COMMUNICATIONS AND CHINA'S NATIONAL INTEGRATION: AN ANALYSIS OF PEOPLE'S DAILY AND CENTRAL DAILY NEWS ON THE CHINA REUNIFICATION ISSUE

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Shuhua Chang*

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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Statement of the Problem

On January 7, 1950, the People’s Daily of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) reported: “Our troops on the east coast salute the New Year. This year Taiwan will be liberated. People from all walks of life in Taiwan are thirsting for liberation.”¹ Six days earlier, the Central Daily News of the Republic of China (ROC) in Taiwan in a front page story reported: “President Chiang Kai-shek proclaims 1950 they are to counterattack and recover the Mainland.”² Thirty-six years later, Taiwan is still not “liberated,” nor the mainland “recovered.” Politically, they are divided; geographically, separated; each government hostile; each contending; each proclaiming its right to govern the Middle Kingdom, China; each being recognized by various countries; each placing major emphasis on the China reunification issue: the old political philosophy of “one unified China” commemorates the only common tradition shared by the two governments.

As the propaganda organs of their respective governments, the People’s Daily and the Central Daily News have reported on the China reunification issue for the past 36 years strictly along party lines.

The two reports have been diffuse, have portrayed images dressed with the language of propaganda, images clothed with political cliches, with the rhetoric of persuasion. The news of the 1950s was not impartial, the news in the 60s unrealistic; the news of the 70s focusing on atrocities; all of the news for the past 36 years biased and subjective.

On December 15, 1978 came the abrupt announcement establishing diplomatic relations between the PRC and the United States. This news marked the beginning of a dramatic change in the reporting diplomacy concerning the China reunification issue. The approach became more subdued, showing more recognition, displaying more acceptance toward the other side.

On December 17, 1978, the People’s Daily terminology “ruling clique” was used for the last time. The ROC leaders were now labeled “Taiwan authorities” by the PRC; Chiang Kai-shek became “xiansheng” or “Mister,” illustrating a polite alteration in language, a less

antagonistic use of vocabulary.\(^3\)

In 1979, “the Chinese Communist bandits” in the *Central Daily News* became “the Chinese Communists.” The People’s Republic of China and titles of PRC leaders were printed in quotation marks.

Thirty years of the *People’s Daily*’s pledge to “liberate Taiwan by all means” became the “return of Taiwan into the arms of the motherland.”

The *Central Daily News*’ “We will counterattack and recover the mainland” became the non-military language of “unifying China under the Three Principles of the People.”

These changes reveal a tendency toward objectiveness, a measure of leniency toward the other side; they suggest the development of a political atmosphere more conducive to achieving a reunification, more open to communication between the two governments. Were these changes superficial or substantial?

The major shift in coverage centers on the peace overtures offered by the PRC to the ROC. The PRC government announced the first overture five and a half years ago, the *People’s Daily* reported. Before that, reports had often focused on the “bloody liberation of Taiwan,” not on a peaceful reunification. Despite the change to support of a peaceful reunification, the PRC has refused to make a commitment of nonviolence toward the ROC.

Before December 1978, the *Central Daily News* was vague about these overtures. Now it covers them with rejection, with malice, spurting every overture, discrediting every intention of the PRC. These overtures, their responses, and the issues of reunification are complex issues; they raise many questions. Are the PRC’s peace proposals too unreasonable, too inconceivable for the ROC to accept? Is the ROC too stubborn, too apprehensive to give any peace plan a chance? Are both governments sincere enough to achieve reunification? Do these peace proposals, with their goal of reunification, represent the opinion of the majority of the Chinese people? These answers must be found through a scientific survey of the one billion Chinese on the mainland and on Taiwan. Obviously, such a survey would prove difficult, indeed impossible, to conduct; therefore, a survey of media coverage of the issue offers an alternative approach, offers insight and understanding the potential of unification, its form and possibility. These insights would be worthwhile not only academically but also practically.

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Purpose of the Study

The primary purpose of this study is to test the relevance of a communications approach of the integration theory of international relations; to study the issues of China's national integration. The test is made through a quantitative survey and a qualitative analysis of coverage of the issue in the official party newspapers of the PRC and the ROC. Specifically, the study uses survey and analysis to test five assumptions of integration theory.

Assumption 1: National integration is a multidimensional phenomenon. 4

Test 1: The study chooses variables and selects factors computed from the survey; they determine if China's potential reunification is multidimensionally reported in the two newspapers.

The study adopts the model of Karl Deutsch, developed in the mid-1960s, that used transaction flows as one set of variables to assess the level of national integration in Europe. 5 Deutsch used variables, which included interviews with elites, and content analysis of selected key newspapers in France and Germany. 6

The study also adopts the approach of integration theorist Bruce Russett. Russett used factor analysis to distinguish regional groups; he reduced larger separate variables to smaller ones. Small groups can be used as indicators of political integration. 7

Assumption 2: Consensus is an essential prerequisite for political integration. Political consensus determines what functions integration institutions should perform. 8

Test 2: The study attempts to determine if a consensus exists between the two Chinese party newspapers in their attitudes about China's national integration.

Assumption 3: The mutual relevance and responsiveness necessary for integration are brought about by a growth in transactions between members of the two systems. Integration may be identified from community-building efforts in the past. By measuring changes in the intensity and scope of transactions between a given group of actors, the growth of a sense of community in a region can be

5. Ibid., p. 454.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid., p. 446.
determined.9

Test 3: To determine the quantity, quality and make-up of transactions between people or elites of the PRC and the ROC, the study examines the trends that the two party newspapers have followed in reporting about the other side and about the common issue.

Assumption 4: Outside governments and international organizations, and nongovernmental actors, act as important catalysts in integration schemes.10

Test 4: The study aims to provide evidence that China’s national integration involves foreign factors, and is not just an internal affair as some decision makers in the PRC, the ROC and the United States have proclaimed. Specifically, the study examines U.S. involvement in China’s national integration, as a major foreign or external factor.

Assumption 5: The “spill-over” or “ramification” concept of integration theory claims that economic interdependence may lead eventually to political unification; hence, initial attempts to integrate along relatively non-controversial, economic lines may eventually spill over into attempts to integrate along more controversial political lines.11

Test 5: The study attempts to determine the relevance of economic integration between the two Chinas and examines the extent of this integration. Using information from the survey, it analyzes economic developments, specifically the competition in foreign trade and the different domestic standards of living of the PRC and the ROC.

Importance of the Study

The unification of China has been a major source of conflict between the PRC and the ROC since 1949. The shift of U.S. diplomatic recognition from the ROC to the PRC in 1979, and the 1984 agreement between the PRC and Britain regarding Hong Kong, have enhanced the importance of the issue of reunification for the two governments. How the issue will be resolved will have a significant effect on the peoples of each country, extending beyond these two countries to the political climate in the world.

Analyzing how each country approaches the issue and uses its official party press may reveal how reunification will be achieved and how the issue will be managed.

The findings of this study demonstrate the significant trends of each newspaper in reporting on the same issues and in reporting about

11. Ibid., pp. 418-419 and 432-433.
the opposite side. These trend data can be important for an understanding of China’s national integration.

The study may also be of value as a reference of how the two governments have used their media, how they express their views on national integration, why they reject views of the opposite side, how they influence their own people, and how they maintain a propaganda dialog with the opponent.

Writers on integration share an interest in studying communications within the units to be integrated. According to theorists Karl Deutsch and Amitai Etzioni, people learn to consider themselves as members of a community. This membership results from human communications patterns. In general, integration theorists hold that people adopt integrative behavior because of expectations developed among elite groups in government and private sectors; therefore, successful integration depends upon a people’s ability to “internalize” the integrative process.12

The news media of the PRC and the ROC give evidence of the changing positions of PRC and ROC leaders regarding reunification. To the extent these leaders voice the desires of the PRC and ROC populations, the news media also give evidence of the changing positions of the respective populations.

This study may also be useful as a reference for the peoples of these two nations, who may have difficulty finding objective analyses of issues, views and strategies of either country on the reunification issue.

In light of the delicate diplomatic balance that the United States maintains between the PRC and the ROC, this study might also promote U.S. understanding of an issue that could have international significance.

Organization of the Study

The present chapter identifies the purpose and the importance of the study and discusses the direction of the work.

Chapter II briefly reviews the history of China’s national integration, focusing on more than 50 years of fierce struggle between the PRC Chinese Communist Party and the ROC Chinese Nationalist Party. A summary of theories of integration and the communications approach to national integration are also included in this chapter.

Chapter III covers the methodology of the thematic content anal-

12. Ibid., p. 424.
ysis and factor analysis that were used for conducting the survey. For the study, a scientific survey of the two party newspapers between December 1978 and May 1985 was conducted to analyze the approach of each to China's national integration.

The criteria for selecting thematic categories for factor analyses were based on concepts used in theories of integration and in a communications approach.

The thematic categories were used as a basis for developing hypotheses, which are also presented in this chapter. These categories are also used to test the five hypotheses.

Chapter IV develops an analysis of the data using a computerized quantitative research design and a qualitative research interpretation of five factors that were found through factor analysis.

The five factors supporting the hypotheses are categorized, labeled and interpreted according to events in the PRC and the ROC relating to reunification that occurred between December 1978 and May 1985.

The factors reveal the policies of both parties regarding national integration and identify the key variables in the future of the issue.

Chapter V provides conclusions and assessments and makes recommendations on how all parties can not only understand these factors but also use their understanding to determine future policies that will shape China's national integration.

Because of the politically sensitive issues of recognition and governmental legitimacy, this study uses a neutral approach in data collection, reference selection and terminology. Politically biased terms are avoided. "The People's Republic of China" is used instead of "Red China" or "Communist China" and "The Republic of China" instead of "Free China" or "Chinese Taipei."

Romanization of Chinese names and terms is determined by context. Discussions involving the People's Daily use the Pinyin system, which is officially accepted in the PRC; discussions involving the Central Daily News use the Wade-Giles system, which is accepted in the ROC.

An appendix of relevant historical documents, events and data statements is added at the end of the study to assist scholars and to assist the reader in drawing personal conclusions.
CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF LITERATURE

History of China’s National Integration Within the Mainland

The study of China’s long history of national integration is a prerequisite to understand the issue of China’s reunification.

In its more than 3,000 years of recorded history, China has gone through many repetitive but cyclical periods of unity and disunity. Dynasties have emerged, empires have prospered, and kingdoms have degenerated and disintegrated; nevertheless, the Chinese nation has always survived because its people have held a unified political philosophy that there is and always has been only “one China.”

Three thousand years ago, Confucius failed to unite the country’s six kingdoms. Since then, millions of Chinese have perished in battles over unification. Some perished in defeat, others in victory. War minimizes progress, and the misadventures of that conflict presage China’s plunge into the modern world.

Division, struggle and turmoil have disrupted the history of China in periods of unity as well as in periods of division. Of the 3,107 years of history, 1,963, or 63.18 percent, were periods of unity; 1,144 years, or 36.82 percent, were years of division. There were, thus, 819 years more of unity than of division. Moreover, during years of division, a multi-state rather than an actual unified China was often the case, as in the East Chou period (770-249 B.C.), the Ch’un-chiu period (722-481 B.C.), the Warring States period (403-211 B.C.), the Later Han Dynasty (9-220 A.D.), the Three Kingdoms (220-280), the East Tsin Dynasty (317-420), the South and North Dynasties (420-590), the Five Dynasties (907-960), the South Sung Dynasty (1127-1279) and the Republic (1912-1986).

To both ancient and modern Chinese people, the existence of multiple, political systems has not meant the discontinuity of “one China”; these multiple states still exist within the same cultural sphere of the Chinese civilization.

A far more serious threat to the “Chung-Kuo” (Middle Kingdom) China has been the invasion of foreigners who might destroy Chinese culture. Perpetuation of culture and ideological unification have always take priority over territorial unification, the assumption

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2. Ibid.
being that, with a common cultural basis, a multi-system China would sooner or later be reunified.3

"The world of the Chinese" to the Chinese quiets itself in the center of the universe, while the "world of the non-Chinese" prattles in the other regions. Until Western powers reached China, Chinese leaders considered the sphere of influence of their civilization "Tien-Hsia" (under the sky), the entire world.4

Nations rise and fall, people are unified and divided; the Chinese understand this cyclical principle of history. Historically, the Chinese demonstrate patience during division, nurturing a belief that their nation will eventually be reunited.5

"One China" is the ideal of the oldest Chinese issue, unification; this unification is of paramount importance in the dispute between the contending governments of the PRC on the mainland and the ROC on Taiwan. From an historical perspective, the present division of China into two hostile political systems is parallel to the competition between elite groups in the early years of China's dynastic history.

The Chinese Communists of the PRC and the Chinese Nationalists of the ROC agree wholeheartedly on the old political philosophy of "one China," despite the more than 50 years of fierce struggle between them.

History of China's National Integration Between the Mainland and Taiwan: Ancient Times to 1949

It is intriguing to examine the two Chinese governments from a historical perspective. Although both Chinese states insist on the ideal of one China, Taiwan has never been more than an outlying region of the Chinese mainland. The term "China" (Chung-Kuo, Middle Kingdom) itself came into use before the birth of Christ. But it only referred to various states in the central Yellow River valley. Chung-Kuo was gradually heralded as all of mainland China; nevertheless, Taiwan, like Outer Mongolia, was not framed within the mainland government until the late 17th century.6

4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
The earliest inhabitants of Taiwan were of Malay stock, not Chinese. Third-century Chinese historical records make reference to Taiwan as “I-chou,” Barbarian Island, and “Liu-chiu” (the same name now used for Japan’s Ryukyu Islands) and give no indication that Taiwan was part of China; rather, Taiwan was regarded as a tributary state in the same category as Thailand, Nepal, Burma, Vietnam, Laos and Korea.\(^7\)

Chinese conquest of the island has been argued. Some historians have cited Shang-shu, a Chinese history book that was probably finished in the early third century B.C., to prove that Taiwan had been a tributary to a Chinese state in ancient times. But this is probably more legend than history. Other historians have said that a Chinese military expedition against I-chou in the third century A.D., by forces of the Wu ruler Sun Chuan (reign 222-252) and an expedition against Liu-chiu in the seventh century by forces of Emperor Yang of the Sui dynasty (589-618) were all in actuality against Taiwan. Therefore, they argue, Taiwan was conquered during these early periods.\(^8\) These, however, were only temporary victories and did not result in Chinese settlement of the island.

To understand that political boundaries are not part of Chinese tradition and thought is to understand the status and potential future of Taiwan with respect to the government on the mainland. Moreover, China has always been a land-based and land-directed society. Until recently, the sea and coastal mountain ranges formed both natural boundaries and barriers for China.\(^9\) The Chinese of the early empires did not view those people living on the seaward side of the coastal slope as Chinese. The Chinese people lived along the coasts of the Yellow and Yangtze River valleys. China’s expansion was inland; its trade routes westward, across India and Asia Minor, to Europe. The Great Wall itself is more than a linear frontier; it is the most important delimitation of a zonal frontier, where there are minor delimitations. What could not be included in the Empires was excluded.\(^10\)

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China's organization was also unsuitable for both these regions: neither could be conquered without drastic changes in the Chinese way of life. Even today, Taiwan can be viewed as a frontier area that China has never properly incorporated.\textsuperscript{11}

The government waited for several centuries before sending Chinese immigrants and a Chinese administration to Taiwan and the adjacent Peng-hu Islands (Pescadores). There is documentary evidence indicating that by 1171 Peng-hu had become a Chinese military outpost. By 1225, it was administratively incorporated into the Chinese Empire and placed under the jurisdiction of Tsin-kiang County of Chuan-chou Prefecture, Fukien Province.\textsuperscript{12}

In 1517, the Portuguese discovered Taiwan and named it Formosa. China made no protest when Taiwan came under foreign control. Until the mid-1600s, there were few contacts between the mainland and Taiwan. Taiwan and Peng-hu were under the siege of foreign traders and adventurers as well as Chinese pirates. In 1602, 1609, 1616 and in the late 1620s, several raids by Japanese pirates or by the Tokugawa Shogunate forces were made against Peng-hu and Taiwan. None of these invasions, however, brought much benefit to Japan.\textsuperscript{13}

In the late 16th century the Dutch first appeared in the Far East. In 1602 the Dutch East India Company was established to coordinate all Dutch colonial activities in East and Southeast Asia, including Taiwan. The first Dutch occupation of the island came in 1622. The Ming Court agreed to let the Dutch live on Taiwan, and to set up trading posts, even though the Ming Court kept control of Peng-hu Islands. For 37 years (1624-1662) Taiwan remained a Dutch colony, with temporary Spanish rule over its northern part between 1626 and 1642.\textsuperscript{14} After the Ming dynasty rulers were conquered by the Manchu leaders in 1661, a Chinese loyalist of the Ming Court, Gen. Cheng Cheng-kung (Koxinga), fled to Taiwan with a small force and a number of followers, driving the Dutch from Taiwan and formally establishing a Chinese government in exile. Although his government never regained power on the mainland, the Chinese gained de facto rule over Taiwan for the first time in history. During this period a massive Chinese immigration to Taiwan occurred.\textsuperscript{15}

From 1662 to 1683, Gen. Cheng, his son and his grandson ruled

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{11} Johnson, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 21.
\item \textsuperscript{12} Shaw, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 8.
\item \textsuperscript{13} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{14} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{15} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
Taiwan. In 1683, Gen. Cheng's grandson surrendered Taiwan to the Ching (Manchu) Empire (1644-1911), which administered Taiwan as a prefecture of the mainland Fukien Province for 202 years. In 1886, the Ching Empire made Taiwan a separate province of China.16

The desire to bring about this political extension thus did not come from the Chinese themselves, but from their Manchu conquerors, even though although Chinese settlers from Fukien and Kwangtung provinces had brought Taiwan well within the Chinese cultural sphere by the late 18th century.17

In the 1800s, the United States government asked China if Taiwan was a part of China. China replied no. Commodore Perry then recommended that the United States establish protectorate status over Taiwan. Because of reasons relating to domestic politics, the U.S. president decided against this.18

In 1874, an Okinawan ship ran aground on Taiwan, and its crew was murdered by aborigines. Japan protested the incident in Peking, but China disclaimed any responsibility on the grounds that the crime had not been committed "in its jurisdiction."19

Nine years later, Taiwan was declared a separate province; it was yielded to Japan in 1895 by the Treaty of Simonoseki, which signified China's defeat in the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895), ending the longest period of Chinese administration on Taiwan—the 212 years between 1683 and 1895.20

Before Japan was able to establish jurisdiction over the island, the Chinese on Taiwan revolted, refusing to accept Japan. They declared their independence and established the "Republic of Taiwan." The Republican government of 1895 was dominated by the Chinese and ignored by the rest of the world; its existence has been conveniently long since forgotten. Nevertheless, within months, the Japanese pacified the island. For the next 50 years, Taiwan was a Japanese colony.21

On November 26, 1943, at the Cairo Conference, ROC President Chiang Kai-shek, U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill issued a joint communiqué. The

17. Ibid.
Cairo Declaration declared that "all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be returned to the Republic of China."

On July 26, 1945, the heads of governments of the United States, the ROC and the United Kingdom further declared in the Potsdam Proclamation, "The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out." This was accepted by Japan in its surrender of September 2, 1945.22

The ROC government took over Taiwan from the Japanese on October 26, 1945. The next day, it announced that Taiwan was a province of China. The ROC has governed Taiwan ever since.23

In the following four years, the mainland and Taiwan were integrated as "one China" for the second time. The first had been the period between 1683 and 1895. This single Chinese nation, however, was dismantled for the second time on October 1, 1949, when the Chinese Communist Party conquered the mainland and established the PRC government. The proclamation establishing the PRC marked the end of a 22-year civil war between the Communists and the Nationalists on the mainland. The defeated Chinese Nationalist Party moved the ROC government from Nanking to Taipei in December 1949,24 making the Taiwan Strait a natural boundary of disintegration between the PRC and the ROC.

Two Chinese governments have been actively participating on the international stage since 1949, although neither government has recognized the legitimacy of the other. Officially, both have maintained de facto recognition by most countries of the world. In reality, there are two Chinas.25

History of China’s National Integration Between the PRC and the ROC, 1949-1985

The PRC and the ROC have existed as independent political entities with separate international personalities for 36 years; however, both have continued to engage in the struggle for national integration. Though not primarily a military struggle, the problem has had a military aspect, although it has largely been waged with political, diplomatic and economic weapons.

23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. Myers, op. cit., p. 69.
The PRC has sought to undermine the ROC's international status, sought to influence the rest of the world to view Taiwan as a legal part of the PRC, and sought to convince the people of Taiwan that they cannot avoid ultimately accepting the sovereignty of the PRC over the island. Throughout this struggle, the governments in Peking and Taipei have maintained that China is one nation and that Taiwan is a province of China; furthermore, the peoples of both nations have been denied the right of self-determination in deciding their international status.

The nations of the world thus have not been asked to recognize Taiwan as an independent state, a state separate from China, but have been forced into a position of officially recognizing one or the other. The inability of the ROC to extend its governmental authority beyond Taiwan and its associated islands has made it difficult for most nations to refuse indefinitely to recognize the government in Peking as the legitimate government of China. Most nations realize that the Peking government has governed the vast majority of the Chinese people for more than 30 years.26

1. The Struggle for International Position

During the first 20 years after 1949, the rivalry between the PRC and the ROC centered on membership in the United Nations. The China seat, first occupied by the ROC and later claimed by the PRC, was the symbol of legitimacy determined by the international community. Many nations, as well as international organizations, tended to follow the lead of the United Nations in their own policies toward the two claimants.

The ROC was a charter member of the United Nations, and one of the five permanent members of the Security Council. In January 1950, three months after the founding of the PRC, the PRC's premier and foreign minister, Chou En-lai, cabled U.N. Secretary General Trygve Lie demanding that the ROC be ousted from the United Nations and that the PRC seated in its place. When a Soviet-sponsored resolution supporting the PRC was voted down, the Soviets walked out of the Security Council. They vowed neither to return nor to accept any Security Council decision as long as the ROC representative remained. In August, the PRC again cabled the United Nations, charging that President Harry S. Truman's positioning of the U.S. Seventh Fleet between Taiwan and the mainland at the outbreak of the

Korean war was an act of armed aggression against the PRC.\textsuperscript{27}

In November 1950, Gen. Wu Hsiuchuan, presenting the PRC case before the Security Council, argued that the island of Taiwan was an integral part of China, supported by the Cairo and Potsdam declarations, which had been returned to the Chinese government in 1945 after the Japanese surrender. Consequently, Gen. Wu said the intervention by the Seventh Fleet to prevent the “liberation” of the island by the PRC was “open and direct aggression against Chinese territory,” calling on the Security Council to condemn the United States for the act, demanding the complete withdrawal of its armed forces from Taiwan. A resolution presented by the Soviet representative was voted down. By this time, large-scale PRC forces had intervened in Korea, and the Soviet Union had vetoed a six-power resolution calling for the withdrawal of these forces.\textsuperscript{28}

By 1951, the United States was able to get a resolution passed in the General Assembly condemning the PRC as an aggressor for having attacked U.N. forces defending South Korea.\textsuperscript{29}

Thus, the PRC’s early efforts to replace the ROC in the United Nations, and efforts to force the United States to abandon Taiwan, failed. President Truman’s reversal of a U.S. hands-off policy toward Taiwan made a successful PRC invasion impossible. The PRC’s intervention in Korea, where a U.N. force representing 16 nations was resisting North Korea, placed a large stumbling block in the way of the PRC’s early acceptance.\textsuperscript{30} Because the Korean War set in motion programs of U.S. military and economic aid to Taiwan, relations steadily grew closer, culminating in the signing of a mutual defense treaty in December 1954. The PRC denounced the treaty as an attempt by the United States to legitimize its occupation of Taiwan. When the PRC launched a successful assault on the minor offshore island of Tachen in January 1955, the United States came to the ROC’s assistance. Subsequently, a congressional resolution was passed authorizing the president to deploy U.S. forces to offshore islands if necessary to ensure the defense of Taiwan. This sent a sharp warning to the PRC.\textsuperscript{31}

Recognizing that it lacked the military force with which to challenge the United States, the PRC shifted to a conciliatory policy in

\textsuperscript{28} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{29} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{30} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{31} Ibid., p. 527.
1955. At the conference of nonaligned nations in Bandung, Indonesia in April 1955, Premier Chou En-lai declared that the Chinese people did not want war with the United States; he offered to negotiate on the question of relaxing tensions in the Taiwan area.\textsuperscript{32}

As a result, talks between ambassadors from the United States and the PRC with some European countries opened in Geneva in August 1955. The two sides did reach an agreement on the repatriation of citizens of the countries, but no progress was made on the Taiwan issue.\textsuperscript{33}

The United States suggested that the PRC renounce the use of force against Taiwan. The PRC maintained that the "liberation" of Taiwan was a domestic issue. The PRC attempted to resolve the issue peacefully, but reserved the "sovereign right" to use force if necessary on Chinese territory. According to the PRC, the only issue between the United States and the PRC concerning Taiwan was the "occupation" of Taiwan by U.S. forces. This international issue, it said, should not be confused with the domestic question of asserting PRC control over Taiwan.\textsuperscript{34}

The United States made it clear that negotiations with the PRC did not constitute diplomatic recognition. It continued to regard the ROC as the legitimate government of China, and it continued to allocate large amounts of U.S. military and economic aid to Taiwan. Still, the ROC authorities expressed concern at U.S. willingness to negotiate with the PRC, and they continued to assert their determination to recover the mainland.\textsuperscript{35}

Disappointed that the Geneva talks had failed to produce results either in gaining diplomatic recognition from the United States or in weakening Washington's links with Taipei, the PRC changed its tactics again in 1958. In his famous Moscow statement of 1957 that "the East wind was prevailing over the West wind," Chairman Mao Tsetung declared his belief that the alignment of forces in the world was shifting against the United States.\textsuperscript{36}

Mao went further in testing the U.S. commitment to the defense of Taiwan, deploying a massive bombing of the ROC's principal offshore island, Quemoy. There were serious doubts among the American people and U.S. allies regarding the wisdom of risking war over the offshore islands. Nonetheless, the U.S. government moved large

\begin{footnotes}
\item[32] Ibid.
\item[33] Ibid.
\item[34] Ibid.
\item[35] Ibid.
\item[36] Ibid., pp. 527-528.
\end{footnotes}
forces into the area and firmly supported the ROC's efforts to break a blockade of the island.\footnote{Ibid., p. 528.}

Ambassadorial talks resumed in Warsaw, providing a channel of communication during the heat of the crisis. The deadlock between Washington and Peking concerning the Taiwan issue remained unbroken; although a direct clash between U.S. and PRC forces was avoided, Quemoy remained in the hands of the ROC. The PRC soon reduced its bombardment to a token shelling on odd days to demonstrate its rejection of the cease-fire sought by the United States.\footnote{Ibid.}

The military clash over Quemoy strained the relations of the two Chinese governments with their big-power supporters. Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union wished to be drawn into a military confrontation. Opinions around the world strongly favored a withdrawal of ROC forces from the offshore islands.\footnote{Ralph N. Clough, \textit{Island China} (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978), p. 21.}

Both the PRC and the ROC, however, viewed these islands as a lasting link between Taiwan and the mainland, a symbol of their intentions to reunite China on their own terms. The longer the United States suggested that the ROC reduce its forces, the more the ROC resisted. PRC Foreign Minister Chen Yi told foreign diplomats in Peking that the PRC's policy was "Liberation" of the offshore islands and Taiwan together. The PRC, however, never again resorted to military action to sever the offshore islands from Taiwan.\footnote{Clough, "The Republic of China and the World, 1949-1981," \textit{op. cit.}, p. 528.}

Neither the use of military force nor bilateral negotiations had caused the United States to withdraw its support from Taiwan. With its control over the Chinese mainland and the vast majority of Chinese people secured, the PRC gained confidence. The United States found it increasingly difficult to mobilize majority support in the United Nations for an annual resolution "not to consider" the Chinese representation issue. Memories of the Korean War faded, the United Nations admitted many new members, and many nations considered the ROC's claim to represent the Chinese people to be unrealistic. Consequently, from 1961 the United States and its allies adopted a different approach, defeating resolutions to seat the PRC by mobilizing majority support for a resolution, which required a two-thirds majority vote. By 1971, however, even this tactic had worn thin; it became increasingly difficult to persuade member nations to exclude the PRC. In 1971, for the first time in 20 years, the U.S. Congress did not pass a
resolution opposing the seating of the PRC in the United Nations. American opinion favored the PRC admittance, provided a place be made for the ROC also; however, the PRC repeated that it would not enter the United Nations as long as the ROC remained there.\(^{41}\)

President Richard M. Nixon's announcement of his upcoming visit to Peking in July 1971 came as a surprise. He announced that he would seek to normalize relations between the PRC and the United States, signalling a radical change in U.S. policy. This change broke down barriers which kept the PRC out of the United Nations: by October 1971, the PRC was voted in and the ROC expelled.\(^{42}\) Their expulsion from the United Nations started a multi-national shift of diplomatic relations from Taipei to Peking, further fueled by President Nixon's trip to the PRC in February 1972 and the Shanghai Communiqué.\(^{43}\)

Even though the language of the Shanghai Communique was carefully drawn, the United States did not accept the PRC's view that Taiwan was a part of the PRC; however, the United States did accept the views held on both sides of the Taiwan Strait that Taiwan was a part of China, virtually ruling out U.S. support for an independent Taiwan. Moreover, the United States declared that the Taiwan issue should be resolved peacefully by the Chinese themselves by announcing the U.S. intention eventually to withdraw all forces and military installations from Taiwan.\(^{44}\)

The communique and other aspects of Nixon trip to the PRC were widely interpreted as the beginning of a U.S. disengagement from Taiwan; this influence spread quickly to other countries. The number of countries maintaining relations with the PRC and the ROC had been about equal in 1971. By February 1973 countries recognizing the PRC rose to 85, while those recognizing the ROC fell to 39. By 1985, 159 nations had diplomatic relations with the PRC and only 22 with the ROC.\(^{45}\)

The PRC began to take advantage of its new position, replacing the ROC in the organs of the United Nations. The PRC replaced the ROC in the Security Council, the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, and many affiliates such as UNESCO, WHO, the Food and Agriculture Organization, the Intergovernmental Civil Aviation Organization, and the International Maritime Consultative Or-

\(^{41}\) Ibid., pp. 528-529.
\(^{42}\) Ibid., p. 529.
\(^{43}\) Ibid.
\(^{44}\) Ibid.
\(^{45}\) Chiu, "The Question of Taiwan in Sino-American Relations," op. cit., p. 179.
The PRC also forced the ROC out of a large number of intergovernmental financial organizations. In 1980, after changes in foreign economic policy brought about by Deng Xiaoping, the PRC applied to join the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The ROC was forced to withdraw. In 1986 PRC was admitted to the Asian Development Bank, of which the ROC has long been a member with U.S. support. 46

Demanding the expulsion of private organizations in Taiwan from international bodies, the PRC concentrated on the 300 or more international nongovernmental organizations affiliated with UNESCO. At the 18th general conference of UNESCO in Paris in 1974, the PRC succeeded in passing a resolution urging all these organizations to exclude the ROC and to break off all relations with “bodies or elements linked with Chiang Kai-shek.” Some organizations complied; others refused. Peking wanted similar resolutions passed at the following biennial UNESCO conferences. The resolution of the 21st session at Belgrade in 1980 “noted with concern that certain international nongovernmental organizations maintaining relations with UNESCO retain among their members bodies or persons linked with the Taiwan authorities, purporting to represent China and conducting activities in that capacity.” The resolution requested all the organizations “take immediate steps to debar bodies or persons linked with the Taiwan authorities from membership and from carrying out activities either in the name of the ‘Republic of China’ or China in the name of Taiwan as a region distinct from China.” 47

The International Council of Science Unions has resisted PRC pressure to expel Taiwan on the grounds that science is a nonpolitical activity and that any legitimate scientific organization should be entitled to belong regardless of nationality. In May 1980 the ICSU adopted a resolution agreeing to accept separate organizations from Taiwan and the PRC as full members representing Chinese scientists. But the PRC declined to participate in a September 1980 meeting because it could not regard Taiwan as a full voting member of the organization. 48

The PRC also has worked hard to squeeze Taiwan out of international sports. The hardest-fought and lengthiest battle was the Olympic Games. Until the summer of 1976, teams from Taiwan competed and PRC teams did not. At the Olympic Games in Montreal in

1976, however, the Canadian government ruled that Taiwan could not compete under the name Republic of China. Therefore, the ROC withdrew. The struggle continued within the International Olympic Committee, which recognized Taiwan, not the PRC. In November 1979, after a postal ballot of all members, the IOC announced its decision to recognize the Chinese Olympic Committee in Peking as the national committee of China. Taiwan would be allowed to compete under the name “Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee” and must use a flag and anthem other than those of the ROC. After an unsuccessful attempt to fight the IOC decision, the Olympic committee in Taiwan agreed in March 1981 to accept its new status. Both the PRC and the ROC competed in the 1984 Summer Olympics in Los Angeles.49

2. The Unfinished Civil War and Propaganda Battles

In addition to undercutting the ROC’s international status, the PRC has taken a variety of other measures to gain final victory in the unfinished civil war and to achieve China’s national integration.

To keep alive its hope of recovering the mainland, up to 1969, the ROC launched occasional small-scale reconnaissance teams against the mainland. It also sent high-flying aircraft to gather intelligence. It maintained regular air and sea patrols of the Taiwan Strait.50

In early 1962, Chiang Kai-shek readied his forces to take advantage of possible revolt on the mainland triggered by several successive years of severe economic hardship. In response, the PRC reinforced its troops in Fukien. But no rebellion occurred. The United States informed the PRC that it had no intention of backing an ROC attempt to invade the mainland. The crisis subsided.51

In recent years, military operations have taken on a routine quality, the PRC not challenging sea and air domination of the Taiwan Strait by the ROC navy and air force, the ROC not taking any actions against the mainland. A tacit understanding has developed as to the boundaries for normal sea and air operations by each side. Neither encroaches upon the other. In the early 1960s, the odd-day shelling of Quemoy and Matsu took the form of shells containing propaganda leaflets rather than high explosives. Even the propaganda shelling was halted after the United States established diplomatic relations with the PRC on January 1, 1979.52

49. Ibid., pp. 531-532.
50. Ibid., p. 532.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid., pp. 532-533.
Except for the short-lived use of large-scale military forces against the offshore islands in 1958, the civil war has been conducted primarily by political rather than military means. At the National People's Congress of 1956, PRC Premier Chou En-lai outlined a policy toward Taiwan. Chou pledged that "the Chinese people would seek to liberate Taiwan by peaceful means so far as it is possible...the possibility of peaceful liberation is increasing."  

Chou declared that the PRC was willing to negotiate with the ROC on specific steps and terms for a peaceful "liberation." He urged that representatives be sent to Peking to negotiate, assuring the Nationalist military and political personnel on Taiwan that they would not be punished for past deeds. On the contrary, Chou said, if they worked for a peaceful "liberation," they would be rewarded by participating in the socialist development of the motherland. He invited them to visit the mainland to see for themselves conditions there. He guaranteed their safe entry and departure.  

The PRC followed up its declaration on peaceful "liberation" with propaganda broadcasts to Taiwan, encouraging appeals from friends and relatives on the mainland to prominent individuals on Taiwan. Peking's appeals, which stressed the love for the mainland, urged the leaders of the ROC not to allow themselves to be controlled by the United States.  

ROCK President Chiang Kai-shek flatly rejected the proposals for negotiation, declaring that there was "absolutely no possibility of any compromise" with Peking. "The ROC government has already had too many painful experiences in negotiating with the Chinese Communists."  

Throughout the 1960s, the PRC and the ROC fought a propaganda war, filling the airwaves with denunciations of each other. When monsoon winds blew toward the mainland, ROC psychological warfare units sent balloons carrying messages and gifts of food; however, there is little evidence that the population on either side was significantly impressed.  

After President Nixon's shift in policy toward the PRC in 1971, the Peking authorities redoubled their efforts to convince the people of

53. Ibid., p. 533.
54. Ibid.
55. Ibid.
Taiwan that they could not depend on the United States and that "liberation" was inevitable. Instead of directing their appeals exclusively to the mainland-Chinese ruling group on Taiwan as they had in the past, they began to cultivate the Taiwanese-Chinese. The PRC recognized that family and other personal ties with the mainland were eroding with the passage of time, and recognized that the political influence of the Taiwanese-Chinese was growing. The Taiwanese-Chinese made up 85 percent of the population and owned most of the farmland, commercial and industrial enterprises in Taiwan. Assuming that the Taiwanese-Chinese would gain control of decision making at the national level, the PRC needed to ensure that the Taiwanese-Chinese as well as the mainland-Chinese on Taiwan would continue to adhere to the one-China concept. 58

The PRC cultivation of the Taiwanese-Chinese took a variety of forms. The Taiwan Self-Government League, the chief political organ for promoting the "liberation" of Taiwan, assumed a more prominent role. The PRC even softened its hostility toward the Taiwan Independence Movement, which it had previously labeled as a tool of the United States. It continued to oppose their advocacy of Taiwan's independence, but supported their attacks on the ROC. 59

High officials, including Premier Chou En-lai, met with visitors from abroad, including some of Taiwan origin, to subdue fears of what might happen to Taiwan after liberation. In a lengthy conversation with overseas Chinese from North America in August 1972, Chou stressed the complexity of the Taiwan problem. He asked for patience and the avoidance of a military solution, denying that the integration of Taiwan into the PRC would lower living standards there. Shanghai, he pointed out, had continued to enjoy a living standard higher than the rest of the mainland after its "liberation." Chou emphasized the important role that the Taiwanese-Chinese would play in the peaceful "liberation" of Taiwan. 60

In a similar conversation with a group of overseas Chinese in October 1974, PRC Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping warned that although priority was being given to a peaceful "liberation," non-peaceful means could not be ruled out if Chiang Kai-shek and his son Chiang Ching-kuo continued to reject negotiations. He expressed the hope that "patriotic" forces could gradually develop in Taiwan that could

58. Ibid., pp. 534-535.
59. Ibid.
play a part in either a peaceful or non-peaceful solution.\textsuperscript{61}

The ruling Nationalist Party in Taiwan was not persuaded. It repeatedly rejected any form of negotiations with the Communist Party in Peking.\textsuperscript{62}

The heaviest blow to the people of the ROC was still to come. On January 1, 1979, the United States severed diplomatic relations with the ROC to recognize the PRC as the legitimate government of China, notifying the ROC that it was terminating the US-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty at the end of 1979. These actions, long sought by the PRC, appeared to remove the principal obstacles to the incorporation of Taiwan into the PRC; nevertheless, the ROC held out firmly against submitting to the PRC's control.\textsuperscript{63}

The PRC was not in a position to force submission because it lacked the military capability to succeed in a naval attack across the Taiwan Strait. To build such a force would require large resources, which were urgently needed for modernizing the country. The Taiwan Relations Act passed the U.S. Congress and became effective on April 10, 1979. The statute is central to the future of the United States relationship with Taiwan,\textsuperscript{64} emphasizing that the United States would be gravely concerned by any attempt to subdue Taiwan by force. Meanwhile, the United States continued to supply substantial amounts of weapons to Taiwan. The use of force against Taiwan thus could shatter potential PRC relations with the United States as well as with Japan. The PRC has relied heavily on both the United States and Japan for modernization and for political support against the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{65}

The PRC thus adopted a conciliatory policy toward the ROC following the establishment of diplomatic relations with the United States. On January 1, 1979, the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress issued "A Message to Compatriots in Taiwan," which halted the odd-day propaganda shelling to the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu, and called for peace talks between the PRC and the ROC, attempting to end the military confrontation along the Taiwan Strait. This statement assured that reunification would "not cause the people of Taiwan any losses," and called for the establishment of "Three Links"—postal, transportation services and trade—

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{63} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{64} Ibid., p. 537.
\textsuperscript{65} Ibid.
\end{flushright}
between the mainland and Taiwan.\textsuperscript{66}

In early January 1979, Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping told a group of visiting U.S. senators that an integrated Taiwan would be allowed to maintain its own political and economic systems, and even its armed forces. It would, however, have to acknowledge PRC sovereignty over the island and take down the ROC flag. Deng said that force would be used against Taiwan only if the Soviet Union interfered there or if the ROC refused indefinitely to negotiate.\textsuperscript{67}

The PRC has continued to maintain this basic position. Their media has issued a steady stream of articles and statements encouraging unification sentiment among the people of Taiwan and describing the growing indirect trade between the mainland and Taiwan through Hong Kong. The PRC media play up the popularity of Taiwan-made TV sets, tape recorders and electric fans among the people of mainland China; they report cordial conversations between scientists, writers and university professors from Taiwan and the mainland meeting abroad; and they publicize the special treatment given in the PRC to athletes of Taiwan origin from Japan and the United States. Mainland television broadcast a documentary on life in Taiwan. According to Radio Beijing, special reception centers have been established in mainland ports for fishermen from Taiwan who seek shelter from typhoon or need vessel repair. The PRC media continually urged personal contact between people from Taiwan and the mainland.\textsuperscript{68}

The ROC has regarded the PRC's conciliatory attitude as a "united front tactic" aimed at undermining resistance on Taiwan, making it vulnerable to a takeover by the PRC. The ROC has continued to flatly reject PRC proposals to negotiate, to open direct trade, or to establish postal, shipping or airline connections. The manifesto of the Twelfth National Congress of the Nationalist Party in March-April 1981 reiterated the party's unyielding anti-Communist position by declaring its determination to unify China under Sun Yat-sen's Three Principles of the People. The manifesto said: "We know that to talk peace with the enemy amounts to inviting our own collapse and that to compromise with the enemy is the same as destroying ourselves."\textsuperscript{69} By 1979, the Taiwan Relations Act, continued sales of U.S. defense equipment to the ROC, and the election of Ronald Reagan as president of the United States had combined to frustrate any hopes for concession by the ROC. Two years after the ROC was diplomatically

\textsuperscript{66} Beijing Review, 22, no. 1, January 5, 1979, pp. 16-17.


\textsuperscript{69} FBIS, April 9, 1981, p. V3.
isolated from the United States, there was still no change in its attitude.\textsuperscript{70}

The PRC leadership decided that it needed a dramatic new initiative. This took the form of the "Nine-Point Peace Proposal" of September 30, 1981, which was presented by Marshall Ye Jiangying, the chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress. While much of its content repeated earlier public proposals made to Taiwan, the document emphasized the theme seeking to restore attention to the integration issue. The major points were: Peace talks between the Chinese Communist Party and the Nationalist Party could be held on a "reciprocal basis" after an initial "exhaustive exchange of views" by party representatives; the Taiwan province could become a "special administrative region" of the PRC with "a high degree of autonomy"; the central PRC government would "not interfere with local affairs on Taiwan"; Taipei authorities would be welcome to "take up posts of leadership...and participate in running the (unified) state"; and both the "freedom of entry and exit" and commercial investments and profits could be "guaranteed" for people of Taiwan. The PRC also offered to "subsidize" Taiwan's budget whenever its "local finance was in difficulty."\textsuperscript{71}

Ye's 1981 peace proposal also included a personal appeal to the Nationalist Party:

We hope that the Nationalist authorities will stick to their one-China position and their opposition to "two Chinas" and that they will put national interests above everything else, forget previous ill-will and join hands with us in accomplishing the great cause of national reunification and the great goal of making China prosperous and strong, so as to win glory for our ancestors, bring benefit to our posterity and write a new and glorious page in the history of the Chinese nation.\textsuperscript{72}

The ROC issued a swift and specific response to the proposal. President Chiang Ching-kuo suggested that the proposal was "primarily intended to stop U.S. arms sales to our country." From an historical perspective, he added, "The Chinese Communists consistently follow the strategy of seeking their goals through peace talks when


\textsuperscript{71} \textit{People's Daily}, October 1, 1981.

\textsuperscript{72} \textit{Ibid.}
these cannot be attained by military means."\(^{73}\) And Premier Sun Yunsuan on June 10, 1982, observed that all of the PRC's offers contained two pre-conditions or assumptions: that the ROC would become a "provincial government" under PRC jurisdiction and that forceful invasion of the island could not be ruled out if preliminary peace talks should fail. "If the political, economic, social and cultural gaps between the Chinese mainland and free China continue to narrow, the conditions for peaceful reunification can gradually mature," Sun said. "The obstacles to reunification will be reduced naturally with the passage of time."\(^{74}\)

While publicly supporting the PRC's approach, the United States declined to become involved in the Chinese integration issue. The U.S. Department of State responded in support of Sun's statement:

> We are very interested in the import of [Sun's] speech, which appears to be consistent with the concept of peaceful settlement of the [Communist-Nationalist] differences. . . . We welcome any moves in this direction. We reiterate, however, our firm policy that the resolution of those differences is a matter for the Chinese people themselves, and our only interest is that any resolution be peaceful. We do not see a role for the United States in promoting or arranging such a settlement.\(^{75}\)

On July 25, 1982, the People's Daily reported that Liao Chengzhi, the PRC official in charge of Taiwan relations, sent a letter to his former friend and schoolmate, ROC President Chiang. Liao offered to come to Taiwan to discuss reunification. On August 17, 1982, Soong Mei-ling, widow of the late ROC President Chiang Kai-shek, replied to Liao in a public letter on behalf of President Chiang, rejecting reunification talks.

On the same day, the United States and the PRC announced their joint communique to limit U.S. arms sales to the ROC, to ultimately phase them out altogether. Also on the same day, the ROC publicized U.S. assurances not to play a mediation role, nor to exert pressure on the ROC to enter into negotiations with the PRC. The PRC reiterated its "fundamental policy of striving for peaceful reunification"; and the United States announced that it understood and appreciated this policy.\(^{76}\)

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\(^{73}\) Central Daily News, June 3, 1982.
\(^{74}\) Ibid., June 11, 1982.
\(^{75}\) The China Post, June 13, 1982.
Renewing its military threat against the ROC, the PRC also hardened its terms for unification. On the date of the communique, Chai Zemin, the PRC Ambassador to the United States, said in a television interview with CBS, "We [will not] make any commitment to any country on the peaceful settlement of the Taiwan problem. We consider the Taiwan problem to be China's internal affair. It is up to us to decide how to solve this problem."  

On October 27, 1982, the PRC tested its submarine-based rockets in the sea area north of Taiwan. Presumably it wanted to show off its military might. On December 28, 1982, the PRC denied that the test was intended as a threat; nevertheless, the threat of using force against the ROC on Taiwan had already reached the people of Taiwan.

The PRC terms for unification were hardened by its adoption of Article 31 of its constitution on December 4, 1982. The preamble states, "Taiwan is part of the sacred territory of the People's Republic of China. To accomplish the great task of reunifying the motherland is a lofty duty of the entire Chinese people, including our compatriots in Taiwan." Unspecified is the time or manner of achieving this goal, but Article 31 declares, "The state may, when necessary, establish special administrative regions. The systems to be instituted in special administrative regions shall be prescribed by law by the National People's Congress in the light of the specific conditions."  

This new article, absent from previous constitutions, differentiates "administrative" from "autonomous" regions, which are defined in Article 30 as comprising "nationality areas."  

The terminology "special administrative region" of Article 31 is identical with the nine-point peace proposal, which offers Taiwan "a high degree of autonomy." This suggests that the provision was deliberately designed to cover Taiwan, and possibly Hong Kong and Macao as well.

On December 17, 1982, ROC President Chiang rejected the PRC's offer of a "special administrative region" for Taiwan because he saw a lesson in what had happened to Tibet, which was taken by PRC force in 1959.

In January 1983, the PRC demanded the ROC's expulsion from the Asian Development Bank. In May 1983, Liao Chengzhi of the

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80. *Ibid*.
81. *Ibid*.
PRC said that Taiwan could continue to buy U.S. weapons and participate in the bank after unification with the PRC.\(^{83}\)

On July 26, 1983, PRC leader Deng Xiaoping, in an interview with Taiwan-raised professor Winston Yang of Seton Hall University, said that Taiwan would not have "complete autonomy" after unification, but would enjoy the "right to follow internal policy."\(^{84}\) Deng offered a number of new proposals to open a dialogue with the ROC government on reunification. "[The PRC] will not send troops or officials to Taiwan to take over, to manage, to supervise or to interfere with Taiwan's internal affairs," Deng announced. "Taiwan will retain its own armed forces and also the right to acquire weapons to maintain defense capabilities, and Taiwan may use its own flag and use the name 'China, Taiwan.'"\(^{85}\)

Until now, the PRC had insisted that reunification would require the ROC to fly the PRC flag and would require a name change from ROC to "Taiwan, People's Republic of China." Deng said the plan would "essentially maintain the status quo and only give the appearance of reunification."\(^{86}\)

The ROC rejected the proposal as a trick to open the way for communist control. The ROC would only consider reunifying if the PRC abandoned communism to embrace the ROC's political ideology, the Three Principles of the People.\(^{87}\)

Deng, the PRC's foremost political figure, responded, "We mean what we say. We play no tricks." Calling the ROC's demands "unrealistic," Deng offered the plan for turning the island into a special administrative region with "exclusive rights" to administer its legislative, judicial and military systems without interference from the PRC government.\(^{88}\)

Deng said that the ROC on Taiwan could retain its independence, and a system different from that of the mainland. "It may exercise independent jurisdiction, and the right of final judgment need not reside in Peking. Peaceful reunification does not mean the mainland swallowing up Taiwan, of course, nor vice versa."\(^{89}\)

Although he offered the most far-reaching assurance to the ROC on Taiwan, promising a free hand in running the island, Deng empha-

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85. Ibid.
86. Ibid.
87. Ibid.
88. Ibid.
89. Ibid.
sized that any autonomy would be limited and conditional. "Complete autonomy is simply out of the question," Deng said, "Complete autonomy means 'Two Chinas,' not 'One China.'"90

Though all of the PRC's peace proposals have been rejected by the ROC on Taiwan, the PRC has not given up its strategies or goals for eventual integration. Furthermore, the PRC has tried to involve the United States in China's integration, although it has often claimed it to be an internal affair.

On January 1, 1984, Deng Yingchao, the widow of former PRC Premier Chou En-lai, said at a New Year's Day party that "foreign interference in China's internal affairs would not end" until reunification takes place. At the same time, she also denounced the Taiwanese Independence Movement.91

In January 1984, during a visit to the United States, PRC Premier Zhao Ziyang said, "The Taiwan issue is the major difference between China and the United States." He declared that reunification of China is one of "two great historical tasks" facing the current generation.92 The United States, however, still retains its policy of non-involvement.

Returning to attempts to directly persuade the ROC, Deng Yingchao of the PRC, on January 16, 1984, in a speech at the 60th anniversary commemoration of the First National Congress of the Nationalist Party, issued a "third united front" for peace talks.93 In another public letter on February 17, 1984, Soong Mei-ling, Chiang Kai-shek's widow, rejected the proposal.94

On February 22, 1984, Deng Xiaoping, in a meeting with former White House national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, said that following unification Taiwan would be allowed to continue to practice capitalism under a "One Nation, Two Systems" model. The concept suggested that the PRC was softening its position, nevertheless, the ROC still rejected the new integration model publicized as "One Nation, Two Systems."95

Whether there be any integration model or satisfactory solution for both the PRC and the ROC remains unanswered. But it is still possible that both governments could agree on the formation of one China of which Taiwan is a part and that mutual understanding could avoid renewed warfare.

90. Ibid.
93. Ibid., January 17, 1984.
Despite firm opposition by the ROC to open and direct links with the PRC, the ROC has tolerated growing indirect trade, mostly through Hong Kong, which exceeded $500 million in 1984, and had already reached this amount in the first half of 1985.\textsuperscript{96}

In an interview with PRC journalists before Zhao's visit to Washington in January 1984, President Reagan reiterated the U.S. position of remaining uninvolved: "We are not going to turn our backs on old friends in order to strengthen or make new friends. . . . The problem between the People's Republic and the people on Taiwan is one for the Chinese to settle between themselves. We will do nothing to intervene. . . ."\textsuperscript{97}

However, the United States has continued to be the principal target of PRC and ROC foreign policy. The rivalry has intensified since the beginning of the Reagan administration. Encouraged by President Reagan's campaign statements, the ROC has argued for a greater degree of "officiality" in relations with the United States and has sought more advanced arms for its defense. The PRC has repeated its view that the Taiwan Relations Act conflicts with the joint communique on establishment of relations and has reminded Americans that it never agreed to U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. The Reagan administration has responded cautiously. It has sought to develop further relations with the PRC, which it regards as important for geopolitical reasons. At the same time, it has adopted a more cordial style than the Carter administration in its unofficial relations with the ROC.\textsuperscript{98} Nevertheless, the United States has retained its policy of allowing the PRC and the ROC to solve the integration problem between themselves.

The Theoretical Framework of A Communications Approach to National Integration

As with many contemporary theories of international relations, integration theory is a relatively new and more precise way of looking at an old problem. The problem considers the merger of two or more states to form a new, larger state, a phenomenon that has long been of interest not only to students but also to those more directly involved in world politics.\textsuperscript{99}

Integration theory is full of controversies. Integration involves the merger of all institutions, separate communities, usually within a

\textsuperscript{96} The China Post, April 24, 1985.
\textsuperscript{97} People's Daily, December 5, 1983.
\textsuperscript{99} Taylor, op. cit., p. 237.
specific geographic area, into a larger unit. Different institutions play different roles, however; elite and popular attitudes differ, and as do economic, political and social transactions. Does integration occur passively and mutually? Or is it brought about by the conscious intervention and manipulation of an integrating elite? Furthermore, there is even little agreement as to how integration itself should be defined. Some say it is a process; others a condition. With controversial implications of integration, can states become integrated without losing their individual identities?

Transactionists and neofunctionalists take contrasting views to integration theory. The transactionists emphasize transactions between people. Transactions indicate attitudes toward others as a reflection of their interdependence. The transactionists concentrate on the volume and rate of these transactions. They monitor changes in public opinion.

The neofunctionalists stress how supranational institutions emerge as various self-interest groups merge to be integrated.

Although the two approaches differ in style and emphasis, they do share some common broad elements to be used as the basic theoretical framework of this study.

1. Integration is a multidimensional phenomenon

Many integration scholars note the importance of a theory based on a recognition of integration as a multidimensional phenomenon. These scholars develop theories and establish links among that encompass the major dimensions. Leon Linberg identifies these dimensions as the "multiple properties of collective decision-making systems" and defines integration as an "interactive multidimensional process" that must be identified, compared, measured and analyzed.

According to Philippe C. Schmitter, "Understanding and explanation in this field are best served not by the dominance of a single accepted grand model, but by the simultaneous presence of antithetic and conflictive ones, which, while they may converge in certain aspects, diverge in many others."

According to Joseph Nye, distinctions should be made among
categories of catalysts, the external environment, and the interruptions that occur in integration. Integration should be broken down into its economic, political and legal aspects, which in turn should be divided into measurable subtypes.  

2. Integration is directed by the elites of the units

Successful integration depends on a people's ability to internalize the process, which turns on the ability of internal elites, not external elites, to direct the process.

Expectations of integration are developed among elite groups in government and in private sectors. Joseph Nye cites many historical examples of integration resulting from choices made by elites or national bureaucrats. The extent to which elites become participants in regional integration determines the extent of integration. Elites are said to be wary of integration because it may threaten their level of control.

The extent to which elite groups of integrating units think alike is important. Nye says that the higher the level of elite consensus, the more likely that steps will continue to be made toward integration. If elites share consensus only to a certain point, then integration will not go beyond that point.

Neofunctionalists stress the role of self-interest in influencing attitudes toward integration, emphasizing the individual motives of elite groups. "Neofunctionalists," Haas says, "rely on the primacy of incremental decision-making over grand designs." Haas assumes here that most political actors stumble from one decision to the next without considering the consequences of earlier decisions. They are "incapable of long-range purposive behavior."

3. Integration is based on a consensus among the people of the units to be integrated

Consensus sustains legitimacy. Political systems develop and are maintained because their members share consensus on the basic structure of the system. Such systems are based on procedural consensus—general agreement on the political framework and the legal processes—and substantive consensus—general agreement on the solutions to problems. The greater the procedural and substantive con-

109. Ibid., p. 441.
Two related questions are fundamental to the study of integration: (1) How are procedural and substantive consensus achieved and maintained? (2) Why do or do not citizens defer to the controlling unit?112

4. Integration can be achieved with or without use of violence

One of the founding fathers of modern integration theory, Karl Deutsch, says that integration is “the attainment within a territory, of a sense of community and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure, for a long time, dependable expectations of peaceful change among its population.”113

This emphasis upon peaceful change or reorientation of attitudes is reflected in a slightly different way by integration theorist Ernest Haas. Haas has defined integration as “the tendency toward the voluntary creation of larger political units, each of which self-consciously eschews the use of force in the relations between the participating units and groups.”114 Joseph Nye carries this theme further, stating that regional political organizations “have made modest contributions to the creation of islands of peace in international systems.”115

Regional integration has even been seen as a means of promoting peaceful cooperation and reducing conflict.116

Other theorists have argued that political systems become or remain intact because of the presence or threat of force. Amitai Etzioni says that a political community’s control over the use of violence is one criterion affecting its level of integration. This community has a center of decision-making that allocates resources and rewards, and forms the main source of political identification for the majority of citizens.117

5. Integration can be achieved through a communications approach, or through persuasion, i.e., through media persuasion

One integration theory is based on the hypothesis that national-
ism can be redirected into a framework for international cooperation in place of national competition and war.\textsuperscript{\textit{118}}

Ernest Haas defines integration as a process “whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national state.”\textsuperscript{\textit{119}}

Writers on integration hold several ideas in common. All are concerned with the process by which loyalty shifts from one center to another. They also share an interest in communications within the units to be integrated. According to Deutsch and Etzioni, people learn to consider themselves members of a community as a result of human communications patterns.\textsuperscript{\textit{120}}

To a greater extent than other writers on integration, Deutsch uses both a communications and a system theory. Deutsch states:

The existence of social science is based on the ability to treat a social group as an organization and not as an agglomeration. Communication is the cement that makes organizations. Communication alone enables a group to think together, to see together and to act together. All require the understanding of communication.\textsuperscript{\textit{121}}

Communication among people can produce either friendship or hostility. Deutsch says that political systems endure as a result of their ability to abstract and code incoming information into appropriate symbols, to store coded symbols, to disassociate certain important information from the rest, to recall stored information when needed, and to recombine stored information entered as input into the systems.\textsuperscript{\textit{122}}

The development of a political unit depends on the flow of communications. Countries are “clusters of population, united by grids of communication flows and transport systems, and separated by thinly settled or nearly empty territories.” People are groups of persons joined together by an ability to communicate on many topics. Boundaries are generally areas in which populations and communications decline sharply.\textsuperscript{\textit{123}}

\textsuperscript{118} Ibid., p. 419.
\textsuperscript{119} Ibid., p. 421.
\textsuperscript{120} Ibid., p. 424.
\textsuperscript{121} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{122} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{123} Ibid., p. 425.
Integration is accompanied by an increase in transactions, trade, capital movement, and communications, and in the exchange of people and ideas. Deutsch assumes that the mutual identification necessary for integration is brought about by a growth in transactions. Deutsch and the transactionalists argue that the variables for integration can be identified from community-building efforts in the past; by measuring changes in transactions between groups, transactionalists can assess the growth of a community in a given region.

Deutsch hypothesizes that the more one state interacts with another, the more relevant they become to each other. Such an increase in mutual relevance, however, does not necessarily lead to integration. It must be accompanied by mutual responsiveness, or the ability to respond to the demands of the transactions.

The transactionalists contend that as communications increase, so will the development of a sense of community. The transactionalists use transaction flows among people as indicators of "mutual relevance" or interdependence, and to determine changes in the levels of transaction flows to determine if people are receiving favorable responses to the demands. Favorable responses may lead to extended communications.

Increases in transactions can therefore be seen as part of a learning process. People become accustomed to using new procedures for making demands and settling disputes. They become accustomed to a developing mutual recognition. In this way common values emerge. Transaction flows thus create a "social-psychological community."

The methodology used by the transactionalists causes them to look for two main patterns of communications: a high volume of transactions within the region over a wide range of economic, political and social activities, and an increasing divergence between the volume and range of transactions between the region and the outside world.

Transaction flows can thus be used to determine the degree of interdependence within a region and to determine if the people in the region are becoming more dependent on each other than they are on people outside of the region.

124. Ibid., p. 439.
126. Ibid.
127. Ibid.
128. Ibid., p. 244.
129. Ibid., p. 245.
130. Ibid.
131. Ibid.
6. Integration may be affected by external elements

Externalization is the extent to which members of an integrating unit must develop common positions to deal with nonmembers. This has happened with the European Community in its various negotiations with outside parties, including the United States.132

To a greater extent than earlier neofunctionalist theory, Nye assumes the importance of external actors. Their active involvement is part of the process in which the importance of outside governments and international organizations, as well as nongovernmental actors, act as catalysts in regional integration.133

Elites cannot help but take into consideration external problems, such as dependence on exports, threats from larger powers, or the loss of status in a changing international system.134

Nye hypothesizes that "the further integration proceeds, the more likely third parties will be to react to it, either in support or with hostility."135

7. Integration can be achieved through economic or other non-political factors

The neofunctionalists see integration as a process in which actors collaborate at the international level to further their individual and collective interests in some technical, relatively non-controversial area. These national actors feel that their interests are best served by delegating decision-making powers to a new supranational body.136

This gradual development of integration is not a result of an emerging ideological commitment to supranationalism, nor is it a result of a consensus on more immediate goals; rather, integration evolves because its best serves the individual interests.137 Central to Haas's work is the concept of spill-over. Mitrany calls it the doctrine of ramification, which is integration through non-political factors.138

The major assumption of the spill-over concept is that initial attempts to integrate along relatively non-controversial economic lines will eventually spill over into controversial, political areas. Political

133. Ibid., p. 441.
134. Ibid., p. 442.
135. Ibid.
137. Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, op. cit., p. 432.
138. Ibid.
integration will follow economic integration. In David Mitrany's doctrine of "ramification," collaboration in one technical field leads to collaboration in other technical fields. This is an essential difference between ideological and technical collaboration. Eventually such collaboration will encroach upon and absorb the political sector. In particular, "economic unification would build up the foundation for political agreement, even if it did not make it superfluous." Haas agrees that there is a tendency for persons who gain from interaction in one sector to favor integration in other sectors. "Earlier decisions," Haas says, "spill-over into new functional contexts, involve more and more people, call for more and more interbureaucratic contact and consultations, meeting the new problems which grow out of the earlier compromises." There is an "expansive logic" contributing to spill-over from one sector to another. The process is one by which the nations "upgrade" their common interests. Haas continues to say that economic issues in a democratic, industrial setting are most likely to spill-over into political integration; however, Haas acknowledges that spill-over is not automatic. It will occur only if "actors, on the basis of their interest-inspired perception, desire to adapt integrative lessons learned in one context to a new situation." To lead to spill-over, Haas says, "decisions must relate directly to experienced needs and demands of important national elites." Some specific issues, such as human rights are more likely to lead to spill-over than others, such as trade union issues.

Previous Studies on National Integration

Studies which have compared the media of divided nations have been a late development in political communications science. The study of divided nations from a social, rather than a political, perspective did not emerge until the 1960s. Previous studies of the unification of various states into a larger unit were focused on Western Europe and the emerging nations. Using concepts such as "social communication," "political integration," "security community," "overlapping

139. Ibid.
140. Ibid., p. 419.
141. Ibid., p. 420.
142. Ibid., p. 432.
143. Ibid.
144. Ibid.
145. Ibid., p. 433.
146. Ibid., p. 434.
147. Ibid.
membership,” “multiple loyalty,” and “nation-building,” scholars like Karl Deutsch, Ernest Haas and Lucian Pye have made many contributions to the understanding of the processes involved in integration.\textsuperscript{148}

The divisions of China, Korea, Vietnam and Germany into Communist and non-Communist political systems have been major political developments since the end of World War II. In 1975, Vietnam became the only one of these divided nations to be reunified by force. The divided states of China, Korea and Germany have not given up their goals of achieving one integrated nation, still resenting terms such as “two Chinas,” “two Koreas” and “two Germanies.”\textsuperscript{149}

China's reunification situation is unique. It differs from that of Korea or Germany, which were divided by international agreements among outside powers: China was divided by civil war.

The greatest difference from the other divided countries lies in the small size of Taiwan compared to the mainland (1:3,000). Each of the smaller parts of the divided states has about the same population, around 18 million. Each has long operated as an independent state; each is larger than two-thirds of all states belonging to the United Nations. East Germany has nearly one-third the population of West Germany; North Korea has almost one-half the population of South Korea. By contrast, the ROC on Taiwan has less than one-fiftieth the population of the PRC on the mainland.\textsuperscript{150}

Among the divided countries, only the PRC has had enough political clout to prevent other nations from establishing diplomatic relations with both parts of the divided states. Long ago, West Germany and South Korea abandoned efforts to force other nations to choose between Bonn and East Berlin, Seoul and Pyongyang. Many countries now have established diplomatic relations with both parts of Germany and Korea. Because of the PRC's enormous size, its importance in world affairs, and its control of the vast majority of the Chinese people, the PRC has been able to demand that countries wanting diplomatic relations with it cannot maintain such relations with the ROC on Taiwan. Forced to choose, most countries, many reluctantly, have chosen Peking over Taipei; likewise, Taipei refuses to maintain official relations with any country recognizing Peking.\textsuperscript{151}

A survey of the literature on the media of divided nations on na-

\textsuperscript{148} Yung Wei, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 60.
\textsuperscript{149} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 61.
\textsuperscript{150} Clough, “Taiwan International Status,” \textit{op. cit.}, p. 141.
\textsuperscript{151} \textit{Ibid.}
tional integration reveals three basic problems: first, there is no com-
mon term that is neutral and precise enough to be an effective
operational concept for empirical research on the media of divided na-
tions; second, there is a failure in obtaining unbiased, complete and
first-hand data on the media of the divided nations on the subject of
national integration; third, there is much subjectivity in analyzing and
interpreting both quantitative and qualitative data.152

152. Review of some previous studies on related subjects is omitted in this edition. Available upon request.
CHAPTER III
RESEARCH DESIGN: METHODOLOGY AND HYPOTHESES

By reviewing the literature on China's national integration, one discovers that most studies use historical not communications research, methods to analyze the issue; few focus on the nature or function of the media's role in the China reunification issue. This study compares the two Chinese party newspapers on the issue of China's reunification, within the analytic framework of integration theory.

Thematic content analysis and factor analysis are the most suitable methodologies for this research design. The reasons for choosing these two newspapers as the basic media samples, and for using these methodologies as well as the proposed hypotheses drawn from the theoretical framework, are as follows:

Media Sample: the People’s Daily of the PRC and the Central Daily News of the ROC

Both official party newspapers, the People’s Daily of the PRC and the Central Daily News of the ROC have been the major political propaganda organs for their parties since the newspapers started; they are the most appropriate media sample to test party views, to determine strategies, and to analyze proposals affecting the China reunification issue.

The design uses a sample of each newspaper from the period from December 1978 to May 1985, commencing in the same month when President Jimmy Carter announced the establishment of U.S.-PRC diplomatic relations and the termination of U.S.-ROC diplomatic relations. This event marked the beginning of the dramatic change in coverage on China’s national integration in the two newspapers.

The sample newspapers were coded and analyzed at the Library of Congress in Washington, D.C., the Library of the Chinese Mainland Research Institute of the Chinese Culture University, the Information and Reference Divisions of the Central Daily News and the Central News Agency in Taipei, Taiwan.

1. The People’s Daily of the PRC

The People’s Daily or Renmin Ribao, as it is referred to in the romanization used in the PRC, was founded in Yanan, Shaanxi prov-
ince on June 15, 1948. But that paper was the *Liberation Daily*, an important Chinese Communist Party paper in Shanghai. The *People's Daily* started as the main party paper in Hebei province toward the end of the civil war in 1948. On February 2, 1949, following the Red Army's march into Peking, the party converted the *North China Daily News*, the former organ of the Nationalist Party Ministry of Information, into the *People's Daily*. Operated under the jurisdiction of the Central Committee of the ruling Chinese Communist Party, it is the official paper, the voice of the party and the PRC government. Its influence filters down to even the most remote villages. Although it is not the country's largest newspaper, the *People's Daily* probably comes as close to being a national newspaper as can be found in the PRC. Exact official circulation figures are unpublished, but it is known to sell well over six million copies each day; however, because of the great distances between cities, poor transportation and high illiteracy, the paper does not penetrate the provinces extensively. Its influence is felt throughout the land, and copies are read by opinion leaders on a national scale. The paper started publishing eight pages daily in January 1980. Before that, it published six pages on weekdays and four pages on Sundays and holidays. It contained no advertisements until January 1979. It sells for the equivalent of 2.5 cents.

If one judges by the usual standards of quality journalism, the *People's Daily* is one of the world's most unusual dailies. It buries world-shaking events in back-page briefs, and it contributes little to "a world community of reason"; nevertheless, it ranks as one of the world's most widely read serious journals, serving as the ultimate voice of authority for the PRC's one billion people.

In many respects, the *People's Daily* is more a governmental bulletin board or propaganda organ than a newspaper. It is a classic example of the restricted paper in a restricted society: it does not represent the state, but serves party interests; it provides "must" reading for officials, party leaders, diplomats or interested "China-watchers" inside and outside the PRC who keep up with party matters.

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To understand why the *People's Daily* plays the role that it does is to understand those elements in Communist ideology that affect the press. The Leninist and the Maoist conceptions of mass persuasion determine the nature of Chinese Communist press. Lenin sought a press fully integrated in the structure of the Communist Party and its government, depending on and supportive of the party, and reflecting the political or economic tasks of the party in each stage of national development.\(^7\)

Chairman Mao Tse-tung of the Chinese Communist Party built on these concepts: A journalists' first duties were to carry out revolution in the name of the party. He opposed a professional role for them.\(^8\)

In the Soviet Union, reporters and editors are politicians first, journalists second; in the PRC they are almost entirely political representatives for the party. In the PRC, journalism exists to educate, to mobilize the masses, and to achieve party objectives. Achievement of these goals places objective and factual reporting—so important to Western journalism—in a secondary role; therefore, “negative news” about the party, stories about sex, or articles about crime seldom appear in PRC papers. Whenever the party or government makes a new move or an alteration on an international issue, the *People's Daily* is the first to defend the act. In that role, it has dealt almost exclusively with the major national and international issues. It gives about 60 percent of its space to the former and 40 percent to the latter. Local news is left to the provincial newspapers. Domestically, the main news in the *People's Daily* is largely concerned with national progress. Internationally, it focuses on unfavorable aspects of events related to its ideological foes, either the West or other Communist nations. For example, during the 1960s it lashed out repeatedly against “U.S. imperialism in Vietnam.” Since 1965, its attacks on the Soviet Union have become increasingly vitriolic.\(^9\)

Despite the *People's Daily*'s large circulation and its nationwide influence on behalf of the party, it is not the PRC's largest circulation daily, being second in readership to the daily tabloid-size *Cankao Xiaoxi (Reference News)*, with circulation in 9 million. *Cankao Xiaoxi* comes closest in the PRC to being a daily newspaper in the normal usage of the term.\(^10\) However, the *People's Daily* clearly makes a strong impact on PRC society, lucidly provides outsiders insights into

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thought and change in the PRC, and remains unfailingly loyal to the Chinese Communist Party, to its central committee, skillfully using information to support party views and central committee causes.

The People's Daily started to publish an overseas edition July 1, 1985. It is edited in Hong Kong and printed in Hong Kong, Paris, San Francisco, New York, Tokyo and Sydney. Aimed at creating a favorable image of the PRC, it contains a daily page of Taiwan and Hong Kong stories.11

2. The Central Daily News of the ROC

The Central Daily News, or Chung Yang Jih Pao under the Wade-Giles Chinese translation system, was founded on March 21, 1927, in Hankow, central China. It stopped publication in September of that year and resumed on February 1, 1928, in Shanghai. Due to wars, the paper moved five times: February 1, 1929, to Nanking; March 1927 to Changsha; September 1, 1929, to Chungking; September 10, 1945, to Nanking; and March 12, 1949, to Taipei.12 The paper is the official voice of the Nationalist Party, or “Kuomingtang” under the Wade-Giles Chinese translation system, of the ROC. It claims to be the vanguard and rear guard of party policies. Its stated publishing goal is to promote party policy not profits. ROC President and Party Chairman Chiang Ching-kuo has instructed the paper “to provide greater service for the goal of China’s reunification under the Three Principles of the People.”13

The paper clearly proclaims itself a propaganda organ for the party. It is not an ordinary objective newspaper by Western journalism standards, though most of its editorial staff received Western-style journalism education; one of its former chairmen of the board, Hollington Tong, and one of its former publishers, Ma Hsin-yeh, were Missouri journalism graduates in 1911 and 1935 and Missouri journalism medalists in 1957 and 1984. The mission of the Central Daily News is similar to that of the People's Daily.14

The paper publishes 12 pages daily, averaging 40 percent of its space for news and averages 60 percent for advertisements. It publishes 16 pages on special holidays and has published an airmailed edition for overseas Chinese readers since June 1950.15 Though the

13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
Central Daily News is the authoritative paper for promoting the party line, it is not the country's largest paper by circulation standards. It shares this characteristic with the People's Daily. Although some publishing experts in Taiwan estimate circulation to be 250,000, ROC circulation figures are inaccurate; the paper itself claims 600,000. The China Times, by comparison, is estimated to have a circulation of 650,000, while claiming 1.2 million. Estimates for the United Daily News are 550,000, with a claim of 1 million. Since August 1979, the Central Daily News has printed pictures in color; the People's Daily still prints pictures in black and white except for the edition: on February 4, 1979, the People's Daily printed a full page of color pictures of Taiwan.

The editorial policy of the Central Daily News is regarded by some scholars to be as uncompromising as they consider the Nationalist Party. The paper's format is Western-style, but its content lacks the Western tendency toward critical reporting, while criticism of the president or any high-ranking officials does not appear in print.

On April 26, 1983, a bomb was set off in the Central Daily News building in Taipei by the Taiwanese Independence Movement, and a protest was lodged against the paper's owner, the Nationalist Party. Twelve people were injured in the explosion.

Thematic Content Analysis

This study examines the news output of the two Chinese party newspapers as they have covered the China reunification issue. Thematic content analysis and factor analysis are the most appropriate methods to conduct this study. Content analysis, Benard Berelson says, is "a systematic technique for analyzing message content and message handling; content analysis is a tool for observing and analyzing overt communication of selected communicators." Berelson characterizes content analysis as "a research technique for the objective, systematic, and quantitative description of the manifest content of communication."

Berelson says that content analysis has been used in three ways:

18. Ibid., December 13, 1983, p. 3.
for evaluating communication: (1) evaluation of performance against standards; (2) evaluation of performance of one body of content against another; (3) evaluation of performance of content against a non-content source. Content analysis, however, has a wide range of uses in the understanding of relationships that can lead to predictions of behavior.\textsuperscript{21}

After the outbreak of World War II, H.D. Lasswell suggested that a "world attention survey" be conducted by an ongoing analysis of the world's press. The purpose of such a survey, he said, would be to increase understanding of the international environment by describing changes and continuities in press coverage. Content analysis of newspapers would reveal the relative prominence (frequency) and evaluation (pro or con) of selected political symbols, including the names of leaders, nations, policies and institutions.\textsuperscript{22} The choice of newspapers was based on theoretical and practical considerations:

In many countries the head of state makes few public statements, and these may be almost purely ceremonial. Party platforms often go unrevised year by year. So far as pressure groups are concerned, there are great differences in importance from state to state, and the task of gathering such fugitive material is a vast research project. The published proceedings of legislative bodies are often scanty, or altogether lacking. All states are modern enough to publish newspapers, however, so that comparable channels can be used for comparative purposes. Further, we can be relatively sure of who controls and who reads the news. In nearly all states some papers are understood to be leading organs of the party in office and of the government. Where the party system is competitive, the principle organ of parties and factions can be identified. Even with the coming of radio and television, the daily paper continues to occupy an important position in the media (and newspaper content is more accessible to study than are broadcasts).\textsuperscript{23}

Content analysis allows for the examination of manifest content by using statistical analysis. The resulting data measure probabilities of chance occurrence, reveal implications about the sources of the con-

\textsuperscript{22} Hosti, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 44.
tent, and reveal behavior that is likely to be the result of the content.\(^{24}\)

The quantitative/qualitative debate is an old one in social science research; nevertheless, the two approaches both aim at the same goal. Critics such as Siegfried Kracauer and A.L. George support a qualitative approach and object to quantification as a requirement.\(^ {25}\) In this study, both approaches are used in gathering and analyzing most of the data and interpreting the results.

On the matter of manifest versus latent content, Berelson says that content analysis is limited to the "description of the manifest content of communication." This limitation only applies to the coding stage of data collection. In systematically collecting the data, manifest attributes are used to code the contents. These include previously defined categories, words, paragraphs, etc. At the interpretation stage, latent meanings can be extracted.\(^ {26}\)

This study draws on Ole R. Holsti's definition of content analysis as any technique for making inferences by systematically identifying specified characteristics of messages. The assumption underlying this definition is that, by systematically identifying the rules and analyzing the data, the researcher works from a scientific basis which gives validity to the results.

Thematic content analysis constitutes the core of the quantitative segment of the study. Themes help to provide a sense of the direction of the content regarding China's reunification. A central element of any thematic content analysis is the set of categorical themes which identify the coded content. "In the absence of standard schemes of classification," Holsti says, "the analyst is usually faced with the task of constructing appropriate themes by trial and error methods. This process consists of moving back and forth from theory to data; of testing usefulness of tentative themes; of then modifying them in the light of the data."\(^ {27}\)

Common requirements in defining themes for content analysis are that the themes "reflect the purpose of the research; they must be exhaustive; be mutually exclusive; be independent; and be derived from a single classification principle.\(^ {28}\) These requirements meet the need

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28. Ibid., p. 95.
for objective measurement. But, as Proeben Sepstrup says, "Category formation (theme formation too) should not—as is often the case in positivistic content analysis—be seen as a neutral-value-free phase preceding the actual content analysis. This is the decisive phase of content analysis and it is imperative that category formation is determined by the purposes and hypotheses, and solely by these."²⁹ The theme category is one special kind of content category; the theme itself is considered a unit of analysis, each theme being placed in a large compartment known as a theme category. A variety of different themes with essentially the same basic meaning can be classified under a single theme category. "A theme is an assertion about a subject matter; the subject must be present or implied in the assertion."³⁰

1. Theme Selection

To ensure that the selected themes of this study were exhaustive, mutually exclusive, independent and not overlapping, five political communications scholars specializing in the China reunification issue and integration theory were consulted. They are Dr. Tao-tai Hsia, chief of the Far Eastern Law Division of the Library of Congress; Dr. Hungdah Chiu, School of Law, University of Maryland; Mr. Robert L. Downen, director of special projects, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, the U.S. State Department; Dr. Hsing-ti Cheng, professor of public policy, National Chengchi University; and Mr. Kai-huang Yang, professor of Mainland problems, Chinese Culture University of Taipei. Fifty-four thematic categories were decided on. These represent the most important political events, statements and announcements by all parties related to China’s reunification from December 1978 to May 1985. These 54 categories were used as variables to test the performance of the two Chinese party newspapers in covering the China reunification issue during the mentioned period.

The thematic categories used as operational variables for this research design are shown in Table 1.

³⁰. Budd, Throp and Donohew, op. cit., p. 47.
TABLE 1
THEMATIC CATEGORIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mnemonic Label</th>
<th>Description of Report</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>#1 TERRITO 1</td>
<td>“One Greater China” territory. For example, border disputes between the PRC and the Soviet Union, the PRC and India, and the PRC and Vietnam; island disputes between the PRC and Japan, the PRC and Vietnam; and the integration dispute between the PRC and the ROC regarding Taiwan as a part of China.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#2 SCENERY 1</td>
<td>The beautiful scenery in the mainland and Taiwan. For example, the great Wall, the Silk Road, the Yangtze River, the West Lake, and Ali Mountain.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#3 HISTORY 1</td>
<td>Chinese history and historical figures. For example, Confucius, Lao Tze and Mencius.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#4 SUNSOON 1</td>
<td>Sun Yat-sen as the revolutionary leader who overthrew the Manchu Empire, and Soong Ching Ling, Sun's widow and the PRC's honorary president.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#5 CNPREVO 1</td>
<td>The Hsin-hai Revolution in 1911 led by Sun Yat-sen and his Nationalist Party.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#6 ONECHIN 1</td>
<td>The traditional political philosophy of “one China.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#7 CHINESE 1</td>
<td>The Chinese as one people regardless of where they live or what they believe.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#8 HOMESIC 1</td>
<td>The separation of people from their native towns resulting from the political separation between the mainland and Taiwan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#9 RELATIV 1</td>
<td>The separated relatives divided by the Taiwan Strait.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#10 REGRDEF 1</td>
<td>The visits made by overseas Chinese or people from the other side, and defections of navy or air force pilots, scholars, artists, scientists or politicians to the other side.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#</td>
<td>Code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>FAVCOMO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>UNFCOMO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>FAVPOLO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>NEUPOLO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>UNFPOLO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>FAVMILO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>NEUMILO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>UNFMILIO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>FAVSOCO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>NEUSOCO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>UNFSOCO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>WARMUSA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>USCOLD0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>DIPLWUS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>TAIREAC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
#26 ARMSALE 1 Arms sales to Taiwan from the United
2 States after severance of U.S.-ROC
diplomatic relations.

#27 HUNACAS 1 Defection of PRC tennis player Hu Na to
2 the United States in 1983, which caused
temporary sour relations between the
United States and the PRC.

#28 SCIETRA 1 Transfer of American scientific technology
2 to either Chinese government.

#29 STRATEG 1 Emphasis on PRC’s or ROC’s strategic
2 importance to Asia, the United States or
the world.

#30 HOLLAND 1 Dutch submarine sale to the ROC in
2 November 1980, which caused temporary
sour relations between Holland and the
PRC in March 1981.

#31 USSR 1 Concerning the USSR’s possible
2 involvement and influence in relations
among the PRC and the United States.

#32 INTLORG 1 The fight between the PRC and the ROC
2 for representation in international
organizations.

#33 OLYMPIC 1 Representation and participation by the
2 PRC and the ROC in the Olympic Games.

#34 NAT1SY2 1 The PRC’s “One Nation, Two Systems”
2 Model to integrate Hong Kong and Taiwan
as “one China” under PRC rule.

#35 TIBETMO 1 The PRC’s Tibet Model to integrate
2 Taiwan as an autonomous region under
PRC rule.

#36 HONGKON1 The PRC’s Hong Kong Model to integrate
2 Taiwan in the same way as Hong Kong
will be when its sovereignty is returned to
the PRC in 1997 from Britain.
PRC's political insistence on the "Four Fundamental Principles": 1. Always stick to the socialist road; 2. Always retain Communist Party leadership; 3. Follow through with the dictatorship of the proletariat; and 4. Follow the thoughts of Marx, Lenin and Mao.

PRC "Special Administrative Region" adopted on December 4, 1982, in Article 31 of the PRC's new constitution, as an alternative for integrating Hong Kong and Taiwan under PRC rule.

Threats by the PRC to integrate Taiwan by force.

ROC's proposal to integrate under its political philosophy of "The Three Principles of the People": (1) Nationalism, (2) Democracy, and (3) The People's Livelihood.

The PRC's 1981 "Nine-Point Peace Proposal" to integrate Taiwan.

The PRC's 1979 "Three-Link, Four-Exchange Peace Proposal" to begin to integrate the ROC: 1. Three links: mail, transportation services and trade. 2. Four exchanges: relatives and tourists, academic groups, cultural groups and sports representatives.

The PRC's peace-talks proposal to the ROC for China's national integration.

The "Multi-System Nations Model" suggested by ROC scholar Yung Wei, recognizing the other Chinese government and co-existing.

The PRC's peace proposal for cooperation between the Chinese Communist Party and the Nationalist Party to achieve China's national integration.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>#46</td>
<td>TAINDPN</td>
<td>The “Taiwanese Independence Movement” organized by the Taiwanese overseas to promote a Taiwan independent from rule by either the PRC or the ROC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#47</td>
<td>TWOCHIN</td>
<td>The “Two Chinas Model” advocated by some scholars and denounced by both the PRC and the ROC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#48</td>
<td>INDTRAD</td>
<td>Indirect trade between the PRC and the ROC through Hong Kong or Singapore.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#49</td>
<td>ADVECOS</td>
<td>Advocacy of its own economic system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#50</td>
<td>UNFECOT</td>
<td>Unfavorable economic report about the other side.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#51</td>
<td>SPECOZN</td>
<td>PRC’s “Special Economic Zones” in Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Shantou of Guangdong Province, and Xiamen of Fujian Province, announced in 1979 and approved by the government on August 26, 1980.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#52</td>
<td>OPENCIT</td>
<td>PRC’s 1984 opening of 14 coastal cities for foreign trade and investment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#53</td>
<td>FAVECOT</td>
<td>Favorable economic report about the other side.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#54</td>
<td>NEUECOT</td>
<td>Neutral economic report about the other side.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*“1” represents the People’s Daily and “2” represents the Central Daily News.

2. Trend and Direction Analysis

Among the 54 thematic categories, 14 are designed for specific trend and direction analysis of the two newspapers’ reports about the other side. These 14 thematic categories are political, military, societal and economic reports about the other side in three directions: favorable, neutral and unfavorable; and commentary to the other side in two directions: favorable and unfavorable. Seldom is commentary neutral.

To statistically determine intensity through frequency, the trends of directions computed from the samples are examined. Trend analysis
has been used most effectively in the area of direction analysis. A trend refers to the increase or decrease of the frequency of given content over a period of time. Trend analysis is done after the basic quantification of the material; its analysis for this sample also comes after the basic data are computed.³¹

The direction method was derived by Richard W. Budd. He defined three directions as criteria for judging news as favorable, neutral or unfavorable:

- **Favorable**: Those items reflecting social cohesion and cooperation and political and economic stability and/or strength. Favorability will be judged on the basis of international cooperation (political, social and economic) in which the country or any group or individual representing that country is depicted as strong, right or cooperative. In internal affairs, favorability will be judged on the basis of persons cooperating in political, social and economic affairs. For example, events and incidents which depict the country or any group or individual within the country as progressive, successful, peace-loving, moral, intelligent, lawful, unified or as exercising leadership will be considered favorable. This classification will not be assigned where the country, or any group or individual thereof, is depicted as exploiting its strength upon weaker nations, groups or individuals.

- **Neutral**: Those items which reflect neither favorable nor unfavorable conditions either through balance of content or a lack of controversial material.

- **Unfavorable**: Those items which report social conflict and disorganization and political and economic instability and/or weakness. Unfavorability will be judged on the basis of international tensions (political, social and economic) in which the country, or any group or individual representing the country, is depicted as weak, wrong or uncooperative. In internal affairs, unfavorability will be judged on the basis of civil disruption in which there is conflict between persons or groups of persons within the country in political, economic or social affairs. For example, events and incidents which depict the country, or any group or individual immoral, impractical, unlawful, disunified or lacking in leadership will be classified unfavorable.³²

Content analysis, Budd says, is most useful when it is able to show direction, or the lack thereof.\textsuperscript{33}

Besides direction itself, the intensity of direction is also studied measured by the coding of frequency. A scale of intensity is also given to compare the two newspapers in each of the reporting areas about the other side.

3. \textit{Units of Measurement}

(1) Coding Sample Newspapers

The sample newspapers used for this study were the domestic editions of the \textit{People's Daily} of the PRC and the \textit{Central Daily News} of the ROC. Samples were gathered between December 1978 and May 1985.

It is most appropriate for this study to use the domestic editions of the papers. The \textit{People's Daily} only started its overseas edition on July 1, 1985, and the \textit{Central Daily News} only publishes a condensed four-page daily for its airmailed edition for overseas Chinese readers. The domestic editions of the two papers are aimed at reporting and promoting party ideologies and policies for domestic readers. It is on an equal comparative level to use the domestic editions of the two papers for this study.


The original domestic editions of the \textit{Central Daily News} of December 1978 to May 1985 were found and coded at the Reference and Information Divisions of the \textit{Central Daily News} and the Central News Agency in Taipei, Taiwan, in March 1985 to June 1985.

The \textit{People's Daily} published six pages daily from December 1978 to December 1979, except for four pages on January 1, on the Chinese lunar-new-year holiday (January 28-31), on Labor Day (May 1), on the PRC's National Independence Day (October 1-2), and on Sundays; it published eight pages daily from January 1980 to June 1981, except for four pages on January 1, on the Chinese lunar-new-year holidays (March 16-18, 1980, and March 5-7, 1981), on Labor Day (May 1), and on National Independence Day (October 1-2); it published eight pages daily from July 1981 to May 1985, except for four

\textsuperscript{33} Ibid., p. 50.


The total of the coded pages of the *People's Daily* for December 1978 to May 1985 was 17,502.


The total of the coded pages of the *Central Daily News* for December 1978 to May 1985 was 29,366.

Combined with the 17,502 pages of the *People's Daily*, 46,868 pages of the two Chinese party newspapers were coded for this study.

Since an average of 5 percent of its space was for advertisement and an average 95 percent for news and editorials, the *People's Daily* actually offered an equivalent of 16,627 pages of news and editorials.

With an average of 40 percent of its space for advertisements and an average of 60 percent for news and editorials, the *Central Daily News* actually offered an equivalent of 17,617 pages of news and editorials for this study. But the *Central Daily News* published four more extra pages than the *People's Daily* in the form of celebration or pub-
lic-bulletin non-news articles on 85 special-occasion days. Subtracting the 340 pages of these extra non-news pages, the Central Daily News finally offered an equivalent 17,277 pages of news and editorials.

The two newspapers offered a very similar amount of space devoted to news and editorial; there is was than a 3.5 percent difference.

(2) Coding Units

The smallest segment of content counted and scored in content analysis is the coding unit. The most common units are a word; a theme or assertion; a paragraph; an item; a character, group, object, or institution; and space or time. Using the entire article as the coding unit is acceptable when the goals of the study and the category system used are of a general nature. The measures may even be as large as pages or whole issues of publications, depending on the statement of the problem. 34

Counting themes rather than words can yield more information. Thematic analysis is linked to direction categories. A theme is a single idea or single item of information extracted from a segment of content. 35

This study, being founded on the specific problem of China’s national integration, uses the theme unit.

(3) The Context Unit

The context unit is the body of material surrounding the coding unit. As much of the material as is required to characterize the coding unit is considered. If the coding unit is the word, the context unit may be the sentence in which the word appears. It might also be the paragraph or the entire article. The context unit must be large enough to provide the background necessary to permit accurate judging, but not so large to cause confusion. In some instances, there may be both implicit and explicit context units. The explicit context unit may be the article in which the coding unit appears, the implicit coding unit the publication or publications analyzed. 36

The entire article was chosen as the context unit for this study since the entire article in the two Chinese party newspapers provided appropriate enough background information to make coding decisions.

For each theme, all 46,868 pages of the two sample newspapers,

34. Ibid., pp. 33-35.
35. Ibid., p. 34.
36. Ibid., p. 36.
including any of the 54 thematic categories, were examined, and their frequency was recorded. A frequency of "1" was coded for each theme in an article. An article might have no theme, one theme or more than one theme related to the subject of the study.

Frequencies were then transferred to tables and charts as trends and directions. In this way unmanageable data was transformed into manageable information.

4. Reliability and Validity

Reliability, in measurement, means that investigators using the same techniques on the same material will get substantially the same results.37

In content analysis, reliability depends in part on how well the researcher describes the coding instructions. For example, simply counting the number of times a key word or symbol appears presents no problem. Assigning direction to statements, detecting propaganda themes, or judging the strength of words may be more difficult to describe. Some of the standard tests of reliability, test-retest, equivalent-forms, and split-halves, are adaptable to content analysis. For content analysis, the test-retest method requires more than one coder using the same instructions to classify the same material.38

For this research, a reliability test was given to two coders. Both were Chinese journalism graduate students. Both frequently read the two Chinese newspapers in their regular studies. They were asked to code 78 randomly selected sample newspapers with the set of 54 thematic categories prepared for the study. To determine the reliability of the two coders, Holsti's formula was used.39

The test was made before the analysis of the results of coding and counting; it received a reliability coefficient of .91. This level of reliability was considered satisfactory for this study.40

To determine the validity of this research, the analyst asked if the methods produced the desired information. He also asked how well his concepts or variables fit his measurements of them. Validity may be determined by one or more methods: jury, known-group, independent-criterion, and construct-validity.41

37. Ibid., p. 66.
38. Ibid., p. 67.
39. Ibid., p. 68, and Holsti, op. cit., p. 140.
40. Budd, Throp and Donohew, op. cit., p. 69.
Experts were asked to judge relevant parts of the methodology, and to define of variables or measuring techniques. The four expert-scholars of political communications familiar with the issue of China’s national integration were asked to examine and modify the 54 thematic categories.

The coders read the two Chinese party newspapers without any language barrier and with no comprehension difficulty in identifying the 54 themes in the two newspapers. These themes are almost self-evident; words or sentences themselves indicate what themes they represent.

**Factor Analysis**

The most distinctive characteristics of factor analysis are data reduction and concept development. Using factor analytic techniques, this research revealed whether some underlying patterns of relationships exist; if so, the variables could be “rearranged” or “reduced” to a smaller set of factors or components.

Factor analysis of social characteristics was used in this study to test whether there are indeed five separate factors as determined by the hypotheses which constitute the concept of China’s national integration. Factor analysis was also used to determine loadings on factors corresponding with the variables that were theoretically associated with the five assumptions discussed in the section on the theoretical framework of national integration.

**Hypothesis**

The theoretical framework of national integration is defined for this study as a multidimensional phenomenon. It can be achieved either through peaceful means with a basis of consensus or by forceful means, directed and decided by elites; it may be achieved sooner if there is a solid basis of mutual understanding built between the two sides; and it may be affected by external economic or other non-political factors.

1. **Hypothesis I: China’s National Integration Is A Multidimensional Phenomenon**

A factor analysis of the survey of the two Chinese party newspapers by 54 thematic categories could produce five to six factors, which could account for most of the variance of the theoretical framework of national integration. This could show that China’s national integration is a multidimensional phenomenon.
2. **Hypothesis II: An Integrative Consensus on Nationalism Will Be One of the Found Factors Which Leads to Either Peaceful or Forceful Integrative Means; However, No Consensus on Integrative Methods or Models Will Be One of the Found Factors**

Thematic categories #2 “Scenery,” #3 “History,” #4 “Sun-Soong,” #5 “1911 Hsin-hai Revolution,” #6 “One China,” #7 “Chinese,” #8 “Homesick,” #9 “Relatives,” #10 “Regressions and Defectors,” #39 “PRC’s Forceful Integration with the ROC,” #40 “ROC’s Integration Model of the Three Principles of the People,” #41 “PRC’s One Nation, Two Systems Model,” #42 “PRC’s Tibet Model for the ROC,” #43 “PRC’s Hong Kong Model for the ROC,” #44 “PRC’s Four Insists,” #45 “PRC’s Peace-Talk Proposal,” and #46 “PRC’s Peace Proposal for Cooperation Between the Communist and the Nationalist Parties” could all correlate with and load substantially on one factor defined as “nationalism consensus” because these thematic categories are mainly nationalism-oriented. These categories could also lead to a peaceful integration based on a nationalism consensus, except #39 “PRC’s Forceful Integration with the ROC” as an alternative integrative means if none of the peaceful integrative means are accepted by both sides. There could be no integrative-model factor correlated by #34 “PRC’s One Nation, Two Systems Model,” #35 “PRC’s Tibet Model for the ROC,” #36 “PRC’s Hong Kong Model for the ROC,” #37 “PRC’s Four Insists,” #38 “PRC’s Special Administrative Region for the ROC,” #44 “Multi-System Nations Model,” #46 “Taiwanese Independence Movement,” and #47 “Two Chinas Model” since none of these are accepted by both the PRC and the ROC. There could be no factor on integrative-method-or-model consensus.

These could meet the assumption of integration theory, which states that national integration can be achieved on a basis of consensus by either peaceful or forceful means. The greater consensus that exists between the integrative units, the better the chance they could be integrated.

3. **Hypothesis III: A Factor of Diverse Mutual Understanding Will Be One of the Found Factors Which Reveals A Tendency of Unfavorable Reporting About the Other Side by Both Papers**

Thematic categories #11 “Commentary Favorable to the Other Side,” #12 “Commentary Unfavorable to the Other Side,” #13 “Favorable Political Report About the Other Side,” #14 “Neutral Political Report About the Other Side,” #15 “Unfavorable Political

This consensus on “Diverse Mutual Understanding” could reveal a tendency of unfavorable reporting about the other side by both papers. The two papers are directed and managed by the elites of the two parties or countries; their consensus could further reveal that these elites, as integration theory says, direct China’s national integration by promoting unfavorable reports about the other side for the masses. This promotion could not speed up, but could slow down, the pace of China’s national integration.

4. Hypothesis IV: A Factor of U.S. China Policy Will Be One of the Found Factors Which Proves that China’s National Integration Has An External or Foreign Factor


This could correspond with the assumption of integration theory that national integration may be affected by external elements.

Other foreign-oriented thematic categories #30 “Holland,” #31 “USSR,” and #33 “Olympics” could not correlate with and load on the “U.S. China Policy” factor or the “Foreign” factor by themselves because they are unrelated by the nature of the events among them.

5. Hypothesis V: A Factor of Economic Function Will Be One of the Found Factors Which Might Lead to Eventual National Integration

Thematic categories #34 “PRC’s One Nation, Two Systems
Model for the ROC,” #36 “PRC’s Hong Kong Model for the ROC,” #48 “Indirect Trade Between the PRC and the ROC,” #49 “Advocacy of Its Own Economic System,” #51 “PRC’s Special Economic Zones,” and #52 “PRC’s Opening of 14 Coastal Cities” might correlate with and load substantially on one factor defined as “Economic-Function Factor.”

All these might encounter the assumption of integration theory which states that national integration can be eventually and indirectly achieved through economic or other non-political factors.
CHAPTER IV
RESEARCH FINDINGS: ANALYSES AND INTERPRETATIONS

Results of Factor Analysis

To measure the correspondence between the hypotheses and the data, a principal factor solution with iterations and varimax rotation was performed. The factor solution groups thematic categories into factors, and varimax rotation makes factor loadings for the variables of the thematic categories less complex by giving the simplest factor structure. The data from the 54 thematic categories were used to calculate a 54 by 54 correlation matrix that related pairs of themes. This correlation matrix was factor analyzed using the principal factor solution with iterations, then submitted to a varimax rotation.

Two criteria were used to determine the number of factors to be used for rotation. The first chose the numbers having eigenvalues in excess of 1.00, while the second chose those having at least 5 percent of the variance. Five factors were chosen for rotation. The results of the factor loadings after varimax rotation are shown in Table 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Thematic Categories</th>
<th>Factor I</th>
<th>Factor II</th>
<th>Factor III</th>
<th>Factor IV</th>
<th>Factor V</th>
<th>Communality h²=SMC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>#1 TERRITOR</td>
<td>.157</td>
<td>-.125</td>
<td>.271</td>
<td>.566*</td>
<td>-.111</td>
<td>.447</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#2 SCENERY</td>
<td>.429</td>
<td>-.042</td>
<td>-.006</td>
<td>-.168</td>
<td>.057</td>
<td>.217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#3 HISTORY</td>
<td>.079</td>
<td>-.024</td>
<td>.107</td>
<td>.028</td>
<td>.483</td>
<td>.253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#4 SUNSOONG</td>
<td>.585*</td>
<td>-.116</td>
<td>.030</td>
<td>-.033</td>
<td>.195</td>
<td>.397</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#5 CNPREVOL</td>
<td>.682*</td>
<td>-.053</td>
<td>.372</td>
<td>-.010</td>
<td>-.067</td>
<td>.611</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#6 ONECHINA</td>
<td>.887*</td>
<td>.207</td>
<td>.201</td>
<td>.051</td>
<td>.191</td>
<td>.910</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#7 CHINESE</td>
<td>.218</td>
<td>.032</td>
<td>.342</td>
<td>.170</td>
<td>.393</td>
<td>.349</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#8 HOMESICK</td>
<td>.578*</td>
<td>.172</td>
<td>-.271</td>
<td>-.115</td>
<td>-.181</td>
<td>.484</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#9 RELATIVE</td>
<td>.663*</td>
<td>-.248</td>
<td>-.277</td>
<td>.074</td>
<td>.026</td>
<td>.584</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#10 REGRDEFE</td>
<td>.065</td>
<td>.375</td>
<td>.215</td>
<td>-.040</td>
<td>-.103</td>
<td>.203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#11 FAVCOMOT</td>
<td>-.137</td>
<td>.646*</td>
<td>.112</td>
<td>-.142</td>
<td>-.044</td>
<td>.472</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#12 UNFCOMOT</td>
<td>.054</td>
<td>-.278</td>
<td>.219</td>
<td>.405</td>
<td>-.035</td>
<td>.294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#13 FAVPOLOT</td>
<td>-.129</td>
<td>.593*</td>
<td>.177</td>
<td>-.009</td>
<td>.091</td>
<td>.408</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#14 NEUPOLOT</td>
<td>-.164</td>
<td>.022</td>
<td>-.172</td>
<td>-.274</td>
<td>.047</td>
<td>.134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#15 UNFPOLOT</td>
<td>-.060</td>
<td>-.346</td>
<td>-.054</td>
<td>-.005</td>
<td>.160</td>
<td>.152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#16 FAVMILOT</td>
<td>-.132</td>
<td>.037</td>
<td>.174</td>
<td>.023</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>.049</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#17 NEUMILOT</td>
<td>-.113</td>
<td>-.164</td>
<td>.089</td>
<td>.239</td>
<td>.040</td>
<td>.107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#18 UNFMILLOT</td>
<td>.073</td>
<td>.322</td>
<td>.091</td>
<td>.330</td>
<td>.074</td>
<td>.232</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(61)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Thematic Category</th>
<th>Percentage of Total Variance</th>
<th>Percentage of Common Variance</th>
<th>Eigenvalue</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>FAVSOCOT</td>
<td>13.5%</td>
<td>31.6%</td>
<td>6.941</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>NEUSOCOT</td>
<td>11.6%</td>
<td>26.1%</td>
<td>5.719</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>UNFSOCOT</td>
<td>7.6%</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
<td>3.660</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>WARMUSA</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>14.9%</td>
<td>3.263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>USCOLDOT</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
<td>10.7%</td>
<td>2.356</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>DIPLWUSA</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*These thematic categories have loadings above .50 cutoff point.
The 54 by 54 matrix of correlations revealed that the five factors account for 45 percent of the total variance. Factor I represents 13.5 percent of the total variance; Factor II, 11.6 percent; Factor III, 7.6 percent; Factor IV, 7 percent; and Factor V, 5.3 percent.

Within the five-factor solution, Factor I accounts for 31.6 percent of the total variance; Factor II, 26.1 percent; Factor III, 16.7 percent; Factor IV, 14.9 percent; and Factor IV, 10.7 percent. All five factors have eigenvalues in excess of 2.35.

As predicted, the tests yielded five important factors. For a loading to be significant at the .01 level, a moderately conservative loading of .50 was chosen for the cutoff point, which was based on the overall interrelationships between thematic categories. In the varimax rotated factor matrix, Factor I accounted for 31.6 percent of the variance and had moderately high loadings in 11 thematic categories, as shown in Table 3.

### TABLE 3

**FACTOR I**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>THEMATIC CATEGORY</th>
<th>LOADING POINT</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>#45 CCPCNPCO</td>
<td>.913</td>
<td>PRC’s peace proposal for cooperation between the Chinese Communist and Chinese Nationalist Parties to achieve China’s national integration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#41 POINTS9</td>
<td>.907</td>
<td>PRC’s 1981 “Nine-Point Peace Proposal” to the ROC for a peaceful national integration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#6 ONECHINA</td>
<td>.887</td>
<td>The traditional political philosophy of “one China.”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PRC's 1979 "Three-Link and Four-Exchange Peace Proposal" to the ROC: 1. Three Links: postal, transportation services and trade; 2. Four Exchanges: relatives and tourists, academic groups, cultural groups, and sports representatives.

The Hsin-hai Revolution in 1911 led by Sun Yat-sen and his Nationalist Party.

Threats by the PRC to integrate Taiwan by force.

The separated relatives divided by the Taiwan Strait.

PRC's peace-talk proposal to the ROC.

Sun Yat-sen as the revolutionary leader who overthrew the Manchu empire, and Soong Ching Ling, Sun's widow and the PRC's honorary president.

The separation of people from their native towns resulting from the political separation between the mainland and Taiwan.

ROC's proposal of "China Reunification under the Three Principles of the People": (1) Nationalism, (2) Democracy and (3) The People's Livelihood.

Factor I has 11 significant loadings on thematic categories related to nationalism consensus and its strategies. This was predicted by Hypothesis II; therefore, Factor I is labeled as the "Nationalism Consensus" factor. No consensus on integrative methods or models is found in this or any other factor.

Factor II accounts for 26.1 percent of the variance and has moderate loadings on six thematic categories shown in Table 4.

### TABLE 4

#### FACTOR II

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>THEMATIC CATEGORY</th>
<th>LOADING POINT</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>#28 SCIETRAN</td>
<td>.736</td>
<td>Transfer of American scientific technology to either Chinese government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#53 FAVECOT</td>
<td>.731</td>
<td>Favorable economic report about the other side.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#20 NEUSOCOT</td>
<td>.712</td>
<td>Neutral societal report about the other side.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#11 FAVCOMOT</td>
<td>.646</td>
<td>Favorable commentary to the other side.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Factor II is characterized by moderate loadings on the thematic categories concerning reports about the other side. This is as Hypothesis III predicted. Factor II is identified as the "Mutual Understanding" factor.

Factor III accounts for 16.7 percent of the variance and has loadings on five thematic categories shown in Table 5.

**TABLE 5**
**FACTOR III**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>THEMATIC CATEGORY</th>
<th>LOADING POINT</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>#34 NAT1SY2</td>
<td>.881</td>
<td>PRC's &quot;One Nation, Two Systems&quot; model to integrate Hong Kong and the ROC under PRC rule.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#36 HONGKONG</td>
<td>.750</td>
<td>PRC's Hong Kong model to integrate the ROC under PRC rule, and the return of the sovereignty of Hong Kong to the PRC in 1997 from Britain.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#51 SPECOZNS</td>
<td>.538</td>
<td>&quot;PRC's Special Economic Zones&quot; in Shenzhen, Zhuhai, and Shantou of Guangdong Province, and Xiamen of Fujian Province, announced in 1979 and approved by the government on August 26, 1980.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Factor III shows substantial loadings on the thematic categories related to integration through PRC's economic reforms and indirect economic means. This is as predicted in Hypothesis V; therefore, Factor III is called the "Economic Function" factor.

Factor IV accounts for 14.9 percent of the variance and has loadings on five thematic categories shown in Table 6.

**TABLE 6**
**FACTOR IV**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>THEMATIC CATEGORY</th>
<th>LOADING POINT</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
Factor IV in the rotated factor matrix is marked by moderate loadings on the thematic categories related to U.S. relations with both sides; and related to the U.S. position regarding Taiwan as a part of China. This was predicted in Hypothesis IV, therefore, Factor IV is called the "U.S.-China Policy" factor.

Factor V accounts for 10.7 percent of the variance and has a loading on two thematic categories shown in Table 7.

**TABLE 7**

**FACTOR V**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>THEMATIC CATEGORY</th>
<th>LOADING POINT</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>#26 ARMSALES</td>
<td>.859</td>
<td>U.S. arms sales to the ROC to protect Taiwan from PRC's forceful integration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#25 TAIREFCT</td>
<td>.842</td>
<td>The &quot;Taiwan Relations Act&quot; passed on March 13 and 14, 1979 by the Congress and signed by the president of the United States, and effective on April 10, 1979. The Act is a guideline for unofficial U.S.-Taiwan relations, after the severance of an official diplomatic relationship between the U.S. and the ROC on January 1, 1979.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Factor V is marked by loadings on the thematic categories related to U.S. protection of Taiwan. Factor V is named the "U.S. Protecting-Taiwan Policy" factor.
Hypothesis IV predicted that Factor IV and Factor V would be categorized as the “U.S.-China Policy” factor; however, the result shows Factor IV to be a category related to the U.S.-China policy and offers in Factor V a category related specifically to the U.S. Protecting-Taiwan policy. Factor V separates a particular U.S. policy on Taiwan from Factor IV of general U.S.-China policy on the China national integration issue. Factor V, therefore, also confirmed Hypothesis IV.

Overall, the results of the factor analysis support five of the hypotheses, confirming Hypothesis I, which states that China’s national integration is a multidimensional phenomenon with five factors that account for most of the variance of a theoretical framework of national integration. The findings of five factors are consistent with Hypotheses II, III, IV and V when 28 of the 54 thematic categories are used.

After discussions of trend analysis and directional analysis, the descriptions of the five factors are interpreted.

Trend Analysis

The survey coded a reporting frequency total of 35,708 in 54 thematic categories from the two newspapers over the six-and-a-half year period. The People’s Daily showed a reporting frequency total of 7,570 or 21.2 percent compared to the Central Daily News’ 28,138 or 78.8 percent.

The Central Daily News showed frequencies about three times more than the People’s Daily when reporting on China’s national integration; therefore, the Central Daily News, more than the People’s Daily, considered integration an important challenge to the legitimacy of its government and considered integration to be a pressing problem to the security of its people both internally and externally.

The reporting trend by the two newspapers, as shown in Figure 1, and the observations made during the data collection, reveal that the People’s Daily took more of an offensive initiating position. For example, it offered peace proposals and other integrative methods and models called on the United States to assist in achieving China’s national integration. On the other hand, the Central Daily News was more defensive and reactive.

Many of the reporting trends, as also shown in Figure 1, corresponded with each other by a similar increase or decrease of frequency in reporting on integration-related issues. The most significant increase was during October 1981, the highest peak in the trends of the two newspapers. During this month, the People’s Daily often reported on the PRC’s nine-point peace proposal and the Central Daily News
immediately reported a rejection. As a result, Figure 1 shows corresponding increases and decreases in reporting frequencies by the two newspapers on this issue.

Figure 2 illustrates that the Central Daily News showed more dramatic increases and decreases in reporting frequency in most of the thematic categories. This is particularly true on thematic categories, #15 “Unfavorable Political Report About the Other Side,” with a frequency total of 3,244; #10 “Regression and Defectors,” with 2,545; #39 “PRC's Forceful Integration With The ROC,” with 1,989; #12 “Commentary Unfavorable on The Other side,” with 1,958; #21 “Unfavorable Societal Report About the Other Side,” with 1,790; #22 “Promote A Warmer Relationship with the United States,” with 1,795; #50 “Unfavorable Economic Report About the Other Side,” with 1,546; #7 “Chinese,” with 1,519; and #6 “One China,” with 1,386.

Among these categories, #10 “Regressions and Defectors,” shown in Figures 2 and 3, had a more dramatic increase in reporting frequency in the Central Daily News than the other categories.

When PRC air force pilot Sun Tienchin defected to the ROC through South Korea in August 1983, the greatest increase in reporting frequency in the trend of Figure 3 occurred. The second greatest increase came during October 1982, when a flux of invited overseas Chinese visited Taiwan. These dramatic increases indicate that the Central Daily News intended to use these events as publicity to promote a favorable image toward the ROC, and to promote an unfavorable image toward the PRC.

Thematic category #10 appeared in both newspapers as an obvious propaganda and consensus strategy against the other side.

“Regressions” were the visits made by overseas Chinese or Chinese from the other side; such visits are encouraged by both Chinese governments.

The well-known overseas Chinese who have visited both the PRC and the ROC include two Nobel-prize-winning scientists Cheng-tao Li and Samuel Chao-chung Ting, Columbia University professors Chien-hsiung Wu and Chia-liu Yuan, the first Chinese American astronaut Taylor Kan-chun Wang, architect I.M. Pei, pianist Fu Cong, violinist Chao-len Lin, computer enterprising billionaire An Wang, Olympic ice-skating medal winner Tiffany Ting-ting Chen, writer Rao-si Chen, politician Anna Chennault, and political science professors James Chien Hsiung and Parris Hsu-chen Chang. Most were received personally by leaders of both sides; their visits highly publicized by the
China they were visiting, but they were seldom mentioned in the newspaper of the other side.

Shanghai-born and Taipei-raised astronaut Taylor Kan-chun Wang presented a PRC flag to PRC Premier Zhao Ziyang in Peking on July 7, 1985. Four weeks later, on August 5, Wang presented an ROC flag to ROC Premier Yu Kuo-hua in Taipei. Wang claimed that each of the flags had accompanied him on his space trip in May 1985 aboard the space shuttle Challenger: the ROC flag was taken up without the consent of the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration.¹

The defectors most played up by the People’s Daily were ROC air force pilots Ta-wei Li and Chi-cheng Huang, ROC political theorist Bi Ma, ROC television variety show producer Ah-yuan Huang, and ROC singer Te-chien Hou. Those most played up by the Central Daily News were PRC air force pilots Sun Tienchin, Wu Ruoken, Wang Hsuanchen and Fan Yuanyen, PRC civilian aircraft hijacker Cho Changjen and his five colleagues, and PRC cellist Li Tienhui.

The Central Daily News took advantage of the propaganda opportunity of the former PRC tennis player Hu Na’s visit to Taiwan in June 1985. Hu defected to the United States in 1982, causing a temporary rift in PRC-U.S. relations. The 19-year-old female tennis star had won many international tennis tournaments for the PRC and her action therefore greatly embarrassed the PRC, causing it temporarily to cancel cultural exchange programs with the United States. The PRC made numerous acrimonious statements, and even a personal attack on President Reagan after the United States refused to send Hu Na back to the PRC. Hu was granted political asylum in 1983.²

More obvious differences in reporting frequency by the two newspapers can be seen in Figures 4-17, which graph frequencies of the 14 thematic categories of political, military, societal and economic reports and commentaries about the other side.

Both newspapers show a much higher frequency of unfavorable reports and commentaries than favorable or neutral ones. As shown in Figures 6, 9, 12, 15 and 17, the Central Daily News had a considerably higher frequency of unfavorable reports about the PRC than the People’s Daily had about the ROC. Both newspapers had a very low frequency on favorable and neutral reports and commentaries.

---
The trends revealed in Figures 4-17 indicate that the two newspapers and parties have a great problem in building mutual understanding, which integration theory regards as essential for achieving integration.

The trends of reporting frequency in the thematic categories of Factors I-V, other than those categories of reporting about the other side, are shown in Figures 18-39.

1. Reporting Trends for Factor I: Nationalism Consensus

Among the trends of Factor I (Figures 18-28), thematic category #39 "PRC's Forceful Integration with the ROC" (Figure 23) shows a trend of dramatic increases and decreases in reporting by the Central Daily News. This suggests that the Central Daily News or the Nationalist Party felt a constant military threat from the PRC to forcefully integrate the ROC.

For thematic category #6 "The Traditional Political Philosophy of 'One China'" (Figure 20) there have generally been corresponding increases and decreases in frequency between the two newspapers; however, the Central Daily News shows a higher amount of reporting frequencies, suggesting that both newspapers or parties have respected the traditional political philosophy of "one China." The highest peak in reporting frequencies on this theme came during October 1981, after the PRC's Nine-Point Peace Proposal was initiated on September 30, 1981.

There are also peaks during the same month for related categories: #45 "The PRC's Peace Proposal for Cooperation Between the Two Parties" (Figure 18), #41 "The PRC's 1981 Nine-Point Peace Proposal" (Figure 19), and #42 "The PRC's Three-Link, Four-Exchange Peace Proposal" (Figure 21). These peaks suggest that the "PRC's Nine-Point Peace Proposal" has been a very important issue.

The reporting trends of thematic category #5 "The Hsin-hai Revolution in 1911 led by Sun Yat-sen and his Nationalist Party" (Figure 22) show high peaks for the Central Daily News during its regular memorial months of October (the Nationalist Revolution occurred in October 1911). The People's Daily shows a sudden peak in October 1981. Reports at this time focused on the "PRC's Nine-Point Peace Proposal."

A similar situation occurs for thematic category #4 "Sun Yat-sen as the Revolutionary Leader, and Soong Ching Ling, Sun's Widow" (Figure 20). Here, the Central Daily News shows regular higher peaks of reporting frequencies on Sun's birthday, Sun's death, and revolution-success day. The People's Daily shows a sudden peak
in June 1981 after the death of Soong Ching Ling on May 29, 1981. At this time, the *People’s Daily* called on the Nationalist Party to join in peace talks and to work for peaceful integration inspired by a common loyalty to Sun Yat-sen. This difference suggests that the *Central Daily News* regularly reported on this event every October, while the *People’s Daily* used this theme for the more specific purpose of peace talks.

For thematic category #43 “The PRC’s Peace-Talk Proposal to the ROC” (Figure 25), the highest peak for the *People’s Daily* came during January 1979, shortly after the PRC established diplomatic relations with the United States, subsequently calling on the ROC to join in peace talks. This suggests that the PRC quickly took the opportunity to offer peace talks to the diplomatically isolated ROC. The peak decreased after the ROC rejected the PRC’s offer in the same month.

In the trends of thematic categories #9 “The Separated Relatives” (Figure 24) and #8 “The Separation of People from Native Towns” (Figure 27), the *People’s Daily* shows the higher peaks in reporting frequency; the *Central Daily* shows a very flat trend-line. These trends suggest that the PRC has used more sentimental appeals than the ROC toward the integration issue.

The trends of thematic category #40 “ROC’s Proposal to Integrate Under the Three Principles of the People” (Figure 28) also revealed a significant difference between the two newspapers. The *Central Daily News* shows an increase in reporting frequency in January 1981; the *People’s Daily* shows a nearly flat trend-line at the zero frequency level. The *People’s Daily* did not mention this theme.

2. Reporting Trends for Factor II: Mutual Understanding

For Factor II, Figures 4, 10, 11, 13 and 16 were analyzed previously; they show the trends in reports and commentaries on the other side.

In thematic category #28 “Transfer of American Scientific Technology” (Figure 29), the *People’s Daily* shows a higher and more irregular trend than the *Central Daily News*. This suggests that the PRC wished to acquire more American transfer of scientific technology from the United States after the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries in January 1979. The *Central Daily News* shows a noticeable increase in this category in January 1984. The two trends suggest that the PRC and the ROC agree that the transfer of American technology is essential.
3. Reporting Trends for Factor III: Economic Function

The trends of thematic category #36 "The PRC's Hong Kong Integrative Model" (Figure 31) show peaks in September 1982, when the PRC started negotiations with Britain to return the sovereignty of Hong Kong to the PRC in 1997. Both newspapers show the highest peak of reporting frequency in September 1984 when the PRC and Britain signed an agreement regarding Hong Kong. The People's Daily reported the event with a tone of celebration. The Central Daily News reported it with a condemning attitude.

In thematic category #34 "The PRC's One Nation, Two Systems Integrative Model" (Figure 30) there are dramatic peaks in September and October of 1984. This suggests that this model did not become a subject of serious debate between the PRC and the ROC until then.

The trends for thematic category #51 "PRC's Special Economic Zones" (Figure 32) show that the People's Daily started to report about this theme in May 1981; it began to emphasize it more in November and December of 1984. The Central Daily News started reporting on this theme at about the same time; it increased its reporting frequencies in 1982 and 1983 with an unfavorable tone.


There are both dramatic increases and dramatic decreases in the reporting frequencies of the thematic categories of Factor IV. This is shown in the trends of thematic categories #22 "Promoting a Warmer Relationship with the United States" (Figure 33), #23 "Calling on the United States to Maintain a Colder Relationship with the Other Side" (Figure 34), #24 "The PRC's Diplomatic Relationship with the United States" (Figure 35), #29 "Emphasis on PRC's or ROC's Strategic Importance to Asia, the United States and the World" (Figure 36), and #1 "One Greater China Territory" (Figure 37).

The figures show peaks of reporting frequencies during the periods of new establishment of PRC-U.S. diplomatic relations in January 1979 and President Reagan's visit to the PRC in April 1984. These trends indicate that both newspapers and both parties tried to influence U.S. China policy by arguing that Taiwan is a part of China.

The Central Daily News hit peaks of reporting frequencies on these themes more often than the People's Daily, suggesting that the Central Daily News expressed a stronger concern than the People's Daily over U.S.-China policy.

For thematic category #35 (Figure 35), both newspapers show a
high peak in December 1978 when PRC-U.S. diplomatic relations were announced on December 15, 1978. The frequencies suddenly drop in the months following January 1979. The figure then shows a moderately flat line for both newspapers. These trends suggest the acceptance of the new diplomatic reality by both the PRC and the ROC.

For thematic category #29 (Figure 36), both newspapers show mild increases and decreases of reporting frequencies. This suggests that both newspapers have regularly emphasized their country's strategic importance to the United States.

5. Reporting Trends for Factor V: U.S. Protecting-Taiwan Policy

For Factor V, thematic categories #26 “U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan” (Figure 38) and #25 “U.S. Taiwan Relations Act” (Figure 39) show peaks in reporting frequency for both newspapers in June 1981 and August 1982, when the PRC started to put pressure on the United States to abolish Taiwan Relations Act and to stop arms sales to Taiwan. On August 17, 1982, the PRC announced the signing of a joint communique with the United States, which agreed to reduce arms sales to Taiwan.

The Central Daily News shows higher peaks on these two events in these months than the People's Daily. This suggests that the ROC cares more about the U.S. policy of protecting Taiwan with its arms sales and the Taiwan Relations Act than does the PRC; it also reflects that Taiwan's security and peaceful or forceful integration with the mainland are influenced by and dependent on the U.S. protecting-Taiwan policy.

Directional Analysis

1. Directional Analysis in Reporting About the Other Side

To obtain a complete overview of the direction of each newspaper as it reports about the other side, the following 14 thematic categories were grouped together for the T-test:

#13 “Favorable Political Report About the Other Side.”
#14 “Neutral Political Report About the Other Side.”
#15 “Unfavorable Political Report About the Other Side.”
#16 “Favorable Military Report About the Other Side.”
#17 “Neutral Military Report About the Other Side.”
#18 “Unfavorable Military Report About the Other Side.”
#19 “Favorable Societal Report About the Other Side.”
#20 “Neutral Societal Report About the Other Side.”
#21 "Unfavorable Societal Report About the Other Side."
#50 "Unfavorable Economic Report About the Other Side."
#53 "Favorable Economic Report About the Other Side."
#54 "Neutral Economic Report About the Other Side."
#11 "Commentary Favorable to the Other Side."
#12 "Commentary Unfavorable to the Other Side."

The percentages of the total reporting frequencies in this group should be previewed for an overall picture to analyze the T-test results. The three directions are favorable, neutral and unfavorable.

Since commentary usually is not neutral, and no thematic category is designed for neutral commentary to the other side, the breakdown did not include thematic categories #11 and #12.

Table 8 shows that during six and a half years, or 78 months, the two newspapers together had a frequency of 9,093 in reporting about the other side. The People's Daily had a frequency of 1,485, or 16.33 percent, and the Central Daily News, 7,608, or 83.66 percent.

**TABLE 8**

PERCENTAGES OF REPORTING FREQUENCIES IN DIRECTIONAL CATEGORIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PD</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>S</th>
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<th>M</th>
<th>S</th>
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<td>Favorable</td>
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<td>460</td>
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<td>7608</td>
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<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>2.34%</td>
<td>5.06%</td>
<td>76.27%</td>
<td>83.66%</td>
<td>76.27%</td>
<td>83.66%</td>
<td>88.59%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unfavorable</td>
<td>5.99%</td>
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P: Political Report About The Other Side, Themes #13, 14 and 15.
M: Military Report About The Other Side, Themes #16, 17 and 18.
S: Societal Report About The Other Side, Themes #19, 20 and 21.
E: Economic Report About The Other Side, Themes #50, 53 and 54.

The Central Daily News showed four times more reporting frequencies than the People's Daily in reporting about the other side. This suggests that the Central Daily News considered it more important to inform its readers about the other side for the sake of China's national integration. It can be interpreted that the Central Daily News felt more threatened about the other side's ideas on integration and therefore was more defensive.
Table 8 also shows that the two newspapers had a total reporting frequency of 7,874, or 80.59 percent, for unfavorable reports about the other side; 674, or 7.41 percent, for neutral reports; and 545, or 5.99 percent, for favorable reports.

Individually, the People's Daily had a reporting frequency of 939, or 10.33 percent, for unfavorable reports about the other side; 214, or 2.35 percent, for neutral reports; and 332, or 3.65 percent, for favorable reports.

The Central Daily News showed a frequency of 6,935, or 76.27 percent, for unfavorable reports about the other side; 460, or 5.06 percent for neutral reports; and 213, or 2.34 percent, for favorable reports.

Both newspapers showed a higher frequency of unfavorable than of neutral or favorable reports about the other side. The Central Daily News showed 14 times more unfavorable than neutral reporting frequencies and 31 times more unfavorable than favorable reporting frequencies about the other side. The People's Daily showed three times more unfavorable than neutral reporting frequencies and two times more unfavorable than favorable reporting frequencies about the other side. The Central Daily News showed almost seven times more unfavorable reporting frequencies about the other side. This breakdown suggests that objective reporting, fair and balanced objectivity about the other side, was not to be found in either newspaper.

Table 9 shows a breakdown of reporting frequencies about the other side in political, military, societal and economic categories. The two newspapers together showed a frequency of 4,075, or 44.81 percent, in political reporting about the other side; 2,532, or 27.85 percent, in societal reporting; 1,957, or 21.52 percent, in economic reporting; and 529, or 5.82 percent, in military reporting.

Individually, the People's Daily showed a frequency of 714, or 7.85 percent in societal reporting; 371, or 4.14 percent, in political reporting; 376, or 4.14 percent, in economic reporting; and 19, or 0.2 percent, in military reporting.
TABLE 9
PERCENTAGES OF REPORTING FREQUENCIES IN DIRECTIONAL CATEGORIES

<table>
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<td>376 1485</td>
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<tr>
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<td>3699 510 1818 1581 7608</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>CDN</td>
<td>40.68% 5.6% 19.99% 17.39% 83.66%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>PD&amp; CDN</td>
<td>4075 529 2532 1957 7609 9093</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>CDN</td>
<td>44.81% 5.82% 27.85% 21.52% 100%</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

F: Favorable Report About The Other Side, Themes #13, 16, 19 and 53.
N: Neutral Report About The Other Side, Themes #14, 17, 20 and 54.
U: Unfavorable Report About The Other Side, Themes #15, 18, 21 and 50.

The Central Daily News showed a frequency of 3,699, or 40.68 percent, in political reporting; 1,818, or 19.99 percent, in societal reporting; 1,581, or 17.39 percent, in economic reporting; and 510, or 5.6 percent, in military reporting. These figures indicate that the People's Daily paid more attention to the ROC's societal affairs than to political, economic or military affairs. The Central Daily News paid more attention to the PRC's political affairs than to societal, economic or military affairs.

Both newspapers showed very high frequencies or percentages of unfavorable reports about the other side in all four thematic categories. In economic reporting, the People's Daily showed a frequency of 251 out of 376, or 66.76 percent, for unfavorable reports about the other side; the Central Daily News, 1,546 out of 1,581, or 97.78 percent. In political reporting, the People's Daily showed a frequency of 291 out of 376, or 77.39 percent, for unfavorable reports about the other side; the Central Daily News, 3,244 out of 3,699, or 87.7 percent. In societal reporting, the People's Daily showed a frequency of 384 out of 714, or 53.78 percent, for unfavorable reports about the other side. The Central Daily News, 1,790 out of 1,818, or 98.45 percent. In military reporting, the People's Daily showed a frequency of 13 out of 19, or 68.42 percent, for unfavorable reports about the other side; the Central Daily News, 355 out of 510, or 69.6 percent.

The small frequencies or percentages in military reporting about the other side could either show that neither side has really felt much
of a military threat from the other side, or else neither side intentionally wants its readers to know about or to fear a military threat.

The results\(^3\) of the T-test show the *People's Daily* and the *Central Daily News* were significantly different in political, military, societal and economic reporting about the other side, regardless of whether the reports were favorable, neutral or unfavorable. Neutral economic reports were the only exception. Both newspapers show small and similar frequencies of neutral economic reports about the other side. The *People's Daily* showed a frequency of 18, and the *Central Daily News*, 13. The results of the T-test demonstrate neutral economic reports were not significantly different between the two newspapers, nor were they significant when compared with the other thematic categories of reporting the other side. This suggests that neither newspaper reported about the other side’s economic situation neutrally enough.

The sharpest difference between the two newspapers occurred in thematic categories #15 “Unfavorable Political Report About the Other Side”, #21 “Unfavorable Societal Report About the Other Side”, #50 “Unfavorable Economic Report About the Other Side.”

For #15 “Unfavorable Political Report About the Other Side,” the *People’s Daily* shows a frequency of 291, the *Central Daily News*, 3,244.

For #21 “Unfavorable Societal Report About the Other Side, the *People’s Daily* shows a frequency of 384, the *Central Daily News*, 1,790.

For #50 “Unfavorable Economic Report About the Other Side,” the *People’s Daily* shows a frequency of 251, the *Central Daily News*, 1,546.

These findings suggest that the readers of the *Central Daily News* have received more unfavorable reports and therefore have likely developed an unfavorable image about the PRC’s political, societal and economic situation.

Unfavorable economic and societal reporting in the *Central Daily News* mostly compared the living standard in the PRC with the higher living standard in the ROC. No attention was given to the contrasting sizes in population or land of the two countries. The content probably has persuaded the readers of the *Central Daily News* since they do enjoy a higher living standard. It has likely driven readers away from any interest in integrating with the PRC, most of the reporting being in a cynical, unsympathetic tone.

The sharp differences between these three thematic categories,

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3. Detailed results of the T-Test are omitted in this edition; available upon request.
and the significant difference between the two newspapers in most of their reporting about the other side, strengthens the argument of Hypothesis III. This also shows that the corresponding "Mutual Understanding" factor (Factor II) is an important but weak factor in China's national integration; both newspapers have reported about the other side without trying to achieve any mutual understanding, required by integration theory as a basis for integration.

The results of the T-test show a significant difference between the two newspapers in thematic categories #11 "Commentary Favorable on the Other Side" and #12 "Commentary Unfavorable on the Other Side." The People's Daily offered more commentary favorable to the other side; the Central Daily News shows an eight times greater frequency of commentary unfavorable to the other side than the People's Daily, suggesting a hard-line editorial policy by the Central Daily News, a policy unfavorable to the PRC on the China national integration issue. The People's Daily used a reconciliatory approach with more commentary favorable to the ROC, causing the Central Daily News to call this approach a "trick with smiles" and a "sugar-coated poison."

This finding further suggests that there is a large gap between the two newspapers or parties in building mutual trust and understanding for integration.

Results of the T-Test on Five Factors

The results of the T-test on the 22 thematic categories, other than those reports about the other side, show that the two newspapers used significantly different approaches of reporting in 15 thematic categories.

The results reveal that the two newspapers only agreed on the aim of "nationalism consensus." They disagreed on any particular integrative methods or models, on "mutual understanding," on "economic function," on "U.S.-China Policy," and on "U.S. Protecting Taiwan Policy."

The sharpest differences are seen in thematic categories #39 "PRC's Forceful Integration with the ROC," #25 "U.S. Taiwan Relations Act," #26 "U.S. Arms Sales," #22 "Promoting a Warmer Relationship with the United States," #23 "Calling On the United States to Maintain a Colder Relationship with the Other Side," and #6 "One China."

In #39 "PRC's Forceful Integration with the ROC," the People's Daily shows a frequency of 38, the Central Daily News, 1,989. It could
be interpreted that the *Central Daily News* felt threatened that the PRC might use forceful means to achieve integration.

In #25 “U.S. Taiwan Relations Act,” the *People’s Daily* shows a frequency of 50, the *Central Daily News*, 410. This difference suggests that the ROC felt a great need for the U.S. Taiwan Relations Act to protect it from forced integration.

In #26 “U.S. Arms Sales,” the *People’s Daily* shows a frequency of 94, the *Central Daily News*, 815. The *Central Daily News* showed a greater play for U.S. attention. The strategy was likely based on the desire to gain more defensive arms sales from the United States.

In #22 “Promoting a Warmer Relationship with the United States,” the *People’s Daily* shows a frequency of 356, the *Central Daily News*, 1,795. This shows that the *Central Daily News* has been more concerned about promoting the ROC’s unofficial relationship with the United States than the *People’s Daily* has been in promoting its official relationship with the United States.

In #23 “Calling on the United States to Maintain a colder Relationship with the Other Side,” the *People’s Daily* shows a frequency of 181, the *Central Daily News*, 716. This suggests that the *Central Daily News* has tried harder to persuade the United States to restrain its relationship with the PRC than the *People’s Daily* has for the U.S. relationship with the ROC.

Along with #22, these two categories show that the *Central Daily News* expressed more of a need for U.S. interests in China’s national integration than did the *People’s Daily*.

In #6 “One China,” the *People’s Daily* shows a frequency of 560, the *Central Daily News*, 1,386. The *Central Daily News* shows almost three times the frequency as the *People’s Daily*. This could be interpreted to mean that the *Central Daily News* felt “one China” integration was more important than the *People’s Daily* did. It also could be said that by maintaining a “one China” policy, the ROC has the advantage of decreasing, or at least not increasing, any immediate threat by the PRC to integrate by forceful means. This is probably true because there is a consensus on the “one China” policy.

The PRC seems to be willing to tolerate the status quo of Taiwan until integration is completed if the ROC maintains a “one China” policy and maintains a common intention to unify with the mainland. A “one China” policy helps the ROC to maintain the legitimacy of its central government; the ROC maintains that it will eventually return to the mainland and is only temporarily in Taiwan.

For thematic categories # 5, 4, 40, 43, 36, 28, 29, 1 and 24, the
Central Daily News also shows significantly higher totals of reporting frequency than the People’s Daily.

In #5 “The Hsin-hai Revolution in 1911 Led by Sun Yat-Sen and his Nationalist Party,” the People’s Daily shows a frequency of 201, the Central Daily News, 798. The high frequency for the Central Daily News is a result of its tradition of reporting on the revolution as an annual memorial event. The People’s Daily began reporting more about the revolution in 1981, using reporting as part of its peace overture.

In #4 “Sun Yat-Sen as the Revolutionary Leader who Overthrew the Manchu Empire, and Soong Ching Ling, Sun’s Widow and the PRC’s Honorary President,” the People’s Daily shows a frequency of 440, the Central Daily News, 707. The People’s Daily has used this theme of Sun and his widow as part of its attempt to appeal to the ROC to join in peace talks. The Central Daily News has had more regular reports on Sun’s birthday and Sun’s death, and has mentioned Sun in most reports concerning governmental speeches or announcements.

In #40 “ROC’s Proposal to Integrate Under the Three Principles of the People,” the People’s Daily shows a frequency of two, the Central Daily News, 124. This suggests that the People’s Daily has tried to ignore this proposal from the ROC, while the Central Daily News has promoted it.

In #43 “The PRC’s Peace-Talk Proposal to the ROC,” the People’s Daily shows a frequency of 163, the Central Daily News, 453. This reveals the ROC’s continuous resistance of the PRC’s proposals for peace talks.

In #36 “The PRC’s Hong Kong Model to Integrate the ROC,” the People’s Daily shows a frequency of 183, the Central Daily News, 436. This reveals that the Central Daily News has used almost twice the frequency as the People’s Daily in discussing and rejecting the PRC’s Hong Kong Model to integrate the ROC.

In thematic categories #28, 29, 1 and 24, the Central Daily News reveals a strong need by the ROC for U.S. support to fight against pressures and threats from the PRC. The need for U.S. support was especially crucial after official ties were cut between the ROC and the United States.

In #28 “Transfer of American Scientific Technology,” the People’s Daily shows a frequency of 46, the Central Daily News, 223.

In #29 “Emphasis of its Strategic Importance to Asia, the United States and the World,” the People’s Daily shows a frequency of 72, the Central Daily News, 149.
In #1 "One Greater China Territory," the *People's Daily* shows a frequency of 323, the *Central Daily News*, 442.

In #24 "The PRC's Diplomatic Relationship with the United States," the *People's Daily* shows a frequency of 167, the *Central Daily News*, 327.

On the other hand, in thematic categories #45, 41, 42, 9, 8 and 51, the *People's Daily* shows significantly higher totals of reporting frequency than the *Central Daily News*.

All six of these categories were related to the PRC's peace proposals and strategies to integrate the ROC under its rule; these strategies were rejected by the *Central Daily News*.

In #45 "The PRC's Peace Proposal for Cooperation Between the Two Parties," the *People's Daily* shows a frequency of 175, the *Central Daily News*, 69.

In #41 "The PRC's 1981 Nine-Point Peace Proposal," the *People's Daily* shows a frequency of 118, the *Central Daily News*, 90.

In #42 "The PRC's 1979 Three-Link and Four-Exchange Peace Proposal," the *People's Daily* shows a frequency of 183, the *Central Daily News*, 88.

In #9 "The Separation of Relatives Divided by the Taiwan States," the *People's Daily* shows a frequency of 180, the *Central Daily News*, 14.

In #8 "The Separation of People from their Native Towns," the *People's Daily* shows a frequency of 106, the *Central Daily News*, 49.

In #9 and #8, the data reveal that the *People's Daily* wanted these sentimental appeals transmitted or relayed to the people on Taiwan even though they usually do not have access to the newspaper. The *Central Daily News* reported on these two categories for sentimental appeal; they presented them as an expression by the people from the mainland residing in Taiwan, not necessarily for the purpose of transmitting them to the PRC.

In #51 "The PRC's Special Economic Zones," the *People's Daily* shows a frequency of 51, the *Central Daily News*, 39. The two newspapers have a very close total reporting frequency but with an opposite attitude in this category. The *People's Daily* tried to promote its new special economic zones with eventual economic function of integration with the ROC in mind; however, the *Central Daily News* rejected this idea firmly.

In #34 "The PRC's One Nation and Two Systems Model," the two newspapers show the same total reporting frequency of 75 but
with completely opposite opinions on the theme. The People’s Daily promoted it, the Central Daily News rejected it.

All of the PRC’s integrative methods or models promoted by the People’s Daily were rejected by the Central Daily News; both sides, however, did agree on the policy of “One-China Nationalism.” The above results of the T-test on the 22 thematic categories show that the two newspapers did have sharp differences in reporting on integrative methods and models.

Descriptions of Five Factors

The descriptions of the five factors and their 28 thematic categories focused on the major issues of consensus or disagreement that the two newspapers or parties have argued. The major issues of consensus and disagreement are pinpointed in an analysis of the initial announcements, historical events, and fundamental ideologies that the two newspapers or parties have used in their propaganda struggle on China’s national integration. This approach avoids tedious, details and confusing items by presenting every article of reporting frequency. This approach should give a full comprehension of the overall issue of China’s national integration as the two newspapers reported on it during the December 1978 to May 1985 time period.

1. Factor I: Nationalism Consensus

Factor I with 11 thematic categories manifests the properties of the dimension of nationalism consensus as postulated in Hypothesis II. All 11 thematic categories have a common appeal: nationalism. Both newspapers used the appeal of nationalism in their bid for China’s national integration, each side offered its integrative method or model and rejected any integrative method or model offered by the other side on the basis of nationalism.

In Factor I, the most dramatic evidence of using nationalism-consensus appeal were reports in the two newspapers on the open letters and announcements made by the leaders of the PRC and the ROC addressed directly to the people and the leaders of the other side. For example, in the People’s Daily on December 18, 1978, peace talks were first proposed by PRC leader Deng Xiaoping, two days after the PRC and the United States announced the establishment of diplomatic relations. The PRC, trying to express its peaceful intentions, announced that it would immediately stop bombardments of the ROC-controlled offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu.

On page one of the People’s Daily on January 1, 1979, a report
announced a message to compatriots in Taiwan calling for reunification. The “PRC’s Three-Link, Four-Exchange Peace Proposal” was first mentioned in this message. The “three links”—postal, transportation services and trade—and “four exchanges”—relatives and tourists, academic groups, cultural groups and sports representatives—were considered by the PRC as the first step toward peace talks with the ROC. The message’s nationalism appeal was clear:

We place our hope on the 17 million people in Taiwan, including the Taiwan authorities. The Taiwan authorities have always firmly stood for one China and opposed an independent Taiwan. We take the same stand and it is the basis for our cooperation. Our position has always been that all patriots belong to one family. The responsibility of reuniting the motherland rests with each of us. We hope the Taiwan authorities will treasure national interests and make valuable contributions to the reunification of the motherland. . . The reunification of the motherland is the sacred mission history has handed to our generation. . . Let us join hands and work together for this glorious goal!

The People’s Daily on January 6, 1979, first called on “Mr. Chiang Ching-kuo” to join in peace talks for reunification. The People’s Daily on February 4, 1979, published a full page of color pictures of Taiwan’s scenery. It was the only color page in the People’s Daily during the survey period of six and a half years.

The People’s Daily on May 31, 1981, reported another of the PRC’s sentimental appeals to the ROC’s leaders. It invited the relatives of Soong Ching Ling to join in her funeral in Peking. Soong, who died on May 29, 1981, was Sun Yat-sen’s widow, the sister-in-law of Chiang Kai-shek, the aunt of Chiang Ching-kuo, and the honorary president of the PRC. The invitation included reimbursement expenses and free landing from ROC airlines. The People’s Daily on June 4, 1981, also reported Deng Xiaoping’s appeal at Soong’s memorial services for peace talks with the ROC. The Central Daily News, however, ignored both appeals, offering little coverage of Soong’s death.

On page one of the People’s Daily on October 1, 1981, a report announced the “PRC’s Nine-Point Peace Proposal.” Ye Jianying, chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, also expressed an appeal to nationalism in this proposal:

We hope that our compatriots in Taiwan will give full play to their patriotism and work energetically for the early reali-
zation of the great unity of our nation and share the honor of it.

The Central Daily News on October 7, 1981, reported a response by ROC President Chiang Ching-kuo to the PRC’s Nine-Point Peace Proposal, also with a sentimental appeal to the people on the mainland:

The Chinese Communists have never ceased to manufacture their rumors of peace talks, but we never paid any attention. At one time they clamored for “washing Taiwan in blood.” Then they shifted to the call for “return and identification.” Now they shout their demands for talks on a “reciprocal” basis and joint “leadership.” Tomorrow they will coin another slogan and try to effect another deception.

In solemnly expressing this view, I want to tell our compatriots on the Chinese Mainland that we are resolved to remove the yoke that the Communists have imposed upon them... We must tell our mainland compatriots of our confidence and determination to deliver them and assure them that we shall never talk with the Communists they hate so deeply.

The People’s Daily on October 10, 1981, reported that Hu Yaobang, secretary general of the Chinese Communist Party, had made an extremely sentimental appeal to ROC President Chiang Ching-kuo in his speech at the 70th anniversary of the 1911 Hsin-hai Revolution:

Does Mr. Chiang Ching-kuo not love his natal land? Doesn’t he want to have Mr. Chiang Kai-shek’s remains moved back and buried in the cemetery of the Chiang family in Fenghua?

In my capacity as a leading member of the Communist Party, I today invite Mr. Chiang Ching-kuo, Mr. Shieh Tung-ming, Mr. Sun Yun-suan, Mr. Tsiong Yien-si, Mr. Kao Kuei-yuan, Mr. Chiang Wei-kuo and Mr. Lin Yang-kang, and Madame Chiang Kai-shek, Mr. Yen Chia-kan, Mr. Chang Chun, Mr. Ho Ying-chin, Mr. Chen Li-fu, Mr. Huang Chieh, Mr. Chang Hsueh-liang and others, and personages in all walks of life in Taiwan to visit the mainland and their natal places. It would be good if they wanted to talk with us, but they are also welcome if they do not want to talk with us for the time being. What have Mr. Chiang Ching-kuo and the others and the compatriots in all walks of life in Taiwan to lose if they do this? Foreign aid is impor-
tant, but what is most important, most reliable and most powerful is the great patriotic unity of one billion people of our own country.

The great cause of reunifying the motherland peacefully and making the Chinese nation prosperous and strong depends on no more than taking the decision or a turning of the hand. Let us consider Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s teaching, “agreeing with the trend of world affairs and serving the urgent needs of the community,” join hands and work together to create a new glorious page in the history of the Chinese nation!

The Central Daily News never mentioned Hu’s appeal; the PRC, however, did not give up easily on this personal sentimental appeal to Chiang. On page one of the People’s Daily on July 25, 1982, Liao Chengzhi, the PRC official in charge of Taiwan relations, issued an open and warm letter to his former friend and schoolmate, ROC President Chiang, offering to come to Taiwan to initiate “peace talks.” In the letter, he also made an appeal to nationalism:

Dear Brother Ching-kuo:

. . . From our childhood friendship to our chats in the Soviet capital, everything in the past is still alive in my memory. But it’s unfortunate that we haven’t heard from each other for so many years. Recently I was told that you are somewhat indisposed and this has caused me much concern. Men in their seventies are often afflicted with illness. I sincerely hope that you will take good care of yourself.

Over the past three years, our party has repeatedly proposed talks with your party to bury the hatchet and work jointly to accomplish the great cause of national reunification. But you have time and again announced that there should be “no contact, no talks and no compromise,” which I think is inadvisable.

. . . Since you are presiding over the administration of Taiwan, you have unshirkable responsibility for the realization of a third cooperation. It would be easier to talk the matter over when leaders on both sides used to be schoolmates and close friends who know one another well. I find it really hard to subscribe to those views which describe cooperation as surrender, humiliating, suffering losses or being duped. . . Such talks as reunifying China under the Three
Principles of the People are regarded by all sensible people as unrealistic, deceptive and self-deceiving.

People of our generation know the true meaning of the Three Principles of the People quite well and there is no need to argue about it. Neither is there any need to dwell on such assertions as Taiwan's economic prosperity, democracy and easy livelihood, the truth of which the venerable gentlemen in Taiwan know clearly. For the sake of your party, I would think that if you take up the historical responsibility and resolutely take part in peace talks to accomplish national reunification . . .

I recently read one of your writings in which you expressed "fervent hopes that my father's soul would be able to return to the homeland and be reunited with the forefathers." I was overwhelmed with emotion when I read this. The remains of your father are still placed temporarily at Cihu. After reunification, they should be moved back and buried in the native soil—in Fenghua, Najing or Lushan—in fulfillment of your filial wishes. You recently said, "Filial devotion should be expanded into national devotion, which means love of the nation and dedication to the country." This is an excellent statement. Why don't you apply it to the great cause of national reunification? As far as the country and the nation are concerned, this would be an answer of the two generations of the Chiangs to history and as far as you yourself are concerned, this would be an expression of both loyalty and filial piety. Otherwise how could you account for yourself after your passing away? It is hoped that you would think more about it.

Dear brother! Your life has been marked by frustrations, which should not be attributed to fate. . . I hope you, my brother, would be good at making the choice. . . What are you waiting for, staying away from home?

The longing for old friends grows with age. If it is convenient to you, I would pack and set out for a visit to Taibei to seek enlightenment from our elders. For all the disasters the brotherhood has remained; a smile at meeting, and enmity is banished. When I look towards the distant southern sky, my heart is already there. No word is enough to express what I wish to say. Hope you will take care of yourself. I am waiting impatiently for a reply.
Please convey my regards to your mother as well as to Fangliang, Weikuo and the children.

The Central Daily News did not report about or respond to Liao's appeal until three weeks later. It released an open letter by Soong Mei-ling in New York on August 17, 1982. Soong, widow of Chiang Kai-shek and younger sister of Soong Ching Ling, responded on behalf of Chiang Ching-kuo with a negative reply to Liao's peace-talks proposal. The People's Daily was not discouraged by the ROC's refusal for peace talks; it has kept reporting these nostalgic messages of reunification appeal from relatives and old friends of the Chiang family.

The People's Daily on June 5, 1983, reported another personal appeal to the ROC people by PRC leader Deng Yingchao. Deng, widow of PRC Premier Chou En-lai, said, "Peaceful reunification of our motherland is a common desire of the people of all nationalities of China and a glorious task history has placed on our generation." Deng also called on the people of Taiwan to display patriotism for reunification. The Central Daily News did not report about Deng's appeal.

When the People's Daily reported another of Deng's appeals on January 17, 1984, the Central Daily News on February 17, 1984 responded with a public letter from Soong Mei-ling in New York. At the Sun Yat-sen Research Association and Nationalist meeting, Deng called for cooperation between the two parties for peace talks and reunification. Soong rejected Deng's appeal with a personal touch:

...I had on several occasions met with you in Chungking during the war of resistance against Japan, inquiring of your views on the war and on the prospects of our national future. We were impressed with your objectivity and your understanding of the multitudinous problems facing our country...Since then, I have often wondered why you should be obsessed by Marxism authored by an anti-God German Jew, who was and continued to be scorned by the God-fearing Jewish people?

Were you a member of the Nationalist Party, I would have addressed you as comrade; were you a member of society at large, I would address you as Mrs. Chou or Miss Teng. All these forms amongst you the practice is to call everyone by one's name—surname and all. Being reared in the Chinese tradition, however, it is my wont to greet everyone courteously. I hope you would understand whereof I speak.
Now that you have passed the proverbial hoary three score and ten, it behooves you to be beyond fear of displeasing your confreres. Should you be speaking from your heart, persuade those who have been led astray to follow truly the examples of Dr. Sun's Three Principles of the People, which you exhorted in your own speech at the recent commemorative meeting. Should you and others work for the reunification of China, then the mainlanders, like the compatriots in Taiwan, will enjoy freedom, peace, prosperity, happiness and an upward mobility to a bright future.

Other sentimental and nationalism-oriented reports in the People's Daily and the Central Daily News were written in a literary style. These come under the themes "Homesick" and "Relatives"; some were even in the form of poetry. They presumably could have little effect since the targeted readers have little chance to read the newspaper of the opposite side.

As for the peace talks for a third cooperation, both newspapers reported that both parties had already had two bitter experiences of cooperation—from 1922 to 1927, and from 1938 to 1948. Both newspapers and parties have maintained their own interpretations of the two earlier brief periods of cooperation. The respective interpretations of those periods have shaped each party's perception of the other, and of the best means for reunifying China.

The Central Daily News asserted that within these two periods of interaction are the chief reasons for the Communist Party's victory over the Chinese mainland in 1949.

The incidents were significant during these two periods: One was the admission of Communist members into the Nationalist Party in 1924 by Sun Yat-sen to gain assistance from the Soviet Union to overthrow the Chinese feudal warlords. Right up to his death in 1925, Sun believed cooperation between the two parties was necessary. Chiang Kai-shek, on the other hand, hardly showed Sun's tolerance. He denounced the Communists in April 1927 and terminated the first cooperation in the same year. The second incident was the creation of the second cooperation in 1936 after Chiang was kidnapped in Xian by his own generals because he agreed to join forces with the Communists to fight Japan.4

With then unpleasant experiences of cooperation made more unpleasant by fundamental political and philosophical disagreements, the Communist Party and the Nationalist Party have a deep historical leg-

acy of mistrust; this mistrust provides a weak basis for a third cooperation between the two parties.\(^5\)

In Factor I, the thematic category of “The PRC’s Forceful Integration with the ROC” was also based on “nationalism consensus.” The PRC has expressed that the use of force to integrate Taiwan is a patriotic and nationalistic action, and has never ruled out the possibility of integrating Taiwan by force. The *People’s Daily* on January 12, 1984, reported that PRC Premier Zhao Ziyang said during his visit to the United States that the PRC “cannot promise any foreign country to use only peaceful means to settle the Taiwan issue” and “China will never guarantee not to use force to unify China.” The *People’s Daily* on October 11, 1984, reported that PRC leader Deng Xiaoping told a Japanese delegation that the PRC made no promise to Americans that it would never use non-peaceful action against Taiwan. Deng told U.S. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger on September 28, 1983, that while the PRC may not have power enough to occupy Taiwan by force, it has strength enough to blockade the Taiwan Strait.

On October 23, 1984, Deng told former Japanese Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki that the PRC “will never accept the United States’ demand to promise unifying with Taiwan by peaceful means only.” Deng reaffirmed: “About peaceful unification with Taiwan, we will have patience. We will never give up the use of non-peaceful means.”

So Factor I of “Nationalism Consensus” shows consensus on “one China” with nationalism appeals to Sun Yat-sen and his Hsin-hai Revolution, to separated relatives on both sides, and to hometowns separated by the integration issue. Factor I also shows some integrative methods and models that the two sides do not express consensus on.

2. **Factor II: Mutual Understanding**


Reports on these thematic categories reflect that the two newspapers used their pages significantly in reporting and commenting about the other side for the last six and a half years. This reporting became a

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factor in China’s national integration as Hypothesis III predicted, as a factor of “mutual understanding.” Most of these reports in the two newspapers were in the form of special columns about the other side. The People’s Daily, from January 1979, reported about the ROC an average of once a week in a special one-third page section called “Taiwan Today.” The Central Daily News had a special weekly column on the PRC named “See Through the Mainland.” The column occupied one-third of a page. The Central Daily News presented this column from issue #304 on December 6, 1978, to issue #636 on May 28, 1985, the last day of this survey.

The People’s Daily used a more sentimental appeal, but filled with substantial unfavorable reports about the ROC. The Central Daily News generally used a more critical tone, and unfavorable content in reporting on the PRC.


The thematic category of “Commentary Favorable to the Other Side” was found mostly in the People’s Daily in sentimental appeals of mainland scenery or hometowns of the people on Taiwan.

The thematic categories of “Favorable Political and Societal Reports About the Other Side” were also usually carried in the “Taiwan Today” column in the People’s Daily. The Central Daily News printed very few favorable political or societal reports about the PRC. For example, the People’s Daily on June 18, 1980, reported that a Taiwan television station broadcast for the first time in Taiwan a documentary that won popular ratings. The documentary showed landscape scenes of the mainland. The People’s Daily on February 20, 1984, reported that ROC Premier Sun Yun-suan announced the relaxation of interactions between Taiwan and the mainland. The People’s Daily on March 13 and 19, 1984, reported that Taiwan had elected Chiang Ching-kuo as president and Li Deng-hui as vice president. It was the first time that the People’s Daily reported them as “president” and “vice president” even though it used quotation marks around the words. The People’s Daily on May 23, 1985 reported that “Taiwan Vice President” Li said, “Taiwan is a part of the mainland.” Though the People’s Daily has gradually reported more favorable and neutral stories about the
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ROC, the Central Daily News has not changed significantly from its unfavorable reports about the PRC.

As the trends and directional analyses on this factor indicate, the mutual understanding with favorable reports and commentaries has been factored as an important but weak factor in China's national integration. The higher percentages and frequencies of unfavorable reports and commentaries about the other side compared with the low percentages of neutral and favorable reports and commentaries about the other side by both newspapers show the factor of mutual understanding to be weak; it must be improved if both sides want integration.

Thematic category #28, "Transfer of American Scientific Technology," could be interpreted as a sample of mutual understanding since both the PRC and the ROC want the United States to transfer as much scientific technology as possible to them, and not to transfer it to the other Chinese side. Each side understood the other on this.

The United States has understood both the PRC's and the ROC's wishes and has taken steps toward enhancing the PRC and the ROC simultaneously through technological and security cooperation. The United States is interested in preserving its influence in these operations, in stabilizing the internal modernization process, and in strengthening the defensive capability of both Chinas; however, in attempting to standardize its dual-assistance stabilizing approach, Washington has not yet established a workable balance that would guarantee Taiwan's security while stimulating progress in the PRC and strengthening diplomatic relations with it.

The Carter administration first authorized the transfer of "dual-purpose" technology and military support equipment to the PRC. The Reagan administration further liberalized export licensing regulations for high technology and proposed the sale of defensive weapons to Peking; nevertheless, policy reconsiderations and bureaucratic reviews of export controls have made implementation slow and uncer-

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tain. Authorization of U.S. nuclear technology transfers were deferred due to concern about Peking's refusal to agree to non-proliferation accords.9

3. **Factor III: Economic Function**

Factor III loading with thematic categories #34 "The PRC's One Nation, Two Systems Integrative Model," #36 "The PRC's Hong Kong Integrative Model," #54 "Neutral Economic Report About the Other Side," and #51 "The PRC's Special Economic Zones" has strong economic elements that might have an economic function as Hypothesis V predicted.

When the PRC started negotiations with Britain on Hong Kong in 1983, it had not yet come out with the "Hong Kong Integrative Model" or the "One Nation, Two systems Integrative Model" for the ROC. But, as negotiations developed, the PRC began to promote these models. It has included the "Hong Kong Model" as an example of the "One Nation, Two Systems Model." Both models are political proposals with a strong economic appeal. The potential economic function, in fact, is aimed at non-political integration.

The People's Daily on May 16, 1984, reported on the "One Nation, Two Systems Integrative Model" for the first time. The paper gave a detailed coverage of this model, which was announced by PRC Premier Zhao Ziyang at the Second Session of the Sixth National People's Congress. "In view of historical experience and the present state of affairs in Taiwan, we have advanced the idea of 'One Nation, Two Systems' to be put into practice after reunification," Zhao announced. The People's Daily on July 24, October 4 and 6, November 17 and December 19, 1984, reported that Deng Xiaoping confirmed the application of the new model by announcing, "Should the system of 'One Nation, Two Systems' be successfully carried out in Hong Kong, it may provide a solution to similar problems in the international arena and Taiwan." In other words, Deng implied that this model may become a new formula for solving the reunification problems of other divided countries such as Germany and Korea.

Chien Chunjui, an advisor to the PRC's Academy of Social Sciences, described the concept of the "One Nation, Two Systems Model" as a new socialist formula:

The principle of the Communist Party Central Committee is

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to maintain socialism on the mainland, but capitalism in Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macao, over a long period after the reunification of the country so that the two systems will co-exist and enhance each other through peaceful competition. The practical way for achieving this is: We should first establish special economic zones, then open 14 coastal cities to foreign investment so as to absorb and employ the good points of capitalism to reform socialism and improve the socialist material civilization on the mainland on a large scale. At the same time, we must continue to promote spiritual civilization on the mainland. In this manner, there will surely be no need to worry about China's economy after 60 or 70 years.\(^{10}\)

Chien's description disclosed the "One Nation, Two Systems Integrative Model" to be an advanced application of the "Hong Kong Integrative Model," aimed at integrating not only Hong Kong but also the ROC and Macao under PRC rule. Moreover, concrete steps have already been taken toward establishing "special economic zones" and opening 14 coastal cities.

This disclosure further confirms Factor III and Hypothesis V's correspondence values: the "PRC's One Nation, Two Systems Integrative Model," the "PRC's Hong Kong Integrative Model," and the "Special Economic Zones" are grouped in the same factor of economic function.

Chien also revealed that the PRC is planning to absorb and employ the capitalism system in Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macao to reform the socialist system on the mainland. An economic interdependence among these four areas can be anticipated if the PRC is seriously promoting the new "One Nation, Two Systems Integrative Model."

The People's Daily expressed the PRC's seriousness on September 27, 1984, after the PRC and Britain signed a joint declaration on Hong Kong the previous day. The paper reported that after the transfer of Hong Kong to the PRC in 1997, the former British colony would be allowed to retain its previous capitalist economic system for 50 years in order to maintain peace and prosperity in the region. This was the first official announcement the People's Daily reported on the "One Nation, Two Systems Integrative Model." The same day, the Central Daily News reported the ROC's rejection and its worries over the

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“PRC’s One Nation, Two Systems Integrative Model” for Hong Kong and the ROC on Taiwan.

The paper reported that ROC Premier Yu Kuo-hua reacted, first, accusing the British government of “pushing 5.5 million people under communist totalitarian enslavement, creating disgrace in human history”; it then condemned the PRC for creating an illusion:

To achieve their purpose of swallowing Hong Kong, the Chinese Communists—fearful of resistance from the Chinese in Hong Kong and Kowloon, who demand freedom and democracy—went out of their way to embellish an illusion of “one country, two systems.” They promised that the present Hong Kong system would remain unchanged for 50 years, in order to confuse the world and to bilk the people of Hong Kong and Kowloon.

The Central Daily News on October 10, 1984, reported another ROC rejection of the Hong Kong solution for reunification. The paper reported a remark by ROC President Chiang: “They have used nationalism and patriotism as a curtain over deception and blackmail in reaching a so-called ‘accord’ with Great Britain; and they have taken further advantage of this opportunity to pull hair over the eyes of the world via an all out propaganda campaign on the question of the reunification of China.”

Regardless of these rejections of the “PRC’s One Nation, Two Systems Integration Model,” the People’s Daily reported on June 2, 1984, that the PRC was sincere in its offers by referring to the PRC’s constitution. The paper reported that Hong Kong would become a special administrative region and be subject to a different system from that on the mainland, according to Article 31 of the constitution. In addition to winning the confidence of the people of Hong Kong and Taiwan, the People’s Daily emphasized the PRC-Britain Accord, which was signed in September 1984, saying that the PRC would carry out its “One Nation, Two Systems Integrative Model.” They would allow Hong Kong and Taiwan to maintain their capitalism system for 50 years after the PRC gained sovereignty of both islands. As political appeals, these attempts have not yet worked. Once the growing trade and the economic functions among the three areas become interdependent, the “PRC’s One Nation, Two systems Integrative Model” might have a better chance of succeeding if trade continues to grow between the PRC and the ROC through Hong Kong.

The survey discovered that the two newspapers did not report objectively on the growing trade and economic interdependent reality.
An analysis of the reality from sources other than the reports of the two newspapers could help give an understanding of its potentiality.

First, an economic interdependence between the PRC and Hong Kong has existed for the past 35 years in various degrees; it has increased since the PRC-Britain Accord was signed. Hong Kong is needed economically by both the PRC and Britain. If economic self-interest were the only consideration, Britain and the PRC could probably carry out their agreement to leave Hong Kong as it is as a new symbol of the PRC's sovereignty. Then, the "PRC's One Nation, Two Systems Integrative Model" could be executed. The benefits to London of preserving the status quo in what has become the world's third largest financial center are obvious: Hong Kong is London's direct connection with the most dynamic region in the world economy.

The PRC also has a great deal to gain from allowing Hong Kong's vitality to survive after the formal transfer of sovereignty. First, since Hong Kong in a microcosm reflects the legal, commercial and monetary problems posed by PRC's own opening to the West, the steps taken in Hong Kong to settle these matters and to preserve investor confidence could demonstrate the priority that the PRC attaches to its modernization. Second, the PRC's trade surplus with Hong Kong has grown from $1.741 billion in 1977 to $4.4 billion in 1983; nearly 40 percent of the PRC's hard currency income is derived from Hong Kong.

Third, since 1970, Hong Kong has moved from twentieth to first position in PRC's re-export trade. Trade in goods imported for transshipment to PRC has grown considerably. In 1979, Hong Kong's re-exports to the PRC increased 514.5 percent from 1970. They fell to 73.3 percent after the PRC's economic retrenchment in 1981. They are expected to grow even more in the next few decades.

Fourth, Hong Kong will continue to play a vital role in the PRC's modernization well into the next century. The PRC's own transport facilities—road, rail, and port—are likely to remain inadequate, despite the heavy emphasis placed on infrastructure in the Five Year Plan (1981-1986) adopted by the National Party Congress in November 1982. Fifth, Hong Kong plays an irreplaceable role as a "political filter" for trade with Taiwan, Indonesia, South Korea, Israel.

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12. Ibid., p. 372.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
and South Africa. To understand further about the potential inter-dependent trade and economic function between the PRC and the ROC, the existing indirect trade between them through third countries or areas via Hong Kong must be analyzed.

Thematic category #48 "Indirect Trade Between the Two Sides Through Hong Kong" did not have enough loading points to be included in this factor. The indirect trade between the two sides through Hong Kong is a possible basis for the "spill-over" function as Hypothesis V predicted that economic function may have an effect on eventual political integration. Trade between the PRC and the ROC through Hong Kong grew from $70 million in 1979, to $460 million in 1981, to $550 million in 1984, to $500 million in the first six months of 1985. It is expected to reach $1.5 billion by the end of 1985.

The Central Daily News on April 14, 1985, reported that the ROC government prohibits the people of Taiwan from trading directly with the PRC. Two days later, the paper reported the ROC government would regard any trade with the people of the mainland by the people of Taiwan as illegal smuggling. Nevertheless, on April 28 the paper reported that the ROC government would not intervene in indirect trade between the mainland and Taiwan through Hong Kong at present because it is estimated to be only one percent of the ROC's total foreign trade. The People's Daily, on the other hand, has not reported any prohibition on trading with Taiwan, directly or indirectly.

Without any direct intervention by either government, trade between the two economies via Hong Kong has been brisk in the past five years. There are several things that have contributed to this trade. First the PRC maintains a duty-free policy for Taiwan goods, established in 1981, regarding them as domestic goods. The policy was designed to draw a favorable image of the PRC for the people of Taiwan. The policy was cancelled in 1982 when the PRC saw that some Hong Kong businessmen took advantage of the policy by importing Korean goods with faked Taiwan labels. Some ROC citizens have feared that an unrestrained expansion of exports to the PRC through Hong Kong may eventually lead to over-dependence on that market, and to non-voluntarily "spill-over" integration with the PRC. Some think that the trade is too risky because the PRC is too volatile under the Communist system. Any unfavorable change could plunge ROC

15. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
exporters into serious setbacks; furthermore, should the ROC one day really become dependent on the PRC market, the PRC might use it as a weapon against the ROC. Some believe that the PRC's rapidly rising demand for ROC products is part of a political picture aimed at reunification under the present communist system. But the ROC government says shipments made by Taiwan manufacturers to meet orders from intermediaries in Hong Kong are in accord with ROC government regulations and the ROC government cannot do anything about them. 18

The ROC Institute for Economic Research has said that the PRC's increasing purchases of ROC products simply reflect a rise in its overall imports of foreign goods made possible by the PRC's economic reforms since 1979. An indication of this is that the PRC's imports from other areas, especially Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore, all showed increases in 1984. Judging by this fact, the institute said that the PRC has not intentionally increased its purchases from the ROC for political purposes. The institute concluded that the ROC need not worry so much about indirect exports to the PRC; because indirect exports are part of free trade, the ROC government cannot and should not interfere with them. Indirect trade through Hong Kong, therefore, will likely continue to be a booming business. It can be considered a potential alternative function of "spill-over" for China's national integration. 19

As for thematic category #54, "Neutral Economic Report About the Other Side," the People's Daily reported on economic issues about the other side with a fairly objective attitude. Both sides watch the other side's economic activities more closely than before. Economic activities have become regarded as a healthy source of competition between them.

Thematic category #51, "PRC's Special Economic Zones," Factor V, have been reported by the People's Daily and the Central Daily News with a close amount of frequency. Both newspapers paid attention to this theme for different reasons. The People's Daily sought to promote the success of the zones in order to use the model for the rest of the mainland. It also considered the zones important in later absorbing Taiwan, since Taiwan has used similar zones for 25 years.

The Central Daily News has mainly reported on its concern over the PRC's political aims of absorbing Taiwan and competing with Taiwan's foreign-trade-oriented economy.

18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
On December 25, 1981, the *People's Daily* reported about the Shenzhen special economic zone in Guangdong province with four pictures. These four zones were officially approved by the PRC government on August 26, 1980. The current active zones are Shenzhen, Zhuhai, and Shantou of Guangdong province, and Xiamen of Fujian province. As the four zones are located near Taiwan, the ROC has felt threatened both economically and politically. The Xiamen zone is only a mile from the ROC-held island of Quemoy. This has worried the ROC the worst. The four special economic zones, however, have been no direct threat to the integration of Taiwan economically. Along with the growing indirect trade between the PRC and the ROC through Hong Kong, and the common attention paid to the economic development of the other side by the two newspapers, and to the economic reforms in the PRC, these new economic trends have strengthened the potential for success of the "PRC's One Nation, Two Systems Integrative Model" for economic integration, if not immediate political integration.

4. Factor IV: U.S.-China Policy

Factor IV with loadings of thematic categories #22 "Promoting a Warmer Relationship with the United States," #23 "Calling on the United States to Maintain a Colder Relationship with the Other side," #24 "The Diplomatic Relationship with the United States," #29 "Emphasis of its Strategic Importance to Asia, the United States or the World," and #1 "One Greater China Territory," made Hypothesis IV valid in predicting the factor as a "U.S.-China Policy" factor.

Thematic categories #22 and #23 have almost the same loadings in Factor IV: .793 and .791, respectively. These two themes often appeared side by side in the same article or on the same page. The *Central Daily News*, however, showed a four-times higher frequency than the *People's Daily* for #22, and a seven-times greater frequency than the *People's Daily* for #23. This suggests that the *Central Daily News* has shown more concerned than the *People's Daily* with the U.S. role in relations between the two Chinas.

The five thematic categories loaded in Factor IV reveal that both the PRC and the ROC intended to influence the United States in China's national integration. In particular, the PRC tried to ask the United States to press the ROC to join in peace talks. The ROC, how-

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ever, has kept resisting any possibilities of peace talks from the United States. On the other hand, Factor IV showed that the United States respects the consensus on the territorial claim of the PRC and the ROC that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States, however, insists that China's national integration should be achieved by peaceful means.

The significance of the five thematic categories in Factor IV is particularly evident in several reports in both newspapers.

The People's Daily on April 26, 1984, commented on President Reagan's Trip to the PRC:

It cannot be denied that the current development of Sino-American relations is very far from what it ought to be. Relations between the countries have suffered certain interference from time to time. In particular, the Taiwan issue remains a major obstacle between China and the United States. The only principles for solving this problem are those guiding Sino-American relations as affirmed in the series of PRC-U.S. joint communiques. We believe that as long as the two sides earnestly abide by the three communiques, respect each other's sovereignty and territory integrity, and refrain from interfering in each other's internal affairs, the relations between the two countries will be freed from turbulence and instability and will grow steadily and continually.

It is clear that the PRC hoped the United States would give up its relations with the ROC in accordance with the PRC's interpretation of the "three communiques." Therefore, an analysis of the "three communiques" would be a better way to describe Factor IV of "U.S.-China Policy."

(1) The Shanghai Joint Communiqué

The Shanghai Joint Communiqué of February 28, 1972, signed by President Nixon and PRC Premier Chou, established a starting point from which future contacts could develop. It made clear that a cooperative relationship could occur despite disagreement on ideological, regional and global issues between Washington and Peking. Most significantly, the Shanghai Communiqué stated the U.S. intention to gradually withdraw all U.S. military forces from Taiwan, thereby allowing cooperation with the PRC. The communiqué affirmed the

22. Downen, "The Diplomatic Dimension," op. cit., 64.
23. Ibid.
U.S. interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese without outside interference. It also acknowledged the existence of "one China" with Taiwan as a subordinate part.\(^\text{24}\) This aspect of U.S. policy, as documented with the Shanghai Communique, has been reiterated frequently:

The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves.\(^\text{25}\)

The PRC text in Chinese uses the term "ren-shi" for acknowledge. This term conveys the same meaning of recognition but not necessarily agreement.\(^\text{26}\)

(2) The Normalization Joint Communique

The Normalization Joint Communique of December 15, 1978, signed by President Carter and PRC Premier Hua Quofeng, says the United States "acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is a part of China, . . . [and] recognizes the People's Republic of China as the sole legal government of China. Within this context, the people of the United States will maintain cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan."\(^\text{27}\)

However, there is a serious linguistic discrepancy in the English and Chinese texts of the communique concerning to the two parties' positions on the status of Taiwan.\(^\text{28}\)

The term "acknowledges" was not accidently chosen in the English version. Following the Shanghai Communique, the term indicated recognition of, but not necessarily agreement with, the PRC's position\(^\text{29}\); however, the PRC used the word "acknowledges" as "cheng-ren" in the Chinese version of the communique. This translates more literally as "recognizes," a term carrying a clear connotation of acceptance or agreement.\(^\text{30}\) When one reads the Chinese texts of the two communiques together, it appears that the United States

\(^{24}\) Ibid.

\(^{25}\) Downen, To Bridge the Taiwan Strait, op. cit., p. 52.


\(^{27}\) Ibid.

\(^{28}\) Ibid.

\(^{29}\) Ibid.

\(^{30}\) Ibid., pp. 29-30.
has increased the degree of its acceptance of the Chinese position from "ren-shi" to "cheng-ren." In interpreting this phrase, U.S. officials have said that the United States will adhere only to the English version; the PRC only to the Chinese version.

The 1978 Normalization Joint Communique reaffirmed all of the political goals set forth by the 1972 Shanghai Communique, also it added references to continuing "cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan." For the most part it was a formal reiteration of the same objectives sought by a different presidential administration, establishing official political ties between the PRC and the United States.

(3) The Joint Communique of August 17, 1982

In the Joint Communique of August 17, 1982, often called the "Shanghai Communique II," the United States affirmed:

It has no intention of...interfering in China's internal affairs, or pursuing a policy of 'two Chinas' or 'one China, one Taiwan.' The United States government understands and appreciates the Chinese policy of striving for a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question...The new situation which has emerged with regard to the Taiwan question also provides favorable conditions for the settlement of United States-China differences over the question of United States arms sales to Taiwan.

The most significant provision of the communique was a U.S. commitment to limit arms sales to the ROC. The United States agreed not to "carry out a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan," not to "exceed...the level of those supplied in recent years"; and to "reduce gradually its sales of arms to Taiwan..." The most significant provision of the communique was a U.S. commitment to limit arms sales to the ROC. The United States agreed not to "carry out a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan," not to "exceed...the level of those supplied in recent years"; and to "reduce gradually its sales of arms to Taiwan..."

In an interview with the U.S. media afterward, President Reagan explained, "In that communique, the People's Republic has agreed that they are going to try and peacefully resolve the Taiwanese issue. We, in turn, linked our statement about weaponry to that...If the day ever comes that those two [the PRC and ROC] find that they can get together and become one China, in a peaceful manner, then there wouldn't be any need for arms sales to Taiwan. And that's all that

31. Ibid., p. 30.
32. Ibid.
34. Downen, To Bridge the Taiwan Strait, op. cit., p. 52.
35. Ibid., p. 53.
was meant in the communique.” 36

The Central Daily News on December 17, 1982, expressed the ROC’s disapproval of the communique but accepted it as long as the United States still supplied it with defensive weapons. The paper reported its view on the communique and Taiwan’s strategic importance in an article restating President Chiang’s reply to an interview by the Far Eastern Economic Review:

The rupture of diplomatic ties between the Republic of China and the United States and the “August 17 Communique” issued jointly by the United States and the Chinese Communist regime have inflicted tremendous damage on the Republic of China; they have also done much to undermine the international reputation of the United States.

The damage of the Republic of China directly affects the stability and prosperity of the entire Asian-Pacific region. The countries in this region do not like this state of affairs, an unfavorable factor for the United States as a member of the Asian-Pacific community.

This indicates that the United States and the Republic of China have common interests. Therefore, we always believe that the strengthening of relations between the United States and the Republic of China is in the best interests of both nations and, the Asian-Pacific region as a whole. We also believe that the United States, as the leader of the free world, will not and should not yield to the Chinese Communists’ unwarranted blackmail. We are confident that the U.S. government will strengthen its adherence to the Taiwan Relations Act.

We are also pleased to see that President Reagan is an American statesman of vision, principle and courage. Judging from his thorough understanding of international Communism and his clear vision in world affairs, we have all the reasons to be optimistic over the future of U.S.-ROC relations.

The reason to accept the communique was that the ROC received private assurances that the United States would “not play any mediation role between Peking and Taipei” and would “not exert pressure on the ROC to enter into negotiations with the Chinese Communists.” 37 The ROC made public these U.S. assurances on August 17,

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36. Ibid.
37. Ibid.
1982, at the same time the ROC announced the communique. These assurances were reiterated to Taipei at the time of President Reagan's visit to the PRC in April 1984. It was also during that visit that Reagan rejected a request by Deng Xiaoping to pressure Taipei to come to the bargaining table. The New York Times disclosed on the day President Reagan arrived in Peking that the United States had provided the ROC a six-point guarantee:

(a) the U.S. government would not set a deadline for the complete cessation of arms sales to Taiwan;
(b) the U.S. government would not negotiate with Peking in advance on questions concerning arms sales to Taiwan;
(c) the U.S. government would not act as intermediary between Peking and Taipei;
(d) the U.S. government would not agree to any proposal to change the Taiwan Relations Act;
(e) the U.S. government would not change its position on the question concerning Taiwan's sovereignty;
(f) the U.S. government would not put pressure on Taiwan to draw it to the negotiation table.

Obviously, the United States and the PRC interpreted the three communiques differently. The PRC emphasized them as a framework for a PRC-U.S. relationship. The PRC also interpreted each to say that Taiwan was a part of the PRC and that the PRC could integrate Taiwan whenever the United States would reduce its arms sales to Taiwan. The United States interpreted the communiques as a reaffirmation of its position for a peaceful settlement without U.S. mediation, but not necessarily a recommendation for peace talks. The United States did, however, subsequently begin a reduction in arms sales to Taiwan.

The different interpretations of the communiques explain why the PRC and the ROC have argued about these issues. They also reveal why the People's Daily and the Central Daily News have shown high frequencies in reporting on the five themes on Factor IV.

Thematic category #24 "The Diplomatic Relationship with the United States," reflected the beginning of the breakthrough in U.S.

41. Ibid.
China policy and a PRC peace proposal for integration to the ROC. This theme deserves a detailed description.

A breakthrough was found possible with the willingness of the PRC and the United States to make concessions on issues that had been disputed by the two sides for 30 years. Each side claimed that the other had made the greater sacrifice.\textsuperscript{42} For its part, the United States agreed to three conditions that the PRC had long insisted on: (a) ending recognition of the ROC on Taiwan; (b) terminating the U.S.-ROC mutual defense treaty; (c) withdrawing the remaining U.S. troops on Taiwan.\textsuperscript{43}

The PRC also agreed to three conditions: (a) not to oppose continued American arms sales to the ROC, (b) to agree that the United States could terminate its defense treaty with the ROC with one year's notice, rather than immediately, and (c) not to object to an American declaration of continued interest in the future of Taiwan.\textsuperscript{44}

American conservative critics have argued that the United States essentially gave in to Peking's demands. The PRC's concessions, they said, were merely rhetorical. But high-level officials of the Carter administration concluded that the United States had won essential points that would ensure Taiwan's independence from the PRC in the foreseeable future.\textsuperscript{45} Both newspapers contributed a significant amount of reporting on establishment of relations between the PRC and the United States in December 1978. The \textit{People's Daily} showed 43 frequencies in that month, the \textit{Central Daily News}, 112.

Although eventual normalization of relations between Washington and Peking had been taken for granted since President Nixon's trip to the PRC in February 1972, the sudden announcement caught most of the world, particularly the ROC, by surprise.\textsuperscript{46} Among those most surprised were some conservative members of Congress. Many of them had thought Carter had promised to consult with them before changing the status of the Taiwan treaty.\textsuperscript{47} Many liberals, however, were enthusiastic about Carter's announcement; however, members of Congress of all political persuasions were upset because Carter had acted so secretly, with little advance warning, with no congressional


\textsuperscript{43} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{44} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{45} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{46} Ibid., p. 13.

\textsuperscript{47} Ibid.
consultation. Even the harshest critics, however, did concede that Carter had the legal authority to switch diplomatic recognition from the ROC to the PRC.

The People's Daily and the Central Daily News reported considerably about the anger on Capitol Hill. The People's Daily, of course, condemned it, the Central Daily News welcomed it. The Central Daily News used a tremendous amount of space and frequency in reporting a suit filed by a group of congressmen led by Sen. Barry Goldwater, R-Ariz., to have the abolition of the Taiwan defense treaty declared illegal because Carter had not consulted Congress. The courts upheld the president's action.

After Carter's announcement, the Central Daily News focused most of its attention on whether the ROC had obtained assurances from the United States for the future security of Taiwan. The paper charged that Carter's action left the ROC vulnerable to an invasion from the PRC and to forceful integration, or to a boycott or blockade, at least. Many supporters of normalization in Congress also said they were concerned about the future safety of Taiwan. Carter administration officials did not alleviate fears for Taiwan's security. They flatly that denied they had ever attempted to pressure the PRC into making a commitment on Taiwan's future. In a statement accompanying the communique, however, Carter did say: "[The United States] will continue to have an interest in the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue." Referring to that phrase, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance said: "We have expressed very clearly our deep concern that the welfare of the people of Taiwan be protected, and that the transition be a peaceful transition, that the Taiwan solution be a peaceful solution. This has not been contradicted by the People's Republic of China." On the one hand, the United States is still at loggerheads with the PRC on the issue of China's national integration. On the other hand, peaceful settlement of the Taiwan issue has been its consistent policy.

The United States has shown a reduced interest in the strategic importance of Taiwan and demonstrated an increased interest in that of the PRC. The Central Daily News has continued to emphasize its

48. Ibid.
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid.
53. Ibid.
54. Downen, To Bridge the Taiwan Strait, op. cit., pp. 52-53.
country’s strategic role while the *People’s Daily* has promoted the change in U. S. attitude. Still, the United States has not changed its policy regarding a peaceful settlement of the integration issue.

5. *Factor V: U.S. Protecting-Taiwan Policy*

Factor V with loadings of thematic categories #26 “U.S. arms Sales” and #25 “U.S. Taiwan Relations Act” also supported Hypothesis IV in its prediction of Factor V as a “U.S.-China Policy” factor. It did, however, emphasize a particular aspect of U. S. policy on Taiwan, making it appropriate to name Factor V, “U.S. Protecting-Taiwan Policy” factor. This emphasis shows an acceptance by the PRC in allowing continued American arms sales to Taiwan. Even during the Carter administration, Secretary of State Vance and other officials repeatedly said the strongest assurance for the safety of Taiwan was the “reality” of the military situation in east Asia. “It simply does not make sense,” Vance said, “for the People’s Republic of China to do anything other than proceed in a peaceful fashion.”

President Carter said that the PRC “did not have the capability” of launching a successful invasion of Taiwan, 100 miles off the mainland and “heavily fortified and heavily armed.” One official said the PRC would have to commit almost its entire armed forces to such an invasion, and that would mean withdrawing troops from the Russian front, which was the PRC’s greatest security concern.

Officials said, however, that a PRC naval blockade of Taiwan might be successful. Taiwan did not have an adequate capability to ward off the large mainland Chinese submarine fleet. Because Taiwan depends on imports for most of its food, oil and raw materials, a prolonged blockade could seriously damage its economy. The main concern, however, for the United States to continue arms sales to the ROC was to protect it from the PRC’s efforts to force negotiations or integration.

The Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, loaded in Factor V, now governs U. S. unofficial relations with the ROC. It protects the island from the PRC’s military threats to integrate it by force.

The House and Senate agreed that “the United States’ decision to establish diplomatic relations with the PRC rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means,” and that the United States would consider “any effort to determine the

future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States.\(^{58}\)

The most distinguishing policies of the Taiwan Relations Act were the preservation of Taiwan’s ability peacefully to determine its own future and the assurance of its social, political, and economic systems through continued U.S. unofficial interaction.\(^{59}\)

This policy statement by the U.S. Congress pledged the continuation of U.S. defensive weapons sales and defensive services to the ROC along with continued commercial exchanges; it offered other means of cooperation for the indefinite future, and also added a new dimension: a commitment in support of “the preservation and enhancement of the human rights of all the people of Taiwan” as “objectives of the United States.” No formal U.S. commitment of equal visibility and force has yet been made with respect to human rights in the PRC.\(^{60}\)

According to the People’s Daily, the continuing sale of U.S. defense weapons to the ROC and the Taiwan Relations Act, which authorized those sales, are the major barriers to China’s national integration. Both the act itself and the arms sales are interpreted by the paper as blatant U.S. “intervention in China’s internal affairs,” which impede both China’s national integration and future progress in U.S.-PRC relations. By “intervening” in this fashion, the People’s Daily maintains, the United States violates the 1978 Normalization Joint Communique.\(^{61}\)

The most fundamental issue that remains unresolved in view of the People’s Daily is the authority of the Taiwan Relations Act. Continuing to argue that the act is illegitimate, the paper writes: “The ‘Taiwan Relations Act’ seriously contravenes the principles embodied in the [1978] joint communique on the establishment of diplomatic relations between [Washington and Peking].”\(^{62}\) The People’s Daily on July 4, 1981, attacked the Taiwan Relations Act because it “obstructed” Taiwan’s unification with the mainland; “as a result, China may be forced to resort to non-peaceful methods to settle the Taiwan problem.” The United States, however, has reiterated that the act is “the law of the land” and has stipulated that in case of any conflict between the act and the joint communique, the law “clearly will take preference.”

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59. Ibid.
60. Ibid.
Peking and Washington were negotiating the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1978. The U.S. government asked the PRC to use peaceful means to solve the Taiwan issue. The PRC promised it would. On a visit to Washington on January 29, 1979, PRC Vice Premier Deng said that his country would not use arms against Taiwan in the next five years. In his talks with Reagan in Peking in April 1984, Deng said that both sides of the Taiwan Strait “could gradually increase their contacts and achieve peaceful reunification through negotiations.”

Interviewed by newsmen after his talks with Deng, Reagan said the Taiwan issue should be settled by people on both sides of the strait and that the United States should not serve as an intermediary. President Reagan had also expressed his attitude in an interview with PRC reporters at the White House before his visit to Peking. On April 18, 1984, the People's Daily reported it:

I realize that there is a difference there and it has been discussed. On a recent visit [by PRC Premier Zhao Ziyang] here, this was one of the subjects of discussion. I think our position is pretty well-known to the leaders of the People's Republic of China, that we have a long and historic friendship with the Chinese people on Taiwan; we are not going to turn our back on old friends in order to strengthen or make new friends.

A firm and consistent U.S. policy on Taiwan has made the Taiwan Relations Act and arms sales to Taiwan effective. Factor V of “U.S. Protecting-Taiwan Policy” has been one of the important issues on which the People's Daily and the Central Daily News have not agreed in their reporting.
CHAPTER V
IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In the beginning it was postulated that the concept of China's national integration reported by the two Chinese party newspapers is a multidimensional phenomenon. Through factor analysis, five factors were established; each accounted for most of the variation in China's national integration; each represented an important element in the views that the two newspapers express on China's national integration; each showed similarities and differences in the view of the two newspapers or parties; and each could be used as a basis in evaluating the implications of the research. Below, eight conclusions or assessments are drawn, and two overall conclusions from this study on China's national integration.

1. The Problem of China's national integration has been and will remain a multidimensional phenomenon for a considerable time before it can be solved.

Both newspaper or parties have recognized China's national integration as a multidimensional phenomenon; no single factor or a single leader can achieve integration. The study reveals how complex the process of integration is. Notwithstanding the media's tendency to oversimplify, the political unification of the mainland and Taiwan remains elusive and unresolved, within the foreseeable future. Realistically, it almost certainly will not occur until a major transformation occurs in the mutual understanding between the two sides, and the understanding of the political leadership or elites of one or both sides.

The inherent complexity of integration also affects the timing and strategies of both PRC and ROC reunification plans. The two have followed different timetables; how long the integration process should take is not the same for both Chinas. In the late 1970s, PRC vice premier Deng Xiaoping was reported to have said that the PRC could wait five or one hundred years for integration to be completed; however, by 1980, he listed integration as one of the three major national objectives of the next decade.¹

In contrast, the ROC's position has been unchanging in its essence, "Reunification but not now." It is doubtful that the ROC lead-

ership has ever set a timetable for itself, being inclined to look at reunification as a distant objective. In the summer of 1982, ROC Premier Sun Yun-suan said that his government hoped the obstacles to reunification would be reduced with the passage of time to allow the political, economic, social and cultural gaps between the two sides to narrow gradually. ²

The reasons for these sharply different timetables are not difficult to understand. For the PRC, the separate existence of the ROC on Taiwan has served as a constant reminder of its unfinished revolution. The surviving members of the first generation of the communist revolution know that time is running out for them. They strongly desire to see the revolution completed before dying. Adding to this sense of urgency is a belief that the current ROC government under President Chiang Ching-kuo represents the last tenuous emotional link between the two peoples. Those who were born after 1950 will likely feel much less attachment to the mainland. PRC leaders are concerned that it will become more difficult to appeal on a patriotic or sentimental level to future leaders. ³ In contrast, the ROC believes it can put off the issue of reunification. The ROC can still maintain a large military for its own defense, will sustaining a high rate of economic growth. ⁴ Unless the ROC leadership is confronted with some extraordinary crisis or is offered extremely attractive benefits, reunification will be given a low priority, perhaps left off the political agenda for many years to come. The present state of multidimensional factors in China’s national integration and their state in the coexistence between the PRC and the ROC may continue for a long time even if not entirely satisfactory.

². As long as a consensus on one-China nationalism as the basis for future integration exists between the PRC and the ROC, there is a possibility of eventual integration.

Both newspapers have used nationalism as the common ground for their stands on integration since 1945; nevertheless, world history has demonstrated that nationalism by itself has seldom been sufficient enough to reintegrate divided nations. One-China nationalism could be reinforced if the two parties realized that China’s national integration is a multidimensional phenomenon.

². Ibid., p. 2.
³. Ibid.
⁴. Ibid., p. 3.
As revealed in the *People's Daily* and the *Central Daily News*, the PRC has promoted consensus on one-China nationalism more than the ROC. One-China nationalism has been advocated by the PRC largely in the form of peace proposals.

The PRC has relied heavily on exploiting interpersonal relationships between prominent figures on both sides, hoping to elicit a more favorable emotional response to the call for peaceful integration. A small group of people on the mainland, mostly ROC military and civilian defectors, relatives of ROC government officials in Taiwan, or leaders or pre-1949 democratic parties, has been used to make recurrent public appeals to ROC leaders to return to the motherland. Other peace proposals by the PRC have relied heavily on the one-China nationalism factor. The most-used peace proposal was the nine-point proposal. These proposals have been pursued with great tenacity. The PRC leaders must be genuinely convinced of their effectiveness. Indeed, they have occasionally expressed puzzlement and indignation at the ROC government's continual rejection of what they consider generous offers. These strategies, however, have been seriously out of touch with current realities. If the Nationalists think they have learned any lesson from history, it is never to be trapped a third time. Had the PRC recognized this attitude of the Nationalists, its leaders might not have been surprised by the scorn and contempt that with which the ROC has opposed its peace proposals. Though PRC peace proposals based on one-China nationalism have been fully rejected by the ROC, both sides have maintained and have used a one-China nationalism consensus for eventual integration. As long as this consensus exists, so does hope for integration.

3. *Due to fundamental ideological differences, there is no consensus on any integrative method or model between the two newspapers or parties, making the realization of integration indefinite.*

Study results suggest that the PRC and the ROC have not agreed on any integrative method or model because of fundamental ideological differences. Because of these differences, no schedule can be determined for China's national integration. At least two reservations can be raised about the feasibility of the integrative methods or models that have been proposed by either side. The first reservation equalizes those methods or models to a renunciation of war by the PRC. Since the 1950s, the PRC has rejected similar demands brought up by the U.S. government. Taiwan is China's internal problem, and the PRC
would neither allow foreign interference nor give up the possible use of force in response to a foreign demand. The PRC regards China's national integration as an entirely different matter, however, in the form of an internally initiated mutual relaxation of relations with the ROC. A second reservation, the process of peaceful integration, could occur only if military pressure is removed. The ROC has lived under the shadow of a PRC attack for 35 years, preventing it from softening its attitude toward the PRC. If military pressure from the PRC were stepped up, and if the ROC were to become even more isolated internationally, ROC leaders might view independence as a lesser evil than total surrender to the PRC. From the PRC's point of view, independence would be worse than the current situation. It might leave the PRC feeling it had no alternative but to resort to war.

By and large, these two reservations would be far outweighed by the positive gains that the two parties could realize from peaceful reunification. Only by removing the threat of war could there exist an atmosphere favorable to conducting serious discussions on eventual integration. Each side might also become more receptive to internal demands for political reform if there were no fear that such reforms would be exploited by the other side to destabilize its government.

The PRC's peace negotiations cannot be conducted in a spirit of good will if one side still expressly reserves the right to use force against the other. The ROC's suspicion that the PRC merely uses these proposals as an attempt to wear down its vigilance is understandable. Would the PRC proposals be better received if they presented an intention to implement the least threatening measures first? The PRC has argued that once the “One Nation, Two Systems,” “Nine-Point,” and “Three-Link, Four-Exchange” peace proposals are accepted, the details can be worked out later. From the ROC's view, expressed in the Central Daily News, it is most dangerous to accept the proposals without the power to control the course of subsequent developments; however, the PRC is certain to continue to press to accelerate its publicity campaign of direct negotiations with leaders of the ROC.

The ROC is likely to continue to reject talks and proposals made solely on the PRC's terms. Virtually every PRC overture has involved a fundamental concession of principle on the ROC's part. The most dramatic gestures, involving retention of economic, social, and military privileges for the island, assume the ROC's submission to the

5. Ibid., p. 12.
6. Ibid.
PRC's authority and control. The lesser offers, suggesting immediate trade, mail, and tourist contacts, have been closely tied to the initiation of talks. In both cases, the basic precondition has been acceptance of the mainland's political dominance; therefore, the reaction of the ROC in the *Central Daily News* remained disinterest. The *Central Daily News* appears to be in no hurry for the ROC to enter the PRC's political embrace for vague assurances of continuity of conditions the ROC already enjoys. The paper sees the ROC as being placed in a subordinate position from the outset, as being a local province accepting the motherland's offer to sit down to talks on repatriation. With these attitudes, the PRC and the ROC will likely retain separate identities and make no progress toward integration.

4. *The common rejection of the disintegrative model of the "Taiwan Independence Movement" has been a unique consensus between the two newspapers or parties.*

This model of thematic category #46 did not have any loadings to become one of the factors because of its uniqueness in being rejected by both sides.

Though unable to agree on any particular integrative method or model, the *People's Daily* and the *Central Daily News* have both stuck to one-China nationalism and rejected the disintegrative model of the "Taiwan Independence Movement" (TIM), the *People's Daily* showing 11 reporting frequencies in rejecting the model of an independent Taiwan, the *Central Daily News*, 371. This suggests that the *Central Daily News* felt more directly threatened by the TIM than the *People's Daily*.

The TIM constitutes another sort of opposition to the ROC government besides the PRC. It has not been very active in Taiwan since the United States recognized the PRC in January 1979 and acknowledged that Taiwan was a part of China.\(^8\)

The TIM was organized in Japan in 1947, with main centers of activity in the United States and Japan, where there are sizeable numbers of Taiwanese-Chinese with foreign citizenship. The organization has been active in both countries for some time; it advocates a Taiwan ruled by Taiwanese-Chinese and the overthrow of the ROC government by force, if necessary. Some would also expel mainlander-Chinese from the island. During the 1960s, the movement received

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considerable publicity when the United States and Japan seemed to be moving toward a two-China policy. At this time, it also allegedly received support from the ruling Liberal Democratic Party in Japan and the Central Intelligence Agency in the United States. The TIM, however, declined in importance in the 1970s. The movement suffered a major setback when President Nixon signed the Shanghai Communique in 1972, which said that there was only one China. It had been assumed that the United States was moving toward a two-China policy, one China and one Taiwan. Soon after this, Japan recognized the PRC and severed official relations with the ROC. Members of the ruling party in Japan as well as businessmen became cautious about their support of the TIM. The TIM is still active in the United States, though without any public support from the U.S. government or from the majority of the people in Taiwan.

Six incidents in the last 17 years have given the movement notoriety:

(1) In 1968, Professor Ming-min Peng, a TIM member, secretly fled from Taiwan to the United States through Sweden after he had been released from prison in the ROC and was under surveillance.

(2) On April 24, 1970, two TIM members attempted to assassinate then ROC Vice Premier Chiang Ching-kuo in New York. The assassins were Taiwan-born graduates of National Chengchi University in Taipei. The university was a former cadres-training school for the Nationalist Party.

(3) On October 10, 1976, a TIM member attempted to assassinate the governor of Taiwan, Hsieh Tung-ming, in Taipei. Hsieh lost his left arm to a letter bomb.

(4) TIM members were responsible for a series of bombings of ROC offices and airline counters in Washington, D.C., New York and Los Angeles in August and December 1979, and January, April and September 1980. The bombings led to the California announcement in 1981 that TIM members were international terrorists.

9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
(5) On December 10, 1979, TIM members and sympathizers were involved in a violent riot in the industrial city of Kaohsiung in southern Taiwan. The clash between rioters and authorities caused 183 military and civilian policemen to be injured. More than 30 rioters and the staff of the *Formosa Magazine*, which organized the riot, were jailed. Later, some of the rioters and some of the initiators of the 1977 ballot dispute riot in Chungli, a small town in northern Taiwan, joined the movement in the United States.15

(6) On July 3, 1981, a Taiwan-born Chinese-American professor, Wen-cheng Chen, died in Taipei after being questioned at ROC military security headquarters for activities sympathetic to the TIM in the United States. The headquarters announced that Chen's fall from a university-campus building was a suicide. This caused an uproar and a U.S. congressional threat to cut off arms sales to the ROC.16

The *Central Daily News* has consistently reported on the movement in condemnation. The *People's Daily* has also reported unfavorably on TIM, except in the cases of the Kaohsiung riot and Cheng's death. The paper labeled the rioters as patriotic democrats fighting against the ROC, and fighting for reunification with the PRC.17 The paper also charged the ROC with political murder in Chen's death.18

In general, the two newspapers or parties have commonly rejected the TIM for its perception of opposition to "One Unified China with the Mainland and Taiwan" and its disintegrative model of "a new and independent Taiwan."19

5. The PRC integrative model of "National Regional Autonomy, Tibet" has been a uniquely disputed model between the two newspapers or parties.

This model of thematic category #35 did not meet any loadings to become one of the factors. This is due to its uniqueness as a model of "national regional autonomy," a model that the PRC offered and the ROC rejected. The *People's Daily* showed 38 reporting frequencies on this theme, the *Central Daily News*, 200. The model was first of-


ferred to the ROC by the PRC in the 1981 nine-point peace proposal, without mentioning the name of Tibet. Point #3 said, "After the country is reunified, Taiwan can enjoy a high degree of autonomy as a special administrative region and it can retain its armed forces. The Central Government will not interfere with local affairs on Taiwan."20 It was the same offer that the PRC had given to Tibet in an agreement on May 23, 1951. Article #3 of that agreement said, "The Tibetan people have the right of exercising national regional autonomy under the unified leadership of the Central People's government."21

The day after the PRC's nine-point proposal was issued on September 30, 1981, and reported in the People's Daily, a three-member delegation of Tibetan exiles in India sent by the Dalai Lama requested that the PRC accord Tibet the same treatment as the proposal offered to the ROC. The request was rejected by the PRC: "Tibet has been liberated for more than three decades. . . the nine-point principle, therefore, is not applicable." The experiences of the Tibetan people have affected the ROC's attitudes toward the PRC's "Tibet Model." In 1953, the PRC said in an agreement with Tibet that it would not alter "the existing political system in Tibet," or "the established status, functions, and powers of the Dalai Lama." The agreement also said, "Officials of various ranks shall hold office as usual."22 In 1959, the PRC took Tibet by force, killing thousands and driving large numbers of refugees into India, dissolving the Tibetan government under the Dalai Lama.23

The Central Daily News on December 14, 1982, responded to the PRC's "Tibet Model" with an article entitled "Trilogy of the Fall of Tibet by a Taiwan author, Peng-hsiao Huang." The article said:

As soon as Peking completed its military occupation of Tibet, it forgot completely the promises it had made to the Tibetans and started tightening its iron-fisted rule.

Finally in 1954, the Chinese Communist authorities disbanded the Tibetan armed forces and appointed puppets to high positions while the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama were in Peking attending the First National People's Congress.

22. Ibid.
By the time the Tibetan leaders returned to their homeland they had become virtual prisoners in their own fief.

On December 17, 1982, the Central Daily News reported a speech made by ROC President Chiang. Chiang used Peng's article to call on the people of Taiwan to regard events in Tibet as a lesson for the ROC. Responding to the ROC's concern, the PRC published three long articles explaining the situation in Tibet. The conclusion of the second article said:

Following more than 30 years of liberation, Xizang (Tibet) has accomplished its democratic and socialist reforms and abolished the serf system. Under the direct leadership of the central people's government, Xizang practices national autonomy, the people will never allow the wheels of history to be turned back. That is why earlier this year, when the Dalai Lama said the Xizang autonomous region must also be allowed to enjoy autonomous right like those of Taiwan, which will become a special administrative region after its return to the motherland, the Chinese Communist Party flatly refused. This is understandable and it meets with the people's approval.24

Provisions for the PRC's "special administrative region" model are outlined in Article 31 of the PRC Constitution, adopted on December 1982. It provides: "The state may establish a special administrative region when necessary. The systems to be instituted in special administrative regions shall be prescribed by law enacted by the National People's Congress in light of the specific conditions."25

PRC leaders made it clear that this article was enacted for the purpose of unifying Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao.

The ROC rejected the proposal to establish Taiwan as a "special administrative region" in January 1983:

Article 31 of Communist China's Constitution is the base melody in the Communists' orchestration to solve the "Taiwan problem," i.e., destroy the ROC and establish Communist China's "sovereignty" over Taiwan. What deserves special notice is this: the "special administrative regions" are to be established "when necessary" and when the necessity is

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no longer operative, they may be abolished. The entire system to be practiced there will be "stipulated by law" by the Chinese Communists. In due course it may be revised or eliminated "by law." The strategy employed here is one of absolutely gradual, step-by-step encroachment. The ambition and the cunning that lie behind it need no comment.\textsuperscript{26}

The PRC's Tibet model or its advanced model of a "Special Administrative Region" model for Taiwan did not receive any favorable responses from the ROC.

6. \textit{The People's Daily} has been more initiating, more on the offensive, more flexible and more dramatic in offering integrative methods and models. \textit{The Central Daily News} has been more responsive, more defensive, more consistent, more determined and more resistant with regard to such methods and models. This is a sign that the two newspapers lack mutual understanding in reporting about the other side.

In this study, the \textit{Central Daily News} showed three times more frequencies than the \textit{People's Daily} in reporting on China's national integration. The \textit{Central Daily News} tried to inform its domestic readers of the party's line on the issue of integration, tried to persuade them to support it. The \textit{People's Daily} tried to transmit party messages on integration via overseas and foreign media, aiming at overseas Chinese, foreign readers, governments, and the people and the ROC government on Taiwan.

The \textit{People's Daily} has offered more integrative methods or models than the \textit{Central Daily News}. It has more often been the one to initiate any methods or models, and has done so by using a dramatic approach. By being the initiator, it has also been able to assume an apparently more flexible attitude.

In comparison, the \textit{Central Daily News} is defensive. It has assumed the role of responding to the PRC's initiations of integrative methods or models, while its responses have been consistently resistant and determined.

The newspapers have shown a lack of mutual trust and understanding in reporting about the other side. Both newspapers have reported much more unfavorably than neutrally or favorably. At this time, formal agreements or contacts between the two sides should probably be avoided because the trust and mutual understanding nec-

necessary to sustain them are still absent. The two newspapers must build mutual trust and understanding and must report on the other side more objectively if integration is indeed their common goal.

National integration will likely be a gradual process involving the reduction of mutual animosity and an accompanying increase in confidence.

A number of tension-reducing attempts or an increase in neutral reports about the other side in the two newspapers could be seen as an attempt to reduce tensions. It is important to maintain the momentum of these changes in reporting and to continue to expand neutral and objective reporting about the other side in all areas. This method of reducing tensions and building mutual understanding could have a strong appeal to the readers and to the people of both sides. As mutual trust, understanding and confidence are restored, attention can be directed more rationally to exploring integrative methods and models, which could also help to end the no-war, no-peace standoff between the two sides.

7. The economic factor could be a function of “spill-over” into political integration. Indirect trade between the two sides through Hong Kong continues to grow and could develop into an interdependence between them. The recent reforms of the PRC’s economic system, which is moving closer, though very slowly, to the ROC’s economic system, however, provides an even greater possibility of future economic interdependence.

A transformation of the PRC-ROC relationship is not only subject to the attitudes and intentions of both parties, but also to conditions beyond the control of either.²⁷ This study suggests that economic interdependence between the PRC and the ROC is growing and might be developing into political integration. The magnitude of the ROC’s international economic involvement and the PRC’s planned interdependence with key trading partners of the ROC could prove instrumental in building mutual understanding; however, economic interdependence could also lead to greater misunderstanding and conflict. Economic interdependence can create a monster—economic boycott.

One PRC option in the event it fails in its reunification campaign might be to seek the collapse of the ROC’s economy by pressuring foreign businessmen to withdraw support from the ROC. Threats

²⁷. Sanford, op. cit., p. 79.
themselves might create enough insecurity to frighten investors away. The PRC could also dump goods on the world market, similar or identical to those produced in Taiwan, but cheaper. This would reduce the ROC’s export revenues.\textsuperscript{28} No such threat on the part of the PRC has been reported nor does the PRC shows any intention now of using such a tool to achieve its national goal of integration; furthermore, and more importantly, it probably does not have the capability, either now or in the near future. The PRC’s recently scaled-down economic goals and revised purchase plans make it a less significant consumer of foreign products than was originally expected. The PRC’s leverage on Western businessmen would be minimal, particularly as a hostile act toward the ROC.\textsuperscript{29}

At this point, it appears that the PRC needs foreign companies more than foreigners need PRC business. The PRC has shown amazing support of the ROC’s economic arrangements. It has not discouraged the dual operations of its trading partners.\textsuperscript{30} The PRC, however, does not need trade links with the ROC equal to those it has with Hong Kong. The ROC does not represent a crucial window for PRC products to move West nor is it a source from which the PRC is likely to build important currency reserves.\textsuperscript{31}

Indirect trade or economic interdependence between the PRC and the ROC has not yet reached the “spill-over” level. Attentive to its growth and development, the current trends in trade have apparently created a new PRC aspect for the ROC. It has also led to a hesitant interest in the ROC for separating economics from politics in foreign policy toward Communist areas. The continuation of this trend could lead to future peaceful associations with the PRC.\textsuperscript{32}

Thirty-five years ago, two radically different economic philosophies were inherited by people of the same ethnic group. Since then, two very different economic situations have developed.

In 1952, on the eve of the First Five-Year Plan in the PRC and the First Four-Year Plan in the ROC, the per capita incomes in the two countries were quite close—$46 in the PRC, and $50 in the ROC.\textsuperscript{33} By 1984, the PRC’s per capita income had reached $295,

\textsuperscript{28} Ibid., p. 81.
\textsuperscript{29} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{30} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{31} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{32} Ibid., p. 82.
while the ROC's had soared to $2,500.\textsuperscript{34}

The widening gap between the two economies and their different economic systems has begun to attract worldwide attention, especially regarding a future economic interdependence. These economic differences were reflected in the reports of the two newspapers in thematic category #49 "Advocacy of its Own Economic System." The People's Daily showed 63 reporting frequencies on this theme, the Central Daily News, 386. The Central Daily News showed a frequency five times higher than the People's Daily in advocating its own economic system.

In light of this attention and the important role that economic realities might play in China's national integration, it is relevant to this study to provide a brief discussion of the different economic strategies that the two Chinese governments have pursued.

(1) The PRC's Economic System

The PRC followed the Marxian-Leninist doctrine of nationalizing land and all means of production, the entire economy being guided by a national plan.\textsuperscript{35} Planning authority is concentrated at the top. All input and output targets for individual enterprises are decided by central planners and are passed down through various levels of administration.\textsuperscript{36} In commerce, the government trading agencies purchase and distribute key commodities, including all capital goods and all necessities. The government monopolizes foreign trade, setting all important prices. Workers are hired by state labor bureaus and assigned to factories and firms where they are paid wages set by the government.\textsuperscript{37}

Many of Mao's economic policies, such as the Great Leap Forward, the People's Commune, "Agriculture learning from Tachai," etc. were against traditionally accepted economic laws.\textsuperscript{38} Many see them as causing great losses to the national economy. Unbalanced development strategy hampered the growth of agriculture and restricted the consumer goods industries. The expansion of the steel and defense industries has drained investment and materials from other basic industries—notably electricity, coal and transportation.\textsuperscript{39}

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{34} Ibid.
\bibitem{35} Cheng, \textit{ibid.}, p. 76.
\bibitem{36} Ibid.
\bibitem{37} Ibid.
\bibitem{38} Ibid., p. 77.
\bibitem{39} Ibid., p. 78.
\end{thebibliography}
A high rate of capital formation resulted in only a moderate rate of economic growth and an extremely low level of per capita GNP. In 1983, per capita GNP in the PRC was $250, about one-eleventh that of the ROC. It is against this background that large-scale reform programs have been undertaken in the past five years. One major reform has granted greater decision-making power to local governments and individual enterprises; another promoted management efficiency by introducing a new system to 100 industrial and transportation enterprises in Sichuan before being extended to 6,600 major enterprises throughout the country. These enterprises account for 60 percent of all production and 70 percent of all profits in the industrial sector. Under the new system, the enterprises have the right to design their own production plans and to retain up to 5 percent of planned profits and 20 percent of extra profits after state quotas are fulfilled. The enterprises are also allowed to control their own profits and their foreign exchange earnings. The right to retain profits is considered the heart of the reforms because it acts as material incentive to the enterprise manager to increase productivity.

In the rural areas, the most significant reform was to establish a system of contracting production with individual households. While the land is still collectively owned, plots of land are now contracted to individual farm households for cultivation. The households are obligated to produce a certain amount which goes to the production team to be sold to the state. After fulfilling the contracted amount, the households may keep the rest of their production, for their own consumption or for their trade at a market. With the introduction of the new system, rural free markets have expanded and private plots cut or banned during the Cultural Revolution have expanded. In some areas, private plots have increased from 6 percent to 15 percent of total cultivated land. Apparently, the new PRC leadership now assumes that the key to agricultural development is the promotion of material incentives.

The strategy of economic development has also been drastically revised. First, there was a change in investment priorities. The share of capital investment for agriculture was raised from 10.7 percent in 1978 to 18 percent in 1980. The shares of investment for textile, electronics and light industries rose from 10.1 percent in 1978 to 17.9 in 1982. The advantage annual growth rate for light industries since 1978

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40. Ibid., and People's Daily, April 30, 1983.
41. Cheng, op. cit., p. 79.
42. Ibid., pp. 79-80.
is 11.8 percent, for heavy industry it dropped to 3.4 percent. The ratio between light industries and heavy industries changed from 42.7 percent and 57.3 percent in 1978, to 50.2 percent and 49.8 percent in 1982, to 49.5 percent and 50.5 percent in 1984. This policy is apparently a move toward more balanced growth.43

With leadership favoring a more open and liberal attitude toward foreign investment, the self-reliance principle has been abandoned. Direct foreign loans and joint ventures have been solicited. Thousands of PRC students have been sent to attend Western academic institutions. Four “Special Economic Zones” have been set up in Quangdong and Fujian provinces. Fourteen coastal cities are open for foreign investment. The PRC is willing to revise the old Stalin-Marxian economic doctrine to a new doctrine—the "Chinese Socialist System."44

The PRC is moving closer, though very slowly, to the economic system of the ROC. For five years, the leadership of the PRC has been searching for a new developmental model. In the 1977-1978 period, the PRC leaders considered the Yugoslavia model an attractive alternative. But after three years of intensive study, they realized that Yugoslavia was plagued with numerous problems.45 After the Yugoslavian model proved inadequate, the impressive achievements of the ROC began to catch the attention of PRC leaders. Since then, the PRC has adopted many strategies employed by the ROC. For example, they have opened the door for foreign consumer goods industries and begun promoting foreign trade.46

To energize the PRC economy, more fundamental changes in the economic system must be carried out. As former President Richard M. Nixon observed, “The key to China’s future economic success lies in its becoming less Communist and more Chinese. Its failures during the third of a century since Mao Tse-tung took power have been a direct result of Communist dogma generally and Maoist dogma particularly.”47 At the heart of the present economic expansion in the PRC is the introduction of economic reforms, which liberalize the rules for private enterprise. Small scale private activities are now permitted in industry, services and agriculture, however, the PRC is still very much

43. Ibid., and China Times (Taipei), May 24, 1985.
44. Cheng, op. cit., p. 80.
46. Ibid.
47. Cheng, “Economic Development in Taiwan and Mainland China,” op. cit., p. 84.
a socialist country and is likely to remain so.\(^48\)

Ma Hong, the president of the PRC Academy of Social Sciences and advisor to the Planning Commission, has written, "In our current efforts to reform the economic management system, we should have a correct understanding of the nature of our socialist economy. Socialist construction in an economically underdeveloped country such as ours requires that commodities and money be fully utilized. In other words, our socialist economy is a planned one which should actively develop commodity production and exchange."\(^49\)

(2) The ROC's Economic System

The ROC on Taiwan has followed a mixed economic system. While the ROC government owns some of the island's major basic industries such as steel, ship building, defense, railroads, public utilities, electric power and petrochemicals, almost all the light industries and virtually all the services and trading firms are privately owned.\(^50\) The government sets goals for the economy by designing long-term developmental plans. At every phase in Taiwan's development, the government has exercised direct control or indirect influence to guide economic activities.\(^51\)

Important regulations used by the government include foreign exchange, import controls, bank credit allocations, interest rate policies, investment licensing, and tax rebates. These controls provide incentive or disincentive by fostering a growth which conforms to the plans of the government agencies.\(^52\) Despite these interventions, government policies improve the investment climate rather than limit private activities. The mixed economic system allows the government to influence the direction of economic activities while preserving private enterprise and individual initiative.\(^53\)

Realizing that agriculture is an important base for an industrialized nation, the ROC has paid great attention to promoting agricultural productivity. One of its major measures was a land-reform

\(^51\) Ibid.
\(^52\) Gustav Ranis, "Industrial Development," in Galenson, ed., Economic Growth and Structural Change in Taiwan, pp. 259-262.
program between 1949 and 1953.\textsuperscript{54} Prior to land reform, land ownership in Taiwan, as in many less-developed countries, was unequal. With a large tenant population, the competition for land was fierce, and rent often consumed as 50 percent of the expected harvest.\textsuperscript{55} The land redistribution program enabled 48 percent of Taiwan's farm families to purchase land. The annual growth rate for total farm yield averaged 5.2 percent for the period 1953 through 1968.\textsuperscript{56}

Aware of its limited domestic market, the ROC promoted export expansion to ensure economic growth. As early as the 1950s, many export programs were started. One of the most important measures, a tax rebate on exportable industrial products, reduced the cost of exports and increased their competitiveness in the international market.\textsuperscript{57}

Between 1952 and 1962, total trade volume went up 80 percent, with an average annual growth rate of 6.1 percent. Between 1962 and 1974, trade increased 22 times, with an annual growth rate of 29.4 percent. The highest growth rate was achieved in the 1970 to 1974 period, 41.5 percent, passing even Japan's postwar record. In recent years, the ROC foreign trade has exceeded its gross national product to become the island's most significant sector.\textsuperscript{58} From the early 1950s, the ROC government has systematically sought foreign investment and expertise; these have created a favorable investment climate for the development program of the island. The annual flow of foreign capital has risen sharply from a few million U.S. dollars a year in the 1950s to a high of almost a quarter of a billion dollars in the 1970s.\textsuperscript{59}

During the past 35 years, the economic system and development strategies adopted by the ROC government have transformed Taiwan from a relatively poor, underdeveloped, agrarian economy to a modern industrial economy, ranking third among Asian countries in per capita income. The ROC's real GNP has increased sevenfold in 35 years, averaging an annual growth of 9 percent, which is among the highest in the world. In foreign trade, the ROC now ranks as the seventh largest trading partner of the United States and is among the 20 largest trading nations in the world.\textsuperscript{60}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item 54. \textit{Ibid.}, p. 72.
\item 56. Cheng, "Economic Development in Taiwan and Mainland China," \textit{op. cit.}, p. 73.
\item 57. \textit{Ibid.}, p. 74.
\item 58. \textit{Ibid.}
\item 59. \textit{Ibid.}
\item 60. John C. H. Fei, Gustav Ranis and Shirley Kuo, \textit{Growth with Equity. The Taiwan Case} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), p. 41; and \textit{China Times, op. cit.}
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
With a much richer natural resources base, if the PRC were to more fully adopt the ROC's economic system, its GNP could conceivably rise rapidly, reducing the economic gap between the two countries. The possibility of future economic interdependence through direct or indirect trade would be greater. Eventually the economic function of "spill-over" could lead to the realization of political integration.

8. Both the PRC and the ROC have attempted to influence the United States to support their respective policies on China's national integration. The United States, however, has continued to support a peaceful integration by the PRC and the ROC themselves. To maintain this policy, the United States maintains unofficial but substantial relations with the ROC.

The People's Daily and the Central Daily News have revealed their intentions of involving the United States in their differing integration goals. The United States has been consistent in its established policy of supporting a peaceful settlement of the reunification issue without outside interference. To protect the ROC from forceful integration, the United States has provided continuous arms sales and has maintained unofficial relations through the Taiwan Relations Act; however, this policy has upset the PRC, which regards it as an obstacle to integration. The ROC is well aware of its relatively small position in American strategic plans, especially when compared with the strategic importance of the PRC; therefore, it has tried to highlight its economic importance to the United States and to strengthen the long-standing U.S. ideological and sentimental ties with the island.61

The United States will likely seek a balance in its China policy, maintaining close unofficial ties with the ROC and maintaining cordial official relations with the PRC. Such balance is not necessarily easy to achieve. Positive developments could include a reduction in PRC pressure over continued U.S. relations with the ROC. The PRC may come to believe that integration is unlikely without the support of the United States. A continued hard line on U.S.-Taiwan relations could alienate American opinion from the PRC and jeopardize chances for integration with Taiwan. The PRC domestic political situation could stabilize and its leaders could reach a compromise with the United States over the ROC without repercussions inside the PRC.

Future trends also could work against U.S. interests. The PRC

might remain uncompromising on U.S.-Taiwan relations; might even increase pressure on the United States to cut off U.S. arms shipments to the ROC; might demand that the United States explicitly recognize PRC sovereignty over Taiwan; could demand that the United States actively support PRC proposals for integration, could require that the United States apply pressure on the ROC to come to terms with the PRC. If the United States refused, the PRC could respond by downgrading diplomatic relations; could shift PRC policy away from the United States and confront American interests more directly in sensitive areas, notably Taiwan; or could establish better relations with the Soviet Union. Any of these trends, combined with a harder PRC line on the ROC, could make it more difficult for U.S. leaders to justify compromise over Taiwan.

U.S.-Taiwan relations could also again become a major partisan issue in U.S. politics. For this reason, the Reagan administration might try to accommodate PRC demands by cutting back on military and other ties with the ROC, and by playing down past American commitments made in the Taiwan Relations Act. Conservatives would have a tough time accusing Ronald Reagan of being "soft" on Taiwan, but they might be able to attack his aides who have been prominently involved in PRC relations. Meanwhile, if the Reagan administration fails to accommodate the PRC and relations are downgraded, Democratic leaders could exploit the administration's "mismanagement" of U.S. China policy.

China's national integration presents difficulties for U.S. China policy. Legally, the Taiwan Relations Act deliberately provides a deterrent level of support. The United States provides arms under the Taiwan Relations Act as interpreted by the U.S.-PRC understanding of August 1982. The island also remains a major U.S. trading and investment partner. These factors indicate that the United States would respond to an attack on the island; nevertheless, those same factors strain the U.S.-PRC relationship, a matter of far greater importance to U.S. interests.

Apart from U.S.-PRC-Taiwan considerations, longer-term American foreign policy could be influenced heavily by shifts in Soviet policy. As the United States or the PRC cooperate with each other against suspected Soviet expansionism, the United States might accommodate PRC interests in Taiwan. If Soviet power were seen by the United States, growing and strategic concerns might push the

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62. Ibid., p. 323.
63. Ibid., p. 324.
United States into favoring the PRC over the ROC. 64

Under these circumstances, the United States would presumably be more willing to cut off military supplies to the island, to recognize PRC sovereignty over Taiwan, and to pressure the ROC to join in peace talks with the PRC. Arguments against such action would continue to focus on the moral commitment to the ROC and on U.S. economic interests on the island. The relative importance of these factors would fade in comparison with broader U.S. strategic interests which would depend on how threatened the United States felt in the face of Soviet expansion and how useful the PRC appeared to be as a partner against the Soviet Union. 65

One general trend has stood out in U.S. policy in the past decade, a policy to move in the direction of meeting PRC demands and conditions and gradually cut back contacts with the ROC for the sake of better relations with the PRC. 66 Unforeseen future developments could change its course, but these policies are likely to continue in U.S.-China policy for some time to come. Ultimately, U.S.-China policy is likely to be more to the PRC's advantage than to the ROC's.

Two overall conclusions are derived from the findings of this study:

1. The theory of integration has been applied and found to be valid by the study's communication approach to the media of integrative entities. The study's hypotheses based on the theory of integration have been supported: the two Chinese party newspapers have used their reporting media for the purpose of advocating their respective integrative ideologies, methods and models. The factor analysis of the survey found five factors in China's national integration: (1) one-China nationalism consensus, (2) mutual understanding about the other side, (3) economic function, (4) U.S.-China policy, and (5) U.S. protecting-Taiwan policy.

The study concludes that the two Chinese party newspapers have focused on one-China nationalism, but without providing common agreeable methods for a future integrative model; have increased their neutral understanding about each other, but still retained a significant amount of unfavorable reports about the other side; have developed an awareness of the possible economic function of indirect trade through

64. Ibid., p. 325.
65. Ibid.
66. Ibid., p. 326.
Hong Kong and of the narrowing economic gap through PRC's recent economic reforms, but without realizing serious discussions or planning for a healthy development of "spill-over" integration; have tried hard to influence the United States to support their respective advantages over the other side on the integration issue, but without much success of changing established U.S. China policy; have disputed continued U.S. protection of the ROC with the Taiwan Relations Act and arms sales, but without direct contacts or consultations between them. Both sides claim integration is an internal problem.

Sentimental appeals to one-China nationalism fill in the two newspapers. A fair and objective reporting policy about the other side seems unlikely to be accepted by the two newspapers in the near future. Mutual understanding and confidence building seem to be beyond the consideration of the two newspapers' editorial policies.

As discussed in conclusion #7, indirect trade through Hong Kong will probably continue to grow. The recent reforms of the PRC's economic system have a fairly good chance of succeeding and of slowly increasing the PRC's economic power. Though it may be a long time before reforms affect the rest of the mainland's economy, there is hope of reducing the economic gap between the PRC and the ROC. There is hope of achieving economic interdependence and eventual economic integration.

As discussed in conclusion #8, the two newspapers or parties will probably try to use their media influence to persuade the United States on integration. The United States is maintaining its established policy for a peaceful settlement unless other factors, such as policies of the Soviet Union, intrude. Nevertheless, the PRC has more to gain than the ROC concerning the concessions that the United States might have made on integration. There is an external element in China's national integration issue as the theory of integration indicates.

2. This study, through research on the media of the two parties on the integration issue, has provided a scientific source for practical political reference in dealing with China's national integration.

The media of the two parties are useful sources; however, access to both domestic editions in the United States was hard to obtain. This study provides a more accessible source for researching the fundamental policies and strategies of the two parties on particular political issues such as China's national integration.
The two newspapers usually carry the full text of announcements or speeches made by their leaders that other Chinese newspapers do not report. The hidden messages between the lines must be found in reference books or other media since the two newspapers are very political and usually allow no second opinions on sensitive issues such as China's national integration.

The two newspapers provide important messages and trends on the issue of integration, even though they are not necessarily popular newspapers as far as the reader's general interests are concerned. In other words, they are more informative on party-line messages, but less educational, less informative and less entertaining by ordinary Western newspaper standards.

For this study on China's national integration, the two Chinese party newspapers certainly served the purpose of the research by providing a way to find relevant materials to either confirm or reject the reporting of the two newspapers on the integration issue.

Recommendation

The results of this study indicate that the PRC and the ROC have not built up a solid mutual understanding of each other. It is worth emphasizing again that such understanding is necessary if they are sincere in pursuing national integration. Both sides could increase their neutral and objective reporting about the other side and decrease unfavorable reporting for their integration-concerned readers.

Both sides probably will maintain their one-China nationalism consensus. If their common goal is an integrated China, they might consider providing solid and workable integrative methods, models for serious academic and political discussion in their newspapers for the benefit of their millions of readers. The present one-way traffic which denounces the other side's proposals and models undermines the development of any workable integrative method or model that could be accepted by both sides. Any foreign effort, particularly by the United States, to coerce or mediate a final solution would be ineffective and possibly counterproductive. The U.S. role can be limited to making as sure as possible that any solution, any process, will be achieved without coercion or force of any kind.

This study also recommends that the United States not stand in the way of all possible contacts and interaction between the PRC and the ROC, nor try to play a direct role in promoting any particular solution.

Assuming that the PRC sticks to peaceful methods, the United States is recommended to adhere to its established position on continu-
ous arms sales to the ROC, and to execute the Taiwan Relations Act so that the ROC not be forcefully integrated by the PRC. The United States might avoid promoting or coercing either party to adopt any particular solution, insisting only that the use of force be avoided. The United States can influence but "should" not control the future of China's national integration. The gradual evolution of PRC and ROC relations neither requires more benefits from excessive attention nor needs suspicions or false claims of urgency. Precipitous actions by either side would fail and be unnecessary and counterproductive.

All five factors in this study could be watched closely by further academic research that monitors their development and change.

The growing indirect trade between the two Chinese countries through Hong Kong, and the recent reforms of the PRC's economic system, are potential economic factors of the "spill-over" function relevant to the study of integration theory. Observation and analysis are recommended. Neither the PRC nor the ROC has shown a genuine interest in stopping the indirect trade between them. Both sides have benefited in the past, and will benefit in the future. Both sides have watched the development of the PRC's economic reforms.

The study also found that integration is not only an internal affair, as the PRC, the ROC and the United States maintain. Each side has tried to involve the United States in its favor. It is this study's recommendation that the ultimate solution to the problem of China's national integration should be a Chinese solution, arrived at by the Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. Ideally, a peaceful solution will respect the willingness and opinions of one billion Chinese on the mainland and the 18 million Chinese on Taiwan.

Further research on media other than these two party newspapers or comparing other media to these two newspapers on the issue of China's national integration is recommended. Other media may have different perspectives that are worthy of research. Radio propaganda of both the PRC and the ROC is also an important media although difficult and complicated to survey.

Because this study is limited to the overall factors of China's national integration found in the media survey, further research could concentrate on particular factors or on particular periods of time. Each factor involves many complex issues, events, theories and practices that are beyond the limitations of this study. Certainly, an advanced study could provide more concrete results or suggestions on workable and acceptable integrative methods or models for the people and the leaders of both sides to consider.

Any study on the integration issue would be extremely valuable
and is encouraged. The interests of one billion Chinese are at stake. Thirty-five years of disintegration between the mainland and Taiwan is not a long time compared to other periods of disintegration in Chinese history. The Chinese on both sides could be open-minded, patient and enthusiastic in evaluating a workable and peaceful integrative method or model.

The final, idealistic recommendation for future research is to conduct an opinion survey the Chinese people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. Is national integration is felt necessary? Or desirable? Why, when and how could national integration be achieved? Answers to these questions would offer a solid reference to the issues of China's national integration.
Frequency: 0–667

Time Series: December 1978–May 1985

-----: The People's Daily, 7,570 reporting frequencies


The two newspapers, a total of 35,708.

FIGURE 1

TREND OF TOTAL REPORTING FREQUENCY OF THE TWO NEWSPAPERS IN A TIME SERIES, DECEMBER 1978–MAY 1985
Frequency: 0-3,244

Thematic Categories: #1-54

---: The People's Daily, 7,570 reporting frequencies.


The two newspapers, a total of 35,708.

FIGURE 2

TREND OF TOTAL REPORTING FREQUENCY OF THE TWO NEWSPAPERS IN
THE THEMATIC CATEGORIES #1-54
Frequency: 0-238
-----: The People's Daily, 474 reporting frequencies.
____: The Central Daily News, 2,545.

The two newspapers, a total of 3,019.

FIGURE 3
TREND OF REPORTING FREQUENCY OF THE TWO NEWSPAPERS IN
THEMATIC CATEGORY #10 "REGRESSIONS AND DEFECTORS," DECEMBER 1978-MAY 1985
Frequency: 0-11

-----: The People's Daily, 32 reporting frequencies.

The two newspapers, a total of 156.

FIGURES 4

TREND OF REPORTING FREQUENCY OF THE TWO NEWSPAPERS IN
THEMATIC CATEGORY #13 "FAVORABLE POLITICAL REPORT ABOUT THE
OTHER SIDE," DECEMBER 1978-MAY 1985 (FACTOR II: MUTUAL
UNDERSTANDING)
Frequency: 0-17


-----: The People's Daily, 53 reporting frequencies.

______: The Central Daily News, 331.

The two newspapers, a total of 384.

FIGURE 5

TREND OF REPORTING FREQUENCY OF THE TWO NEWSPAPERS IN THEMATIC CATEGORY #14 "NEUTRAL POLITICAL REPORT ABOUT THE OTHER SIDE," DECEMBER 1978-MAY 1985
Frequency: 0-122

-----: The People's Daily, 291 reporting frequencies.
_____: The Central Daily News, 3,244.

The two newspapers, a total of 3,535.

FIGURE 6
TREND OF REPORTING FREQUENCY OF THE TWO NEWSPAPERS IN
THEMATIC CATEGORY #15 "UNFAVORABLE POLITICAL REPORT ABOUT
THE OTHER SIDE," DECEMBER 1978-MAY 1985
Frequency: 0-10


-----: The People's Daily, 2 reporting frequencies.

-----: The Central Daily News, 53.

The two newspapers, a total of 55.

FIGURE 7

TREND OF REPORTING FREQUENCY OF THE TWO NEWSPAPERS IN
THEMATIC CATEGORY #16 "FAVORABLE MILITARY REPORT ABOUT THE
OTHER SIDE," DECEMBER 1978-MAY 1985
Frequency: 0-23

-----: The People's Daily, 4 reporting frequencies.

The two newspapers, a total of 106.

FIGURE 8
TREND OF REPORTING FREQUENCY OF THE TWO NEWSPAPERS IN
THEMATIC CATEGORY #17 "NEUTRAL MILITARY REPORT ABOUT THE
OTHER SIDE," DECEMBER 1978-MAY 1985
Frequency: 0-19


----: The People's Daily, 13 reporting frequencies.


The two newspapers, a total of 368.

FIGURE 9

TREND OF REPORTING FREQUENCY OF THE TWO NEWSPAPERS IN
THEMATIC CATEGORY #18 "UNFAVORABLE MILITARY REPORT ABOUT THE
OTHER SIDE," DECEMBER 1978-MAY 1985
Frequency: 0-9


-----: The People's Daily, 191 reporting frequencies.


The two newspapers, 205.

FIGURE 10

Frequency: 0-13
-----: The People's Daily, 139 reporting frequencies.

The two newspapers, a total of 153.

FIGURE 11
TREND OF REPORTING FREQUENCY OF THE TWO NEWSPAPERS IN
THEMATIC CATEGORY #20 "NEUTRAL SOCIETAL REPORT ABOUT THE
OTHER SIDE," DECEMBER 1978-MAY 1985 (FACTOR II: MUTUAL
UNDERSTANDING)
Frequency: 0-48


-----: The People's Daily, 384 reporting frequencies.

___: The Central Daily News, 1,790.

The two newspapers, a total of 2,174.

FIGURE 12

TREND OF REPORTING FREQUENCY OF THE TWO NEWSPAPERS IN THEMATIC CATEGORY #21 "UNFAVORABLE SOCIETAL REPORT ABOUT THE OTHER SIDE," DECEMBER 1978-MAY 1985
Frequency: 0-9


-----: The People's Daily, 107 reporting frequencies.

---: The Central Daily News, 22.

The two newspapers, a total of 129.

**FIGURE 13**

Frequency: 0-8


---: The People's Daily, 18 reporting frequencies.


The two newspapers, a total of 31.

FIGURE 14

TREND OF REPORTING FREQUENCY OF THE TWO NEWSPAPERS IN
THEMATIC CATEGORY #54 "NEUTRAL ECONOMIC REPORT ABOUT THE
OTHER SIDE," DECEMBER 1978-MAY 1985 (FACTOR III: ECONOMIC
FUNCTION)
Frequency: 0-55


-----: The People's Daily, 251 reporting frequencies.

_____: The Central Daily News, 1,546.

The two newspapers, a total of 1,797.

FIGURE 15

TREND OF REPORTING FREQUENCY OF THE TWO NEWSPAPERS IN THEMATIC CATEGORY #50 "UNFAVORABLE ECONOMIC REPORT ABOUT THE OTHER SIDE," DECEMBER 1978-MAY 1985
Frequency: 0-13


-----: The People's Daily, 250 reporting frequencies.

The two newspapers, a total of 300.

FIGURE 16

TREND OF REPORTING FREQUENCY OF THE TWO NEWSPAPERS IN
THEMATIC CATEGORY #11 "COMMENTARY FAVORABLE TO THE OTHER
SIDE," DECEMBER 1978-MAY 1985 (FACTOR II: MUTUAL
UNDERSTANDING)
Frequency: 0-63


-----: The People's Daily, 206 reporting frequencies.
_____: The Central Daily News, 1,958.

The two newspapers, a total of 2,164.

FIGURE 17

TREND OF REPORTING FREQUENCY OF THE TWO NEWSPAPERS IN
THEMATIC CATEGORY #12 "COMMENTARY UNFAVORABLE TO THE OTHER
SIDE," DECEMBER 1978-MAY 1985
Frequency: 0–70

Time Series: December 1978–May 1985

—-: The People's Daily, 175 reporting frequencies.


The two newspapers, a total of 244.

FIGURE 18


(FACTOR I: NATIONALISM CONSENSUS)
Frequency: 0-89

---: The People's Daily, 118 reporting frequencies.

The two newspapers, a total of 208.

FIGURE 19
TREND OF REPORTING FREQUENCY OF THE TWO NEWSPAPERS IN
THEMATIC CATEGORY #41, ”THE PRC'S 1981 NINE-POINT PEACE
PROPOSAL TO INTEGRATE THE ROC," DECEMBER 1978-MAY 1985
(FACTOR I: NATIONALISM CONSENSUS)
Frequency: 0-82
----: The People's Daily, 560 reporting frequencies.
---: The Central Daily News, 1,386.

The two newspapers, a total of 1,946.

FIGURE 20
TREND OF REPORTING FREQUENCY OF THE TWO NEWSPAPERS IN
THEMATIC CATEGORY #6 "THE TRADITIONAL POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
OF ONE CHINA," DECEMBER 1978-MAY 1985 (FACTOR I: NATIONALISM
CONSENSUS)
Frequency: 0-39
-----: The People's Daily, 183 reporting frequencies.
      The two newspapers, a total of 271.

FIGURE 21
TREND OF REPORTING FREQUENCY OF THE TWO NEWSPAPERS IN
THEMATIC CATEGORY #42 "THE PRC'S THREE-LINK, FOUR-
EXCHANGE PEACE PROPOSAL TO BEGIN TO INTEGRATE THE ROC,"
DECEMBER 1978-MAY 1985 (FACTOR I: NATIONALISM CONSENSUS)
Frequency: 0-99

-----: The People's Daily, 201 reporting frequencies.

The two newspapers, a total of 999.

FIGURE 22
TREND OF REPORTING FREQUENCY OF THE TWO NEWSPAPERS IN
THEMATIC CATEGORY #5 "THE HSIN-HAI REVOLUTION IN 1911 LED BY
SUN YAT-SEN AND HIS NATIONALIST PARTY," DECEMBER 1978-MAY
1985 (FACTOR I: NATIONALISM CONSENSUS)
FIGURE 23
TREND OF REPORTING FREQUENCY OF THE TWO NEWSPAPERS IN
THEMATIC CATEGORY #39 "PRC'S FORCEFUL INTEGRATION WITH THE
ROC," DECEMBER 1978-MAY 1985 (FACTOR I: NATIONALISM
CONSENSUS)
Frequency: 0-21

-----: The People's Daily, 180 reporting frequencies.

The two newspapers, a total of 194.

FIGURE 24
TREND OF REPORTING FREQUENCY OF THE TWO NEWSPAPERS IN
THEMATIC CATEGORY #9 "THE SEPARATED RELATIVES DIVIDED BY THE
TAIWAN STRAIT," DECEMBER 1978-MAY 1985 (FACTOR I:
NATIONALISM CONSENSUS)
Frequency: 0-45

---: The People's Daily, 163 reporting frequencies.
___: The Central Daily News, 453.

The two newspapers, a total of 616.

FIGURE 25
Frequency: 0-122

-----: The People's Daily, 440 reporting frequencies.

The two newspapers, a total of 1,138.

FIGURE 26
TREND OF REPORTING FREQUENCY OF THE TWO NEWSPAPERS IN
THEMATIC CATEGORY #4 "SUN YAT-SEN AS THE REVOLUTIONARY
LEADER, AND SOONG CHING LING, SUN'S WIDOW," DECEMBER
1978-MAY 1985 (FACTOR I: NATIONALISM CONSENSUS)
FIGURE 27
Frequency: 0–9

Time Series: December 1978–May 1985

-----: The People's Daily, 2 reporting frequencies.


The two newspapers, a total of 126.

FIGURE 28

Frequency: 0-17


-----: The People's Daily, 46 reporting frequencies.

____: The Central Daily News, 223.

The two newspapers, a total of 269.

FIGURE 29

TREND OF REPORTING FREQUENCY OF THE TWO NEWSPAPERS IN THEMATIC CATEGORY #28 "TRANSFER OF AMERICAN SCIENTIFIC TECHNOLOGY," DECEMBER 1978-MAY 1985 (FACTOR II: MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING)
Frequency: 0–32
Time Series: December 1978–May 1985

---: The People's Daily, 75 reporting frequencies.
___: The Central Daily News, 75.

The two newspapers, a total of 150.

FIGURE 30
TREND OF REPORTING FREQUENCY OF THE TWO NEWSPAPERS IN
THEMATIC CATEGORY #34 "THE PRC'S ONE NATION, TWO SYSTEMS
INTEGRATIVE MODEL," DECEMBER 1978–MAY 1985 (FACTOR III:
ECONOMIC FUNCTION)
Frequency: 0-56

-----: The People's Daily, 183 reporting frequencies.

The two newspapers, a total of 619.

FIGURE 31
Frequency: 0-8

-----: The People's Daily, 51 reporting frequencies.
-----: The Central Daily News, 39.

The two newspapers, a total of 90.

FIGURE 32
TREND OF REPORTING FREQUENCY OF THE TWO NEWSPAPERS IN THEMATIC CATEGORY #51 "PRC'S SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES IN GUANGDONG AND FUJIAN PROVINCES," DECEMBER 1978-MAY 1985 (FACTOR III: ECONOMIC FUNCTION)
Frequency: 0-86

----: The People's Daily, 356 reporting frequencies.

The two newspapers, a total of 2,151.

FIGURE 33

TREND OF REPORTING FREQUENCY OF THE TWO NEWSPAPERS IN
THEMATIC CATEGORY #22 "PROMOTING A WARMER RELATIONSHIP WITH
CHINA POLICY)
Frequency: 0–88
Time Series: December 1978–May 1985

-----: The People's Daily, 181 reporting frequencies.
-----: The Central Daily News, 716.

The two newspapers, a total of 897.

FIGURE 34
TREND OF REPORTING FREQUENCY OF THE TWO NEWSPAPERS IN
THEMATIC CATEGORY #23 "CALLING ON THE UNITED STATES TO
MAINTAIN A COLDER RELATIONSHIP WITH THE OTHER SIDE,"
Frequency: 0-112
-----: The People's Daily, 167 reporting frequencies.
-----: The Central Daily News, 327.
The two newspapers, a total of 494.

FIGURE 35

TREND OF REPORTING FREQUENCY OF THE TWO NEWSPAPERS IN
THEMATIC CATEGORY #24 "THE PRC'S DIPLOMATIC RELATIONSHIP
WITH THE UNITED STATES," DECEMBER 1978-MAY 1985 (FACTOR IV:
U.S. CHINA POLICY)
Frequency: 0-10
-----: The People's Daily, 72 reporting frequencies.
      : The Central Daily News, 149.
      The two newspapers, a total of 221.

FIGURE 36
TREND OF REPORTING FREQUENCY OF THE TWO NEWSPAPERS IN
THEMATIC CATEGORY #29 "EMPHASIS ON PRC'S OR ROC'S STRATEGIC
IMPORTANCE TO ASIA, THE UNITED STATES OR THE WORLD,"
DECEMBER 1978-MAY 1985 (FACTOR IV: U.S. CHINA POLICY)
Frequency: 0-41


----: The People's Daily, 323 reporting frequencies.

____: The Central Daily News, 442.

The two newspapers, a total of 765.

FIGURE 37

TREND OF REPORTING FREQUENCY OF THE TWO NEWSPAPERS IN
THEMATIC CATEGORY #1 "ONE GREATER CHINA TERRITORY," DECEMBER
1978-MAY 1985 (FACTOR IV: U.S. CHINA POLICY)
Frequency: 0-51
-----: The People's Daily, 94 reporting frequencies.
-----: The Central Daily News, 81.
The two newspapers, a total of 909.

FIGURE 38
TREND OF REPORTING FREQUENCY OF THE TWO NEWSPAPERS IN
THEMATIC CATEGORY #26 "U.S. ARMS SALES TO TAIWAN," DECEMBER
Frequency: 0-29

-----: The People's Daily, 50 reporting frequencies.

The two newspapers, a total of 460.

FIGURE 39
TREND OF REPORTING FREQUENCY OF THE TWO NEWSPAPERS IN
THEMATIC CATEGORY #25 "U.S. TAIWAN RELATIONS ACT," DECEMBER
The Shanghai Communique, February 28, 1972

President Richard Nixon of the United States of America visited the People's Republic of China at the invitation of Premier Chou En-lai of the People's Republic of China from February 21 to February 28, 1972. Accompanying the President was Mrs. Nixon, U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers, Assistant to the President Dr. Henry Kissinger, and other American officials.

President Nixon met with Chairman Mao Tse-tung of the Communist Party of China on February 21. The two leaders had a serious and frank exchange of views on Sino-US relations and world affairs.

During the visit, extensive, earnest and frank discussions were held between President Nixon and Premier Chou En-lai on the normalization of relations between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China, as well as on other matters of interest to both sides. In addition, Secretary of State William Rogers and Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei held talks in the same spirit.

President Nixon and his party visited Peking and viewed cultural, industrial and agricultural sites, and they also toured Hangchow and Shanghai where, continuing discussions with Chinese leaders, they viewed similar places of interest.

The leaders of the People's Republic of China and the United States of America found it beneficial to have this opportunity, after so many years without contact, to present candidly to one another their views on a variety of issues. They reviewed the international situation in which important changes and great upheavals are taking place and expounded their respective positions and attitudes.

The U.S. side stated: Peace in Asia and peace in the world requires efforts both to reduce immediate tensions and to eliminate the basic causes of conflict. The United States will work for a just and secure peace: just, because it fulfills the aspirations of peoples and nations for freedom and progress; secure, because it removes the danger of foreign aggression. The United States supports individual freedom and social progress for all the peoples of the world, free of outside pressure or intervention. The United States believes that the effort to reduce tensions is served by improving communication between countries that have different ideologies so as to lessen the risks of confrontation through accident, miscalculation or misunderstanding. Countries should treat each other with mutual respect and be willing to compete peacefully, letting performance be the ultimate judge. No country should claim infallibility and each country should be prepared to re-examine its own attitudes for the common good. The United States stressed that the peoples of Indochina should be allowed to determine their destiny without outside intervention; its constant primary objective has been a negotiated solution; the eight-point proposal put forward by the Republic
of Vietnam and the United States on January 27, 1972 represents a basis for the attainment of that objective; in the absence of a negotiated settlement the United States envisages the ultimate withdrawal of all U.S. forces from the region consistent with the aim of self-determination for each country of Indochina. The United States will maintain its close ties with and support for the Republic of Korea to seek a relaxation of tension and increased communication in the Korean peninsula. The United States places the highest value on its friendly relations with Japan; it will continue to develop the existing close bonds. Consistent with the United Nations Security Council Resolution of December 21, 1971, the United States favors the continuation of the ceasefire between India and Pakistan and the withdrawal of all military forces to within their own territories and to their own sides of the ceasefire line in Jammu and Kashmir; the United States supports the right of the peoples of South Asia to shape their own future in peace, free of military threat, and without having the area become the subject of great power rivalry.

The Chinese side stated: Wherever there is oppression, there is resistance. Countries want independence, nations want liberation and the people want revolution—this has become the irresistible trend of history. All nations, big or small, should be equal; big nations should not bully the small and strong nations should not bully the weak. China will never be a superpower and it opposes hegemony and power politics of any kind. The Chinese side stated that it firmly supports the struggles of all the oppressed people and nations for freedom and liberation and that the people of all countries have the right to choose their social systems according to their own wishes and the right to safeguard the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of their own countries and oppose foreign aggression, interference, control and subversion. All foreign troops should be withdrawn to their own countries.

The Chinese side expressed its firm support to the peoples of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia in their efforts for the attainment of their goal and its firm support to the seven-point proposal of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam and the elaboration of February this year on the two key problems in the proposal, and to the Joint Declaration of the Summit Conference of the Indochinese Peoples. It firmly supports the eight-point program for the peaceful unification of Korea put forward by the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on April 12, 1971, and the stand for the abolition of the “U.N. Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea.” It firmly opposes the revival and outward expansion of Japanese militarism and firmly supports the Japanese people's desire to build an
independent, democratic, peaceful and neutral Japan. It firmly maintains that India and Pakistan should, in accordance with the United Nations resolutions on the India-Pakistan question, immediately withdraw all their forces to their respective territories and to their own sides of the ceasefire line in Jammu and Kashmir and firmly supports the Pakistan Government and people in their struggle to preserve their independence and sovereignty and the people of Jammu and Kashmir in their struggle for the right of self-determination.

There are essential differences between China and the United States in their social systems and foreign policies. However, the two sides agreed that countries, regardless of their social systems, should conduct their relations on the principles of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, non-aggression against other states, non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. International disputes should be settled on this basis, without resorting to the use or threat of force. The United States and the People's Republic of China are prepared to apply these principles to their mutual relations.

With these principles of international relations in mind the two sides stated that:

- progress toward the normalization of relations between China and the United States is in the interests of all countries;
- both wish to reduce the danger of international military conflict;
- neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony; and
- neither is prepared to negotiate on behalf of any third party or to enter into agreements or understandings with the other directed at other states.

Both sides are of the view that it would be against the interests of the peoples of the world for any major country to collude with another against other countries, or for major countries to divide up the world into spheres of interest.

The two sides reviewed the long-standing serious disputes between China and the United States. The Chinese side reaffirmed its position: The Taiwan question is the crucial question obstructing the normalization of relations between China and the United States; the Government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal government of China; Taiwan is a province of China which has long been returned to the motherland; the liberation of Taiwan is China's internal affair in which no other country has the right to interfere; and all U.S. forces and military installations must be withdrawn from Taiwan. The Chinese Government firmly opposes any activities which aim at the creation of
"one China, one Taiwan," "one China, two governments," "two Chinas," and "independent Taiwan" or advocate that "the status of Taiwan remains to be determined."

The U.S. side declared: The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. With this prospect in mind, it affirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military installations from Taiwan. In the meantime, it will progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes.

The two sides agreed that it is desirable to broaden the understanding between the two peoples. To this end, they discussed specific areas in such fields as science, technology, culture, sports and journalism, in which people-to-people contacts and exchanges would be mutually beneficial. Each side undertakes to facilitate the further development of such contacts and exchanges.

Both sides view bilateral trade as another area from which mutual benefit can be derived, and agreed that economic relations based on equality and mutual benefit are in the interest of the peoples of the two countries. They agree to facilitate the progressive development of trade between their two countries.

The two sides agreed that they will stay in contact through various channels, including the sending of a senior U.S. representative to Peking from time to time for concrete consultations to further the normalization of relations between the two countries and continue to exchange views on issues of common interest.

The two sides expressed the hope that the gains achieved during this visit would open up new prospects for the relations between the two countries. They believe that the normalization of relations between the two countries is not only in the interest of the Chinese and American peoples but also contributes to the relaxation of tension in Asia and the world.

President Nixon, Mrs. Nixon and the American party expressed their appreciation for the gracious hospitality shown them by the Government and people of the People's Republic of China.

Joint Communique on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China, January 1, 1979

(The communiqué was released on December 15, 1978, in Washington and Peking)

The United States of America and the People’s Republic of China have agreed to recognize each other and to establish diplomatic relations as of January 1, 1979.

The United States of America recognizes the Government of the People’s Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China. Within this context, the people of the United States will maintain cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan.

The United States of America and the People’s Republic of China reaffirm the principles agreed on by the two sides in the Shanghai Communique and emphasize once again that:

• Both wish to reduce the danger of international military conflict.
• Neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region or in any other region of the world and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony.
• Neither is prepared to negotiate on behalf of any third party or to enter into agreements or understandings with the other directed at other states.
• The Government of the United States of America acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China.
• Both believe that normalization of Sino-American relations is not only in the interest of the Chinese and American peoples but also contributes to the cause of peace in Asia and the world.

The United States of America and the People’s Republic of China will exchange Ambassadors and establish Embassies on March 1, 1979.

*The Chinese text translated the word “acknowledges” into Cheng-jen, which, if retranslated into English, would mean “recognize.”


United States Statement Accompanying the Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the United States and the People’s Republic of China, December 15, 1978

As of January 1, 1979, the United States of America recognizes the People’s Republic of China as the sole legal government of China. On the same date, the People’s Republic of China accords similar recognition to the United States of America. The United States thereby establishes diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China.

On that same date, January 1, 1979, the United States of America will notify Taiwan that it is terminating diplomatic relations and that the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of China is being terminated in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty. The United States also states that it will be withdrawing its remaining military personnel from Taiwan within four months.

In the future, the American people and the people of Taiwan will maintain commercial, cultural, and other relations without official government representation and without diplomatic relations.

The Administration will seek adjustments to our laws and regulations to permit the maintenance of commercial, cultural, and other nongovernmental relationships in the new circumstances that will exist after normalization.

The United States is confident that the people of Taiwan face a peaceful and prosperous future. The United States continues to have an interest in the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue and expects that the Taiwan issue will be settled peacefully by the Chinese themselves.

The United States believes that the establishment of diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic will contribute to the welfare of the American people, to the stability of Asia where the United States has major security and economic interest, and to the peace of the entire world.

People's Republic of China Statement Accompanying the Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the United States and the PRC, December 15, 1978

As of January 1, 1979, the People's Republic of China and the United States of America recognize each other and establish diplomatic relations, thereby ending the prolonged abnormal relationship between them. This is a historic event in Sino-U.S. relations.

As is known to all, the Government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal Government of China and Taiwan is a part of China. The question of Taiwan was the crucial issue obstructing the normalization of relations between China and the United States. It has now been resolved between the two countries in the spirit of the Shanghai Communiqué and through their joint efforts, thus enabling the normalization of relations so ardently desired by the people of the two countries. As for the way of bringing Taiwan back to the embrace of the motherland and reunifying the country, it is entirely China's internal affair.

At the invitation of the U.S. Government, Teng Hsiao-ping, Vice-Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, will pay an official visit to the United States in January 1979, with a view to further promoting the friendship between the two peoples and good relations between the two countries.
APPENDIX 5: JANUARY 1, 1979. PRC'S ANNOUNCEMENT OF HALTING ITS BOMBINGS ON QUEMOY AND MATSU ISLANDS, AND PRC'S "A MESSAGE TO COMPATRIOTS IN TAIWAN" (The People's Daily)
TEXT OF NPC STANDING COMMITTEE MESSAGE TO TAIWAN COMPATRIOTS

Beijing, January 1, 1979

[emphasize added]

Text of the New Year's Day message of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress to compatriots in Taiwan, which was endorsed after discussion at the committee's fifth plenary session on December 26:

Dear compatriots in Taiwan:

Today is New Year's Day 1979. We hereby extend our cordial and sincere greetings to you on behalf of the people of all nationalities on the mainland of our motherland.

As an old saying goes, "a special festival calls up affectionate remembrances of our beloved ones." On this happy occasion as we celebrate New Year's Day, our thoughts turn all the more to our kith and kin, our old folks, our brothers and sisters, in Taiwan. We know you have the motherland and your kinsfolk on the mainland in mind too. This mutual feeling of many years standing grows with each passing day. From the day when Taiwan was regrettably separated from the motherland in 1949, we have not been able to communicate with or visit each other, our motherland has remained disunited, relatives have been unable to have a reunion, and our nation, country and people have suffered great losses as a result. All Chinese compatriots and people of Chinese descent throughout the world, without exception, look forward to an early termination of this sad situation.

Our Chinese nation is a great nation. It accounts for almost a quarter of the world's population and has a long history and excellent culture, and its outstanding contributions to world civilization and human progress are universally recognized. Taiwan has been an inalienable part of China since ancient times. The Chinese nation has great vitality and cohesiveness. All through past history, foreign invasions and internal strife have failed to split our nation permanently. Taiwan's separation from the motherland for nearly 30 years has been artificial and
against our national interests and aspirations, and this state of affairs must not be allowed to continue. Every Chinese, in Taiwan or on the mainland, has a compelling responsibility for the survival, growth and prosperity of the Chinese nation. The important task of reunifying our motherland, on which hinges the future of the whole nation, now lies before us all; it is an issue no one can evade or should try to. If we do not quickly set about ending this disunity so that our motherland is reunified at an early date, what can we say to our ancestors or to our descendants? This sentiment is shared by all; and who among the descendants of the Yellow Emperor wishes to be branded a traitor of all ages?

Radical changes have taken place in China's status in the world over the past 30 years. Our country's international prestige keeps rising and its international role becomes ever more important. The people and governments of almost all countries now place tremendous hopes on us in the struggle against hegemonism and in safeguarding peace and stability in Asia and the world as a whole. Every Chinese is proud to see the growing strength and prosperity of our motherland. If we can end the present disunity and join forces soon, there will be no limit to our contributions to the future of mankind. Early reunification of our motherland is not only the common desire of all the people of China, including all compatriots in Taiwan, but the common wish of all peace-loving peoples and countries the world over.

Reunification of China now fits in with the direction of popular feeling and the general trend of development. The world in general recognizes only one China, with the Government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal government. The recent conclusion of the China-Japan treaty of peace and friendship and the normalization of relations between China and the United States show still more clearly that no one can stop this trend. The present situation in the motherland, one of stability and unity, is better than ever. The people of all nationalities on the mainland are working hard and with one will for the great goal of the four modernizations. It is our fervent hope that Taiwan returns to the embrace of the motherland at an early date so that we can work together for the great cause of national development. Our state leaders have firmly declared that they will take present realities into account in
accomplishing the great cause of reunifying the motherland and respect the status quo on Taiwan and the opinions of people in all walks of life there and adopt reasonable policies and measures in settling the question of reunification so as not to cause the people of Taiwan any losses. On the other hand, people in all walks in Taiwan have expressed their yearning for their homeland and old friends, stated their desire "to trace their roots and return," and raised diverse proposals which express their earnest hope for an early return to the embrace of the motherland. With all conditions now favorable for reunification and everything set, no one should go against the will of the nation and counter the trend of history.

We place great hopes on the 17 million people on Taiwan and also the Taiwan authorities. The Taiwan authorities have always taken a firm stand of one China and opposed an independent Taiwan. This is our common stand and the basis for our cooperation. We have always taken the position that all patriots belong to one family. The responsibility for reunifying the motherland rests with each of us. We hope the Taiwan authorities will place national interests paramount and make valuable contributions to the reunification of the motherland.

The Chinese Government has ordered the People's Liberation Army to stop the bombardment of Quemoy and other islands as from today. A state of military confrontation between the two sides still exists along the Taiwan straits. This can only create artificial tension. We hold that first of all this military confrontation should be ended through discussion between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Taiwan authorities so as to create the necessary prerequisites and a secure environment for the two sides to make contacts and exchanges in whatever area.

The prolonged separation has caused a lack of mutual understanding between the compatriots on the mainland and on Taiwan and various inconveniences for both sides. Since many Overseas Chinese residing in foreign lands far away can return for visits and tours and reunion with their families, why shouldn't compatriots living so near, on the mainland and Taiwan, visit each other freely? We believe that there is no reason for such barriers to continue. We hope both sides will bring about at an early date the setting up of transportation and postal services to make it easier for compatriots of both sides to contact
each other directly, write to each other, visit relatives and friends, exchange tours and visits and make academic, cultural, sports and technological interchange.

Economically speaking, Taiwan and the mainland of the motherland were originally an entity. Unfortunately, economic ties have been suspended for many years. Now, construction is going on vigorously in the motherland and we also wish Taiwan growing economic prosperity. There is every reason for us to develop trade between us, each making up what the other lacks and create economic interflow.

This is our mutual need and will benefit both parties without doing any harm.

Dear compatriots in Taiwan:

The bright future of our great motherland belongs to us and also to you. The reunification of the motherland is the sacred mission history has bequeathed to our generation. Times are moving along and the situation is developing. The earlier we fulfil this mission, the sooner we can jointly write an unprecedented, brilliant page in the history of our country, catch up with advanced powers and work together for this glorious goal!
APPENDIX 7: OCTOBER 1, 1981. YE JIAYING'S NINE-POINT PEACE PROPOSAL (The People's Daily)
Ye Jianying, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, in an interview with Xinhua today, elaborated on the policy concerning the return of Taiwan to the motherland for the realization of China's peaceful reunification.

The full text of his statement follows:

Today, on the eve of the 32nd anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China and at the approach of the 70th anniversary of the 1911 Revolution, I wish, first of all, to extend my festive greetings and cordial regards to the people of all nationalities throughout the country, including the compatriots in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao, and Chinese nationals residing in foreign countries.

On New Year's Day 1979, the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress issued a message to the compatriots in Taiwan, in which it proclaimed the policy of striving to reunify the motherland peacefully. The message received warm support and active response from the people of all nationalities throughout China, including the compatriots in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao, and those residing abroad. A relaxed atmosphere has set in across the Taiwan Straits. Now, I would take this opportunity to elaborate on the policy concerning the return of Taiwan to the motherland for the realization of peaceful reunification:

(1) In order to bring an end to the unfortunate separation of the Chinese nation as early as possible, we propose that talks be held between the Communist Party of China and the Kuomintang of China on a reciprocal basis so that the two parties will cooperate for the third time to accomplish the great cause of national reunification. The two sides may first send people to meet for an exhaustive exchange of views.

(2) It is the urgent desire of the people of all nationalities of both sides of the Straits to communicate with each other, reunite with their relatives, develop trade and increase mutual understanding. We propose that the two sides make arrangements to facilitate the exchange of mails, trade, air and shipping services, and visits by relatives and tourists as well as academic, cultural and sports exchanges, and reach an agreement thereupon.

(3) After the country is reunified, Taiwan can enjoy a high degree of autonomy as a special administrative region and it can retain its armed forces. The central government will not interfere with local affairs on Taiwan.
(4) Taiwan's current socio-economic system will remain unchanged, so will its way of life and its economic and cultural relations with foreign countries. There will be no encroachment on the proprietary rights and lawful right of inheritance over private property, houses, land and enterprises, or on foreign investments.

(5) People in authority and representative personages of various circles in Taiwan may take up posts of leadership in national political bodies and participate in running the state.

(6) When Taiwan's local finance is in difficulty, the central government may subsidize it as is fit for the circumstances.

(7) For people of all nationalities and public figures of various circles in Taiwan who wish to come and settle on the mainland, it is guaranteed that proper arrangements will be made for them, that there will be no discrimination against them, and that they will have the freedom of entry and exit.

(8) Industrialists and businessmen in Taiwan are welcome to invest and engage in various economic undertakings on the mainland, and their legal rights, interests and profits are guaranteed.

(9) The reunification of the motherland is the responsibility of all Chinese. We sincerely welcome people of all nationalities, public figures of all circles and all mass organizations in Taiwan to make proposals and suggestions regarding affairs of state through various channels and in various ways.

Taiwan's return to the embrace of the motherland and the accomplishment of the great cause of national reunification is a great and glorious mission history has bequeathed on our generation. China's reunification and prosperity is in the vital interest of the Chinese people of all nationalities — not only those on the mainland, but those in Taiwan as well. It is also in the interest of peace in the Far East and the world.

We hope that our compatriots in Taiwan will give full play to their patriotism and work energetically for the early realization of the great unity of our nation and share the honor of it. We hope that our compatriots in Hong Kong and Macao and Chinese nations residing abroad will continue to act in the role of a bridge and contribute their share to the reunification of the motherland.

We hope that the Kuomintang authorities will stick to their one-China position and their opposition to "two Chinas" and that they will put national interests above everything else, forget previous ill-will and join hands with us in accomplishing the great cause of national reunification and the great goal of making China prosperous and strong, so as to win glory for our ancestors, bring benefit to our posterity and write a new and glorious page in the history of the Chinese nation.
Taiwan Relations Act, 1979

SHORT TITLE
Section 1. This Act may be cited as the “Taiwan Relations Act”.

SEC. 2. (a) The President having terminated governmental relations between the United States and the governing authorities on Taiwan recognized by the United States as the Republic of China prior to January 1, 1979, the Congress finds that the enactment of this Act is necessary-
(1) to help maintain peace, security, and stability in the Western Pacific; and
(2) to promote the foreign policy of the United States by authorizing the continuation of commercial, cultural, and other relations between the people of the United States and the people on Taiwan.

(b) It is the policy of the United States-
(1) to preserve and promote extensive, close, and friendly commercial, cultural, and other relations between the people of the United States and the people on Taiwan, as well as the people on the China mainland and all other peoples of the Western Pacific area;
(2) to declare that peace and stability in the area are in the political, security, and economic interests of the United States, and are matters of international concern;
(3) to make clear that the United States decision to establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means;
(4) to consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States;
(5) to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character; and
(6) to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan.

(c) Nothing contained in this Act shall contravene the interest of the United States in human rights especially with respect to the human rights of all the approximately 18 million inhabitants of Taiwan. The preservation and enhancement of the human rights of all the people on Taiwan are hereby reaffirmed as objectives of the United States.

IMPLEMENTATION OF UNITED STATES POLICY WITH REGARD TO TAIWAN

SEC. 3. (a) In furtherance of the policy set forth in section 2 of this Act, the United States will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.

(b) The President and the Congress shall determine the nature and quantity of such defense articles and services based solely upon their judgment of the
needs of Taiwan, in accordance with procedures established by law. Such determination of Taiwan's defense needs shall include review by United States military authorities in connection with recommendations to the President and the Congress.

(c) The President is directed to inform the Congress promptly of any threat to the security or the social or economic system of the people on Taiwan and any danger to the interests of the United States arising therefrom. The President and the Congress shall determine, in accordance with constitutional processes, appropriate action by the United States in response to any such danger.

APPLICATION OF LAWS; INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS

SEC. 4. (a) The absence of diplomatic relations or recognition shall not affect the application of the laws of the United States with respect to Taiwan, and the laws of the United States shall apply with respect to Taiwan in the manner that the laws of the United States applied with respect to Taiwan prior to January 1, 1979.

(b) The application of subsection (a) of this section shall include, but shall not be limited to, the following:

(1) Whenever the laws of the United States refer or relate to foreign countries, nations, states, governments, or similar entities, such terms shall include and such laws shall apply with respect to Taiwan.

(2) Whenever authorized by or pursuant to the laws of the United States to conduct or carry out programs, transactions, or other relations with respect to foreign countries, nations, states, governments, or similar entities, the President or any agency of the United States Government is authorized to conduct and carry out, in accordance with section 6 of this Act, such programs, transactions, and other relations with respect to Taiwan (including, but not limited to, the performance of services for the United States through contracts with commercial entities on Taiwan), in accordance with the applicable laws of the United States.

(3) (A) The absence of diplomatic relations and recognition with respect to Taiwan shall not abrogate, infringe, modify, deny, or otherwise affect in any way any rights or obligations (including but not limited to those involving contracts, debts, or property interests of any kind) under the laws of the United States heretofore or hereafter acquired by or with respect to Taiwan.

(B) For all purposes under the laws of the United States, including actions in any court in the United States, recognition of the People's Republic of China shall not affect in any way the ownership of or other rights or interests in properties, tangible and intangible, and other things of value, owned or held on or prior to December 31, 1978, or thereafter acquired or earned by the governing authorities on Taiwan.

(4) Whenever the application of the laws of the United States depends upon the law that is or was applicable on Taiwan or compliance therewith, the
law applied by the people on Taiwan shall be considered the applicable law for that purpose.

(5) Nothing in this Act, nor the facts of the President's action in extending diplomatic recognition to the People's Republic of China, the absence of diplomatic relations between the people on Taiwan and the United States, or the lack of recognition by the United States, and attendant circumstances thereto, shall be construed in any administrative or judicial proceeding as a basis for any United States Government agency, commission, or department to make a finding of fact or determination of law, under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, to deny an export license application or to revoke an existing export license for nuclear exports to Taiwan.

(6) For purposes of the Immigration and Nationality Act, Taiwan may be treated in the manner specified in the first sentence of section 202(b) of that Act.

(7) The capacity of Taiwan to sue and be sued in courts in the United States, in accordance with the laws of the United States, shall not be abrogated, infringed, modified, denied, or otherwise affected in any way by the absence of diplomatic relations or recognition.

(8) No requirement, whether expressed or implied, under the laws of the United States with respect to maintenance of diplomatic relations or recognition shall be applicable with respect to Taiwan.

(c) For all purposes, including actions in any court in the United States, the Congress approve the continuation in force of all treaties and other international agreements, including multilateral conventions, entered into by the United States and the governing authorities on Taiwan recognized by the United States as the Republic of China prior to January 1, 1979, and in force between them on December 31, 1978, unless and until terminated in accordance with law.

(d) Nothing in this Act may be construed as a basis for supporting the exclusion or expulsion of Taiwan from continued membership in any international financial institution or any other international organization.

OVERSEAS PRIVATE INVESTMENT CORPORATION

SEC. 5. (a) During the three-year period beginning on the date of enactment of this Act, the $1,000 per capita income restriction in clause (2) of the second undesignated paragraph of section 231 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 shall not restrict the activities of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation in determining whether to provide any insurance, reinsurance, loans, or guaranties with respect to investment projects on Taiwan.

(b) Except as provided in subsection (a) of this section, in issuing insurance, reinsurance, loans, or guaranties with respect to investment projects on Taiwan, the Overseas Private Insurance Corporation shall apply the same criteria as those applicable in other parts of the world.
SEC. 6. (a) Programs, transactions, and other relations conducted or carried out by the President or any agency of the United States Government with respect to Taiwan shall, in the manner and to the extent directed by the President, be conducted and carried out by or through—

(1) The American Institute in Taiwan, a nonprofit corporation incorporated under the laws of the District of Columbia, or
(2) such comparable successor nongovernmental entity as the President may designate, (hereafter in this Act referred to as the "Institute").

(b) Whenever the President or any agency of the United States Government is authorized or required by or pursuant to the laws of the United States to enter into, perform, enforce, or have in force an agreement or transaction relative to Taiwan, such agreement or transaction shall be entered into, performed, and enforced, in the manner and to the extent directed by the President, by or through the Institute.

(c) To the extent that any law, rule, regulation, or ordinance of the District of Columbia, or of any State or political subdivision thereof in which the Institute is incorporated or doing business, impedes or otherwise interferes with the performance of the functions of the Institute pursuant to this Act, such law, rule, regulation, or ordinance shall be deemed to be preempted by this Act.

SERVICES BY THE INSTITUTE TO UNITED STATES CITIZENS ON TAIWAN

SEC. 7. (a) The Institute may authorize any of its employees on Taiwan—

(1) to administer to or take from any person an oath, affirmation, affidavit, or deposition, and to perform any notarial act which any notary public is required or authorized by law to perform within the United States;
(2) to act as provisional conservator of the personal estates of deceased United States citizens; and
(3) to assist and protect the interests of United States persons by performing other acts such as are authorized to be performed outside the United States for consular purposes by such laws of the United States as the President may specify.

(b) Acts performed by authorized employees of the Institute under this section shall be valid, and of like force and effect within the United States, as if performed by any other person authorized under the laws of the United States to perform such acts.

TAX EXEMPT STATUS OF THE INSTITUTE

SEC. 8 (a) The Institute, its property, and its income are exempt from all taxation now or hereafter imposed by the United States (except to the extent that section 11 (a) (3) of this Act requires the imposition of taxes imposed under chapter 21 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, relating to the Federal Insurance Contributions Act) or by any State or local taxing authority of the United States.
(b) For purposes of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, the Institute shall be treated as an organization described in sections 170(b)(1)(A), 179(c), 2055(a), 2106(a)(2)(A), 2522, and 2522b).

FURNISHING PROPERTY AND SERVICES TO AND OBTAINING SERVICES FROM THE INSTITUTE

SEC. 9. (a) Any agency of the United States Government is authorized to sell, loan, or lease property (including interests therein) to, and to perform administrative and technical support functions and services for the operations of, the Institute upon such terms and conditions as the President may direct. Reimbursements to agencies under this subsection shall be credited to the current applicable appropriation of the agency concerned.

(b) Any agency of the United States Government is authorized to acquire and accept services from the Institute upon such terms and conditions as the President may direct. Whenever the President determines it to be in furtherance of the purposes of this Act, the procurements of services by such agencies from the Institute may be effected without regard to such laws of the United States normally applicable to the acquisition of services by such agencies as the President may specify by Executive order.

(c) Any agency of the United States Government making funds available to the Institute in accordance with this Act shall make arrangements with the Institute for the Comptroller General of the United States to have access to the books and records of the Institute and the opportunity to audit the operations of the Institute.

TAIWAN INSTRUMENTALITY

SEC. 10. (a) Whenever the President or any agency of the United States Government is authorized or required by or pursuant to the laws of the United States to render or provide to or to receive or accept from Taiwan, any performance, communication, assurance, undertaking, or other action, such action shall, in the manner and to the extent directed by the President, be rendered or provided to, or received or accepted from, an instrumentality established by Taiwan which the President determines has the necessary authority under the laws applied by the people on Taiwan to provide assurances and take other actions on behalf of Taiwan in accordance with the Act.

(b) The President is requested to extend to the instrumentality established by Taiwan the same number of offices and complement of personnel as were previously operated in the United States by the governing authorities on Taiwan recognized as the Republic of China prior to January 1, 1979.

(c) Upon the granting by Taiwan of comparable privileges and immunities with respect to the Institute and its appropriate personnel, the President is authorized to extend with respect to the Taiwan instrumentality and its appropriate personnel, such privileges and immunities (subject to appropriate conditions and obligations) as may be necessary for the effective performance of their functions.
APPENDIX
(Continued)


SEPARATION OF GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL FOR EMPLOYMENT WITH THE INSTITUTE

SEC. 11. (a) (1) Under such terms and conditions as the President may direct, any agency of the United States Government may separate from Government service for a specified period any officer or employee of that agency who accepts employment with the Institute.

(2) An officer or employee separated by an agency under paragraph (1) of this subsection for employment with the Institute shall be entitled upon termination of such employment to reemployment or reinstatement with such agency (or a successor agency) in an appropriate position with the attendant rights, privileges, and benefits which the officer or employee would have had or acquired had he or she not been so separated, subject to such time period and other conditions as the President may prescribe.

(3) An officer or employee entitled to reemployment or reinstatement rights under paragraph (2) of this subsection shall, while continuously employed by the Institute with no break in continuity of service, continue to participate in any benefit program in which such officer or employee was participating prior to employment by the Institute, including programs for compensation for job-related death, injury, or illness; programs for health and life insurance; programs for annual, sick, and other statutory leave; and programs for retirement under any system established by the laws of the United States; except that employment with the Institute shall be the basis for participation in such programs only to the extent that employee deductions and employer contributions, as required, in payment for such participation for the period of employment with the Institute, are currently deposited in the program's or system's fund or depository. Death or retirement of any such officer or employee during approved service with the Institute and prior to reemployment or reinstatement shall be considered a death in or retirement from Government service for purposes of any employee or survivor benefits acquired by reason of service with an agency of the United States Government.

(4) Any officer or employee of an agency of the United States Government who entered into service with the Institute on approved leave of absence without pay prior to the enactment of this Act shall receive the benefits of this section for the period of such services.

(b) Any agency of the United States Government employing alien personnel on Taiwan may transfer such personnel, with accrued allowances, benefits, and rights, to the Institute without a break in service for purposes of retirement and other benefits, including continued participation in any system established by the laws of the United States for the retirement of employees in which the alien was participating prior to the transfer to the Institute, except that employment with the Institute shall be creditable for retirement purposes only to the extent that employee deductions and employer contributions, as required, in payment for such participation for the period of employment with the Institute, are currently deposited in the system's fund or depository.
(c) Employees of the Institute shall not be employees of the United States and, in representing the Institute, shall be exempt from section 207 of title 18, United States Code.

(d)(1) For purposes of sections 911 and 913 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, amounts paid by the Institute to its employees shall not be treated as earned income. Amounts received by employees of the Institute shall not be included in gross income, and shall be exempt from taxation, to the extent that they are equivalent to amounts received by civilian officers and employees of the Government of the United States as allowances and benefits which are exempt from taxation under section 912 of such Code.

(2) Except to the extent required by subsection (a)(3) of this section, service performed in the employ of the Institute shall not constitute employment for purposes of chapter 21 of such Code and title II of the Social Security Act.

REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

SEC. 12. (a) The Secretary of State shall transmit to the Congress the text of any agreement to which the Institute is a party. However, any such agreement the immediate public disclosure of which would, in the opinion of the President, be prejudicial to the national security of the United States shall not be so transmitted to the Congress but shall be transmitted to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives under an appropriate injunction of secrecy to be removed only upon due notice from the President.

(b) For purposes of subsection (a), the term “agreement” includes—

(1) any agreement entered into between the Institute and the governing authorities on Taiwan or the instrumentality established by Taiwan; and

(2) any agreement entered into between the Institute and an agency of the United States Government.

(c) Agreements and transactions made or to be made by or through the Institute shall be subject to the same congressional notification, review, and approval requirements and procedures as if such agreements and transactions were made by or through the agency of the United States Government on behalf of which the Institute is acting.

(d) During the two-year period beginning on the effective date of this Act, the Secretary of State shall transmit to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, every six months, a report describing and reviewing economic relations between the United States and Taiwan, noting any interference with normal commercial relations.

RULES AND REGULATIONS

SEC. 13. The President is authorized to prescribe such rules and regulations as he may deem appropriate to carry out the purposes of this Act. During the three-year period beginning on the effective date of this Act, such rules and regulations shall be transmitted promptly to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate. Such action shall not, however, relieve the Institute of the responsibilities placed upon it by this Act.
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

SEC. 14. (a) The Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, and other appropriate committees of the Congress shall monitor—

1. the implementation of the provisions of this Act;
2. the operation and procedures of the Institute;
3. the legal and technical aspects of the continuing relationship between the United States and Taiwan; and
4. the implementation of the policies of the United States concerning security and cooperation in East Asia.

(b) Such committees shall report, as appropriate, to their respective Houses on the results of their monitoring.

DEFINITIONS

SEC. 15. For purposes of this Act—

1. the term "laws of the United States" includes any statute, rule, regulation, ordinance, order, or judicial rule of decision of the United States or any political subdivision thereof; and
2. the term "Taiwan" includes, as the context may require, the islands of Taiwan and the Pescadores, the people on those islands, corporations and other entities and associations created or organized under the laws applied on those islands, and the governing authorities on Taiwan recognized by the United States as the Republic of China prior to January 1, 1979, and any successor governing authorities (including political subdivisions, agencies, and instrumentalities there-of).

AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS

SEC. 16. In addition to funds otherwise available to carry out the provisions of this Act, there are authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary of State for the fiscal year 1980 such funds as may be necessary to carry out such provisions. Such funds are authorized to remain available until expended.

SEVERABILITY OF PROVISIONS

SEC. 17. If any provisions of this Act or the application thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the remainder of the Act and the application of such provision to any other person or circumstance shall not be affected thereby.

EFFECTIVE DATE

SEC. 18. This Act shall be effective as of January 1, 1979.
(The Central Daily News)
CHINA REUNIFICATION ISSUE  


China-US Joint Communiqué

August 17, 1982

(1) In the Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations on January 1, 1979, issued by the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the People's Republic of China, the United States of America recognized the Government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China, and it acknowledged the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China. Within that context, the two sides agreed that the people of the United States would continue to maintain cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan. On this basis, relations between the United States and China were normalized.

(2) The question of United States arms sales to Taiwan was not settled in the course of negotiations between the two countries on establishing diplomatic relations. The two sides held differing positions, and the Chinese side stated that it would raise the issue again following normalization. Recognizing that this issue would seriously hamper the development of United States-China relations, they have held further discussions on it, during and since the meetings between President Ronald Reagan and Premier Zhao Ziyang and between Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr. and Vice-Premier and Foreign Minister Huang Hua in October 1981.

(3) Respect for each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity and non-interference in each other's internal affairs constitute the fundamental principles guiding United States-China relations. These principles were confirmed in the Shanghai Communique of February 28, 1972 and reaffirmed in the Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations which came into effect on January 1, 1979. Both sides emphatically state that these principles continue to govern all aspects of their relations.

(4) The Chinese Government reiterates that the question of Taiwan is China's internal affair. The Message to Compatriots in Taiwan issued by China on January 1, 1979 promulgated a fundamental policy of striving for peaceful reunification of the motherland. The Nine-Point Proposal put forward by China on September 30, 1981 represented a further major effort under this fundamental policy to strive for a peaceful solution to the Taiwan question.

(5) The United States Government attaches great importance to its relations with China, and reiterates that it has no intention of infringing on Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity, or interfering in China's internal affairs, or pursuing a policy of "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan." The United States Government understands and appreciates the Chinese policy of striving for a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question as indicated in China's Message to Compatriots in Taiwan issued on January 1, 1979 and the Nine-Point Proposal put forward by China on September 30, 1981. The new situation which has emerged with regard to the Taiwan question also provides favourable conditions for the settlement of United States-China differences over United States arms sales to Taiwan.

(6) Having in mind the foregoing statements of both sides, the United States Government states that it does not seek to carry out a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan, that its arms sales to Taiwan will not exceed, either in qualitative or in quantitative terms, the level of those supplied in recent years since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and China, and that it intends gradually to reduce its sale of arms to Taiwan, leading, over a period of time, to a final resolution. In so stating, the United States acknowledges China's consistent position regarding the thorough settlement of this issue.

(7) In order to bring about, over a period of time, a final settlement of the question of United States arms sales to Taiwan, which is an issue rooted in history, the two Governments will make every effort to adopt measures and create conditions conducive to the thorough settlement of this issue.

(8) The development of United States-China relations is not only in the interests of the two peoples but also conducive to peace and stability in the world. The two sides are determined, on the principle of equality and mutual benefit, to strengthen their ties in the economic, cultural, educational, scientific, technological and other fields and make strong joint efforts for the continued development of relations between the Governments and peoples of the United States and China.

(9) In order to bring about the healthy development of United States-China relations, maintain world peace and oppose aggression and expansion, the two Governments reaffirm the principles agreed on by the two sides in the Shanghai Communique and the Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations. The two sides will maintain contact and hold appropriate consultations on bilateral and international issues of common interest.
APPENDIX 12: AUGUST 18, 1982. ROC'S PROTEST ON PRC-U.S. JOINT COMMUNIQUE OF AUGUST 17, 1982
From the moment of its founding, the Republic of China has dedicated itself to abolishing unequal treaties affecting China, and to establishing a China that is of the people, by the people, and for the people.

Hongkong and Kowloon are Chinese territory, and the right of sovereignty over them should naturally be returned to the Republic of China. But the British government has had the effrontery to arrange an "agreement" on the so-called Hongkong problem with the Chinese Communists, that totally ignores the will and wishes of the 5.5 million free residents of Hongkong and Kowloon, and would force them into a slave system of Communist totalitarianism. This is not only a disgraceful episode in human history, but also a grievous offence to all seekers of peace and devotees of democracy in the world. Therefore, the government and the people of the Republic of China can not recognize such an "agreement."

To achieve their purpose of swallowing Hongkong, the Chinese Communists—fearful of resistance from the Chinese in Hongkong and Kowloon, who demand freedom and democracy—went out of their way to embellish an illusion of "one country, two systems." They "promised" that the present Hongkong system would remain unchanged for 50 years, in order to confuse the world and to bilk the people of Hongkong and Kowloon.

It is no secret that throughout the history of the Communists, there has never been any record established of their good faith nor any "agreement" that was not later trashed. No matter what the illusion the Chinese Communists attempt to create today, the basic policy identified in their "four principles" is in sharp illustration of the fact that Communism's totalitarian nature will never change.

Freedom cannot be faked, nor can it be divided, nor confined in fences. What the whole Chinese people seek is an eternal, perfected, and fully realized state of well-being nourished on freedom and democracy. We believe that the people of Hongkong and Kowloon—patrons of peace and of democ-
racy—will never tolerate the saddle of Communist artifice and deceit.

Hongkong and Kowloon are, tragically, being ushered toward an era of darkness. The government and people of the Republic of China extend their deepest concern to the residents of these Chinese areas.

On behalf of the government and people of the Republic of China, with emotions of deep grief, I solemnly declare the following points of assistance for our beloved compatriots in Hongkong and Kowloon:

1. We will continue to expose Chinese Communist intrigues directed toward Hongkong and Kowloon and their sly and execrable intent with regard to the inhabitants of Hongkong and Kowloon. We will make clear for our compatriots in Hongkong and Kowloon and people round the world that any pledge made by the Chinese Communists is but a mirage radiating from consistent practices of trickery and hypocrisy.

2. We will continue to rouse public opinion in the world to help assure the freedom and prosperity of Hongkong, and to support our compatriots in fully expressing their aspirations for freedom and democracy and their rejection of Communist rule. We will also call upon the nations and peoples of the free world to take on squarely the issue of the future of Hongkong and Kowloon, calling on them to uphold international justice and to render active assistance to the inhabitants of Hongkong and Kowloon.

3. We urge the Chinese residents of Hongkong and Kowloon to more vigorously pursue their struggle against Communism, for freedom. We will assist and support this struggle using various methods and via different channels.

4. We hope the Chinese residents of Hongkong and Kowloon will work together in solidarity and extend themselves to participate in as many local "elections" as possible so that their strength will be burnished to deal with Chinese Communist ambitions for control, and thereby to help protect and secure freedom and democracy.
5. The ROC Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission has set up a special office to offer information and assistance to those Chinese in Hongkong and Kowloon who wish to come to Taiwan.

6. Chinese residents of Hongkong and Kowloon may apply via presently established procedures for multiple entry permits to travel to Taiwan.

7. For the dedicated anti-Communist Chinese residents of Hongkong and Kowloon, we will make ready arrangements so they may return here at any time.

8. For patriotic Chinese of Hongkong and Kowloon who wish to come and settle down here, we will make things as easy as possible, and we will assist them to obtain loans to purchase homes.

9. To those Chinese of Hongkong and Kowloon who wish to come here to arrange to invest and to do business, we will give prior consideration to their cases and render assistance and guidance.

10. If the Chinese residents of Hongkong and Kowloon wish to deposit their savings in Taiwan, our Offshore Banking Unit will provide appropriate services so remittances can be freely made and encounter no restriction.

11. To those Hongkong-Kowloon Chinese who wish to arrange education for their children in Taiwan, we will give prior consideration and provide assistance, guidance, and appropriate arrangements for them.

Finally, I would like to say to our compatriots in Hongkong and Kowloon that though night falls, dawn will surely follow. If you sharpen your awareness to avoid being entrapped by Chinese Communist deceptions, join in solidarity, and act in consonance with us here in Taiwan, the Hongkong and Kowloon area will one day definitely be reunited with the Republic of China.
APPENDIX 14: FEBRUARY 16, 1985. ROC PREMIER YU KUO-HUA'S REMARKS ON PRC'S ONE NATION, TWO SYSTEMS MODEL
1978 Constitution

Preamble

"...Taiwan is the sacred territory of China. We must definitely liberate Taiwan and complete the great work of unifying the fatherland..."

1982 Constitution

Adopted on December 4, 1982 by the Fifth National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China At Its Fifth Session

Preamble

"...Taiwan is a part of the sacred territory of the People’s Republic of China. The great endeavor of accomplishing unification of the fatherland is the sacred responsibility of the people of all China, including the compatriots of Taiwan..."

Chapter One
General Principles
Article Four

"...Regional autonomy applies in areas where people of national minorities live in compact communities; autonomous organs will be established to exercise the rights of autonomy. National autonomous areas are inalienable parts of the People’s Republic of China..."

Article Thirty

"The state may, when necessary, establish special administrative districts. The system practiced in the special administrative districts will be stipulated by law in accordance with the concrete situation."

(It is interesting to note that the PRC’s 1954 and 1975 Constitutions neither mention Taiwan by name nor address the issue of national reunification. In addition, the question of the governance of China’s “national autonomous regions”: Xinjiang, Guangxi, Ningxia, Inner Mongolia, and Xizang (Tibet) receives a considerable degree of legalistic attention in the 1982 Constitution that is largely absent in the 1954, 1975, and 1978 versions. In addition to reflecting Beijing’s increased concern for legal norms, this section also probably reflects Beijing’s sensitivity to Taiwan’s charges that the PRC’s actions in Tibet since 1959 are an “object lesson” in Communist perfidy).
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