UNITED STATES-CHINA NORMALIZATION: AN EVALUATION OF FOREIGN POLICY DECISION MAKING
Jaw-ling Joanne Chang

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UNITED STATES-CHINA NORMALIZATION
AN EVALUATION OF FOREIGN POLICY DECISION MAKING

Jaw-ling Joanne Chang
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Finally, I thank my husband whose forbearance and encouragement were essential to me.

Despite all the help I have received from many sources, I alone am responsible for the contents and shortcomings of this book.
To my parents
    Yu-hwa and Yu-feng Chyou

To my family
    Eugene and Jennifer Chang
WADE-GILES AND PINYIN SPELLINGS

In 1978, the State Council of the People’s Republic of China announced that it had decided to use the Chinese phonetic alphabet, called pinyin, to standardize the romanization of the names of people and places in China. The change went into effect on January 1, 1979. The new system poses problems and confusions for the reader unfamiliar with Chinese pronunciation. The older spelling (Wade-Giles) is used in this dissertation because this study deals with the analysis of the pre-1979 period.* The names under the old spelling and the new system are listed as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Old</th>
<th>New</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mao Tse-tung</td>
<td>Mao Zedong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chou En-lai</td>
<td>Zhou Enlai</td>
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<td>Teng Hsiao-p’ing</td>
<td>Deng Xiaoping</td>
</tr>
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<td>Hua Kuo-feng</td>
<td>Hua Guofeng</td>
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<td>Huang Hua</td>
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<td>Chai Tse-min</td>
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<td>Huang Chen</td>
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<td>Qiao Guanhua</td>
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<td>Chiang Ch’ing</td>
<td>Jiang Qing</td>
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<td>Wang Yu-p’ing</td>
<td>Wang Youping</td>
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<td>Lei Yang</td>
<td>Lei Yang</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yao Wen-yüan</td>
<td>Yao Wenyuan</td>
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<td>Wang Hung-wen</td>
<td>Wang Hongwen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chang Ch’un-ch’iao</td>
<td>Zhang Chunqiao</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The capital city of China was spelled “Peiping” by the Chinese Nationalists, “Peking” by the Communists after they took power in 1949 and “Beijing” since 1979. To avoid confusion, this last spelling is used throughout this work.
INTERVIEWS


Lilley, James R. Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, August 30, 1985. Washington, D.C.


Tsai, Wei-ping. Former Director of the Institute of International Relations. June 1979. Taipei.

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UNITED STATES-CHINA NORMALIZATION
AN EVALUATION OF FOREIGN POLICY DECISION MAKING

Jaw-ling Joanne Chang
PREFACE

One of the most important United States foreign policy decisions of this century was normalizing its relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC). This was a momentous "watershed" decision, the ramifications of which are still unfolding. Few would dispute its impact on world power configurations and its implications for international relations within the Communist world and between the East and West.

Though much has been written about United States-PRC relations both before and since normalization, the normalization process itself has yet to be subjected to systematic analysis in terms of relevant decision-making models constructed by contemporary international relations theorists. This is the purpose of this book.

Part I reviews United States-PRC relations to provide the context for normalization. Part II evaluates the efficacy of decision-making models for a proper understanding of the normalization process.

The main focus of this study is on the United States foreign policy decision-making process—not that of the PRC. It is hoped that this book will make a modest contribution to theories of international relations and to the efficacy of decision-making models in demystifying some of the complexity of international relations in the contemporary world.

References are indicated in two ways: (1) sources cited in the bibliography are referenced in the text; and (2) explanatory notes are placed at the bottom of the page.

Jaw-ling Joanne Chang
Lanham, Maryland
September 1, 1986
INTRODUCTION

Since President Nixon's 1972 trip to the People's Republic of China (PRC), followed by President Ford's 1975 visit, normalization of relations with the PRC has been a U.S. foreign policy goal. The only question was: when, how, and on what terms. Beijing's three preconditions for normalization of relations with the United States were (1) withdrawal of recognition of the Republic of China (ROC), (2) withdrawal of U.S. troops from Taiwan, and (3) abrogation of the Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan. During the Nixon and Ford administrations, normalization of relations with the PRC was blocked by U.S. unwillingness to accept the three demands from Beijing without a firm pledge in return that the PRC would refrain from using military force to unite Taiwan with mainland China.¹

On 15 December 1978, President Carter announced establishment of full diplomatic relations with the PRC. The Carter administration accepted China's three demands without a firm commitment from Beijing not to use military force to attack Taiwan. Instead, the United States declared unilaterally that "the United States continues to have an interest in the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue and expects that the Taiwan issue will be settled peacefully by the Chinese themselves." The United States considered that Beijing had made three concessions to Washington: (1) the United States would terminate the Mutual Defense Treaty in accordance with its terms rather than abrogating it as the PRC previously demanded; (2) the PRC did

¹ George Bush, "Our Deal With Peking: All Cost, No Benefit," Washington Post, 24 December 1978:D3-4. Ambassador Harvey Feldman wrote in a personal letter to the author, dated 4 January 1984: "You should not accept George Bush's contention at face value, inasmuch as he was hardly an objective observer (since he had already decided to seek the Republican nomination for 1980). In fact, normalization was blocked by a constellation of events, most notably Watergate during the Nixon administration, and by Ford's unwillingness to hand an issue to Reagan and the Republican Right. It is my personal view that, absent Watergate, Kissinger would have recognized the PRC during 1974. Please recall that during that time there was no official PRC statement setting forth those three conditions as a formal demand and formal precondition for exchange of diplomatic recognition."
not contradict the U.S. statement that the United States has an interest in the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue; and (3) the United States would continue to sell "selected defensive weaponry" to Taiwan on a "restricted basis" in the postnormalization period after the defense treaty expired at the end of December 1979. The PRC responded that Beijing "absolutely could not agree" to such arms sales; nonetheless, the Chinese leaders decided to go ahead with normalization (Appendix C).

This study probes two major issues: (1) why the United States made the normalization decision at the end of 1978 (why not before or after?), and (2) why the United States acceded to Beijing's three demands without a firm commitment from the PRC not to use force to reunite Taiwan with mainland China.

MODELS AND THEIR RELEVANCE

Scholars seek to analyze how and why foreign policy decisions are made. Decision-making analysts emphasize that foreign policy is made by human beings and is not the determinant product of national power and interests. They believe decisions are influenced by factors such as international, domestic, bureaucratic, idiosyncratic, cybernetic, and cognitive elements. This study examines whether decision-making models help us understand the normalization decision.

Earlier decision-making scholars (Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin, 1962) developed a check list to explain foreign policy outcomes. Simon (1957) proposes a "satisficing model" to replace the so-called traditional "rational actor model." Braybrooke and Lindblom (1963) argue that most political decisions fall into categories of "disjointed incrementalism." Hilsman (1971), Huntington (1961), and Neustadt (1960) emphasize the political process of foreign policy decision making. Allison (1971) uses the rational actor model, the organizational model, and the bureaucratic politics model to analyze foreign policy decision making. George (1972) proposes a system of multiple advocacy to make constructive use of Allison's bureaucratic politics model. Steinbruner's cognitive and cybernetic models have been considered by many analysts as another breakthrough. Barber (1977), George (1974), Holsti (1962, 1968), Jervis (1975), Axelrod (1976), and Hermann (1976) have tried to incorporate the factors of perception, belief system, personality, and cognitive processes into empirical foreign policy research.

An examination of all decision-making factors is clearly beyond the scope of this study. The purpose here is to relate four decision-making models to the timing, manner, and terms of the U.S. normalization decision for the period 1969 to 1978.
Rational Actor Model

The classical rational actor model tells us that decision making is a process of maximizing net gains. The decision maker, as an economical and rational person, is able to (1) identify and rank the goals and values to be sought, (2) gather all information relevant to the event, (3) consider and estimate the expected value of all possible alternatives systematically, and (4) choose only that alternative with potential maximum net gains.

The rational actor model assumes that the nation or government, as a rational, unitary decision maker, will select the action that will maximize national goals and objectives. Foreign policy decisions can be explained by personifying rational actors and by examining their aims and choices. In other words, the analyst imitates the rational actor’s process of decision making and explains how, in the given context with certain objectives, the actor came to choose the action he did (Allison, 1971: 36).

In the real world, however, most foreign policy decisions involve conflicting values and goals as well as inaccessibility to relevant information. Normalization with the PRC was no exception. Global balance-of-power relationships, bilateral relationships, national security, legal issues, economic gains, and moral issues were only some of the important and complex elements. A rational choice evaluation of national security considerations, for example, would examine the effects of normalization not only upon the U.S.-PRC security relationship but also upon the relationship of the United States to all other 160-odd countries in the world. It would be nearly impossible to collect all relevant information, and the payoff may not justify the time and effort. Therefore, in this study only the most important elements of calculations are examined.

From the rational actor perspective, the United States would presumably select the timing and terms of normalization agreements with the PRC that would maximize net gains. One question is suggested:

Would the United States have rationally chosen the optimal timing and terms to normalize relations with the PRC; that is, (1) could the United States have maximized bilateral relations with the PRC, (2) could the United States have normalized relations with the PRC without sacrificing the detente relations with the Soviet Union, and (3) could the United States also have normalized relations with minimal costs of U.S.-Taiwan relations?
Bureaucratic Politics Model

The bureaucratic politics model assumes that the government actor is not a unitary agent but a number of individual players. Governmental action is a political result "in the sense that what happens is not chosen as a solution to a problem but rather results from compromise, conflict, and confusion of officials with diverse interests and unequal influence" (Allison, 1971:162). Foreign policy is the end product of the "pulling and hauling" between players. Each player competes for power, promotion, and retention of his own position, and bases his stand on the stakes in the issue and his perception of "national security interests, organizational interests, domestic interests, and personal interests" (Allison, 1971:167).

The main players in Allison's bureaucratic politics model include "chiefs," "staffers," "Indians," and "ad hoc players": legislators, members of the press, and spokesmen for important interest groups (Allison, 1971:165). In this study, the bureaucratic model does not examine the "ad hoc players," which are dealt with separately in the domestic politics model.

To explain the normalization decision, two bureaucratic politics questions are suggested:

Could the timing and terms of the normalization decision have been best explained by the pulling and hauling of the bureaucratic players?

Could each bureaucratic politics player's position on the normalization issue have been predicted from his position in the bureaucracy?

Domestic Politics Model

The rational actor model's unit of analysis is governmental choice; national security and national interests are the principal categories in which strategic goals are conceived (Allison, 1971:33). Domestic political considerations and personal interests are set aside in the formal analysis of decision making in the area of national security because, according to Halperin, there is a strong view in the United States that "it is immoral to let domestic political considerations influence decisions which may affect war and peace" (Halperin, 1974:63). In the United States, however, each president must consider congressional support, public opinion, and various interest groups in the making of foreign policy, for legitimacy reasons as well as for political reasons. As Quandt pointed out, "in a democratic polity, foreign policy is inevitably influenced by domestic realities" (Quandt, 1977:15).
The third model—the domestic politics perspective—attempts to deal with (1) the role of public opinion, (2) the role of Congress, (3) the impact of interest groups, and (4) the role of a presidential election. The main purpose is to examine the extent to which congressional attitudes and public opinion influenced the normalization decision, and the extent to which a presidential election and interest groups affected that process.

In order to assess the evolution of congressional attitudes toward the normalization issue between 1969 to 1978, the following matters are examined: congressional reactions on issues of Nixon's China trip, the admission of the PRC to the United Nations, gradual withdrawal of U.S. military presence in Taiwan, the removal of U.S.-PRC trade and travel restrictions, and repeal of the Formosa Resolution.

The analysis of public opinion includes both the "mass public" and "opinion elites." The so-called "China Lobby," one of the most notable interest groups in U.S. foreign affairs during the 1950s and early 1960s, its decline of influence, and the increasing activities of the so-called "Red China Lobby"—as well as their respective impact on the U.S. administration's China decision in the period 1969 to 1978—are studied.

In explaining the normalization decision, the following domestic political questions are posed:

Did stronger public or elite opinion and interest groups against normalization with the PRC at the expense of Taiwan delay the normalization process and elicit tougher U.S. conditions for Taiwan's security guarantee, and vice versa?

Did those members in Congress against normalization with the PRC at the expense of Taiwan delay the process of the normalization decision and toughen the United States' stand toward the question of Taiwan, and vice versa?

Did the impact of a presidential election on the process of normalization depend on the strength of the existing administration? Did a weak administration that could not mobilize domestic opposition for normalization with the PRC tend to stall or delay the consideration of normalization decision in order to deny the potential opponent a major issue in the presidential election period?

2. The term "Red China Lobby" was used in Forrest Davis and Robert A. Hunter, The Red China Lobby (New York: Fleet, 1963).
Idiosyncratic, Cognitive, and Cybernetic Models

The idiosyncratic model stresses the importance of the impact of individuals on foreign policy. The cognitive model emphasizes the effect of a decision maker's perception of the decision environment on policy outcomes. Steinbruner's *Cybernetic Theory of Decision* has been regarded as another breakthrough following Allison's *The Essence of Decision*. How decision makers cope with uncertainty and conflict are Steinbruner's main foci. The decision maker does not maximize; instead, he simplifies the complex world. The decision maker does not integrate values; instead, he separates them. Steinbruner finds that the cognitive and cybernetic perspectives "serve to illuminate some of the more troublesome underlying assumptions of rational theory" (Steinbruner, 1974:235).

Since Nixon's 1972 trip to the PRC, Beijing repeatedly stressed that the PRC would never make a pledge on the settlement of the Taiwan question. Beijing also pointed out that the PRC would never permit arms sales to Taiwan after normalization with the United States. How the U.S. decision makers interpreted the PRC's messages on those so-called "non-negotiable conditions" was a very important factor in determining U.S. bids or counterbids during the bargaining process.

During the formal negotiation period, it was disclosed that the Carter administration never asked Beijing for a pledge not to use force to regain Taiwan. Carter revealed at a press conference that a commitment from the PRC to refrain from the use of force against Taiwan was not "possible to achieve"; accordingly, Carter did not ask for it. Why did the Carter administration think it was not possible to get such a pledge from the PRC?

Normalization with the PRC involved not only conditions of uncertainty but also conflicts in values. Steinbruner argues that under conditions of uncertainty and value conflict, the decision maker will tend to conceptualize his decision environment to avoid recognizing tradeoffs between his values (Steinbruner, 1974:348). The decision maker will suppress the tradeoffs by engaging various mechanisms for defensive avoidance, such as bolstering, wishful thinking, and procrastination.

The combination of idiosyncratic, cognitive, and cybernetic perspectives raises the following questions:

Did the personal characteristics of decision makers have an important impact on the normalization decision?

Was the lowest level of acceptability on the terms of the Tai-
The main questions relating to each model are answered by reference to qualitative methods. Major sources for answering these questions are public or published material—primarily statements of American and Chinese officials, congressional reports and hearings, memoirs, newspaper and scholarly articles, and references in books dealing with U.S.-China relations. Certain information, however, remains classified, and there are gaps and incorrect observations in this study because of the unavailability of the official record. Printed material, therefore, is supplemented with open-ended interviews of various decision-making actors.

Part 1 concerns the historical background of the Sino-American normalization issue. Part 2 examines four decision-making models used as a theoretical framework to explain normalization decision making in the United States from 1969 to 1978. The conclusion assesses the questions listed above.
PART 1
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
1
U.S.-PRC RELATIONS
1949-1968

U.S.-CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY RELATIONS PRIOR TO 1949

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was established in Shanghai in 1921. Prior to the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC) on 1 October 1949, CCP leaders were mostly concerned with the survival of their party against the threat of Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist Government.

Formation of the CCP's policies toward the United States was conditioned by ideology and the CCP's assessment of American support for the communist movement in China. In the late 1920s and early 1930s, the United States was perceived negatively by CCP leaders because of American imperialist ambitions in China and U.S. involvement in Chiang's anti-communist extermination campaigns.1 In October 1934, the Chinese Communists were forced to flee from their base in southern China to the northwest, the "long march" period of the Communists. During the Sino-Japanese War, the CCP changed its policy and tried to woo American newsmen who visited Yanan, the northwestern base of the Communists (Sutter, 1978:12; Shewmaker, 1971:70-85). This opening to United States journalists began to close, however, before the disintegration of the CCP-Nationalist Party united front in 1940.

After the United States' entrance into the Pacific War, CCP leaders initiated a more serious effort to win American support. The U.S. State Department in 1967 and 1969 published two volumes of previously classified documents on U.S. contacts with the Chinese Commu-

nist leaders in 1944 and 1945. The documents disclosed the efforts by Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai to establish friendly relations with the United States in the postwar period.

Some evidence exists that the U.S. considered the Communists to be stronger opponents to the Japanese forces than the Nationalists. (Tsou, 1963:150; Barrett, 1970:7; Diamond, 1971:1). In the summer of 1944, 18 U.S. observers, headed by John Stewart Service, a political officer, were invited to Yenan by the Communists to assess the strength of the Chinese Communist forces as potential military allies and as recipients of U.S. aid in the war against the Japanese. There were three objectives behind the CCP's invitation: establishment of a consulate in Washington, a personal visit by Mao and Chou to Washington for exploratory talks with President Roosevelt, and long-term U.S.-Chinese Communist economic cooperation. The American observers were favorably impressed by the Communists after talks with their leaders, and concluded that the Communists were a more effective force against the Japanese than the Nationalists. Service recommended that the United States avoid taking sides in the impending civil war between the Communists and the Nationalists and remain flexible to accept the reality of Communist power (Diamond, 1971:1).

These views, however, were not supported by the U.S. Ambassador to China, Patrick J. Hurley, who was given dominant power by President Roosevelt in the conduct of American policy in China before Hurley's resignation in November 1945. Indeed, Hurley advocated Chiang's position of not sending U.S. aid to the Communists. By early 1945, the CCP leaders began to see that the United States was strongly on the side of the Nationalists, and they no longer viewed the United States as a potential friend of the communist movement in China. The pace of civil war accelerated after presidential special representative General George Marshall's failed mission to mediate differences between the Communists and the Nationalists in 1946. By virtue of its military defeat by Communist forces, the Nationalist Government collapsed and fled to Taiwan in 1949.

U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE RECOGNITION OF THE PRC IN 1949 AND 1950

The question of recognition of the PRC emerged after Nanking was captured by the Chinese Communists on 24 April 1949. Several meetings were held between U.S. Ambassador J. Leighton Stuart and

Huang Hua, chief of the Communist Office of Alien Affairs, in May and June of 1949 to discuss U.S. relations with the new regime. (Stuart, 1954:236). Huang expressed much interest in the recognition of Communist China by the United States during his first meeting with Stuart on 13 May 1949 (Stuart, 1954:247). Stuart replied that the U.S. government could consider the recognition question only when there emerged a new government in China that “had the support of people” and “was able and willing to perform its international obligations.”

After the second meeting on 6 June 1949, Stuart reported to Washington that the Communists were “extremely anxious” for the United States to break off relations with the Nationalist Government. Stuart pointed out to Huang that the Nationalists still retained nominal control of large amounts of Chinese territory and also stated that the “presence in Nanking of chiefs of diplomatic missions (with the exception of Soviet) after arrival of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) could be regarded as significant.”

On 28 June, Stuart was invited to Beijing by Mao and Chou to visit Yenching University, of which Ambassador Stuart was former president. Secretary of State Dean Acheson, however, instructed Stuart that he should not visit Beijing on 1 July 1949, and referred to a decision reached at the “highest level.” Four days before the invitation, 16 Republican and six Democratic U.S. senators signed a letter to President Truman asking him not to recognize the Chinese Communists. In response, Acheson sent a letter to Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Tom Connally on 1 July 1949, the same day that he rejected Stuart's trip to Beijing, giving assurances that he would consult the committee when the question of recognition would arise.

On 1 July 1949, Mao coincidentally delivered his famous speech on the “People's Democratic Dictatorship.” Mao denounced U.S. imperialistic power and America's supplying of arms to Chiang Kai-shek. Mao announced that China would now “lean to the side of the Soviet Union.” After July 1, there was nothing left to be discussed between Stuart and Huang, and Ambassador Stuart returned home.

4. Ambassador Stuart to the Secretary of State, 8 June 1949, ibid., note 23.
5. Ibid., p. 10.
6. Ibid., p. 11.
The State Department published a 1054-page White Paper on China, on 5 August, which placed responsibility for Chiang's defeat on the ineptitude of the Nationalist Government. Secretary of State Dean Acheson declared that "the only alternative open to the U.S. was full-scale intervention in behalf of a Government which had lost the confidence of its own troops and its own people." But intervention "would have been resented by the mass of the Chinese people, would have diametrically reversed our historic policy, and would have been condemned by the American people." Acheson justified the U.S. policy of nonintervention by stating that:

The unfortunate but inescapable fact is that the ominous result of the civil war in China was beyond the control of the government of the United States. Nothing that this country did or could have done within the reasonable limits of its capabilities could have changed that result; nothing that was left undone by this country has contributed to it. It was the product of internal Chinese forces, forces which this country tried to influence but could not. A decision was arrived at within China, if only a decision by default.

The White Paper was cited by the communists as evidence of American interference in Chinese domestic politics. Mao launched a propaganda campaign in People's Daily, the official communist newspaper, to educate the Chinese people about the U.S. imperialists' intervention in China (People's Daily, 19 August 1949:2).

The White Paper was also criticized in Washington by the so-called China Lobby. Senators Bridges, Knowland, McCarran, and Wherry issued a memorandum calling the White Paper "a 1054-page Whitewash of a wishful, do-nothing policy which has succeeded only in placing Asia in danger of Soviet conquest." General Patrick J. Hurley assailed the White Paper as "a smooth alibi for the pro-Communists in the State Department who had engineered the overthrow of our ally, the Nationalist Government of the Republic of China and aided in the Communist conquest of China."

The Truman administration in late 1949 adopted a dual American China policy of disengagement from the Nationalists and a "wait-

9. Ibid., p. XVI.
10. Ibid.
12. Ibid., p. 10941.
and-see” approach concerning recognition of the PRC. Meanwhile, the administration hoped to see the development of a Chinese “Titoism.” Acheson anticipated in the White Paper that “ultimately the profound civilization and the democratic individualism of China will reassert themselves and she will throw off the foreign yoke. I consider that we should encourage all developments in China which now and in the future work toward this end.” 13 Acheson also stated in National Security Council (NSC) 48/2, on 30 December 1949, that:

The United States should exploit, through appropriate political, psychological and economic means, any rifts between the Chinese Communists and the USSR and between the Stalinists and other elements in China, while scrupulously avoiding the appearance of intervention. Where appropriate, covert as well as overt means should be utilized to achieve these objectives. 14

Disengagement from the Nationalists was one way to avoid further hatred from the PRC. Although the United States still provided economic aid to the Nationalists, the fall of Taiwan was expected by the Truman administration. An October 1949 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) report predicted that without American military “occupation and control,” Taiwan would “probably... succumb to the Chinese Communists by the end of 1950.” 15

Acheson stated to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the fall of Formosa was “probably... inevitable.” “Under present circumstances, the Communists would be criminally crazy if they did not put an end to it just as soon as possible.” 16 President Truman announced in a statement concerning American policy toward Taiwan, on 5 January 1950:

The United States has no desire to obtain special rights or privileges or to establish military bases on Formosa at this time. Nor does it have any intention of utilizing its armed forces to interfere in the present situation. The U.S. will not pursue a course, which will lead to involvement in the civil conflict in China. Similarly, the U.S. Government will not provide military aid or advice to Chinese forces on

13. U.S. Department of State, United States Relations with China, 1949, p. XVI.
15. Ibid., p. 245.
16. Ibid.
Formosa.\textsuperscript{17}

In a conference with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 10 January 1950, Acheson drew a defensive perimeter in the western Pacific which must and would be held by the United States. This defensive perimeter ran along the Aleutians through Japan and the Ryukyus to the Philippine Islands (Kuhn, 1950:1). Taiwan and South Korea were left outside of this line.

Besides this "hands-off-Formosa" policy, the Truman administration began a series of debates on the question of recognition of the PRC as a means to gain some leverage in Sino-Soviet relations. In October, 24 leading scholars, businessmen, and missionaries interested in China attended a meeting chaired by Phillip C. Jessup, a key adviser to the Truman administration. Most participants agreed that the Nationalists' cause was lost and urged the administration to extend de jure recognition to the new regime in China and to do so fairly soon.\textsuperscript{18}

In October 1951, \textit{Time} magazine, which was then pro-Nationalist, revealed that two years earlier a "high State Department source" told one of its reporters that:

Acheson had been steadily arguing with Truman to go along on an early recognition of Communist China. Just before Truman left for Key West, Acheson got him to admit the logic of early recognition. Truman said that Acheson made a forceful case. The trouble now is not with Truman, but in persuading him to override the pressure from congressional and other groups not to recognize.\textsuperscript{19}

Apart from the domestic political difficulty, other problems prevented the Truman administration from recognizing the PRC. On 1 February 1947, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party announced that it considered invalid all the treaties, agreements, and loans that the Nationalist Government had concluded with foreign countries during the civil war. Furthermore, American diplomats in China were mistreated by the Communists. On 24 October 1949, Angus Ward, American consul general in Mukden, and four of his staff were jailed for a month after being held under house arrest for


\textsuperscript{18} See Professor Edwin O. Reischauer's remark in "Transcript of the Round Table Conference" as reproduced in the U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, \textit{The Institute of Pacific Relations}, Hearing, 82d Congress, 1st and 2d sessions (1951-1952), p. 1667, cited from Tsou, \textit{America's Failure in China}, p. 515.

nearly a year. They were tried, found guilty of spying, and deported from China. This action was considered by the United States to be “in clear violation of established principles of international comity and practice respecting the treatment of consular officials.”

In a press conference on 12 October 1949, Secretary Acheson stated three main criteria in recognizing a new government: (1) that it effectively control the area it claimed to govern; (2) that it recognize its international obligations; and (3) that it govern with the consent of the people (Westerfield, 1955:360). Acheson also gave the following statement on recognition of China before an executive session of the Foreign Relations Committee on the same day:

We of the executive branch stated to this committee and stated in public that any action which is taken along this line will be taken after consultation with the committee, if that is possible, or if the Congress is not in session, with the Chairman or such members of the Committee as are available. We could not anticipate that there will be any imminent reason for dealing with this matter, but on the other hand, I do not want to give you the impression that such an event might not arise.

Acheson apparently did not rule out the possibility of recognition of the Chinese Communist regime, which depended upon whether the PRC met the three conditions Acheson outlined. Had these conditions been met by the PRC, it would have been politically less painful for the Truman administration to establish diplomatic relations with Beijing.

Acheson elaborated on the reason for establishing diplomatic relations in a speech on relations with Latin America in September 1949:

We do not establish an embassy or legation in a foreign country to show approval of its government. I do so to have a channel through which we conduct essential government relations and to protect legitimate United States interests.

Acheson reiterated the distinction between recognition and approval of a government:

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One of the important factors is the one we have been talking about in relation to Spain. Do not get this thing mixed up with approval or disapproval. The failure to recognize in itself isn’t going to change anything. On the other hand, the only really important fact about recognition is that you exchange representatives. That is what follows from it.23

One of the reasons the United States did not want to exchange representatives with the PRC was because the Communists did not treat American diplomats with decency. Acheson stated that “we do not want to recognize a country and send people there only to have them thrown into jail and kept in compounds for a year.”24

The Chinese Communists, however, were not interested in American recognition. On 14 January 1950, the Communists seized buildings in Beijing that the State Department considered to be American property. The State Department immediately decided to recall all American official personnel from China.

On 14 February 1950, the PRC announced the conclusion of a Sino-Soviet Treaty of Alliance. The Chinese Communists leaned further toward the Soviet Union and became increasingly anti-American in their propaganda. The American hope of Chinese “Titoism” had diminished considerably.

THE KOREAN WAR AND U.S. CHINA POLICY

On 25 June 1950, North Korea attacked South Korea. The outbreak of the Korean War brought an abrupt end to the American “hands-off” policy toward Taiwan. On 27 June 1950, President Truman declared that “the attack upon Korea makes it plain beyond all doubts that Communism has passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nations and now uses armed invasion and war. . . . In these circumstances the occupation of Formosa by Communist forces would be a direct threat to the security of the Pacific area. . . .” (George, 1955:229-230). President Truman therefore dispatched the Seventh Fleet to neutralize the Formosa Strait. Mao Tse-tung immediately attacked this decision as an “open exposure by the U.S. of its true imperialist face.”25 Mao also warned that the actions of the American Navy in the Taiwan Strait “constitute armed aggression

24. Ibid.
25. Chairman Mao Tse-tung’s comment on President Truman’s statement of June 27, a brief talk given on 28 June 1950, at the eighth meeting of the Central People’s Government
against the territory of China and total violation of the United Nations Charter.”

The neutralization of the Formosa Strait was a reversal of U.S. policy of not defending Formosa by military force, a policy inferred in Acheson's "perimeter" statement less than six months before. The dispatch of the Seventh Fleet, however, was thought to be a temporary action to deny Formosa to a hostile power. President Truman did not have a definitive policy for the future status of Formosa (Truman, 1956:339). Beijing's decision to enter the Korean War in November 1950, however, cemented U.S. support for the Nationalists in Taiwan. The United States rapidly increased military aid to Taiwan. The U.S. consulate in Taipei was upgraded to an embassy in late 1950. Recognition of the PRC was now out of the question. The Chinese Communist regime was further pushed by the United States into the arms of the Soviet Union.

In May 1951, the State Department announced a decision not to recognize the PRC. On 18 May 1951, Dean Rusk, then assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern Affairs, declared in a speech before the China Institute at a dinner in New York that:

We can tell our friends in China that the U.S. will not acquiesce in the degradation which is being forced upon them. We do not recognize the authorities in Peiping for what they pretend to be. The Peiping regime may be a colonial Russian government—a Slavic Manchukuo on a larger scale. It is not the Government of China. It does not pass the first test. It is not Chinese.

THE McCARTHY ERA AND THE RECOGNITION ISSUE

Senator Joseph R. McCarthy delivered a speech on 9 February 1950, charging that Communists were knowingly infiltrated into the State Department and were directing its policies, especially with respect to the Far East. A special subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was set up to investigate McCarthy's charge.

During the McCarthy era, the "soft-on-communism" attack often centered on the so-called "loss" of China. The "old China hands" were major targets. John S. Service was charged as "a known associ-
ate and collaborator with Communists and pro-Communists." 28 Philip C. Jessup was accused of having "unusual affinity for Communist causes." 29 As a result of these charges, according to James C. Thomson, Jr., an East Asian specialist in the State Department's Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs from January 1961 to July 1964, this Department was "purged of its best China expertise, and of farsighted, dispassionate men" (Thomson, 1968:47). Only those who were committed to the containment and isolation of China remained in the State Department (Thomson, 1968:47). Officials favoring improved relations with the Chinese Communist regime became reluctant to speak out.

With the outbreak of the Korean War and China's involvement in the war in late 1950, and the developments relating to McCarthyism, anti-Communist sentiment reached a peak during the early 1950s. The Democrats were openly blamed by Republicans for the "loss" of China and Beijing's invasion of South Korea.

During the 1952 election campaign, General Dwight Eisenhower accused President Truman of allowing the nation to become militarily weak and of announcing "to all the world that it had written off most of the Far East as beyond our direct concern" (Diamond, 1971:48).

Richard Nixon, running as a vice presidential candidate, declared that "China would not have gone Communist if the Truman Administration had had backbone" (Diamond, 1971:2). U.S. policy toward the PRC during the Eisenhower years focused on containing Chinese Communist aggression, opposing the seating of Beijing in the United Nations, strengthening U.S. commitment to Taiwan, and continuing the nonrecognition policy.

In December 1954, the United States and the Republic of China in Taiwan signed a mutual defense treaty, pledging separately and jointly to "maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack and Communist subversive activities." They agreed that an armed attack on either of them would endanger the peace and safety of the other, and each country declared "it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes." "Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations." Though the treaty guaranteed only Taiwan and the Pescadores against attack from the PRC, it specifically provided that the agreement could be extended to other areas by consent of both sides. The Chinese Nationalists agreed not to attack the mainland.

29. U.S. Senate, State Department Loyalty Investigation, p. 28, quoted in ibid.
without U.S. approval. The treaty had no expiration date, although it could be terminated by either party on one year's notice (see Appendix A).

The U.S. Senate ratified the treaty by a 64-6 vote on 9 February 1955, and it took effect on 3 March 1955. Conclusion of the mutual defense treaty underscored American support of, and defense commitment to, Taiwan, viewed as a vital link in the chain of U.S. bases or potential bases in the western Pacific.

The PRC bitterly assailed the defense treaty as an attempt by the United States to legalize the occupation of Taiwan. On 18 January 1955, Communist forces seized the offshore island of Yikiang (Yikiangshan), 210 miles north of Taiwan. The next day, more than 200 Communist planes bombed the Tachen Islands, eight miles from Yikiang. Although the Eisenhower administration did not consider either Yikiang or the Tachens essential to the defense of Taiwan, President Eisenhower sent a message to Congress on 24 July 1955 requesting emergency authorization to use American forces to protect Taiwan, the adjoining Pescadores Islands, and "related positions and territories." The House adopted this "Formosa Resolution" by a 410-3 vote after only three hours of debate, and the Senate by a 85-3 vote. President Eisenhower indicated at a news conference on 2 February that the emergency authorization was sought to prevent war. Years later, Eisenhower reiterated in his memoirs that the defense treaty and the Formosa Resolution "left no doubt of the United States' intention regarding Formosa and the Pescadores; in that region we would not be in the situation we had faced in the 1950 Korean crisis" (Eisenhower, 1963:469).

In his memoirs, Eisenhower quoted Mao's writing on the strategy of war: "Enemy advance, we retreat; enemy halts, we harass; enemy tires, we attack; enemy retreats, we pursue." Eisenhower stated that in the Formosa Strait in 1955 the United States refused to retreat and the Chinese Communist, "true to his formula, for a while tried harassment but refused to attack" (Eisenhower, 1963:483). The crisis in the Taiwan Strait cooled down until 1958.

THE AMBASSADORIAL TALKS IN GENEVA, 1955-57

In the spring of 1955, the Communists once again adopted a policy of accommodation with the United States in an attempt to improve relations with the United States and weaken U.S.-Taiwan relations. Premier-Foreign Minister Chou En-lai proposed U.S.-PRC talks in April 1955. Hoping to obtain the release of the 11 airmen and 41 American civilians imprisoned in China and to reduce the risk of war with the
PRC, the Eisenhower administration showed interest in opening diplomatic negotiations with Beijing.

On 31 July 1955, one day before the ambassadorial talks, Beijing announced the release of the 11 U.S. fliers held since November 1954, as a friendly gesture to the United States. Secretary of State Dulles was pleased with Beijing's action. Both sides voiced optimism concerning ambassadorial talks in Geneva. Hard negotiation for five weeks produced an agreement on the return of the civilians, but when the PRC failed to release all the civilians held, the talks made no further progress. Beijing rejected Washington's demands to renounce the use of force on Taiwan. The United States rebuffed the PRC's proposals for a bilateral foreign minister's conference for removal of the U.S. embargo on trade with China and for an exchange of journalists.

Meanwhile, the United States adhered steadfastly to its nonrecognition policy toward the PRC. On 12 March 1957, Dulles held that U.S. recognition or U.N. membership for Communist China "would serve no national purpose" but instead would "encourage influences hostile to us and to our allies" (Yim, 1973:64). Diplomatic recognition of the PRC, Dulles declared, would

1. "immensely" discourage mainland Chinese from seeking a change in their government,
2. cause "millions of overseas Chinese in free Asian countries" to accept Communist Chinese leadership,
3. break U.S. treaty pledges to the Nationalist Chinese government, and

The ambassadorial talks in Geneva were suspended in December 1957. Nine months later, Beijing started a massive bombardment of Quemoy, trying to counter American strength in the Taiwan Strait areas with Soviet strategic power. The American rapid deployment of naval and air forces nearby, and the Soviet failure to provide effective support for Beijing during the 1958 Taiwan Strait crisis forced the Chinese Communists to retreat and seek a resumption of the ambassadorial talks, to which President Eisenhower promptly agreed.

The U.S.-PRC ambassadorial talks resumed on 15 September 1958 in Warsaw. Although no official records of the Warsaw talks were given out, the United States apparently proposed a number of possible formulas to reduce tensions, ranging from the reduction of armed forces on the offshore islands to some form of demilitarization, neutralization, trusteeship, or judicial settlement through the World Court (Young, 1968:179). The PRC never responded to any of these proposals. An impasse developed in the Warsaw talks when the PRC
rejected the U.S. proposal for a cease-fire as a precondition for negotiations. No agreement was reached in resolving the status of the offshore islands throughout the talks. Bombardment of Quemoy, however, gradually diminished, and the PRC finally scaled down its artillery bombardments to an every-other-day exercise of no military significance.

On 4 December 1958, Secretary of State Dulles reiterated the U.S. policy of nonrecognition, stating that Communist bombardment of offshore islands had made it “ever more clear” that U.S. recognition of the PRC would deal “a well-nigh mortal blow to the survival of the non-Communist governments of the Far East” (Yim, 1973:114).

The Taiwan Strait crisis in 1958 passed the most serious confrontation between Washington and Beijing after the Korean War. The Nationalists reduced the size of their forces on the offshore islands by 15,000 after the United States promised to increase the supply of firepower to Taiwan.

U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE PRC DURING THE KENNEDY AND JOHNSON YEARS

During the 1960 presidential election debates, Democratic candidate John F. Kennedy strongly disagreed with Republican candidate Richard Nixon on U.S. policy toward the defense of the offshore islands. Kennedy believed that it was unwise “to take the chance of being dragged into a war which may lead to a world war over two islands which are not strategically defensible . . . (or) essential to the defense of Formosa” (Yim, 1973:138). Nixon, on the other hand, declared that:

[T]he question is not these two little pieces of real estate—they are unimportant. It is not the few people who live on them—they are not too important. It is the principle involved. These two islands are in the area of freedom. . . . We should not force our Nationalist allies to get off them and give them to the Communists. . . . (lest) we start a chain reaction, because the Communists are not after Quemoy and Matsu. They are after Formosa. . . . This is the same kind of woolly thinking that led to disaster for America in Korea. . . . I would never tolerate it as President. . . . (Yim, 1973:138).

Kennedy took office in January 1961. According to Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., President Kennedy considered the state of U.S. relations with the PRC as irrational and did not exclude the possibility of making some changes during his administration (Schlesinger,
1965:479). But because of his slim majority of election votes, Kennedy felt that he could not take on the China problem immediately (Schlesinger, 1965:479). The Kennedy administration did not bring any significant change in U.S.-PRC relations. Eisenhower had warned Kennedy shortly before the inauguration, Schlesinger said, that Eisenhower would consider it necessary to return to public life if Communist China threatened to enter the United Nations (Schlesinger, 1965:479). The Kennedy administration continued the nonrecognition policy toward the PRC.

Secretary of State Dean Rusk reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to defend Taiwan, at a news conference on 6 February 1961. In response to troop movements by the PRC in mainland areas near Taiwan, President Kennedy on 27 June 1962 reiterated the policy established by Eisenhower that the United States would take all actions necessary to ensure the defense of Taiwan and the Pescadores.

Meanwhile, disappointed by the lack of Soviet support during the Taiwan Strait crisis and by the Soviet decision to withdraw its technicians, the PRC decided to become more self-reliant. Gradually, the PRC became preoccupied with internal problems, such as the Great Leap Forward Movement of the late 1950s, the Tibetan rebellion in 1959, and the Cultural Revolution of the mid-1960s.

The United States was well aware of the gradual breakup of the Sino-Soviet alliance in the 1960s. In December 1963, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Roger Hilsman urged Americans to take a realistic view of the PRC, asserting that the Communist regime was here to stay and recognizing the possibility that the PRC would evolve into a more moderate state.  

Marshall Green, assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific Affairs during the Nixon administration, revealed in an interview that he, as the U.S. consul general in Hong Kong in the early 1960s, had recommended major modifications of travel and trade restrictions for Americans in their relations with China. In September 1963, Green was called back to Washington, D.C. to undertake a review of U.S. policy toward China. Green said that a real breakthrough seemed in prospect by the end of 1963, but the tragic event of Kennedy's assassination in November 1963 intervened.  

The Johnson administration did not take immediate steps to im-


prove relations with China; the atmosphere, however, began to change. In December 1965, the United States announced that the ban on travel to the PRC was being lifted. During 1966, the United States eased restrictions on the travel of scholars and writers to communist countries. On 14 February 1966, the United States offered to let journalists from the PRC enter the country. President Johnson said in a televised speech that eventual reconciliation with China was necessary (Diamond, 1971:5). A deepening of American involvement in the Vietnam war during the Johnson years created more tensions with the PRC.

By the late 1960s, the PRC, recovering from the turbulent Cultural Revolution and suffering a growing hostility with the Soviet Union, began to reassess its hostile relations with the United States. The Sino-Soviet border clashes in March 1969 demonstrated to the United States that the balance of power in East Asia was undergoing a great deal of change. The Nixon administration took the initiative that ended nearly two decades' containment and U.S. isolation policy toward the PRC.
Richard Nixon raised the issue of the importance of improving Sino-American relations in an article in *Foreign Affairs* in October 1967. Unlike his previous anticommunist stand, Nixon questioned the utility of the decades-old U.S. policy of containment and isolation toward the PRC. Nixon stated:

> Any American policy toward Asia must come urgently to grips with the reality of China. This does not mean, as many would simplistically have it, rushing to grant recognition to Peking, to admit it to the United Nations and ply it with offers of trade—all of which would serve to confirm its rulers in their present course. It does mean recognizing the present and potential danger from Communist China and taking measures designed to meet that danger. It also means distinguishing carefully between long-range and short-range policies, and fashioning short-range programs so as to advance our long-range goals. . . .

> Taking the long view, we simply can not afford to leave China forever outside the family of nations, there to nurture its fantasies, cherish its hate and threaten its neighbors. There is no place on this small planet for a billion of its potentially most able people to live in angry isolation.

> For the short run, then, this means a policy of firm restraint, of no reward, of a creative counterpressure designed to persuade Peking that its interests can be served only by accepting the basic rules of international civility. For the long run, it means pulling China back into the world community—but as a great and progressive nation, not as the epicenter of world revolution (Nixon, 1967:121, 123).

Nixon recommended a positive policy of "pressure and persuasion" together with the policy of "containment without isolation" toward the PRC (Nixon, 1967:123).
On 1 February 1969, less than two weeks after his inauguration, Nixon wrote a memorandum to Henry Kissinger, then national security council adviser, urging that “we give every encouragement to the attitude that the administration was exploring possibilities of rapprochement with the Chinese.” “This, of course, should be done privately and should under no circumstances get into the public prints [sic] from this direction (Nixon, 1979, v.2:8).

This memorandum was meant for the Soviet Union. Kissinger was asked to create the impression among East Europeans that the United States was exploring a move toward China (Kissinger, 1979:169). President Nixon believed that a rapprochement with the PRC would give the United States a great strategic opportunity for diplomatic maneuver. He also thought that an opening to China would provide an incentive for the Soviet Union to help the United States end the war in Vietnam” (Kissinger, 1979:169).

The growing tension between the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communists convinced the Nixon administration that the United States was in the best position to develop a triangular Washington-Beijing-Moscow relationship. Sino-Soviet relations had deteriorated after Khrushchev’s failure to support China more resolutely during the 1958 Quemoy crisis. In 1960, the Soviets had pulled out their technical advisers and ended all economic aid to China. The Soviet Union also withdrew its promise to assist China in developing Chinese nuclear weapons.

Border incidents had begun around 1959. The Soviet Union increased the number of troops stationed along the 4000-mile border with China after signing a 20-year “Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Aid” with Mongolia in January 1966 (Kissinger, 1979:167). The treaty allowed the Soviet Union to station troops and to maintain bases in Mongolia. In 1964, the Soviet Union had about 12 understrength divisions along the Chinese border, but by the late 1960s, more than 40 modernized divisions were in place (Kissinger, 1979:167). The problem of how to deal with Soviet aggression and hostility emerged as the primary Chinese foreign policy concern of the late 1960s.

On 26 November 1968, three months after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and just after the U.S. presidential election, the PRC proposed to resume Warsaw talks with the United States beginning in February 1969. From 1954 to 1968, 134 ambassadorial meetings between Washington and Beijing were held. Only one agreement was produced in September 1955 on repatriation of some U.S. nationals. On 18 February 1969, two days before a scheduled meeting with U.S. representatives in Warsaw, the PRC decided to cancel this meeting
because of the U.S. government's decision to grant political asylum to a diplomat who had defected from the PRC.

Two weeks later, on 2 March 1969, the highly publicized Sino-Soviet border incidents drew the world's attention. The Sino-Soviet armed clashes along the disputed Ussuri River boundary and the rumor of a Soviet attack on Chinese nuclear facilities reinforced Nixon's belief that Communist China might be ready to reenter the diplomatic arena. Both Nixon and Kissinger believed that the United States should expand its contacts with the PRC as a means of leverage against the Soviet Union (Kissinger, 1979:182; see also Nixon, 1979, v.2:8).

The Nixon administration took several initiatives in 1969 toward establishing a dialogue with Beijing. On 21 July 1969, the United States announced it would allow American tourists and residents abroad to purchase up to $100 worth of goods originating in China and would permit automatic validation of passports for American citizens wishing to travel to China. In December 1969, the United States further allowed foreign subsidiaries of American-owned firms to trade with China in nonstrategic items. The United States also removed the $100 limit on purchases of Chinese goods by Americans for noncommercial use.

The Nixon administration also took initiatives to open communication channels with the PRC. Walter Stoessel, U.S. ambassador to Poland, was instructed by Kissinger to "walk up to the Ambassador of the PRC at the next social function they both attended and tell him that we were prepared for serious talks" (Kissinger, 1979:188). Stoessel delivered the message and, on 11 December 1969, Chou En-lai invited Stoessel to the Chinese embassy through the "front door," the first such invitation since 1949. On 8 January 1970, the United States and the PRC agreed to resume formal ambassadorial meetings in Warsaw. The talks began in January, were called off briefly by the PRC in May because of the American attack against North Vietnamese forces in Cambodia, but resumed in July 1970.

Meanwhile, the Nixon administration took the first serious public step toward recognizing the Chinese Communists in February 1970 when President Nixon sent the first Foreign Policy Report to Congress. Nixon stated in the section on China:

The Chinese are a great and vital people who should not remain isolated from the international community. . . .

It is certainly in our interest and in the interest of peace and stability in Asia and the world, that we take what steps
we can toward improved practical relations with Peking (Nixon, 1979, v.2:8).

Apart from using the Warsaw talks connection, President Nixon had also used French, Romanian, and Pakistani channels to convey his wish to improve relations with the PRC (Nixon, 1979, v.2:9-11). The so-called Pakistan "Yahya Channel" turned out to be the most successful. After a two-year exchange of messages through Pakistani President Yahya Khan, President Nixon finally received this most important message from the PRC on 2 June 1971:

Premier Chou En-lai has seriously studied President Nixon's messages of April 29, May 17, and May 22, 1971, and has reported with much pleasure to Chairman Mao Tse-tung that President Nixon is prepared to accept his suggestion to visit Peking for direct conversations with the leaders of the PRC. Chairman Mao Tse-tung has indicated that he welcomes President Nixon's visit and looks forward to that occasion when he may have direct conversations with His Excellency the President, in which each side would be free to raise the principal issue of concern to it.

Premier Chou En-lai welcomes Dr. Kissinger to China as the U.S. representative who will come in advance for a preliminary secret meeting with high level Chinese officials to prepare and make necessary arrangements for President Nixon's visit to Peking (Nixon, 1979, v.2:17).

Kissinger told President Nixon that "this is the most important communication that has come to an American President since the end of World War II" (Nixon, 1979, v.2:16-17).

Other signs indicated that the Sino-American rapprochement was warming up. On 15 March 1971, the United States lifted all further restrictions on travel to the PRC. In April 1971, the U.S. table-tennis team competing in the world championship in Japan was invited to visit the PRC. The Nixon administration immediately granted permission to accept the invitation.

Kissinger secretly flew from Pakistan's capital, Islamabad, to Beijing on 9 July 1971 to arrange Nixon's visit. Kissinger spent most of his two days there discussing various world issues with Premier Chou En-lai. A joint announcement on Nixon's visit was finally agreed upon after some bargaining between Kissinger and Huang Hua. Kissinger rejected the original Chinese draft because it suggested that President Nixon had solicited the invitation and that Taiwan would be the first agenda item discussed, before the topic of normalization of relations (Kissinger, 1979:751-52). The final announcement by Presi-
President Nixon, delivered on 15 July on nationwide television, read as follows:

Premier Chou En-lai and Dr. Henry Kissinger, President Nixon’s Assistant for National Security Affairs, held talks in Peking from July 9 to 11, 1971. Knowing of President Nixon's expressed desire to visit the PRC, Premier Chou En-lai, on behalf of the Government of the PRC, has extended an invitation to President Nixon to visit China at an appropriate date before May 1972. President Nixon has accepted the invitation with pleasure.

The meeting between the leaders of China and the U.S. is to seek the normalization of relations between the two countries and also to exchange views on questions of concern to the two sides. . . .

Our action in seeking a new relationship with the PRC will not be at the expense of our old friends. It is not directed against any other nation. We seek friendly relations with all nations. Any nation can be our friend without being any other nation’s enemy (Kissinger, 1979: 759-60).

Nixon’s China announcement was generally welcomed in the United States. Most of the serious criticism came from the conservatives, as President Nixon expected (Nixon, 1979, v. 2:20).

Kissinger returned to China in October 1971 to arrange the agenda for Nixon’s visit, set for 20 October 1971, five days before the U.N. General Assembly met to vote on admitting the PRC as a member nation. On 2 August 1971, U.S. Secretary of State Rogers had announced that the United States “will support action at the General Assembly this fall calling for seating the PRC. At the same time, the U.S. will oppose any action to expel the Republic of China or otherwise deprive it of representation in the U.N.” This “two Chinas” approach was unacceptable to both Beijing and Taipei. Although George Bush, American ambassador to the United Nations, tried to rally votes to keep Taiwan’s seat in the General Assembly, Kissinger’s second visit to Beijing gave the other countries an obvious signal about American intentions on this issue. The PRC was voted in and Taiwan was expelled from the United Nations on 25 October 1971 by a vote of 76 to 35, with 17 abstentions.1

1. Ambassador Harvey Feldman wrote in a personal letter to the author, dated 4 Jan. 1984:

“Actually, the key vote was on the “Important Question,” which was defeated by a vote of 55(US) - 59 - 15. That is to say, we lost on the Important Question by just four votes, and on a day on which Kissinger was in Beijing! I remain con-
President Nixon concluded his spectacular eight-day visit to China by signing the “Shanghai Communique” on 28 February 1972. The communique was the product of many hours' hard bargaining between Kissinger and Chou En-lai. Most of the context had been worked out during Kissinger’s second trip to China in October 1971. This joint declaration broke diplomatic ground by stating each party's conflicting points of view, rather than obscuring differences with platitudinous generalizations. (See Appendix B.)

The Chinese expressed firm support to Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia in their efforts to attain their goals and supported the seven-point proposal put forward by the Vietcong in February 1972. The United States stressed its support for the eight-point peace plan proposed by the United States and South Vietnam in Paris on 27 January 1972. The United States also proclaimed support for South Korea and Japan; the Chinese endorsed North Korea’s plan for unification of the Korean peninsula, and stated its opposition to the revival and outward expansion of Japanese militarism.

Another important section of the communique provided that neither nation “should seek hegemony in the Asia Pacific region and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish hegemony.” The provision was clearly aimed at the Soviet Union.

Taiwan was the most controversial issue during the negotiation processes. In the Shanghai Communique, Beijing claimed to be the sole legal government of China and that Taiwan was a province of China. The PRC stressed that the liberation of Taiwan was China's internal affair in which no country had a right to interfere, and demanded that all U.S. forces and military installations be withdrawn from Taiwan. Beijing also firmly opposed any activities aimed at the creation of “one China, one Taiwan,” “one China, two governments,”
“two Chinas,” and an “independent Taiwan,” or which advocated that “the status of Taiwan remains to be determined.” The United States declared its position on the question of Taiwan:

The U.S. acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The U.S. Government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. With this prospect in mind, it affirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military installations from Taiwan. In the meantime, it will progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes.

The Taiwan question was the crucial issue obstructing the establishment of diplomatic relations between Washington and Beijing in 1972. President Nixon felt that the United States “could not and should not abandon the Taiwanese” because the United States was “committed to Taiwan’s right to exist as an independent nation” (Nixon, 1979, v. 2:40). The Nixon administration was unable to make further concessions to the Taiwan issue because of domestic political considerations. Kissinger stated this point in his White House Years:

For different reasons Taiwan involved issues of principle for both countries. And to suggest that principles have a price can be offensive. This is why the two sides conducted themselves as if we had to solve a common problem not by a sharp bargain but by a joint understanding. We took pains to explain our domestic necessities to each other with great frankness, because we knew that the communique would not survive if negotiated through trickery or found unacceptable at home (Kissinger, 1979:1075-1076).

The absence of any mention of Beijing’s opposition to both Washington’s diplomatic relations and the defense treaty with Taiwan in the communique was considered Beijing’s concession to the United States. Another concession was Beijing’s willingness to begin the process of normalization of relations with the United States before the Taiwan question had been resolved. In return, the United States conceded that it would “progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes.” This document provided the basic framework for the conduct of Sino-American relations before the completion of normalization six years later in 1978.
TOWARD NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS, 1973-1977

The Shanghai Communique did not specify any timetable or terms regarding "progress toward the normalization of relations." President Nixon was reported to have assured the Chinese that he would establish full diplomatic relations if elected to a second term (Gwertzman, 1977a:1,5).

Although there was no apparent solution to the major stumbling block to normalization—the Taiwan question—the momentum gained by improved Sino-American relations was high in 1972-1973. Sino-American trade jumped from $5 million in 1971 to $95.9 million in 1972, $805 million in 1973, and $933.8 million in 1974 (Barnett, 1977a:224). Various exchange programs were expanded rapidly. Although the PRC was not happy with Nixon's decision to mine and bomb Haiphong in December 1972, the signing of the Vietnam peace agreement in Paris in January 1973 improved Sino-American relations. America's withdrawal of combat forces from South Vietnam further removed one of the Sino-American disagreements in the Shanghai Communique. Less than a month after the Paris accords on Indochina, the United States and the PRC reached an agreement in February 1973 to establish liaison offices in Washington and Beijing.

In March 1973, David Bruce, a distinguished diplomat of ambassadorial rank, was appointed to head the U.S. liaison office in Beijing, and Huang Chen, China's former ambassador to France, was selected to be in charge of the PRC liaison office in Washington. The liaison offices were formally in operation by May 1973, assuming most functions of regular embassies.

The PRC had for years strongly opposed the idea of maintaining diplomatic representation in the capital of any country that recognized the Republic of China in Taiwan. The establishment of liaison offices represented an important compromise by Communist China. Beijing's agreement to the formation of liaison offices, however, was based on an understanding that it would soon be upgraded to full diplomatic status (Choudhury, 1976:606). To Beijing's disappointment, there would be no visible progress made toward establishment of full diplomatic relations until 1978.

From mid-1973, and particularly by mid-1974, there were signs that the momentum had begun to slow. Huang Chen returned to China for several months in November 1973 (Gelb, 1974:2). David Bruce was absent from his post for eight weeks in January-March 1974 (New York Times, 23 March 1974:7. See also Gelb, 1974:2). Secretary of State Kissinger's trips to Beijing in 1973, 1974, and 1975 were not as successful as his earlier trips. Sino-American trade fell to

Sino-American relations deteriorated during 1974 and 1975 because of China's unhappiness over the lack of progress toward normalization, due in part to domestic problems in each country, and over U.S. agreements with the Soviet Union at summit meetings at Vladivostok in November 1974 and Helsinki in August 1975.

In late 1973, a "mini-cultural revolution," representing another battle between moderate forces and the radicals, was launched in China. In Washington, President Nixon's political demise prevented him from fulfilling his "tacit understanding" with the Chinese concerning the establishment of full diplomatic relations. Saigon's fall early in 1975 and the 1976 presidential election precluded President Ford from making any controversial decisions, such as the normalization of relations with the PRC. Ronald Reagan, in his 1976 presidential nomination campaign, repeatedly emphasized that the interests of Taiwan should not be sacrificed in the process of normalization with the PRC (Christian Science Monitor, 24 August 1976:28; 19 August 1976:1, 9). The Ford administration, therefore, adopted a "wait-and-see" policy toward the normalization decision. President Ford's December 1975 trip to China produced no significant changes in U.S.-China relations, and no joint communique was issued during his visit.

Detente between Washington and Moscow also contributed to the deterioration of relations between Washington and Beijing. Beijing condemned detente as Soviet-American "collusion" against Chinese interests. Beijing launched a campaign between November 1974 and August 1975 against U.S. "appeasement" policies toward the Soviets in response to Soviet-American summit meetings.2

American defeats in Indochina increased Chinese doubts about American strength and willingness to confront Soviet encroachment in East Asia. The original U.S.-PRC rapprochement had been possible because both sides were willing to put the Taiwan question temporarily aside. The PRC did so because of Soviet threats. Now that American usefulness as a strong partner against Soviet aggression was in question, there was less justification to leave the Taiwan problem alone. The PRC reiterated that normalization of relations could be

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realized "only on the basis of confirming the principle of one China." Beijing was annoyed when the United States appointed Leonard Un-ger ambassador to Taipei in 1974, instead of allowing the post to go unfilled, and when it authorized the government of the Republic of China to open three new consulates in the United States. The Sino-American relationship entered a stagnant period.

U.S.-Taiwan trade rose from $1.61 billion in 1971 to $4.8 billion in 1976. At the same time, the United States gradually withdrew its combat units and military personnel from Taiwan in partial fulfillment of the Shanghai Communique. On 9 October 1974, the U.S. Senate with the acquiescence of the State Department, voted to repeal the 1955 Formosa Resolution. President Chiang Kai-shek died at the age of 87 on 4 April 1975. The government in Taipei took a realistic step toward strengthening its defense program by purchasing from the United States two disarmed submarines, additional destroyers, helicopters, F-104 fighters, and C-123 aircraft.

In 1976, while the United States was preoccupied with the presidential election, the PRC was predominantly concerned with its succession problem. Premier Chou En-lai had died on 8 January 1976. In April, the Politburo named Hua Kuo-feng as first vice chairman of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, and premier of the PRC. Teng Hsiao-p'ing was thereafter removed from his posts as vice premier, vice chairman of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, and chief of staff of the armed forces. Leftist leaders temporarily had regained influence in the conduct of Chinese policy.

The radical leaders adopted a more militant line on Taiwan and Sino-American relationships. One month after the death of Chairman Mao on 9 September 1976, Chiang Ch'ing (Mao's widow) and three other radical members of the Chinese Politburo—Wang Hung-wen, Chang Ch'un-ch'iao, and Yao Wen-yüan—were purged and put under house arrest in October 1976. In July 1977, Teng was finally restored to the party-government posts he had lost.

THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION AND THE NORMALIZATION DECISION

As a presidential candidate, Carter pledged to honor the commitment to Taiwan. After entering office, President Carter endorsed the Shanghai Communique and stated that normalization was the goal of U.S. policy. However, normalization with the PRC was not among Carter's foreign policy priorities during his first year in office. The new administration was preoccupied with problems in the Middle East, SALT II negotiations, Africa, and the Panama Canal Treaties.
In August 1977, Secretary of State Vance went to Beijing for exploratory talks on normalization with the PRC. Vance reportedly proposed to switch the U.S. embassy from Taipei to Beijing and the liaison office from Beijing to Taipei. Teng Hsiao-p'ing rejected Vance’s suggestion and stated that Vance’s visit was a step back from normalization (Karnow, 1979: 598).

Two major events in the spring of 1978 changed the prospect of Sino-American normalization. U.S.-Soviet relations deteriorated in 1977 because of Carter’s human rights policy toward the Soviet Union and his administration's concern over the buildup of conventional forces by the Soviet Union. The United States was further disturbed by Soviet and Cuban military activities in Africa and the growth of Soviet military power in the spring of 1978. In June, President Carter challenged the Soviets to “choose either confrontation or cooperation.”

Meanwhile, the Senate approved the Panama Canal Treaties, and this victory strengthened Carter’s confidence in dealing with Congress. Passage of the Panama Canal Treaties freed Carter to deal with the normalization issue.

It was within these international and domestic contexts that Brzezinski, the leading advocate of a hard-line approach toward the Soviet Union, was scheduled in May 1978 to visit the PRC. Brzezinski told Teng that “the President has made up his mind to normalize relations with the PRC” (Brzezinski, 1983:208, 214).

Negotiation between the two governments was lifted to a new level on 19 September, when Carter met with Chinese Liaison Office Chief, Chai Tse-min, at the White House. The U.S. conditions for normalization with the PRC set by President Carter were:

1. unofficial American presence in Taiwan after normalization,
2. the continuation of American commercial, cultural, and other relations with Taiwan,
3. selected defensive arms sales to Taiwan after normalization,
4. a public U.S. statement expressing hope for a peaceful solution to the Taiwan problem, and
5. termination of the defense treaty with Taiwan in accordance with the terms of the treaty, which provided for termination upon one year’s notice by either party.³

In early November 1978, Ambassador Woodcock gave Huang Hua a draft of the joint normalization communique (Brzezinski, 1983:230). In late November, President Carter suggested a target date of 1 January 1979 for normalization (Carter, 1982:197). Carter extended an invitation to either Teng or Hua to visit Washington in January. The invitation was accepted by Teng, who met with Ambassador Woodcock on 13 December.

Negotiations between the United States and the PRC were held secretly and participants were limited to the Carter administration's inner cabinet: Vance, Brzezinski, Brown, and Jordan (Brzezinski, 1983:224). They were supported by Richard Holbrooke, assistant secretary of state for East Asia, and Michel Oksenberg, a Michigan University professor on the National Security Council staff. Brzezinski was the dominant force in wrapping up the agreement for President Carter (Brzezinski, 1983:233). Since mid-August 1978, Brzezinski had met many times with Ambassador Chai Tse-min to discuss normalization (Brzezinski, 1983:226).

Ambassador Woodcock revealed in an interview that during the meeting with Teng on 13 December 1978, Teng told him that, instead of the PRC's prior insistence that the United States abrogate its Defense Treaty with Taiwan, the PRC now acquiesces to its termination in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty calling for one year's notice prior to termination. Teng then asked that while the Treaty is still in force, would the United States agree not to make any new commitments meanwhile to sell arms to Taiwan? The United States agreed on a one-year moratorium not to make any new commitment of arms sales to Taiwan. 4

Despite this seeming understanding, the White House still harbored the intention to sell certain carefully selected defensive weapons to Taiwan after the moratorium and Treaty termination. Accordingly, two days after the Woodcock-Teng meetings, Woodcock received a White House cable asking him to make certain that the PRC clearly understood Washington's position on this matter. Although Ambassador Woodcock preferred to forego such clarification, he met with Teng again to explain the U.S. position. Teng, according to Woodcock, was furious and stated that the United States knew that the PRC would never agree with Washington's intention. Nevertheless, Teng said that to complete the normalization process was the first

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For two days intensive negotiations took place in both Beijing and Washington on the issue of arms sales to Taiwan, and on the settling of remaining details. A normalization agreement was concluded and announced on 15 December (Brzezinski, 1983:230-31).

The Carter administration informed congressional leaders only hours prior to the formal normalization announcement, which occurred during a congressional recess. Thus, an effective and timely congressional opposition movement was successfully precluded by the Carter administration. In July 1978, the U.S. Senate had passed an amendment to the International Security Assistance Act by a unanimous 94-0 roll call vote that called on the president to consult with the Senate before taking any action to terminate the 1954 Defense Treaty with the Republic of China (Gayner, 1979:334). This Dole-Stone amendment was later approved in a House-Senate conference committee, making it a resolution of the full Congress. However, Congress was not consulted in the normalization agreement.

Questions arose concerning the sudden rush for normalization, and the timing, terms, and the manner in which President Carter handled the China decision:

1. Kissinger commented two days after the normalization announcement that the normalization process could have been consummated several years earlier had the Republican administration been willing to accept the terms Carter accepted. Why did the Carter administration find the PRC's three demands acceptable without a

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5. Ibid.

6. It should be noted that there was a clear discrepancy between the word used in the English text and the Chinese text of the normalization communique, that is Chengren and renshihdao. Professor Michel Oksenberg claimed in an interview with a Japanese Professor Shigeru Usami that this discrepancy was inaccurate. "First of all, the negotiation was conducted in English and the sense of meaning was established by the English language. Secondly, we noted the alternation in Chinese. The U.S. had asked the Chinese whether this change is stylistic or substantive in its meaning. The Chinese said that it is a stylistic change and adds no change in its meaning and the English remains the same. This conversation was carried out by Stapleton Roy with the Chinese counterpart. In addition one can check on normalization agreements reached by a number of other countries and the phrase, chengren and renshihdao and one other phrase I do not remember was used variously in different normalization agreements and the translations were not totally consistent. In other words, I am confident that this is insignificant change and that those who sought to cast aspersions on the negotiating process were searching for rocks to throw," Oksenberg explained. Oksenberg was a staff member of the NSC, 1977-1980. Translated from The Asia Quarterly (Japan), 15, no. 4 (April 1985):70.
firm commitment from the PRC not to use military force to reunite Taiwan with mainland China?

2. Why did the Carter administration press the PRC to accept selected arms sales to Taiwan after normalization?

3. Did public opinion and Congressional support for the U.S.-PRC normalization increase to the extent that the administration was confident it could withstand domestic opposition?

4. Did the final phase of the normalization process occur because the U.S. played the China card, or the PRC played the American card, against the USSR?


6. Why was Congress not consulted by the Carter administration regarding Carter's decision to terminate unilaterally diplomatic relations and the Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of China?

THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL NATURE OF THE NORMALIZATION DECISION

Before analyzing the timing and terms of the U.S.-PRC normalization decision, it is important to understand the meaning of normalization itself. Normalization of relations between the United States and the PRC involved two important issues: mutual recognition of each other's state and government, and inauguration of diplomatic relations. Granting of recognition and acknowledgment of diplomatic relations do not necessarily go hand in hand. For example, the United States recognizes the government of Fidel Castro as the government of Cuba but does not maintain diplomatic relations with Cuba.

Recognition means "a formal acknowledgment or declaration by the government of an existing state that it intends to attach certain customary legal consequences to an existing set of facts which, in its view, justify it (and other states) in doing so" (Kaplan and Katzenbach, 1961:109). Normally the question of recognition of a foreign
government does not arise unless the change of government occurred through extraconstitutional means. The change of government of China in 1949 did not occur in accordance with the domestic law of China. The Communist government of the PRC came to power through revolution rather than through free elections, and therefore raised the question of recognition of the new government and the state of the PRC.

During the Truman administration, recognition of a new government that seized power through extraconstitutional means was normally delayed in order to determine if the new government controlled the territory of the state and was willing to honor its international obligations. If the new government satisfied these criteria, the United States usually extended recognition within a month (Galloway, 1978:36).

Recognition of the Communist government of the PRC was one of the most controversial cases faced by the Truman administration. President Truman refused to recognize Mao's government on several grounds. First, the Chinese Communists had not completed their conquest of the entire country, because the Nationalist government remained in control of Taiwan. Second, from the viewpoint of the American government, the government did not represent the substantially declared will of the Chinese people. Third, the Communist government was not willing to honor its international obligations. Fourth, as a sovereign state the United States was free to withhold recognition from a government hostile to it (Whiteman, 1963:90-110).

Recognition policy under Eisenhower was dominated by two main concerns: (1) the new government should be in effective control of the state; and (2) the new government should be anti-communist. The new government's willingness to honor international obligations was still a matter of inquiry by the Eisenhower administration, but in most cases this was only pro forma (Galloway, 1978:39). The Eisenhower administration supported the view that recognition should be looked on as "an instrument of national policy." According to the State Department, recognition was "a privilege and not a right" (Barnett, 1961:431). Dulles believed that "there is nothing automatic about it" (Barnett, 1961:543, note 4). The nonrecognition policy of the PRC continued throughout the Eisenhower years.

The U.S. recognition policy changed under the Kennedy administration. President Kennedy used recognition to promote constitutional government, especially in Latin America. President Johnson took a more pragmatic view of coups d'état. On 3 April 1964, Dean Rusk stated that the United States would support constitutional rule in Latin America, but would not "simply walk away" from states that
were under military rule. Numerous coups d'état occurred in Africa during the Johnson administration. The United States usually resumed relations with whatever regime was in power.

In 1969, the Senate passed Resolution 205 which indicated that recognition of a foreign government did not necessarily imply U.S. approval of the form, ideology, or policy of that foreign government. This resolution did not, however, mention the criteria that should be used for recognition.

During the presidencies of Nixon and Ford, the United States tended to resume relations with whatever regime was in control of the government and deemphasized the entire recognition process if vital U.S. national interests were not at stake. Recognition was withheld whenever the United States suffered significant setbacks because of the overthrow of the old governments. The most notable cases were the fall of South Vietnam and Cambodia in 1975 and the civil war in Angola in 1975-1976 (Galloway, 1978:103).

In summary, the practice of U.S. recognition policy has been complex and inconsistent. Criteria used for recognition varied from one administration to another.

It is within this historical context that the normalization of relations between the United States and the PRC is examined.

After the establishment of the PRC in 1949, the Truman administration took a “wait-and-see” position toward recognition of the new Chinese regime. In the Truman years, the U.S. recognition policy toward a new government that achieved power through extraconstitutional means was best illustrated by Dean Acheson’s 1949 speech to the Pan American Society:

> Our policy with respect to recognizing new governments in Latin America is not inconsistent with our encouragement of democracy. We maintain diplomatic relations with other countries primarily because we are all on the same planet and must do business with each other. . . . When a freely elected government is overthrown and a new and perhaps militaristic government takes over, we do not need to recognize the new government automatically and immediately. We can wait to see if it really controls its territory and intends to live up to its international commitments. We can consult with other governments, as we have often done. But

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if and when we do recognize a government under these cir-
cumstances, our act of recognition need not be taken to im-
ply approval of it or its policy.9

Had the PRC met the condition of honoring its international obligations, the Truman administration would likely have recognized the PRC is order to encourage “Titoism” in China. The outbreak of the Korean War made President Truman believe that communism was monolithic. The U.S. Seventh Fleet was dispatched to neutralize the Taiwan Strait. President Truman did not want to see Taiwan fall to the PRC in part because this would have released more Chinese Communist troops to aid the North Koreans. Recognition of the PRC was out of the question after Beijing entered the Korean War. Throughout the 1950s, nonrecognition of the PRC was used mainly as a political weapon ostensibly to halt the spread of communism. America’s perception of monolithic communism changed in the next decade (viz., the Sino-Soviet split), which finally led President Nixon to reconsider American nonrecognition policy toward the PRC in the late 1960s.

Neither President Nixon’s 1972 trip to China, nor the establishment of the liaison offices, immediately led to recognition of Beijing. It took nearly seven years after Nixon’s China trip in 1972 to conclude the process of normalization of relations between Washington and Beijing. In the 1970s, the importance of recognition as a political tool to advance national interests was downplayed. With few exceptions, the United States was more concerned with continuing relations with the government currently in effective control than with its nature. One may wonder, then, why the United States took such a long time to extend recognition and establish diplomatic relations with the PRC. Why did not President Nixon recognize the PRC while he was in Beijing in 1972 as Japan did in September of that year? What national interests were at stake when considering recognition of the PRC?

From one perspective, U.S. recognition of the PRC was more a political question than a legal issue. Unlike crisis decision making, the recognition decision had few time constraints; the United States could choose the timing and terms. Conversely, PRC recognition of the U.S. may also be viewed as a political question. The PRC could also choose the best timing and terms to normalize relations with the United States. Although both perspectives may be considered equally important, logistical concerns and research constraints compel that the U.S. perspective be emphasized here. How well and to what extent

the rational actor model explains the process of normalization of relations between the U.S. and the PRC from 1969 to 1978 is the focus of chapter 3.
PART 2
THE EFFICACY OF DECISION-MAKING MODELS
THE RATIONAL ACTOR MODEL
STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES

The rational actor model assumes that decision making is a process of means-ends calculation. The nation as a rational, purposeful, and unitary decision maker will select the action, among alternatives, that will maximize goals and national interests.

Graham Allison believes that the rational actor model is the model most frequently used by analysts to explain foreign policy (Allison, 1971:10-13). Traditional foreign policy analysts use national interests as the prime motivating factor for state interactions. Studies by Lasswell (1965), Morgenthau (1951), Palmer (1952), and Osgood (1953) contend that nations always behave rationally in their pursuit of wealth, power, prestige, territorial gains, and the like, under the veil of national interest. States are treated as the sole actors of international politics. Foreign policy can be explained by recounting the aims and calculations of nations or governments. According to Downs (1951, 1967), a rational decision maker is one who seeks the most efficient means to get what he wants. To Allison (1971), rationality refers to “consistent, value-maximizing choice within specified constraints” (Allison, 1971:30). Action is chosen in response to the strategic problem the nation faces. The components of a rational choice model include:

1. Goals and objectives. National security and national interests are the principal categories in which strategic goals are conceived;
2. Options. Various courses of action relevant to a strategic problem provide the spectrum of options;
3. Consequences. Enactment of each alternative course of action will produce a series of consequences. The relevant consequences constitute benefits and costs in terms of strategic goals and objectives;
4. Choice. Rational choice is value-maximizing. The rational agent selects the alternative whose consequences
rank highest in terms of his goals and objectives (Al-}

In real world politics, however, this "ideal" process of decision making falls short of its aims. Criticisms of this rational actor approach to decision-making analysis began to emerge in the early 1960s. The main criticisms are (1) it is not possible to collect "perfect information," needed to identify alternatives and compare the consequences of each alternative to the goals being sought; (2) it is not always possible to order conflicting values and goals of foreign policy. After identifying a problem, the decision maker is assumed to be able to order his or her values and goals. Yet, most foreign policy decisions involve a range of often conflicting values and goals; (3) governments are not monoliths. The rational actor model regards the state as the prime actor in international politics. But some challengers to this model believe that political action is undertaken by concrete human beings and that the decision-making process consists of spheres of competence, communication and information, and motivations. Foreign policy emerges from the normal political process of bargaining, compromising, favor trading, and so on.

In brief, the "state-as-the-sole-rational-actor" approach to analyzing foreign policy decision making is no longer adequate. The rational actor model, however, is only a simplification of the decision-making process. The model, despite its limitations, may still be considered a useful tool to understand the making of foreign policy. Keeping in mind its limitations, the Sino-American normalization decision is analyzed in terms of the major components of this model.

RECONSTRUCTION OF U.S. CALCULATIONS

In order to understand the timing and terms of the normalization decision, it is important to first examine American goals and objectives. Some pre-1978 speculations and concerns in the United States would prove ill-founded, but nevertheless merit analysis in the context of the rational choice model. Utilization of this model for explanatory purposes, moreover, requires review of scholarship and analyses of the major options presumably considered by the main actors at the time.

Goals and Objectives

On the issue of normalization of relations with the PRC, the United States had three sets of goals and objectives: strategic, economic, and moral.

Strategic. The first set of considerations concerned U.S. strategic in-
Normalization was likely to ease tensions and hostile feelings between the United States and the PRC, thus reducing the dangers of another military confrontation with the PRC, which represents nearly one-quarter of the world population.

International politics had changed since 1950. The Soviet Union had risen to a position of global power. A shift in the nuclear balance between the United States and the Soviet Union occurred in the direction of parity. China itself had developed a nuclear capability. Tensions that had developed between Moscow and Beijing since the late 1950s led to an open break on the Sino-Soviet border by the spring of 1969. China became a fully independent actor in world affairs.

By the end of the 1960s, the United States realized that it could no longer afford to act as the world’s policeman. The Nixon Doctrine in 1969 attempted to reduce America’s international presence and general overseas obligations in light of changed world conditions. The United States declared its intention to lead the world away from an “era of confrontation” into an “era of negotiation.”

From a rational actor model perspective, the world scene of the 1970s had become politically multipolar and militarily bipolar. A multipolar world was assumed to be safer than a bipolar one. The end of bipolarity meant the end of the zero-sum game wherein a gain for one bloc is automatically regarded as a loss for the other. America’s massive global involvement could be reduced under the multipolar international system. The United States tried to bring China into this new structure; an accommodation with the PRC could enhance American strategic capability to counter Soviet influence and power. Normalization of relations with Beijing could strengthen a stable balance of power in East Asia that would help prevent domination of the region by international “hegemony”—a euphemism denoting the Soviet Union. Improved relations between Washington and Beijing could also help prevent dangerous miscalculations by the emerging nuclear power in China. Beijing could also cooperate with the United States in settling such sensitive international problems as arms control and the military confrontation in Vietnam and Korea. There were, however, potential risks involved. If the United States accepted Beijing’s three demands for normalization, American strategic interests, particularly in Taiwan, might be damaged. In the 1950s, Taiwan remained a key strategic base in the effort to contain the expansion of Chinese Communism. In the late 1960s, the United States’ perception of the strategic importance of Taiwan altered as a result of changes in U.S. perceptions toward the PRC. Neither containment nor the “roll-back” policy toward Beijing was compatible with changes that had taken place in the world over the past two decades. As tensions be-
tween Washington and Beijing eased, Taiwan's strategic importance as a link in the chain of alliances designed to check the expansion of Beijing's influence in Asia declined. Taiwan's importance as a logistics and communications center in support of U.S. military operations in Asia during the war in Vietnam was considerable. But as the United States attempted to reduce its involvement in Vietnam in the late 1960s, the island of Taiwan gradually lost its strategic value to the United States.

In the 1970s, the United States' principal security concerns in Northeast Asia centered around the gradual buildup of Soviet military power in Asia and the Pacific, and the danger of conflict in the Korean peninsula. In Southeast Asia, the United States was concerned about obtaining "peace with honor" in Indochina in the early 1970s. While U.S. bases on Taiwan could be useful for logistic support and refueling purposes in times of war, Taiwan was certainly less significant strategically than a closer U.S.-PRC relationship in terms of a successful defense of Soviet ambitions in Asia and military withdrawal from South Vietnam.

Although Taiwan was now less important strategically to the United States, a nonpeaceful resolution of the Taiwan question could threaten the peace and security balance of the western pacific area. Termination of the U.S. defense treaty with Taiwan could also call into question U.S. willingness to stand by its defense commitments elsewhere in Asia. An armed attack on Taiwan by the PRC after normalization of relations with the United States would have an adverse impact on South Korea and on the noncommunist states in Asia. U.S. credibility and reliability could be severely damaged if the United States failed to respond firmly to such an attack. American withdrawal from Taiwan could also be interpreted as presaging a broader American withdrawal from Asia, and therefore a changed balance-of-power situation in Asia.

Two potential benefits emerged from Sino-American normalization vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. First, the establishment of U.S.-PRC diplomatic relations would help increase U.S. leverage against the Soviet Union. Fears of Sino-American collusion might provide Moscow with an incentive to compromise with the United States on such important issues as SALT and disarmament in Europe. Second, normalization with China might reduce the chances of Sino-Soviet rapprochement. Continuing Sino-Soviet hostility implied the continuation of Soviet military stations on the Sino-Soviet border. In the 1970s, the Soviet Union had deployed about 20-25 percent of its ground forces along the Sino-Soviet border and up to one-third of its naval forces in Pacific waters (Wang, 1981:651). It was believed that
every Soviet division on the Sino-Soviet border was one less division facing NATO (Chyba, 1981:471).

On the other hand, normalization with the PRC could risk the worsening of American-Soviet relations if Moscow perceived Sino-American normalization as Washington’s playing the “China card” against the Soviet Union. Should Washington fail to handle the sensitive triangular relations properly, the Soviet Union might interpret Sino-American normalization as America’s siding with Beijing against Moscow. Attainment of any agreements relating to SALT and other vital issues might be more difficult if not impossible. The Soviet Union might also retaliate against Sino-American collusion with a massive military buildup or with the formation of its own “second front” to China, such as allying with Vietnam, the PRC’s enemy, or against Cambodia, the PRC’s friend. Soviet formation of an anti-Chinese and an anti-American alliance with other Asian nations might destabilize the balance of power in Asia. The Soviet Union and the United States might reenter a cold war environment.

If Taiwan were abandoned by the United States, the government in Taiwan might consider a Soviet option because of fears of invasion from the PRC. Were the Soviet Union to gain access to Taiwanese ports of Keelung and Kaoshiung, China would be encircled by Moscow from Vladivostok and Soviet-aligned Vietnam to the south and Mongolia to the north (Kintner and Copper, 1979:13, note 8). This possible scenario would definitely be against American strategic interests in Asia.

In brief, American strategic goals and objectives concerning normalization of relations with the PRC can be grouped into the following categories:

1. Maximize American diplomatic leverage vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and minimize Soviet suspicion of Sino-American collusion against Moscow;

2. Improve Sino-American bilateral relations without endangering the security of Taiwan;

3. Work out a solution that could satisfy Beijing’s demands and minimize the damage to American credibility as a trustworthy ally in Asia as well as in other parts of the world.

1. During his May 1978 trip to China, Brzezinski had pointed out to Teng Hsiaoping the danger that an insecure Taiwan, after normalization, might turn to the Soviet Union. Teng responded that “the Chinese had thought about this possibility, but since the United States would maintain economic relations with Taiwan, this would be less a problem (Brzezinski, 1983:218).
Economic. Economic factors were less important than strategic dimensions in determining America's efforts to achieve normalization of relations with the PRC. Nevertheless, an expanding economic relationship with the PRC, with a potential one billion customers, could be a powerful incentive.

Potential economic gains following Sino-American normalization would include an increase in U.S.-PRC trade. China's foreign trade has often been influenced by economic factors. Japan's trade with the PRC jumped 63 percent in 1974 in response to Japan's decision to normalize relations with the PRC under Beijing's terms in 1972. Sino-West German trade rose 73 percent in 1973, one year after the establishment of diplomatic relations with the PRC. Sino-American trade also increased sharply the first two years after Nixon's China trip. On the other hand, foreign trade could decline sharply following the deterioration of political relations. Sino-American trade dropped significantly in 1975 and 1976 when the PRC was upset with the lack of progress toward normalization and with Soviet-American detente relations. Sino-Soviet trade also dropped sharply in the 1960s when hostility increased between Moscow and Beijing.

On 23 October 1977, Teng Hsiao-p'ing vividly explained the major limitation to Sino-American trade before full diplomatic relations:

Our relations with the U.S., compared to those with Britain and Europe, are limited because there is a political limitation. The reason for this is that Sino-American relations have not yet been normalized. There is a great difference between having and not having normalization. Certainly, we could have exchanges now, but there are limits. For example, should we want to buy something abroad, we would prefer to do business with countries with which we maintain normal diplomatic relations; even if the price is higher. Such is the case with the United States. For example, we once wanted to import computers from the United States. Your businessmen were interested in the deal but your government did not approve it. It does not matter that you do not sell these things to us; we will not die. The problem is whether relations have been normalized—it makes a

3. Ibid.
great difference.4

The United States was treated by the Chinese as a residual supplier of agricultural products from the beginning of Sino-American trade in the early 1970s. Grain imports from the United States increased in 1973 and 1974 because of a poor Chinese harvest in 1972. When China’s grain harvests improved, the PRC canceled contracts with U.S. suppliers while maintaining contracts with Canada and Australia, countries that had diplomatic relations with Beijing. Unless U.S. products had been clearly superior as, for example, Boeing passenger aircraft, and ammonia products, the Chinese would rather buy from other countries, presumably in an effort to increase pressure on the United States to normalize relations.5 This evidence suggested that normalization was likely to lead to increased Sino-American trade.

Normalization, however, was not likely to change Sino-American trade dramatically, because of China’s self-reliance economic policy and its shortage of foreign exchanges to pay for imports. The “vast China market” proved to be exaggerated. Sino-American trade did not play an important role in the economy of either country. Trade with China is not likely to exceed one or two percent of total U.S. foreign trade in the near future (Barnett, 1977:36).

Another economic consideration was the potential impact of U.S.-PRC normalization on U.S.-Taiwan economic relations. If the United States normalized relations with the PRC under Beijing’s terms, U.S.-Taiwan trade might be adversely affected.

Taiwan has been one of the world’s best performers in economic growth. From 1955 to 1975, Taiwan’s gross domestic product (GDP) grew at an average rate of eight percent.6 U.S. economic aid to Taiwan from 1950 to 1965 contributed a great deal to the successful growth of Taiwan’s economy. The end of U.S. economic aid in 1965, however, did not stop its rapid and sustained economic growth and the growth of exports and imports.

From 1952 to 1968, Taiwan’s exports jumped from $111 million to $842 million, a compound growth rate of 11.1 percent (Koo, 1973:418). Total Taiwan imports from the United States grew from $98 million in 1954 to $2,347 million in 1978. Taiwan exports to the

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United States in the same period increased from $5 million to $5,010 million (Chang, 1981:604).

After 1966, the United States replaced Japan as Taiwan’s top trading partner, to the extent that by 1977 the United States was taking 40 percent of Taiwan’s exports (Far Eastern Economic Review, 1978:318). American private investment, moreover, amounted to $566.13 million by the end of 1978, which represented more than 25 percent of all foreign investment in Taiwan (Chang, 1981:604). Taiwan was the Export-Import Bank’s second largest customer after Brazil, with loans and guarantees outstanding in the amount of more than $1.8 billion in 1978. 7 Ranking twelfth among America’s largest trading partners in 1976, Taiwan’s two-way trade with the United States amounted to $4.8 billion, while the PRC’s two-way trade with the United States was only $337 million in 1967. 8

Continuing economic stability, was crucial to insuring political viability in Taiwan. There was apprehension, therefore, that termination of the U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan might seriously disrupt economic stability on the island and that foreign investors might pull their investments out of Taiwan. It was feared, too, that U.S. economic losses would be considerable if Taiwan were to become one province under the control of the PRC. In Taiwan, U.S. businessmen could own 100 percent of their equity, whereas such freedom in the PRC was out of the question. The trend whereby U.S.-Taiwan trade each year exceeded several times the annual U.S.-PRC trade was likely to continue in the foreseeable future were there no serious security doubts about Taiwan’s stability.

Moral. Morality is seldom mentioned as an ingredient in foreign policy goals. This omission does not, however, imply that foreign policy makers totally ignore ethics while making decisions. On the contrary, some policy makers, such as presidents Woodrow Wilson and Jimmy Carter, strongly emphasized morality in foreign relations. President Carter in 1977 declared that “human rights is the soul of American foreign policy.”

The keeping of promises, respect for international law, repudiation of war as an instrument of national policy, protection of human

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7. U.S. Congress, Senate, Taiwan Enabling Act, Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Together with Additional Views on S. 245. 1 March 1979, p. 22.

rights, and fair dealings are some ethical precepts most often discussed by writers in international politics (Morganthau, 1978:236).

Relating to the question of Sino-American normalization of relations, some moral restraints on the United States existed in making the normalization decision. The central problem was when and how to sever its relationship with Taiwan, a country that had been friendly for several decades. Taiwan had been a loyal friend to the United States since 1950; unilateral termination of the defense treaty and diplomatic relations with the United States might subject the 18 million people in a free society to political and economic harassment and possible military attack from the PRC. If the United States severed diplomatic and military relations with Taiwan—not because of any perfidy by this small country, but only because the very nation the United States intended to protect that country against demanded it—the whole world would question U.S. credibility as an ally.\(^9\)

As it moved toward normalization of relations with China, the United States certainly wanted to avoid the charge of selling out Taiwan in exchange for its own political and strategic benefits. On the other hand, normalization between Washington and Beijing could be rationalized and encouraged in terms of another level of moral consideration, that is, peace versus war. Normalization could ease tensions and hostility with a country having nearly one billion people, and thus reduce chances of a war between two nuclear powers.

How to work out a solution to normalize relations with the PRC without endangering Taiwan’s security was the main moral concern in the normalization decision for the United States.

**Options**

After identifying the goals and objectives of the normalization issue, a rational decision maker would then search various options and examine consequences of each alternative. A variety of options for normalization were discussed widely in the United States before December 1978.\(^10\) They can be briefly categorized in five formulas.

*The Japanese Formula.* The United States would accept Beijing’s three demands for normalization and set up “unofficial” offices in Taipei and Washington to conduct cultural and economic relations with Taiwan after normalization of relations with the PRC.

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On 29 September 1972, Japan accepted Beijing's three demands for normalization: (1) recognition of the PRC as the sole legitimate government of China, (2) acceptance of Taiwan as an integral part of China, and (3) abrogation of the "illegal" Taiwan-Japan Peace Treaty. On the question of Taiwan, Japan noted that it "fully understood" and respected Beijing's stand that Taiwan constituted an inalienable part of the PRC's territory. In conformity with the third condition set forth by the PRC, Foreign Minister Ohira declared that Japan would henceforth regard its treaty with Taiwan as invalid. Japan also announced that a "liaison organ" would be established to maintain "trade and other private level relations" (*Kyodo*, 6 November 1972, from *China Quarterly*, 1973:201).

The PRC began referring to the Japanese model as a basis for normalization between the United States and the PRC. The Japanese formula, preferred by Beijing, presented Washington with a dilemma. Taiwan's relations with the United States were far more important than with Japan. The United States had a defense treaty with the government in Taiwan and Japan had no security commitment to that island. Should the United States recognize the PRC as the sole legal government of China and withdraw recognition of the Republic of China government in Taiwan, the United States would be in a poor legal position to provide any military, political, or economic aid to strengthen Taiwan's security position. Acceding to Beijing's three demands would also raise the question of legitimacy of the other 59 government-to-government treaties and executive agreements between the United States and the Republic of China, such as the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation. Were Taiwan considered part of the PRC, a Communist country, Taiwan's most-favored-nation standing and access to Export-Import Bank loans and guarantees could also be jeopardized.

Acceptance of Beijing's three conditions might be rewarded with Beijing's more cooperative attitude toward the United States with respect to other world problems, such as arms limitation talks and U.S.-PRC blocked assets problems. Termination of the defense treaty could also relieve the United States of the obligation of assisting Taiwan in case of war between Taipei and Beijing, thus obviating U.S. involvement in another Asian civil war. On the other hand, Taiwan's security position and American credibility might be damaged under the Japanese formula.

Various compromise proposals were suggested to substitute for the defense treaty. Both the PRC and the United States had conditions for normalization; final agreement could be reached only through mutual concessions by both sides. A number of U.S. China
experts suggested that the United States accept Beijing’s three conditions for normalization, but that the United States should add a formal declaration voicing strong opposition to the settlement of the Taiwan question by other than peaceful means and that the U.S. should continue arms sales to Taiwan after normalization.11 A U.S. declaration—issued either in the name of Congress or the president, or both jointly—would reassure Taiwan and other U.S. allies that the United States would not abandon its friend, Taiwan. Continued arms sales would thus minimize the cost of normalization. Should the PRC refuse to accept these conditions, the United States could then choose other less specific words in the declaration, by not referring to Taiwan directly. For example, it could use “the Western Pacific along the rim of East Asia”—a general formula that would clearly include Taiwan without affronting the PRC directly.12 The United States could also issue the declaration after normalization of relations with Beijing; thus the PRC would be less likely to break diplomatic ties with the United States over the Taiwan issue.

The German Formula. Some American China experts suggested that the United States maintain embassies in both China and Taiwan just as the United States did in both West and East Germany.13 The German formula would bring U.S. diplomatic relations with the two parts of China in line with the reality of the two governments currently existing in China. The United States could also continue its defense commitment to Taiwan while recognizing Beijing as the ruler of mainland China.

This alternative was very attractive to many Americans because it would require no sacrifice of U.S.-Taiwan relations. In the Shanghai Communique, however, the PRC reiterated its opposition to the creation of “one China, one Taiwan,” “one China, two governments,” and “two Chinas.” The German formula clearly contradicted Beijing’s position. If the United States were to propose the German formula for normalization, Sino-American relations would probably deteriorate. The United States might also run the risk of a military confrontation with the PRC. The strategic benefit, then, which the United States enjoyed since Nixon’s opening of China, might cease to exist.

Independent Taiwan Formula. Congressman Lester L. Wolff recom-

12. Ibid:XVII.

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mended that the United States could encourage the Taiwan government to conduct a plebiscite in Taiwan as a prelude to declaring Taiwan an independent country.\(^{14}\) The United States would then maintain diplomatic relations with Taipei as the popularly approved government of Taiwan, while recognizing the PRC as the legal government of China on the mainland.

The difficulty with this option was that neither Beijing nor current leaders in Taipei would accept an independent Taiwan. Unless under extreme circumstances, such as military attack from the PRC, the Nationalist government would most likely oppose the independent Taiwan option. The PRC would certainly oppose any movement leading toward the independence of Taiwan. An independent Taiwan formula, would most likely preclude any possibility of normalizing relations with China.

\textit{One China, But Not Now, Formula.} Proponents of this option suggested that the United States should recognize there is only one China and Taiwan is part of China. The United States would not encourage the independent Taiwan movement. Taiwan’s status would be decided between Beijing and Taipei through peaceful means. Meanwhile, the United States should honor its defense commitment to safeguard the security of Taiwan and the Pescadores (Abramowitz and Moorsteen, 1971:19).

Under this formula, the United States could terminate the defense treaty with Taiwan if the PRC would agree to formally renounce the use of force against Taiwan and allow the United States to continue arms sales to Taiwan after normalization.\(^{15}\) The United States could also refuse explicitly to acknowledge the PRC claim to Taiwan, therefore leaving open the possibility of maintaining semi-official relations with Taiwan, such as in the form of a consulate or a liaison office (Lindsay, 1977:7-8). From 1950 to 1972, Britain had a consular office in Taiwan headed by a charge d’affaires, while maintaining a diplomatic mission in Beijing. Proponents of this formula argued that normalization would be conceivable only through mutual concessions in each other’s terms.

The “one China, but not now” formula would satisfy part of Beijing’s demands by recognizing the territorial integrity of China regarding Taiwan. The presence of U.S. consular or liaison officers in Taiwan, and the continuation of arms sales to Taiwan after normaliza-

\(^{14}\) Remarks of Congressman Lester L. Wolff, 20 September 1977, in ibid:VIII,XIX.

\(^{15}\) See testimony of Robert Scalapino, 20 September 1977, U.S. Congress, Normalization of Relations with the PRC, pp. 24-78.
tion, would greatly facilitate economic and military ties between the United States and Taiwan. U.S. credibility as Taiwan’s ally could endure should the PRC pledge not to use military force against Taiwan. U.S. refusal to endorse the Chinese legal claim over Taiwan could leave open the unification issue for Taipei and Beijing. The U.S. could also not be blamed for “abandoning” Taiwan, since it would be maintaining quasi-diplomatic military ties with Taiwan. A major difficulty, however, was that the PRC might not be willing to accept this formula. Negotiations of terms for normalization might be long and hard. Nevertheless, the United States would never be able to find out Beijing’s room for compromise unless the United States kept exploring, in a sustained effort, Beijing’s intentions.

Status-quo Formula. Proponents of keeping Sino-American relations at a status-quo level—having a liaison office in Beijing and an embassy in Taipei—argued that what really brings nations together is the congruence of their national interests. If the United States and the PRC had a basic common interest, such as being against Soviet hegemony, Sino-American relations would continue to expand with or without normalization. On the other hand, if mutual interests were not strong enough to bind the two nations together, full diplomatic relations would not be enough to guarantee cooperation. The history of the Sino-Soviet relationship provided an excellent example. The Soviet Union was Beijing’s best friend in the early 1950s when Moscow and Beijing perceived parallel interests in cooperating with each other. The Soviet Union, however, had become Beijing’s number one enemy, even with continued diplomatic ties.

If Chinese fears of the Soviet threat were real and Chinese needs for Western computers, machinery, and oil equipment were great, closer cooperation between Beijing and Washington could proceed with or without full diplomatic relations.

Normalization on Beijing’s terms might increase trade with the United States, but this favor could be withdrawn at any time (Lindsay, 1977:8). If the United States acceded to Chinese demands regarding Taiwan, and abandoned its defense commitment to that island, it could also make the Chinese doubt U.S. reliability as a partner to stand up to the threat of Soviet hegemony.

The PRC perceived the United States as a temporary ally against the Soviet Union. This thought was vividly demonstrated in the political report of then CCP Chairman Hua Kuo-feng to the 11th Party Congress on 12 August 1977, as quoted by Robert A. Scalapino:

The more powerful enemy (read the USSR) can be vanquished only by exerting the utmost effort, and most thor-
ously, carefully, attentively and skillfully making use
without fail of every, even the smallest, "rift" among the ene-
 mies (read the USSR and the U.S.), of every antagonism of
interest, among the bourgeoisie of the various countries and
among the various groups or types of bourgeoisie within the
various countries (read United States, Japan, and West Eu-
 rope), and also by taking advantage of every, even the small-
est, opportunity of gaining a mass ally, even though this ally
be temporary, vacillating, unstable, unreliable and condi-
tional (read the U.S.). 16

Hua further discussed the Chinese attitude toward the United
States in terms of the following themes:

Soviet-United States contention extends to every corner
of the world, but its focus is still Europe.

The Soviet Union and the United States are the source
of a new world war, and Soviet social-imperialism in particu-
lar presents the greater danger.

The two hegemonic powers, the Soviet Union and the
United States, are the biggest international exploiters and op-
pressors of today and the common enemies of the people of
the world. . . . 17

Within the context of this Chinese attitude toward the Sino-
American detente relationship, opponents of normalization strongly
recommended that the United States conduct Sino-American relations
at the quasi-diplomatic level without sacrificing U.S.-Taiwan relations.
Some also suggested that the United States could further enhance
Sino-American economic and political relations, in the absence of full
diplomatic relations, by passing an amendment to the U.S. Export-
Import Bank Charter to allow U.S. exporters credit for ventures in the
PRC, or to reduce tariffs on imported silk fabric, an important prod-
uct of PRC cottage industries. 18 Partial measures like these could help
break new ground in Sino-American relations and yet maintain U.S.
credibility. The United States could also approve sales of high tech-
ology related materials to China as a means to improve Sino-Ameri-
can relations without normalizing relations with the PRC.

Proponents of normalization, however, strongly disagreed with
this point of view. Some American China experts warned that the

16. Quoted from prepared statement of Robert A. Scalapino in U.S. Congress, Normal-
ization of Relations with the PRC, p. 36.
17. Ibid.
PRC was unlikely to wait indefinitely for the United States to establish full diplomatic relations with Beijing. Failing to move forward toward normalization could risk moving backward.\textsuperscript{19}

Timing was another consideration for normalization. Timing and terms were closely linked. There was no good time to break relations with a good and loyal friend; however, it was believed that if the United States chose optimal timing and normalization terms, Taipei's pain could be minimized.

The best timing for normalization negotiation was endlessly debated. In the mid-1970s, there was a strong sense among some that the United States normalize relations with the PRC prior to Mao's death, lest the momentum and advantageous timing for negotiations on the Taiwan question be lost. This argument assumed that Mao was the chief architect of Sino-American rapprochement, and that the post-Mao leadership might turn toward the Soviet Union for better relations and hence be less willing to compromise on the Taiwan issue.

Choosing an optimal timing for normalization was difficult for U.S. decision makers. Normalization was a noncrisis decision with minimal time constraints. China's Vice Premier Teng told George Bush, former U.S. envoy to the PRC, during his 1977 visit to China, that "if you need time on the Taiwan problem, you have it" (Moritz, 1977:4). Teng also indicated to Cyrus Vance in October 1975 that the PRC would be prepared to wait five, ten, or one hundred years to acquire Taiwan.\textsuperscript{20} Mao was quoted in 1957 as saying that if the United States does not recognize the PRC in 100 years, it will surely do so in 101 years.\textsuperscript{21} Nevertheless, normalization of relations with the PRC was a prime goal of U.S. foreign policy of the Nixon, Ford, and Carter administrations.

First, it would be advantageous for the United States to negotiate the Taiwan question before a Sino-Soviet rapprochement. Fears of the Soviet threat and Soviet-American collusion at the time of high hostility between Moscow and Beijing might encourage the PRC to compromise on the Taiwan question. Nixon's opening of China in 1972 and the establishment of liaison offices in 1973 were possible because China's concern over the Soviet Union outweighed its apprehensions


\textsuperscript{20} Cited from prepared statement of Allen S. Whiting, U.S. Congress Normalization of Relations with the PRC, p. 16.

over U.S.-Taiwan relations. A PRC detente with the Soviet Union or an easing of Sino-Soviet tensions would mean the United States would no longer be needed to counteract the Soviet Union. Thus, there would be less reason for Beijing to make concessions on the issue of Taiwan. The United States would then have fewer “bargaining chips” on the negotiation table. In other words, it would be good timing to negotiate with the PRC on normalization terms while the United States still occupied a favorable position in the strategic “triangle.”

Second, the United States would be in a better bargaining position over the Taiwan issue when moderate leadership was in control of power in the PRC. Mao’s policy toward the United States in the early 1970s had met with significant opposition from radical groups in China, particularly among the military. If radical groups in China were to regain power, Sino-American detente relations would be subject to reassessment and might be in jeopardy. The PRC might toughen its demands on Taiwan and be more impatient to settle the Taiwan question peacefully.

Third, the United States would be in a better position to normalize relations with Beijing while Taiwan was still strong and stable in political, military, and economic terms, so that Taiwan could withstand the shock of American derecognition. Normalization would most likely involve concessions from Washington on U.S.-Taiwan relations. Since the early 1970s, Taiwan survived withdrawals of membership from the United Nations and various other international organizations and derecognitions from many countries. Political and economic stability, however, might not last indefinitely, even with continuing U.S. recognition of the island. Taiwan’s economic prosperity could easily be disrupted in case of world-wide inflation or recession. During the world-wide recession of 1974-1975, Taiwan’s real growth plunged to 1.1 percent in 1974 from 13 percent in 1973, and reached only 3.1 percent in 1975. If the United States completed normalization with the PRC when Taiwan was still stable and strong, the PRC would be less likely to attack Taiwan, thus minimizing risks of an immediate war between Taipei and Beijing after normalization, which would have a severe impact on U.S. credibility.

Fourth, the United States would be in a better position to downgrade military ties with Taiwan when tension in the Asian area diminished. Taiwan’s strategic importance, which depended upon the overall U.S. assessment of the balance of power in Asia, changed overnight when the Korean War broke out in 1950. When tension in the

Asian area diminished, as indicated in the Shanghai Communique, the United States would be more willing to withdraw its forces and military installations from Taiwan.

Fifth, the United States would have more leverage over Beijing on the issue of Taiwan when U.S.-Soviet relations were improved. Should the establishment of Sino-American diplomatic relations occur when U.S.-Soviet detente relations were firm, Soviet fears of Sino-American encirclement against Moscow would be minimized. The United States could then continue to occupy the most favorable position of the triangular relationships after normalization, and let China and the Soviet Union compete against each other for improved relations with the United States. On the other hand, if normalization took place when U.S.-Soviet relations were strained, Washington’s needs for Beijing would be more urgent, and the PRC would then be in a better position to bargain over the Taiwan question.

It is within the context of U.S. options of terms and timing that we proceed to explain why the United States decided to normalize relations with the PRC in late 1978 mainly on Beijing’s terms.

THE RATIONAL EXPLANATION

Strategic Explanation

There were three levels of strategic considerations in the normalization decision. At the global level, the main concern was to maximize the U.S. strategic position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. At the regional level, the United States would hope to enhance its diplomatic leverage by soliciting help from the PRC, after normalization, in finding solutions to sensitive problems in such places as Korea, Taiwan, and Indo-China. At the bilateral level, the United States would like to eliminate tensions with the PRC while maintaining meaningful relations with Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea as well as with other friendly Asian countries. Another important concern was to minimize the cost of U.S. credibility as a trustworthy ally.

The Washington-Beijing-Moscow Triangle Explanation. Three competing schools of thought on American triangular policy toward the Soviet Union and China emerged in the 1970s. First, the “low impact” school has argued that closer U.S.-China ties have had, and are likely to have, little effect on Soviet foreign policy. Second, the “manipulation” school advocates that playing the China card does have an impact on the Soviet Union. The United States should build closer relations with China in order to gain leverage against the Soviet Union. There were two different approaches within this school of thought, however. One subgroup maintained that an evenhanded pol-
icy toward China and the Soviet Union could best secure U.S. strategic interests. The other subgroup stressed the need for the United States to tilt China against the Soviet Union. Third, the "nonmanipulation" school argued that although U.S. policy toward China does have a substantial influence on Soviet actions, the United States should not exploit its China policy in a manner adverse to Moscow. 23

"Playing the China card" was a loosely defined concept that refers to "building closer U.S. political, economic, military, or technological ties with the PRC for the purpose of gaining greater U.S. leverage against the Soviet Union." 24

Which of the three schools of thought regarding the "China card" could best serve U.S. interests was debatable. Calculating potential gains and costs of playing the China card against Moscow was extremely difficult. Judging gains and costs on their merits alone, without considering whether they might lead to other uncalculated and unexpected side-effects, could have had disastrous results. The most common risks in playing the China card can be summarized as follows:

1. Overt U.S.-China political, economic, and military ties might cause Soviet policy to turn to a hard line, endangering U.S.-Soviet detente relations and returning the two superpowers to a renewed cold war;
3. Military aid to China might one day be counterproductive to U.S. interests because of domestic political uncertainties and complexities in China.

Given the complexity of international politics and the difficulty of obtaining complete information, it was not possible for the U.S. to develop an optimal strategy toward Moscow and Beijing under the ideal rules of the rational actor model. Instead, the policy toward these two super communist countries would be based on U.S. decision makers' own wisdom and their perception and assessment of international politics.

During the Nixon-Ford-Kissinger years, U.S. policy toward Bei-

jing and Moscow was based on the “Realpolitik” approach with “evenhanded” practices.

Kissinger believed that the relative permanency of the Sino-Soviet split put the United States in the most favorable position of the triangular superpower relationships. The Soviet preoccupation with its Chinese problem, and Chinese concern over the Soviet threat, together with their common desire for U.S. technology to reduce their domestic economic problems, had motivated China and the Soviet Union to compete against each other for improved relations with the United States.

Another factor that motivated the U.S. to reassess Sino-American relations in the late 1960s was the Vietnam war. The United States gradually realized that Washington could no longer afford a policy of simultaneous confrontation with Moscow and Beijing. Kissinger indicated that “history suggested that it was usually more advantageous to align oneself with the weaker of two antagonistic partners, because this acted as a restraint on the stronger” (Kissinger, 1979:178).

Kissinger also believed that an evenhanded policy designed to improve political, economic, and technological ties with both Moscow and Beijing would best assure the United States the most advantageous position vis-a-vis China and the Soviet Union. Normalization of relations with the PRC was viewed in this context.

In February 1972, Nixon and Kissinger consolidated Sino-American rapprochement by signing the Shanghai Communiqué, with an anti-hegemony clause. Three months later, Nixon signed the first SALT agreement with the Soviet Union. One month after the January 1973 Paris Peace Agreement, the United States and China agreed to establish liaison offices in Beijing and Washington. The United States further signed two détente agreements with the Soviet Union during the summit meetings at Vladivostok in November 1974 and at Helsinki in August 1975. In Helsinki, the heads of 35 nations signed a declaration to “broaden and deepen” the process of détente. The Helsinki accord reportedly also ratified the principle of permanent spheres of influence in Europe for the Soviet Union and the United States (Stoessinger, 1978:195). Three months after the Soviet-American Helsinki meeting, President Ford went to China for a second Sino-American summit meeting.

Both Washington and Beijing had hoped that further progress toward normalization might be feasible during President Ford's return visit to China in 1975. The collapse of Vietnam and Cambodia in early 1975, however, had created considerable instability in Asia. The United States was now unwilling to further compromise on the Taiwan question. Another often cited factor for delay was the Watergate
scandal of 1972-1974, which turned the Nixon administration toward internal politics. Major international crises such as the oil crisis of 1973-1974 and the Yom Kippur War of 1973 also left the United States in no position to deal with the less urgent issue of establishment of full diplomatic relations with Beijing.

These domestic and international crises, however, provided only partial explanation for the delay of full normalization of relations between Beijing and Washington during the Nixon-Ford-Kissinger years. Another reason was that the United States could wait for better timing to negotiate the normalization issue. The United States chose the “status-quo” option during this period with its own rationale that keeping Sino-American relations at the quasi-diplomatic level was the optimal choice at this time.

Kissinger firmly believed that the PRC was then more concerned about the military threat from the Soviet Union than the solution of the Taiwan question or the completion of the normalization of relations with the United States. The overwhelming fears of a possible Russian attack prompted Beijing to welcome President Nixon to visit China in 1972 without forcing Washington to break ties with Taiwan. That same fear motivated Beijing to establish liaison offices with the United States in 1973 while the embassy of the Republic of China was still in Washington.

The United States had enjoyed a great deal of diplomatic leverage since the opening of China in the early 1970s. In Korea, the PRC discouraged Kim Il-sung’s more belligerent posture toward South Korea and stressed the need for peaceful reunification, manifested by North-South talks in 1972-1973. Beijing also welcomed strengthening of the NATO alliance and a continuing U.S. military presence in Asia. The PRC since 1972 not only felt reluctant to attack the U.S.-Japan alliance but encouraged the United States to strengthen ties with Japan. Moreover, PRC leaders gave quiet support for U.S. diplomacy on issues concerning the Middle East, Africa, South Asia and Northeast Asia. The United States was no longer the main target of Beijing’s propaganda in the United Nations or in other international forums (Solomon, 1978:335). The PRC also showed no objection to continued American bases in the Philippines, Thailand, or on Diego Garcia (Solomon, 1978:335).

In its relations with the Soviet Union, the United States also gained diplomatic benefits from the evenhanded policy toward Beijing and Moscow. The opening of China in 1972 added new momentum to Soviet-American relations. Kissinger believed that Sino-American rapprochement did cause the Soviets to speed up efforts to reach agreements on SALT I (Kissinger, 1979:766-67; 770; 836-38).
detente relations with both China and the Soviet Union also contributed to the isolation of Hanoi in 1972 and facilitated ultimate American disengagement from Vietnam. 25

In other words, the United States before the mid-1970s worked both sides of the triangle to its advantage. More important, the United States during this period enjoyed strategic and political benefits with only limited costs in its relations with Taiwan, thus minimizing damage to the credibility of American commitments abroad. Although Taiwan suffered from derecognition from many countries and from withdrawal of membership in international organizations since the Sino-American rapprochement in the early 1970s, the U.S.-Taiwan defense treaty continued to remain in force during the Nixon-Ford-Kissinger years. The United States on various occasions had given Taiwan 50 to 60 reassurances of its commitment to their mutual defense treaty since 1972 (Chiu, 1978:53).

Domestic and international crises during the Nixon and Ford years, and the presidential elections of 1972 and 1976, were all good reasons to prevent the United States from moving toward full diplomatic relations with the PRC. The real reason, however, was that the United States realized that “indecision” toward full normalization with Beijing was the optimal choice at that time. Holding the China card without playing it could minimize Soviet suspicion of Sino-American collusion against Moscow’s interests. As Kissinger put it, the United States enjoyed “diplomatic ties with the PRC in all but name” (Kissinger, 1979:1092).

Many partial measures, however, were taken by the United States to facilitate Sino-American relations during this period. The United States relaxed controls on U.S. exports to China and lifted a 22-year ban on travel in 1972. Washington also extended diplomatic privileges and immunities to the liaison office of the PRC in 1973. The Formosa Resolution was repealed by the U.S. Congress in 1974. The United States also gradually withdrew military personnel and equipment from Taiwan.

Beijing enjoyed tremendous political, strategic, and diplomatic benefits from detente relations with the United States, including gaining membership in the United Nations’ Security Council in 1971. Japan established full diplomatic relations with the PRC in 1972 under Beijing’s terms. By 1976 more than 100 countries recognized the PRC, while Taiwan suffered enormously from diplomatic setbacks (see tables 10 and 11 in chapter 6). No country was able to maintain full

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diplomatic ties with both the PRC and the Republic of China in Taiwan. Even the United States did not challenge the Chinese position that "there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China." The United States also agreed in the Shanghai Communiqué that one of its ultimate objectives was to withdraw all U.S. forces and military installations from Taiwan. A potential attack from a U.S.-backed Taiwan against the PRC was eliminated. Sino-American detente relations also gave Moscow warning that a Soviet attack on China might risk a two-front war (in the East and West). The United States realized as early as 1969 that it was against American interests to let China be "smashed" in a Sino-Soviet war (Kissinger, 1979:182). Any Soviet attack on China would bring strong opposition from the United States.

In short, both Washington and Beijing enjoyed strategic and diplomatic benefits from the Sino-American rapprochement. The favorable triangular position the United States enjoyed since the late 1960s, however, gradually changed in the mid-1970s, when the possibility of a Sino-Soviet war lessened. On the other hand, Soviet-American detente relations deteriorated, because of, for example, Soviet involvement in Africa. As the military threat from the Soviet Union diminished, the PRC began to show signs of impatience on the lack of progress toward full normalization with the United States. Further movement toward full diplomatic relations with the PRC gradually emerged not only as a necessary step to keep the momentum of Sino-American relations but also as a useful card to play vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.

In 1975, the Soviet Union and Cuba gave considerable support to one of three political groups competing for the control of Angola. Soviet intervention in Angola demonstrated the limits of detente and Soviet determination to influence Third World countries. The Soviet Union also had shown no restraint in the buildup of strategic and conventional arms. Professor Donald Zagoria described in 1977 the growth of Soviet military forces in the Pacific, as follows:

Nowhere is the growth of Soviet military power more evident than in the Pacific. The Soviet submarine fleet is already the largest in the world. The production rate of nuclear powered subs has been stepped up to two a month rather than three a year. In the course of worldwide exercises in 1975, Soviet naval activity extended throughout the entire Pacific. In 1976, the Soviet Navy sent its first aircraft carrier to sea and six such carriers are projected. Although traditionally the military modernization of Soviet forces in the East have lagged behind the modernization of Soviet forces in the West, this lag is now being eliminated. MIG-23's,
MIG-25's, and SU-19's are now being deployed on the Eastern front and the Pacific fleet is being equipped with Delta class submarines. It seems evident that the Soviet Union is intent on challenging American naval dominance in the Pacific.\(^{26}\)

It was no accident that President Ford announced in a television interview on 2 March 1976 that the term "detente" would be replaced with "peace through strength" (Morrison, 1977:532). Negotiations of SALT II had stagnated in 1976 because of Soviet intervention in Angola and disagreements over the American cruise missile (Wolfe, 1979:201, 216). Soviet-American trade relations were also affected by deterioration of political relations between Moscow and Washington. The Ford administration no longer opposed the Jackson-Vanik Amendment, which demanded a substantial increase in Soviet emigration of Jews before granting the most-favored-nation tariff treatment to the Soviet Union, nor would it oppose the Stevenson Amendment which limited the USSR to $300 million in credits over four years (Talbott, 1979:74).

It was within the context of these chilled Soviet-American relations that President Carter took office in 1977. President Carter hoped to improve Soviet-American relations and to continue an evenhanded policy toward Moscow and Beijing. Secretary of State Vance was sent to Moscow with multiple SALT plans in March 1977, but his SALT II mission to Moscow ended in failure. Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko publicly denounced Carter's SALT proposals as a "cheap and shady maneuver," aimed at achieving for the United States "unilateral advantages."\(^{27}\) Gromyko also called for a ban on the U.S. B-1 bomber and the Trident submarine (Labrie, 1979:438), and stated that Carter's human rights policy poisoned the atmosphere and aggravated the political climate.

After Vance's disastrous experience in Moscow, there were increasing indications that the United States was turning more attention to China. In a speech to the United Nations on 17 March 1977, Carter stated that "we will continue our efforts to develop our relationship with the PRC. We recognize our parallel strategic interests in maintaining stability in Asia and will act in the spirit of the Shanghai Communique."\(^{28}\)

\(^{26}\) Prepared statement of Donald S. Zagoria, U.S. Congress, *Normalization of Relations with the PRC*, p. 156.

\(^{27}\) Pravda, 1 April 1977 (translated in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* 29, no. 13:5-9).

\(^{28}\) See the text of President Carter's address at the United Nations on 17 March 1977.
The National Security Council reviewed Sino-American relations in April 1977, including the issue of sales of military-related technology to Beijing (Garrett, 1979:238). The initial draft of the NSC secret review, Presidential Review Memorandum (PRM) 24, was leaked to the New York Times on 24 June 1977. In three sections, the "broad options" of Chinese-American relations, the withdrawal of American troops from Taiwan and the "sale of defense-related technology," PRM 24 opposed the sale of military technology to China and discussed the "range of Soviet reactions" to a potential transfer of military technology to China:

Soviet reactions to a U.S. decision to facilitate transfers of military-related material to the PRC would range from intense lobbying to reverse the decision to a serious rethinking of fundamental Soviet policies toward the U.S.

At the mild end of the spectrum, Soviet officials would certainly make strong representations to get the decision reversed on the grounds that China is a dangerous and unstable country and that Moscow regards this sort of assistance as anti-Soviet. Such efforts could well be accompanied by a less cooperative attitude on various issues.

The severity of Soviet reactions would increase with the perceived threat to Soviet interests. At some undefined point Soviet perceptions of the threat of U.S.-China military collaboration would stiffen Soviet positions on even the major issues of U.S.-Soviet relations such as SALT, especially if initial Soviet efforts to reverse the trend has failed. The Soviets might also increase tensions with China.

Since the desire to head off Chinese-Western collaboration was a major impetus to the present leadership's policy of detente, there is presumably a point at which the present Soviet leadership or its successors would conclude that this policy is not achieving the desired objective....

Despite the difficulties for other Soviet objectives, Moscow would then be compelled to make a fundamental reassessment of its policies toward the U.S. The likelihood of a strong Soviet reaction to a relaxation of U.S. policy on defense-related transfers to China is further demonstrated by the authoritative May 14 Pravda article by I. Aleksandrov which denounces Chinese militarism and warns the West against diverting Chinese expansion toward others (Weinraub, 1977:A3).

Although the conclusion of PRM 24 was against a "tilt" toward
China in the transfer of military-related technology, the draft document gave Moscow a clear warning that further deterioration of relations between Washington and Moscow could result in growing Sino-American security ties. PRM 24 also indicated the possibility of a Sino-Soviet detente, unless the United States cut Taiwan out of its "current presence baseline" and accommodated the PRC (Safire, 1977:23).

At Notre Dame University on 22 May 1977, President Carter stated that "we see the American-Chinese relationship as a central element of our global policy, and China as a key force for global peace" (Garrett, 1979:259-60). This was the first time the United States viewed Sino-American relations to be a central element in U.S. global, rather than regional, policy (Garrett, 1979:259-60).

Secretary of State Vance emphasized American commitment to move toward full normalization of relations with China, in late June 1977. Vance also stated that a constructive Sino-American relationship "will threaten no one." "It will serve only peace" (Garrett, 1979:239).

Despite the rhetoric toward China, the United States continued to pursue an evenhanded policy toward Moscow and Beijing during the summer of 1977. NSC Presidential Review Memorandum 10, a major interagency review of the global balance of power and U.S. strategy, was also leaked to the press in the summer of 1977. PRM 10 concluded that growth in Soviet military and economic power was slowing down and that long-term trends favored the United States. This NSC study also indicated that "the U.S.-Soviet military balance was roughly equal at present, but contrasted the strength and capability for technological innovation with forecasts of impending Soviet capital and labor shortages" (Garrett, 1979:239).

Meanwhile, the Carter administration began to "adjust" American policies in order to ease tensions with the Soviet Union. In May 1977, an agreement had been reached on a new framework for negotiations of SALT II between Washington and Moscow. On 30 June 1977, the United States announced cancellation of B-1 bomber production. Moscow was pleased with this decision. In June, President Carter also decided not to meet the wife of prominent Soviet dissident Anatoly Sharansky who was then touring the United States, even though he had met with Vladimir Bukovsky earlier that month.

President Carter stated in late June that "an atmosphere of peaceful cooperation is far more conducive to an increased respect for human rights than an atmosphere of belligerence or hatred or warlike confrontation." He called for enlarging the areas of cooperation between Moscow and Washington "on a basis of equality and mutual
respect.” He also wanted to see the Soviets “further engaged in the growing pattern of international activities designed to deal with human problems—not only because they can be of real help, but because we both should be seeking for a greater stake in the creation of a constructive and peaceful world order” (Labrie, 1979:475-78).

Washington’s obvious desire to improve relations with Moscow disappointed Beijing. Secretary of State Vance briefed the Chinese on American global strategic assessments and U.S. policy intentions embodied in the NSC PRM 10 during a trip to China in late August. Beijing, however, disagreed with PRM’s assessment of the global balance of power and feared Soviet-American collusion against the PRC. According to Chairman Hua, the current strategic situation was that “Soviet social imperialism is on the offensive and U.S. imperialism on the defensive” (Garrett, 1979:261, note 39). In his political report to the 11th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in August 1977, Hua charged that “there is a trend toward appeasement among those people in the West who cherish the illusion that peace can be maintained through compromises and concessions, and some even want to follow in Chamberlain’s footsteps and try to divert the peril of the new tsars to the East in order to preserve themselves at the expense of others” (Garrett, 1979:260, note 38).

The PRC was upset with Carter’s soft-line approach toward the Soviets. Vance’s mission to China was later regarded by Teng Hsiao-p’ing as a “setback” in U.S.-China relations (Boccardi, 1977:A1, 21). The Chinese continued to view the United States as a declining power and the Soviet Union as the superpower on the ascendancy. The PRC did not believe Vance’s claims of U.S. military superiority over the Soviet Union.

The failure of the Vance mission to Beijing, however, was followed by a “September breakthrough” on SALT II during Andrei Gromyko’s visit to Washington in the fall of 1977. Both Washington and Moscow had made some significant concessions during negotiations in September (Talbot, 1979: 131; Labrie, 1979:388-89; Wolfe,

29. One month before Vance’s trip to China, Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua allegedly delivered a secret speech to a large group of party and army cadres gathered for a party congress on 30 July 1977. Huang’s 42,000-word presentation was recorded and smuggled out by his opponents in Taiwan. Huang Hua predicted Vance’s trip would bring no progress toward full normalization: “it is rather unlikely that there will be any new proposals in the nature of a breakthrough.” Vance was nevertheless invited to China because Vance’s visit would upset the Soviet Union and Taiwan. Huang said, “Who would be most worried and nervous concerning the Vance visit? I would say first, Soviet revisionism and after that, Taiwan.” (Safire, 1977:23). See also Issues and Studies (Taipei) January 1978:109-16).
1979:227). Despite the considerable September progress, however, a
number of important issues were left unresolved. In early 1978, fur­
ther involvement of Soviet and Cuban forces in Ethiopia's war with
Somalia over the Ogaden desert complicated SALT II negotiations
with the Soviet Union. In March 1978, President Carter warned the
Soviets that the common social, scientific and economic goals both
countries supported will "certainly erode" if Moscow "failed to
demonstrate restraint in missile programs and other force levels and in
the projection of Soviet or proxy forces into other lands and contin­
ents." President Carter also stated that the United States would
continue to modernize its strategic system and revitalize its conven­
tional forces while simultaneously searching for arms control agree­
ments with Moscow.

In the spring of 1978, the Carter administration gradually
adopted a tougher stand toward Soviet adventurism in Africa and its
buildups of conventional forces. One of the ways to show American
displeasure about Soviet aggression was to revive the long-delayed ac­
tion to normalize relations with the PRC. Brzezinski's trip to China
on May 20-23 should be viewed in this context. Brzezinski told the
Chinese in Beijing that President Carter "is determined to join you in
overcoming the remaining obstacles in the way to full normalization of
our relations within the framework of the Shanghai Communique"
(Garrett, 1979:244). In a banquet toast, Brzezinski said that "only
those aspiring to dominate others have any reason to fear further de­
velopment of American-Chinese relations" (Garrett, 1979:244). This
statement was a clear warning aimed at the Soviet Union. Brzezinski
also briefed Chinese leaders in detail on the SALT II negotia­tions,
which irritated the Soviets. During his Washington trip at the end of
May, Gromyko protested to Vance that the Chinese had "no legiti­
mate interest" in SALT II and therefore should not be given an official
briefing from the United States (Talbott, 1979:153). Gromyko's trip in
May did not produce any significant progress toward concluding
SALT II.

Sino-American relations expanded rapidly after Brzezinski's visit
to China in May. Joint projects in energy, space, medicine, agriculture
and other fields were begun. At least six U.S. oil firms were negotiat­
ing with the PRC for cooperative exploration of China's off-shore oil
reserves. Trade with the PRC tripled in one year, with total values

30. The text of the speech is in President Carter: 1978 (Washington, D.C.: Congres­

Office, 4 January 1979, Washington, D.C., p. 3.
of more than $1 billion in 1978. The United States also strengthened government-to-government relations with the PRC. Secretary of Energy James Schlesinger and Agriculture Secretary Robert Bergland visited China in the fall of 1978.

Apart from warming up relations with the U.S., the PRC also signed a Friendship and Cooperation Treaty with Japan on 12 August 1978, which contained an “anti-hegemony” article aimed at the Soviet Union. Furthermore, Beijing concluded economic agreements with the European Community. Chinese Premier Hua Kuo-feng’s visits to Romania, Yugoslavia, and Iran added to Soviet suspicions of Chinese intentions of meddling in “Russia’s backyard.”

In response to further Soviet involvement in the invasion of Zaire’s Shaba Province by Katangese rebels in early May, President Carter in June 1978 challenged the Soviets to “choose either confrontation or cooperation,” and that “the United States is adequately prepared to meet either choice” (Garrett, 1979:245). The Soviet Union, on the other hand, was more and more convinced that the United States was playing the China card against Moscow. Pravda warned the United States against playing the China card on 17 June 1978:

Washington’s latest intrigues, or to be more exact, “petty intrigues” with China do not in the least serve to strengthen confidence. In and of itself, the desire to play the “China card” in the global game is nothing new for American politicians. But until now, it seemed that U.S. leaders were aware that they could not play that card without endangering the cause of peace and indeed, without danger to themselves and to the United States’ own national interest. 32

The trials of Soviet dissidents Anatoly Sharansky and Alexander Ginsberg in July further complicated the scheduled Vance-Gromyko meeting in Geneva the same month. In response to the outpouring of bipartisan criticism from Capitol Hill over the trials, President Carter decided to cancel the sale of a $7 million Sperry Rand Univac computer system to Tass of the Soviet Union, but allowed a Sperry Rand sale to Beijing of two Univac 1110 series computers similar to those denied Moscow (Garrett, 1979:262-63, note 57). Carter also canceled a Moscow visit by his science adviser, Frank Press, and American participation in the scheduled sixth session of the joint Soviet-American commission on scientific and technological cooperation (Garrett, 1979:247). Press, however, went to Beijing in July to discuss with the

Chinese future scientific and technical cooperation between the United States and the PRC.

In order to counterbalance Chinese global strategy, the Soviet Union began to take more constructive actions in its SALT II negotiations with the United States and in its dealing with Japan and Vietnam. Soviet efforts to sign a cooperation treaty with Japan was unsuccessful because of Japanese insistence on regaining the four small islands north of Japan which the USSR had seized at the end of World War II. Moscow, instead, signed a 25-year Treaty of Friendship with Vietnam on 3 November 1978.

Significant progress was made on SALT II in September in Washington. Paul C. Warnke, chief SALT II negotiator and head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, indicated after Gromyko's September visit that "95 percent" of a SALT II agreement had been completed (Oberdorfer, 1978a:A1,14). Although Vance failed to work out remaining differences with the Soviet Union in October, in early December Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin indicated that the next Vance-Gromyko meeting in Geneva before Christmas might wrap up a SALT II agreement (Talbott, 1979:225). Senior administration officials had also leaked a message to the press that tentative plans were under way for the Brezhnev-Carter summit meeting in Washington for a SALT II signing in mid-January (Talbott, 1979:229).

It was a great surprise to the Soviet Union when President Carter announced normalization of diplomatic relations between the United States and the PRC on 15 December 1978, just days before the Vance-Gromyko meeting in Geneva. The Soviet Union was further disturbed that Vice Premier Teng would be coming to Washington at the end of January. Although President Carter publicly declared that normalization with the PRC was a major goal of American foreign policy soon after he took office in 1977, it was understood that he would normalize relations with Beijing after the signing of SALT II (Talbott, 1979:229). The Soviet Union once strongly advocated the establishment of diplomatic relations between Washington and Beijing when Sino-Soviet relations were on good terms. Still, the timing of the normalization announcement surprised the Soviets. The Soviets also blamed Washington for the press leak and for the timing of Teng's visit to Washington. If Brezhnev were to come to Washington in mid-January, the Soviets would probably be under pressure from "world public opinion" to conclude the SALT II agreement by the January deadline (Talbott, 1979:247). Teng's visit at the end of January could also upstage Brezhnev's because of the historic nature of Teng's visit.

From a Soviet perspective, it is not surprising that Moscow decided to delay conclusion of SALT II and therefore to postpone
Brezhnev's summit meeting in Washington. The Vance-Gromyko meeting in Geneva on December 21-23 did not resolve remaining issues for a SALT II agreement. Moscow decided to wait and see the outcome of Teng's trip to Washington and then to reassess the triangular relations among Beijing, Moscow, and Washington as well as the SALT II negotiations.

The Carter administration had not expected normalization of relations with the PRC to complicate SALT II negotiations. On the contrary, President Carter and Brzezinski, the main actor in the normalization negotiations, had hoped that the normalization announcement would positively affect the conclusion of SALT II. Brzezinski believed that normalization could be to U.S. advantage in "helping Moscow understand the value of restraint and reciprocity" (Brzezinski, 1983:196). In his memoirs, Power and Principle, Brzezinski indicated that "perhaps if the Soviets worry a little more about our policy toward China, we will have less cause to worry about our relations with the Soviets" (Brzezinski, 1983:200). Brzezinski further revealed that the timing of normalization was "definitely influenced by the Soviet dimension" (Brzezinski, 1983:197). The deterioration of Soviet-American détente relations during 1977-1978 made Sino-American normalization useful as a way to counterbalance Soviet military buildups and interventions in the Third World—from Angola in 1975, through Ethiopia, Somalia, and South Yemen in 1977-1978, to support for the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea in late 1978. The need to gain geopolitical leverage against the Soviet Union influenced the United States' decision to accede to Beijing's demands on U.S.-Taiwan relations.

Important international events, such as the Camp David Accord on 17 September 1978, also shaped the process of negotiations on normalization. President Carter gained personal confidence in making controversial foreign policy decisions after the Camp David Summit, which was the greatest triumph of Carter's foreign policy at that time. One of Carter's senior advisers later recalled that President Carter hoped to "convert the force for peace-making we have unleashed here into something that will finally give us SALT" (Talbott, 1979:205). President Carter hoped for a chain reaction; two days later, he met with Ambassador Chai and told him that the United States would accept Beijing's three demands if the PRC would accept America's conditions for normalization.

It was no coincidence that President Carter made 1 January 1979 the target date for normalization. President Carter hoped to conclude SALT II before the end of 1978. Another deadline, 17 December 1978, was set for a final peace agreement between Egypt and Israel.
The successful conclusions of SALT II, the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty, together with normalization with the PRC, would be spectacular successes in America's foreign policy.

**CHINESE CALCULATIONS**

Chinese leaders, on the other hand, had their own calculations concerning the timing of normalization. In a meeting with a delegation of the Japanese Komeito party in Beijing on 29 November 1978, Vice Premier Teng told the Japanese visitors that normalization of China-U.S. relations depended on President Carter. Teng said that the situation was the same as that concerning the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty that had depended on the Japanese government. Teng said that he had always believed that the Peace Treaty could be concluded "in one second" once Japan decided to have it. Teng added that "Sino-American relations also can be normalized in two seconds" if the United States decides to do so.33

Negotiations of the terms of normalization should be viewed as a process of mutual modifications of goals. Each side's bids or counterbids depended on the other side's actions. When the United States would accept Beijing's three conditions, provided that the PRC would set forth its bottom line of normalization terms (namely that the United States allow continuing sales of selected arms to Taiwan; that the United States terminate the defense treaty with Taiwan rather than abrogate it; and that the United States would issue a unilateral statement of its interest in the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue), it would then be up to the PRC to make up its mind with respect to the U.S. position.

Of the three American conditions, the PRC was concerned most with the arms sales issue. The PRC preferred to see the United States cut all military ties with Taiwan after normalization. Unification between the mainland and Taiwan could be delayed were Taiwan to obtain enough arms from the United States. On the other hand, delay of normalization with the United States could only give the United States a legitimate reason to sell arms to Taiwan. There was nothing to be gained by the PRC in delaying the normalization process. Once U.S.-PRC relations became normalized, Beijing would have more leverage to bargain the arms sales issue since the United States by then would have recognized the PRC government as the only legitimate government in China, and hence Taiwan would be considered a part of

China. U.S. arms sales to Taiwan would then constitute an interference in Chinese internal affairs, according to international law.

Another Chinese consideration was, of course, the Soviet Union. Throughout the 1970s, the dominant theme in Sino-American relations had been their mutual concern about Soviet hegemony. Beijing's main concern was how to curb Soviet power through better Sino-American ties. The immediate fear of Soviet aggression toward China in late 1978 was linked to the joint hostility from both the Soviet Union and Vietnam. Vietnam, in China's backyard, used to be as close as "lips to teeth" to the PRC. Sino-Vietnamese relations, however, gradually deteriorated in the 1970s as Vietnam moved closer to the Soviet Union for military and economic support and as the PRC started playing its American card to counter Soviet threats.

Beijing and Hanoi drifted further apart in 1977-1978 because of Hanoi's ambition to control Kampuchea, Beijing's friend, and Hanoi's mistreatment of ethnic Chinese in Vietnam. By 30 May 1978, the PRC had terminated all joint projects with Vietnam. On 17 June 1978, Beijing ordered the Vietnamese to close its consulates in the PRC. Vietnam was described by Teng Hsiao-p'ing as the "Cuba of Asia" (Pye, 1981:234). In the summer of 1978, the PRC took several diplomatic initiatives to improve relations with Japan, India, Eastern Europe, the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) countries, and the United States in order to strengthen its geopolitical position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and Vietnam. Besides signing the Sino-Japanese treaty in August, Chairman Hua visited Romania, Yugoslavia, and Iran. In November 1978, Vice Premier Teng visited several ASEAN countries, including Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore. Meanwhile, Beijing had also begun serious negotiations with Washington on normalization. On 26 September 1978, one week after the Carter-Chai meeting in Washington on the normalization issue, the PRC unilaterally terminated border negotiations with Vietnam and launched a strong propaganda campaign against Hanoi (Pye, 1981:239).

In response to Beijing's moves, Hanoi began to push the process of normalization with Washington. Hanoi's initiative, however, was thwarted by Brzezinski who perceived that normalization with Hanoi should await completion of Sino-American normalization (Pye, 1981:239). Hanoi, instead, signed a Treaty of Friendship with the

34 Ambassador Harvey Feldman indicated in a personal letter that some State Department officials were in favor of establishing relations with Hanoi prior to Beijing and in fact "a negotiation with Hanoi took place in some spasmodic fashion over the months between August 1977 and the North Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia." Ambassador Feldman's letter to the author was dated 4 January 1984.
Soviet Union on 3 November 1978. Two days after the announcement of the treaty, the United States notified all members of the U.N. Security Council that American intelligence sources showed that a Vietnamese attack on Kampuchea was imminent (Pye, 1981:241).

It was within the context of this international environment in Indochina that the PRC sensed an urgent need to conclude the normalization agreement with the United States. As soon as he came back from his Southeast Asian trip, Teng Hsiao-p’ing joined normalization negotiations and finally produced the December breakthrough. The PRC accepted the formula of “agree to disagree” on the arms sales issue.


Besides the Vietnam factor, Beijing’s calculations of the timing of the normalization announcement and Teng’s visit to Washington were also influenced by the consideration of Soviet-American detente relations. In December 1978, Brzezinski had told Chai Tse-min that the U.S. had resolved all the major SALT II issues with the Soviet Union and would soon be deciding on a date for a summit meeting between President Carter and Brezhnev (Carter, 1982:198). The delay of the SALT II agreement and the cancelation of Brezhnev’s visit to Washington surely were considered favorably by Beijing (Talbott, 1981:86). There was a widespread impression in the United States that President Carter had been “outfoxed” by Teng Hsiao-p’ing in the final stage of the normalization negotiations (Talbott, 1981:87).

The degree of rapidity of Chinese responses toward normalization in December surprised the Carter administration. In a congressional hearing, Warren Christopher, Deputy Secretary of State, remarked that Chinese leaders “had not responded sequentially; they responded to the overall presentation and then Vice Premier Deng [Teng in Wade-Giles] came into the matter.”

The United States was surely the initiator to renew the normalization negotiations. The PRC, however, pushed the secret negotiations to the final stage.

Regional and Bilateral Relations Explanation

At the regional level, the United States in 1978 was eager to strengthen its strategic position in East Asia through normalization of relations with the PRC. The United States was pleased to see the signing of the Sino-Japanese treaty in August 1978. This was the first time in decades that the United States was able to improve relations with both Japan and China without having to worry about possible revenge from one or the other. An emergence of a friendly Beijing-Tokyo-Washington triangular relationship could greatly enhance the U.S. strategic position in East Asia vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.

The fall of Vietnam in 1975 and the total withdrawal of U.S. military involvement in Indochina significantly reduced Taiwan’s strategic importance as a military base for the United States. The decline of U.S. political, economic, and military capabilities as a result of Watergate, the oil crisis, and its defeat in Vietnam put the United States in a weaker bargaining position in 1978, compared to 1972 when President Nixon first visited Beijing. The “lesson of Vietnam” also made the United States more reluctant to get involved in another civil war, such as the one between Taiwan and China. This was another reason why the United States decided to normalize relations with the PRC under Beijing’s three conditions.

Another level of explanation of the normalization decision, from the rational choice perspective, concerns bilateral relations of the United States with the PRC. Ideal timing for normalization negotiations on the Taiwan issue would be when U.S.-PRC and U.S.-Soviet Union relations were on good terms while Beijing-Moscow relations were deteriorating. Under such circumstances, the United States could derive the best bargaining position over the Taiwan question because Beijing’s need for Washington would be more urgent; the PRC would then be more willing to make concessions on the Taiwan issue. Such circumstances certainly did not occur when the United States finally decided to move toward full normalization of relations with the PRC in 1978. On the contrary, in early 1978 Sino-American and American-Soviet relations were both in limbo. Sino-American relations had deteriorated to an extent that the PRC even began to rethink its “Russian card” in 1977-1978. Only then did the United States perceive it urgent to improve relations with the PRC. The timing of the normalization decision provided a partial explanation why the United States could only normalize relations with the PRC under the Japanese model.

In 1975 Beijing began to publicly express its dissatisfaction with American policy. Low-level media coverage likened President Ford’s detente policy toward Moscow to British Prime Minister Neville
Chamberlain’s policy toward Hitler at the Munich conference before World War II (Sutter, 1978:114). The Chinese media also accused the U.S. of violating the Shanghai Communique because of American support for movements favoring Tibet’s independence from the PRC and the U.S. appointment of Leonard Unger as an ambassador to succeed Walter McConaughy in Taipei (Sutter, 1978:115, see also 135, note 26). During Secretary of State Kissinger’s October 1975 visit to China, the PRC Foreign Minister Ch’iao Kuan-hua warned the United States that détente was an illusion that should not blind the world to Soviet hegemonism (Sutter, 1978:115). In December 1975, three weeks after President Ford’s visit to China, the PRC released three Soviet helicopter pilots held as alleged spies since March 1974 to show Chinese displeasure over U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union and normalization.

After the death of Mao Tse-tung in September 1976, the Soviet Union launched a major peace campaign toward Beijing. Although the PRC did not respond positively toward Moscow’s overtures at that time, there were signs that indicated Beijing had begun to reevaluate its strategy toward Moscow and Washington. According to Gottlieb (1979:4), Teng Hsiao-p’ing, reemerging from his third purge in July 1977, began to reciprocate Moscow’s overtures because of deep frustrations over the lack of progress toward normalization with the United States, the stagnation of the Sino-Japanese peace treaty negotiation, and the Soviet-American détente relation. First, Moscow and Beijing resumed talks on Sino-Soviet border river navigation issues in July 1977. Second, Beijing decided to withhold information about a serious border incident in Sinkiang in the late summer of 1977, which was provoked by armed Soviet troops. (This incident was not made public until one year later. The PRC, however, gave maximum publicity to a border incident that occurred on the eve of Brzezinski’s visit to China in May 1978.) Third, Beijing sent Ambassador Wang Yu-p’ing to Moscow three days after Vance’s August trip to China. This post had been vacant for 18 months. Fourth, the PRC tacitly recognized Soviet sovereignty over the disputed channel near the Soviet port city of Khavarovsk by agreeing to “give the Soviet river traffic authorities notice when passage through the confluence was intended,” a condition Beijing had refused to accept for 11 years. Fifth, Chinese Foreign Minister Huang Hua attended the Soviet National Day reception in November 1977 in Beijing. This was the first time for over a decade that the PRC had sent a representative higher than a deputy foreign minister to attend the Soviet embassy’s annual reception (Gottlieb, 1979:6-9).

According to Gottlieb, these events were clear signals that the
PRC was interested in improving Sino-Soviet relations in order to strengthen its strategic position internationally. The tilt-toward-the-Soviet policy stopped during the winter of 1977-1978 when Soviet-American and Soviet-Japanese relations deteriorated (Gottlieb, 1979:9-10). Japan showed renewed interest in negotiating a peace treaty with the PRC in March 1978. The United States, on the other hand, adopted a tougher policy against Soviet interventions in Africa. The Carter administration also began to seriously deliberate on normalization of relations with the PRC in the spring of 1978. Beijing then returned to its anti-Soviet position.

China's "hundred-day thaw" toward the Soviet Union demonstrated Chinese ability to manipulate triangular relations. The United States realized that Washington could not take for granted Beijing's fear and hatred toward Moscow and Beijing's patience on normalization with the United States. Had the United States allowed Sino-American relations to continue to deteriorate, the PRC could have chosen to move closer to the Soviet Union.

From the perspective of a rational consideration of global, regional, and bilateral relations, the United States in early 1978 was motivated to speed up the normalization process with the PRC in order to improve its gradually deteriorating strategic position in East Asia. The United States was not in a good bargaining position on the Taiwan issue because the United States in 1978 no longer occupied the most favorable position in the triangular relations. U.S. detente relations with Moscow and Beijing were both in limbo. Under these circumstances, the United States had few "bargaining chips" over the Taiwan question. The Japanese model became the most appropriate for normalization because the United States could not get a better deal from Beijing. The United States agreed to break diplomatic ties with Taiwan because no other country succeeded in maintaining an embassy in both Taipei and Beijing. The United States agreed to terminate the defense treaty with Taiwan because, after the fall of Vietnam, Taiwan no longer played an important role in the defense of U.S. strategic interests in Asia.

Economic and Moral Explanation

In March 1978, the Fifth National People's Congress approved the "Four Modernization Program"—a program to modernize Chinese agriculture, industry, national defense, and science and technology. This program was first announced by the late Premier Chou En-lai at the Fourth National People's Congress in January 1975.

Although economic considerations were not primary reasons for the United States to normalize relations with the PRC in 1978,
China’s Four Modernization Plan, which required imports of large amounts of western technology and capital goods, certainly gave the United States an extra incentive to speed up the normalization process. In February 1978, the PRC and Japan signed an eight-year trade agreement worth a record $20 billion. Under this agreement, Japan agreed to export whole plants, machinery and equipment, and technology to China through 1985. China, in return, would increase sales of coal and crude oil to Japan.

In April 1978, the PRC signed its first trade agreement with the European Economic Community (EEC). China and the EEC agreed to increase bilateral trade with reciprocal most-favored-nation treatment. Scientific and technical cooperation agreements were signed by China with France, Kuwait, and the Philippines. The PRC also reportedly placed a $700 million purchase order with France for HOT and Milan antitank missiles and Crotale antiaircraft missiles, during French Prime Minister Raymond Barre’s visit to China in January 1978 (Garrett, 1979:261, note 44).

For years the United States was treated by the PRC as a supplier of last resort. Trade priorities were given to countries with which the PRC had diplomatic relations. The PRC had favored Japan and Europe.

Sino-American trade had been imbalanced, favoring the United States, throughout the 1970s. The United States faced a foreign trade deficit of $30 billion in 1978 and a grave national deficit. It was only natural that the United States, the most powerful capitalist country in the world, wanted a share in China’s market. Normalization of relations between Washington and Beijing would be the first step toward improved trade relations.

The Japanese model, which the PRC suggested as a foundation for Sino-American normalization, would allow the United States to continue economic relations with Taiwan after normalization. In 1978, Japan’s trade with Taiwan had increased more than two and one-half times since Japan severed diplomatic relations with Taiwan in 1972 (Solomon, 1978:346). Japan’s experience suggested that the United States could also increase trade with both Taipei and Beijing after normalization with Beijing, if there was no immediate danger to Taiwan’s security. The United States perceived that there would be only a remote possibility that the PRC would launch an attack on Taiwan in the near future. It would be costly for Beijing to take over Taiwan because of Taiwan’s strong military capability. An attack on Taiwan could make the PRC more vulnerable to Soviet attack and could risk ruining its relations with the United States and Japan, thus jeopardizing China’s modernization program. Continuing arms sales
to Taiwan and the declaration of continued U.S. interests in peaceful solutions to the Taiwan issue could be considered sufficient for Taiwan's security after normalization between Washington and Beijing. The Japanese model, therefore, was considered by the United States from an economic perspective as a sound formula for normalization.

An alliance is always a marriage of convenience. When the U.S.-Taiwan alliance was no longer considered desirable to Washington, it became only a matter of time to dissolve this relationship. How to disengage from Taiwan smoothly and less painfully for the government and the people of Taiwan was a main concern of Washington since President Nixon's trip to China in 1972. The United States adopted a policy to delay normalization with Beijing so that Taipei could have more time to prepare for a final divorce with Washington. Meanwhile, the United States tried to strengthen Taiwan's defense capability by increasing sales of arms to Taiwan in the early 1970s, on the assumption that the stronger and more stable Taiwan became, the easier it would be for the United States to withdraw from Taiwan. U.S. arms sales through Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and commercial channels to Taiwan increased significantly since the early 1970s, especially in air and naval defenses. The United States also authorized the coproduction of F-5E jet fighters with Taiwan. Washington, on the other hand, quietly reduced U.S. military personnel in Taiwan from ten thousand at the peak of the Vietnam war to 700 in 1978.

The reasons the United States insisted on continuing arms sales to Taiwan after normalization were grounded on the following considerations. First, arms sales to Taiwan would give Taiwan more confidence in its defense capability against the PRC. Thus, Taiwan would not panic or seek radical solutions, such as evoking Soviet friendship or reconsidering its nuclear option that would be contrary to U.S. interests. Second, continued arms sales to Taiwan could also reduce suspicions and doubts from other U.S. allies about U.S. reliability in keeping its defense commitments. Third, if Taiwan remained strong militarily, the PRC would be less likely to launch an attack on Taiwan. A military attack on Taiwan after normalization would be a great embarrassment for the United States. In summary, U.S. continuing arms sales to Taiwan after Sino-American normalization of relations could provide the United States with more leverage in its conduct of foreign policy.36

36. Ambassador Harvey Feldman, Director for Republic of China Affairs, State Department, 1977-1979, indicated in a personal letter to the author dated 4 January 1984: "Your analysis . . . of the relevant military considerations, is exactly correct and in fact replicates in different words State Department analysis of the situation."
### Table 1
U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan from 1974 to 1978

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Foreign military sales ($ millions)</th>
<th>Commercial export licenses ($ millions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FY 74</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orders</td>
<td>88.7</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deliveries</td>
<td>93.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 75</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orders</td>
<td>144.8</td>
<td>45.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deliveries</td>
<td>115.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 76</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orders</td>
<td>324.0</td>
<td>42.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deliveries</td>
<td>136.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 77</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orders</td>
<td>153.0</td>
<td>46.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deliveries</td>
<td>142.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 78</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orders</td>
<td>346.3</td>
<td>174.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deliveries</td>
<td>131.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data source: Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State, January 1979.

If there existed no immediate danger to Taiwan's security and economic position after normalization, the United States could also reduce criticisms of being an immoral and unreliable ally. There is no permanent enemy just as there is no permanent alliance. Normalization with Beijing, which could enhance peace and reduce the possibility of another war with a country of one billion population, could be justified by moral considerations, even at the expense of severing diplomatic relations with Taiwan with only 18 million people.

From the U.S. perspective, Washington had given Taipei nearly seven years to prepare for the eventual separation of relations between Taipei and Washington. Sino-American normalization of relations, which the Shanghai Communique anticipated as the final goal between Washington and Beijing, should not come as a surprise to the Nationalist Government in Taiwan. Increased arms sales to Taiwan in the 1970s had greatly strengthened Taiwan's military posture against the PRC. The United States believed that it had helped Taiwan's economic, political, and military capabilities a great deal since 1950. It was time for the people and the government of Taiwan to now help themselves.

The United States believed that it would make no sense to blame Washington on moral grounds because every nation in this world considers its own national interests first. The United States should have
normalized relations long ago. By 1978, most of its major allies had already established diplomatic relations with the PRC on Chinese terms. The United States was the last major power to recognize the PRC. If other countries could normalize relations under Beijing's terms, why should the United States be blamed for doing so?

CONCLUSION

In retrospect, it is quite clear why the United States began to speed up the normalization process in 1978. From the rational actor perspective, the United States in 1978 did try to maximize its net gains when the Carter administration chose 1 January 1979 as the target date for normalization. It was also obvious why the PRC began to respond to the American position on normalization with such rapidity in December 1978.

After normalization, Sino-American relations entered into a "honeymoon" period in 1979 with significant increases in trade and exchange programs. A Trade Agreement between the United States and the PRC was signed on 7 July 1979. Most-favored-nation treatment was extended to the PRC on 1 February 1980. Claims of U.S. citizens against the PRC and frozen PRC assets in the United States were settled. In 1980, the United States relaxed controls on high technology exports to China and declared its willingness to permit the Chinese to buy carefully selected military support equipment (but not weapons) from U.S. firms. Nonmilitary exports to China were eligible for support from the U.S. Export-Import Bank.

The honeymoon period did not last long. After President Reagan took office in 1981, Sino-American relations gradually deteriorated over the issue of arms sales to Taiwan. By the end of 1981, Beijing even threatened to downgrade its diplomatic mission in Washington if the Reagan administration decided to sell Taiwan those highly sophisticated aircraft items Taiwan wanted. The once deferred Taiwan question emerged to haunt Sino-American relations.

The rational choice model enabled us to see the central considerations of the normalization decision more clearly and in their proper setting. Rationality did come into the normalization decision-making process. This "ideal" process of decision making, however, fell short of its aims because of uncertainty and human frailty inherent in international politics. The United States did not achieve every goal it had pursued from normalization.

Professor Michel Oksenberg, a staff member of the National Security Council, 1977-1980, emphasized in an interview that the Carter administration inherited a negotiating record on the normalization issue. The first task of the administration was to review the negotiating
record of the Nixon and Ford administrations. The next step was to assess the range of options within the context of this normalization record. Oksenberg revealed that the Carter administration felt "bound" by the previous negotiating record. So, the range of options available to the Carter Administration was rather narrow.\textsuperscript{37} The Nixon and Ford administrations had not fixed the terms for normalization because they had not come to a point of serious negotiation of normalization. But the record showed that when normalization was to occur, Beijing's three conditions for normalization would not prove to be an obstacle. In other words, according to Oksenberg, the U.S. had already promised the Chinese that the Japanese model would be the formula for normalization.\textsuperscript{38}

Roger Sullivan, deputy assistant secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, 1978-1980, likewise revealed in an interview that the normalization decision-making process was not very complex. Sullivan pointed out that by the time the United States reached the stage of negotiation, the real issue was: does the United States want normalization on these terms or not? Sullivan revealed that President Ford accepted Beijing's three conditions for normalization when he visited China in 1975. Although President Ford denied that he had then promised the PRC to normalize relations with Beijing under the Japanese formula, Sullivan believed that President Ford simply did not remember that he, indeed, had made this promise. Sullivan said that the real issues requiring negotiation at the time were: the projection of arms sales to Taiwan after normalization and what would be the nature of U.S. relations with Taiwan after normalization.\textsuperscript{39}

One State Department official commented in an interview that the rational actor model is an ideal process of decision making. But in reality, there are many irrational factors that will influence decision makers' options, such as leader's preferences, bureaucratic politics, and domestic politics factors. He acknowledged, nevertheless, that the rational actor model sheds light on the normalization decision-making process.

\textsuperscript{37} Interview with Professor Michel Oksenberg, a staff member of the National Security Council, 1977-1980. 29 July 1985. Ann Arbor, MI.
\textsuperscript{38} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{39} Interview with Roger Sullivan, Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, State Department, 1978-1980. 9 August 1985. Washington, D.C.
4

THE BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS MODEL

THE ESSENCE OF THE BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS MODEL

The bureaucratic politics model does not assume that a nation's foreign policy is made by a unitary, value-maximizing, nation-state actor. Instead, the bureaucratic politics model assumes that foreign policy is the end-product of intranational political results:

Resultants in the sense that what happens is not chosen as a solution to a problem but rather results from compromise, conflict, and confusion of officials with diverse interests and unequal influence; political in the sense that the activity from which decisions and actions emerge is best characterized as bargaining along regularized channels among individual members of the government (Allison, 1971: 162).

The governmental actor is not a unitary agent but a number of individual players with different positions, different responsibilities, different resources, different information sources, and different powers within the government (Snyder and Diesing, 1977:348-49). Decisions are outcomes of “pulling and hauling” between players, each possessing different priorities, perceptions, goals, vested interests, and powers. Power is composed of at least three elements: “bargaining advantages, skill and will in using bargaining advantages, and other players' perceptions of the first two ingredients”; power determines each player's impact on results (Allison, 1971:168).

Each player takes a stand on the basis of organizational role, perceptions of goals and interests, and stakes in the issue involved. “Where you stand depends on where you sit” (Allison, 1971:176). Constitutions, statutes, court interpretations, executive orders, conventions, and culture determine the rules of the game. Bargaining, coalition building, persuasion, pulling and hauling, and politics are the mechanisms of choice (Allison, 1971:171). Action channels, a regularized means of taking governmental action on a specific kind of issue, structure the game by preselecting the major players, determining
their usual points of entrance into the game, and distributing particular advantages and disadvantages (Allison, 1971:170).

In *Essence of Decision*, Allison portrays the U.S. president as little more than another bureaucratic politics player:

> In status and formal powers the President is chief. Every other participant's business somehow involves him. But his authority guarantees only an extensive clerkship. If the President is to rule, he must squeeze from these formal powers a full array of bargaining advantages (Allison, 1977:148).

Halperin and Kanter give the president more weight in the decision-making process:

> The President stands at the center of the foreign policy process in the United States. His role and influence over decisions are qualitatively different than those of any other participants. In any foreign policy decision widely perceived at the time to be important, the President will be a principal if not the principal figure determining the general direction of actions (Halperin and Kanter, 1973:6-7).

The bureaucratic politics perspective characterizes decision making as a process of building a coalition among the major players: the president, chiefs, staffs, and the "indians." The major chiefs in the United States are the presidents, the secretaries of State, Defense, and Treasury, the director of the CIA, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the special assistant for National Security Affairs. Staffs include the immediate staff of each chief. "Indians" are the political appointees and permanent government officials within each of the departments and agencies (Allison, 1971:164). Bureaucratic politics coalition building requires the participation of at least three people, or at least two different bureaus or departments and a central decision maker (Snyder and Diesing, 1977:356).

Applied to the U.S.-PRC normalization-of-relations decision making, two hypotheses emerge from the assumption of the bureaucratic politics model: (1) timing and terms of the normalization decision can best be explained by the pulling and hauling of the bureaucratic politics players, and (2) each bureaucratic politics player's stand on the normalization issue can be predicted from his position in the bureaucracy.

The bureaucratic politics model's explanatory power is achieved by displaying the details of the game—the action channels, the positions, the players, their preferences, and the pulling and hauling (Allison, 1977:173). The most serious problem of the bureaucratic
approach is the lack of information about the details of the bureaucratic game. There are no classified documents available at this time for a case study such as the normalization decision making from 1969 to 1978. To piece together the game, the researcher has to rely on "unreliable" information sources, such as memoirs of former decision makers, interviews of participants, congressional hearing reports, published papers or articles, and newspapers. It is no accident that bureaucratic politics analysts are often accused of "imposing their theory on the data, rather than testing their theory on the basis of their data" (Caldwell, 1977:100).

The data problem, however, does not cripple the analysis of normalization decision making from the bureaucratic politics perspective, for two reasons. First, U.S.-China normalization decision making from 1969 to 1978 showed that major decisions were made by the president or like-minded players. The bureaucratic politics model is not a very relevant factor, therefore, in explaining the timing and the terms of the normalization decision. The main pulling and hauling occurred not within the executive branch, but rather between the White House and Congress. Second, because of the extreme secrecy and the limited number of participants involved in the entire decision-making process, there was no opportunity for middle or lower levels of bureaucrats to engage in bureaucratic fights. According to the president's wishes, even key members of the cabinet were not aware of the secret decision to conclude normalization. The bureaucratic politics model has limited applicability for explaining the normalization issue. The lack of data to portray the bureaucratic politics game results not only from the unavailability of official documents but also from the limited engagement of bureaucratic politics during the normalization decision-making process.

THE BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS EXPLANATION

The normalization decision-making process is analyzed from the bureaucratic politics perspective in four stages: (1) 1969-1972: the opening of China; (2) 1972-1973: another step toward normalization—the establishment of the liaison offices; (3) 1974-1977: the stagnation period; and (4) 1978: the year of the full normalization decision.

1969-1972: The Opening of China

The major players who participated in the process of the China initiative from 1969 to 1972 were President Nixon, National Security Adviser Kissinger, and the State Department. The State Department, while participating in early contacts between Washington and Beijing from 1969 to May 1970, was deliberately left out by the White House
after the aborted 137th Warsaw Meeting with the PRC in May 1970 because of President Nixon's personal distrust and fears of leaks by the State Department. After Nixon's announcement of the China trip on 15 July 1971, the State Department once again participated in the preparation of Nixon's trip to China. The State Department, however, did not directly negotiate with the Chinese for the Shanghai Communique—the most important document between Washington and Beijing before the final normalization of relations in 1978—until the first draft was concluded by Kissinger and Premier Chou En-lai. The Shanghai Communique was the foundation upon which the negotiations of the terms of normalization were based in 1978. The State Department did manage to make some changes on the first draft of the Communique (Kissinger, 1979:1082-85. See also Hersh, 1983:497-99). Those changes, however, did not touch the most important issue—the Taiwan question—which blocked Sino-American relations for two decades. Accordingly, the impact of the State Department on the course of events pertaining to the opening of China was not significant. The White House, the National Security Council, and their staff members played the most important role in paving the way for Nixon's historic visit to China in February 1972.

There were two levels of action channels in the process of opening the China door, namely, the international and the intragovernmental levels. At the international level, the United States had used the Warsaw talks channel, the Pakistani channel, the Romanian channel, and the Paris channel to communicate with leaders of the PRC about U.S. interests in improving relations with Beijing. At the intragovernmental level, with the exception of the Warsaw channel, the White House was the only unit that had total control of secret China diplomacy before July 1971.

The action channels determine "who's got the action" (Allison, 1971:170). Typically, issues are "recognized and determined within an established channel for producing action" (Allison, 1971:170). For example, one action channel for producing the normalization of relations with China could include a recommendation by the Secretaries of State and Defense; an evaluation by the intelligence community of the strategic, political, military, and economic consequences of normalization with the PRC; a recommendation by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the National Security Council; a presidential decision to negotiate with Beijing; the transmittal of the U.S. decision through a third country to the PRC; the response from the PRC about the conditions for normalization; the feedback and recommendations from each department involved about the terms for normalization; the presidential decision on the agreeable terms for normalization; the State Department's negoti-
ating team to work out an agreement with the PRC; and the final announcement of normalization of relations with the PRC.

The case of the opening of China, however, did not go through normal governmental action channels. President Nixon took the initiative to change a policy that had been used for 20 years. There was no major movement in any of the departments to urge the president to change the China policy. The policy change was made by the president, not from recommendations of various bureaus. President Nixon personally selected the action channels as well as the players.

The selection of the action channels and players, however, was not deliberately made from the beginning of the China initiative. Nor was Nixon’s new China policy a well-planned and carefully executed strategy. President Nixon decided to move China diplomacy into the White House after several frustrated bureaucratic battles with the State Department (Kissinger, 1979:190). The new China policy gradually emerged when Nixon’s concept of playing the China card against the Soviet Union encountered an opportunity—the Sino-Soviet border wars.

Before the Chenpao border incident on 2 March 1969, President Nixon had a “notion” to improve relations with the PRC, but not yet a “strategy” to move toward the PRC (Kissinger, 1979:171). Although President Nixon had urged National Security Adviser Kissinger to explore “possibilities of rapprochement with the Chinese” as early as 1 February 1969, Kissinger’s assignment was to create the “impression” that the United States was exploring a move toward China instead of moving directly toward the Chinese (Kissinger, 1979:169). The border wars and the increased hostility between Moscow and Beijing changed the whole picture of the global balance of power situation overnight. The opportunity for developing a favorable triangular relationship for the United States arose when the Soviet Union replaced the United States as the number one enemy of the PRC. President Nixon seized the opportunity and decided to move toward the Chinese directly.

Apart from making a unilateral concession to ease the trade embargo against the PRC in July 1966, President Nixon also sent out messages in August 1969 through President Yahya Khan of Pakistan and President Nicolae Ceausescu of Romania to the leaders of the PRC that the United States was interested in improving relations with Beijing (Kissinger, 1979:179-81). National Security Adviser Kissinger told Pakistan’s ambassador in Washington, Agha Hilaly, that President Nixon preferred to use the Hilaly channel with Kissinger as “the single confidential point of contact for any further discussion of this
subject” (Kissinger, 1979:181). The State Department did not know of the Pakistani channel.

The State Department was assigned another role in initiating communication with the PRC. As previously noted, the U.S. ambassador to Poland, Walter Stoessel, was instructed to deliver the message of U.S. interests in serious talks with Beijing to the Chinese charge d'affaires in Poland, Lei Yang, in September 1969. This was the first operational involvement of the regular State Department machinery in the new China policy. Before then, the State Department made a significant contribution to the various policy review studies done in the National Security Council (NSC) system and to the implementation of Nixon’s order to ease trade restrictions toward the PRC. The State Department, however, had not been involved in the overall strategy toward China (Kissinger, 1979:181).

The entrance of the State Department into the action channels from September 1969 fulfilled one of the preconditions of the bureaucratic politics game—the involvement of at least three players: the president, the National Security Council, and the State Department. Another precondition for bureaucratic coalition politics requires the existence of a conflict between at least two different units or departments (Snyder and Diesing, 1977:356). It did not take long to develop conflicts of views toward the new China policy between the State Department and the White House.

As early as June 1969, in response to the White House's decision to ease trade restrictions against the PRC, Soviet experts in the State Department, led by former ambassador to the Soviet Union Llewellyn Thompson and Charles (Chip) Bohlen, warned President Nixon against any attempt to “use” China against the Soviet Union. They believed that the superpower relationship was more important than a triangular relationship in solving problems of peace and war. This group saw more risks and few advantages in Sino-American rapprochement. They did not believe that better U.S.-PRC relations would induce better U.S.-Soviet relations. In a State Department paper submitted to the NSC Review Group in September 1969, this group’s thought was expressed as follows:

Soviet tolerance of U.S. overtures to Peking [Beijing] may be substantial—but these overtures will nevertheless introduce irritants into the U.S.-Soviet relationship. Moreover, if a significant improvement in the Sino-American relationship should come about, the Soviets might well adopt a harder line both at home and in international affairs. It is impossible to foresee the point at which the advantages in an improvement in Sino-U.S. relations might be counterbal-
anced by a hardening in U.S.-Soviet relationships. The fact that such a point almost certainly exists argues for caution in making moves toward better relations with China. . . . (Kissinger, 1979:189).

Llewellyn Thompson further suggested that Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin be kept informed of all U.S. contacts with the PRC in the Warsaw talks. Secretary of State Rogers did not endorse this proposal, nor did Kissinger. President Nixon formally rejected Thompson's proposal on 12 December 1969 (Kissinger, 1979:190). Besides fighting the battle with Soviet experts in the State Department on the China initiative, the White House also found itself battling with the enormous bureaucratic communications machinery of the State Department. President Nixon had no confidence in the State Department's way of making policy—receiving and sending cables (Kissinger, 1979:27). On 11 December 1969, several days after Ambassador Stoessel successfully conveyed the message to the PRC, Stoessel was invited to the Chinese embassy in Poland.1 The resumption of the Warsaw talks was proposed by the United States. Within days after learning of the imminent resumption of the Warsaw talks between Washington and Beijing, the State Department had sent accounts of the Warsaw meeting to U.S. embassies in Tokyo, Taipei, and Moscow. Friendly allies of the United States, such as the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, France, Italy, and New Zealand, had been briefed either before or after Stoessel's December meeting with the Chinese (Kissinger, 1979:190).

Another “tug-of-war” began between the White House and the State Department in January 1970 over the agenda of the 135th and 136th Warsaw meetings and over President Nixon's proposal to send a representative to Beijing for direct discussions with PRC leaders. The main agenda for discussion in the previous 134 Warsaw meetings had been the U.S. relationship with Taiwan, and bilateral issues such as arms control, claims and assets questions, release of U.S. prisoners in China, and so on. Unaware of the messages that had been passed to the PRC through the secret Pakistani and Romanian channels, the State Department's Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs saw no reason to change the contents of discussion for the 135th Warsaw meeting. The White House, however, hoped to use the 135th meeting to address new themes: that the United States wanted to make a fresh

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1. Ambassador Walter Stoessel, Jr. indicated in an interview on 21 June 1985 that he attached special significance to the fact that his meeting with the PRC officials was in the Chinese embassy in Warsaw instead of in other conference settings, which afforded frank and open discussion.
start; that the United States would not participate in a Soviet-American condominium; that the United States would proceed not on the basis of ideology but on the assessment of mutual interest (Kissinger, 1979:686). Neither the Asian experts nor the Soviet experts in the State Department found these themes acceptable for Ambassador Stoessel to espouse at the 135th meeting on 20 January 1970 (Kissinger, 1979:686).

After a bureaucratic fight, a compromise agreement was reached: National Security Adviser Kissinger conceded all of State's Warsaw agenda in return for the themes Kissinger considered most essential. At the January meeting, Ambassador Stoessel told the Chinese that the United States did not seek to “join in any condominium with the Soviet Union directed against China.” Stoessel also told the Chinese that the United States “would be prepared to consider sending a representative to Peking for direct discussions with your officials or receiving a representative from your government in Washington for more thorough exploration of any of the subjects I have mentioned in my remarks today or other matters on which we might agree” (Kissinger, 1979:687).

Debates over how to respond, should the PRC accept the U.S. proposal to send a representative to Beijing or to receive a Chinese emissary in Washington, produced another bureaucratic fight between the White House and the State Department. The State Department recommended to “simply note the Chinese reply without comments.” Kissinger, on the other hand, wanted Stoessel to “indicate agreement in principle and refer the matter to Washington for a detailed reply” (Kissinger, 1979:688). President Nixon sided with Kissinger. Stoessel was instructed to respond positively by President Nixon. At the 136th Warsaw meeting, Ambassador Lei Yang conveyed the message that the PRC agreed to receive an American representative to Beijing. In response to Beijing’s acceptance of the U.S. proposal, the East Asian Bureau of the State Department urged President Nixon not to hold high level talks in Beijing before making some progress on bilateral issues. Kissinger did not agree with the department’s view. Kissinger believed that fears of a Soviet attack was the main reason for Beijing’s positive response to the U.S. proposal. Beijing’s immediate concern was not the Taiwan issue nor the bilateral issues, but the global balance-of-power question.

On 10 March 1970, Secretary of State Rogers proposed the following projects for the 137th Warsaw meeting: “agreement in principle to peaceful settlement of the Taiwan problem and expansion of trade and mutual contacts; some unilateral Chinese gesture of goodwill, such as the release of Americans or the expansion of trade” (Kissinger, 1979:688).
Marshall Green, the assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, also summarized his view in a personal note to Kissinger on 17 March 1970, in which Green pressed for Chinese willingness to meet U.S. concerns on bilateral issues before sending a U.S. representative to Beijing:

To go to Peking without such clarification poses serious risk of our being used by Peking for its own purposes in its relations with the Soviets without any compensating gains either in terms of our bilateral relations with the Chinese or in progress toward a relaxation of tensions elsewhere, particularly in Southeast Asia. For the same reason, I think we should not offer to discuss with the Chinese modalities of a meeting such as communications, personnel, timing, security, etc., unless we have made a firm and final decision to go ahead with such a meeting. Our discussion of such modalities will be interpreted as a firm commitment to a higher-level meeting by Peking, and may reinforce the Chinese belief they need not discuss "substance" with us until such a meeting takes place. To make such a commitment at this point would thus weaken our ability to press the Chinese now to commit themselves further on their own intentions and negotiating position at a higher-level meeting (Kissinger, 1979:691).

President Nixon once again shared Kissinger's view that geopolitical benefits of an American emissary to Beijing was far greater than the risks involved. The 137th Warsaw meeting, originally scheduled for 20 May 1970, was canceled by the PRC because of the American invasion of Cambodia. The Warsaw talks never resumed. The end of the Warsaw talks marked the end of the State Department's operational involvement in the China initiative.

President Nixon decided to rely on more confidential channels to communicate with the PRC leaders. As noted previously, the Pakistani channel turned out to be the most successful. Details of Pakistan's role in arranging Kissinger's secret trip to Beijing have also been described previously. The arrangement was kept secret. Besides President Nixon and Kissinger, there were only a few staff members who knew of it. Kissinger chose three members of his NSC staff to go with him to Beijing: John Holdridge, Dick Smyser, and Winston Lord (Kissinger, 1979:730). The State Department did not know about Kissinger's trip to Beijing until 8 July 1971, hours before Kissinger's departure from Pakistan to Beijing. Secretary of State Rogers was told by Nixon that the trip to Beijing was a last-minute decision in response
to an invitation Kissinger had received while in Pakistan (Kissinger, 1979:739). By then, it was too late for the Secretary of State to present any opposing views.

The State Department opposed Kissinger’s second trip to China, to arrange President Nixon’s February 1972 visit, on the ground that the timing of Kissinger’s trip, October 20—a few days before the U.N. General Assembly’s voting on the Chinese representative issue—would interfere with American strategy on the China question. Another obvious reason for Rogers’ objection was that the president should not send emissaries who were independent of the Secretary of State (Kissinger, 1979:775-76). Once again, President Nixon rejected Secretary of State Rogers’ position.

On his second trip to China, Kissinger finally had with him a China expert from the State Department, Alfred Jenkins. Jenkins was an expert on the bilateral issues between the United States and the PRC. Jenkins, however, was not allowed to actually participate in discussions of key geopolitical issues, particularly negotiations on the drafting of the communique (Kissinger, 1979:775). The same strategy was used during President Nixon’s visit to China in 1972. Nixon wanted to keep Secretary of State Rogers and Assistant Secretary of State Marshall Green busy elsewhere while Nixon and Kissinger held talks with Mao and Chou on sensitive matters. Kissinger, however, managed to include his NSC staff member Winston Lord as a notetaker in the historic talks between the leaders of the United States and the PRC, while Secretary of State Rogers was absent (Kissinger, 1979:1057).

President Nixon deliberately kept State Department officials from participating in negotiations about the Shanghai Communique. Nixon told Premier Chou that “our State Department leaks like a sieve” (Kissinger, 1979:1070). The State Department delegation was finally given the draft of the communique on the plane from Beijing to Hangchou, one day before the communique was to be announced. As soon as the U.S. delegation arrived at Hangchou, Secretary Rogers informed President Nixon that the communique was unsatisfactory.

2. Ambassador Harvey Feldman indicated in a personal letter that “Three qualified State Department interpreters went along as part of the entourage for Nixon’s February 1972 visit. None of the three were used by Nixon or Kissinger in their substantive discussions, and instead PRC-provided interpreters were used. One of the three, Charles Freeman, was used by Nixon as interpreter at social functions. That was the extent of their participation. Secretary Rogers conducted the discussions with the Chinese on the mutual claim issues. Marshall Green, with Alfred Jenkins, conducted discussions on other essentially minor issues. John Holdridge, I believe, participated in these as well.” Ambassador Feldman’s letter was dated 4 January 1984.
Rogers recommended a list of changes prepared by his State Department staff.

Marshall Green, assistant secretary for the State Department Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, 1969-1972, said in an interview that the United States stated in the Shanghai Communique America’s continued support for South Vietnam, South Korea, and Japan, without mentioning Taiwan. Green believed that the omission of America’s defense treaty with Taiwan in the Shanghai Communique was a serious mistake. 3 “Why mention the others when you don’t mention this obligation?” “The implication was that we were going to abrogate or overlook” the defense obligation to Taiwan, Green revealed (Hersh, 1983:497). Green also recalled that the omission instantly reminded him of Dean Acheson’s famous “mistake” in early 1950 when Acheson defined America’s “defensive perimeter” as extending from the Ryukyus Islands in the western Pacific to the Philippines in Asia, without mentioning South Korea. 4 Accordingly, Green tried to convince Rogers of the importance of reopening the negotiations with the PRC on the Shanghai Communique. The defense treaty problem was finally resolved when Nixon and Kissinger decided that if the question of America’s treaty commitment to Taiwan arose, Kissinger would orally reaffirm that commitment (Hersh, 1983:499).

Nixon was not happy with the “numerous” and “trivial” amendments submitted by the State Department. Nixon and Kissinger both knew that the PRC leaders would surely be reluctant to reopen negotiations on the communique, with which President Nixon agreed less than a day before. On the other hand, President Nixon did not want to go home with a divided delegation (Hersh, 1983:498-99. See also Kissinger 1979:1083). If the State Department was not happy with the communique, which the State Department had no part in negotiating, State’s opposition would soon be leaked to the press. After reconsidering potential political damage at home, President Nixon finally decided to take the department’s amendments to the Chinese. As expected, Ch’iao Kuan-hua, foreign minister of the PRC, was not happy with the last minute proposal by the United States. The Chinese, nevertheless, agreed to consider changes on the parts of the communique not dealing with the Taiwan question (Kissinger, 1979:1084). The final draft of the communique was concluded and announced on 28 February 1972. The Chinese accepted much of the State Depart-

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ment's proposed amendments, but none dealing with the Taiwan question (Kissinger, 1979:1084).

In brief, the new China policy from 1969 to 1972 was initiated and mainly implemented by the White House. Fear of leaks and bureaucratic politics were the main cause for President Nixon to bypass his cabinet, particularly the State Department. The initial brief and unsatisfactory participation of the department in the new China diplomacy made President Nixon more than ever convinced of the necessity of keeping secret the opening of China.

The new China policy was not made in a vacuum, however. Various interagency studies concerning U.S.-China relations had been requested by the National Security Council, which can order agency studies without revealing the real purpose. In this way, the White House could learn the views of the agencies as well as the necessary background information without formally "clearing" overall strategy with them. In White House Years, Kissinger described the contribution of interagency studies to the decision-making process of the new China policy, as follows:

One advantage of the NSC system for the secret diplomacy in which we were now involved was that it enabled the President and me to obtain agency views and ideas without revealing our tactical plan. Thus, as part of the study of our military posture in Asia, I requested a breakdown of which of our forces in Taiwan were needed for Indochina operations and which were required as part of the Mutual Security Treaty with Taipei. This gave me some idea of what it was possible to concede if we were to withdraw some forces as "tensions in the area diminished" (Kissinger, 1979:705. See also Hersh, 1983:496).

The State Department, though not directly participating in the negotiations on the communique, had its imprint on the vital Taiwan question of the communique. Kissinger gave special credit to the State Department in his memoirs:

    Taiwan, as expected, provided the most difficult issue. We needed a formula acknowledging the unity of China, which was the one point on which Taipei and Peking agreed, without supporting the claim of either. I finally put forward the American position on Taiwan as follows: "The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the

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5. Kissinger did not specify which parts of the proposed amendments made by the State Department were accepted by the RPC.
Taiwan Straits maintain there is but one China. The United States Government does not challenge that position." I do not think anything I did or said impressed Chou as much as this ambiguous formula with which both sides were able to live for nearly a decade. (In fairness I must say that I adapted it from a State Department planning document for negotiations, which aborted in the Fifties.) (Kissinger, 1979:783).

Some State Department officials actually participated in the preparation of the drafting of the Shanghai Communique in 1971-1972. In The Price of Power, Seymour M. Hersh described in detail how some State Department's China experts were involved in the drafting of the communique:

In the months before the summit, Kissinger realized that the Asia experts on his NSC staff, headed by John Holdridge, would be unable to produce all the papers needed, and he turned to an outsider, Alfred Jenkins of the State Department. Jenkins was one of the few China hands who had escaped the purges of the "Who lost China?" lobby in the early 1950s, because he had been unrelentingly hostile to the Communist Chinese. Over the winter of 1971-72, Jenkins became a trusted insider and was provided with copies of the backchannel communications between Washington and Peking and the transcripts of Kissinger's meetings with Chou En-lai. His basic assignment was to draft a communique to be made public at the close of the summit. Jenkins, unable to handle all Kissinger's demands, in turn recruited two other State Department Asia experts, Roger Sullivan and William A. Brown. The three men were given office space in a hideaway on the top floor of the State Department. It is not clear whether Kissinger realized that Sullivan and Brown were actually writing most of the papers, or indeed if he knew of the three-man operation. The secrecy extended everywhere. William Rogers and his top aides, Alexis Johnson and Marshall Green, knew of the special office, but they were not told that the Jenkins group had access to the backchannel messages and the transcripts of the Kissinger-Chou meetings (Hersh, 1983:492-93).

Roger Sullivan, deputy assistant secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, 1978-1980, revealed in an interview on 9 August 1985 that he wrote five different drafts of the Shanghai Communique in 1971-1972. Sullivan also indicated that the single issue that concerned
Kissinger most during the preparation of the Shanghai Communique period was the Vietnam question.

The State Department had also been actively involved with the implementation of President Nixon's decisions to ease trade and travel restrictions against the PRC. The Defense, Commerce, and Treasury Departments also had participated in the implementation of some of the relaxation of trade and economic relations with the PRC throughout this period (Hersh, 1983:697-98, 723). The director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Richard Helms, and Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, Jr., chief of naval operations, had helped Kissinger set up an effective "backchannel," an important factor for successful conduct of the secret China policy (Hersh, 1983:722-23). Those agencies, however, were not involved in formulation of the overall strategy toward China.

1972-1973: Another Step Toward Normalization

After Nixon's 1972 trip to China, day-to-day business between Washington and Beijing was conducted through two channels. Most business had gone through the Paris channel. The PRC ambassador in Paris, Huang Chen, and U.S. Ambassador Arthur Watson, were in charge of communication between the two countries. Sensitive messages, however, were passed through the backchannel. The PRC mission to the United Nations was chosen by President Nixon as the backchannel (Kissinger, 1982:61). In his second volume of memoirs, Years of Upheaval, Kissinger stated how the Nixon administration communicated with the PRC through the backchannel:

Initially Peking stressed that it preferred the Paris channel. The UN mission was to be used only for emergencies—perhaps it did not want us to have the benefits of a Chinese embassy without diplomatic recognition. Soon the necessity of rapid communication and the importance of candid discussion had caused both sides to stretch the definition of "emergency" more and more widely. From November 1971 until May 1973, I traveled secretly to New York on a score of occasions for face-to-face meetings with Huang Hua, usually in a CIA-provided "safe house" in mid-Manhattan, a seedy apartment whose mirrored walls suggested less prosaic purposes (Kissinger, 1982:61).

The backchannel was totally controlled by the White House. The State Department was not aware of it. After Nixon's China trip, the increasing need for frequent exchange of views on global as well as bilateral issues had made the "clumsy means of communications" be-
tween Washington and Beijing inadequate (Kissinger, 1982:60). Kissinger went to Beijing in February 1973 with no clear-cut plan to improve relations with the PRC but with an intention to propose some modest step, such as an American trade office in China. The Nixon administration at that time remained convinced that the PRC did not want to open any office in Washington so long as Taiwan's embassy was there (Kissinger, 1982:61).

The idea of establishing liaison offices in each country's capital appeared to be a proposal made by the United States. In reality, "it was only 'marginally' true," stated Kissinger (Kissinger, 1982:61). He described in detail the way in which the idea of establishing de facto diplomatic relations emerged during his talks with Chou En-lai in February 1973:

As we talked about bilateral relations, I mentioned the utility of a permanent point of contact. Zhou (Chou in Wade-Giles) allowed himself to seem mildly interested. He asked me whether I had any idea how to implement it. Consular representation did not interest him; it was too technical. Neither did the idea of a trade office in any of its variations strike a spark. He obviously wanted to emphasize political and not commercial relationships. So I dusted off the idea of a liaison office, which had been prepared for Hanoi and peremptorily rejected there. We had not yet, in Pham Van Dong's view, earned the privilege of permanent association and regularized harassment. Zhou perked up. I was neither very specific nor did I presume to offer reciprocity in Washington, so certain were we that Peking's envoys would never appear where Taiwan's representatives were established.

Zhou said he would "consider" my "proposal" of a liaison office. It was not clear to me that I had formally made it. The next day he "accepted" it. He added a subtle wrinkle, however, China would insist on reciprocity: a Chinese liaison office should be established in Washington as well (Kissinger, 1982:61-62).

Roger Sullivan claimed in an interview that he was the initiator of the idea for establishing liaison offices in the PRC and in the U.S., respectively. Kissinger initially was pessimistic, according to Sullivan, assuming that the PRC would react negatively. The idea, nevertheless, became one of several proposals submitted for Beijing's consideration. Although Kissinger later surprisingly attributed the idea of liaison offices as having originated with the PRC, Sullivan in retro-
spect believed that Kissinger did not remember that the idea already had been put forward by the United States. Regardless of who originated the idea, Sullivan claimed that no precedent existed in diplomatic history for such offices and that their establishment underlines the uniqueness of U.S.-China relations.6

Richard Solomon, a staff member of the National Security Council, 1971-1976, revealed in an interview that the liaison offices proposal was made by the United States in October 1971. Beijing did not show any interest in this proposal at that time because of Beijing’s concern over the Vietnam war. After the conclusion of the Paris Peace Agreement in early 1973, the PRC then felt free to again raise the idea of establishing liaison offices.7

The liaison offices were actually “embassies in all but name.” President Nixon decided to appoint David K.E. Bruce, a distinguished ambassador and public figure, to head the liaison office in Beijing. The selection of Bruce symbolized the importance the Nixon administration attached to the assignment. Bruce was one of the few people who knew the arrangement of Kissinger’s first secret trip to Beijing (Kissinger, 1979:756). As a matter of fact, Bruce was originally considered by President Nixon as the ideal emissary to take the secret trip to China (Kissinger, 1979:715). Later, President Nixon decided not to send Bruce to China because Bruce’s role as head of the U.S. delegation to the Paris peace talks on Vietnam might complicate the China mission.

The U.S. decision to move toward de facto diplomatic relations with the PRC incurred very little bureaucratic hostility mainly because it was another China decision made by the highest authorities in Washington and Beijing. There was no public debate in any agency on this subject. Even Kissinger himself did not believe it would be possible for the PRC to accept a semi-official relationship with the United States prior to full normalization of relations. Accordingly, there was little opportunity for bureaucratic players to engage in countermovements before Kissinger’s trip. By the time the Chinese agreed to establish the liaison offices, it was too late for any player to propose negative views, if there were any.

In February 1973, Kissinger was accompanied by State Department officials Herbert G. Klein and Alfred Jenkins and members of his National Security staff: Winston Lord, Jonathan Howe, Richard

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Solomon, and Peter Rodman. Once again, the White House was the center for making policy decisions and the State Department played only a supplementary role. Jenkins held several talks on technical subjects with Chinese Assistant Foreign Minister Chang Wen-chin.⁸

Halperin believed that "complete and faithful implementation of a Presidential decision remains the exception rather than the rule" (Halperin and Kanter, 1973:33). Successful implementation of a decision such as the establishment of liaison offices required the cooperation of the State Department to work out the details of technical arrangements. But more important questions depended on the political will of the highest authorities of Washington and Beijing.

During the second stage of the U.S.-China normalization process, the major players and action channels followed the same pattern as during the period of the initial opening of China. President Nixon and Kissinger were again the dominant figures in determining the pace of normalization. Nixon wanted to improve relations with the PRC but short of full normalization. The PRC responded with the best possible solution the United States could expect—the liaison offices. The idea of liaison offices came from the State Department. But neither Kissinger nor Nixon gave enough credit to the department's original idea. The bureaucratic politics model's assumption—pulling and hauling among players—explains very little about the ways in which the decision of the establishment of the liaison offices was made.

President Nixon's and Kissinger's decision to bypass the State Department on the most important issues concerning China did not imply that the State Department institutionally resisted the Nixon/Kissinger China policy. Ambassador Harvey Feldman pointed out that opinions within the department's bureaucracy were actually quite divided:

The "old guard"—and perhaps most especially then Under Secretary for Political Affairs U. Alexis Johnson, was absolutely opposed to rapprochement with Beijing. Assistant Secretary Green was dubious but not completely opposed, although his principal deputy, Ambassador Winthrop Brown, was. Below that level, however, there was much enthusiasm for the Nixon/Kissinger policy. Alfred Jenkins was completely committed to it at that time (he later came to oppose it), and Jenkins' deputy, Roger Sullivan, was if anything even more eager than Jenkins. The details for the es-

establishment of the liaison offices were handled by Jenkins and Sullivan.9

1974-1977: The Stagnation Period

After formal establishment of the liaison offices, Kissinger paid another visit to Beijing in November 1973. This time, National Security Adviser Kissinger had another official title—U.S. Secretary of State. Kissinger was nominated as the Secretary of State by President Nixon in August 1973.

Chairman Mao Tse-tung received Kissinger in November 1973. The two sides held a wide-ranging talk on international affairs as well as bilateral relations. A joint U.S.-PRC communique was issued at the conclusion of Kissinger’s visit. The Chinese reiterated that normalization of relations could be realized “only on the basis of confirming the principle of one China.” According to Kissinger, the November 1973 trip was the last visit in which Kissinger received a warm reception from the Chinese hosts. Kissinger’s subsequent visits to China in 1974 and 1975 were either “downright chilly or were holding actions” because of domestic crises in both Washington and Beijing (Kissinger, 1982:698). U.S. credibility was drastically reduced with the evaporation of presidential authority, partly due to the Watergate scandal. The PRC was also preoccupied with a minicultural revolution—the anti-Confucius campaign, which was aimed at Chou En-lai.

It was important that the normalization decision be made at a time when the U.S. bargaining position vis-a-vis the PRC could be maximized and when the president felt politically strong enough to withstand domestic opposition. The post-Watergate period was surely not a prime time to move toward resolution of the normalization issue.

Was the bureaucratic politics model relevant to explain the delay of the normalization decision from 1974-1977? The power struggle between the National Security adviser and the Secretary of State no longer existed after Kissinger’s appointment as Secretary of State in 1973. Although Kissinger was removed from the National Security Council post in the so-called “Sunday Night Massacre” on 2 November 1975, Brent Scowcroft, Kissinger’s successor, was no match in competing with Kissinger for power in foreign policy affairs. Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger was purged in the massacre. The difference of views between Kissinger and Schlesinger was not on U.S. policy on China but rather on U.S.-Soviet detente relations. During the Nixon administration, President Nixon and Kissinger held ulti-

mate power in foreign policy decisions. In the Ford administration, Secretary of State Kissinger was generally believed to be not only the prime initiator but also the prime executor of American foreign policy. President Ford was guided by Kissinger in foreign affairs to a greater extent than had been President Nixon (Hinton, 1976:77). Without access to official documents, it would be impossible to make definitive conclusions about the impact of the bureaucratic politics factor on the normalization decision during the stagnation period. But given the dominant nature of Kissinger's power during this period, it would be difficult to attribute the delay of normalization to pulling and hauling among the China players.

The bureaucratic politics factor would be relevant to explain decision making involving conflict between at least different departments and a minimum of three participants. When one or two people make decisions, the rational choice explanatory model appears more relevant (Snyder and Diesing, 1977:356). In the normalization case, the main decisions were made by President Nixon, Kissinger, and later President Ford. The bureaus were more involved in implementing presidential decisions than in making decisions. The departments had a good deal of influence in the implementation of presidential decisions, such as easing trade restrictions against the PRC, gradually withdrawing personnel and military equipment from Taiwan, and arms sales to Taiwan. But the decision of when and how to normalize relations with the PRC was totally controlled by the White House. When the decision was made not to normalize relations with Beijing, implementation of the decision was irrelevant to its success.

When President Carter took office in January 1977, the issue of normalization with the PRC was not on the list of foreign policy priorities. This was not because the Carter administration was not interested in normalizing relations with Beijing; rather it was because other foreign policy matters, such as the Middle East peace talks, SALT II, and the Panama Canal Treaties had assumed greater urgency and required the immediate attention of the president. That normalization with the PRC was an ultimate goal of U.S. foreign policy, however, was not questioned in the Carter administration.

In May 1977, President Carter indicated in his Notre Dame speech that the American-Chinese relationship is "a central element" of U.S. global policy. President Carter hoped "to find a formula" that could bridge some of the difficulties that still separated the United States and the PRC (Brzezinski, 1983:199).

On 27 June 1977, a policy review committee under Assistant Secretary Richard Holbrooke's direction recommended a "near term" recognition of the PRC (Vance, 1983:78). In late 1977, President
Carter met with Brown, Vance, Brezezinski, Holbrooke, and Oksenberg to discuss the strategic and domestic political implications of normalization of relations with the PRC. At the end of that meeting, President Carter said that he wanted to complete normalization and asked Vance to prepare a draft of a communique to be issued in Beijing if the PRC responded favorably to a U.S. presentation (Vance, 1983:79). President Carter approved the State Department's draft in early August.

On 22 August 1977, one day before Vance's trip to China, however, President Carter had second thoughts and pulled back the normalization decision after talking to Vice President Walter Mondale on the Panama Canal Treaties issue (Brzezinski, 1983:201. See also Vance, 1983:79). President Carter realized that it would be unwise to move toward full normalization with the PRC before final approval of the Panama Canal Treaties by Congress. The strategy used by the Carter administration during Vance's trip to China was to delay the normalization by proposing to the PRC a "maximum position": "U.S. government personnel would have to remain on Taiwan after normalization, under an informal arrangement, for the purpose of rendering practical assistance to U.S. citizens in Taiwan" (Vance, 1983:79). In an interview with Richard Holbrooke, assistant secretary of state for the East Asian and Pacific Affairs, 1977-1980, Holbrooke said that "we knew the Chinese would turn down Vance's proposal. But we needed time. There was never any question in my mind that we would fall back." 10

In brief, the delay of the normalization decision from 1974-1977 was mainly a result of rational assessments of domestic and international environments. The bureaucratic politics model explains very little about the decision-making process during the stagnation period of U.S.-PRC relations. Definitive judgments of the impact of the bureaucratic factor, however, must await declassification of official documents.

1978: The Year of the Normalization Decision

Negotiations on normalization began in July 1978. The key players from the Carter administration were President Carter, Cyrus Vance, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Harold Brown, Richard Holbrooke, and Michel Oksenberg. The inner group was deliberately limited to a few key cabinet members in order to prevent leaks. The head of the U.S. liaison office in Beijing, Leonard Woodcock, and the Chinese represent-

ative, Chai Tse-min, presented each government's positions on normalization.

Secretary of State Vance was out of the country during the last stage of intensive negotiations in December 1978. On 13 December 1978, two days before the normalization announcement, President Carter asked Vance to return to Washington from the peace negotiations in Jerusalem. Brzezinski's influence on the timing of the normalization announcement and the final negotiations of the terms of the normalization agreement was much greater than Vance's. For example, Brzezinski was the one who suggested using the formula of "agree to disagree" on the arms sales issue, which was the last objection Beijing raised before the final wrapping up of the normalization agreement.

Vance was reported to be skeptical of the timing of the normalization announcement because of his concern of its potential impact on the SALT II negotiations. There was little disagreement, however, on the terms of the normalization agreement. It was generally agreed among the White House, the State Department, and the Defense Department that:

1. the benefits of normalization with Beijing outweighed the potential costs of severing diplomatic and military relations with Taiwan;
2. Taiwan's strategic importance as a military base diminished considerably after the fall of Vietnam;
3. there was no point to press the PRC to formally renounce the use of force against Taiwan since this was a non-negotiable term the PRC had reiterated publicly throughout the 1970s;
4. The PRC had no intention or capability to launch a war against Taiwan in the near future. Therefore, Taiwan's security would not be in danger immediately after the normalization of relations between Washington and Beijing.

President Carter's China team consisted of like-minded players.

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12 For details see: testimonies of Harold Brown, Secretary of Defense; General David Jones, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense; Warren Christopher, Deputy Secretary of State Department; Michael Armacost, Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State; and Roger Sullivan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, East Asian and Pacific Affairs, in U.S. Senate, *Taiwan* hearings. See also Vance, 1983:75-78, 81, 117; Brzezinski, 1983:196-233; and Carter, 1982:186-201.
Although there was little pulling and hauling among the key participants on accepting PRC's three conditions for normalization, there were some disagreements on other matters. Ambassador Feldman, Director of Republic of China Affairs, State Department, 1977-1979, pointed out in a personal letter as follows:

Some of the participants were quite willing to agree to Chinese demands that all treaties and agreements with the Republic of China were to end at normalization; others were not. Some participants were prepared to accede to the PRC position that granting Ex[port]-Import loans was an official act of government, and that therefore no such loans could be made to Taiwan after normalization. And some advisers were even prepared to accept the PRC position on arms sales.\(^\text{13}\)

General David Jones, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, preferred an absolutely firm commitment in writing from the Chinese that under no conditions would they attack Taiwan.\(^\text{14}\) The Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, were not involved in the negotiations. During congressional hearings on Taiwan relations legislation on 22 February 1979, General David Jones, asked by Senator Charles H. Percy why the Carter administration did not insist on a commitment from Beijing not to use force against Taiwan, replied: "I think a very precise answer would have to come from those who were running the negotiations."\(^\text{15}\)

The bureaucratic factor, however, was not completely irrelevant to the final outcome of the normalization agreement. Various interagency studies were requested by the White House, and these bureaucratic studies were valuable in providing background information. One secret study by the Defense Department, entitled Consolidated Guidance Study No. 9, was leaked to the press. This document assessed what Taiwan's defense needs would be after normalization of relations between Washington and Beijing. This study was a working level draft and never got into final form.\(^\text{16}\) The contents of this document, however, provide a clue as to why the Carter administration insisted on the limited arms sales to Taiwan during the normalization negotiations. The 60-page document stressed that the United States must continue military links to Taiwan and keep Taiwan's forces from falling into disarray. This document assumed that Taiwan could defend itself against attack so long as the United States maintained an

\(^{13}\) Ambassador Feldman's personal letter to the author, dated 4 January 1984.

\(^{14}\) Testimony of General David Jones in *Taiwan*, op. cit., p. 752.

\(^{15}\) Ibid.

\(^{16}\) Ibid:750.
arms sale relationship with Taiwan and provided some air support. This study suggested, therefore, that the United States should continue to supply air defense equipment, military spare parts, and other material to Taiwan (Weinraub, 1978:23).

The bureaucratic politics model also enriches analysis of the normalization decision making by its assumption that governmental actions are intranational political resultants. Although the 1978 normalization decision making could be better explained by like-minded players than by pulling and hauling among players, the pulling and hauling between Vance and Brzezinski still contributed to an explanation of the timing of the normalization agreement.

Allison points out that power determines each player's impact on results. Bargaining advantages, and skill and will in using bargaining advantages, are some of the main elements of power. Allison further elaborates the main sources of power, as follows:

The sources of bargaining advantages include formal authority and responsibility (stemming from positions); actual control over resources necessary to carry out actions; expertise and control over information that enables one to define the problem, identify options, and estimate feasibilities; control over information that enables chiefs to determine whether and in what form decisions are being implemented; the ability to affect other players' objectives in other games; personal persuasiveness with other players (drawn from personal relations, charisma); and access to and persuasiveness with players who have bargaining advantages drawn from the above (based on interpersonal relations, etc.) (Allison, 1971:168-69).

The power struggle between Secretary of State Vance and National Security Adviser Brzezinski was out in the open in April 1980 when Vance resigned in protest against President Carter’s Iran rescue mission. The Vance-Brzezinski relationship was similar to the Rogers-Kissinger relationship during the Nixon years, and perhaps to the Haig-Allen conflict during the Reagan administration. The main difference was that National Security Adviser Kissinger was the winner in most foreign policy disputes with Secretary of State Rogers, but National Security Adviser Brzezinski did not always prevail over Secretary of State Vance.

The successful opening of China was important to Brzezinski in his power struggle against Secretary of State Vance. The two did not disagree over the importance of normalization. The difference was rather in how to approach Moscow and Beijing at the same time.
Should the United States take an “evenhanded” policy toward the PRC and the Soviet Union? Or should the United States play the China card to induce Soviet cooperation with Washington? Would it be better for the United States to first conclude SALT II, and then to normalize relations with the PRC? Or should normalization with the PRC proceed first, before SALT II?

As a lawyer, Vance believed in mediation and compromise between conflicting parties at home and abroad. He thought that the United States and the Soviet Union had mutual interests (Gelb, 1980:A23). Brzezinski, on the other hand, believed that Soviet-American relations were deeply adversary. Detente with the Soviet Union created a false sense of security for the American people. Brzezinski favored taking a tougher stand toward Soviet aggression in the world. Normalization with China was viewed by Brzezinski within the context of global U.S.-Soviet relations.

At the beginning of the Carter administration, the president adopted Vance’s view of an “evenhanded” policy toward Moscow and Beijing, but after Soviet interventions in Ethiopia and Zaire, President Carter leaned toward Brzezinski’s position. In a speech delivered in March 1978, President Carter linked trade and future Soviet-American scientific and economic cooperation to Soviet aggression in Africa and the growth of Soviet military power (Garrett, 1981:242). Brzezinski’s subsequent trip to China in May was interpreted as another step in this move against the Soviet Union. Secretary Vance opposed Brzezinski’s trip to China, believing it might complicate Vance’s scheduled meeting with Gromyko in New York at the end of May 1978. 17

Brzezinski’s visit to China was a turning point in Sino-American relations; negotiations of normalization began after he returned. But Brzezinski’s anti-Soviet view greatly departed from Vance’s “evenhanded” approach. In the spring of 1978, the Vance-Brzezinski rift over power and policy grew to such proportions that the House International Relations Committee wrote a letter to President Carter asking who was running foreign policy (Quinn, 1979a:C3). Vance reportedly told President Carter that he would have to choose between Brzezinski’s hard line and his own cooler approach toward the Soviet Union. In June 1978, at a regular meeting of senior foreign policy advisers, President Carter reassured Vance that he was the principal foreign policy spokesman (Kaiser, 1980:A21. See also Brzezinski, 1983:114-15 and Brzezinski, 1983:202-09.

17. Interview with Michel Oksenberg, a staff member of the National Security Council during the Carter administration, 4 September 1981. New York City. See also Vance, 1983:114-15 and Brzezinski, 1983:202-09.
1983:220-21). For months before the announcement of the normalization agreement, Brzezinski kept a low profile.

Normalization, for Brzezinski, was a significant personal triumph. He was the key figure in Washington in negotiating the normalization agreement during the final crucial period, December 13-15, and was the dominant influence in the timing of the announcement. Holbrooke revealed in an interview that the PRC originally proposed 1 January 1979 as the date for the announcement, but Brzezinski succeeded in convincing President Carter to change the time to 15 December 1978 in order to prevent leaks.18 Before he left for the Middle East on 11 December 1978, Vance personally approved the final instructions to Ambassador Woodcock for Woodcock’s meeting with Teng Hsiao-p’ing. The report of the Teng-Woodcock meeting came back on 13 December 1978, when Vance was in Jerusalem. The final negotiations on the normalization agreement and the time of its announcement were made without the participation of Vance (Vance, 1983:118-19; Brzezinski, 1983:231-32). By the time Vance returned to Washington, it was too late to change the timing of the announcement. Vance would have preferred to delay the announcement until after the Vance-Gromyko meeting to be held before Christmas 1978 (Vance, 1983:118-19). Holbrooke believed that Brzezinski chose a wrong timing, but it reflected that Brzezinski had more influence than did Vance in conducting the final negotiations.

CONCLUSION

The main problem of the bureaucratic politics model is that it underestimates the power of the president. From study of the U.S.-China normalization of relations decision making, we witness that the president turned out to be the one who could initiate, dictate, as well as implement the new China policy.

President Nixon had the power to cut the State Department out of the making of the China initiative, in order to avoid bureaucratic battles. President Carter included the State Department in negotiating the normalization agreement with the PRC. President Carter, however, had the power to choose the players. According to Holbrooke, the East Asia and Pacific Affairs division of the State Department was the center of the normalization negotiations. Holbrooke accepted the position of assistant secretary of state for East Asia and Pacific Affairs

18. Interview with Richard Holbrooke, 4 June 1982. Washington, D.C. Brzezinski, however, pointed out in an interview that President Carter did not need to be convinced by him. Carter was the one who decided to announce the normalization as early as possible in order to prevent leaks. 21 February 1986. Washington, D.C.
after President Carter and Secretary of State Vance agreed to put China back into his bureau. Participation of Holbrooke's bureau and Secretary of State Vance in the normalization negotiations did not imply involvement of the whole State Department. As a matter of fact, in the State Department, Vance, Holbrooke, and Warren Christopher, the Deputy Secretary of State, were the only officials who knew of the negotiations. The Policy Planning Division of the State Department, for example, was cut out of the decision making on normalization per Secretary of State Vance's personal instruction.

In the Defense Department, Secretary of Defense Brown was the only person who participated in the negotiations. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Commerce Department, the CIA, the Treasury Department, and the Justice Department did not know anything about the normalization decision making.

The most complicated aspect of the normalization issue was the legislation—the so-called Taiwan Relations Legislation Act. President Carter had considered letting the Justice Department do the drafting of the Taiwan Relations Act, but decided against it for fear of leaks. Instead, President Carter had a separate team of lawyers, completely separated from the negotiation team, work on the legislation issue. These lawyers were not knowledgeable about the negotiations.

Each department was asked to submit a policy study and formal

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20. Ibid. Ambassador Harvey Feldman, however, had a different opinion. Feldman indicated in a personal letter to the author, dated January 4, 1984, that "I think Holbrooke is covering his tail—and maybe Vance's too—because that was his (and Vance's) instruction from Carter. In point of fact, others knew as well: Roger Sullivan, who was then Deputy Assistant Secretary in East Asian Bureau; Harry Thayer, the Country Director for PRC Affairs; and to a degree (though less than the others) I also. Herb Hansell, the Legal Adviser, was consulted from time to time. Donald Anderson, Thayer's deputy, had a general idea. In Beijing, J. Stapleton Roy, the Deputy Chief of Mission, was fully involved.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid. Ambassador Feldman did not agree with Holbrooke's view. Feldman pointed out in a personal letter to the author, dated January 4, 1984, that "as far as I am aware (and granted, I do not claim to know everything that was going on), the only lawyers working on normalization issues were: Herb Hansell, the Legal Adviser, who, together with me consulted in secret with former Attorney General Herbert Brownell; Jim Michel, who occasionally was asked by Hansell to write a paper on a specific subject; Steve Orlins, who occasionally was asked by me to write on a specific legal subject. At normalization, work was begun on a crash basis by teams of lawyers in the Legal Division of the State Department, consulting with other agencies of government as necessary. Jim Michel began drafting the Taiwan Relations Act with help from Steve Orlins, from the then Assistant Secretary of State for Administration, John Thomas, and from me. A group of lawyers under Assistant Legal Adviser Lee Marks began working on topics like Ex-Import loans,
statement on the normalization issue to the White House. But once their views were presented to the White House, they were cut out of the decision-making process. Congress also was deliberately cut out of the negotiation process by President Carter.

The opening of China in 1971 was made possible because President Nixon successfully kept the initiative secret and bypassed the potentially most troublesome department—the State Department. President Carter used the same strategy. The inner group was small and the whole negotiation process was kept secret.

In brief, the normalization process from 1969 to 1978 provided an illuminating case study that demonstrated the importance of presidential preferences. President Nixon initiated and implemented the opening of the new China policy through backchannels. During Nixon's trip to China in 1972, Nixon and Kissinger dominated the negotiations of the Shanghai Communique. In 1973, once again, President Nixon and Kissinger responded to Chinese subtle suggestions and moved toward establishment of the liaison offices. From 1974 to 1977, Presidents Nixon, Ford, and Carter separately came to the same decision to delay normalization for domestic and international considerations.

Three conclusions emerge. First, presidential preferences were of overriding importance in explaining the timing and terms of the normalization decision. The president had the power to select players and action channels, thus manipulating the bureaucratic politics game. Second, the bureaucratic politics model is of only limited use in explaining the normalization decision making. The normalization decision-making processes are better explained by the workings of like-minded players than by the bureaucratic politics perspective. The governmental departments, however, had contributed to the normalization decision making by providing critical background information in their policy review studies. Implementation is another area in which the bureaucratic politics factor may have its imprint on policy. On the normalization issue, the importance of implementation ranked second only to the decision itself. Once the U.S. government announced the normalization agreement, poor implementation of the agreement by any responsible department would not change the fact that the United States had already recognized the PRC and severed diplomatic relations with the Republic of China in Taiwan. The U.S. Congress, however, was more germane to the successful implementa-

IAEA inspections, treaty obligations, etc. But I want to emphasize that no practical legal work, and no legislative drafting, was done prior to the December 15 announcement.”

26. Ibid.
tion of the normalization agreement. Both the appointment of the U.S. ambassador to the PRC and enactment of the Taiwan Relations Act, for example, required the approval of Congress.

Third, the assumption of "where you stand depends on where you sit" explains some of the department's stand, but it does not help illuminate the timing and the terms of the normalization agreement. The Joint Chiefs of Staff's stand on obtaining a firm commitment from the PRC not to use force against Taiwan could be explained from the perspective of the military branch's parochial and dominant concern—keeping military bases and commitments. A firm commitment from Beijing on the Taiwan issue would secure Taiwan as a military base from falling into the hands of a communist country. If Taiwan's security was not in danger, the charges against the U.S. decision to terminate the defense treaty with Taiwan could also be lessened. In the early years of the Nixon administration, the State Department was reluctant to cooperate with the White House on the new China policy because of the diplomatic consequences of the China initiative. Secretary of State Vance's preference for the timing of the normalization announcement—after the final round of negotiations on SALT II—could also be explained from this perspective.

Some of the characteristics of bureaucratic behavior, such as inertia, preference for the status quo, lack of innovation, and incremental changes, also help us understand why major policy shifts, such as the new China policy, are initiated from the top level of the government rather than from the lower level of bureaus. The personal power struggle and bureaucratic rivalry between the State Department and the National Security Council (Rogers vs. Kissinger and Vance vs. Brzezinski) enriches analysis of normalization decision making. Bureaucratic rivalry, however, was not a determining factor in influencing the outcome of the normalization decision making. Presidential preference is the most important explanation of the normalization issue. The bureaucratic politics model can be seen as a supplementary element in the analysis of the normalization case.

In a negative and paradoxical sense, however, the influence of the bureaucratic politics model in the normalization decision making was not insignificant. Just as no decision is one kind of a decision, so also was the absence of bureaucratic politics (avoidance of bureaucratic participation and rivalry) tantamount to a kind of bureaucratic politics game. The very fact that Nixon, Kissinger, Carter, Brzezinski, and Vance were successful in cutting out all other governmental actors and units from the process points to the significant influence of bureaucratic politics. Otherwise, Nixon and Carter would not have bothered
to maintain such extraordinary secrecy.  

Domestic politics must be considered as still another factor that affected the pace of normalization decision making. One example can demonstrate this point. Secretary of State Vance's visit to China in August 1977 came after the Panama Canal Treaties were concluded. National Security Adviser Brzezinski's trip to Beijing in May came right after the Panama Canal Treaties were ratified by the Senate. President Carter did not want to take up two controversial foreign policy issues at the same time, which was the main reason the normalization decision was delayed until the final settlement of the Panama Canal Treaties. The impact of domestic politics on the normalization issue is the main focus of analysis of the next chapter.

5

THE DOMESTIC POLITICS MODEL
No analysis of the normalization decision making would be complete without considering the domestic politics factors. By the late 1960s, the emotional debate on “who lost China” had subsided. But whether the United States should normalize relations with the PRC was still a controversial domestic issue. There was, however, no strong domestic movement to reconsider the old containment policy toward the PRC. In 1970, the U.S. Congress still publicly opposed the seating of the PRC in the United Nations and supported the continuing seating of the Republic of China. Public opinion and congressional attitudes changed significantly after President Nixon’s trip to China in 1972. The main purpose of this chapter is to examine the extent to which the domestic politics factors—public opinion, Congress, presidential election, and interest groups—affect the timing and terms of the normalization decision.

THE ROLE OF PUBLIC OPINION
The main problem of using public opinion as a guide for policy makers is that the vast majority of Americans are either ill-informed or apathetic about foreign affairs. Public opinion on foreign policy issues tends to be unstable, acquiescent, and manipulable (Kegley and Wittkopf, 1982:270-93). As a consequence, the American public looks to the president for cues. Various data indicate that American public opinion is inclined to be permissive and supportive of presidential decisions in foreign affairs (Spanier and Uslaner, 1978:92-93; Almond, 1960:29-68).

Shifts of American public attitudes toward the PRC provides an illuminating example of the volatility of public opinion. There have been significant changes in public opinion toward Beijing since 1949. In December 1950, a poll indicated that 81 percent of respondents blamed the Soviet Union for Chinese intervention in the Korean War. Only 5 percent of the people polled believed that the PRC had acted on its own initiative (Oksenberg and Oxnam, 1978:78). The PRC was perceived a Soviet puppet. But as the war advanced, American hostil-
ity toward the PRC increased. The American image of an aggressive and expansionist China was further reinforced by the Formosa Strait crisis in 1958 and the Sino-Indian War in 1962.

In the 1950s, the American public supported the government’s policy of nonrecognition (see table 2). The American public also opposed seating the PRC in the United Nations throughout the 1950s and 1960s (see table 3). In 1967, during the Cultural Revolution and the Vietnam War, a Gallup poll indicated that 71 percent of the American public thought China a greater threat to world peace than the Soviet Union (20 percent saw Russia as the greater threat; 9 percent were undecided).

Table 2

U.S. Attitudes Toward Dealing With Communist China*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Favorable</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unfavorable</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Opinion</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
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<tr>
<td>No Answer</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>—</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Meanwhile, the American public began to show interest in improving relations with the PRC in the 1960s. In 1961, 53 percent favored taking steps to improve relations with China with only 32 percent against it. Forty-seven percent of the American public favored establishment of trade relations with the PRC (35 percent opposed it) (Oksenberg and Oxnam, 1978:81). A national survey of American opinion on U.S. policy toward the PRC, conducted in May and June 1964, also showed that a large majority of those polled (73 percent) favored following presidential leadership in improving relations with the PRC, such as easing trade restrictions (Steele, 1966:277, 281-82).

In October 1966, a Gallup poll of an elite group, whose members appeared in Who's Who, revealed that 64 percent favored admitting the PRC to the United Nations and only 32 percent opposed it, although a poll of the mass public still showed that a majority of Americans still opposed admission of the PRC to the United Nations (56 percent to 25 percent) (Oksenberg and Oxnam, 1978:81). In May 1971, five months before the PRC was admitted to the United Nations,
Table 3
Admittance of the PRC as a Member of the United Nations*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Should</th>
<th>Should Not</th>
<th>No Opinion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1954</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 1954</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 1961</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 1964</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr. 1966</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 1969</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 1970</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1971</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Surveys were conducted by American Institute for Public Opinion: Do you think that Communist China should or should not be admitted as a member of the United Nations? Data source: Public Opinion Quarterly, 44, No. 2 (Summer 1980): 270. Technically, the question before the UN was not the admission of the PRC as a UN member, but rather what government (PRC or ROC?) should be seated as the representative of China—a charter member state of the UN.

the American public, for the first time, shifted to favor admission of Beijing in the United Nations (see table 3).

On the issue of recognition of the PRC, American public opinion supported the extension of diplomatic ties with Beijing even before President Nixon's trip to China (see table 4). A majority of the American public, however, did not favor establishing full diplomatic relations with the PRC at the cost of severing diplomatic ties with Taiwan. Public polls indicated that the overwhelming majority of Americans favored continuing diplomatic relations with Taiwan. But the American public was reluctant to provide military aid to Taiwan if attacked by the PRC (see table 5).

The American public's knowledge about China, however, was limited. In April 1977, a survey by the Gallup organization for the Potomac Associates revealed that 56 percent of individuals questioned were not sure whether the government in Taiwan was communist (Kau, 1978:138). One-third of the respondents did not even know
## Table 4

Diplomatic Ties with the PRC and Taiwan (ROC)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Establish Ties with PRC</th>
<th>Continue Ties with Taiwan</th>
<th>Derecognize Taiwan in Favor of Normalization with PRC</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes %</td>
<td>No %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977 (April)</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977 (August)</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979 (January)</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*It should be noted that the wording of the questions asked was not identical, but the contents are roughly comparable. Data from the Foreign Policy Association polls are based on ballots cast by its study groups across the nation. The Potomac Associates poll was conducted by the Gallup Organization. The “no opinion” responses are not shown here, but obviously amount to the remaining percentage of respondents in each case. Data source: from Michael Y. M. Kau et al., “Public Opinion and Our China Policy,” *Asian Affairs* 5, no. 3, (January-February 1978): 136 and Connie De Boer, “The Polls: Changing Attitudes and Policies Toward China,” *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 44, no. 2, (Summer 1980): 271.
Table 5
Provide Military Aid to Taiwan if Attacked*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Yes %</th>
<th>No %</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>Potomac Associates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>Harris</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>Harris</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975 (April)</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>Gallup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975 (October)</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>Gallup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977 (April)</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>Foreign Policy Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>1977 (April)</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>Potomac Associates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>Potomac Associates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>Potomac Associates</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


whether "mainland China" had a communist government. The substantial ignorance or misinformation of the American public suggested that the president had much freedom to set his policy direction and to shape public opinion on the issue of normalization of relations with China. For example, the American public image of the PRC had significantly improved since President Nixon's new China policy. In the fall of 1971, 56 percent of the Americans polled thought China its greatest threat, while 27 percent believed the Soviet Union as its greatest danger (Solomon, 1978:329). In 1976, the American public treated China and the Soviet Union just about the same; a Gallup poll revealed that 21 percent had favorable views of China while 20 percent viewed the Soviet Union favorably (Solomon, 1978:329). American favorable views of China jumped from 26 percent in 1977 to 65 percent in 1979, after the full normalization of relations with China (see table 6).

In July and August 1977, just before Vance's trip to China, a survey of "opinion elites" was conducted by a research team at Brown University. Questionnaires were sent to 1,800 elites, including all

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Table 6
Scalometer Ratings of China (PRC) and Taiwan (ROC)*

| Date | China (PRC) | | Taiwan (ROC) | |
|------|-------------|------|---------------|--|------|------|
|      | Favorable   | %    | Favorable     | %  | Unfavorable | %    |
| 1967 | 5           | 91   | 53            | 38 |
| 1972 | 23          | 71   | 48            | 39 |
| 1973 | 49          | 43   | 55            | 34 |
| 1975 | 28          | 58   | 48            | 39 |
| 1976 | 20          | 73   | 55            | 34 |
| 1977 | 26          | 52   | 56            | 18 |
| 1979 | 65          | 25   | 64            | 20 |

* All data taken from Gallup polls. The 1975 poll was conducted by the Gallup Organization for the Chinese Information Service, and the 1977 and 1979 polls for Potomac Associates. The "no opinion" responses are not shown here, but obviously amount to the remaining percentage of respondents in each case. Data Source: Kau, "Public Opinion and Our China Policy," p. 135 and Sneider and Watts, The United States and Korea: New Directions for the '80s, p. 18.

members of the U.S. Congress, members of Democratic and Republican National Committees, State governors, State legislative leaders, State Chairmen of both Democratic and Republican Parties, publishers and editors of major newspapers, and executive officers and news directors of major television stations. Forty-one percent of the elites responded. While endorsing the principle of normalization, the survey revealed that nearly nine out of ten opinion leaders were opposed to normalization of relations with the PRC under Beijing's three conditions (see table 7). Fifty-five percent of the respondents favored continuation of diplomatic relations with Taiwan after normalization of relations between the PRC and the United States. While 40 percent of opinion elites favored maintaining U.S. security commitments and military presence in Taiwan after normalization, 58 percent wished to reduce the security commitments to the island (see table 8).

In brief, the mass public and elite opinion polls in the 1970s all indicated that the American public's distrust of Beijing had significantly diminished after President Nixon's China initiative. A majority of Americans favored negotiation with, rather than confrontation toward, the PRC. Full normalization of diplomatic relations with the Chinese Communists had become well supported by the American people. The only reservation was that a majority of American people
Table 7
Brown University Survey of Opinion Leaders’ Attitudes toward U.S.-China Normalization and Taiwan*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Favor %</th>
<th>Oppose %</th>
<th>No Opinion %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Accept the PRC’s “three demands” as the precondition for normalization.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Pursue normalization without jeopardizing the “independence and freedom” of Taiwan.</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Continue to honor our diplomatic ties and defense treaty with Taiwan if it declares independence.</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Taiwan can survive the PRC’s economic and military pressure without outside aid.</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Unilateral U.S. disengagement from Taiwan would hurt our leadership and credibility in Asia.</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. U.S. derecognition and disengagement from Taiwan may prompt Taiwan to seek Soviet aid and/or develop nuclear weapons.</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


did not want to normalize relations with the PRC at the expense of Taiwan-American relations.

THE ROLE OF CONGRESS

In 1971, Roger Hilsman described the power of Congress in foreign affairs as a “negative, limit-setting power—the power of deterrence and the threat of retaliation” (Hilsman, 1971:83). The role of Congress in the making of foreign policy underwent some significant changes in the 1970s. In the wake of the Vietnam war and Watergate, Congress no longer felt content to continue the passive role it had played in foreign affairs since World War II. Charles Kegley and Eugene Wittkopf summarized the following actions to show growing congressional assertiveness in foreign affairs, as follows:

- In 1970 Congress “repealed” the Gulf of Tonkin Resolu-
Table 8
Brown University Survey on Minimum Policy Options that the United States Should Take*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy Options</th>
<th>Choice %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Diplomatic Representation in Taiwan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Maintain the present embassy.</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Reduce representation to a liaison office.</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Reduce representation to a consular office.</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Reduce representation to an &quot;unofficial&quot; office.</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. No opinion.</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Military Ties with Taiwan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Maintain current security commitments and military presence.</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Reduce commitments to formal security guarantees and provide military aid.</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Reduce commitments to informal security assurances and provide arms sales.</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Reduce commitments to arms sales only.</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. No opinion.</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Treaty Relations with Taiwan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Maintain all treaties (military, economic, and cultural) currently in force.</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Reduce relations to economic and cultural treaties only (concerning loans, nuclear fuel, investment guarantees, most-favored-nation tariff status, and so forth).</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Reduce relations to selective economic and cultural agreements.</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Reduce relations to trade relations only, with no special or preferential arrangements.</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. No opinion.</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


...tion, which had given President Johnson, as interpreted by him, a "blank check" for prosecuting an undeclared war in Southeast Asia.

- In 1973 Congress overrode President Nixon's veto to write the War Powers Act into law, thus requiring a modicum of consultation between the president and Congress on the issue of dispatching troops abroad.
- In 1974 Congress embargoed arms sales to Turkey in retaliation for its invasion of Cyprus, despite the protests of the Ford administration.
- In 1974 Congress refused to permit the president to extend "most-favored-nation" (MFN) trade treatment to
the Soviet Union by linking MFN to emigration of Soviet Jews.

- In 1975 Congress ensured termination of American participation in the Vietnam war by denying the president authority to provide emergency military aid to the South Vietnamese government to forestall its imminent collapse in the face of communist forces.
- In 1976 Congress prohibited continued expenditures by the CIA to bolster anti-Marxist forces fighting in Angola.
- In 1976, fully 20 years after the proposal was first introduced, the Senate established a permanent intelligence oversight committee to monitor the sprawling intelligence community; the House followed suit a year later.
- In 1980 Congress passed legislation designed to establish its right to prior notice by the executive branch of covert intelligence activities abroad (Kegley and Wittkopf, 1982:394).

The power of Congress in foreign policy decision making, however, is still limited. Congress is poorly equipped to compete effectively with the executive branch in exercising direct control of, or in taking initiatives in, foreign affairs. Congressional weaknesses most often mentioned in making foreign policy were parochialism, lack of expertise, and organizational weaknesses (Kegley and Wittkopf, 1982:403-12).²

Congressional preoccupation with biennial elections made Congress more interested in domestic rather than foreign policies. Former Senator William Fulbright had the following observation:

With their excessively parochial orientation, congressmen are acutely sensitive to the influence of private pressure and the excesses and inadequacies of a public opinion that is all too often ignorant of the needs, the dangers, and the opportunities in our foreign relations (Kegley and Wittkopf:1982:403-04).

Congress is also poorly equipped in terms of technical expertise and intelligence information to conduct foreign affairs. The decentralization of power and responsibility within Congress and the overload of

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² Aside from congressional weaknesses in the conduct of foreign affairs, it should be noted that constitutionally the president alone in external affairs has the power to speak and listen as a representative of the nation, and, moreover, only the presidency has the very delicate and exclusive power as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation, 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
work by most representatives and senators further prevented Congress from taking a leadership role in foreign affairs.

In this connection, it is not difficult to explain why the China initiative of the early 1970s came from the executive branch rather than from Congress. Congress, on the other hand, played a role of advice, consent, modification, restraint, and rejection, which also had an important impact on the process of the normalization of relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China.

The Initiator-Respondent Role

Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, Congress supported the containment and isolation policy toward the PRC. Congress ratified the Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of China in 1954 and the Formosa Resolution in 1955. Congress also backed the administration's policy of nonrecognition of the PRC and opposed the admission of Beijing to the United Nations. The old proposition that "the President proposes, Congress disposes" quite accurately described the relationship between the executive and the legislative branches on the China question.

In the 1950s, new policy proposals toward Beijing made by some congressional representatives usually ended with no substantial results. For example, a few senators in 1957 advocated changing the nonrecognition policy toward Beijing. On 18 February 1957, Senator Theodore F. Green, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, suggested that the United States "should recognize Red China sooner or later" (Congressional Quarterly, 1980:28). In June 1957, Senator William Fulbright, second ranking majority member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said that recognition of Red China by the United States was inevitable in the course of time; the only question was "when and how you do it" (Congressional Quarterly, 1980:28). The Quemoy crisis of 1958, however, put an end to the rising sentiment in Congress for a revision in U.S. policy toward the PRC.

In the mid-1960s, Congress began a series of debates over Vietnam and U.S. policy toward the PRC. Concerned about China's reaction to growing American military involvement in Vietnam, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee started a three-week hearing on U.S. policy toward China on 8 March 1966. Leading China scholars and experts were invited to give their thoughts on how to deal with the China issue. Professor A. Doak Barnett of Columbia University suggested that "rigid dogmatism cannot point the way toward sound poli-
cies."

The majority of witnesses proposed a more flexible policy toward China, such as an expansion of trade relations, admission of the PRC into the United Nations, and recognition of the PRC by the United States.

On 19 May 1966, the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Far East and Pacific released a hearing report on U.S. policy toward Asia. The report suggested that the United States should prevent Beijing from engaging in expansion in Asia. Meanwhile, the United States should also continue to seek peaceful contacts with China (Congressional Quarterly, 1980:33).

Congressional interest in China was renewed at the end of the 1960s. On 10 March 1969, Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield urged the United States to put an end to special travel restrictions toward China. Mansfield also suggested that trade with China in non-strategic goods should be put on the same basis as U.S. trade with other communist nations (Congressional Quarterly, 1980:36). Senator Edward Kennedy further advocated that the United States should establish consular relations with Communist China and should support the admission of Beijing to the United Nations. Kennedy also stated that these steps should be taken without jeopardizing U.S. relations with Taiwan (Congressional Quarterly, 1980:36).

In September 1969, by a 77-3 roll-call vote, the Senate passed a resolution (S. Res. 205) which declared that U.S. recognition of a foreign government did not “of itself imply that the U.S. approves of the form, ideology or policy of that foreign government” (Congressional Quarterly, 1980:36). Senator Thomas J. Dodd, who voted against passage, said, “if the resolution is not intended to clear the way for the recognition of Communist China . . . then it is difficult to understand the motivation behind it. . . .” (Congressional Quarterly, 1980:36).

A hearing report, published in July 1970 by the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on U.S. Commitments Abroad, revealed that U.S. policy toward Taiwan was in a period of transition. Administration witnesses disclosed that U.S. military assistance was being phased out (Congressional Quarterly, 1980:36). Meanwhile, most of the China experts, who testified before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs in the fall of 1970 and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in June 1971 and July, had urged a normaliza-

4. For details, see ibid.
tion of relations with the PRC.  

In the early 1970s, congressional support for U.S. commitment toward the Republic of China in Taiwan was firm. There was, however, a rising desire from Congress to revise the U.S. containment and isolation policy toward Beijing. Congress had supported President Nixon's policy to ease the trade embargo and travel restrictions to China. Congress also welcomed President Nixon's decision to visit China. In 1971, for the first time in 20 years, Congress failed to go on record against Beijing's admission to the United Nations. Senator Strom Thurmond stated in a news conference that, although he still supported nonadmission of the PRC to the United Nations, he was not sure that "the majority of Congress would oppose the seating of Communist China in the United Nations this year" (Congressional Quarterly, 1980:37).

There was, however, strong opposition in Congress against the expulsion of Taiwan from the United Nations. Immediately after the General Assembly's decision to expel Nationalist China from the United Nations on 25 October 1971, some members of Congress proposed a reduction in U.S. financial support of the United Nations. Senator Barry Goldwater even suggested that the United States should withdraw from the United Nations (Congressional Quarterly, 1980:37).

In 1971, the Nixon administration had urged the Senate to repeal the Formosa Resolution. The Senate failed to act on it because the debate on the repeal took place right after the expulsion of Taiwan from the United Nations. After repeated attempts, Congress, on 11 October 1974, finally repealed the January 1955 Formosa Resolution, which had given the president the power to intervene in the Taiwan Strait in order to defend Taiwan. The administration wanted Congress to repeal this resolution as part of the effort to normalize relations with the PRC (Congressional Quarterly, 1980:215). After the opening of the China door, Congress had also been supportive of the administration's policies of gradual withdrawal of American troops from Taiwan, less military aid to the government in Taiwan, and rapprochement with the PRC.

In brief, at one level of analysis, the term "initiator-respondent" was rather accurate in describing the executive-congressional relationship on the China issue. Bipartisan support on the China issue had

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temporarily disappeared during 1949-1959 over the emotional debate of the “who-lost-China” question. Republicans in Congress blamed the Truman administration for betraying the Nationalist Government to the Chinese Communists. Both Republican and Democratic members in Congress, however, gave their support to President Truman’s policy to send the 7th Fleet to the Taiwan Strait to prevent any attack on Taiwan by the PRC. Subsequently, U.S. policy toward China during the Eisenhower years had bipartisan cooperation. In the mid-1960s, those members in Congress who advocated a policy of “containment without isolation” toward Beijing were mainly Democrats, with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee as a base (Congressional Quarterly, 1980:25). Although there had been many arguments in Congress in favor of easing tensions with the PRC, there was no serious effort in Congress to push the administration to change U.S. policy toward Beijing. A.T. Steele in 1966 offered the following explanation for the passive congressional actions toward the China issue:

There are many reasons, but several stand out: first, a kind of congressional paralysis, based on the assumption that any suggestion of change would provoke a hostile public reaction; second, the reluctance of the administration and of influential private groups to take the initiative in encouraging a new look at the China situation; third, the quite evident conviction of a large sector of Congress that our present policy is right and offers the only acceptable choice under existing circumstances (Steele, 1966:205).

The Restraining Role

The executive branch was the main initiator of the new China policy in the early years of the Nixon administration. Congress responded favorably toward Sino-American rapprochement, but not at the expense of Taiwan’s security. Facing a strong congressional and domestic political opposition toward normalization with the PRC at the expense of Taiwan, President Nixon was particularly cautious during the drafting of the Shanghai Communique to avoid any charge that Sino-American rapprochement was achieved by abandoning Taiwan. President Nixon even used domestic political reasons to convince the Chinese of “the necessity of exercising moderation” on the Chinese claim to Taiwan during the negotiation of the Shanghai Communique (Nixon, 1979, v.2:40). Since the Nixon administration was not able to make further concessions to the PRC on the Taiwan issue, there was no possibility of establishing full diplomatic relations with the PRC during President Nixon’s visit to China in 1972.
In July 1978, the American Conservative Union (ACU) conducted a poll of members of the House of Representatives on the normalization question. Each congressional office was asked the following question: “Would you support normalization of relations with the People’s Republic of China if it meant that the United States would have to sever full diplomatic ties with [the] Republic of China and abrogate our Mutual Defense pact with that country?” Of the 435 members of the House of Representatives and four delegates that ACU reached, 211 stated their opposition to normalization on Beijing’s terms. Another 34 members said they were “leaning against” normalization on such terms. Only six congressmen stated that they were either in favor, or were “leaning in favor.” One hundred eighty Congressmen either made no response or were undecided, and eight members refused to answer the poll (American Conservative News, 29 July 1978; Rowe, 1979:89).

The result of the poll clearly indicated that only a small number of congressmen favored normalization on Beijing’s three conditions. In the summer of 1978, both the House and the Senate adopted a resolution that called on the president to consult with Congress before making any policy changes affecting the continuation of the defense treaty with Taiwan. The unanimous passage (94-0) of Dole-Stone Amendment by the Senate further indicated congressional concerns about its role in the process of the normalization of relations between Washington and Beijing.

Congressional debates on the issue of normalization took place within the forum of congressional hearings, study reports, and individual congressmen’s comments. In late 1975 and the first half of 1976, the House Subcommittee on Future Foreign Policy Research and Development conducted a series of nine hearings to explore and reappraise Sino-American relations within the context of triangular relationships among Beijing, Washington, and Moscow. At the same time, the House International Relations Committee held a series of hearings to review and assess the prospects for normalization with the PRC. Witnesses in those hearings offered a wide divergence of views on triangular relations and normalization terms.

On the issue of normalization, several conclusions emerged from these hearings. First, it was in the U.S. national interest to normalize

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relations with the PRC. Second, the process of normalization of relations with Beijing would necessarily involve a downgrading of the U.S. relationship with Taiwan, although it was not clear what that deescalation should encompass. Third, the Taiwan issue was the core problem preventing a full normalization of relations and its importance should not be underestimated.7

The most prominent member in Congress to urge normalization with the PRC was Senator Edward Kennedy. Senator Kennedy believed that Sino-American normalization of relations would contribute to Taiwan’s security. Kennedy did not think U.S. interests would be damaged by accepting Beijing’s three demands. On 15 August 1977, the eve of Secretary of State Vance’s trip to China, Senator Kennedy stated that the Carter administration should speed up the normalization process. Kennedy warned that further delay might bring more difficulties on normalization negotiations and might also increase the possibility of Sino-Soviet rapprochement (Chan and Reardon-Anderson, 1978:67-68).

Kennedy’s view on normalization was not widely shared among members of Congress. Among those who spoke out against normalization under Beijing’s three conditions were Republican Senators Barry Goldwater, Robert Dole, Howard Baker, and Jacob Javits, and Representative Philip N. Crane. Besides these conservative Republicans, some influential Democratic congressmen were also against Beijing’s terms for normalization: Senator John Sparkman, and Representatives Clement J. Zablocki, Samuel Stratton, and Lester L. Wolff. Senator Goldwater repeatedly warned the president of the risk of impeachment if the president unilaterally terminated the defense treaty with Taiwan.

In brief, while supporting the goal of normalization with the PRC, the majority of congressional representatives were against normalization under Beijing’s terms. Congress wanted to see more security guarantees for Taiwan. Some members of Congress, such as Ohio Representative John Ashbrook, recommended the “German Formula” for normalization.8 Idaho Representative George Hansen, and Wisconsin Representative Clement J. Zablocki, Chairman of the House Committee on International Relations, preferred the “Independent Taiwan” formula as a solution for the Taiwan question.9

9. Cited from U.S. Congress, House, United States-Soviet Union-China: The Great Power Triangle, part I. See also the statement of George Hansen in U.S. Congress, House
Senator Kennedy supported the Japanese formula for normalization.

Congressional reluctance to accept Beijing's conditions for normalization had been a restraining factor in delaying the administration's move toward normalization, especially when the administration's domestic political position was weakened, such as during the Watergate scandal and the withdrawal from Vietnam. A weak administration would be more vulnerable to congressional pressure for fear that congressional opposition on one issue might extend to other issues of foreign or domestic affairs. This was why President Nixon was unable to move toward normalization with the PRC during the investigation of the Watergate scandal. President Ford was also in a poor position to deal with normalization after U.S. failure in Vietnam and during the presidential election.

Hilsman was correct in describing that the role of Congress in foreign policy was almost never direct or initiative-taking (Hilsman, 1971:78). Congress, however, is quite capable of influencing the outcome of foreign policy indirectly. The case of Sino-American normalization of relations was a good example. The president had the power to make the decision to normalize relations with Beijing any time before 1978. But in view of the unfavorable domestic and international environment, the executive branch chose to delay the normalization decision. Were there no strong congressional opposition to Beijing's terms, full diplomatic relations between Washington and Beijing might have been established long before 1978 or even during President Nixon's 1972 trip to China.

Another indirect congressional influence on the timing of the normalization decision consisted of congressional debates on the passage of the Panama Canal Treaties in 1977-1978. In the summer of 1977, negotiations on the Panama Canal Treaties ended. The treaties were signed by President Carter and General Torrijos on 7 September 1977. The Senate finally approved the Panama Canal Treaties on 16 March and 18 April 1978. It was the second longest treaty debate in the history of the Senate. Jimmy Carter revealed in his memoirs, Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Taiwan Legislation* hearings, 96th Congress, 1st session, February 7-8, 1979:92-104, 108.

10. One treaty was called the Panama Canal Treaty, the other the Treaty Concerning the Permanent Neutrality and Operation of the Panama Canal, cited in Cecil V. Crabb, Jr., and Pat M. Holt, *Invitation to Struggle* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1980:70).

11. The debate of the Panama Canal Treaties ran for a total of 38 legislative days, making it the longest treaty debate in U.S. history except for the debate on the Treaty of Versailles after World War I, cited from U.S. Congress, *Senate Debate on the Panama Canal Treaties: A Compendium of Major Statements, Documents, Record Votes and Relevant Events*, prepared for the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate by
Keeping Faith, that the fight over the passage of the Panama Canal Treaties was "the most difficult political battle I had ever faced, including my long campaign for President" (Carter, 1982:152).

The Carter administration did not want to risk taking on two controversial issues at the same time. "We can't give away the Panama Canal and then in the next breath abandon a commitment to a long-standing ally," a State Department official said in August 1977 (Wallach, 1977:A5). Michel Oksenberg, a member of Carter's China team, revealed in detail that Secretary of State Vance's trip to China in August 1977 could have led to serious negotiations on normalization had there been no domestic obstacle over the passage of the Panama Canal Treaties:

In a July 30 (1977) meeting, when giving Vance instructions for his August China trip, the President said, "Cy, lay it all out on the line, I've never gained from procrastinating. Describe our full position." Carter said that if the Chinese were prepared to accept his package, he was ready to normalize, but if they were unwilling, then so be it. He would go no further. In fact, so serious was the Vance mission that the Secretary carried with him a draft recognition communiqué which he was authorized to table and begin negotiating, should the Chinese react favorably to his presentation.

Between the July 30 meeting and Vance's late August trip, however, a major political development intruded on the landscape: the growing recognition of the battle looming ahead to secure Senate approval of the Panama Canal Treaties. The President's earlier willingness to absorb the recognition was tempered by his desire not to jeopardize a single possible vote on the Treaties. As a result, Vance built some room for maneuver into his earlier, leaner presentation. Specifically, he indicated a preference, in the post-normalization period, for the United States to assign some governmental


12. For more detailed analysis of the battle over the passage of the Panama Canal Treaties by Jimmy Carter, see Carter (1982:152-83).

13. According to Michel Oksenberg, President Carter's package for normalization was made in June 1977. The U.S. conditions for normalization were: "first, that normalization would not prevent the United States from selling arms to Taiwan; second, that the American people could continue, unimpaired, unofficial cultural, economic, and other relations with the people of Taiwan; and third, that at the time of normalization the United States could make a unilateral, uncontested statement concerning its expectation that the Taiwan issue would be settled peacefully" (Oksenberg, 1982:182).
employees to the non-official entity which would represent the American people in Taiwan (Oksenberg, 1982:182).

It was under this portion of Vance’s presentation that Vice Premier Teng commented that Vance’s position on normalization was a retrogression from President Ford’s. Holbrooke stated in an interview that the Carter administration knew that the PRC would not agree to switch embassy and liaison offices between Taipei and Beijing, but the Carter administration needed time. President Carter needed time to resolve the Panama Canal Treaties.

The timing of Brzezinski’s trip to China was also influenced by the Panama Canal issue. This trip was initiated by the PRC (Oksenberg, 1982: 183). The Chinese were interested not only in Brzezinski’s tougher views toward the Soviet Union but also in creating bureaucratic rivalry between the National Security Council and the State Department (Oksenberg, 1982:183). Oksenberg described how the timing of the decision of Brzezinski’s visit to China was made:

One day after the Administration won the vote on the first treaty, the Chinese were informed of Brzezinski’s desire to accept the invitation they had extended in the winter, and the precise date for his visit was set on the day following the vote on the second treaty (Oksenberg, 1982:184).

Congressional opposition to accepting Beijing’s terms for normalization explains in part why the Carter administration could not move toward normalization before the final approval of the Panama Canal Treaties by Congress. After the successful passage of the treaties by the Senate, President Carter gained confidence in dealing with Congress on controversial foreign affairs issues. The international and domestic environments in the spring of 1978 looked very favorable for moving toward full diplomatic relations with the PRC. The deterioration of Soviet-American relations concerning Soviet intervention in Africa and domestic Soviet human rights issues motivated the Carter administration to speed up the process of normalization. The cost of downgrading U.S.-Taiwan relations was justified in view of broader U.S. strategic benefits gained from closer relations with Beijing through normalization. Passage of the Panama Canal Treaties further cleared domestic obstacles.

Since Nixon’s 1972 trip to China, more and more members of Congress were invited to visit the PRC each year (see table 9). In 1972, only four members of Congress visited the PRC—Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield, Senate Minority Leader Hugh Scott,

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House Minority Leader Gerald Ford, and House Majority Leader Hale Boggs. By 1978, the number had grown to 65. Various trip reports have been produced. The majority of these trip reports recommended that the United States should establish diplomatic relations with the PRC as soon as possible. Most members of Congress who had visited the PRC also recommended that normalization with Beijing should be done in a way that would not jeopardize the peace and stability of Taiwan.

Once international and domestic political situations became favorable for normalization, the administration, having constitutional power to recognize foreign governments and states, saw no reason to delay further the negotiation of the normalization agreement. Congress was not consulted at all during the negotiation period. Holbrooke said that President Carter had deliberately kept Congress from participating in any of the negotiations on normalization. “Otherwise we could not have done it,” added Holbrooke.

The timing of the normalization announcement—15 December 1978—was deliberately chosen by President Carter. Congress was in


the midst of a three-month recess. Congressmen were caught unprepared and thus unable to mobilize an effective opposition to President Carter's China decision.

Table 9

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Members of Congress Who Visited the PRC, 1972-1978</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1972</strong></td>
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<td><strong>1973</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>1977</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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1978


Fear of leaks was the main reason why President Carter chose to bypass Congress on normalization negotiations despite the fact that Congress passed a resolution in the summer of 1978 that called for presidential consultation on the termination of the defense treaty with Taiwan. Senator John Glenn, Chairman of the Far East Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, stated that “calling a few of us in one hour before he [Carter] goes on television doesn’t seem like much consultation” (Gayner, 1979:334).
President Carter's confidence in winning the legal battle over the normalization issue was another reason the Carter administration ignored the congressional request for prior consultation on the termination of the defense treaty issue. President Carter's confidence came from two sources.

First, there was no single, undisputed, procedure in the Constitution that specified a congressional role in terminating a treaty. Senator Goldwater argued that “the Senate, being a partner with the President to the treaty-making authority, possesses a special interest and role in the method used by the United States for the termination of treaties.” Precedents could be cited for three principal alternatives for the president to terminate a treaty:

1. Congress may express its will that the President terminate a treaty to which the United States is a party;
2. The President acting in conjunction with the Senate may terminate a treaty;
3. The President acting alone may abrogate a treaty (Findley, 1978:8).

There has never been a court decision, however, to determine which one of these methods is the Constitutional method. Under U.S. practice, the Senate and House of Representatives have acted jointly in the enactment of legislation terminating over 40 treaties. The only defense treaty the United States has abrogated was by an act of Congress signed into law by the president. This occurred in 1798 when the United States terminated a series of treaties with France, including a Treaty of Alliance (Findley, 1978:8). Senator Goldwater, therefore, believed that the president could not unilaterally terminate or abrogate a treaty without the approval of both houses of Congress.

President Carter, however, did not agree. Article X of the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of China stated that either party could terminate the treaty with one year's notice. Since the Constitution is silent on which branch of government can terminate treaties, President Carter believed that the president had the authority to terminate the defense treaty with Taiwan with one year's notice without the approval of Congress.\(^\text{19}\)


\(^{18}\) Senate Concurrent Resolution 109, op. cit.

\(^{19}\) For more information see U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Treaty Termination hearings, 96th Congress, 1st session, 9-11 April 1979.
In October 1979, Federal District Judge Oliver Gasch reviewed Senator Goldwater's suit against President Carter's unilateral decision to terminate the defense treaty with Taiwan and ruled that President Carter had to get approval from two-thirds of the Senate or from a majority in each house of Congress in terminating the defense treaty. The White House appealed that decision before the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in November 1979. On 30 November 1979, the appellate court overturned the Gasch decision and upheld Carter's right to end the defense treaty without approval by Congress by a vote of 4-1 (Congressional Quarterly, 1980:40). On 13 December 1979, the Supreme Court denied Goldwater's appeal on the ground that the dispute between Goldwater and President Carter was a "political question" (Congressional Quarterly, 1980:42). President Carter's decision to terminate the defense treaty with Taiwan was thus prevailed.

Second, President Carter was confident in withholding criticism from conservative members in Congress because the majority of the members of Congress believed that normalization between Washington and Beijing would enhance American strategic interests. Congressional criticisms toward Carter's normalization announcement centered on President Carter's failure to consult with Congress on the termination of the defense treaty rather than on the decision to normalize diplomatic relations with the PRC. President Carter found that opposition toward his China decision was less than expected:

The serious opposition we had expected throughout our country and within Congress simply did not materialize. The press treatment was also favorable, expressing chagrin only at the fact that, without leaks, the media had been caught by surprise (Carter, 1982:200).

The executive branch retained the ultimate authority to make foreign policy decisions. Congress, on the other hand, has rarely played a direct or initiative role in the making of foreign policy.

THE ROLE OF INTEREST GROUPS

The so-called "China Lobby" was believed to be one of the most effective interest groups in the 1950s. The "China Lobby," originating in the 1940s and 1950s, was a loose alliance of organizations that supported the Chinese Nationalists and opposed the Communist regime in China. Among the pro-Nationalist lobbies were: The Committee of One Million, the American Legion, the Veterans of Foreign Wars, the executive council of the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), the American Conservative Union, the American Security Council, the Young Americans for
Freedom, and some other organizations (Congressional Quarterly, 1980:30; Steele, 1966:119). The Committee of One Million, formed in 1953, was the most notable group that for decades fought against admission of the PRC to the United Nations and U.S. recognition of the PRC.

The Committee of One Million had obtained considerable congressional support for its policy against the Chinese Communists. In August 1965, the Committee of One Million had attained 312 congressional signatures, representing a majority of both houses, on its declaration against policy change with regard to the PRC (Steele, 1966:122). Hilsman described the influence of the China Lobby as follows:

In a sense the China Lobby was not an interest group organized by general citizens to put pressure on Congress, but an interest group organized by one set of congressmen to put pressure both on other congressmen and on officials in the Executive branch, and especially the latter. For the principal leaders of the Committee of One Million were Congressman Walter H. Judd of Minnesota and Senator William F. Knowland of California. Both of these men were ardent supporters of Chiang and the Kuomintang and vehement opponents of the Chinese Communists, and they used the China Lobby to further their own views (Hilsman, 1971:71).

The influence of the Committee of One Million declined considerably in the mid-1960s because of the death and retirement of some key members. Only former Representative Walter H. Judd remained active. In 1966, the committee suffered further loss when some influential members resigned and others withdrew their support because of the committee's inflexible policy toward the PRC.

During the cold war period, most members of Congress were convinced that the general American public favored a tough line toward the PRC. The China Lobby had been effective against Beijing because it had the support of the executive, branch, the Congress, and the American public. The favorable international and domestic environments for the China Lobby gradually changed in the late 1960s. In the wake of new global balance-of-power situations after the Sino-Soviet border wars in 1969, many congressional members in the Committee of One Million became unwilling to support the rigid policy toward Beijing the committee had advocated for nearly two decades. President Nixon's sudden change of U.S. policy toward the PRC further triggered the decline of influence of the China Lobby.

The China Lobby was effective because its position and the off-
cial position of the government were the same (Spanier and Uslaner, 1978:86). When the Nixon administration changed its policy toward the PRC, the China Lobby, losing executive support, found itself powerless to battle against the new China policy.

On the eve of Nixon's China trip in 1972, the Committee of One Million reformed and changed its name to the Committee for a Free China. Walter Judd continued to serve as chairman. Among the founders of the new committee were seven representatives and two senators, Strom Thurmond (R-South Carolina) and Barry Goldwater. Later they were joined by Senators Jesse Helms (R-North Carolina), Gordon Humphrey (R-New Hampshire), Orrin Hatch (R-Utah), and Harry F. Byrd Jr. (D-Virginia) (Bachrack, 1979: A21).

Although the influence of the China Lobby had dwindled considerably since the change of U.S. China policy in the early 1970s, Congress and the American public were not ready to see Taiwan punished because of the Sino-American rapprochement. Conservative members in Congress had strongly opposed normalization of relations with Beijing at the expense of Taiwan. This is part of the reason why President Nixon could make no further concession on the Taiwan issue during his 1972 trip to China. The remaining influence of the China Lobby put a constraint on the administration toward Sino-American normalization of relations.

Bernard C. Cohen believed that interest groups rarely played a decisive role in foreign policy decision making (Cohen, 1959). Interest groups exerted a greater impact on foreign policy when their positions coincided with the administration's policy. The main cause of the seven-year delay of the normalization decision consisted of unfavorable domestic and international situations. The China Lobby, as part of the unfavorable domestic political ingredient, did play a role in delaying the normalization decision, but its power was overstated. During the Carter administration, the timing of the normalization decision was influenced by the Senate debate on the Panama Canal Treaties, whose major opponents were also supporters of the Committee for a Free China. It was no accident that President Carter decided not to take up the normalization issue while the Senate was still debating the passage of the Panama Canal Treaties. The China Lobby, therefore, contributed indirectly to the explanation of the timing of the normalization decision. After the successful passage of the Panama Canal Treaties, the China Lobby, having only limited sources of influence without support from the administration, could no longer stand alone to fight the battle against Sino-American normalization of relations.

President Nixon's new China policy in the early 1970s, on the other hand, had encouraged the reemergence of a new China Lobby—
the so-called “Red China Lobby.” Among those actively advocating recognition of the PRC were: the National Committee on United States-China Relations, Citizens to Change United States Policy, the National Council for United States-China Trade, and the Committee on Scholarly Communication With the People’s Republic of China.

The National Committee on United States-China Relations, a well-funded, pro-Beijing organization established in 1966, was the best organized. Charles Yost, former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, succeeded W. Michael Blumenthal—the Secretary of Treasury during the Carter administration—to head the organization in 1975. From 1966 to 1969, the committee brought the question of U.S.-China relations to the attention of thousands of Americans through 130 seminars and meetings throughout the U.S. (Congressional Record, 29 September 1976:33409). This committee and the U.S. Table Tennis Association had jointly arranged and financed arrangements for China’s table tennis team to be received in the United States in April 1972 (Congressional Record, 29 September 1976:33409). The National Committee on United States-China Relations had been cited by President Ford for its “important contribution . . . to our national effort to build a normal relationship with the PRC” (Congressional Record, 29 September 1976:33409).

These pro-Beijing lobby groups had similar policy objectives: ending all trade embargoes against the PRC, admission of the PRC to the United Nations, and the recognition of Communist China. The National Council for United States-China Trade, established in May 1973 with the support and encouragement of the administration, is a nongovernmental organization to promote and facilitate trade between the United States and the PRC. By the end of 1977, the council had hosted or sponsored 21 trade delegations to and from the PRC (Ludlow, 1978:25). Christopher H. Phillips, head of the council and a former deputy ambassador to the United Nations, had strongly urged the administration to move toward normalization. Phillips believed that the consequences of nonrecognition of the PRC would adversely affect trade and other American interests. The Committee on Scholarly Communication with the PRC was formed in 1966. This committee, however, was not active until 1971 when Americans began traveling to China. The committee received a third of its funding from the Bureau of Education and Cultural Affairs, Department of State.20

During a congressional hearing in December 1975, Phillips, of the

20. The Committee on Scholarly Communication with the PRC receives a third of its funding from private foundations such as Ford, Rockefeller, Charles F. Kettering, and other private foundations, and a third from the National Science Foundation.
National Council for United States-China Trade, and Melvin W. Searls, Jr., vice president of the Committee on Scholarly Communication with the PRC, had both urged the normalization of relations in order to improve trade and exchange programs with the PRC. In April 1977, Phillips told Vance that trade between the U.S. and China had "bottomed out" because of a combination of political and economic reasons (Gwertzman, 1977b:7). Vance had reportedly told Phillips of the Carter administration's strong backing for the council's effort to normalize political and economic relations with the PRC (Gwertzman, 1977b:7).

It is difficult to assess the extent to which these groups affected the policy outcome of the administration. Roger Sullivan, former deputy assistant secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the State Department from June 1978 to 1980 and vice president of the National Council for U.S.-China Trade, stated in an interview that economic and commercial interests were not the main concern for the normalization decision in 1978. Sullivan revealed that he did not pay too much attention to the council when he served as deputy assistant to Richard Holbrooke. Only after he became vice president of the council did he realize how little the administration was concerned about the interests of an organization like the National Council on U.S.-China Trade. Sullivan also pointed out that the council received more official attention and became more active after Sino-American relations were normalized.

Since President Nixon's trip to China, both old and new China lobby groups had tried various ways—through seminars, conferences, exchange programs, propaganda campaigns, and letter-writing campaigns to the congressmen—to influence the administration, Congress, and the American public on the pros and cons of the normalization issue. The gradual change of American public opinion toward the PRC in the 1970s was a result. The remaining power of the old China Lobby, together with the domestic and international crises, had prevented the administration from making the normalization decision. In 1978, after seven years' delay, the domestic climate for normalization was more favorable than in 1972. President Carter seized the opportunity and established full diplomatic relations with the PRC.

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THE ROLE OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

Besides public opinion, Congress, and interest groups, the presidential election had an impact on the timing of the normalization decision as well. There is no conclusive data available on the exact effects of presidential elections on foreign policy issues. Some studies show that during election years more attention is devoted to domestic politics than to foreign policy issues (Campbell, et al., 1954; Quandt, 1977:23). A commonly held assumption is that in presidential election years controversial foreign policy decisions are delayed in order to deny a potential opponent a major political issue. A presidential candidate, on the other hand, tries to generate a popular image as a peacemaker as well as one knowledgeable in foreign affairs (Halperin, 1974:66-67).

U.S. foreign policy toward the PRC was not a major issue in the 1972 or 1976 presidential elections. These elections, however, delayed the process of normalization of relations. Halperin raised two issues that concern presidential candidates: (1) appealing to the population as a whole, and (2) denying potential opponents a key issue. These two issues had some impact on the normalization decision during the 1972 and 1976 presidential election campaigns (Halperin, 1974:67-70).

Appealing to the Population as a Whole

It is generally believed that a presidential candidate’s popularity can be increased if the candidate can demonstrate ability and willingness to contribute to the cause of world peace. Rarely has any presidential candidate won the election because of “hawk talk.” President Johnson successfully defeated Barry Goldwater by portraying Goldwater as a war-monger. President Nixon’s landslide victory in 1972 was linked to his skill in creating an image of himself as a peacemaker. Nixon had effectively demonstrated his capability in easing world tension by initiating detente with the Soviet Union and rapprochement with the PRC. Shortly before the 1972 election, the Nixon administration announced that peace in Vietnam “is at hand.” Available data indicates that the American public in 1972 had cast their votes with Vietnam as a major issue in mind (Miller, et al., 1976:753-78).

President Carter in 1978 also used “peace” as the major reason for his decision to normalize relations with the PRC. In the text of his statement on 15 December 1978, President Carter declared that “the normalization of relations between the United States and China has no other purpose than the advancement of peace” (see Appendix C). Completion of normalization with the PRC, SALT II, and the Camp David Accords on the Middle East could have brought spectacular foreign policy successes to President Carter as a peacemaker.
Denying Potential Opponents a Key Issue

The opening-of-China policy initiated by President Nixon was welcomed by the American people because Sino-American rapprochement could reduce tensions and the possibility of another war between two nuclear powers. President Nixon's popularity increased after his China trip in 1972 to a 56 percent approval rating, the highest in 14 months of his presidency (Brown, 1976:9). Normalization between Washington and Beijing, however, would be an unpopular decision if it was achieved at the expense of Taiwan, especially during presidential election time. The normalization decision was delayed in 1972 and 1976 because both Presidents Nixon and Ford did not want their opponents to use the normalization issue against them.

Nixon stated frankly in his memoirs why no agreement concerning Taiwan could be reached during his 1972 trip to China:

We knew that if the Chinese made a strongly belligerent claim to Taiwan in the Communique, I would come under murderous crossfire from any or all the various pro-Taiwan, anti-Nixon, and anti-PRC lobbies and interest groups at home. If these groups found common ground on the eve of the presidential elections, the entire China initiative might be turned into a partisan issue. Then, if I lost the election, whether because of this particular factor or not, my successor might not be able to continue developing the relationship between Washington and Peking. . . . (Nixon, 1979, v.2:40-41).

Normalization of relations between Beijing and Washington in 1972 was not possible because no agreement concerning Taiwan could be reached. The presidential election was a major factor in President Nixon’s decision to postpone normalization during the second term of his presidency.

In 1976, President Ford faced a strong conservative challenge from Ronald Reagan for the presidential nomination. Reagan had been a strong supporter of Taiwan and opposed Sino-American normalization at the expense of U.S.-Taiwan relations.

In August 1976, Reagan amended the Republican party platform by inserting a specific pledge that the United States would honor its defense treaty with Taiwan:

The United States Government, while engaged in a normalization of relations with the People's Republic of China, will continue to support the freedom and independence of our friend and ally, the Republic of China, and its 16 million
people. The United States will fulfill and keep its commitments, such as the mutual defense treaty, with the Republic of China (Congressional Quarterly, 1980:61).

It was obvious that President Ford was in a difficult situation to normalize relations with Beijing under its three conditions during the presidential election campaign. President Ford’s 1975 trip to China ended with no progress on normalization. Like President Nixon, President Ford could only promise the Chinese host that he would move toward normalization if elected in 1976.

The Democratic platform adopted on 14 July 1976 was rather vague on the issue of Sino-American normalization of relations. The plank stated: “Our relations with China should continue to develop on peaceful lines, including early movement toward normalizing diplomatic relations in the context of a peaceful resolution of the future of Taiwan” (Congressional Quarterly, 1980:60).

The normalization question was raised during the second nationally televised debate between President Ford and candidate Jimmy Carter on 6 October 1976 in San Francisco. Ford and Carter, however, gave only general and unspecific answers on the ways in which normalization should be pursued. President Ford declared that the Ford administration “will not let down, will not eliminate or forget our obligations to the people of Taiwan” (Congressional Quarterly, 1980:61). Candidate Carter stated that “I would never let that friendship with the People’s Republic of China stand in the way of the preservation of the independence and freedom of the people of Taiwan” (Congressional Quarterly, 1980:61). Neither President Ford nor Governor Carter was interested in taking a strong stand on the controversial normalization issue during election time.

Another way to deny opponents a main issue is to preempt the issue. President Nixon did just that in 1972 when he opened the China door. The Democratic platform of 1968 stated that “we would actively encourage economic, social, and cultural exchange with mainland China as a means of freeing that nation and her people from their narrow isolation” (Congressional Quarterly, 1980:59). The GOP in 1968, however, reaffirmed its opposition to Beijing’s admission to the United Nations and recognition of the PRC. Four years later, President Nixon’s surprising China initiative denied Senator George McGovern, the 1972 Democratic presidential nominee, a key foreign policy issue. McGovern had favored improved relations with communist countries, such as the Soviet Union, China, and North Vietnam (Congressional Quarterly, 1980:60). President Nixon’s detente policy toward Moscow and Beijing, and peace negotiations with North Vietnam, had undercut much of McGovern’s positions.
President Carter's decision to normalize relations with the PRC in 1978 also denied Senator Edward Kennedy, a main supporter for normalization and a major challenger of President Carter for the 1980 presidential nomination, a key foreign policy issue.

The timing of the normalization announcement was also influenced by congressional elections. On 16 May 1978, President Carter stated in his diary, on the ideal timing of the normalization issue, the following:

I had a meeting with Brzezinski, Brown, Vance, Mondale, Jordan to discuss Zbig's trip to China, and decided that we would move on normalization this year if the Chinese are forthcoming. Our preference is to take final action after the November election. We all agreed that a better relationship with the PRC would help us with SALT (Carter, 1982:194).

President Carter finally chose December 1978 to normalize relations with the PRC, a time when November 1978 congressional elections were just over, when Congress was out of session, and when political opponents were unable to mount a quick campaign against his normalization decision. By the time of the 1980 presidential election, the establishment of diplomatic relations was a fait accompli.

CONCLUSION

Having analyzed four major domestic political factors—public opinion, Congress, interest groups, and presidential elections—we conclude that the normalization decision was constrained and delayed by domestic realities. Presidential elections of 1972 and 1976 precluded the incumbent from making the controversial normalization decision. A weak administration, such as the Nixon administration during the Watergate period followed by the Ford administration, was more vulnerable than a strong administration to the pressures of domestic politics. The normalization decision was delayed because of prevailing public opinion and congressional attitudes against normalization under Beijing's three conditions.

By 1978, the domestic environment was more favorable for the normalization decision. Successful passage of the Panama Canal Treaties removed one major domestic obstacle. American public attitudes toward Beijing in the 1970s had gradually changed. More and more American people and congressmen had visited the PRC. The majority of public opinion and congressmen favored full normalization of relations with the PRC. On the other hand, the once influential "China Lobby" had lost support from important members in the Congress. A new "China Lobby," with the same policy objectives as the adminis-
tration's, had reemerged and actively campaigned for full normalization with Beijing in order to strengthen American strategic and economic benefits.

The Chinese domestic environment in 1978 was also favorable to normalization. The mini-cultural revolution of 1973-1974, the second purge of Teng Hsiao-p'ing and the deaths of Chou and Mao in 1976, complicated the consideration of the normalization decision. The arrest of the "Gang of Four" and the gradual stabilization of Teng's power consolidated the capability of the moderate force in the PRC. Carter recalled in his memoirs, *Keeping Faith*, that in August 1977, during Vance's visit, the PRC was not ready domestically to move toward full normalization with the United States:

When Secretary Vance began his exploratory discussions in Peking on August 22, he found his hosts more cautious than I had anticipated. With the deaths of both Chou En-lai and Mao Tse-tung in 1976, the new leaders of China had many internal political and economic questions to address. In addition, they were still not well acquainted with me or my policies, and probably needed a few more months before deciding how far to trust us on the major decisions (Carter, 1982:191).

In 1978, Teng's power was well established. In February 1978, the National People's Congress placed four modernization plans at the top of China's domestic agenda. The normalization of relations with the United States could certainly help its economic development. Meanwhile, the PRC had become seriously concerned about Soviet intervention in Africa and Soviet-Vietnamese relations. Full normalization with the United States could give Beijing more leverage toward Hanoi and Moscow. President Carter grasped the opportunity and moved toward full normalization of relations with the PRC.
6
THE IDIOSYNCRATIC, COGNITIVE, AND CYBERNETIC MODELS

THE IDIOSYNCRATIC MODEL: THE "GREAT MAN THEORY"

The main assumption of the idiosyncratic model is that the personal characteristics of decision makers can make a difference in policy outcomes. The "Great Man Theory" stresses the importance of individual leadership. American foreign policy is considered to be the end product of the preferences and initiatives of presidents or secretaries of State. Some examples are the Marshall Plan, Truman Doctrine, Eisenhower Doctrine, Dulles' "massive retaliation," Kennedy's "frontiersmanship," Nixon's "detente policy," and Carter's "human rights policy" (Kegley and Wittkopf, 1982:493). The values, beliefs, personalities, and perceptions of the individuals who participate in the making of U.S. foreign policy decisions, therefore, are believed to have a major impact on the outcome of foreign policy. From the "Great Man Theory" perspective, the opening-of-China policy was the product of President Nixon's personal leadership.

The idiosyncratic model or the "Great Man Theory" approach has been criticized for its limited utility in explaining American foreign policy. The main counterargument is that situations, not the idiosyncratic characteristics of individuals, determine a nation's behavior. Craig Haney and Philip Zimbardo made the following comment in 1973 after a decade of research on this subject:

If there has been one important lesson coming from all the research in social and personality psychology in the past few years, it is that situations control behavior to an unprecedented degree. It is no longer meaningful, as it once was, to talk in terms of personality "types," of persons "low in ego strength," or of "authorities"—at least it is not meaningful if we wish to account for any substantial portion of an individual's behavior. . . . Rather, we must look to the situation in which the behavior was elicited and is maintained if we hope
ever to find satisfactory explanations for it. The causes of behavior we have learned are more likely to reside in the nature of the environment than inside the person (Kegley and Wittkopf, 1982:520, note 17).

Applied to the normalization issue, President Nixon certainly deserved personal credit in taking the China initiative. President Nixon’s new China policy, however, was not made in a vacuum. The international environment, domestic political situations in both the United States and the PRC, and bureaucratic politics were factors in influencing President Nixon’s policy toward China. Had there been little possibility of a major Sino-Soviet war at the end of the 1960s, and had there been little American anxiety to get out of the Vietnam war, the China door might have been opened much later. In other words, the international situation was one of the most important factors that motivated President Nixon to seek rapprochement with Beijing.

President Nixon’s personality, ideology, and value system played only a minor role in explaining the opening of China. In the 1950s, Vice President Nixon was a strong fighter against communism. Vice President Nixon had vigorously defended President Eisenhower’s containment and isolation policy toward “Red China.” A decade later, Richard Nixon, the same individual with no remarkable change in his personality and ideology, made a complete policy change toward the PRC.

Another way to demonstrate the weak linkage between personality and foreign policy is to show that individuals with remarkably different personal backgrounds support similar policies (Quandt, 1977:30). The nonrecognition policy toward the PRC had been followed by four presidents—Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson—since the outbreak of the Korean War. There were significantly different personal characteristics among these four presidents; yet they all supported a similar policy toward the PRC. President Kennedy had wanted to improve relations with the PRC, but found it would be politically too risky to do so. President Johnson, while interested in easing tensions with the PRC, was unwilling to make concessions on the Taiwan issue. Since the Korean War, United States policy toward Beijing had remained basically the same. There were some incremental changes to ease tensions with the PRC; overall, though, the containment and nonrecognition policy was supported by four presidents.

In the early 1970s, when the China door was opened and the U.S. policy direction toward the PRC was set, once again there were only incremental changes in terms of U.S. policy toward Sino-American normalization of relations. Normalization between Washington and Beijing had been repeatedly declared by Presidents Nixon, Ford, and
Carter as one of the U.S. foreign policy goals. Presidents Nixon, Ford, and Carter, with different idiosyncratic backgrounds, had come to the same conclusion—the importance of Sino-American rapprochement and normalization of relations vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. Once the process of normalization of relations was completed, even President Reagan, a major opponent toward normalization as a presidential candidate in 1976 and a key supporter for reestablishment of U.S.-Taiwan diplomatic relations in 1980, felt compelled to carry out the normalization agreement and to continue the course of policy direction toward Beijing.

The impact of presidential personality on the Sino-American normalization of relations issue was not critical, considering the fact that the same person, Richard Nixon, had supported dramatically different policies toward Beijing, and presidents with remarkably different personalities had supported a similar policy toward China.

There is still, however, an unanswerable question: had candidate Hubert Humphrey been elected president in 1968, would Sino-American relations have been different? The same question can be asked of Reagan. Had Reagan been elected president in 1976, would the normalization decision have been delayed?

President Nixon’s personal distrust of bureaucrats and his preference for secret diplomacy was another important factor that contributed to the successful opening of China in 1972. Had someone else been president in 1968, with a different approach to handling the opening of China, the rapprochement between Washington and Beijing might also have been delayed.

THE COGNITIVE MODEL

The cognitive model believes that the unitary rational actor model cannot accommodate “all the observed phenomena of decision making and should not be relied upon, therefore, as the only base theory for political analysis” (Steinbruner, 1974:14). The cognitive model assumes that “an individual’s behavior is in large part shaped by the manner in which he perceives, diagnoses, and evaluates his physical and social environment” (Holsti, 1976:19). From the cognitive perspective, a nation’s actions are dependent upon “its perception of the results of its own actions, which often depend on the estimate of the other country’s future reactions” (Sullivan, 1976:272).

William Quandt believed that “it is less the personality of the

1. For further discussions of the different characters of presidents Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford and Carter, see Barber (1977) and George (1974:234-82).
president that must be understood than the way he and his advisers view the world and how they reason" (Quandt, 1977:29). Decision makers' world views and perceptions are, indeed, important sources in explaining a nation's foreign policy. How the U.S. decision makers perceived Beijing's "non-negotiable" principle on the Taiwan issue constituted an important ingredient in defining Washington's bargaining position on normalization negotiations.

Glen H. Snyder and Paul Diesing believed that "bargaining is largely a process of manipulating values and perceptions of them" (Snyder and Diesing, 1977:183). Thomas C. Schelling also stated that bargaining by one party "is guided mainly by his expectations of what the other will accept" (Schelling, 1980:21) Schelling further discussed how a convergence emerged from bargaining.

A bargain is struck when somebody makes a final, sufficient concession. Why does he concede? Because he thinks the other will not. "I must concede because he won't. He won't because he thinks I will. He thinks I will because he thinks I think he thinks so. . . ." (Schelling, 1980:21-22).

J. N. Morgan has described bargaining power as the power to fool and bluff, "the ability to set the best price for yourself and fool the other man into thinking this was your maximum offer." The main point of bargaining tactics is how to communicate effectively and persuasively one's demands, offers, commitments, threats, and concessions to the other party.

Since 1972, the major question regarding Sino-American normalization of relations had been who should make what concessions on the Taiwan issue. Beijing's three conditions for normalization were well known. The U.S. position on the Taiwan issue had gone through several changes. After his visit to the PRC in 1972, President Nixon privately reassured the Republic of China that the United States intended to "honor its defense treaty commitments" to Taiwan (Cohen, 1971:31). President Nixon also stated publicly that "our action in seeking a new relationship with the People's Republic of China will not be at the expense of our old friends" (Cohen, 1971:31). During a news conference on 6 May 1975, President Ford also reaffirmed U.S. commitments to Taiwan.3

The Nixon administration had a negotiating plan, however, to ac-

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cept Beijing's three conditions for normalization if there was a firm commitment from Beijing to settle the Taiwan question peacefully. According to Eugene K. Lawson, a former officer on the Republic of China desk at the State Department, the Nixon administration had the following conditions for normalization:

The defense treaty was, of course, the bottom line, and of Peking's three demands (break diplomatic relations with Taiwan, withdraw our military and end the treaty), that is the one we should have worked on. And, in fact, the Nixon Administration did have a package of minimum conditions in its mind to implement.

The most important element in the Nixon plan included the ways and means to find a plausible substitute for the treaty. First, the United States would cite only those People's Republic statements that spoke of resolving the situation peacefully and ignore the more belligerent ones. Second, the president would issue with the Congress a statement after normalization with Peking was achieved that force by anyone in the Taiwan Straits would cause the United States to consider whatever military actions appeared necessary to preserve peace.

Moreover, we would continue to ensure that the international waters existing between the mainland and Taiwan would be open to all countries, and, finally, we would continue to sell defensive equipment to Taiwan. Our assumption was that we were in the driver's seat and Peking needed us more than we needed it. While Peking had its conditions for normalization, we had ours. As for the future of Taiwan, we would follow the Shanghai Communique by keeping the door open on its ultimate status, in the same way Japan, Canada, the United Kingdom and others have done (Lawson, 1978:A15).

George Bush, former director of the Central Intelligence Agency and U.S. representative to Beijing, also indicated in the Washington Post on 24 December 1978 the U.S. position toward normalization:

For several years, Peking had insisted on three preconditions before there could be "normalization"... The United States had consistently balked at those terms, insisting that it would not formally recognize Peking until there was a firm, explicit commitment to settle the Taiwan issue peacefully. And there the negotiations were stuck... The terms that the Carter Administration has accepted
and even trumpeted, are the same terms that have been available for the past seven years. But they were always refused before because we knew—just as the Chinese knew—that in the absence of sufficient guarantees, they were but a figleaf for an abject American retreat (Bush, 1978:D3-4).

The American conditions, as stated by Bush and Lawson, could be viewed as the initial U.S. bargaining stand. The bottom line, then, was that Washington would accept Beijing’s three demands if Beijing would in return agree to settle the Taiwan question peacefully.

U.S. insistence on a firm commitment from Beijing on the Taiwan issue had historical background. During the 1955-1956 ambassadorial talks, some 40 meetings were held to discuss the issue of the renunciation of force on Taiwan. Washington and Beijing exchanged seven proposals and counterproposals, but found no common ground on this issue. Beijing and Washington had different definitions of the “renunciation of force on Taiwan.” To Beijing, a renunciation of force meant an unconditional American withdrawal from Taiwan; whereas to Washington it meant an unconditional renunciation of efforts to take Taiwan by military means (Young, 1968:93). Beijing was not willing to accept the American demand at that time because it did not want to limit its claim to sovereignty over Taiwan. To Beijing, a formal endorsement of the American proposal would mean the acceptance of two Chinas (Sutter, 1978:55). Beijing, however, was willing to accept a renunciation of force agreement with no specific reference to the Taiwan area. Washington, on the other hand, insisted that its position on Taiwan was inflexible and “nonnegotiable” (Young, 1968:105). The issue of Taiwan had been a stumbling block between Washington and Beijing throughout the ambassadorial talks in the 1950s and 1960s.

The normalization agreement was finally reached in 1978 after Washington gave up its once “nonnegotiable” principle of a firm pledge from Beijing not to use force to solve the Taiwan issue. Why did the Carter administration think that it was not possible to get a pledge from the PRC? How did the PRC persuade the United States that its stand on Taiwan would never change?

There were three possibilities to interpret Beijing’s firm and nonnegotiable conditions for normalization. First, the U.S. decision makers could interpret that Beijing was bluffing. Second, Washington could interpret that Beijing was not yet ready to yield on the Taiwan question but would soon. Third, the United States could believe that Beijing meant what she said—the leaders of the PRC would never

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4. For further information of the dialogue on the renunciation of force on Taiwan, see Kenneth T. Young, 1968:91-115 and appendix, pp. 414-17.
concede on the Taiwan question. The United States apparently adopted the third interpretation of Beijing’s messages on the Taiwan question during the normalization negotiations in 1978. President Carter acknowledged in January 1979 that seeking a clear commitment by Beijing to resolve the Taiwan issue peacefully had been a U.S. goal, but such a pledge “was not possible to achieve” (Oberdorfer, 1979b:A2).

Two major explanations can be given for the U.S. decision to normalize relations with the PRC mainly on Beijing’s terms. First, unlike the situation in the mid-1950s, the United States in 1978 sincerely intended to establish diplomatic relations with the PRC. During the 1955-1956 ambassadorial meetings, Beijing's real interest was to arrange a conference of foreign ministers “to settle through negotiations the question of relaxing and eliminating the tension in [the] Taiwan area” (Young, 1968:415), meaning Washington’s total withdrawal from Taiwan. The United States at that time did not intend to make any concession on the Taiwan question. Secretary of State Dulles, therefore, countered Beijing’s initiative by insisting on the mutual renunciation of the use of force in the Taiwan area as a precondition for further talks on the arrangement of a foreign minister’s conference. Beijing refused, and no further talks were held.

In the 1950s and 1960s, the United States saw no significant benefits from making any concession on the Taiwan issue. But the 1970s international environment was much more complex and dynamic, and the United States became interested in improving relations with the PRC in order to gain strategic, economic, and other benefits. The Taiwan question was temporarily put aside by Washington and Beijing in order to deal with a greater and much more urgent issue—Soviet hegemonism. The high-level summit, desired by the PRC since 1955-1956, was finally arranged in 1972. The United States did not insist on any precondition, such as the non-use of force toward Taiwan. Neither did the PRC demand that the Nixon-Mao meeting settle the Taiwan question. The establishment of diplomatic relations, however, required breaking the impasse on the Taiwan issue. Detailed analysis of the timing of the normalization decision has been discussed in previous chapters. Sincerity, together with a favorable international and domestic political environment, motivated the United States to concede on the Taiwan issue in order to gain other geopolitical benefits in 1978.

The second explanation of American willingness to compromise on the Taiwan issue is that the PRC had successfully persuaded the United States that Beijing would never make any concession on the Taiwan question.
Official Statements and Remarks

Through various official statements, interviews, and meetings, Beijing had made known its position on the Taiwan issue. It was non-negotiable. The PRC position, as stated in the Shanghai Communique, was that there is only one China and Taiwan is part of China. The PRC was strongly opposed to the “two Chinas,” “one China, one Taiwan,” “one China, two governments,” and “independent Taiwan” formulas. The PRC had also declared many times that the liberation of Taiwan is China’s internal affair in which no other country has the right to interfere (see Appendix B).

Empirical Demonstrations

The PRC had also proved its credibility of firmness on the Taiwan question through empirical evidence. No country had been able to maintain diplomatic relations with Beijing and Taipei at the same time. In October 1971, before the admission of the PRC to the United Nations, 62 nations still recognized Taipei as the government of China. By the end of 1972, 23 countries had switched diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing. By 1980, 23 other countries had followed suit (see table 10). In August 1981, Taipei retained diplomatic relations with only 23 countries, five of which had extended diplomatic recognition since 1971 (see table 11).

In the 1970s, Beijing concluded 75 joint communiques with foreign countries concerning normalization of diplomatic relations (Shen, 1982: 33). Six nations “recognized” the PRC as the “sole legal government of China” and also “recognized Beijing’s claim that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the PRC.” While recognizing Beijing as the sole legal government of China, 25 nations chose to use ambiguous wording toward Beijing’s claim to Taiwan such as, “take note of,” “understand,” “respect,” and “acknowledge,” rather than formally “recognize” that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the PRC. Forty-four states, mostly small third world countries, did not mention the status of Taiwan in the joint communiques with which they established diplomatic relations with the PRC. The PRC, however, always insisted on including a “Taiwan clause” in any joint communiqué with important Asia-Pacific countries or major U.S. allies, namely: Thailand, Malaysia, Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, Spain, Greece, Italy, Canada, Belgium, Iceland, Brazil, Ja-

5. Chou En-lai, Teng Hsiao-p’ing, and their associates held at least 20 interviews to elaborate their views on Taiwan. For detailed sources of those interviews see Chen, “Peking’s Attitude Toward Taiwan,” in Chiu, ed., 1978:35-36, note 4.
Table 10
Countries Switching Diplomatic Recognition from Taipei to Beijing: October 1971-December 1980

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<td>-Dec. 31, 1972</td>
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<td>Upper Volta</td>
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<td>(Benin)</td>
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<td>Greece</td>
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<td>1977</td>
<td>Barbados</td>
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<td>1978</td>
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(b) Established diplomatic relations with Taipei in 1971.

Data Source: U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, The New Era in East Asia hearings, 97th Congress, 1st session, May 19, 20, 28; June 3, 10; and July 16, 1981, p. 39.

Japan, Netherlands and the Philippines (Shen, 1982:79), the PRC-West Germany joint communique being the sole exception.

The PRC also demonstrated its firmness toward the non-negotiable one-China position in the forums of international organizations. In the 1950s and 1960s, the PRC repeatedly declared that it would not join the United Nations if the Republic of China government was a member. In August 1971, two months before the United Nations
### Table 11
Countries Establishing Diplomatic Relations With Taiwan (ROC), 1972-1981

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<td>W. Samoa (a)</td>
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<td>Nauru (b)</td>
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<td>Tuvalu</td>
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<td>St. Vincent and the Grenadines</td>
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(a) Severed relations with Taipei in 1975
(b) Raised relations from consular to diplomatic level

Countries maintaining diplomatic relations with Taipei as of August 1981 are: Bolivia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Ivory Coast, South Korea, Lesotho, Malawi, Nicaragua, Nauru, Panama, Paraguay, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, St. Vincent, Swaziland, Tonga, Tuvalu, Uruguay, the Vatican.


General Assembly's vote on the admission issue, the PRC reiterated its position:

Should a situation of “two Chinas,” “one China, one Taiwan,” or “the status of Taiwan remaining to be determined” or any other similar situation occur in the United Nations, the Government of the People's Republic of China will absolutely have nothing to do with the United Nations. *(Beijing Review, 27 August 1971:7).*

After the expulsion of the Republic of China from the United Nations, the PRC successfully replaced the Republic of China in ten specialized agencies of the United Nations (Shen, 1982:84-85, note 32). In 1980, the Taipei government was expelled from the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the International Finance Corporation, and the International Development Association in favor of the PRC (Shen, 1982:85-86).

In other words, Beijing consistently demonstrated to the United States as well as to other countries its credibility of standing firm on the Taiwan issue. Besides manifesting its position through official statements and empirical practices, the PRC also used three other tactics to increase its bargaining position vis-a-vis the United States on the Taiwan issue.
Bolstering Beijing's Stakes on the Taiwan Issue

Snyder and Diesing have discussed the importance of the decision maker's perception of the participating parties' comparative stakes:

When a state yields on any issue, it is more likely to be because it believes its adversary's interests to be stronger than its own . . . than because its independent valuation of the stake is low. That is, a state's resolve in a particular case is a function of how it perceives the comparative interests of itself and its opponent. . . . Thus, when a state yields in a conflict where its own values at stake are of intermediate importance, it may also yield on issues of greater importance if it thinks the adversary's stake is greater still; and conversely, it may be firm on lesser issues when it thinks the balance of interests favors itself. . . . (Snyder and Diesing, 1977:186).

For Washington, normalization challenged the "integrity of defense commitments and the welfare of a long-time ally"; for Beijing, the issue of "sovereignty" was at stake (Solomon, 1978:325). Both Washington and Beijing's stakes on the Taiwan issue were high. But comparatively speaking, nothing was more important than a nation's sovereignty. Beijing repeatedly declared that the Taiwan issue is an issue of sovereignty.6

Reducing Washington's Stakes on the Taiwan Question

Washington's stake in breaking diplomatic relations and terminating the defense treaty with Taiwan was considered a function of its payoffs—its costs versus its benefits—from the normalization with Beijing. Beijing had tried to convince Washington that normalization under Beijing's terms would increase Washington's strategic and economic benefits and eventually would reduce Washington's risk of becoming involved in another civil war in Asia. Former Foreign Minister Huang Hua allegedly stated in a speech on 20 July 1977:

When the Chinese people deem the time to be ripe to liberate Taiwan by force, would the American people really have the resolve to live or perish with the Chiang dynasty, and share the fate of the island of Taiwan? Go read American history, we have not seen an instance in which the United States has

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6. For example, Hua Kuo-feng reiterated China's position on Taiwan in August 1977: "Taiwan Province is China's sacred territory. We are determined to liberate Taiwan. When and how is entirely China's internal affairs, which brooks no foreign interference whatsoever." Quoted from the political report by Hua Kuo-feng, Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, to the Eleventh National Congress of the Communist Party of China, 12 August 1977 (Solomon, 1978:325).
had had such resolve and courage to sacrifice for others.7

The lesson of Vietnam has been quite painful for the United States; if the United States had no intention of getting into another civil war in Asia, Washington would be wise to terminate the defense commitment with Taiwan. Besides decreasing Washington's cost of ending the defense treaty, Beijing had also tried to stress the benefits of an early normalization of relations between the United States and the PRC. The PRC had linked Sino-American economic, cultural, and exchange program relations with normalization. Sino-American trade setbacks in the mid-1970s was explained as the lack of full diplomatic relations by the PRC. In September 1977, Teng Hsiao-p'ing also hinted that Beijing's patience for normalization should not be taken for granted and would not last forever (Boccardi, 1977:A1, 21). The PRC had indicated to the United States the danger of further delay of the normalization decision and potential political and economic benefits from an early decision to establish diplomatic relations. In brief, Beijing had tried to devalue Washington's costs in terminating the diplomatic and military relations with Taiwan, and in the meantime stressed the benefits from an early decision toward normalization of relations.

Challenging Washington's Legal Position on the Taiwan Issue

In September 1977, after Secretary of State Vance's visit to China, Teng Hsiao-p'ing revealed in an interview that former President Ford "promised" in December 1975 that if reelected he would resolve the Taiwan problem the same way the Japanese had done it (Boccardi, 1977:A1). Although President Ford had a different view on this subject, Teng insisted that President Ford had made the promise in 1975 (Boccardi, 1977:A1, 21). Teng further commented that Vance's proposal to set up a U.S. liaison mission in Taiwan was a step back from Ford's position. Teng's disclosure of Ford's position on the Taiwan issue was aimed at limiting President Carter's room for maneuver. The PRC also challenged Washington's bargaining position on the Taiwan issue by stressing the U.S. position in the Shanghai Communique. In the Shanghai Communique, the United States had acknowledged the one-China principle. From the PRC perspective, the United States had no legal right subsequently to set up a liaison office in Taiwan after the establishment of full diplomatic relations with Beijing.

In brief, Beijing had used various channels and tactics to commu-

7. According to Taiwan's sources, the speech was ordered by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party as one of the means to prepare its middle level cadres for the Eleventh Party Congress, held 11-18 August 1977 (Chiu, 1978:188).
nicate with Washington its stakes and firmness on the Taiwan question. The Carter administration in 1978 finally concluded that Beijing was immovable on the non-negotiable Taiwan issue; that is, Beijing would not make any concession on the Taiwan question. Washington's acceptance of Beijing's terms for normalization can be viewed as Beijing's triumph.

THE CYBERNETIC MODEL

The main point of Steinbruner's cybernetic model is that the fundamental decision problem is not "as a matter of maximizing expected utility (or any loose approximation), but rather as a question of simplifying an incomprehensibly complex world" (Steinbruner, 1976:236). Steinbruner believes that "the decision maker does not resolve value conflicts; that is, he does not seek to produce an optimally balanced return to competing objectives" (Steinbruner, 1976:236).

Under conditions of uncertainty or a value conflict situation, Steinbruner believes that decisions are structured not by rational procedures, but by nonrational rules of cognitive operations. For example, the decision maker will tend to conceptualize his decision environment so as to avoid recognizing tradeoff relationships between his values. The decision maker will suppress the tradeoffs by conceptualizing his world in such a way that the values do not appear to conflict (Snyder, 1978:348).

Leon Festinger also points out that the decision maker can reduce or even eliminate his cognitive dissonance by conceiving his decision as being the only choice he can possibly make under the circumstances (Snyder, 1978:348; Festinger, 1957:43-44). In brief, the cybernetic approach stresses that there are strong cognitive forces in operation "under conditions of uncertainty which predispose decision makers to deny the existence of trade-offs, to deny choice, and to impute unwarranted certainty to this view of their situation" (Snyder, 1978:348).

The announcement of the normalization agreement on 15 December 1978 came as a surprise to the U.S. Congress and American people. The Republic of China government was informed only a few hours before President Carter's announcement. In a report of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the Carter administration was criticized by Congress on several accounts for not obtaining a better deal on the Taiwan question:

First, the United States yielded on all three of the PRC's major conditions for normalization. . . . Even when the PRC dropped a newer fourth condition banning U.S. arms sales to
Taiwan, the United States agreed to a one-year moratorium on new sales commitments.

Second, the United States did not obtain a pledge from the PRC that it would not take military action against Taiwan.

Third, the language of the December 15, 1978 communique goes slightly beyond that of the 1972 Shanghai Communique in recognizing China’s claim to sovereignty over Taiwan. It also goes further than similar statements made by some other countries. In the Shanghai Communique the United States “acknowledges” and agrees not to challenge the position of Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Straits that Taiwan is part of China.

In the December 15 Communique, the United States “acknowledges” as the Chinese position that Taiwan is part of China. The extent of this change is more marked in the Chinese translations of the two communiquees, but the Committee was assured by Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher that the United States adheres to only the English translation.8

In February 1979, Dr. Ray Cline revealed his conversation with Kissinger on the normalization terms, in a congressional hearing:

I happened to encounter Dr. Kissinger this morning. He works in the same institution, not the proposed nonprofit private institute, but Georgetown University’s Research Center, where I work, and I again, only a few hours ago, asked Dr. Kissinger: “Did you and President Nixon ever give any assurance of normalization on the terms that Peking dictated and President Carter accepted?” And he said, “Absolutely not. I am on the record repeatedly on this point.” It is unfair to suggest that the Carter decision was the same one as the Shanghai Communique decision, which was to normalize with Peking but on terms where we preserved our relations with Taiwan.9

In *Years of Upheaval*, Kissinger disclosed his conversation with Chairman Mao on 12 November 1973, on the settlement of the Taiwan issue:

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Having established the basic analysis of the international situation in about an hour, Mao suddenly turned to the issue of Taiwan, and then not to state a challenge but to hint obliquely at a solution. He had heard that the three Baltic states still had embassies in the United States, he said. I affirmed it. “And the Soviet Union did not ask you first to abolish those embassies before they established diplomatic relations with you?” That was not exactly accurate, since the time relations were established the Soviet Union recognized the Baltic states. But if Mao was implying that relations with Taiwan were no necessary obstacle to normalization with China, I saw no reason to draw fine historical distinctions; so I assented to his proposition. Zhou [Chou] helpfully chipped in that though maintaining diplomatic relations with the United States, the Baltic states did not have access to the United Nations. Did all this mean, I wondered, that China might acquiesce in a separate legal status for Taiwan, contenting itself with excluding Taiwan from the UN? . . .

What did all this mean? Was it another hint that normalization could be separated from the issue of Taiwan? And that the rate of normalizing relations was up to us? . . . I am inclined to believe that like Zhou on the day before, Mao was indirectly inviting a proposal that combined the principle of a unified China with some practical accommodation to the status quo. . . . (Kissinger, 1982:691-92).

Mao in 1973 showed signs of some flexibility on the settlement of the Taiwan question after Sino-American normalization of relations. Whether the United States could have secured a better deal on the Taiwan issue in 1978 could be debated endlessly. The Carter administration apparently thought the Sino-American normalization agreement was good enough.

The Sino-American normalization decision involved a tradeoff for the United States between two values—the avoidance of the charge of being an unreliable friend, and the promotion of U.S. geopolitical and economic benefits. Alexander George has discussed two major ways by which the policymaker may deal with a value conflict situation. First, the decision maker may recognize the value conflict and deal with the difficult tradeoff analytically and strategically. Second, the decision maker may seek to avoid a value conflict by denying its existence or playing down its importance (George, 1980:29). How did the U.S. decision makers deal with the value tradeoff problem relating to the normalization decision?
The Nixon and Carter administrations had different approaches to the value conflict situation. President Nixon and Kissinger realized that, in the process of normalizing relations with the PRC, U.S.-Taiwan relations would eventually be undermined. President Nixon, however, skillfully managed the value conflict in the best possible way. In 1972, the United States worked out the ambiguously worded Shanghai Communique with the PRC. The political relationship between Washington and Taipei was downgraded. The Nixon administration, however, was able to reiterate that U.S. commitments to Taiwan were unaffected, right after President Nixon’s trip to the PRC. In 1973, the United States and the PRC established their liaison offices. The United States, however, still managed to maintain diplomatic relations with the Republic of China. Kissinger described one instance in which he faced the value tradeoff situation:

I had one of the more painful meetings of my career on July 1, 1971. The Ambassador of the Republic of China, James Shen, came to see me about preserving Taiwan’s seat at the next United Nations General Assembly vote on Chinese representation. Shen lodged an extensive objection to the State Department plan for “dual representation,” which would have attempted to admit Peking to the UN without expelling Taiwan. I found it difficult to concentrate on the details, for that July 1 was the very day I was due to leave on my trip to Asia for the secret rendezvous in Peking. No government less deserved what was about to happen to it than that of Taiwan. It had been a loyal ally; its conduct toward us had been exemplary. Its representatives, most notably its Ambassador, had behaved with that matter-of-fact reliability and subtle intelligence characteristic of the Chinese people. I found my role with Shen particularly painful, since I knew that before long his esoteric discussion of UN procedural maneuvers would be overtaken by more elemental events; but I could say nothing to him, and indeed it was essential that I maintained as normal and nonchalant a schedule as possible (Kissinger, 1979:733).

Kissinger also recounted his meeting with Shen after President Nixon’s China trip in 1972. “The most painful was my meeting with Ambassador James Shen from Taiwan; we had not in fact made any commitments undercutting Taiwan security, but the entire process was bound to be inimical to its status” (Kissinger, 1979:1094).

Unlike the Nixon administration, the Carter administration tried to deny the existence of any value conflict when it dealt with the nor-
nalization issue. President Carter even believed that the people of Taiwan were not hurt by his normalization decision. In an interview on 19 December 1978, President Carter made the following statement:

   My reports from Taiwan, in the last few days or few hours, has (sic) been that they studied the agreements with the People’s Republic, that their original concerns have been substantially alleviated, and I don’t think that the people of Taiwan are any more concerned about future peace than they were before. . . . But as of the first of January, we will have relations with and acknowledge the nationhood of China. And Taiwan will no longer be a nation in the view of our own country. . . . I think what we’ve done is right. It’s better for our country. It’s better for the people of China. It does not hurt the people of Taiwan. It’s good for world peace. I think we’ve benefitted greatly, and I’m very proud of it.  

   How could President Carter believe that the people in Taiwan were not hurt while the newspapers were reporting otherwise? The Washington Post, for example, had the following report on 17 December 1978:

   Taipei, Taiwan, Dec. 16—Anti-American demonstrations erupted here today as the Taiwan government reacted sharply and swiftly to the sudden U.S. announcement that the United States will recognize the Peking government and end its diplomatic ties with Taiwan.

   Taiwan postponed its parliamentary elections scheduled for next week and the country’s foreign minister resigned.

   Thousands of jeering demonstrators, dragging an American flag in the dirt, gathered outside the dingy yellow U.S. Embassy and U.S. military headquarters to denounce President Carter as a “coward” and to wave placards saying, “Down with Yankee bandits!” (Matthews, 1978:A1).

   How did the Carter administration deal with the value tradeoff problem? Did it resort to defensive avoidance to deny the value conflict problem?

**Procrastination**

Any tradeoff between two important values would violate the principle

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of cognitive consistency. Procrastination is one major method the decision maker can use to avoid recognizing tradeoff relationships between his values.

The United States had delayed the normalization decision for almost seven years. In a way, it can be seen as a calculated procrastination. The first few years after the signing of the Shanghai Communique, the PRC had on various occasions indicated that the United States has the time if she needs it to solve her domestic problems relating to the Sino-American normalization of relations. The 1972 and 1976 presidential elections, Watergate, and the fall of Vietnam were all good and legitimate reasons for postponing the normalization decision. Another reason was that the United States was using the strategy of “calculated inactivity” to delay the settlement of the Taiwan problem. The Carter Administration had used the same strategy to postpone consideration of the normalization decision until settlement of the Panama Canal Treaties in order to avoid confronting two controversial foreign policy issues at the same time.

The Taiwan issue, however, was not solved when the United States normalized diplomatic relations with the PRC. Washington and Beijing agreed to disagree on the issue of arms sales to Taiwan. In the normalization agreement, the United States was allowed to state unilaterally that it expects Taiwan’s status to be settled peacefully. The official Chinese statement on 15 December 1978, however, declared that the method of reunifying Taiwan with the PRC is “entirely China’s internal affair” (Oberdorfer, 1979b:A2). On 15 January 1979, Teng Hsiao-p’ing indicated that China preferred a peaceful solution, but refused to rule out the use of military force (Oberdorfer, 1979b:A2). The formula of “agree to disagree” was invented to avoid a difficult value conflict situation. The United States and the PRC were able to make separate statements on the Taiwan question to satisfy each country’s domestic needs. Neither the United States nor the PRC would admit that it had made any tradeoff of values. The Taiwan issue, however, remained to be solved.

**Bolstering**

Bolstering is another major way a decision maker can avoid recognizing tradeoff relationships between his values. Janis and Mann defined bolstering as “an umbrella term that includes a number of different psychological tactics that contribute to creating and maintaining the decision maker’s image of a successful outcome with high gains and tolerable losses” (Janis and Mann, 1977:91). In the normalization decision, the Carter administration used three major bolstering tactics for defensive avoidance.
Exaggerating favorable consequences. This is the tactic used most often by a decision maker, according to Janis and Mann, to resolve a conflict that otherwise would leave him in a painful state of indecision (Janis and Mann, 1977:91). In December 1978, President Carter made the following statement:

The change that I’m announcing tonight will be of great long-term benefit to the peoples of both our country and China—and, I believe, to all the peoples of the world. Normalization—and the expanded commercial and cultural relations that it will bring—will contribute to the well-being of our own nation, to our own national interest, and it will also enhance the stability of Asia. These more positive relations with China can beneficially affect the world in which we live and the world in which our children will live.11

In February 1979, three months after the normalization announcement, however, the PRC launched a military attack into Vietnam. The Carter administration had hoped normalization would motivate the Soviet Union to be more cooperative with the United States. President Carter firmly believed that Sino-American normalization of relations “will not put any additional obstacles in the way of a successful SALT agreement and also will not endanger our good relationships with the Soviet Union.”12

On 19 December 1978, President Carter disclosed a message from Leonid Brezhnev “very positive in tone” that conveyed the Soviet leader’s understanding of the American decision to normalize relations with the PRC.13 The Soviet Union, however, made public in Tass on 21 December 1978 the details of Brezhnev’s message to President Carter, in an apparent attempt to show that President Carter misinterpreted Brezhnev’s message. Brezhnev expressed concern about the United States and the PRC condemning “hegemony” in their joint normalization communique. Brezhnev also raised questions about the new Chinese-American relationship and vowed to watch it closely (Shipler, 1978:Al, 7).

In January 1979, highly placed Soviet officials acknowledged for the first time that Brezhnev put off his trip to the United States to avoid being upstaged by Teng’s visit (Whitney, 1979:A9). Some of Secretary of State Vance’s advisers thought that the Soviet Union had

12. Excerpt from President Carter’s Interview with Walter Cronkite 19 December 1978, in ibid., p. 49.
13. Ibid.
apparently decided to put off an agreement on SALT II because of deep concern over Sino-American normalization of relations (Whitney, 1979:A9). Later, Brzezinski also came to the conclusion that normalization had complicated SALT II negotiations, after meeting with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin and talking to U.S. officials who had been in Geneva in December 1978 for the SALT II negotiation (Talbott, 1979:247). President Carter finally admitted in January 1979 that normalization did create problems for SALT II negotiations (Oberdorfer, 1979a:A8)

Minimizing unfavorable consequences. Another way of "bolstering" is to minimize unfavorable costs of the preferred choice. The decision maker may attempt to convince himself that the preferred choice could minimize the likelihood of an unfavorable outcome, and those rejected alternatives would bring more negative consequences.

Secretary of State Vance stated in January 1979 that "failure to try to move forward would have left us in danger of moving backward—at great cost to our global position."14 "We did not have the option of temporizing . . . we had the choice of moving forward or allowing the situation with China to erode," said a senior official in the Carter administration (Oberdorfer and Walsh, 1978b:A1, 12). The Carter administration had tried to use the strategy—"normalization now or never" and "cost less now or cost more later"—to reduce the value tradeoff problem.

The Carter administration believed that the PRC does not have the capability of launching a 120-mile attack across the ocean against Taiwan in the next five years. By assuming that no negative result would happen in the foreseeable future, the Carter administration tried to reduce the cost of terminating the defense treaty with Taiwan. In other words, the United States could terminate a defense treaty with an ally, for example, Israel or Korea, if the United States could be sure that country would not be attacked by its enemy within five years after the termination of the defense treaty. Ambassador Woodcock stated in a press conference, "As each day goes by and the island is not sinking into the sea, the political pressure will lessen" (Washington Post, 2 January 1979:A9).

President Carter also explained the need for secrecy and the incremental essence of his normalization decision as follows:

We did not depart from the established policy of our country that's been extant since President Nixon went to

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China in 1972. And I think had we caused a public debate in our country about all the ramifications of the negotiations at the very time we were trying to conclude these discussions with the Chinese, it would have resulted in failure. And our country would have lost a wonderful opportunity to [gain] a great stride forward and all the benefits that be derived from this agreement.

So, I don't have any doubt that what I did was right and correct. I don't have any doubts that had we made a public issue of it, it would have complicated the issue unnecessarily. 15

President Carter was apparently convinced that the timing, manner, and terms of the normalization decision were not merely right, but also represented the only choice he could possibly make under the circumstances. By stressing his normalization decision as merely incremental progress of U.S. policy toward China that had been developing since the early 1970s, President Carter tried to dispel any astonishment concerning his sudden announcement on 15 December 1978.

Denying the significance of negative feeling. Value conflict could also be minimized by denying the significance of aversive feelings (Janis and Mann, 1977:92).

President Carter indicated that in recognizing the PRC "we are recognizing simple reality." 16 Brzezinski stated that the real significance of Carter's decision to normalize relations with the PRC was that "it ends a long period of illusion." 17 President Carter further explained that:

By establishing relations with the People's Republic of China the United States is terminating a fiction and catching up with reality. The fiction has been that we recognized the authorities on Taiwan to be the legitimate government of 1 billion Chinese on the mainland. This has not been the case for 29 years, and the situation is not going to change. Both Peking and Taipei insist each is the government of all of China, and no country in the world has diplomatic relations with both. Neither side allows it. Over 100 countries now recognize the Peking government, including all our European al-

15. Ibid., p. 50.
16. Ibid., p. 46.
lies, and we are adjusting our diplomatic stand in conformity with international practice.\textsuperscript{18}

Secretary of State Vance echoed President Carter:

By the time we took the decisive step, every other member of NATO, our two treaty partners in ANZUS (Australia-New Zealand-United States), and Japan had long since recognized the P.R.C., as had most other nations of the world.\textsuperscript{19}

The Carter administration displayed a characteristic pattern of defensive avoidance by bolstering the expected gains and minimizing the likelihood of costs from normalization. The significance of terminating diplomatic ties and the defense treaty with Taiwan was downgraded so that there would be less of a tradeoff problem. The Carter administration was right in stating that the government in Taiwan in the preceding 29 years was not the government of 1 billion people on the mainland. The reality, however, was not as simple as the Carter administration claimed. China had two governments, each of which effectively controlled different parts of Chinese territory. According to Senator Jesse Helms at that time, a realistic policy would have been "to recognize each government as competent in the territory it controls."\textsuperscript{20} "There is no need to recognize the claim which each makes to the territory controlled by the other, nor is there any need to deny such claims."\textsuperscript{21}

\section*{CONCLUSION}

The U.S. normalization decision was influenced by various decision makers’ perceptions and assessments of national interests, domestic politics, and personal political interests. Presidents Nixon, Ford, and Carter all came to the same conclusion—Sino-American relations must be normalized—even though each president had his own idiosyncratic background and individual attributes. While precise causal relationships cannot be weighted, the Carter administration’s perception of Beijing’s "non-negotiable" principle, and its capability and intentions toward the settlement of the Taiwan question, appeared to have exerted an important influence on President Carter’s position on the Taiwan issue.

When interviewed, former Ambassador Leonard Woodcock re-

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{20} U.S. Congress, \textit{Taiwan Enabling Act}, 1979, p. 53.
\item \textsuperscript{21} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
called that it was he who persuaded President Carter to drop the condition that the PRC promise to renounce the use of future force against Taiwan on the ground that such a prior constraint would constitute an infringement of China's sovereignty. Woodcock, moreover, maintained that, despite later criticisms of Carter to the contrary, a U.S. requirement of such a pledge from the PRC would have blocked any further negotiations. The PRC simply would have refused to acquiesce to such a condition.22

There were still other considerations influencing the Carter White House, according to Woodcock. One was its assessment that Congress, in any event, would never accord credibility to a communist country's pledge to renounce force against Taiwan. And another consideration was the White House assumption that, under the most favorable scenario, the PRC would trade such a pledge only for a U.S. concession on its arms flow to Taiwan.23

According to President Carter's National Security Council staff member, Michel Oksenberg, in a 1985 interview, even had Ronald Reagan won the presidency in 1976—that would neither have delayed normalization nor altered U.S. terms. Despite Reagan's oft-repeated support for Taiwan, Republican Reagan would not have reneged on Republican Nixon's commitment, Oksenberg explained. A national direction, not just a Republican direction, had already been established. Moreover, the fear of a PRC rapprochement with the Soviet Union would have then influenced Reagan as much as it did influence Carter, a Democrat, to follow Nixon's initiative.24

Normalization between Washington and Beijing was achieved at the expense of U.S.-Taiwan relations. It would have violated normalization decision makers' cognitive consistency had they admitted that the Carter administration could have gained better terms on the Taiwan issue had it tried harder. It would also have violated President Carter's cognitive consistency had he admitted that Taiwan's interests were damaged by his normalization decision. To acknowledge the existence of a value tradeoff situation would create a problem of cognitive dissonance, especially for a decision maker, such as President Carter, who stresses the importance of dignity, truthfulness, and honesty. It is not surprising that the Carter Administration resorted to


23. Ibid.

defensive avoidance mechanisms to deny the tradeoff and therefore to ease cognitive dissonance.
CONCLUSION

The Sino-American normalization decision making was an extremely complex and convoluted process. The rational actor model enabled us to see normalization decision making as a process of maximizing U.S. strategic, economic, and moral goals. The timing and terms of normalization were assumed to be rationally chosen as a result of careful examinations of potential gains and costs of each alternative. The first question to which this study is addressed is repeated:

Question 1—The Rational Actor Model

Would the United States have rationally chosen the optimal timing and terms to normalize relations with the PRC, that is, (1) could the United States have maximized bilateral relations with the PRC, (2) could the United States have normalized relations with the PRC without sacrificing the detente relations with the Soviet Union, and (3) could the United States have normalized relations with the PRC with minimal costs to U.S.-Taiwan relations?

From the analyses of this study, the 1972 opening of China policy, the 1973-1977 indecision toward full normalization of relations, and the December 1978 breakthrough were indeed rationally chosen by the U.S. decision makers after careful considerations of international and domestic environments. The rational actor approach to explain the normalization decision was found to be particularly relevant.

The United States, however, did not gain the maximum benefits hoped for in normalization. The Carter administration in 1978 had miscalculated Moscow's reaction toward normalization between Washington and Beijing. Sino-American normalization of relations had complicated SALT II negotiations.

At the bilateral level, in the years immediately following the normalization decision, U.S.-PRC relations had greatly improved. Two-way trade between the United States and the PRC had jumped from $5 million in 1971 to $2 billion in 1979, $4.9 billion in 1980, and $5.5
billion in 1981 (Hsueh, 1982:11). In 1985, two-way trade jumped to a record $7.7 billion, while United States-Taiwan trade in the same year was more than $22 billion (The Asian Wall Street Journal, 5 May 1986:11; Lasater, 1986:11). In 1984, the PRC was the 21st largest trading partner of the United States, while Taiwan was the fifth (Lasater, 1985:5).

The United States had also given the PRC various trade benefits such as Most-favored-nation status (MFN), full access to Export-Import Bank and Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) export credits, and participation in Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) programs (Daumbaugh, 1985:9).

Cultural, scientific, and technological programs between Washington and Beijing had also significantly strengthened. In 1982, more than 100,000 Americans visited the PRC, while nearly 10,000 Chinese students were studying at American universities. During the academic year 1983-1984, there were approximately 12,000 PRC students and scholars in America (Lampton, et. al, 1986:2).

Sino-American relations, however, gradually deteriorated after President Reagan took office in 1981. The question of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan was not settled in the course of negotiations of the Sino-American normalization agreement. The U.S.-PRC Joint Communique of 17 August 1982 failed to solve the arms sales to Taiwan issue. This communique was the result of ten months of intense and difficult negotiations. The United States declared in the communique that “it does not seek to carry out a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan, that its arms sales to Taiwan will not exceed, either in qualitative or in quantitative terms, the level of those supplied in recent years.” The United States also indicated in the communique that “it intends to reduce gradually its sales of arms to Taiwan, leading over a period of time to a final resolution.” (See Appendix D.)

The PRC was, however, not satisfied with the U.S. position on the arms sales issue. The PRC wanted the United States to set a date for ending arms sales to Taiwan. The United States, on the other hand, insisted that this communique did not “provide either a time frame for reductions of U.S. arms sales or for their termination.”

In the fall of 1982, the PRC began to widen its foreign policy options. Beijing had reemphasized its identification with the Third

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World and resumed a dialogue with Moscow. Concurrently, the PRC had moved to alienate relations between Washington and Beijing.

On 5 October 1982, the PRC and the Soviet Union resumed talks in Beijing. The ninth round of talks was concluded in October 1986. During these talks, Beijing and Moscow did not make significant progress in narrowing their differences on strategic issues such as Soviet military withdrawals from Afghanistan, Mongolia, and the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia. The dialogue, however, had taken some of the "sting" out of the twenty-year hostility and rivalry between these two communist giants. One indicator of an improvement in Sino-Soviet relations was their bilateral trade, which jumped from a total of $330 million in 1981 to $880 million in 1982 (Doder, 1983c: A21). In 1985, Sino-Soviet trade rose 60% to more than a billion dollars (Kempe, 1986:11).

On 28 July 1986, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev announced in a speech to reduce the number of its forces in Afghanistan and Mongolia. Gorbachev also declared that Moscow would be prepared to negotiate a border settlement on the basis of Beijing's claim that the "main channel" be used to demarcate the disputed boundary along the Amur river rather than the Chinese bank (Nations, 1986:33). On 25 September 1986, the PRC announced that it will resume stalled border talks—frozen since the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan—with the Soviet Union at the vice foreign ministerial level in 1987 (The Washington Post, 26 September 1986a: A32).

Better relations with the Soviet Union would greatly increase Beijing's leverage toward Washington. In the 1970s, Washington was in a position to improve relations with Moscow and Beijing to gain strategic leverage. In the 1980s, Moscow and Beijing tried to improve their relations as a means of influencing their respective relations with Washington. Beijing has been quite successful in using its diplomatic leverage vis-a-vis Moscow to gain Washington's attention.

United States relations with the PRC have improved steadily since the summer of 1983. In May 1983, the Reagan administration further relaxed export controls to the PRC. Beijing was moved from Country Group P to Country Group V, joining other friendly Asian, African, and European countries. In October 1985, the United States reached an agreement with the Coordinating Committee (COCOM) for exports to communist countries, which helped to further speed U.S. technology exports to the PRC (Sutter, 1986:8). High-tech equipment exports to the PRC have increased significantly since 1983. By one estimate, the value of high-tech equipment exports, excluding commercial aircraft but including all the green line product categories, nearly doubled between 1982 and 1983 to more than $214 million. By
the same accounting method, high-tech equipment exports exceeded $300 million in 1984. This upward trend continued in 1985.\footnote{4}

President Reagan's trip to China in April 1984 climaxed a series of high-level contacts between Washington and Beijing. United States-PRC military ties have gradually been built since Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger's September 1983 trip to China. In August 1985 the PRC signed a contract with General Electric for five GE LM2500 gas turbine naval engines for destroyers. One month later, the Reagan administration notified Congress of its first Foreign Military Sales (FMS) to the PRC, a $98 million package including the design and general layout of an artillery munitions factory and data packages for M82 primers, M577A1 fuzes, and M107 155mm projectiles (Lasater, 1985:10).

In early 1986, the Reagan administration further decided to help modernize the PRC air force. On 8 April 1986, Congress was notified concerning the sale of $550 million of advanced avionics for 50 new Chinese F-8 aircrafts, which would give the aircraft all-weather capability (Chanda, 1986:11). In September 1986, an agreement was reached between the United States and the PRC on port calls by ships capable of carrying nuclear weapons. It will be the first time for U.S. warships to visit Communist China (Washington Post, 1 October 1986b: A26).

In retrospect, despite a difficult period during 1982-83, overall relations between Washington and Beijing have been improved significantly since normalization. Normalization, however, was no guarantee for endurable and friendly relations between the United States and the PRC. For example, Beijing threatened to downgrade relations with Washington if no agreement was reached on U.S. arms sales to Taiwan issue in early 1982. United States-PRC relations could also be strained for insignificant reasons. One example is that Beijing decided on 7 April 1983 to sever all sports and official cultural exchanges with Washington until the end of 1983 in retaliation for the Reagan administration's decision to grant political asylum to Chinese tennis player Hu Na.

Relations between Washington and Taipei, on the other hand, have been conducted by nonprofit private corporations—the American Institute in Taiwan and the Coordination Council for North American Affairs—based on the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act. U.S. investment and two-way U.S.-Taiwan trade have continued to grow since 1979. The government in Taiwan, however, had suffered great

\footnote{4}{U.S. Department of State, "U.S. Export Controls and China," Gist, March 1985, pp.1-2.}
political and diplomatic setbacks from U.S.-PRC normalization of relations. The Reagan administration has progressively reduced Foreign Military Sales to Taiwan by about $20 million a year after the conclusion of the 17 August 1982 Communiqué, from $780 million in 1983 to $720 million in fiscal 1987 (Goldstein, 1986: 26).

From the American perspective, tensions had been "markedly down in the Taiwan Strait area" since the U.S.-PRC normalization of relations. Beijing, however, still refuses to make a pledge not to use military force against Taiwan. Since 1982 the United States has declined to sell Taipei more advanced weapons than those it now possesses. Beijing, on the other hand, has progressed in its military modernization—with substantial assistance from the United States and other Western countries. Taiwan's long-term security remains uncertain. History will reveal whether the United States' strategy to normalize relations with the PRC at the expense of its relations with a long-term ally in Taiwan was a wise decision. To repeat our next two questions:

**Question 2—The Bureaucratic Model**

Could the timing and terms of the normalization decision have been best explained by the pulling and hauling of the bureaucratic players? Could each bureaucratic politics player's position on the normalization issue have been predicted from his position in the bureaucracy?

From 1969 to 1978, normalization decision making shows a consistent pattern of limited participation of a few people. Fears of leaks and bureaucratic fights compelled President Nixon to bypass regular bureaucratic channels to formulate the new China policy. The Carter administration used the same strategy to conduct the normalization negotiation.

The original target date—1 January 1979—and U.S. terms for normalization were reached on 20 June 1978 with little pulling and hauling among the key players—Carter, Vance, Brzezinski, Brown, and Jordan (Brzezinski, 1983:233). The timing and terms of normalization were better explained by like-minded players than by pulling and hauling among them. Question (2) is not supported from the analyses of this study.

The bureaucratic politics model, however, enhanced our understanding of the political context of the normalization decision making. The final timing of the normalization announcement was influenced by Brzezinski's personal interests in speeding up the normalization pro-

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cess in order to gain strategic benefits vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. Two days after the normalization announcement, President Carter told Brzezinski that “you are genuinely the driving force behind the whole effort. Whenever I wavered, you pushed me and pressed me to go through with this” (Brzezinski, 1983:233). In 1981, during Brzezinski’s visit to Beijing, Teng Hsiao-p’ing also told Brzezinski that “you and I together overcame the last difficulties” of normalization (Brzezinski, 1983:230).

Brzezinski’s May 1978 trip to China and his advocacy of a tougher line toward the Soviet Union did generate and increase his clash with Secretary of State Vance. In February 1978, Vance told Brzezinski explicitly that he was “strongly against” Brzezinski’s plan to go to China (Brzezinski, 1983:204). In order to overcome Vance’s resistance, Brzezinski had made a “sustained effort” to push President Carter’s approval of his China trip. The strategy used by Brzezinski was to “fashion an alliance” to support his China trip (Brzezinski, 1983:204). Brzezinski finally obtained the support from Vice President Mondale and Secretary of Defense Brown (Brzezinski, 1983:204). Brzezinski won a bureaucratic fight when President Carter decided to let him go to China.

There was no disagreement, however, between Vance and Brzezinski on the importance of Sino-American normalization of relations. Nor was there any difference on the terms of normalization (Brzezinski, 1983:223). The difference was that Vance did not want the National Security Council to undercut the State Department’s right to conduct U.S.-PRC relations.

The answer to our question, “Does where you stand depend on where you sit?” explains some of the Department’s stand, discussed in chapter 4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff’s preference to get a pledge from Beijing and the State Department’s concern over the impact of normalization on the SALT II negotiations were understandable from the viewpoint of their respective bureaucratic responsibilities and concerns. The normalization decision was reached through consensus among the players. Those departments who might have different views on the normalization issue were not included in decision making.

Overall, the bureaucratic politics model did not portray the essence of normalization decision-making processes. The president had the dominant power to make decisions. President Carter alone made the decisions to let Brzezinski visit the PRC and start normalization negotiations. President Carter personally “worked on every line of the communiques going to Woodcock in Peking” (Carter, 1982:197). President Carter, like President Nixon, was also the one who made the
decision to conduct normalization negotiations in strict secrecy. In a memo to Vance in June 1978, President Carter stated:

Cy—Devise special procedures; leaks can kill the whole effort. We should limit the dispatches and the negotiating information strictly—maybe just to the PDB group. Avoid any public hints of degree of progress. I don’t trust (1) Congress, (2) White House, (3) State, or (4) Defense to keep a secret. JC. (Brzezinski, 1983:224). 6

Question 3—The Domestic Politics Model

President Carter’s normalization decision was also influenced by the realities of domestic politics. By reference again to our original questions:

Did stronger public or elite opinion and interest groups against normalization with the PRC at the expense of Taiwan delay the normalization process and elicit tougher U.S. conditions for Taiwan’s security guarantee, and vice versa?

Did more members in Congress against normalization with the PRC at the expense of Taiwan delay the process of the normalization decision and toughen the U.S. stand toward the question of Taiwan, and vice versa?

From the analyses of chapter 5, these two questions are answered affirmatively. From 1972 to 1977, Presidents Nixon, Ford, and Carter had decided to delay the normalization process because of unfavorable domestic situations. The main cause was that the majority of U.S. public opinion and members of Congress had opposed normalization at the expense of U.S.-Taiwan diplomatic and military relations. By 1978, more and more members of Congress favored normalization. Favorable public and elite opinions toward the PRC and normalization had also increased significantly since the early 1970s. The influence of the “China Lobby” had declined considerably. Since the executive branch has the sole power to make decisions to normalize relations with foreign countries, President Carter saw no reason to delay normalization with the PRC.

The timing of the normalization announcement—December 1978—was carefully chosen in order to avoid antagonizing domestic constituencies (Brzezinski, 1983:200). The timing of normalization was influenced by congressional approval of the Panama Canal Treaties and the November 1978 congressional elections (Brzezinski,

6. President’s Daily Brief (PDB) is accessible only to the president himself, the vice-president, Vance, Brown, and Brzezinski.
1983:206). President Carter's insistence on continuing arms sales to Taiwan after normalization was also influenced by domestic political considerations. Brzezinski recalled the final stage of negotiations on the arms sales issue, as follows:

Not everything went smoothly. I noted on December 15: "Unfortunately, at the last minute the arms sales issue has arisen. The Chinese are operating on the assumption that we will discontinue immediately. We made it clear that we will continue after a one-year pause during which the treaty is being abrogated. . . .

We were faced with the prospect of a last-minute fiasco. Vance was out of the country and the situation called for fast action. Even though Woodcock demurred, believing that a direct statement by the President would force a negative Chinese reaction, I insisted that he tell Deng [Teng] that "we will try to be as restrained as we can on the subject of arms sales, but that within the United States political process it is simply impossible for the United States not to reaffirm its position on this subject. . . ."

The President, his domestic advisers, and I all felt strongly that normalization would run into major political difficulties in the United States if we were not clear on this subject (Brzezinski, 1983:231-32).

In 1978, the majority of the American people still opposed normalization of relations with the PRC should Taiwan be "abandoned" by the United States. President Carter realized that he could not withhold public criticisms if he failed to insist on the arms sales to Taiwan condition.

Did the impact of a presidential election on the process of normalization depend on the strength of the existing administration? Did a weak administration which could not mobilize domestic opposition for normalization with the PRC tend to stall or delay the consideration of normalization decision in order to deny the potential opponent a major issue at the presidential election period?

This question could not be answered completely affirmatively from the analyses of this study. A weak administration, such as President Ford's in 1975-1976, was apparently in no position to move toward normalization with the PRC during the 1976 presidential election period. The Nixon administration in 1972 was comparatively much stronger than the Ford administration. President Nixon, however, still hesitated to deal with the controversial normalization issue during the 1972 election year. The evidence suggests that in presiden-
tial election years controversial foreign policy decisions, such as the normalization issue, tend to be delayed in order to deny a potential opponent a major political issue, regardless of the strength of the existing administration.

**Question 4—The Idiosyncratic, Cognitive, and Cybernetic Models**

Did the personal characteristics of decision makers have an important impact on the normalization decision?

The analyses of this study indicate that international and domestic politics factors were more important than the idiosyncratic factor in explaining the timing and the terms of the normalization issue. It would be very difficult, however, to assess the extent to which the impact of the decision maker's characteristics had on the normalization issue. Kissinger had the following observation on this point.

The impact of personalities on events is never easy to define. To be sure, China and the United States were brought together by necessity; it was not abstract goodwill but converging interests that brought me to Peking; it was not personal friendship with Chou but a commonly perceived danger that fostered the elaboration of our relationship. But that these interests were perceived clearly and acted upon decisively was due to leadership that—on both sides—skillfully used the margin of choice available. That China and the United States would seek rapprochement in the early 1970s was inherent in the world environment. That it should occur so rapidly and develop so naturally owed no little to the luminous personality and extraordinary perception of the Chinese Premier (Kissinger, 1979:746).

The amount of influence of presidential leadership on the normalization decision making would be an interesting topic for further analyses and debates. To repeat our last two study questions:

Was the lowest level of acceptability on the terms of the Taiwan question influenced by the U.S. decision makers' interpretations and perceptions of (1) the PRC's military capabilities, (2) the PRC's intention toward the settlement of the Taiwan question, and (3) the PRC's stake on the issue of "sovereignty?"

Given the assumption that any tradeoff between two equally important values violates the principle of cognitive consistency, can it be said that the normalization agreement could have been reached only at the expense of U.S. integrity of defense commitments and the welfare of a long-term ally, Taiwan, and that the U.S. decision makers then
would have had to suppress their recognition of value tradeoffs by engaging various mechanisms for defensive avoidance?

Affirmative answers to these last two questions were reached from the analyses of chapter 6. The cognitive model stresses the importance of decision makers' perception. The Carter administration was convinced that the PRC had no intention or capability to attack Taiwan after normalization. Nor would the PRC make any concession on the non-negotiable principle toward Taiwan. The PRC had also successfully persuaded the United States that Beijing would never make any pledge not to use military force against Taiwan. President Carter finally came to the conclusion that it was "not possible" to get a pledge from Beijing because the Taiwan question, from the PRC's perspective, is a question of sovereignty. The Carter administration finally accepted Beijing's three conditions without a firm pledge from Beijing on the settlement of the Taiwan question. Normalization was achieved at the cost of U.S.-Taiwan diplomatic and military relations. The Carter administration did use defensive mechanisms to bolster the benefits of normalization and downgrade the costs of U.S.-Taiwan ties in order to avoid any cognitive dissonance.

Sidney Verba stated that "no model and no theorist, no matter how committed to holistic principles, can encompass the totality of a situation (Verba, 1961:106). The same is true for the explanation of the normalization decision. The rational actor model enabled us to see the central considerations of normalization more comprehensibly. The means-end rationality model, however, is only a simplification of the real decision-making process (Verba, 1961:108). The bureaucratic and domestic models highlighted the political context of the normalization decision making. Bureaucratic or domestic politics *per se*, i.e., in isolation, did not explain much. The final decision was based on decision makers' perceptions and interpretations of the environment. The entire picture of the normalization decision-making process may never be realized, but if we share each scholar's insights we may come closer to reality.
APPENDIX A
MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY BETWEEN THE
UNITED STATES AND THE REPUBLIC
OF CHINA, DECEMBER 2, 1954
AND NOTES EXCHANGED ON DECEMBER 10, 1954

The Parties to this Treaty,

Reaffirming their faith in the purposes and principles of
the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in
peace with all peoples and all Governments, and desiring to
strengthen the fabric of peace in the West Pacific Area,

Recalling with mutual pride the relationship which
brought their two peoples together in a common bond of
sympathy and mutual ideals to fight side by side against im-
perialist aggression during the last war,

Desiring to declare publicly and formally their sense of
unity and their common determination to defend themselves
against external armed attack, so that no potential aggressor
could be under the illusion that either of them stands alone
in the West Pacific Area, and,

Desiring further to strengthen their present efforts for
collective defense for the preservation of peace and security
pending the development of a more comprehensive system of
regional security in the West Pacific Area,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United
Nations, to settle any international dispute in which they may be in-
volved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace,
security and justice are not endangered and to refrain in their interna-
tional relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsis-
tent with the purpose of the United Nations.

ARTICLE II

In order more effectively to achieve the objective of this Treaty,
the Parties separately and jointly by self-help and mutual aid will
maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist
armed attack and communist subversive activities directed from with-
out against their territorial integrity and political stability.

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ARTICLE III

The Parties undertake to strengthen their free institutions and to cooperate with each other in the development of economic progress and social well-being and to further their individual and collective efforts towards these ends.

ARTICLE IV

The Parties, through their Foreign Ministers or their deputies, will consult together from time to time regarding the implementation of this Treaty.

ARTICLE V

Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the West Pacific Area directed against the territories of either of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

ARTICLE VI

For the purposes of Articles II and V, the terms "territorial" and "territories" shall mean in respect of the Republic of China, Taiwan and the Pescadores; and in respect of the United States of America, the island territories in the West Pacific under its jurisdiction. The provisions of Articles II and V will be applicable to such other territories as may be determined by mutual agreement.

ARTICLE VII

The Government of the Republic of China grants, and the Government of the United States of America accepts, the right to dispose such United States land, air and sea forces in and about Taiwan and the Pescadores as may be required for their defense, as determined by mutual agreement.

ARTICLE VIII

This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the Parties under the
Charter of the United Nations or the responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

ARTICLE IX

This Treaty shall be ratified by the United States of America and the Republic of China in accordance with their respective constitutional processes and will come into force when instruments of ratification thereof have been exchanged by them at Taipei.

ARTICLE X

This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely. Either Party may terminate it one year after notice has been given to the other Party.

In witness whereof the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty.

Done in duplicate, in the English and Chinese languages, at Washington on this second day of December of the Year One Thousand Nine Hundred and Fifty-four, corresponding to the second day of the twelfth month of the Forty-third year of the Republic of China.

For the United States of America:

JOHN FOSTER DULLES

For the Republic of China:

GEORGE K. C. YEH

Exchange of Notes
Department of State
Washington, December 10, 1954
APPENDIX B
THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE, FEBRUARY 28, 1972

President Richard Nixon of the United States of America visited the People's Republic of China at the invitation of Premier Chou En-lai of the People's Republic of China from February 21 to February 28, 1972. Accompanying the President were Mrs. Nixon, U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers, Assistant to the President Dr. Henry Kissinger, and other American officials.

President Nixon met with Chairman Mao Tse-tung of the Communist Party of China on February 21. The two leaders had a serious and frank exchange of views on Sino-U.S. relations and world affairs.

During the visit, extensive, earnest and frank discussions were held between President Nixon and Premier Chou En-lai on the normalization of relations between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China, as well as on other matters of interest to both sides. In addition, Secretary of State William Rogers and Foreign Minister Chi P'eng-fei held talks in the same spirit.

President Nixon and his party visited Peking and viewed cultural, industrial and agricultural sites, and they also toured Hangchow and Shanghai where, continuing discussions with Chinese leaders, they viewed similar places of interest.

The leaders of the People's Republic of China and the United States of America found it beneficial to have this opportunity, after so many years without contact, to present candidly to one another their views on a variety of issues. They reviewed the international situation in which important changes and great upheavals are taking place and expounded their respective positions and attitudes.

The U.S. side stated: Peace in Asia and peace in the world requires efforts both to reduce immediate tensions and to eliminate the basic causes of conflict. The United States will work for a just and secure peace: just, because it fulfills the aspirations of peoples and nations for freedom and progress; secure, because it removes the danger of foreign aggression. The United States supports individual freedom and social progress for all the peoples of the world, free of outside pressure or intervention. The United States believes that the effort to reduce tensions is served by improving communication between countries that have different ideologies so as to lessen the risks of confrontation through accident, miscalculation or misunderstanding. Countries should treat each other with mutual respect and be willing to compete peacefully, letting performance be the ultimate judge. No country should claim infallibility and each country should be prepared
to re-examine its own attitudes for the common good. The United States stressed that the peoples of Indochina should be allowed to determine their destiny without outside intervention; its constant primary objective has been a negotiated solution; the eight-point proposal put forward by the Republic of Vietnam and the United States on January 27, 1972 represents a basis for the attainment of that objective; in the absence of a negotiated settlement the United States envisages the ultimate withdrawal of all U.S. forces from the region consistent with the aim of self-determination for each country of Indochina. The United States will maintain its close ties with and support for the Republic of Korea; the United States will support efforts of the Republic of Korea to seek a relaxation of tension and increased communication in the Korean peninsula. The United States places the highest value on its friendly relations with Japan; it will continue to develop the existing close bonds. Consistent with the United Nations Security Council Resolution of December 21, 1971, the United States favors the continuation of the ceasefire between India and Pakistan and the withdrawal of all military forces to within their own territories and to their own sides of the ceasefire line in Jammu and Kashmir; the United States supports the right of the peoples of South Asia to shape their own future in peace, free of military threat, and without having the area become the subject of great power rivalry.

The Chinese side stated: Wherever there is oppression, there is resistance. Countries want independence, nations want liberation and the people want revolution—this has become the irresistible trend of history. All nations, big or small, should be equal; big nations should not bully the small and strong nations should not bully the weak. China will never be a superpower and it opposes hegemony and power politics of any kind. The Chinese side stated that it firmly supports the struggles of all the oppressed people and nations for freedom and liberation and that the people of all countries have the right to choose their social systems according to their own wishes and the right to safeguard the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of their own countries and oppose foreign aggression, interference, control and subversion. All foreign troops should be withdrawn to their own countries.

The Chinese side expressed its firm support to the peoples of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia in their efforts for the attainment of their goal and its firm support to the seven-point proposal of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam and the elaboration of February this year on the two key problems in the proposal, and to the Joint Declaration of the Summit Conference of the Indochinese Peoples. It firmly supports the eight-point program for
the peaceful unification of Korea put forward by the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on April 12, 1971, and the stand for the abolition of the "U.N. Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea." It firmly opposes the revival and outward expansion of Japanese militarism and firmly supports the Japanese people's desire to build an independent, democratic, peaceful and neutral Japan. It firmly maintains that India and Pakistan should, in accordance with the United Nations resolutions on the India-Pakistan question, immediately withdraw all their forces to their respective territories and to their own sides of the ceasefire line in Jammu and Kashmir and firmly supports the Pakistan Government and people in their struggle to preserve their independence and sovereignty and the people of Jammu and Kashmir in their struggle for the right of self-determination.

There are essential differences between China and the United States in their social systems and foreign policies. However, the two sides agreed that countries, regardless of their social systems, should conduct their relations on the principles of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, non-aggression against other states, non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. International disputes should be settled on this basis, without resorting to the use or threat of force. The United States and the People's Republic of China are prepared to apply these principles to their mutual relations.

With these principles of international relations in mind the two sides stated that:

—progress toward the normalization of relations between China and the United States is in the interests of all countries;

—both wish to reduce the danger of international military conflict;

—neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony; and

—neither is prepared to negotiate on behalf of any third party or to enter into agreements or understandings with the other directed at other states.

Both sides are of the view that it would be against the interests of the peoples of the world for any major country to collude with another against other countries, or for major countries to divide up the world into spheres of interest.

The two sides reviewed the long-standing serious disputes between China and the United States. The Chinese side reaffirmed its
position: The Taiwan question is the crucial question obstructing the normalization of relations between China and the United States; the Government of the People’s Republic of China is the sole legal government of China; Taiwan is a province of China which has long been returned to the motherland; the liberation of Taiwan is China’s internal affair in which no other country has the right to interfere; and all U.S. forces and military installations must be withdrawn from Taiwan. The Chinese Government firmly opposes any activities which aim at the creation of “one China, one Taiwan,” “one China, two governments,” “two Chinas,” and “independent Taiwan” or advocate that “the status of Taiwan remains to be determined.”

The U.S. side declared: The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. With this prospect in mind, it affirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military installations from Taiwan. In the meantime, it will progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes.

The two sides agreed that it is desirable to broaden the understanding between the two peoples. To this end, they discussed specific areas in such fields as science, technology, culture, sports and journalism, in which people-to-people contacts and exchanges would be mutually beneficial. Each side undertakes to facilitate the further development of such contacts and exchanges.

Both sides view bilateral trade as another area from which mutual benefit can be derived, and agreed that economic relations based on equality and mutual benefit are in the interest of the people of the two countries. They agree to facilitate the progressive development of trade between their two countries.

The two sides agreed that they will stay in contact through various channels, including the sending of a senior U.S. representative to Peking from time to time for concrete consultations to further the normalization of relations between the two countries and continue to exchange views on issues of common interest.

The two sides expressed the hope that the gains achieved during this visit would open up new prospects for the relations between the two countries. They believe that the normalization of relations between the two countries is not only in the interest of the Chinese and American peoples but also contributes to the relaxation of tension in Asia and the world.

President Nixon, Mrs. Nixon and the American party expressed
their appreciation for the gracious hospitality shown them by the Government and people of the People's Republic of China.

APPENDIX C

JOINT COMMUNIQUE ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

JANUARY 1, 1979

The United States of America and the People's Republic of China have agreed to recognize each other and to establish diplomatic relations as of January 1, 1979.

The United States of America recognizes the Government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China. Within this context, the people of the United States will maintain cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan.

The United States of America and the People's Republic of China reaffirm the principles agreed on by the two sides in the Shanghai Communiqué and emphasize once again that:

—Both wish to reduce the danger of international military conflict.

—Neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region or in any other region of the world and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony.

—Neither is prepared to negotiate on behalf of any third party or to enter into agreements or understandings with the other directed at other states.

—The Government of the United States of America acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China.

—Both believe that normalization of Sino-American relations is not only in the interest of the Chinese and American peoples but also contributes to the cause of peace in Asia and the world.

The United States of America and the People's Republic of China will exchange Ambassadors and establish Embassies on March 1, 1979.
TEXT OF PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT ON TIES WITH CHINA

Following is the transcript of President Carter's statement in Washington on normalizing relations with China, as recorded by The New York Times through the facilities of ABC News:

Good evening. I would like to read a joint communique which is being simultaneously issued in Peking at this very moment by the leaders of the People's Republic of China:


"The United States of America and the People's Republic of China have agreed to recognize each other and to establish diplomatic relations as of January 1, 1979.

"The United States recognizes the Government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China. Within this context the people of the United States will maintain cultural, commercial and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan.

"The United States of America and the People's Republic of China reaffirm the principles agreed on by the two sides in the Shanghai Communique of 1972 and emphasize once again that: both sides wish to reduce the danger of international military conflict. Neither should seek hegemony—that is the dominance of one nation over others—in the Asia-Pacific region or in any other region of the world and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony.

"Neither is prepared to negotiate on behalf of any other third party or to enter into agreements or understandings with the other directed at other states.

"The Government of the United States of America acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China.

"Both believe that normalization of Sino-American relations is not only in the interest of the Chinese and American people but also contributes to the cause of peace in Asia and the world.

"The United States of America and the People's Republic of China will exchange Ambassadors and establish Embassies on March 1, 1979."

Yesterday, our country and the People's Republic of China reached this final historic agreement. On January 1, 1979, a little more than two weeks from now, our two Governments will implement full normalization of diplomatic relations.
As a nation of gifted people who comprise about one-fourth of the total population of the Earth, China plays, already, an important role in world affairs—a role that can only grow more important in the years ahead.

We do not undertake this important step for transient tactical or expedient reasons. In recognizing the People’s Republic of China, that is a single Government of China, we’re recognizing simple reality. But far more is involved in this decision than just the recognition of a fact.

‘Long History of Friendship’

Before the estrangement of recent decades, the American and the Chinese people had a long history of friendship. We’ve already begun to rebuild some of the previous ties. Now our rapidly expanding relationship requires a kind of structure that only full diplomatic relations will make possible.

The change that I’m announcing tonight will be of great long-term benefit to the peoples of both our country and China—and I believe for all the peoples of the world. Normalization and expanded commercial and cultural relations that it will bring—will contribute to the well-being of our nation to our own national interest. And it will also enhance the stability of Asia. These more positive relations with China can beneficially affect the world in which we live and the world in which our children will live.

Special Message to Taiwan

We have already begun to inform our allies and other nations and the members of the Congress of the details of our intended action, but I wish also tonight to convey a special message to the people of Taiwan.

I have already communicated with the leaders in Taiwan, with whom the American people have had, and will have, extensive, close and friendly relations. This is important between our two peoples. As the United States asserted in the Shanghai Communique of 1972, issued on President Nixon’s historic visit, we will continue to have an interest in the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue.

I have paid special attention to insuring that normalization of relations between our country and the People’s Republic will not jeopardize the well-being of the people of Taiwan.

Broad Ties With Taiwan Pledged

The people of our country will maintain our current commercial, cultural, trade and other relations with Taiwan through nongovern-
mental means. Many other countries of the world are already successfully doing this.

These decisions and these actions open a new and important chapter in our country's history and also in world affairs. To strengthen and to expedite the benefits of this new relationship between China and the United States, I am pleased to announce that Vice Premier Teng has accepted my invitation and will visit Washington at the end of January. His visit will give our Governments the opportunity to consult with each other on global issues and to begin working together to enhance the cause of world peace.

Negotiations Begun By Nixon

These events are the final result of long and serious negotiations begun by President Nixon in 1972 and continued under the leadership of President Ford. The results bear witness to the steady, determined, bipartisan effort of our own country to build a world in which peace will be the goal and the responsibility of all nations.

The normalization of relations between the United States and China has no other purpose than this: the advancement of peace. It is in this spirit, at this season of peace, that I take special pride in sharing this good news with you tonight.

Thank you very much.

TEXTS OF STATEMENTS FROM U.S., CHINA AND TAIWAN

Following are the texts of the United States statement on Taiwan, provided by the White House; the official English text of the Chinese statement on Taiwan read by Chairman Hua Kuo-feng, provided by Reuters from Peking, and an unofficial English translation of the statement by President Chiang Ching-kuo of Nationalist China.

United States' Statement

As of January 1, 1979, the United States of America recognizes the People's Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China. On the same date, the People's Republic of China accords similar recognition to the United States of America. The United States thereby establishes diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China.

On that same date, January 1, 1979, the United States of America will notify Taiwan that it is terminating diplomatic relations and that the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of China is being terminated in accordance with the provisions of
the Treaty. The United States also states that it will be withdrawing its remaining military personnel from Taiwan within four months.

In the future, the American people and the people of Taiwan will maintain commercial, cultural, and other relations without official government representation and without diplomatic relations.

The Administration will seek adjustments to our laws and regulations to permit the maintenance of commercial, cultural, and other non-governmental relationships in the new circumstances that will exist after normalization.

The United States is confident that the people of Taiwan face a peaceful and prosperous future. The United States continues to have an interest in the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue and expects that the Taiwan issue will be settled peacefully by the Chinese themselves.

The United States believes that the establishment of diplomatic relations with the People's Republic will contribute to the welfare of the American people, to the stability of Asia where the United States has major security and economic interests and to the peace of the entire world.

China's Statement

As of January 1, 1979, the People's Republic of China and the United States of America recognize each other and establish diplomatic relations, thereby ending the prolonged abnormal relationship between them. This is a historic event in Sino-United States relations.

As is known to all, the Government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal Government of China and Taiwan is a part of China. The question of Taiwan was the crucial issue obstructing the normalization of relations between China and the United States. It has now been resolved between the two countries in the spirit of the Shanghai Communiqué and through their joint efforts, thus enabling the normalization of relations so ardently desired by the people of the two countries. As for the way of bringing Taiwan back to the embrace of the motherland and reunifying the country, it is entirely China's internal affair.

At the invitation of the U.S. Government, Teng Hsiao-ping, Vice-Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, will pay an official visit to the United States in January 1979, with a view to further promoting the friendship between the two peoples and good relations between the two countries.
Taiwan's Statement

The decision by the United States to establish diplomatic relations with the Chinese Communist regime has not only seriously damaged the rights and interests of the Government and the people of the Republic of China, but has also had a tremendously adverse impact upon the entire free world. For all the consequences that might arise as a result of this move, the United States Government alone should bear full responsibility.

In the past few years, the United States Government has repeatedly reaffirmed its intention to maintain diplomatic relations with the Republic of China and to honor its treaty commitments. Now that it has broken the assurances and abrogated the treaty, the United States Government cannot be expected to have the confidence of any free nation in the future.

The United States, by extending diplomatic recognition to the Chinese Communist regime, which owes its very existence to terror and suppression, is not in conformity with its professed position of safeguarding human rights and strengthening the capability of democratic nations to resist the totalitarian dictatorship.

The move is tantamount to denying the hundreds of millions of enslaved peoples on the Chinese mainland their hope for an early restoration of freedom. Viewed from whatever aspect, the move by the United States constitutes a great setback to human freedom and democratic institutions. It will be condemned by all freedom-loving and peaceloving peoples all over the world.

Recent international events have proven that the United States' persuasion of the "normalization" process with the Chinese Communist regime did not protect the security of free Asian nations, has further encouraged Communist subversion and aggressive activities and hastened the fall of Indochina into Communist hands. The Government and the people of the Republic of China firmly believe lasting international peace and security can never be established on an unstable foundation of expediency.

Regardless of how the international situation may develop, the Republic of China, as a sovereign nation will, with her glorious tradition, unite all her people, civilian and military, at home and abroad, to continue her endeavors toward progress in the social, economic and political fields. The Chinese Government and the people, faithful to the national objectives and their international responsibilities, have full confidence in the future of the Republic of China.

The late President Chiang Kai-shek repeatedly instructed the Chinese people to be firm with dignity and to complete the task of
national recovery and reconstruction. The Government and the people of the Republic of China have the determination and the faith, which they will exert to their utmost, to work together with other free peoples in democratic countries to conquer Communist tyrannical rule and its aggressive policy. Henceforth, we shall be calm and firm, positive and hardworking. It is urged that all citizens cooperate fully with the Government with one heart and one soul, united and determined to fight at this difficult moment. Under whatever circumstances, the Republic of China shall neither negotiate with the Communist Chinese regime, nor compromise with Communism, and it shall never give up its sacred task of recovering the mainland and delivering the compatriots there. This firm position shall remain unchanged.
APPENDIX D

UNITED STATES-CHINA JOINT COMMUNIQUE
OF AUGUST 17, 1982

(1) In the Joint Communique on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations on January 1, 1979, issued by the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the People's Republic of China, the United States of America recognized the Government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal government of China, and it acknowledged the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China. Within that context, the two sides agreed that the people of the United States would continue to maintain cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan. On this basis, relations between the United States and China were normalized.

(2) The question of United States arms sales to Taiwan was not settled in the course of negotiations between the two countries on establishing diplomatic relations. The two sides held differing positions, and the Chinese side stated that it would raise the issue again following normalization. Recognizing that this issue would seriously hamper the development of United States-China relations, they have held further discussions on it, during and since the meetings between President Ronald Reagan and Premier Zhao Ziyang and between Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr., and Vice Premier and Foreign Minister Huang Hua in October, 1981.

(3) Respect for each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity and non-interference in each other's internal affairs constitute the fundamental principles guiding United States-China relations. These principles were confirmed in the Shanghai Communique of February 28, 1972 and reaffirmed in the Joint Communique on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations which came into effect on January 1, 1979. Both sides emphatically state that these principles continue to govern all aspects of their relations.

(4) The Chinese government reiterates that the question of Taiwan is China's internal affair. The Message to Compatriots in Taiwan issued by China on January 1, 1979 promulgated a fundamental policy of striving for peaceful reunification of the Motherland. The Nine Point Proposal put forward by China on September 30, 1981 represented a further major effort under this fundamental policy to strive for a peaceful solution to the Taiwan question.

(5) The United States Government attaches great importance to its relations with China, and reiterates that it has no intention of infringing on Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity, or interfering
in China's internal affairs, or pursuing a policy of "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan." The United States Government understands and appreciates the Chinese policy of striving for a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question as indicated in China's Message to Compatriots in Taiwan issued on January 1, 1979 and the Nine-Point Proposal put forward by China on September 30, 1981. The new situation which has emerged with regard to the Taiwan question also provides favorable conditions for the settlement of United States-China differences over the question of United States arms sales to Taiwan.

(6) Having in mind the foregoing statements of both sides, the United States Government states that it does not seek to carry out a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan, that its arms sales to Taiwan will not exceed, either in qualitative or in quantitative terms, the level of those supplied in recent years since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and China, and that it intends to reduce gradually its sales of arms to Taiwan, leading over a period of time to a final resolution. In so stating, the United States acknowledges China's consistent position regarding the thorough settlement of this issue.

(7) In order to bring about, over a period of time, a final settlement of the question of United States arms sales to Taiwan, which is an issue rooted in history, the two governments will make every effort to adopt measures and create conditions conducive to the thorough settlement of this issue.

(8) The development of United States-China relations is not only in the interests of the two peoples but also conducive to peace and stability in the world. The two sides are determined, on the principle of equality and mutual benefit, to strengthen their ties in the economic, cultural, educational, scientific, technological and other fields and make strong, joint efforts for the continued development of relations between the governments and peoples of the United States and China.

(9) In order to bring about the healthy development of United States-China relations, maintain world peace and oppose aggression and expansion, the two governments reaffirm the principles agreed on by the two sides in the Shanghai Communique and the Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations. The two sides will maintain contact and hold appropriate consultations on bilateral and international issues of common interest.
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