were undertaken by the ROC government, but no response was visible on the Soviet side. The ideological factor of “proletarian internationalism” in Soviet-mainland China relations suppressed pragmatic considerations, and conspicuously forced the USSR to abate (unlike the other countries of the world) its contacts with the ROC.

A. Lukin, a young Sinologist and former Soviet diplomat who was recently elected a member of the Moscow Municipal Council, visited Taiwan in May 1990 on an invitation from the Chung-kuo Shih-pao. He tried to persuade the ROC officials that expectations of early progress were exorbitant and proposed to start partnerships between local (municipal or provincial) authorities, with the aim of seeking approaches to higher levels of power in the USSR later. 69 While participating at a conference in New York in early June, A. Grachev, Deputy Director of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee’s International Department, emphasized the

importance of Soviet-Taiwanese trade being separate from other kinds of relations.70

The general climate being thus unpropitious,71 Taiwan had to put aside its expectations. New Minister of Foreign Affairs, Chien Fu, admitted that Soviet-Taiwanese relations differed in principle from Soviet-South Korean ties, because the latter was developing at a good pace due to Korea's internationally recognized status as a divided country. He expressed hope that successful Taiwanese investors would be able to influence Soviet decision-makers in the future and foster bilateral relations.72

The summer of 1990 saw the start of a series of visits of Soviet delegations to the ROC.73 G. Popov, Chairman of the Moscow City

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According to the statistics of the ROC representative office in Singapore, during the year finishing with July 1990, over one hundred Soviet nationals received their entry
Council and a well-known democratically oriented politician, arrived in October. He followed the steps of A. Lukin, proposing to Chien Fu that Moscow and Taipei exchange representative offices. He did not exclude the possibility of diplomatic relations, but stressed that "every vegetable has its own season," and pronounced economic cooperation plans.

The gradual disintegration of the Soviet Union began in the autumn of 1990. Union Republics started proclaiming independent sovereignty. Of course, that did not mean complete secession, but it definitely manifested signs of the empire's nascent implosion. Taiwanese political scientists supposed that splintering of the USSR could be propitious for both the ROC trade and probably for the establishment of consular relations. However, realists like Dr. Su Chi, the then Deputy-Director of the NCCU Institute of International Relations, continued to stress the importance of economic cooperation and found quick political changes more than equivocal. Anticipating the emerging changes in the USSR, MOFA relinquished all interdictions of the ROC overseas servicemen's contacts with Soviet representatives.

74. The visit had several bizarre aspects. First, G. Popov was expected to be Mayor of Moscow, so the press asked Prof. Pih Ying-hsien to clarify the guest's official status. Second, N. Lutsenko, a correspondent accompanying the group, was introduced as a Member of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. Lien-ho Pao (United Daily News), October 27, 1990, p. 2; October 28, 1990, p. 3. Third, the trip was organized by the "Chung Hsing Textile Group" division - "Yih Hsing Company" - which expected to prosper from Soviet trade. Indeed, a delegation of the "Russian House Company" arrived in Taiwan soon after G. Popov and ordered goods worth US $ 8 bln. However, in the course of time the "Russian House" turned out to have no financial resources, and proposed to shift to barter trade which brought the "Yih-Hsing" to the brink of insolvency. The incident had a staggering effect on those who dreamed of quick profits from Soviet trade. Chung-kuo Shih-pao (China Times), January 8, 1991, p. 10; Lien-ho Pao (United Daily News), October 30, 1990, p. 3; January 8, 1991, p. 3.

G. Popov met in Taipei with one of the leaders of the 1989 Tiananmen student movement, Wuer Kaixi, which infuriated Beijing. Strong protest was presented to the Soviet Foreign Ministry. Izvestiya (The News), November 4, 1990, p. 3. It should be noted that A. Lukin's trip invited a similar reaction of the PRC. Chung-kuo Shih-pao (China Times), August 2, 1990, p. 4; Ming Pao, November 1, 1990, p. 25. In the summer of 1991, as a gesture of punishment, the PRC Foreign Ministry cancelled G. Popov's visit to mainland China. Lien-ho Pao (United Daily News), July 11, 1991, p. 1.

75. The Japan Times, October 28, 1990, p. 3.


There was one particular need for such communication: The Soviet authorities detained three Taiwanese fishing boats in its territorial waters. Since such incidents happened quite often, some type of bilateral fishing agreement was most necessary. On November 2, 1990 bilateral, unofficial fishing negotiations began in Tokyo. Later on, they turned out to be difficult, and ultimately abject to any conclusive result. The final letter of intent, outlining basic principles of mutual cooperation, was only signed by the Soviet Union Fishing Industry Company and the ROC Association for Overseas Fishing Cooperation on August 19, 1991. This meant that the agreement had no treaty value from the point of view of either international law or the Soviet, and later Russian, government.

By the end of 1990, different Soviet officials made enough statements on Soviet-Taiwanese relations to clarify the situation. The then Minister of Finance, V. Pavlov, said that political factors hindered full-scale economic cooperation. The Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation, A. Kozyrev, maintained that his Republic was ready to develop mutual trade with Taiwan, but not at the expense of relations with the PRC. Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Council on International Relations, A. Dzasohov, declared all visits of Soviet government officials to Taiwan to be illegal.

The above-mentioned prolific pronouncements to a large extent resulted from Beijing’s pressure. The PRC Ambassador in Moscow, Yu Hongliang, missed no chance to show contempt for the feeble Soviet-Taiwanese contacts. In November 1990, the Beijing-published Liaowang (Outlook, overseas edition) published an article explaining the latest developments as a well elaborated plot of


80. Lien-ho Pao (United Daily News), July 21, 1991, p. 11. In March 1992, after the dissolution of the USSR, a Russian Foreign Ministry representative noted that an agreement did not give the Taiwanese the rights to fish in Russia’s territorial waters or to enter its ports. Chung-yang Jih-pao (Central Daily News), March 6, 1992, p. 9.

Taipei, which sought upgrading relations with Moscow.\textsuperscript{82} The intimidating message was clear: newly restored Soviet-Chinese communist-friendly relations could wither due to the further growth of contacts with the ROC.

Despite the obstacles in its way, the Soviet-Taiwanese relationship kept on developing. Its volume had already become quite salient when in January 1991 the Executive Yuan decided to establish an Interdepartmental Research Group on Relations with the Soviet Union, presided by the MOFA Vice-Minister, Chang Hsiao-yen.\textsuperscript{83} On March 29, it was reorganized into a Working Group on Relations with the USSR.\textsuperscript{84} By that time MOFA had already established contacts not only with the Russian Federation, but also with the other union republics - Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Georgia, Moldova and Azerbaijan - all of which sought Taiwanese economic cooperation and aid as well.\textsuperscript{85} Taipei paid special interest to the possibility of opening official relations with the Baltic states, but any definite action had to be postponed until their actual independence from the USSR.

Concurrently, numerous civic associations started to emerge. Their main purpose lay in the sphere of stimulating bilateral relations. As early as late November 1990, the China-Soviet Economic Development Association (CSEDA) started its operations. President of the Overseas Chinese Bank, Chua Siao-hua, was its Chairman, and the scheme of operations was developed by Prof. Wei Woo of the National Sun Yat-sen University. He had previously lectured at Moscow State University and had some experience in dealing with the Soviet Union's official business and academic circles.\textsuperscript{86} Alongside CSEDA existed another association, headed by the legis-


\textsuperscript{83} \textit{Chung-kuo Shih-pao} (China Times), January 8, 1991, p. 4.

\textsuperscript{84} It included representatives from MOFA, MOEA, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Transportation and Communications, Ministry of Education, Mainland Affairs Council, National Science Council, Central Bank of China and National Security Bureau. With the emergence of the Commonwealth of Independent States, the group was first renamed into Working Group on Relations with the Soviet Commonwealth, and then into Working Group on Relations with Russian Commonwealth. \textit{Ching-nien Jih-pao} (Youth Daily News), February 26, 1992, p. 2.


\textsuperscript{86} \textit{Lien-ho Pao} (United Daily News), November 24, 1991, p. 4; \textit{Tzu-yu Shih-pao} (The Liberty Times), January 24, 1990, p. 3.
lator Tsai Chung-han. It mostly dealt with private contacts between the two countries. The idea of the Chinese-Soviet Economic Exchanges Foundation was also discussed.\(^{87}\)

Unofficial associations or private individuals started actively inviting Russian officials of different levels in anticipation of dramatic breakthroughs in bilateral ties. Most often, immediate returns from such contacts were expected by both sides. The visit to Taiwan by the Governor of Sakhalin Island, V. Fedorov, can serve as an example. His main purpose was to attract Taiwanese investments, or even to get some contributions to the “Sakhalin Development Fund.” Together with the legislator Hsieh Lai-fa, he signed several agreements on investment guarantees, joint investments and fishing. No one seemed confounded by the lack of clarity in those documents’ legal value. It may be assumed that Hsieh Lai-fa expected some benefits for his own “Ta Ou Trading Company,” and that there was competition between him and other businessmen. Another notorious “Soviet trade activist” legislator, Tsai Chung-han, insisted that it was his “Ching Lai International Company” which invited V. Fedorov to the ROC.\(^{88}\)

On the Soviet side, certain members of the economic elite, free from political prejudice, exemplified a pragmatic approach to relations with Taiwan, and prepared to reap the harvest from the groundswell of future bilateral trade. In January 1991, A. Vladislavlev, member of the USSR Supreme Soviet and one of the leaders of the Soviet Scientific-Industrial Union (a party-like organization of high-ranking industrial bureaucrats), arrived in Taipei. He advertised the plan of establishing a special foundation for promoting relations between the two countries.\(^{89}\) A. Vladislavlev was a proxy of an influential group of cadres who coalesced around the well-known Soviet Communist Party Central Committee activist, A. Volsky. They supported M. Gorbachev’s economic reforms to the extent that they did not contradict the interests of big state-owned enterprises. The foundation proposed by A. Vladislavlev was conspicuously planned as a tool for trade development, but it confluently could perform such functions as visa processing. The A. Volsky group had influential positions in the Soviet hierarchy, and hoped to monopolize relations with the ROC. During his second


trip to Taipei in July 1991, A. Vladislavlev mentioned that the new foundation would be the main channel of communication between the USSR and Taiwan. He also seemed to have no doubts about its ability to perform consular functions.\textsuperscript{90} A. Vladislavlev and Huang Shang-hui, President of Hung Pang International Enterprise Group, signed an agreement on the establishment of the Foundation of Far Eastern Exchanges. Two branches were to be founded: one on Taiwan and the other in the USSR, with the latter being presided by the former Foreign Minister, E. Shevardnadze. The project received much publicity. Newspapers reported that the foundation could help barter Taiwanese computers and consumer goods for Soviet oil, aluminum and timber (the volume of the deal reaching US $ 200 mln). However, CETRA refrained from taking part in the undertaking, as it did not seem to be unequivocally supported by the Soviet authority.\textsuperscript{91}

Meanwhile, the Beijing factor began to interfere with developments once again. In May 1991, the CCP Chairman Jiang Zemin visited Moscow. A serious misunderstanding emerged when the diplomats were editing the text of a joint communique. The Soviet Foreign Ministry proposed to include a phrase about the Chinese side admitting non-official commercial, scholarly and cultural relations between the USSR and Taiwan, if they did not lead to the establishment of diplomatic relations. The PRC’s rebuff was so strong that the Soviet side finally agreed to withdraw the proposal and state its adherence to the Beijing position on the Taiwan issue.\textsuperscript{92} Generally speaking, the Soviet Foreign Ministry of the Gorbachev period could not remain unbiased due to two fronts of pressure - the PRC and domestic conservatives. It turned out that Beijing “did not allow” Moscow even to sustain unofficial relations with the ROC as done by other nations of the world.\textsuperscript{93}

Soviet authorities demonstratively mistreated Taiwanese officials arriving in Moscow. For example, the Chairman of the Executive Yuan Council of Labor Affairs, Chao Shou-poh, waited for two

\textsuperscript{90} Lien-ho Pao (United Daily News), July 21, 1991, p. 11.

\textsuperscript{91} Ching-chi Jih-pao (Economic Daily News), July 21, 1991, p. 2. Indeed, in September, Taiwanese and Soviet foundations started trading timber and discussed joint development of natural resources in the Irkutsk district, but there was no talk about issuing visas or general attempts to foster bilateral relations as a whole. Tsu-lih Tsao-pao (The Independence Morning Post), September 15, 1991, p. 4.

\textsuperscript{92} Chung-yang Jih-pao (Central Daily News), March 31, 1992, p. 3.

\textsuperscript{93} The fact was bluntly admitted by a Soviet diplomat in Washington in April 1991. Chung-kuo Shih-pao (China Times), April 4, 1991, p. 6.
days in April 1991 until he could pass the border in the Moscow international airport. Soon afterwards, MOEA Vice-Minister Chiang Ping-kun’s entry visa was canceled. This was especially embarrassing for the ROC, since in May 1991 further simplification of visa processing procedures for Soviet nationals was introduced.

It is important to note that in the circumstances of limited liberalization in the USSR there existed an unpacted agreement that unofficial contacts with Taiwan could develop. High-ranking ROC officials were shunned to avoid exacerbation of tension with the PRC. For instance, a seminar on bilateral economic relations was convened in Moscow at the end of May 1991 with the support of the CETRA representative (in those days still having no official status in the USSR), the Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research and the Institute of Oriental Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Ms. Hsu Chih-man was the first ROC MOFA diplomat to participate in a bilateral event of the kind. A large group of Taiwanese and Soviet businessmen exchanged views on the prospects of cooperation and trade.

IV. DYNAMICS FOLLOWING THE ABORTIVE COUP OF AUGUST 1991

The abortive coup of August 1991 not only drastically changed the situation in the Soviet Union, but also provided favorable conditions for the gradual growth of relations with the ROC. The downfall of the Communist regime in the USSR seriously inconvenienced the Beijing leadership. One of those was the dismantling of the ideological partnership with Moscow. Now the “fraternal” devotion to the cause of China’s unification under the auspices of the PRC could no longer serve as a reason for Soviet and/or Russian absenteeism from developing unofficial contacts with Taiwan. Of course, the strategic importance of friendly relations with the PRC did not evaporate together with the downfall of Soviet Communism, but Moscow definitely acquired greater flexibility. The Chairman of the IFES Soviet-Chinese Relations Research Section, Dr. S. Goncharov, pointed out in an interview with Tzu-lih Tsao-pao that

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the change of the political regime in the USSR had opened new (although limited) possibilities for cooperation with the ROC. At the same time he expressed a reserved attitude towards the eventual broadening of ties between Taiwan and the former Soviet republics. Dr. S. Goncharov explained that the bureaucracy of the newly independent states was inexperienced in diplomacy; some of them did not have a correct idea of how complicated ROC-PRC relations had been.97

A. Taiwanese Optimism

Taiwanese politicians and observers were much more optimistic. Greeting the participants of "The Republic of China and New International Order" Conference in Taipei on August 21, 1991, Premier Hau Pei-tsun characterized M. Gorbachev as an outstanding leader. The statement manifested clear change of official attitude towards the USSR.98 Some time later Dr. Su Chi maintained that the changes in the Soviet Union, though not detrimental to Moscow-Beijing relations, could at the same time help to improve the ROC's international standing.99 The Chairman of the Legislative Yuan Foreign Relations Committee, Prof. Wei Yung, was more explicit; he clearly defined strengthening contacts with the Soviet republics as a primary goal. He proposed to attain major targets (i.e., diplomatic relations) through concrete, incremental steps, such as economic aid, cultural and educational exchanges.100 The Legislative Yuan was especially active all through the autumn of 1991, exerting pressure on MOFA and demanding earlier establishment of diplomatic relations either with the Baltic states or with Ukraine. Consistent with those aspirations, Taiwanese diplomats had undertaken adequate steps and were awaiting responses from the newly independent states. It was supposed that the exchange of official representatives with Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia would take place in the near future.101 As for Ukraine, the problem turned out

100. Chung-yang Jih-pao (Central Daily News), September 6, 1991, p. 2.
101. MOFA stated in late November 1991, that the respective agreements had already been signed with all three states, but the ROC representative office was to be opened only in Riga, the capital of Latvia. Chung-yang Jih-pao (Central Daily News), November 29, 1991, p. 2. Taiwan had provided Latvia with US $10 mln of economic aid, signed agreements on air transport and protection of investments in September 1992 during the official visit of Premier I. Godmanis to Taiwan. Nezavisimaya gazeta (The Independent Newspaper), August 15, 1992, p. 3. Due to the changes in the Latvian
to be more complicated. First, Ukraine’s independence presented the unprecedented case of a union republic’s formal secession from the Soviet Union (the case of the Baltics differed because they were internationally considered to be occupied territories). Until Ukraine’s sovereignty was completely institutionalized, any moves by the ROC government could have been interpreted as support of separatism. According to IIR Director, Dr. Lin Bih-jaw, that was utterly undesirable because of internal reasons (i.e., the debate on Taiwanese independence). Second, Taipei could not be sure of Kiev’s reply to its advances.\(^{102}\)

The last months of the USSR’s existence were marked by several important developments. V. Gerashenko, President of the USSR Central Bank, visited Taiwan in October 1991, when he participated in the opening of the Taipei office of the financial company “Eurasco” and held negotiations with MOEA Minister, Chiang Ping-kun. V. Gerashenko pointed out that a Soviet visa issuing office might be opened in Taipei after a certain period of initial development of bilateral relations.\(^{103}\) In December of the same year, Soviet Vice-Premier and Director of the Institute of Economics, L. Abalkin, a well-known architect of Gorbachev’s still-born economic reforms, presented lectures in Taipei as well.\(^{104}\)

December 1991 was especially rich in events. The Chairman of the ROC National Science Council, Hsia Han-min, arrived in the USSR in order to inquire into the possibilities of utilizing Soviet scientific and technical potential.\(^{105}\) Taipei City Mayor, Huang Tah-chou, visited Moscow in April 1992, and the friendly ties between

government, the proponents of co-operation with the PRC prevailed. Vice-Premier M. Gailis visited Beijing in 1994 and signed an agreement, guaranteeing, that Latvia would not maintain official relations with Taiwan. As a result of that, in the autumn of 1994, the ROC General Consulate in Riga had to change its status to unofficial. *The China Post*, February 21, 1994, p. 1; July 30, 1994, p. 1; Tzu-lih Tsao-pao (The Independence Morning Post), November 25, 1994, p. 2.


105. Due to the election of Nobel Prize laureate Prof. Ting Chao-chun an Honorary Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences as early as 1977, the ROC National Science Council had a proper channel of communication with the Soviet academic circles. *Tzu-lih Tsao-pao* (The Independence Morning Post), June 17, 1991, p. 3; December 17, 1991, p. 7.
the two capitals were strengthened. Due to A. Lukin's mediation, KMT representatives, Prof. Ming Chi, Chairman of the Russian Department of the Chinese Culture University and President of the KMT-owned "San Yih Company", along with Deputy General Manager of the party publishing houses "Cheng Chung Bookstore," Wang Chien-hung, took part in N. Travkin's Russian Democratic Party Congress.

No consistency was observed in the Soviet authorities' attitude towards the ROC visitors. For example, Hsia Han-min, a ministerial-level official was admitted; while the delegation to the unofficial negotiations on a fishing agreement found it impossible to obtain entry visas. Another example deals with the visit to Taipei of the delegation led by the Soviet Minister of Light Industry, L. Davletova, who clumsily avoided meeting Minister Chiang Ping-kun. It was obvious that while the political system was changing, bureaucracy had no united approach to the problem of relations with Taiwan. After final approval by the Moscow city government in October, it became possible to establish a CETRA representative office in December 1991 under the name of the Taipei World Trade Center Moscow Branch Office. The Taiwanese side expected more changes, such as the opening of an air link and maritime communication, strengthening of contacts between banks and favorable taxation of ROC imports to the USSR.

Activities of Taiwanese businessmen and parliamentarians remained an important driving force behind the development of bilateral relations. A prominent Taiwanese politician, Kang Ning-

106. In 1995, new Taipei Mayor Chen Shui-pien visited Moscow and continued friendly relations between the capitals of the two countries.
111. *Ching-chi Jih-pao* (Economic Daily News), October 19, 1991, pp. 9, 10. The latter request was satisfied by the Soviet authorities on grounds politically unfavorable to the ROC. Moscow put the Taiwanese goods into the same category as if they were produced in the PRC.
hsiang, visited Moscow with the delegation of the Institute of International Affairs (titled in Chinese as the Chinese International Cultural and Economic Association) in November 1991. The trip made the Taiwanese Foundation for Far Eastern Exchanges nervous, as they feared that Kang would grip their Soviet contacts. Indeed, many Taiwanese civic associations sought benefits from the newly emerging ROC-USSR relationship. Competition sometimes resulted in confusion. For example, when Kang Ning-hsiang proposed the supplies of rice as a kind of humanitarian help, he was told in Moscow that another delegation had already made a similar offer.\textsuperscript{112}

One month later, a group of Taiwanese politicians and businessmen visited the USSR for the purpose of reconnoitering Siberia's economic potential. Legislator Lin Shou-shan boasted that he had signed an agreement according to which the Foundation for Far Eastern Exchanges would in three months time be licensed as a visa processing body.\textsuperscript{113} In spite of the fact that the agreement turned out to be inconsequential, one might say that “there was no smoke without fire.” The delegation was received by a very important figure in Russian politics - Director of the Russian Federation Presidential Office, Yu. Petrov. As a close associate of Boris Yeltsin, he could have fostered qualitative changes in Russia's relations with the ROC.\textsuperscript{114} Probably, he made some encouraging promises to his Taiwanese guests.

B. Effect of the Dissolution of the USSR

The emergence of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the dissolution of the Soviet Union had a tumultuous effect on Taiwanese counterparts, because many had already become involved in the bilateral relationship. Now, new approaches and new solutions were to be sought. First of all, any aspirations for establishing official contacts with the newly independent states withered at a direful speed. On December 27, 1991, the PRC declared official recognition of the twelve former Soviet Union republics. Minister of Economics and Trade, Li Lanjing, and Vice-


\textsuperscript{113} Chung-kuo Shih-pao (China Times), December 27, 1991, p. 9.

\textsuperscript{114} Kang Ning-hsiang also called on Yu. Petrov, which enables us to suppose that by the end of 1991 the Russian Presidential Office was intensively involved in dialogue with Taiwan. Ching-chi Jih-pao (Economic Daily News), December 4, 1991, p. 9; Chung-kuo Shih-pao (China Times), December 27, 1991, p. 9.
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tian Zengpei, toured Russia, Ukraine, Byelorussia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan, and established official relations with each. Russia had acknowledged all the diplomatic documents signed between the USSR and the PRC, while the other states declared recognition of Beijing authority as the sole legal government of China, and additionally verbalized a pledge not to maintain any kind of official relations with Taiwan.\textsuperscript{115} Byelorussia had to spare special effort to convince Beijing that contacts between its officials and Taiwanese businessmen in the summer of 1991 were not intended to pave the way to diplomatic recognition of Taipei. Premier V. Kebich admitted later, that “the Taiwan problem was a stumbling block during the negotiations on the diplomatic relations agreement between Byelorussia and China.”\textsuperscript{116}

However, those developments did not seem to discourage the ROC MOFA, which indeed quite realistically expected them to be-tide. On January 11, 1991, MOFA Minister Chien Fu presented the Legislative Yuan with a report entitled “How to Develop Relations Between Our Country and the New ‘Commonwealth of Independent States’ in Soviet Russia.” Despite the clumsy title, it contained accurate information on the CIS and pin-pointed the future steps towards strengthening of bilateral relations. Chien Fu admitted that Beijing relied on well-rooted contacts with the USSR while settling intergovernmental contacts with the CIS member-states. Historical consequences deprived the ROC of that possibility.\textsuperscript{117} Against that background, the constructive dialogue with the three Baltic states could have been interpreted as a measure of success. Indeed, in early 1992 the PRC Foreign Ministry had set up a special working group in order to resist Taiwan's diplomatic offensive in the CIS.\textsuperscript{118} MOFA declared that Russia, Ukraine and Byelorussia


\textsuperscript{117} The Minister noted that recognition by the ROC might have not been accepted, which would have resulted in a loss of face. See also Asia Wall Street Journal, February 3, 1992, p. 1.

\textsuperscript{118} Lien-ho Pao (United Daily News), February 7, 1992, p. 1. In the autumn of 1992, Latvia’s experience of maintaining simultaneous ties with the ROC and the PRC was considered by the Russian press as a viable diplomatic pattern for the other countries to apply in relations with China, “probably, but for the great powers”. Nezavisimaya Gazeta (The Independent Newspaper), September 15, 1992, p. 3. The prophesy did not work out.
remained its priorities within the CIS. Exchange of representative offices remained an important goal. Visits of delegations and cooperation in the fields of natural resources development, fishing and agriculture, science, education and culture were planned. MOFA financially supported the increase in numbers of the CIS students practicing Mandarin in Taiwan. Chien Fu noted that Russia, Ukraine, Byelorussia and Kazakhstan had through indirect channels applied for humanitarian aid, which could eventually help to foster bilateral ties.

Certain facts suggest that a comparatively sound channel of informal communication between Taipei and Moscow had already existed by that time. In late December 1991 in Taipei, Kang Hsinhsiang introduced three unspecified high-ranking Russian officials to the MOFA Vice-Minister, Chang Hsiao-yen. In late January to early February 1992, Chang started his unofficial visit to Russia, Ukraine and Latvia. The results obtained seemed quite encouraging. Russia gratefully accepted a donation of 100,000 tons of rice worth US $20 mil. Ukraine was promised humanitarian medical aid worth US $15 mil., and in return agreed to sign a communique on economic cooperation and exchange euphemistically titled trade

119. See Minister Chien Fu's interview with Izvestiya - "Economic Miracle is Possible in Russia Too", Izvestiya, April 15, 1992, p. 2.
120. Lih-fa-yuan Kung-pao (Gazette of the Legislative Yuan) Vol. 81, # 6 (1991), pp. 231, 236. In the spring of 1992, delegations from Kyrgyzstan and Azerbaijan visited Taiwan in order to foster trade and sought economic aid from the ROC. Chung-yang Jih-pao (Central Daily News), March 9, 1992, p. 3.
122. The decision to render assistance to Russia was adopted by the ROC government consistent with the policies of the developed nations of the world, which deemed it expedient to support the post-Communist rehabilitation. Eight shipments of rice were shipped under the ROC flag by several Taiwanese companies to different Russian ports (Vladivostok included). Izvestiya (The News), February 28, 1992, p. 6. Quite significantly, in April 1991, a Russian M/V "Komsomolskaya Slava" with two high-ranking government officials on board was allowed to enter the Keelung harbor to take a cargo of rice. The whole project had good publicity in Russia, Taiwan and internationally. See S. Agafonov, "Taiwan's Rice Gift", Izvestiya (The News), January 11, 1992, p. 5; Lih-fa-yuan Kung-pao (Gazette of the Legislative Yuan), Vol. 82, # 30 (1992), p. 137. Later on the "rice case" became notorious because of the rumors spread by the Russian press about the Taiwanese grain being contaminated with chemicals. Despite the fact that there was no proof to that, the issue had been many times discussed in the Legislative Yuan.

Director of the CETRA Moscow office Wu Lih-min published a statement in which he refuted the reports of the Russian media and proved that Taiwanese rice was ecologically clean. Izvestiya (The News), August 20, 1993, p.3.
representatives. In Latvia, a General Consulate was to be opened with the office's name including the words, "Republic of China." Chang Hsiao-yen appeared in Moscow unofficially, and met with O. Lobov. At that particular moment, the latter had no special post in the government, but he was known as a close associate of President B. Yeltsin. As it became known later, the ROC MOFA resorted to the assistance of American businessman, B. Lacher, who helped maintain contacts with O. Lobov.

The softening of the climate did not mean that the Russian government bodies, primarily the Foreign Ministry, were eager to start moving towards serious and drastic restructuring of Russian policies towards Taiwan. However, the conservative forces at a certain stage had lost their prevailing influence, and the initiative was taken by Oleg I. Lobov. Due to his active negotiations with Chang Hsiao-yen, the Moscow-Taipei Economic and Cultural Coordination Commission (MTC) and the Taipei-Moscow Eco-

123. See statement by the Ukrainian Minister of Foreign Economic Relations Kravchuk. *Chung-kuo Shih-pao* (China Times), January 20, 1992, p. 1. Further contacts with Kiev made Chang Hsiao-yen quite optimistic about the future relationship. In April 1992, he considered the exchange of representative offices with Ukraine most probable. *Izvestiya* (The News), February 4, p. 6; *Lien-ho Pao* (United Daily News), April 19, 1992, p. 4. Vice-Speaker of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet V. Grinev visited Taiwan in August 1992 and made a series of statements, which rather testified his lack of diplomatic experience. V. Grinev was optimistic about early settlement of the representation issue and saw no obstacles in the way of selling weapons to Taiwan (an aircraft carrier included). Only to drive Beijing mad and to cause uneasiness in Taipei, he maintained that “no one can deny Taiwan being an independent sovereign state”. *Tzu-lih Tiao-pao* (The Independence Morning Post), August 28, 1992, p. 4; August 29, 1992, p. 1. In the final result Kiev strongly allied itself with the PRC and no positive changes had been attained.


126. He had worked with B. Yeltsin at the Sverdlovsk region party committee since 1972. Though the Russian press spreads numerous rumors about Lobov’s participation in factional struggle, in reality he is the President’s faithful ally. As Moscow’s *Izvestiya* put it, Lobov is “Yeltsin’s man” and enjoys the confidence of his boss. I. Savvateeva. “Yeltsin’s Man”, *Izvestiya* (The News), May 13, 1994, p. 5. Further developments in Russia had shown Lobov’s continuing strength. In the position of the Secretary of the State Security Council he played an important role during the Chechnya suppression operation.

127. Chang Hsiao-yen first visited Moscow on January 24, 1992 unofficially and signed an agreement with the Russian Government Committee on Grain Products on the supplies of Taiwanese humanitarian aid to Russia.
onomic and Cultural Coordination Commission (TMC) came into existence. After three days of negotiations, the Protocol on the Establishment of the Taipei-Moscow Coordination Commission and the Moscow-Taipei Coordination Commission was signed in Moscow during their second meeting on April 16, 1992. The parties agreed that the development of economic ties between Russia and the ROC could be mutually beneficial, primarily in such spheres as “employment of high technology, raw material supplies, development of projects including raw material extraction and processing, commercial construction projects, infrastructure development and tourism.”128 TMC and MTC had to serve as “non-governmental, non-profit instrumentalities” and open their respective representative offices in Moscow and Taipei. A protocol stipulated that both commissions, despite their unofficial status, had to “enjoy the required authorizations from the . . . respective governments granted normally to governmental officials.” The parties agreed to “undertake all the necessary steps” in order to obtain the “consents” of their governments.129 According to the document, O. Lobov and Chang Hsiao-yen hoped to get the approval of the highest authority by the end of May 1992. Emergence of semi-official communication with Russia made all of the “people’s diplomacy” amateur entrepreneurship absolutely unnecessary. It evidently distressed legislator Mah Ai-chen, who along with A. Vladislavlev deemed himself an architect of the Taiwanese trade office in Vladivostok. A. Vladislavlev’s political weight visibly diminished with the change of the political system in Russia and the services of the Foundation for Far Eastern Exchanges were no longer needed in either Moscow or in Taipei.130

Overwhelming changes in Russia’s political landscape naturally produced a wave of political and commercial adventurism. Having no idea of the severe realities of Moscow-Beijing relations, businessmen and new bureaucrats believed it possible to make fortunes trading weapons to Taiwan. In January 1992, the newspapers prolifically reported about possible Russian arms sales to the ROC. It happened that during the parliamentary hearings on relations with

the CIS, MOFA Minister Chien Fu noted that Minister of Defense Chen Lih-an often consulted him on the advisability of purchasing Russian weaponry.\textsuperscript{131} The public's reaction overcame all expectations and the media intensively speculated on the matter. Some argued in favor of diversifying the sources of armaments, while others contended that just samples would be enough to learn how to combat the Chinese Communists who relied on Russian techniques. Still others pointed to the possibility of ROC authorities manipulating the news in order to speed up the supplies of American F-16 fighters. In all these cases, Taiwanese-Russian contacts and discussions of a possible arms deals were taken for granted.\textsuperscript{132} Finally, Premier Hau Pei-tsun repudiated all of the hearsay, remarking that any deal of the kind would have been a dangerous adventure if it concluded prior to the normalization of bilateral relations.\textsuperscript{133} With some delay, the Russian Foreign Ministry also rejected any suspicions of Moscow's intention to trade weapons to Taipei.\textsuperscript{134}

Chang Hsiao-yen also denied any mentioning of military supplies during his talks in Moscow and Kiev. As shown by the following events, that might not have been the case. In the summer of 1992, the KMT newspaper, \textit{Chung-yang Jih-pao}, reported that during his last visit to Ukraine in June, Vice-Minister Chang discussed the possibility of buying weapons, but received a negative answer from his hosts.\textsuperscript{135} Chang Hsiao-yen mentioned that during the same trip to the CIS, the Russian side expressed its wish to sell the armaments, but now he himself doubted the credibility of such ad-

\textsuperscript{131} \textit{Chung-kuo Shih-pao} (China Times), January 12, 1992, p. 3. Chien Fu rejected any possibility of reorientation on Russia under the circumstances, when ROC military supplies relied on the USA by 85%. However, the press accentuated the government's interest in Russian weapons. The question was raised in the Parliament too. \textit{Lih-fa-yuan Kung-pao} (Gazette of the Legislative Yuan), Vol. 81. # 6 (1992), p.255.


\textsuperscript{134} \textit{Jen-min Jih-pao} (People's Daily), March 6, 1992, p. 6. However Russian military producers, for instance "Sukhoi" fighter plant, kept in touch with the Taiwanese. \textit{Chung-kuo Shih-pao} (China Times), June 9, 1992, p. 4.

\textsuperscript{135} \textit{Chung-yang Jih-pao} (Central Daily News), July 14, 1992, p. 3; \textit{Tzu-ih Tsao-pao} (The Independence Morning Post), February 1, 1992, p. 4.
vances. However, Chang admitted the possibility of military co-operation "in principle", but not at the current moment.\textsuperscript{136}

In June 1992, the former Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Pacific Fleet, Admiral V. Sidorov, and Vice-Admiral A. Styrov arrived in Taiwan. They were invited by the brother of the deceased President Chiang Ching-kuo, General Chiang Wei-kuo who was also President of the Society for Strategic Studies. The guests were received by the ROC Prime-Minister and high-ranking military officials, with the Minister of Defense and the Chief of General Staff included.\textsuperscript{137} Though symbolic indeed, the visit produced abundant rumors about a nascent military partnership; this having been well prepared by the news manipulation of the previous months.

The autumn of 1992 was a period in Russian-Taiwanese relations that attracted worldwide attention. The creation of the MTC was approved by President B. Yeltsin on September 2, 1992,\textsuperscript{138} and on that same day, the reorganization of the Expertise Council under the Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation into the Presidential Expertise Council was confirmed. As Chairman of the Council, O. Lobov probably used the occasion of signing respective papers in order to convince the President about the feasibility of creating the MTC. That event, though reported by the press quite briefly, gave rise to "naive euphoria," as M. Beliy, the Director of the First Asian Department of the Russian Foreign Ministry, later described the atmosphere of the time.\textsuperscript{139} The press and local observers predicted serious changes in the Russian attitude towards the ROC; for example, there were reports about establishing consular relations or establishing the MTC and TMC, whose functions would be close to the respective bodies in American-Taiwanese relations. Such speculations were absolutely groundless, as the basic factors of Russian-PRC relations did not evaporate and continued to dominate the situation. The decision to establish the two commissions did not entail any kind of dual recognition or the like; this was clear to many in the Russian government. Vice-Premier A. Shohin frankly told Minister of Economic Affairs Chiang Ping-kun, who happened to be in Moscow in early September 1992, that one should not expect any special breakthroughs in

\textsuperscript{136} Chung-kuo Shih-pao (China Times), July 12, 1992, p. 4.
\textsuperscript{138} Izvestiya (The News), September 9, 1992, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{139} V. Abarinov, A. Vinogradov, "Moscow - Beijing: Positions 'Close or Coinciding'", Segodnya (Today), January 28, 1994, p. 3.
Russian-Taiwanese relations. In line with this and probably due to the hysteria of some pro-Beijing minded diplomats, on September 12, Russian Foreign Minister A. Kozyrev volunteered special apologetic explanations to the mainland Ambassador in Moscow, Wang Jingqing. That step might have also reflected the Foreign Ministry's exasperation with the ad libitum diplomacy of the Presidential cohort.

People standing behind the MTC, however, deemed it possible to keep ignoring the irritation of the Foreign Ministry. On September 10, 1992, Izvestiya published an interview with O. Lobov, who was very optimistic about the prospects of Russian-Taiwanese relations. He stressed, that they were to be developed unofficially as the majority of the other countries did in their contacts with the ROC. O. Lobov also pointed out that the problems of issuing visas (euphemistically called "traveling documents") and transportation were to be solved positively in the near future. He also mentioned that, for reasons of convenience, the personnel of the TMC and MTC representative offices were to enjoy certain quasi-diplomatic privileges.

All of a sudden the appearance of the MTC gave an impetus to a political scandal, which occurred not only because of Beijing's protests but also due to an internal Russian political struggle. Of course, the PRC was dissatisfied with the Russian-Taiwanese dialogue, but it did not dare to dictate its terms to the Russian government, which was not at all friendly to Beijing, since the latter had silently approved of the 1991 abortive coup in the USSR. The Russian Foreign Ministry demonstrated irritation with Lobov's achievements, which were dubbed "private diplomacy" and criticized for lack of professionalism. Influential figures put pressure on the President in order to make corrections in the documents which served as a basis for Russian-Taiwanese relations. As a result, on September 15, 1992, B. Yeltsin signed a Decree "On Relations Be-

141. Jen-min Jih-pao (People's Daily), September 15, 1992, p. 6; Nezavisimaya gazeta (The Independent Newspaper), September 15, 1992, p. 3.
142. O. Lobov, "Russia and Taiwan Become Closer to Each Other", Izvestiya (The News), September 10, 1992, p. 2.
143. According to the document of the People's Party of Free Russia, cited by E. Bazhanov, one of the instigators of the new decree was the First Vice-Premier and Secretary of State G. Burbulis, whose rivalry with O. Lobov was well-known. Chung-yang Jih-pao (Central Daily News), April 19, 1993, p. 3.
tween the Russian Federation and Taiwan." The Decree stressed Russia's adherence to a "one-China" policy as absolute and emphasized the unofficial and non-political character of all Russian-Taiwanese bilateral contacts. The use of ROC state symbols were prohibited in Russia, and any visits by officials ranking higher than vice-minister were banned as well. The list of MTC Board members was turned down for further reconsideration and readjustment, as it previously included important officials from all the leading

144. Following is the author's translation of the Decree, which was received from private sources (It was later published by E. Bazhanov in Chinese in Chung-yang Jih-pao (Central Daily News), April 19, 1993, p. 3):

"1. In relations with Taiwan, Russian Federation proceeds from there being only one China and the Government of the People's Republic of China being the sole legal government representing the whole of China. Taiwan is an inalienable part of China.

Rusian Federation does not sustain official intergovernmental relations with Taiwan.

Economic, scientific, technical, cultural and other unofficial ties between Russia and Taiwan are implemented by separate citizens and non-governmental organizations, which have necessary functions for legal, technical and other promotion of the above-mentioned ties, as well as for protection of Russian citizens' interests in Taiwan. Russian-Taiwanese ties are regulated by the respective legal acts of the Russian Federation.

All possible representative offices of Russian organizations in Taiwan and respectively of Taiwan in Russia are non-governmental institutions and cannot pretend to have status, rights, privileges and franchise that could have been claimed by a government body. Legal status of such representative offices is defined by local legislation. Persons in the government service cannot be listed among the personnel of the organizations and institutions, which implement contacts with Taiwan.

In Russian-Taiwanese contacts, agreements, documentation, etc., state symbols of Russia and "Republic of China" cannot be used, as well as the name "Republic of China" per se. The latter cannot also be used in the Russian territory by the Taiwanese partners. Possible variants of title are: "Taiwan, China" or "Taipei, China".

Consular departments of Russian Federation embassies in the third countries and non-governmental institutions in Moscow and Taipei render assistance to Russian nationals and organizations in processing of traveling documents for trips to Taiwan, and to Taiwanese residents for journeys to Russia.

Foreign Ministry of the Russian Federation is empowered to control the implementation of this Decree's stipulations. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has the right to approach the Government of Russian Federation with proposals [1] to suspend the operations of institutions, which had been established (irrespective of the date of their registration) in violation of this Decree's provisions; and [2] to take administrative measures against officials violating the provisions of this decree.

2. Presently refrain from opening permanent representative offices of Moscow-Taipei Coordination Commission in Moscow and Taipei.

Take decision on the name list of the commission's Russian part, its functions and the date of offices' inauguration after the consultations with the Foreign Ministry of the Russian Federation".

145. Izvestiya (The News), September 16, 1992, p. 1; Moskovsky komsomolets (Moscow Comsomol Member), September 17, 1992, p. 1.
ministries and executives of large government corporations. One important feature of the Decree lay in outlining the role of the Foreign Ministry in the Russian-ROC relationship. It received the power to control the Decree’s implementation and obtained the right to propose that administrative punishment be imposed on violators. In so doing, the President had permitted the Ministry to control the presumably unofficial Russian-Taiwanese contacts.

Well-known political columnist, S. Kondrashov, published a critical article entitled “Private Diplomacy Around Taiwan”\(^\text{146}\) in which he hinted at O. Lobov and his colleagues’ private interests in cooperating with the ROC. S. Kondrashov cited many politically incorrect phrases of Lobov, which could be understood to mean that Russia and Taiwan had been involved in official intergovernmental dialogue. In indignation against O. Lobov, the author did not even refrain from invoking the words of the PRC ambassador which insulted Russia’s national dignity. That publication, alongside the Decree of September 15, constituted a blow to O. Lobov and his MTC partisans, who at the particular moment had been visiting Taiwan and holding negotiations on the opening of transportation links, tourism and other crucial problems.\(^\text{147}\) The Russian communist press used the occasion to attack the government and the ROC.\(^\text{148}\)

Despite the storm in Moscow, the delegation led by O. Lobov was confident enough to sign in Taipei memoranda of understanding on tourism and air communication.\(^\text{149}\) Chang Hsiao-yen did some very favorable advertising for O. Lobov, saying that he was the “number three person” in the Russian political hierarchy.\(^\text{150}\) It must be noted here that for several years ROC diplomacy relied heavily on O. Lobov as a main supporter of progress in Russian-

\(^{146}\) V. Kondrashov, “Private Diplomacy Around Taiwan”, Izvestiya (The News), September 17, 1992, p. 6.

\(^{147}\) Svobodny Kitaj (Free China), (May-June 1994), p. 59.

\(^{148}\) Pravda (The Truth), September 17, 1992, p. 3.


\(^{150}\) Chung-kuo Shih-pao (China Times), September 17, 1992, p. 3. O. Lobov’s group also expected to bargain on some of the ROC’s gigantic infrastructure construction projects, such as the Taipei Mass Rapid Transit System. Unfortunately for the Russian side, it did not win any of them then or in later years. Chung-kuo Shih-pao (China Times), May 13, 1995, p. 10.
Taiwanese ties. That factor was most unpropitious for the ROC, however, as afterwards many international moves of O. Lobov met harsh criticism in Russia, where his every mistake was linked by journalists to his breakthrough achievements in relations with Taiwan.\footnote{151} Furthermore, O. Lobov often changed offices, and Taipei found itself in constant worry about his current status.\footnote{152}

Nonetheless, the above-mentioned conflict of interests over the creation of the MTC or the "correction through crisis," whatever those events may be called, did not block the Russian-Taiwanese dialogue. In some respect the September 15, 1992 Decree served as guidelines for its institutionalization. The limitations set by the Decree were dictated by the logic of contemporary Russian-PRC relations and helped to avoid unnecessary conflicts with Beijing. At the same time, the Decree did not exclude any progress in Russian-Taiwanese cooperation. As the Deputy-Director of the Russian Diplomatic Academy, Prof. Ye. Bazhanov, has pointed out, Russia could even contribute to the world's acceptance of one China consisting of two equal political entities (though Russia's freedom to maneuver in this field was more limited than that of the other countries).\footnote{153} Novoye Vremya correspondent, A. Chudodeev, optimistically noted that the Decree "was inspiring, as it meant, that Taiwan existed" for Russia.\footnote{154} This opinion was proved with certainty during the visit of President B. Yeltsin to mainland China in December 1992. At his press-conference in Beijing, B. Yeltsin appraised Taiwan's economic success, and the joint communiqué signed by the

\footnote{151. In the beginning of 1995, O. Lobov was attacked for establishing a Foundation for Humanitarian and Economic Cooperation with France, which attempted to privatize valuable Russian government-owned real estate in France. The Moscow weekly Stolitsa quite slanderously compared that fact with Lobov's alleged "barter exchange of Russian scrap iron for Taiwanese rice". E. Erikssen, "Oleg Lobov Nearly Built His Nest on the Ruins of the Counts' Residence", Stolitsa (The Capital), # 3 (January 1995), pp. 6-8. In spring O. Lobov turned out to be one of the Russian supporters of the notorious Japanese religious sect "Aum Shinrikyo". Once again the press branded him as a person with strange contacts, and Taiwan was mentioned in that context once again. Izvestiya (The News), March 28, 1995, p. 1; March 30, 1995, p. 1.}

\footnote{152. Lien-ho Pao (United Daily News), June 11, 1993, p. 4; September 18, 1993, p. 4. See also the discussion in the Legislative Yuan. Lih-fa-yuan Kung-pao (Gazette of the Legislative Yuan), Vol. 82, # 15 (1993), p. 183.}

\footnote{153. Lien-ho Pao (United Daily News), September 5, 1993, p. 1; in March 1994, the representative of the Foreign Ministry once again stressed limitations on the Russian-Taiwanese relations. Chung-yang Jih-pao (Central Daily News), March 15, 1994, p. 3.}

two sides, and mentioned Russia's intention to proceed with economic, cultural and scientific cooperation with Taiwan.\textsuperscript{155}

As the practice of Russian-Taiwanese relations showed, limited publicity was good for progress in contacts. The MTC went through a reshuffle of personnel, was registered by the Russian Ministry of Justice on April 15, 1993,\textsuperscript{156} and continued its cooperation with the TMC. The latter opened its representative office in Moscow on July 12, 1993,\textsuperscript{157} but had not yet been granted any official status by the Russian government. The MTC's office was opened in Moscow in August of the same year. The press qualified the commission as an "international non-governmental body created in order to coordinate bilateral ties, and to protect the interests of Russian citizens and organizations on Taiwan."\textsuperscript{158} This was an example of a misunderstanding resulting from the ambiguity of the MTC's status. It was not an international organization, and if it was non-governmental, how could it protect Russian interests in Taiwan? To a large extent the controversy was stimulated by the MTC itself: It was a civic association on paper, but it was planned to perform the functions of a Russian representative office as soon as it was stationed in Taipei. That was the usual trap in which the unofficial missions in Taiwan found themselves, but they managed to ignore these limitations successfully. The essence of the unapplied relationship was more than clearly defined by MOFA Minister, Chien Fu: "If you asked them, they would reply that relations were always 'unofficial,' but if you did not pose questions, then relations turn out to be official indeed."\textsuperscript{159}

The year 1993 began with quite frustrating news about Taiwanese rice which was supplied as humanitarian aid to Russia; allegedly, it was infested with deadly pesticides. A short article by Izvestiya was soon followed by another one in Komsomolskaya pravda, and the image-damaging issue was discussed many times in the Legislative Yuan.\textsuperscript{160} Despite the lack of any testimony, politicians like Chao Shao-kang used the "rice affair" as a pretext for

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\item 159. Lih-fa-yuan Kung-pao (Gazette of the Legislative Yuan), Vol. 82, # 15 (1993), p. 184.
\end{thebibliography}
attacks against the government’s loose control of environmental protection.\textsuperscript{161} Despite numerous cables sent by MOFA to the TMC Moscow office, no intelligible response from the Russian authorities was obtained. Probably, the only consolation was O. Lobov’s statement that the news was an intentionally concocted falsity.\textsuperscript{162}

As it turned out, exchanges of visits,\textsuperscript{163} growth in trade,\textsuperscript{164} commercial exhibitions, film festivals, orchestra, ballet and circus performances, exchanges of students and scholars, and many other projects in the fields of cultural and economic cooperation became possible even within the framework of contemporary Russian-ROC contacts. Even visa-processing was now being done in Moscow (via the ROC Consulate General in Riga, Latvia, though it later lost its official status) with greater speed than by the representatives of many other countries in Russia, and this practice did not meet protests from the PRC side.

For several years, the problem of Russia opening a representative office in Taipei remained unresolved. From time to time, the mass media reported the nascent inauguration of the MTC’s mission in Taipei. For example, in March 1993, Vice-President A. Rutskoi told correspondents in Singapore that the period of difficulties in Russian-Taiwanese relations were over, and that the question of unofficial representation was going to be solved positively.\textsuperscript{165} Russian Foreign Ministry Counselor, V. Malishev, a diplomat responsible for relations with the ROC, more than once mentioned that Russian presence in Taipei was anticipated in the nearest future. Ambassador V. Trifonov, a sinologist by education, abandoned his

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item[161.] *Lih-fa-yuan Kung-pao* (Gazette of the Legislative Yuan), Vol. 82, # 13 (1993), p. 134.
\item[162.] *Lih-fa-yuan Kung-pao* (Gazette of the Legislative Yuan), Vol. 82, # 46 (1993), pp. 119-120.
\item[165.] *Lien-ho Pao* (United Daily News), March 9, 1993, p. 4.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
post in Mauritius and arrived in Moscow, keeping in mind the forthcoming appointment to Taiwan.\textsuperscript{166} Nevertheless, further development was blocked.

In February 1994, the MTC delegation arrived in Taipei and held a round of consultations with Taiwanese counterparts. The meeting was called the “Second Joint Meeting of MTC and TMC”, but it had no meaningful consequences. Meanwhile, the disappointment of the Taiwanese side was growing. In an interview with 	extit{Lien-ho Pao}, TMC Representative in Moscow, Lo Loon, regretted that since his appointment to Russia he had not met O. Lobov even once. He characterized the MTC as a group of businessmen who could not substitute for diplomatic contacts.\textsuperscript{167}

On April 25, 1994, the International Relations Committee of the State Duma of the Russian Federation convened hearings on Russian-Chinese relations. Deputy Chairman of the Committee, RLDP representative A. Mitrofanov spoke in favor of developing contacts with Taiwan. Dr. P. Ivanov of the Institute of Oriental Studies pointed out that in the future the international community would inevitably recognize China as being a divided country and called for closer cooperation with the ROC.\textsuperscript{168} Parliamentary discussions in no way influenced the course of events, and the issue of a Russian office in Taipei remained unresolved.\textsuperscript{169} In the spring of 1995, it became known that the documents of the TMC Taipei office had already been sent to the administration of the Russian Premier and had been awaiting the final approval of V. Chernomyrdin since April.\textsuperscript{170}

Different explanations of Moscow’s official resistance exist. One holds that the gradual strengthening of cooperation with Beijing (economic ties, growing arms sales, and probable joint juxtaposition to the West) forced Russia to refrain from making steps towards Taiwan. Another maintains that O. Lobov’s cohort was allegedly actively resisting the opening of the MTC mission in the

\textsuperscript{166} During his mission in the ROC, V. Trifonov’s ambassadorial position in the Foreign Ministry was to be suspended temporarily. 	extit{Lien-ho Pao} (United Daily News), November 7, 1994, p. 4.

\textsuperscript{167} 	extit{Lien-ho Pao} (United Daily News), February 27, 1994, p. 4.

\textsuperscript{168} 	extit{The China Post}, April 27, 1994, p. 6. A. Mitrofanov also wanted to know, whether the Foreign Ministry would issue an entry visa to President Lee Teng-hui, if he arrived in Russia. Vice-Minister A. Panov answered that the visa would be granted, but the Ministry would not organize any official reception. 	extit{Lien-ho Pao} (United Daily News), April 26, 1994, p. 4.

\textsuperscript{169} See regret expressed by 	extit{Izvestiya} (The News), April 2, 1994, p. 2.

\textsuperscript{170} 	extit{Chung-kuo Shih-pao} (China Times), May 13, 1995, p. 10.
ROC. As the Russian office in Taipei would have had a staff of Foreign Ministry diplomats, there could have been some control or detection of unseemly transactions of the people grouping around the MTC.\textsuperscript{171} There is good reasoning in the latter point of view. Even without a mission in Taipei, Russia had more than a US $1 bln. trade surplus with the ROC in 1995 (the CIS in general being one of the main suppliers of steel and cotton to Taiwan).\textsuperscript{172} It is unseemly that Russian business can benefit from any further bureaucratic institutionalization of bilateral relations. If Taipei undertook some semi-repressive measures against Russia in the economic field, one might expect a wave of Russian merchants lobbying in Taiwan's favor. However, that is highly improbable, because the ROC has very limited freedom to maneuver in the international arena. Taking into account the complicated developments both in Russian internal politics (i.e., the left-wing forces' victory at the 1995 parliamentary elections and unpredictable results of the forthcoming 1996 presidential elections) and in the strained PRC-ROC relationship, which cannot be ignored by Moscow, one cannot expect any breakthroughs in Moscow-Taipei ties at least before June 1996, when Russia elects its new head of state. Notwithstanding these factors, Vice Foreign Minister A. Panov stated on January 4, 1996 that Russia's unofficial mission to Taipei was to appear in the first half of the year and that Beijing was duly informed about it.\textsuperscript{173}

Despite all the difficulties mentioned, bilateral relations continued to develop at a good pace during the period of 1993-1995. Minister of Foreign Affairs, Chien Fu, had good reason to say that he was satisfied with the state of Taiwanese-Russian contacts by the end of 1994,\textsuperscript{174} as the absence of diplomatic recognition did not prevent different government offices from starting mutual cooperation. For example, Wu Tung-min and Liao Cheng-hao, Directors of the ROC Ministry of Justice Investigation Bureau, visited Moscow in 1994 and 1995 respectively, successfully maintaining cooperation

\textsuperscript{171} The latter opinion was reflected in several publications in the Taiwanese press, see, for example, report of Chou Te-hui in \textit{Lien-ho Pao} (United daily News), June 12, 1995, p. 6. Prof. E. Bazhanov unambiguously titled his article "Lobov Is a 'Behind the Curtain Black Hand' Impeding the Progress in Chinese-Russian Relations," \textit{Chung-yang Jih-pao} (Central Daily News), June 12, 1995, p. 4. O. Lobov was referred to as a corrupted bureaucrat seeking only private benefits from Taiwan and hindering any progress in establishment of Russian office in Taipei.

\textsuperscript{172} \textit{Kung-shang Jih-pao} (Commercial Times), April 26, 1995, p. 2.


\textsuperscript{174} \textit{Segodnya} (Today), December 16, 1994, p. 3.
with the Russian National Tax Police and other law enforcement agencies.\textsuperscript{175}

Interaction in the field of radioactive waste disposal serves as another example. In the early 1990s, it became clear that the radioactive waste facilities of Taiwan Power Company (Taipower Co.) were soon to be exhausted. The company started looking out for possibilities overseas, Russia and mainland China included. In March 1994, the Deputy General Manager of Taipower Co., Lin Ying, led a delegation to Russia in order to inquire into the possibilities of mutual cooperation.\textsuperscript{176} The negotiations obviously went smoothly because later in May, President of Taipower Co., Chang Chung-chien, went to Moscow for further negotiations with Russian counterparts and reached a general understanding with them. A letter of intent was signed with the Kurchatov Center of the Russian Academy of Sciences. The Russian side insisted on confidentiality, as it feared protests from environmental groups. For quite a long time, the exchange of information and experience in low radiation waste utilization took place between the respective agencies of Russia and the ROC. However, the realization of any cooperation projects in this sphere was possible only under the condition of Taiwan’s buying Russian nuclear fuel (which contradicted the current agreements between the ROC and the USA), otherwise Russian legislation prohibited even temporary imports of radioactive waste and its reprocessing. Taipower Co., constantly being criticized by different environmental groups, had to make all its moves public. News leakage connected with the topic of radioactive waste disposal aroused widespread protests and indignation in Russia. As a result of that, the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy had to deny any contacts with Taiwan (at the same time meaningfully hinting at the eventual profits from cooperation with the ROC, if it had existed).\textsuperscript{177} Only in September 1995, after President B. Yeltsin had signed the decree, which allowed the disposal of imported radioactive waste at Russian processing plants, was cooperation with Tai-


\textsuperscript{176} \textit{Lien-ho Pao} (United Daily News), January 2, 1994, p. 3; \textit{The China Post}, March 1, 1994, p. 15.

wan publicly acknowledged by the authorities. Apart from radioactive waste disposal, Russia and Taiwan were going to cooperate in the construction of the second scientific atomic reactor in the ROC, as Dr. Hsu Yih-yun, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Council of the Executive Yuan, stated in Moscow in July 1995.

V. INITIAL STATE OF RUSSIAN-TAIWANESE "UNOFFICIAL" RELATIONS

Analyzing the initial stage of Russian-Taiwanese relations in general, it becomes clear that both sides had different objectives.

Russia’s objectives were to attract as much foreign investment as possible, to foster technical cooperation (the industrial development of Russian technologies in Taiwan included), and to receive as much Taiwanese help as possible without making concessions on the question of “one China” (in Beijing’s understanding of the term). Big Russian companies, close to O. Lobov, also looked for contracts dealing with enormous Taiwanese infrastructural projects, such as the Taipei Mass Rapid Transit System and others. To put it briefly, the Russian approach was aimed at maximum economic achievement not accompanied by shifts in the political sphere. The negative role of the conservative bureaucracy and the “Beijing lobby” in the Russian government and parliament was obvious. Many officials either truly believed that “at any cost not to provoke Beijing’s animosity” was one of the primary political tasks, or acted out of group interest. In so doing, they supposedly protected Russia’s “political interests,” but actually played the role of the PRC proxy. As for Russian-Taiwanese relations, they were limited in scope. That was why the “Taiwan lobby” (the big companies and ministries standing close to the MTC) turned out to be comparatively smaller and weaker than the “Beijing lobby.”

The ROC’s objectives were to speed up the incorporation of the country into the world community, to gain the international recognition of China’s being a divided country consisting of two equal political entities, and to increase the number of nations that have stable and friendly relations with the ROC. Simply put, Taipei pur-

sued serious political objectives, and all the other goals played a subordinate role.

One can say that the bilateral relationship was "wandering between reality and illusion." Each side pursued its goals and ignored (sometimes deliberately) constraints imposed by reality. In certain cases a syndrome of daydreaming appeared. For example, during quite a long period of time, the Russian side naively expected that the ROC was ready to invest a considerable part of the famous "Taiwanese billions" in Russia, though the Taiwanese International Economic Cooperation Fund's capacity was unable to meet Russian needs. One must admit that too much propaganda of "Taiwan being the richest country in the world" sowed the seeds of groundless expectations all around the globe.\(^\text{181}\) On the other hand, only recently did it become clear that a complicated system of taxation and licensing, as well as deficiencies in legislation (together with the absence of elementary security which resulted even in the murder of Taiwanese businessmen\(^\text{182}\)) removed any incentive for Taiwanese investors to cooperate with Russia.\(^\text{183}\) Minister of Economic Affairs, Chiang Ping-kun, stated in January 1995 that Russia could not be considered a safe place for Taiwanese investments (only 23 investment cases had been registered up to that time) and recommended businessmen to confine their activities to trade operations.\(^\text{184}\)

VI. PROBLEMS OF CURRENT RUSSIAN-TAIWANESE RELATIONS

Bilateral relations between Russia and Taiwan confront several specific problems. Primarily, the mass media, a lack of accurate in-


\(^{182}\) In January 1995, Mr. Ting Shih-tai, General Manager of Wei Pu Computer Co. and Ms. Chen Mei-chen, General Manager of San Chi Import Export Co. had been brutally assassinated, and the murderer was never found by the Russian police. Lien-ho Pao (United Daily News), January 6, 1995, p. 1.


formation, and novice diplomatic tactics continue to plague the dialogues and interactions between Russia and Taiwan.

A. Mass Media

In Taiwan, the press (sometimes with the unwilling assistance of officials) often reports about the “nearly attained achievements.” As soon as the news turns out to be false, they become counter-productive, giving birth to pessimism and disappointment. For instance, for a time there was steady progress in the negotiations about air communication between Russia and Taiwan. One of the main obstacles had already been overcome - an accord was reached between Moscow and Beijing about the possibility of such flights. Russian government agencies also reached an agreement between themselves regarding the great importance of air and maritime transportation between Russia and Taiwan.\textsuperscript{185} During the visit of the ROC Ministry of Transport and Communications delegation to Moscow in August 1993, it was agreed that the Russian “Transaero” company and “Mandarin Airlines” jets, leased by “China Airlines,” would perform the flights.\textsuperscript{186} However, new problems emerged. Moscow kept delaying the inauguration of its representative office in Taipei. Inability to process Russian visas on the spot made it difficult for the Taiwanese passengers to use the prospective air route; it was finally postponed. But the Taiwanese press had been reporting about the “no problem” or “nearly no problem” situation for over a year.\textsuperscript{187} When the project was put aside, the effect was frustrating.

A second example of media interference was when, in an interview with the Moscow correspondent of Lien-ho Pao, A. Chernishev, the then head of the Asia-Pacific Department of the

\textsuperscript{185} Delovoy mir (Business World), February 26, 1994, p. 4.

\textsuperscript{186} Beijing insisted that only one company from each side could perform the flights and Russia accepted that demand. Lien-ho Pao (United Daily News), January 16, 1995, p. 4. According to the preliminary estimates, the Taipei-Moscow route can have as many as 1000 passengers per day in May-August, and around 1000 passengers per week during the other months of the year. Lien-ho Pao (United Daily News), August 1, 1993, p. 4.

\textsuperscript{187} Lien-ho Pao (United Daily News), July 28, 1993, p. 4; September 4, 1994, p.4; In one of reports it was stated that flights between Taipei and Saint-Petersburg were to begin quite soon, though actually only such a possibility was mentioned by the city Mayor A. Sobchak, Lien-ho Pao (United Daily News), September 6, 1994, 4. The Free China Journal, March 1, 1994, p. 1, predicted the beginning of flights in May-June 1994. Probably Chung-yang Jih-pao (Central Daily News), March 18, 1994, p. 4, can serve as an example of moderate approach - “Chinese-Russian Air Link Not Far.”
Russian Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, pointed out that in the future there might have been an agreement on investment guarantees between Russia and Taiwan. The newspaper published the news under a large headline saying that Russia was ready to conclude such an agreement with the ROC.\(^{188}\) A vague possibility was presented as a forthcoming fact.

In a third example, numerous reports about the notorious Russian Liberal-Democratic Party's (RLDP) extending an invitation to the ROC President Lee Teng-hui to visit Moscow was another embarrassing case. \textit{Lien-ho Pao, Chung-yang Jih-pao} and other newspapers reported in March 1994 about Russia's "biggest" party's showing a friendly attitude towards Taiwan.\(^{189}\) But the background of events was somewhat different. The RLDP, a radical nationalist party led by V. Zhirinovsky, indeed received a considerable number of votes at the parliamentary elections in December 1993. That fact did not in any way reflect the RLDP's real influence in the country. Many ballots were indeed cast not in support of the RLDP, but as an expression of criticism against the government. Relying on the support of a marginal social stratum and dissatisfied with the results of economic reform, the party first looked for every chance of a scandal in the sphere of Russia's international relations to attract public attention; furthermore, experiencing lack of funds, the party probably expected to receive some financial support from Taipei. V. Zhirinovsky invited President Lee Teng-hui to participate in the RLDP party congress. He also expressed his hope that Lee Teng-hui might present a speech about current developments in Taiwan at the next session of the State Duma Geopolitics Committee. The RLDP leader insisted that his party was able to provide Lee with an adequate reception and that the invitation was approved by the Foreign Ministry.\(^{190}\) The ROC side doubted the truthfulness of his statements and turned down the invitation as not being satisfactorily official.\(^{191}\) It also became known quite definitely that the Russian government in no way supported the RLDP initiative.

The broadcasting of the RLDP's invitation by the Russian "Ostankino" TV channel did not at all add to the good reputation of

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188. \textit{Lien-ho Pao} (United Daily News), September 6, 1993, p. 4.
the ROC, though it was enthusiastically reported by *Lien-ho Pao*.192 The event was perceived by the Russian public as an anecdote. The truth was simple: Important events in bilateral relations did not always coincide with the word “Taiwan” being publicly pronounced in Russia. In the course of time, the ROC media learned more about Moscow politicians, and in 1995 V. Zhirinovsky was referred to by *Chung-yang Jih-pao* as no less than “a wacko from the Russian parliament.”193

Some other irresponsible statements from the Russian side publicized in Taiwan also played a negative role. For example, V. Kravchuk, a businessman who at that time was an MTC Board member, announced that the Russian office in Taipei was to be opened in September 1994 and that the post of representative was to be occupied by Dr. Yu. Galenovich, a former Deputy-Director of the Moscow IFES.194 This erroneous news spread anxiety in Taipei, as the opening of the MTC office had been and was still an anticipated event. Moreover, the personality of the possible representative also did not arouse enthusiasm, for though he was a Chinese scholar, he in no way corresponded to the rank of Ambassador Lo Loon, who was later stationed in Moscow as the TMC representative. Another example deals with an interview of V. Kravchuk, who predicted that during the “Days of Moscow” Festival in Taiwan in 1994, Mig-31 and Su-27 military jets were to be demonstrated, and that Russian military authorities saw no reason to object against high ranking Russian officers visiting Taiwan.195 That news was equally qualified by both the Russian and Taiwanese sides as a provocation, though most probably, the Russian businessman just wanted to have a good impression and did not harbor any bad intentions.

**B. Lack of Accurate Information**

The continued absence or lack of accurate information about each other is the second specific feature of Russian-Taiwanese relations. Nowadays this is much more characteristic of Russia than of the ROC, as the latter is actively training Russian experts and providing them adequate information about recent events from the TMC office in Moscow. The data about Taiwan, published in Rus-

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sia, is astonishing in terms of the abundance of errors. I am not referring now to the distinctly moronic examples like the article by B. Barahta in Pravda where late President Chiang Ching-kuo was called the "President of the Taiwanese Republic," or where President Chiang Kai-shek's widow, Madame Soong Mei-ling (who is still living in the USA), was reported as having perished during the anti-Japanese war. Neither am I referring to the "Taiwan Guidebook," where the Executive Yuan is mentioned twice under different Russian names as two separate governing bodies. Even qualified writers such as Yu. Savenkov, a well-known journalist with extensive experience in Singapore and mainland China who has a good knowledge of Chinese history and politics, could make serious misleading mistakes. In a series of articles, written after his visit to Taiwan, Yu. Savenkov wrote that "the ROC was founded by Dr. Sun Yat-sen in 1911," mistaking the date of Hsinhai Revolution for the date of the foundation of the state. Not being able to abandon the old communist cliches, he wrote that the KMT developed its base on Taiwan under the defense of the 7th Fleet of the USA, forgetting that the fleet appeared only in the beginning of the Korean War; this has been one of the most common "Russian mistakes" about Taiwanese history. Yu. Savenkov also stated that in 1971 the PRC "restored its rights in the United Nations." Everyone was forced to say this while communists were in power in Russia. But now everyone can freely admit that initially the PRC had no rights in the UN, and for that reason there was nothing to restore. The most important fact was that the author was not deliberately erroneous, but he unconsciously applied outdated schematics. While speaking about contemporary events, Yu. Savenkov also missed important details and distorted reality by stating, for example, that "... China's conversion into a divided state has not officially been recognized by the international community or by the conflicting parties themselves." (It was thus useless for him to visit the ROC and miss the main shift in the country's policies towards the PRC.) He further stated that "the PRC was visited by 5 million people from Taiwan." (If understood literally, this phrase would mean that every fourth Taiwanese has participated in the "mass pil-

197. Taiwan. Spravochnik (Taiwan guidebook), Moscow: Nauka Publishers, 1993, pp. 13-14. The same book tells the reader that Taiwan was proclaimed the Republic of China after 1949. Ibid., p. 11.
grimage” to the mainland; however, in reality, the figure refers to the number of journeys.)

Whatever the odd drawbacks in the Russian newspapers’ coverage of Taiwan, the information about the ROC is steadily penetrating Russia. The Taiwanese (GIO) plays an important role in this process, regularly inviting journalists from the leading Russian newspapers to visit the ROC. Such authors as V. Miheev of Izvestiya or A. Chudodeev of Segodnya can now be called professional writers on the topics related to the ROC. Cooperation between the information agencies of the two countries began with respective agreements on the exchange of news data which were signed in November 1993 by the Director of the Central News Agency, Tang Pen-pen, and General-Director of ITAR-TASS, V. Ignatenko. The Russian News Agency is represented in Taipei by its correspondent.

C. Diplomatic Novices

Diplomatic novices, such as politicians or businessmen, incessantly try to use Russian-Taiwanese ties for their own personal commercial or political ends; this has been the third explicit feature of bilateral relations. The exertions of the Sino-Russian Association for International Humanitarian Dialogue (SRAIHD) serve as the most clear-cut example. It was established in the spring of 1994, was supported by the opposition Democratic Progressive Party, and was financed by businessman Su Ke-fu, whose interest lay in trade links between Taiwan and the CIS countries. Many DPP legisla-


202. Initially it was proposed that it be called the Taiwanese-Russian Association, but the Russian counterparts (primarily the East-West International Institute of Scholarly and Cultural Cooperation of the Russian Humanitarian University) insisted on “Sino-Russian,” so that Beijing had no pretext to blame them for dealing with separat-
tors naively insisted that the lack of progress in Russian-Taiwanese relations could have been explained only by the professional inefficiency of the MOFA which was overwhelmed by the ruling KMT. In May 1994, the SRAIHD delegation led by a DPP Central Committee member, Chen Sheng-hung, visited Russia with the ambitious aim of attaining breakthroughs in two spheres: disposal of Taiwanese radioactive waste and cooperation in the field of space and military aviation technologies. Needless to say, any result was indiscernible.

In order to promote publicity, the SRAIHD invited former Soviet Premier N. Ryzhkov to visit Taiwan. Some Taiwanese were inclined to think that he was the most probable winner of the future presidential elections in Russia. Besides, the association competed with the Lien-ho Pao, which had organized the visit of M. Gorbachev in March-April 1994.

In the course of time, the initiatives of SRAIHD acquired a mischievous flavor. In the autumn of 1994, the Association invited Yu. Meshkov, President of the Republic of Crimea, to visit Taiwan. Crimea is a part of Ukraine. At that particular moment, the relations between the Crimean President and the Ukrainian government were very strained. That was the first reason why Yu. Meshkov's appearance in Taipei was not welcome. First of all, it could have crushed the feeble achievements of ROC diplomacy which had made inroads for the exchange of representative offices with Ukraine. Second, separatist sentiments and slogans of many Crimean politicians, who demanded secession from Ukraine, could have been exploited by the Taiwanese pro-independence forces. MOFA and the TMC Moscow office blocked the activities of SRAIHD despite the fact that the Ukrainian authorities did not object to the "private visit." Su Ke-fu was furious, as he definitely had serious commercial plans in Crimea. Finally, Yu. Meshkov had to cancel the visit himself because of the constitutional crisis out-

ists. Tzu-lih Tsao-pao (The Independence Morning Post), March 21, 1994, p. 3; May 30, 1994, p. 4. Russian press presented Su Kefu as the main figure in the SRAIHD. Nezavisimaya gazeta (The Independent Newspaper), August 24, 1994, p. 3.

203. Tzu-lih Tsao-pao (The Independent Morning Post), May 5, 1994, p. 3.


205. There was also an unsuccessful attempt to invite K. Ilyumzhinov, the notorious billionaire President of the Kalmyk Republic within the Russian Federation. Tzu-lih Tsao-pao (The Independence Morning Post), August 16, 1994, p. 3.
break. Later, the SRAIHID continued political intrigues: It planned to invite Azerbaijan’s President G. Aliev to visit Taiwan in 1995.

It is appropriate to mention how the disbandment of the Soviet Union was apprehended by the pro-independence forces in Taiwan. It was generally understood that the secession of the former union republics and their proclamation of independence could serve as a good example for Taiwan. The DPP legislators sharply reacted to President B. Yeltsin’s decision to suppress the belligerent independence movement in Chechnya in the end of 1994. Russia was condemned as an aggressor. The Deputy-Chairman of the DPP faction in the Legislative Yuan, Yeh Hui-peng, declared that if no one supported Chechnya, then Taiwan was doomed to the same fate in the case of Beijing’s aggression. DPP legislator Yeh Chu-lan demanded that the ROC immediately establish diplomatic relations with Chechnya. In January 1995, the DPP several times raised the questions of “freezing” relations with Russia and of rendering humanitarian aid to Chechnya. The opposition party showed complete misunderstanding of both Russian internal politics and of the current state of ROC-Russian relations. Quite interestingly, Russian politicians also compared Chechnya to Taiwan. The former Procurator-General and current leader of the People’s Conscience Party, A. Kazannik, proclaimed that Moscow should treat Chechnya in the same way as Beijing dealt with Taiwan: neither recognizing it as a separate political entity nor undertaking military action against it. Here we also can trace the extremely poor understanding of the reality of the Taiwan Straits.

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206. *China News*, October 19, 1994, p. 3; October 28, 1994, p. 2; *Chung-kuo Shih-pao* (China Times), November 1, 1994, p. 12; *Chung-yang Jih-pao* (Central Daily News), October 31, 1994, p. 1; *Lien-ho Pao*, October 15, 1994, p. 10; October 16, 1994, p. 4; November 20, 1994, p. 4. Dr. O. Remyga, the former Chinese economics specialist from the Moscow IFES was one of Yu. Meshkov’s closest associates and actively participated in planning of his visit to the ROC.


VII. PROSPECTS FOR FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF RUSSIAN-TAIWANESE RELATIONS

A. Role of Economic Contacts

Despite the existing difficulties, economic relations between Russia and Taiwan were growing steadily. Bilateral trade increased from US $119 mln. in 1990 to US $227 mln. in 1991, to US $680 mln. in 1992, to US $760 mln. in 1993, surpassing the US $1 bln. mark and reaching US $1.260 bln. in 1994, to US $1.9 bln in 1995. \(^{210}\) The ROC has turned into the fourth largest trading partner of Russia in the Asia-Pacific, being behind only mainland China, Japan and South Korea. \(^{211}\) The Taiwanese are importing mostly steel, iron products and chemicals, and Taiwanese business exhibitions are becoming regular events in Moscow. One was held in February-March 1994, \(^{212}\) where 30 Taiwanese companies participated. \(^{213}\) Another took place in February 1995. \(^{214}\)

The high price of Taiwanese goods is the main reason for the clear trade deficit Taiwan has with Russia. For example, in 1993, Russia bought ten times less than it sold. \(^{215}\) The structure of trade also remains unchanged: Russia exports natural resources and half-products, and imports a limited list of cheap consumer goods and computer/electronics spare parts. Despite this fact, the quality of comparatively inexpensive Taiwanese products is much higher than that of goods coming from mainland China, but the prices remain too high for the Russian market. Even the press admits that

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211. V. Miheev, “Taiwan Is One of the Countries Where We Sell More Than Buy”, Izvestiya (The News), May 19, 1995, p. 3.
212. It was supposed to be held in the autumn of 1993 together with cinema and musical festivals of Taiwan in Russia [Izvestiya (The News), September 8, 1993, p. 3; September 14, p. 7], but afterwards was delayed because of the tragic events in Moscow in October, when the conflict between the President and the Supreme Soviet resulted in open hostilities close to the proposed site of the exhibition. As for cultural exchanges, Russia organized Bolshoi Theatre performances in Taipei in January 1993, an exhibition of treasures from the Tsar's palace Tsarskoye Selo in December 1993, and circus performances starting February 1994. Svobodny kraj (Free China), (May-June 1994), pp. 61, 63.
"Taiwanese goods are too expensive"\textsuperscript{216} (for more detailed information on Russian-Taiwanese trade composition, please refer to Appendix).

Several years ago, Dr. S. Shilovtsev pointed out that the Russian side should look for new possibilities in order to prevent bilateral trade from moving down the slope. However, the balance of trade keeps growing. Nevertheless, his idea of Russian-Taiwanese cooperation in developing new technologies deserves attention.\textsuperscript{217} The Vice Chairman of the ROC National Science Council, Hu Chin-piao, visited Russia in July 1994 to negotiate the possibility of joint laser technologies development.\textsuperscript{218} In May 1995, the delegation led by the General Director of the Bureau of Foreign Trade, MOEA, Lin Yih-fu, visited Russia as well. The guests had shown interest in the newest Russian technologies, which were mostly developed by the military industry. As reported by ITAR-TASS on May 17, 1995, the spokesman for the Russian Foreign Ministry rejected any possibility of arms sales to Taiwan, but he did not exclude the possibility of joint research in the sphere of military conversion. In the spring of 1995, a detailed plan of technical cooperation between Russia and the ROC was worked out. It included the production of turbines, various engines and motors, precise gearboxes, distributors, condensers, laser and medical equipment, radar and electronic communication devices, specific processing methods (such as powder metallurgy), strategic metals and rubber recycling, energy saving, aeronautics technology, and environmental protection.\textsuperscript{219} Since that time, some Taiwanese businessmen have tried to buy new technologies for future development and production in the ROC. “Pacific Technologies Co.,” which is led by Mr. Chou Chuan and engaged in the development and production of ekranoplane, is one example.\textsuperscript{220}

A survey conducted by the author in Moscow revealed the main problems of Taiwanese businessmen working in Russia. The majority of these businessmen assumed commercial risk only after completing market surveys and examining certain information provided by CETRA in Taipei. It was important for them to find a

\textsuperscript{216} Vecherny peterburg (The Evening Peterburg), August 12, 1994, p. 3.
\textsuperscript{217} Biznes MN (Commercial Supplement to the Moscow News), #29 (August, 1992), p. 8.
\textsuperscript{218} Lien-ho Pao (United Daily News), July 3, 1994, p. 3.
\textsuperscript{219} Kung-shang Jih-pao (Commercial Times), April 26, 1995, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{220} Chung-kuo Shih-pao (China Times), February 14, 1995, p. 4; Lien-ho Pao (United Daily News), May 23, 1995, p. 3.
field in which Taiwanese goods could be competitive. Lai Shih-ming of the New Extra International Business Corp. and Johnston J. Chu of the Vigorous C.H. Enterprise Co. chose clothing and footwear. High efficiency, low prices and good quality give them the advantage over mainland China rivals. Vigorous posters can be seen everywhere in Moscow, even in Red Square. The important factor of import tax reduction (now Taiwanese and PRC import duties are both at 15%) also played a favorable role. Moscow, with its relatively high standard of living, was only a fraction of these companies’ market. Many cheaper goods went to provincial towns. However, in the survey, the businessmen pointed out several main difficulties: insecurity from crime, bureaucratic abuse and corruption, contradictory legislation, an inconvenient banking system, irrational taxation, and an inadequate infrastructure for transport and communication. Despite these difficulties, bilateral trade continues to grow, though mostly to the benefit of Russia. Taiwanese entrepreneurs remained reluctant to invest in the country, which remained unstable and could not provide them with a favorable business environment.

B. Role of Scholarly Exchanges

The exchange of scholars has played an important role in bilateral contacts as well. Russian scientists started working in Taiwan even before the relaxation of any tensions, as “The Memorandum of Understanding on the Cooperative Relations in Engineering Science and Technological Development between the National Science Council, ROC and the USSR Academy of Engineering” was signed on November 4, 1991. As was noted earlier, the ROC was actively inviting Russian natural science scholars to teach and to do research in Taiwan. Later, many legislators specifically emphasized the significance of possible cooperation in the field of space technologies, and it was also suggested that the professionals from the CIS could help the ROC military to comprehend properly the specific characteristics of the weapons acquired by Beijing from Russia.

The economic crisis made it practically impossible for Russian sinologists to do research in mainland China. Fortunately, however, some of them obtained grants from the Chiang Ching-kuo Foundation for International Scholarly Exchange, the Pacific Cultural Foundation, and the Chinese Studies Center of the National Central Library in Taiwan. Many currently teach at ROC universities. Students of the Chinese language from Russian colleges now have the chance to improve their linguistic abilities in the ROC. Growing mutual interest led to the establishment of the Graduate Institute of Russian Studies at the National Chengchi University, as well as to the introduction of Russian language courses in many other educational institutions, including Taiwan University, Fufjen University, Fuhisingkang Academy and some others.

In Russia, the first open publications about contemporary Taiwan appeared. In 1992, the IFES published a booklet with brief data on Taiwan.223 One year later, scholars of the same institute prepared a handbook for businessmen who wanted to learn more about Taiwan.224 A group of economists from other academic institutes published another handbook on Taiwan, but it was notorious for its mistaken information.225

Growing interest in the ROC inspired many scholars to start research on Taiwan, and thus resulted in a special issue of the Problemi Dalnego Vostoka (Problems of the Far East, a bimonthly) in 1993.226 In the spring of that year, the first Russian-Taiwanese conference devoted to the current problems of bilateral relations was held in Moscow at the Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; the ROC delegation led by Director Lin Bih-jaw of the IIR participated in its work,227 and the proceedings were pub-

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227. The delegation included MOFA spokesman Leng Juo-shui, several legislators, scholars and businessmen.
lished.228 In the following years, there were several conferences devoted to the ROC's history and its contemporary problems, which included the following: the Scholarly Conference Devoted to the Centennial of the Kuomintang (Institute of Asian and African Countries of the Moscow State University, October 1994), the Scholarly Conference in Commemoration of Late President Chiang Kai-shek (Institute of Asian and African Countries, April 1995), and the Academic Seminar, “Taiwan and the United Nations Organization” (June 1995, Taiwan Studies Center, Institute of Oriental Studies).229 The latter invited comments from the Russian Foreign Ministry, which hurried to clarify that the scholars’ sympathetic attitudes towards the upgrading of the ROC's international status in no way reflected the position of the Russian government.230 In the spring of 1992, the Academic Council of the Institute of Oriental Studies in Moscow decided to establish a Taiwan Studies Center, which united a dozen sinologists interested in doing research on Taiwan. By the end of 1994, the first collection of essays entitled “Contemporary Taiwan” was published and met a favorable response from the press and the public.231

228. Problemi i perspektivy razvitiya nepravitelstvennikh svyazej mezhdu rossiyej i taivaniem (Problems and perspectives of the development of non-governmental ties between Russia and Taiwan), Moscow: Diplomatic Academy, 1993.
During the last several years, Taiwanese studies has developed into a separate field of Russian Sinology, permitting the author of this article to publish a special review. It is important to note that Russian scholars mostly concentrate on research of Taiwan's economic experience, as there is hope to utilize it in Russia in some way. As for ROC politics, many authors have inadequate or erroneous perceptions of the structure and function of the government and the parliamentary system.

Not only has scholarly research in the area of ROC social studies become more abundant, but general information about Taiwan has also started appearing more regularly. Of course, that happened mainly due to the active position of the ROC Government Information Office, whose representative in Moscow did everything possible to foster the publication of articles about Taiwan. Sometimes the information was released in the name of the Government Information Office (GIO). A booklet entitled Republic of China on Taiwan in Questions and Answers, as well as several other materials, were met by Russian readers with great interest. The same could be said about the new bi-monthly, Svobodny Kitaj (Free China), which has already entered its second year of publication. Transmissions of the Voice of Free China in the Russian language are received with fluctuating success not only in Russia, but also on the territory of the Commonwealth of Independent States in general.

Whatever difficulties lie in the way of Russian-Taiwanese relations, they continue to grow in volume and content. The closer these two entities become, the stronger is the irritation of Beijing, which jealously watches over all Russian-ROC contacts. In the last years of communism in the USSR, every publication in the Soviet press in which Taiwan was called a "country" aroused wild protests from the PRC embassy. Nowadays, the newspapers are free to speak out, and many of them qualify the ROC or Taiwan as a state "though small and not recognized by many," or as a country "which


in fact possesses all the features of statehood.”  

This brings us to the analysis of Russian-ROC relations in close contact with the PRC-ROC dialogue and the Russian attitude towards it.

VIII. CHINESE MAINLAND FACTORS AND RUSSIAN RESPONSES

As noted before, for several decades the Soviet government denied the legal status of the ROC on Taiwan. The politics of Moscow towards the Chiang Kai-shek government has always been extremely hostile. But at the same time, the separation of China into two parts coincided with the Stalinist approach to post-war international relations. The ROC on Taiwan played the role of a permanent thorn in Beijing-Washington relations and to a considerable extent guaranteed the limits of eventual US-PRC rapprochement. For the Soviet Union, it was an “I hate you, but need you indeed” situation. Of course, it was concealed behind the loudly pronounced support of Beijing’s rights in the world arena. After communism, the scene has changed into “I do not hate you and I need you, but do not dare to show how much.” Despite the basic shifts in Russian feelings about Taiwan, the necessity to observe the rules imposed by Beijing remain. In this respect several points of view on Russian-Taiwanese relations exist in Moscow.

A. The Pro-PRC, Anti-ROC Response

The first viewpoint sees Russia as historically, geographically, politically and economically linked to mainland China. The general volume of bilateral relations is so great that it is even useless to dream about supplementing the partnership with the PRC with ROC contacts. This does not present anyone with the possibility of extending dual recognition to both the PRC and the ROC (such a development previously being unacceptable to both sides of the Taiwan Straits, and now to Beijing only).

The supporters of this position maintain that mainland-Taiwan relations refer exclusively to the sphere of China’s internal rela-

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236. The ROC Minister of Foreign Affairs Chien Fu has mentioned that his country would not “drop its relations with South Africa if that nation decides to recognize Beijing”, as the dual recognition can only benefit both parts of China. The Free China Journal, May 20, 1994, p.1.
tions (or "internal relations of the Chinese nation"). Such a stance corresponds to the Beijing's unwillingness to allow any international participation in the resolution of the "Taiwan question."

The opponents of developing relations with Taiwan often point out that Beijing and Taipei have long been connected with a secret liaison and are now constantly engaged in covert consultations, concealed from the outside world. For the Russian anti-Taiwan minded politicians, the above-mentioned statement had a more general anti-Chinese meaning: "The Chinese could always fool the Westerners while pursuing their own goals successfully; the animosity between them being a political theater." To a big extent, such speculations were stimulated by Beijing's hints, expressed in private, about having a complete understanding with the KMT.

The proponents of this first position can be qualified as the most anti-ROC minded. They see no reason to provoke Beijing's animosity or to gamble on a questionable end. These people, however, do not necessarily represent the left wing of the political spectrum. Ideological partnership with Beijing is another factor. The Russian Communist Party, whose influence is currently growing, has always maintained close friendly relations with Chinese Communists and has always deplored Taiwan.

It is interesting how the attitude towards Taiwan is related to the views on the fate of Soviet empire. Very few among Russian

237. See the interview of the Vice Director of the First Asian Department of the Russian Foreign Ministry E. Afanasiev in Chung-kuo Shih-pao (China Times), September 23, 1994, p. 10.

238. For example, an influential politician and once Vice Premier S. Shahrai in his speech at the Russian parliamentary hearings on Russian-Chinese relations and in an article published afterwards - "A Strategy of Relations with China Is Needed", Izvestiya (The News), May 20, 1994, p. 4 - did not even mention Taiwan as a possible partner for Russia. Literaturnaya gazeta (The Literary Gazette), January 19, 1994, p. 4, a weekly newspaper representing liberal intellectuals, pointed out, in connection with the publication of Beijing's "White Paper" on Taiwan, that the document might have served as useful instruction for the countries of the world who want to develop relations with the ROC.

239. The Communist newspaper "Pravda" always referred to Taiwan in a hostile manner, undoubtedly reflecting the party stance. It criticized the very idea of Russian arms sales to the ROC, precautioning against the drastic deterioration in relations with Beijing. B. Bolshakov, "Taiwanese Mirages", Pravda (The Truth), December 26, 1992, p. 2. Report about M. Gorbachev's visit to Taipei was close to indecent in wording, and mentioned the ROC head of state as "...a Lee Teng-hui, who provided Gorbachev with pompous reception, and called himself 'President of the Republic of China'". A. Krushinskij, "Parvenu from Taipei or Taiwanese Type of Imposting", Pravda (The Truth), March 31, 1994, p. 3.
politicians view the relations between the PRC and the ROC as “a problem not international, and not domestic, but between the two political entities.” To those who cannot accept the dismantling of the USSR and the independence of the former Soviet republics, Taiwan is an enemy of state unity. It is natural to support the ROC for those who easily accept the emergence of many new independent states. (This is a current trend not only in the former USSR, but in Eastern Europe as well.)

B. The Neutral Position

The second position acknowledges the fact that the ROC on Taiwan has a defined territory, a government and the capacity to enter into relations with other states. Being democratically minded, adherents of this position even agree with the necessary application of the self-determination principle; this, as Dr. J. Crawford stresses, makes impossible the transfer of Taiwan to the PRC without the consent of ROC citizens.

Proponents of the second point of view do understand that “a country can be a country without being internationally recognized, and that unofficial ties are an internationally accepted practice. They see Beijing’s demands on limiting Russia’s contacts with Taiwan as offensive to Russian sovereignty and dismiss them, though in a polite manner. This position is reflected in the Russian media, which often refers to the question of the “lengthy experience of several Chinese states’ coexistence.”

The second point of view reflects the attitude of people who agree with the idea that Russia and China are still potential threats to each other. Different from the first group, which is overly enthusiastic about PRC “achievements,” the second one sees the situ-

242. Ibid., p.11.
243. As stated by the Attorney-General Department of Australia in connection with the registration of the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in Australia. The Free China Journal, February 4, 1994, p. 2.
244. Segodnya (Today), January 28, 1994, p. 3.
ation on the Chinese mainland as unstable and pregnant with serious socio-political crises, which may have detrimental consequences for the Asian-Pacific region in general and for Russia in particular. The proponents of this moderate approach deem it necessary to protect Taiwan from the military encroachments of Beijing not out of special sympathy to the ROC, but out of fear of general regional destabilization. In this respect, proponents of the second response view the idea of an Asian-Pacific collective security system, proposed by President Lee Teng-hui on September 4, 1992, in a favorable light.

The former Soviet president M. Gorbachev serves as a showcase of a pivotal figure between the first position to the second. While in office, he strongly supported the PRC position, but having adopted the international role of a “politician-humanist,” he changed his approach to the ROC. The repeated statements about obligatory peaceful resolution of all political conflicts was probably one of the two main achievements of M. Gorbachev’s visit to Taiwan in the spring of 1994. The second being his vague hint on a parallel between the PRC and the ROC and the former East and West Germany. It is important to note that though proponents of the second position have factually conceived of the de facto division of China, they do not always dare to be outspoken or frank about it.

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247. “...if hijackers, being young people, prefer the Taiwanese prison to the life in their motherland, it means that something is wrong on mainland China.” Izvestiya (The News), November 10, 1993, p. 9.

248. They consider Russian arms sales to the PRC to be detrimental to the stability in the Asia-Pacific, and point out that secret supplies of weaponry to Beijing can lead to further arms race in the Taiwan Straits. Izvestiya (The News), March 5, 1993, p. 3.

249. In Taiwan many felt sympathy for M. Gorbachev, who was praised as an architect of Communism’s collapse. In December 1991 a member of the Legislative Yuan Wu Hsien-erh proposed to establish a special foundation in support of M. Gorbachev, and to hire him as an international advisor to the ROC government with an annual salary of US $1 mln. Tzu-yu Shih-pao (The Liberty Times), December 26, 1992, p. 3. Many parliamentarians thought that in the future M. Gorbachev might restore his ruling position; they recommended the MOFA to assist the Gorbachev Foundation in the same way as Taiwan contributed US $2 mln to the R. Reagan’s Presidential Library. Chung-kuo Shih-pao (China Times), January 12, 1992, p. 3.


252. Gorbachev’s visit per se was not seen in Russia as a breakthrough in relations with Taiwan, as the former president was a private person not seriously influential in politics any longer. However, the international repercussions were more vivid, for Gorbachev enjoyed greater popularity outside his own country. Regardless, his tour
Before describing the third point of view, we need to stop and discuss the issue of China's being a divided state. For several decades, both the PRC and the ROC refused to admit this fact. As the former Director of the Russian Institute of Oriental Studies, Prof. M. Kapitsa, once mentioned in a private conversation, had Chiang Kai-shek agreed to "two Chinas" in the United Nations when Beijing was weak, the present international status of Taiwan would have been different. Of course, it is now useless to pass responsibility to the past. Though history sometimes repeats itself, it was Beijing that denied ROC sovereignty first, and now the ROC on Taiwan, though with much greater reason, tries to prove to the world community that the PRC never controlled the Taiwan area.²⁵³

C. The Emerging Pro-ROC Stance

As for the third point of view, its adherents see the signs of change behind the stubborn unwillingness of major powers to support the ROC in the international scene. Taiwan's attempts to break the isolation, including the official and "holiday" trips of President Lee Teng-hui in 1994 and 1995, aroused sympathy in many.²⁵⁴ The President's contacts with the leaders of the Southeast Asian nations, the upgrading of the level of foreign officials' visits to Taiwan, the increase in numbers of foreign unofficial missions in Taipei (which have started issuing visas), the US Senate's and British Parliament's demands to upgrade their countries' relations with the ROC, and the support of its UN bid convince us that the new trend is on the rise. The friendly attitude of the US administration, which admitted the visit of President Lee Teng-hui to his alma mater at Cornell University in June 1995 and granted a transit visa to Vice-President Li Yuan-tsu in early 1996, serve as similar testimony.

Russian politicians, having been afraid of contacts with Taiwan for a long time, at last had got the ball rolling. The first group of parliamentarians led by Nikolai Stolyarov, Vice Chairman of the State Duma Geopolitics Committee, arrived in Taipei unofficially in July 1994. Through contacts with the Presidential Office, the Con-

trol Yuan, and the Legislative Yuan, the delegation tried to establish initial ties with the political circles of the ROC. The Russians acted on behalf of the "Sergy Radonezhsky Foundation of Social Partnership," which was supposed to act as one more intermediary in relations with Taiwan. Its partner in Taipei was another newly registered Sino-Russian Cultural and Economic Association with businessman Hsiao Te-jen as Chairman. The association quickly went into oblivion, but this did not prevent N. Stolyarov from having further contacts with Taiwan.255

N. Stolyarov's trip to Taiwan helped to establish better relations between the ROC representatives in Moscow and local politicians. Representative Lo Loon visited the State Duma and met with its Chairman, I. Rybkin. These ties were strengthened during the international conference, held in Moscow in early August 1994 by the World League for Freedom and Democracy (WLFD).256 In October, I. Rybkin, together with N. Stolyarov, met with high-ranking Taiwanese guests and discussed with them the possibility of closer cooperation.257

Invited by the WLFD President Chao Tzu-chi, one of the most representative delegations from the CIS countries, led by N. Stolyarov, landed at Chiang Kai-shek International Airport on April 26, 1995. The delegation consisted of high-ranking officials from Russia, Byelorussia, Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, and Tajikistan. The Taiwanese press especially noted that many guests were of the rank of Vice-Premier (Secretary-General I. Korochnya of the Commonwealth of Independent States, Byelorussian Vice-Premier M. Myasnikovich, and several others). The mass media was also impressed

255. Tai-wan Jih-pao (Taiwan Times), July 1, 1994, p. 2.
256. WLFD had been previously called the World Anti-Communist League. It now has a Russian division chaired by G. Popov. The WLFD conference was attended by 160 delegates from 60 countries, and beyond all manifested considerable political success for the ROC. WLFD President Chao Tzu-chi hoped that after the conference one could anticipate Premier V. Chernomyrdin and Russian parliament upper chamber chairman V. Shumeiko would visit Taiwan, which was definitely an overestimate. Chung-yang Jih-pao (Central Daily News), August 12, 1994, p. 4.
257. Initially N. Stolyarov's relations with Taiwan were established due to the help of a Russian/American businessman A. Dokeichuk (who owns a "D & P Sov Group Co." and is a partner of Hsiao Te-jen). According to the reports of the Russian press, A. Dokychuk's interests mostly lay in the sphere of arms sales. Authorities suspect him of serious embezzlement of funds and fraud. The man himself hinted to the newsmen that "some parliamentarians" (allegedly elected due to his support) now have tried to get rid of him. A. Dokychuk even expressed suspicion that contacts with Taiwan might have turned into the hands of the mafia. See M. Isayev, "Sweet Piece", Nezavisimaya gazeta (The Independent Newspaper), January 18, 1995, p. 4.
by the Russian Minister of Justice (V. Kovalyov), members of the
Presidential Office Secretariat, the Vice-Mayor of Moscow, and im-
portant figures from Russian financial circles. The group was re-
cived by ROC President Lee Teng-hui, the Minister of Foreign
Affairs (Chien Fu), and other government officials. During the
visit, several important statements were made. For example, N.
Stolyarov said that the ROC was a sovereign and independent
state. Byelorussian Vice-Premier M. Myasnikovich hinted at the
possibility of a future exchange of representative offices between
his country and the ROC, as well as a possibility of President Lee
being invited to visit Minsk. Speaking about the probability of his
country’s support of the ROC returning to the UN, M. Myas-
nikovich said that it would be wise to start with developing bilateral
economic relations and investments first.

It has become clear to the third group that the time has come
to carry out some preparatory work for further development of
Russian-Taiwanese relations in the future, when the obvious fact
of China’s being a divided state will be internationally accepted.

260. Lien-ho Pao (United Daily News), April 29, 1995, p. 4. The ROC relations with
Byelorussia had passed through dramatic changes. As early as in May 1992, the Mayor
of the Byelorussian capital Minsk visited Taiwan and met with the widow of President
Chiang Ching-kuo Faina Ipatievna Vahreva (or Chiang Fang-liang). That was the only
occasion when the Taiwanese authorities allowed visitors from the former USSR to see
her. In August of the same year the then Vice Minister of Economic Affairs Chiang
Ping-kun visited Minsk, and agreed to subsidize US $ 8 mlr for the development of
Byelorussia’s satellite communications. The ROC also promised to supply US $ 500,000
worth of medicine as humanitarian aid. Later on in 1993 all of the above-mentioned
projects had been put aside, as Byelorussia turned out to be unresponsive, and did not
hurry to exchange offices with Taiwan. In 1994, the bilateral trade was as low as US $ 15.9
mlr of which Taiwanese imports constituted nearly 92%. Vice Minister of Foreign
Affairs Chen Hsi-fan visited Byelorussia in April 1995 and held negotiations with the
local Foreign Ministry. However no visible changes in the bilateral relations had oc-
curred. Lien-ho Pao (United Daily News), May 9, 1993, p. 4; April 13, 1995, p. 1; Lih-ja-
yuan Kung-pao (Gazette of the Legislative Yuan), Vol. 82, # 21 (1993), pp. 234-235; # 46,
p. 125.

261. In the second half of 1995, N. Stolyarov kept playing the role of the main coun-
terpart of Taiwan in the Russian Duma. In September he held discussions with the
ROC Legislative Yuan officials delegation led by Chief Secretary Ku Min. It was agreed
to establish “groups of friendly relations” in the parliaments of the two countries.
Chung-yang Jih-pao (Central Daily News), September 11, 1995, p. 2. However it is un-
clear whether these ties can be sustained after the Duma elections of 1995.

262. See P. Ivanov, “Possible Transformation of Taiwan’s International Status and
the Russian Policy”, Problemi i perspektivy razvitija nepravitelstvenikh svyazej
mezhdu rossiyej i taiwanjem (Problems and perspectives of the development of non-
The realization of such a necessity has already arrived in the minds of some Russian and CIS politicians. Their support for the ROC United Nations move, their advocating enactment of the Russian version of the “Taiwan Relations Act,” or some other steps towards improving bilateral relations are possible. Of course, the PRC factor is taken into account by the third group too. But they believe that if the international community starts moving closer to Taiwan, it will be impossible for Beijing to keep the old line interminably.

More and more publications in the Russian press, and more and more politicians and social celebrities, cried out in support of Taiwan. Of course, this kind of support was not expected to become a national campaign. Anyway, the topic of Taiwan deserving a fair international status (UN membership included) turned into a normal topic discussed from different points of view: critical, neutral, and optimistic.263

The present trend in Russia represents the gradual growth of the second point of view and some strengthening of the third viewpoint. The possible influence of adherents of these views on the institutionalization of Russian-Taiwanese relations should not be overestimated. Russia still has a long way to go in order to reach the level of genuine friendly unofficial relations with the ROC, but these groups represent a basis for positive change (though set at a conservative speed). The factor of the overwhelming importance of Moscow-Beijing relations remains as important as ever, despite the room for political maneuvering which was acquired by Russia after the de-ideologization of its ties with the PRC.

IX. CONCLUSION

Summing up the results of previous years in Russian-Taiwanese relations, one feels inclined to deem them an “unrecognized success.” Indeed, within a very short period of time, the two sides have covered an enormous distance between complete isola-

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tion/animosity on the one hand, and constructive dialogue/dynamic cooperation on the other. Certain problems, such as the final initiation of the long awaited Russian representative office in Taipei and the establishment of air communication links remain to be solved. As for Russia, better efficiency in banking correspondence, improvement of foreign investment legislation, and the environment are all issues on the agenda. All of the complications mentioned can be overcome in the course of time though, and Russian-Taiwanese relations should continue to develop within advisable frameworks that correspond to the national interests of the two sides respectively.
APPENDIX

Russian-Taiwanese Trade during the Year ending on
October 1, 1994 according to the data of the
China External Trade Development Council (ROC).264

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Export to Russian Federation by commodity in 1994</th>
<th>Value (US $1,000)</th>
<th>% of total / growth from 1993</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>126354.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parts and accessories</td>
<td>30502.2</td>
<td>24.1/198.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coded form and machines for processing such data</td>
<td>25786.2</td>
<td>20.4/261.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Articles for funfair, table or parlor games</td>
<td>13571.2</td>
<td>10.7/575.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Television receivers</td>
<td>6057.2</td>
<td>4.8/105.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electrical apparatus for line telephony/telegraphy</td>
<td>6270.8</td>
<td>5.0/500.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sewing machines</td>
<td>3048.4</td>
<td>2.4/-2.320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electric sound or visual signaling apparatus</td>
<td>2338.7</td>
<td>1.6/339.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woven fabrics of synthetic filament yarn</td>
<td>2060.5</td>
<td>1.6/70.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other footwear with outer soles and uppers of rubber or plastics</td>
<td>1650.7</td>
<td>1.3/-23.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other knitted or crocheted fabrics</td>
<td>1650.0</td>
<td>1.3/228.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Footwear with outer soles of rubber, plastics, leather or composition leather and uppers of textile materials</td>
<td>1370.6</td>
<td>1.1/-37.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other articles of plastics and articles of other materials</td>
<td>1302.3</td>
<td>1.0/102.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Synthetic filament yarn</td>
<td>1189.8</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specified or included lamps and lighting fittings</td>
<td>1149.5</td>
<td>0.9/437.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other made up clothing accessories</td>
<td>1124.0</td>
<td>0.9/-11.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polycetals, other polyethers and epoxide resins</td>
<td>1052.3</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Footwear with outer soles of rubber, plastics, leather or composition leather and uppers of leather</td>
<td>1051.7</td>
<td>0.8/287.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electronic integrated circuits and microassemblies</td>
<td>1005.8</td>
<td>0.8/2485</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electrical transformers, static converters and inductors</td>
<td>996.0</td>
<td>0.8/317.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beauty or make-up preparations</td>
<td>910.6</td>
<td>0.7/34.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parts and accessories of the motor vehicles</td>
<td>678.2</td>
<td>0.5/420.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electric instantaneous or</td>
<td>625.3</td>
<td>0.5/90.75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

264. The author is grateful to the Taipei World Trade Center Moscow Branch Office for the courtesy of supplying the statistics.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Storage water heaters, dryers, irons</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other furniture and parts</td>
<td>645.1</td>
<td>0.5/108.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transmission apparatus for radio-telephone, TV cameras, radio-telegraphy</td>
<td>620.6</td>
<td>0.5/3018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ball point pens, felt tipped and other pens and markers</td>
<td>593.2</td>
<td>0.5/327.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machinery for working rubber or plastics</td>
<td>592.4</td>
<td>0.5/26.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air or vacuum pumps, gas compressors, fans</td>
<td>558.2</td>
<td>0.4/80.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Articles and equipment for gymnastics and sports</td>
<td>541.3</td>
<td>0.4/978.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baby carriages</td>
<td>534.1</td>
<td>0.4/308.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pasta, whether or not cooked or stuffed</td>
<td>513.5</td>
<td>0.4/2094</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tableware, kitchenware, toilet articles of plastics</td>
<td>502.8</td>
<td>0.4/163.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Padlocks and locks</td>
<td>469.9</td>
<td>0.4/266.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electrical parts of machinery or apparatus</td>
<td>459.9</td>
<td>0.4/99.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exercise books, blotting-pads, binders, albums</td>
<td>397.8</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seats, beds and parts</td>
<td>396.0</td>
<td>0.3/661.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calculating machines, accounting machines, cash registers</td>
<td>390.6</td>
<td>0.3/-59.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men’s or boy’s suits, ensembles, jackets</td>
<td>374.5</td>
<td>0.3/-59.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leather of other animals</td>
<td>371.6</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other toys</td>
<td>358.8</td>
<td>0.3/427.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table, kitchen or other household articles of iron or steel</td>
<td>351.7</td>
<td>0.3/492.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woven fabrics of synthetic staple fibers</td>
<td>351.2</td>
<td>0.3/87.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Photographic cameras, flashlight apparatus</td>
<td>351.1</td>
<td>0.3/240.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spareparts</td>
<td>343.2</td>
<td>0.3/380.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electro-mechanical domestic appliances</td>
<td>337.6</td>
<td>0.3/263.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insulated wire, cable and other insulated electric conductors</td>
<td>331.6</td>
<td>0.3/653.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Filing, card-index cabinets, paper trays</td>
<td>316.4</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spectacles, goggles and the like</td>
<td>313.5</td>
<td>0.2/423.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tools of two or more in sets</td>
<td>309.8</td>
<td>0.2/119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hand tools, blow lamps etc.</td>
<td>302.9</td>
<td>0.2/2445</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vacuum flasks</td>
<td>260.3</td>
<td>0.2/446.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Articles for the conveyance or packing of goods</td>
<td>245.6</td>
<td>0.2/446.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Records, tapes and other recorded media</td>
<td>226.0</td>
<td>0.2/31.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other clocks</td>
<td>225.3</td>
<td>0.2/380.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woven fabrics of cotton</td>
<td>221.4</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other articles of iron and steel</td>
<td>202.0</td>
<td>0.2/412.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Unit 1</td>
<td>Unit 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waters, including mineral and aerated</td>
<td>200.6</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imitation jewelry</td>
<td>198.1</td>
<td>0.2/8513</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wire, rods, tubes, electrodes</td>
<td>193.0</td>
<td>0.2/11252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panty hose, tights, stockings, socks</td>
<td>187.4</td>
<td>0.1/26.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s or girls’ suits, ensembles, jackets</td>
<td>186.3</td>
<td>0.1/278.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trunks, suit-cases, brief-cases, other different cases</td>
<td>168.1</td>
<td>0.1/15.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electrical apparatus for switching or protecting electrical circuits</td>
<td>157.4</td>
<td>0.1/378.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machines and mechanical appliances having individual functions</td>
<td>154.2</td>
<td>0.1/963.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polymers of styrene</td>
<td>149.0</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slide fasteners and parts thereof</td>
<td>147.4</td>
<td>0.1/-49.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machine-tools for working wood, cork, bone, hard rubber</td>
<td>147.2</td>
<td>0.1/3245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buttons, press-fasteners, snap-fasteners</td>
<td>140.2</td>
<td>0.1/140.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knives with cutting blades</td>
<td>138.5</td>
<td>0.1/-20.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other made-up articles, including dress patterns</td>
<td>137.2</td>
<td>0.1/2265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men’s or boys’ suits, ensembles (knitted or crocheted)</td>
<td>135.4</td>
<td>0.1/1057</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Textile fabrics impregnated, covered or laminated with plastics</td>
<td>124.0</td>
<td>0.1/-47.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machinery for washing, cleaning, drying, ironing, pressing, dyeing textiles</td>
<td>123.1</td>
<td>0.1/8106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other articles of glass</td>
<td>122.3</td>
<td>0.1/61.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jerseys, pullovers, cardigans</td>
<td>119.0</td>
<td>0.1/-28.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Microphones, loudspeakers, headphones, amplifiers</td>
<td>116.3</td>
<td>0.1/306.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dish washing machines, machines for sealing and packing bottles</td>
<td>115.9</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Builders’ ware of plastics</td>
<td>107.8</td>
<td>0.1/1727</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Floor, wall or ceiling coverings</td>
<td>107.2</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machine-tools for working any material by laser or photon beam</td>
<td>97.0</td>
<td>0.1/385.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Invalid carriages</td>
<td>96.6</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wallpaper</td>
<td>90.4</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parts and accessories</td>
<td>88.2</td>
<td>0.1/1564</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combs, hair pins, hair-curlers and the like</td>
<td>80.0</td>
<td>0.1/742.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wooden frames for paintings, photos, mirrors</td>
<td>78.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parts of footwear</td>
<td>75.5</td>
<td>0.1/69.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other articles of wood</td>
<td>75.4</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food processing machinery</td>
<td>73.8</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Articles of apparel and clothing</td>
<td>71.5</td>
<td>0.1/652.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item</td>
<td>Value (US $ 1,000)</td>
<td>% of total/growth from 1993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accessories</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trailers and semi-trailers</td>
<td>71.4</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plates, sheets, film, foil and strip of plastics</td>
<td>70.0</td>
<td>0.1/227.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Webs of cellulose fibers, toilet paper, handkerchiefs, tampons, napkins</td>
<td>69.2</td>
<td>0.1/1256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Printed circuit</td>
<td>67.7</td>
<td>0.1/-18.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other paper</td>
<td>67.4</td>
<td>0.1/4393</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bed linen, table, toilet, kitchen linen</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>0.1/21.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baths, shower-baths, bidets, flush-baths</td>
<td>66.6</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Printing machinery</td>
<td>65.0</td>
<td>0.1/-59.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machinery for industrial preparation of food and drink</td>
<td>64.1</td>
<td>0.1/157.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brooms, brushes</td>
<td>62.2</td>
<td>0.0/298.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exceeding 1,000 volts electrical apparatus for switching or protecting electrical circuits</td>
<td>60.9</td>
<td>0.0/204.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Import from Russian Federation by commodity in 1994</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>889,056.7</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-finished products of iron or non-alloy steel</td>
<td>586,951.0</td>
<td>66.0/64.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unwrought aluminum</td>
<td>88,375.7</td>
<td>9.9/225.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gold unwrought or in manufactured forms</td>
<td>55,464.2</td>
<td>6.2/152.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flat-rolled products or iron or non-alloy steel</td>
<td>32,035.0</td>
<td>3.6/155.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heterocyclic compounds with Nitrogen hetero-atoms only</td>
<td>13,180.7</td>
<td>1.5/70.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other bars and rods of iron or non-alloy steel</td>
<td>10,363.9</td>
<td>1.2/316.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Synthetic rubber and factice derived from oils</td>
<td>8,727.5</td>
<td>1.0/-7.046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woven fabrics of cotton</td>
<td>8,236.9</td>
<td>0.9/292.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotton, not carded or combed</td>
<td>8,226.8</td>
<td>0.9/388.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polymers of vinyl chloride or others</td>
<td>8,172.5</td>
<td>0.9/326.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angles, shapes and sections</td>
<td>7,109.7</td>
<td>0.8/-17.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ball or roller bearings</td>
<td>4,499.0</td>
<td>0.5/115.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mineral or chemical fertilizers</td>
<td>3,994.8</td>
<td>0.4/55.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flours, meals and pellets</td>
<td>3,502.9</td>
<td>0.4/122.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bars and rods (hot rolled) of iron</td>
<td>3,247.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other bars and rods of other alloy steel</td>
<td>3,066.1</td>
<td>0.3/88.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nitrosated derivatives polycarboxylic acids</td>
<td>2,976.4</td>
<td>0.3/544.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magnesium and articles thereof</td>
<td>2,904.6</td>
<td>0.3/80.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coal</td>
<td>2,163.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newsprint, in rolls or sheets</td>
<td>2,130.3</td>
<td>0.2/3.237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unwrought zinc</td>
<td>2,017.2</td>
<td>0.2/-60.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unwrought nickel</td>
<td>2,002.3</td>
<td>0.2/-77.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Unit 1</td>
<td>Unit 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flat-rolled products of other alloy steel</td>
<td>1741.6</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acyclic alcohols</td>
<td>1700.8</td>
<td>0.2/151.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artificial filament yarn</td>
<td>1484.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other alloy steel in ingots or other primary forms</td>
<td>1249.7</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leather of bovine or equine animals</td>
<td>1230.0</td>
<td>0.1/100.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iron and non-alloy steel in ingots</td>
<td>1138.5</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Platinum</td>
<td>1124.9</td>
<td>0.1/-75.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diodes, transistors and similar semiconductor devices</td>
<td>1098.9</td>
<td>0.1/433.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pig iron</td>
<td>1097.1</td>
<td>0.1/-69.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemical wood pulp, soda or sulphate</td>
<td>1007.0</td>
<td>0.1/291.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polymers of ethylene in primary forms</td>
<td>895.8</td>
<td>0.1/3794</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chromium oxides and hydroxides</td>
<td>958.1</td>
<td>0.1/107.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compounded rubber</td>
<td>825.0</td>
<td>0.1/-1.044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copper tubes and pipes</td>
<td>812.5</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotton yarn (85% or less by weight)</td>
<td>769.8</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cobalt mattes and other products thereof</td>
<td>705.2</td>
<td>0.1/174.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wood sawn or chipped</td>
<td>652.0</td>
<td>0.1/-42.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wood in rough bark</td>
<td>611.2</td>
<td>0.1/-62.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glass fibers</td>
<td>584.3</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petroleum oils</td>
<td>575.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemical elements doped for use in electronics</td>
<td>568.6</td>
<td>0.1/309.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Synthetic filament yarn</td>
<td>561.2</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncoated paper and paperboard</td>
<td>387.7</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemical wood pulp, sulphite</td>
<td>386.2</td>
<td>0.0/1309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fish frozen, excluding fillets</td>
<td>355.7</td>
<td>0.0/168.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phosphinates, phosphonates, phosphates</td>
<td>338.7</td>
<td>0.0/-75.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electronic integrated circuits and microassemblies</td>
<td>332.4</td>
<td>0.0/10980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncoated Kraft paper and paperboard</td>
<td>331.9</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stainless steel in ingots</td>
<td>292.9</td>
<td>0.0/47.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Molluskas, aquatic invertebrates other than crustaceans</td>
<td>283.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Derivatives ketones and quinones</td>
<td>280.6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machine-tools, including presses, for working metal</td>
<td>278.2</td>
<td>0.0/-46.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motor cars and other motor vehicles</td>
<td>278.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artificial staple fibers</td>
<td>260.9</td>
<td>0.0/75.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotton yarn (85% by weight or more)</td>
<td>247.3</td>
<td>0.0/4396</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lathes for removing metal</td>
<td>207.3</td>
<td>0.0/130.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Synthetic organic and inorganic tanning substances</td>
<td>202.7</td>
<td>0.0/23.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Product Description</td>
<td>Value 1</td>
<td>Value 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sulfates, alums, peroxosulphates</td>
<td>197.0</td>
<td>0.0/2562</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woven fabrics of cotton (85% or more by weight)</td>
<td>196.7</td>
<td>0.0/-89.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aluminum waste</td>
<td>180.9</td>
<td>0.0/3832</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motor vehicles for the transport of goods</td>
<td>164.4</td>
<td>0.0/-58.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polyamides in primary forms</td>
<td>129.7</td>
<td>0.0/558.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copper foil</td>
<td>125.8</td>
<td>0.0/280.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mineral or chemical fertilizers</td>
<td>122.8</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salts of oxometallic or peroxometallic acids</td>
<td>119.3</td>
<td>0.0/40.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machining centers</td>
<td>118.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milk and cream, concentrated or containing sugar</td>
<td>116.2</td>
<td>0.0/-78.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chlorides, chloride oxides</td>
<td>107.8</td>
<td>0.0/431.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yarn of carded wool</td>
<td>89.2</td>
<td>0.0/-66.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compression-ignition internal combustion piston engines</td>
<td>88.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carbons</td>
<td>87.6</td>
<td>0.0/36.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiberboard of wood or other lignocereous materials</td>
<td>87.6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paintings, drawings and pastels</td>
<td>83.9</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reclaimed rubber in primary forms</td>
<td>82.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flat-rolled products of stainless steel</td>
<td>81.8</td>
<td>0.0/128.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ferro-alloys</td>
<td>79.8</td>
<td>0.0/128.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electro- and other magnets</td>
<td>78.4</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diamonds</td>
<td>77.8</td>
<td>0.0/-69.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other articles of nickel</td>
<td>73.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Photographic cameras, binoculars</td>
<td>73.0</td>
<td>0.0/396.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glass beads, imitation precious or semi-precious stones</td>
<td>62.6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woven fabrics of flax</td>
<td>59.0</td>
<td>0.0/-72.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roundabouts, swings and other fairground amusements</td>
<td>59.0</td>
<td>0.0/-31.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other live animals</td>
<td>58.7</td>
<td>0.0/121.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electric motors and generators</td>
<td>55.9</td>
<td>0.0/121.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Titanium and articles thereof</td>
<td>55.8</td>
<td>0.0/-92.57</td>
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