FROM TRADITION TO MODERNITY: A SOCIO-HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION ON CHINA'S STRUGGLE TOWARD MODERNIZATION SINCE THE MID-19TH CENTURY

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I. INTRODUCTION

In our human history, no society has ever existed in a state of complete equilibrium. Various factors—physical, demographic, social and so on—are always present, making new demands. Change is always an on-going social phenomenon. Nevertheless, the changes that have occurred during the past two hundred years can be seen as one of the most remarkable and fascinating experiences human beings have ever had. The technological development, two world wars, urbanization, the population explosion, the end of colonization in non-western societies are the striking revolutions of our time. Among these, the end of colonization, the emergence of new nations, and the effort of modernization by non-western societies are of special significance for us.

Indeed, the struggle for independence and the effort to achieve modernization in order to join the ranks of the prosperous, powerful, and peaceful in non-western societies involve not only the domestic development of societies but also the relations among them. Modernization thus becomes a special kind of hope to the people of non-western societies. Political scientist David Apter once noted that "it embodies all the supreme human desires." For the people in these societies, traditional ways of doing things are no longer the framework within which modern societies conduct their business. To them, "modern" means dynamic, concerned with people, democratic and equalitarian, scientific, economically advanced, sovereign, and influential.

But modernization is no easy task. This is particularly true in non-western societies. The problem of modernization in many non-western societies arise partially due to the lack of a smooth transformation based upon societal internal differentiation. S.N. Eisenstadt said, "Modernization is the process of change toward those types of

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social, economic, and political system that has developed in western Europe and North America from the seventeenth century to the nineteenth."² Similarly, in Asia, the modern situation, as Robert N. Bellah has found, "did not arise out of the East Asian past, either as natural growth or as pathological observation; rather it came from without. It came often sharply, even brutally, and it had no roots in the past."³

Just like her Asian neighbors, the problems of modernization in China are also extremely complicated. The history of modern China is without any doubt a history of China's struggle toward modernization. It is a fascinating subject that has received a great deal of attention in the social science community in the recent years. The main purpose of this essay is to review the existing literatures on Chinese modernization with a goal of developing a theoretical synthesis that could explain the socio-historical process of modernization in China.

This essay will begin with a critical review of theories of Chinese modernization in western literatures, followed by a discussion of the views from Chinese intellectuals. Then, a four-stage developmental process of China's modernization effort during the past one hundred and forty years will be presented, with special attention given to a detail discussion on the socio-economic modernization of Taiwan since 1949. Finally, characteristics of China's modernization process will be outlined and a theoretical synthesis based on the existing literatures and China's experience will be proposed at the conclusion.

II. WESTERN THEORIES ON CHINESE MODERNIZATION: A CRITICAL REVIEW

Hundred of books and articles have been written about China's modernization, and several theories have also been proposed in recent years in an attempt to explain this experience. However, most of these theories seem to be preoccupied with the following two empirical questions.

The first is concerned with the analysis of the structural weakness in the traditional Chinese society which handicapped the possible modernization before the 19th century. Such theorists as Max Weber, Marion J. Levy, Robert N. Bellah, S.N. Eisenstadt, and Frances V. Moulder have all at one time or another tried to explain why moderni-

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The second question that China specialists are interested in concerns with the failure of Chinese modernization programs proposed during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. A few researchers seem to be puzzled by the fact that although China and Japan started on their way toward modernization at almost the same time, Japan succeeded in becoming a modern nation-state while China failed. This group of researchers tended to focus their studies on analyzing conflicts between modern Chinese social and political structures and modernization planning itself. Examples of this focus are Lucian Pye's work on the spirit of modern Chinese politics and Barrington Moore's comparison of the modernization efforts of the Nationalists and the Chinese Communists.

It is without any doubt that our understanding of the process of Chinese modernization has been greatly benefited from the above mentioned studies. Nevertheless, we feel that the explanations offered in them often seem fragmentary as well as narrow-minded.

Until now, what we really have are many small works aimed at explaining the faults of Chinese society and the weakness of various Chinese subsystems in developing a Western type of politics and economy. No attempt has been made, however, to understand the incompatibility of the concept of modernization in Chinese existing social structure. No one has ever tried, for instance, to investigate the conditions under which modernization became a great evil to the Chinese in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. There is a lack of awareness in the existing literatures that the modernization process the Chinese experienced is quite different from the one the Western world had experienced earlier. Thus, any new theory on Chinese modernization has to take into account such a difference between China and the West.

1. The Role of Traditional Religion in China's Modernization

The most authoritative work on the study of the inability of the traditional Chinese social structure to develop a capitalist modernization is Max Weber's Religion of China.

The major objective of Weber's work is to demonstrate that

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China's failure to develop a rational bourgeois capitalism was due to the absence of a particular kind of religious ethic for the needed motivation. The *Religion of China* was intended as a support for the major theme in his *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, in which Weber tried to establish the Protestant ethic as an independent causal factor in the development of modern capitalism in the West.

In *Religion of China*, Weber first examined five major concrete factors in the Chinese social system as characterizing features having relevance to the functional requirement of modern capitalism: the monetary system, cities and guilds, the patrimonial state, kinship organization, and law. Although Weber saw many unfavorable conditions for the development of capitalism in these five major spheres, he did find such favorable ones as the absence of status restriction by birth, free migration, free choice of occupation, absence of compulsory schooling and military service, and absence of legal restraint on usury and trade. Weber said, "From a purely economic point of view, a genuine bourgeois industrial capitalism not to appear in China was basically due to the lack of a particular mentality," such as that of ascetic Protestantism.

Taking Chinese social structure on the material condition as given, Weber then compared the differences between Chinese Confucianism and Western ascetic Protestantism. Table 1 is a comparison between Confucianism and Puritanism in Weber's thesis as summarized by Reinhard Bendix.

It was this difference, according to Weber, that contributed to an autonomous capitalist development in the West and the absence of a similar development in China. Weber noted that, "to a striking degree they (the Chinese) lacked rational matter-of-factness, impersonal rationalism, and the nature of an abstract, impersonal, purposive association. True 'communities' were absent, especially in the cities, because there were no economic and managerial forms of association or enterprise which were purely purposive."

*Religion of China* indeed represents an extremely stimulating work in the comparative study of the complex Chinese social system and is a source of provocative ideas for the study of its patterns of socioeconomic change. The value of this work is so enormous that

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**TABLE 1**

**MAX WEBER’S CONCEPTIONS OF CONFUCIANISM AND PURITANISM**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Confucianism</th>
<th>Puritanism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belief in impersonal, cosmic order; tolerance of magic.</td>
<td>Relief in superabundance God; rejection of magic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjustment to the world to maintain harmony of heaven and earth; the ideal of order.</td>
<td>Mastery over the world in unceasing quest for virtue in the eyes of God; the ideal of progressive change.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vigilant self-control for the sake of dignity and self-perfection.</td>
<td>Vigilant self-control for the sake of controlling man’s wicked nature and doing God’s will.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absence of prophecy related to inviolability of tradition; man can avoid the wrath of the spirits and be “good” if he acts properly.</td>
<td>Prophecy makes tradition and the world as it is appear wicked; man cannot attain goodness by his own efforts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Familial piety as the principle governing all human relations.</td>
<td>Subordination of all human relations to the service of God.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kinship relations as the basis for commercial transactions, voluntary associations, law and public administration.</td>
<td>Rational Law and agreement as the basis for commercial transactions, voluntary associations, law and public administration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distrust of all persons outside the extended family.</td>
<td>Trust of all persons who are “brothers in the faith.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wealth as the basis of dignity and self-perfection.</td>
<td>Wealth as a temptation and unintended by-product of a virtuous life.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

most of the studies on Chinese society by contemporary Western scholars have often taken it as an indispensable theoretical point of departure. Because of its great importance, unfortunately, many of Weber’s followers have tended to ignore the many empirical problems inherent in it.

In reviewing Weber's *Religion of China*, one must keep in mind that the underlying theoretical orientation of Weber's work on the
study of China, India and other civilizations was not so much as to prove the existence of the capitalism in these societies, but rather to demonstrate the highly unique characteristics of rational capitalist economic development in the West. The basic foundation of Weber's comparative methodology was thus to demonstrate the great importance of the rational mentality of the Protestant ethic in the development of Western industrialization and the lack of such a mentality in all the other great civilizations, including China and India. With this preoccupation in mind, Weber thus tended to pick only those factors that favored his own arguments.

More specifically, in the case of China, Weber failed to make a necessary distinction between the ideal and actual patterns of social behavior in traditional Chinese society. Confucian ethic, unlike Christian ideology, was often regarded only as an ideal that was too high to be reached by the common people in traditional China. The Confucian ethic was in fact never a major force in popular culture of the general population. Even those in the upper level of society rarely practiced it as rigidly as was required in the original text of Confucian Classics. What is now thought to be conservative may have been interpreted as progressive by different Confucian scholars in different periods of China's long history, because the context in Confucian classics was so vague that it could be interpreted in either way. It is, therefore, misleading to take Confucianism as comparable with Protestantism, as Weber did.

Weber also failed to realize that the country of China is too large to be taken as a "cultural whole." Many China specialists have noted that in China there are a great many local cultures existing, each with its own distinctive characteristics; even two nearby villages may sometimes have quite different patterns of behavior norms and values. Since Confucian ethic was often merely an ideal pattern, as we have argued, the differences existing in local communities must have had significant impact on the attitudes of the people living there toward socioeconomic development. One apparent example of such a local economically oriented culture can be found in Anhui province, for the people of Anhui have been one of the most successful and influential business groups in China ever since the tenth century; they dominated Chinese commercial and banking businesses for many centuries. No other territorial group in China has had such distinctive economic ori-

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entation and achievement. If the people of An-hwei practiced Con-
fucianism as precise as it was presented in the text which condemned commercial business as evil, there would not be any so-called An-hwei Businessmen in China's economic history.

One of the main arguments in Weber's *Religion of China* is that there was no tension found in the traditional value system. He said

[There were] no tensions between nature and deity, between ethical demand and human shortcoming, consciousness of sin and need for salvation, conduct on earth and compensation in the beyond, religious duty and socio-political reality. Hence, there was no leverage for influencing conduct through inner forces freed of tradition and convention.12

Here again, we saw that Weber took for granted that Confucianism played the sole role in traditional Chinese society. Weber failed to take into account the significant impact of Taoism on the Chinese masses. As a school of philosophy, Taoism did represent one of the most conservative schools of thought in the traditional Chinese philosophical system. But as a religious sect, it was one of the most progressive and rebellious groups in Chinese history. History shows that revolutions and rebellions initiated by Taoists and their followers were frequently observed in several of the Chinese dynasties. In fact, Taoism was the religion of the Chinese mass peasantry. To say that Taoism is conservative, therefore, is to misunderstand its great potential for progressive change, which was often reflected in the Chinese peasantry, certainly the majority group of the Chinese population. To completely ignore the popularity of Taoism as Weber did is unforgivable.

In short, Weber's contribution on the analysis of Chinese social structure is overshadowed by his preoccupation in attempting to prove that the condition in traditional China was unfavorable to the development of rational capitalism.

Another similar theoretical argument on the relationship between religious belief and modernization in China is found in Robert N. Bellah's *Tokugawa Religion*, which is designed to apply Weber's theory of industrialization to the Japanese case.

Although Bellah does not deal with Chinese religious belief directly in his *Tokugawa Religion*, he often cites Chinese examples for comparison with the Japanese experience. He notes:

At many points in this study implicit or explicit comparisons

with China have been made. This has usually been prompted by the fact that so much of the cultural and religious tradition is common to both, whereas the process of modernization took such a different course in China and Japan. We have usually attempted, whatever this subject has come up, to use the basic value systems of the two societies as a primary reference point in explaining the difference.\textsuperscript{13}

The basic difference between China and Japan, according to Bellah is that "China was characterized by the primacy of integrative value whereas Japan was characterized by primacy of political or goal-attainment value." The integrative value in China thus are more concerned with system maintenance than with goal-attainment or adaptation, more with solidarity than with power or wealth. The human relations in China, in other words, is more concerned with particularistic ties than with universalistic attributes.

The Chinese saw the problem of system maintenance, according to Bellah, "in terms of a determinate set of human relations that only needed to be kept in a state of mutual adjustment for a harmonious and balanced social system to result. An adjusted equilibrium is indeed the ideal of Chinese society."\textsuperscript{14} Thus, the value of filial piety clearly superseded political loyalty. Even the political loyalty existing in traditional China was strongly "familistic." In short, Bellah argues, the traditional Chinese polity was not constructed for progressive change or goal-attainment, but for system maintenance.

Bellah concludes, therefore, the Chinese ethic lacks the dynamism which would overcome the traditionalism of the masses and transfer the primacy allegiance from the family to some larger collectivity. The rationalism inherent in the Confucian ethic seems to need to be linked with a value system in which political values have primacy if it is to have an influence in the direction of modernization.

From the above summary of Bellah's arguments, we can see he is under the great shadow of Weber, even though he did try to use a different language to describe it. For Bellah, the system maintenance of integration in Chinese society is responsible for the lack of goal-attainment or developmental motivation; whereas for Weber, it is the Confucian doctrine of nature harmony and integration that is responsible for the failure of the development of capitalist economy. The main difference between Bellah and Weber lies in the fact that Bellah tried to focus his study on the religious tradition in the lives of "ordi-

\textsuperscript{13} Bellah, \textit{Tokugawa Religion}, supra note 3, p. 188.
\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., p. 189.
nary people,” while Weber was more concerned with Confucian ideology. It seems to me, then, Bellah’s approach is much closer to the true picture of Chinese daily life than Weber, for the reason we mentioned earlier.

The main problem in Bellah’s comparison of Japan and China is that he seems to ignore the diversity of religious traditions among ordinary Chinese people. For it is evident that Japan’s small population of “ordinary people” is much more harmonious ideologically and religiously than their Chinese counterpart. As we mentioned before, many different local cultures existed in China, and it is impossible to consider the Chinese “ordinary people” as a homogenous group.

In methodology, Bellah also falls into the Weber’s trap. Like Weber, Bellah attempts to show that China lacked the ability of developing a rational economy which was contrast in Japan. It is quite apparent that Japan is merely a substitute for Weber’s West in Bellah’s work. In reading Takugawa Religion, there is a strong mixture of Weberian theory and Parsonian language in it.

2. Chinese Family Structure and Modernization

Marion J. Levy, Jr. has developed an interesting theory on the inability of Chinese social structure for the development of modernization by looking into the role of the traditional family in China. Levy suggested that the Chinese modernization might fail because of the Chinese family’s inability to change its inner structure to promote change. Levy constructed a comparison between Chinese and Japanese families in an attempt to emphasize the Chinese shortcoming in this particular respect.

Levy saw the major differences between Chinese and Japanese family structures that are relevant for modernization as (1) how family considerations enter the total social picture, (2) the fact that there was no single ideal type of family in Japan, and (3) the emphasis on primogeniture in Japan.15

The first of these main differences referred to the mechanism of social integration, Levy said:

In Japan the family certainly occupied a position of strategic importance, but it was definitely subordinated to other considerations in the society. This created in the society a possibility overriding or manipulating various aspects of the

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family patterns for other purposes. In China this possibility of manipulating family patterns in terms of other aspects of the society was much more limited because the family structure of China was too a much greater degree the major focus of the society than was the case in Japan.\(^{16}\)

One distinctive example is that, in Japan, loyalty to the feudal hierarchy took clear precedence over loyalty to one's family. Every man's first duty in Japan was to his overlord while the family came second. In China, on the contrary, nothing is more important than one's own family.

The second of the differences between the Chinese and Japanese family structures in relation to modernization turns on the marked differences in class structures in the two societies. In theory, China could be seen to have an open class system while in Japan the class system was almost closed. This contrast was reflected in the status of the merchants in these two societies. According to Levy, then, the Chinese merchants held roles of extremely low prestige because the open class system allowed the children of the merchants to move up into the official bureaucracy, either through such formal channels as examinations or through such informal channels as capital donations or bribes. The ideal and highest goal of the upward mobility in China was service in the official bureaucracy; wealth was one way to move into this bureaucracy. Consequently, the status of merchants became a "transitory status" for those who failed in examination but whose goal was still to go to the official bureaucracy.\(^{17}\)

In Japan, Levy argued, the picture was completely different. The closed class system inhibited any movement from the bottom to the top, and thus, preserved the continuity of the status of merchants. Levy said that "one was born to the social position of one's parents. It was expected that one stay in it as well."\(^{18}\) No matter how rich a man was, he and his descendants still remained in the same social status. Thus, the Japanese merchants did not have any motivation or incentive to move up into the feudal hierarchy in this closed class system. They remained as merchants and worked hard to preserve thereby the welfare of their family. This group of Japanese merchants then became an important factor in that country's economic development.

The third of the differences lies in the fact that the Japanese family instituted a sort of business civil service within their own compa-
nies, and those men most successful in the business competition and destined to become major figures in the various enterprises of the family more frequently brought into the family membership. The role of equal inheritance on the part of all sons that held in China was not practiced in Japan, nor did the oldest sons always succeed to the family property or rights. Levy said that "he [the oldest son] could be, and sometimes was, replaced by someone adopted as an oldest son, or he could even be replaced by a younger one. . . . This made possible at one and the same time the continued concentration of wealth in a single family line and the creation of a cadet class." 19

The immediate consequence of such a system of adoption-related modernization is that economic capital could be easily passed from one generation to another within a single family. This also means that family wealth can be more effectively utilized in large-scale industrial investment, and the criteria of adoption, in terms of universalistic competence, may encourage an effective and successful business operation.

Although it may very well be true that the Chinese family was responsible for the failure of the development of Chinese modernization, as Levy has suggested. The three major contrasting factors are, it seems to me, not very likely to be the most crucial ones in the different processes of modernization experienced by China and Japan. There are several problems in Levy's theoretical arguments.

First, there is some evidence that the Chinese can develop a successful entrepreneur society under the traditional family structure. Studies on the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia have clearly demonstrated this to be true. 20

Second, the argument on the class structures in Japan and China is a strange one, for mobility is often regarded as the necessary condition to develop a capitalist system. As a matter of fact, economic growth and development can hardly sustain without a free occupational mobility. In addition, I also find other reasons to question Levy's argument here. First, in a closed-class system like Japan's, there certainly was no motivation for upward mobility into a higher social class. A merchant is always a merchant under this system. Thus, is he expected to work hard all his life for nothing but wealth? Second, in a society as isolated as Japan's was in the pre-industrial period, the majority of the population would be peasants while the size

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19. Ibid., p. 517.
of the merchant class was likely to be small. Then, how could the merchants inspire the peasants to join their revolt against the existing system, if they themselves had no chance to move up? Even Weber agreed, as we mentioned earlier, China, in comparison with Japan, probably had a better chance to develop its socio-economic modernization than Japan insofar as the class structures are concerned.

As mentioned earlier, Levy also argued that the role of the Chinese merchant is merely a transitory one because his ultimate goal is in the official bureaucracy. Levy claimed that such an open-class system encouraged the talented people to go to the official bureaucracy instead of staying in the merchant class, and by emphasizing the high value of the bureaucracy, therefore, has undoubtedly hurt the development of an entrepreneur class in China. But I do not believe this lack of an entrepreneur class development was due to the result of the recruitment process of the bureaucracy through which government recruited all the talented men while leaving only the less intelligent in the business world, as Levy strongly suggested. Rather, it seems to me, it is because the tremendous investment in both human energy and capital, which could otherwise be used in socioeconomic development went into the preparation for the examination that handicapped the business and other commercial developments. Very often, as stories told by history, ten years, or even one's whole life, could be and was spent in this important endeavor in traditional China in the hope that someday he would pass the examinations.

In regard to the third difference, one important question Levy leaves unanswered is what percentage of merchants in Japan practiced the idea of adoption? In other words, how many merchants in Japan actually adopted a capable business partner or co-worker from outside the family to succeed them in the business and replace their own sons in the family? Was this only a possible "ideal" or was it really practiced in most of the great Japanese merchant families? Levy did not provide any empirical evidence to support his argument.

In short, what may be the contrasting characteristics between the Japanese and the Chinese family structures may not be the "contrasting factors" at all in modernization processes experienced differently by these two societies. Moreover, Levy never gave us any explicit rationale or justification for his selection of the points he compared.

3. Chinese Political Structure and Modernization

Three major works in this field will be discussed here. They are: Barrington Moore's Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy,

Moore's main theoretical argument regarding China’s failure to modernize is focused on the political implication of social structures in that country. First, according to Moore, large numbers of lower-degree candidates at the bottom of the official Chinese system of ranking dissipated their energy in fruitless revolt and insurrection within the prevailing framework. Conversely, the lower ranks of the Japanese samurai provided much of the impetus toward modernization during the 19th century.21

Second, according to Moore, the imperial Chinese society never created an urban trading and manufacturing class comparable to the one that grew out of the latter stages of feudalism in Western Europe. Since the Chinese believed that money-making activities represented a dangerous threat to the scholar-official’s image and legitimacy, the government was very careful not to allow such activities to get out of control. Thus, they taxed commerce for their own gain, or they turned business into state monopoly and kept the most lucrative positions for themselves.

Third, according to Moore, the Chinese government was too weak to have any national industrialization program because most of the commercial and industrial elements were foreign and largely beyond its control in the late 19th century. Further, any attempt to use modern technology was made by the powerful local provincial gentry for their own separatist purpose.

Fourth, Moore indicated, there was no independent ideology of the Chinese middle class in the nineteenth century.

Finally, China failed to adopt a commercial agriculture; the Chinese landowner showed no enthusiasm for improving production methods for the sake of the urban market. And because of this, Moore argued, the Chinese peasantry in the first half of this century turned against the urban-middle class oriented Nationalist government while giving their support to the Chinese Communists.

The main issue in Eisenstadt’s study of the processes of change in Chinese society is that the condition necessary for the development of extensive marginal and total change did not exist in traditional China. The principle type of change that dominated China’s long history was, according to him, “accommodable change.” He said:

> China presents a good example of a society in which processes of accommodable change occurred and of the con-

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crete conditions under which they tend to develop. In China, throughout many centuries (until the end of the nineteenth century and the meeting with the West), accommodable and marginal (rebellious and dynastic) changes constituted the principal types of change. On the other hand, all the marginal types of change either evaporated or merged in the processes of accommodable change, becoming reintegrated into the basic framework of the political institutions. 22

Processes of accommodable change were connected with the social condition that made possible the continuous fundamental harmony in traditional Chinese polity. Conflicts among different political groups were often regulated through the existing norms and activities of the major political and regulative institutions of the society.

Eisenstadt argued that three vital tendencies capable of undermining the existing institutional framework never fully developed in traditional China: (a) the potential trend toward feudalization as patrimonial decentralization which was often blocked by the gentry and the older aristocracy; (b) the tendency toward complete independence of the urban merchant and professional groups; and (c) the trend toward development of activistic, universalistic, religious and cultural orientations. He then concluded that failure to develop these three great tendencies made the later modernization attempt more difficult. 23

The third major work on Chinese political institution and modernization is Lucian W. Pye's The Spirit of Chinese Politics. His central argument is that there was an authority crisis in Chinese politics in particular and in society generally. The lack of a national identity and of effective norms of authority made it difficult for the Chinese to move toward successful development and modernization. Pye said that "basic problem in development for the Chinese has been that of achieving within their social and political life few forms of authority which can both satisfy their need to reassert a historic self-confidence and also provide the basis for re-ordering their society in modern terms." 24

Thus, Pye concluded that it was impossible for the Chinese government to advance national political development, because they could not meet the essential requirements to penetrate more thoroughly into

23. Ibid., pp. 325-326.
the society and mobilizing human and material resources more extensively than had been possible in the traditional system, so long as the Chinese were experiencing such an authority crisis.

We found there were two main issues in the three studies just summarized. Moore and Eisenstadt all focus on the lack of dynamic oriented change inherent in traditional Chinese social and political structures which then made any contemporary progressive change impossible. Pye emphasized the special importance of the authority crisis after contact with the West in the transitional period. In turn, Pye argued, such an authority crisis made the government unable to advance any political and economic developments of their own. Since political modernization is now generally regarded as the most urgent task in the whole process of modernization in the non-Western societies the studies on Chinese political structure in relation to modernization is, therefore, greatly welcomed.

The theoretical arguments found in Moore and Eisenstadt’s respective work did not really go any farther than Weber’s work which we mentioned earlier. What Moore and Eisenstadt really achieved, if any, is their attempts to narrow their focuses particularly to political and legal systems in traditional China, while Weber looked at a much general level of value system in traditional China.

There are some difficulties in Eisenstadt’s theory of “accommodable change” of traditional Chinese society. First of all, he did not give us any satisfactory reason why accommodable change existed only in China, not other societies; he simply said that the pressure of integrative harmony was too strong for any total change in social and political structures to occur in China. Secondly, he also did not show us how China could maintain integration for such a long time or if there was any significant structural feature in the Chinese political system that contributed to such an integration in traditional China.

Sociologically, for the purpose of studying change and modernization, it seems to me, it would be very interesting to find out how China was able to avoid total change during her long history. In other words, what mechanisms were used in China to sustain its political and social systems functionally intact? For instance, the bureaucratic system of recruitment can be seen as a system-maintenance mechanism against total change in society. By requiring a complete memorizing of Confucian Classics without argument or question, the government was able to indoctrinate the traditional norms and ideology into every potential government official as the only line of thinking and way of doing things. Similarly, the strict practice of Confucian ideology, which was required for the promotion and upward mobility
within the official bureaucracy, also contributed to political integration in traditional China. They reduced the possible change of any deviant thought and behavior, and thus, revolution, among political leaders in the traditional Chinese society.

In general, I would agree with Pye's main argument of the crisis of authority responsible for the government's inability to mobilize China's resources for modernization. But his "identity crisis" bothers me. I do not believe the Chinese have ever doubted who they were during this period of social and political crisis in the 19th and 20th centuries. For the majority of Chinese, it was a question of Chinese against foreigners, not the Chinese against the Chinese. To them, the Manchu rulers and Westerners were both foreigners. Being against the Manchu government did not mean being against the Chinese themselves.25

The authority crisis emanating from such a political struggle resulted in the failure of the Chinese themselves to establish an efficient centralized government to deal with the challenge from the West. For instance, the revolutionary party of Dr. Sun Yat-sen before 1911 never admitted that the Manchus were Chinese. The party leaders believed that the Manchus were foreigners and barbarians and that they were responsible for the failure of system-maintenance and for the failure of creating an effective coping mechanism to deal with these crises. In fact, the leaders were convinced that they could solve the crisis situation themselves because they, as true Chinese, knew and understood the problems much better than the Manchu rulers. Thus, it is very unlikely that crisis in China resulted from the national identity crisis, as Pye has suggested.

On the contrary, the problems in China at that time were quite similar to those in other colonial societies—the problem of standing against colonial rulers, the problem of national independence, and so forth. Following this line of argument, one question might be of interest: why did the authority crisis not disappear in China after the successful revolution in 1911? One possible way to study this problem, it seems to me, is to analyze the ideological and political backgrounds of the Chinese political modernization leadership in the post-1911 period. It is evident that conflicts between traditional and modernization political leaders created a tremendous impediment to a smooth and well-planned social and political transformation in China. Nowhere

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25. Wen-hui Tsai, *Patterns of Political Elite Mobility in Modern China, 1912-1949* (Hong Kong: Chinese Materials Center, 1983).
does Pye make a serious attempt to analyze China in terms of a theory that applied to transitional societies as a whole.

More serious is the methodology upon which Pye develops his theoretical generalization. Although what he has said may very well be true, he offers no assurance of validity beyond his own expertise in the field; no empirical work is presented. The basis of his whole argument, as a matter of fact, was his own personal experience of growing up in China. He also claimed that in this psychological oriented study of political culture, he did not need to be concerned with questions about the actual distribution of attitude and feelings throughout the Chinese population. The personal bias inherent in this work is most unfortunate.

4. External Factors in Chinese Modernization

Although most studies have generally agreed that the Chinese contacts with the West have had a significant impact on the process of Chinese modernization, very few systematic studies have been done in this respect. In fact, Western scholars seem very reluctant to admit that Western political economic, and military interference in the nineteenth century created a tremendously difficult situation for the Chinese to work on their developmental projects independently from the West.

Most of these scholars argue that the contacts with the West should have given China an advantageous opportunity from the West, but China failed to do so. For instance, Levy argued that China would have had an even better chance than Japan, because the Western countries had invested more capital in China than in Japan, and therefore, China should have been able to utilize more Western capital in its investment on modernization, as compared with Japan.

Both Levy and other scholars who took the same stand with him failed to realize the fact that Chinese economic programs in the late 19th and early 20th centuries were under a great restriction from the West because of the Chinese economic dependence on the West. Historical evidence can be found that on several occasions Chinese developmental plans were rejected by the Western money-lenders whenever those plans were in conflict with the latter's. The Chinese had almost no freedom to do anything without permission from the West. Francis

L.K. Hsu once said it sadly: "Since the middle of the nineteenth century China has never had the freedom of pondering its own way and moving at its own pace."\(^{28}\)

A similar viewpoint was expressed in Frances V. Moulder’s comparison of modernization between Japan and China. Moulder sees that there was no strong effort by the Western nations in the 19th century to incorporate Japan’s dependencies because of its small market for trade and investment which enabled Japan to develop its own strategies for development. But in China, the Western capitalist nations developed a large staple trade with China and the assumption of the power of China’s government which led to the dismantling of the already weak imperial state. As a result, according to Moulder, Japan enjoyed a greater degree of autonomy in its development, while China’s dependency on the Western nations undermined its efforts in modernization in the 19th century.\(^{29}\)

It is certainly very naive to blame either the West or the Chinese alone for the failure of China’s modernization, even though the external forces in China at that time were very crucial. What is needed is a systematic analysis of both the advantages and disadvantages of the western impact on China, institutionally as well as psychologically.

In summary, our review of the western theories of Chinese modernization has found that most studies and theories on this subject tend to be fragmentary as well as narrow-minded, for too much emphasis is often put on a certain limited aspect of the Chinese social structure while ignoring all the others. Weber’s study of Chinese traditional religion, Bellah’s examination of traditional value system, Levy’s work on the role and functions of the family, the respective works of Eisenstadt, Pye, and Moore on the Chinese political system, and Moulder’s analysis of foreign external forces in China all pose a common problem that they are too narrow in scope to be able to explain the complexity of the Chinese modernization process. Moreover, all the above mentioned theories are developed by western scholars who are not personally involved in China’s modernization experience. In the next section, we shall turn to the various competing views offered by Chinese intellectuals on the fate of Chinese modernization.


III. CHINESE VIEWS ON MODERNIZATION EFFORT

The idea of change and reform has been discussed among Chinese intellectuals ever since the mid-19th century, and yet, according to Fairbank and Teng, "the process of ideological change in modern China had to begin with the reinterpretation of the Chinese heritage, rather than with its denial and rejection."30 Shocked by domestic rebellions and foreign invasions, the Chinese scholar-officials suddenly realized the possibility of the fall of the Empire and the necessity of searching for a proper path to a strong new China. The radicals were for jettisoning the whole traditional system, while the conservatives clung to their hope of a Confucian revival. The radicals were very few in number, whereas the conservatives were the great majority of Chinese intellectuals and, more importantly, were strongly sympathized with by the Imperial Court in the mid-nineteenth century. The 1860s T'ung-Chih Restoration was one of the great attempts of the conservatives. The great aim of the T'ung-Chih Restoration was the revival of Confucian values and institutions which the conservatives regarded as superior to the western barbarian values and institutions, and which could stabilize popular sentiment and integrate the great Chinese nation. Led by T'seng Kuo-fan the Chinese conservatives re-examined Confucian values and institutions in great detail in order to recreate a modified theory which could be fit into Chinese social and political situations at the time. The program of the restoration involved finance, the civil service, law, and ethical morality, as well as foreign policy.

The assumption in such a self-examination of the traditional Confucian theory was that peace and stability could be achieved through the restoration of the traditional heritage. The Chinese conservatives were convinced that Chinese history during the past three thousand years has shown several successful reforms through such a "return to the old way." However, the Chinese conservatives in the mid-nineteenth century failed to realize the complexity of the social and political situations in relation to the internal unrest and foreign aggressions. The traditional theory of a cyclical change was not only invalid for the modern period, but also complete inadequate; progress forward now must be taken into consideration. It is not enough merely to restore the best of the ancient Chinese values and institutions but it is necessary to have a far-reaching plan of modernization in which China may find a place in the large universe. The lack of such a foundation made the failure of the "T'ung-Chih Restoration"

30. Fairbank and Teng., eds., China's Response to the West, supra note 26, p. 7.
movement inevitable. Wright said, "The country became weaker than stronger: sycophants filled the posts lately held by the great Restoration statement; and the successful foreign policy of the sixties gave way to an era of ever more humiliating treaties, loss of territory, and—in all but name—loss of sovereignty itself."31

The ideological consequence of the failure of the "T'ung-Chih Restoration" is apparent: the conservatives lost their confidence on the old theory, whereas the radicals sought revolution as the only solution to save China. Although there were several attempts toward a smooth reform in the late-nineteenth century and early twentieth century, the revolution finally broke out in October 1911. Dr. Sun Yatsan and his revolutionary group overthrew the old Manchus Empire and established a new Republic, the first in China's long history.

The Chinese modernizing elite, those foreign educated Chinese young intellectuals in particular, were quite understandably enthusiastic about the success of the Republican revolution and saw it as the beginning of a new era in China's return to world respectability. Unfortunately, their dream of a stronger and better China soon became a nightmare as China after the revolution fell into the hands of a group of warlords with endless civil wars while the threat of a Japanese dominance endangering China's independence became more and more real and unbearable. The fate of China's future thus became the central focus of a furious debate among the Chinese intellectuals in the post-revolutionary China.

The currents of Chinese ideological thought in the post-1912 period are too complicated to be easily classified. For the purpose of our discussion here we may classify the Chinese intellectuals of the period into two major groups: the modernizing elite and the traditional elite. The Modernizing elite are those reformers who attempt to adopt western values and institutions into Chinese society in order to establish a new modern China. Within this group of modernizing elite, it is also necessary to differentiate the liberals who prefer the gradual transformation of Chinese modernization through education and other peaceful methods, and the leftists who are communists and/or socialists in favor of radical political action to achieve the goal of modernization in China.

The Confucians were the other major group of Chinese intellectuals in the post-1912 period. These traditional elite insisted that the traditional Confucian values and institutions were superior and thus

must be preserved in China; they believed that China can be a strong nation based on a rebuilt Confucian theory. Some of the traditional elite even declared that someday the Confucian theory will regain its glory in the world when the Western materialistic civilization collapses.

It is certainly significant to note here, nevertheless, that many Chinese leaders of the period at one time or another had a foot in either group. And events have moved so rapidly in twentieth-century China that by clinging to certain views a radical might find himself soon grown conservative.

1. Hu Shih and the Modernizing Elite

The central figure in the modernizing elite at the early Republican period after the 1911 revolution was Dr. Hu Shih, an American educated professor of philosophy at Peking University. Hu Shih argued the current crisis in modern Chinese society is mainly the result of the great mistake made by traditional Confucianism. He attacked the Chinese worship of meaning, the filial piety symbolism, and Confucian classical education as not fitting into the present-day Chinese society.

For Hu Shih, civilization is an evolutionary process of imitation. "The greatest period of a race is the period of imitating others." Hu said, "When a race does not learn from others, the race is going to decline. The greatest age of China were the periods in which we sincerely tried to learn from the others. The great capacity for imitation in the Japanese race has made Japan a great nation. On the other hand, Chinese traditions do not fit into present-day society at all. There is no other way to save China from destruction than to imitate others. . . We have to learn from others with whole heart. We have to imitate them. We have to learn how to educate people to kick out our stupidity, how to operate machines to conquer nature for human happiness, and how to establish efficient systems for business, industry, and even politics." 12

Hu Shih argued that the civilization of a race is simply the summation of its achievement in adjusting itself to its environment. Success or failure in that adjustment depends upon the ability of the race to use intelligence for the invention of necessary effective tools. Advancement in civilization depends upon the improvement of tools. Thus, the difference between Eastern and Western civilizations is pri-

marily a difference in the tools used. He said, “Every tool of civilization is produced by human intelligence making use of the matter and energy in the natural world for the satisfaction of a want, a desire, an aesthetic feeling or an intellectual curiosity.” And, “there is no such thing as a purely material civilization.”

The material civilization and spiritual civilization are not two contradictory concepts, they are in fact the two manifestations of human civilization, we do not merely mean the physical object but also the human intelligence used in its creation. Hu Shih deeply believed that the spiritual civilization must be built on the foundation of material progress. As a matter of fact, no spiritual civilization can be achieved without the satisfaction of material civilization. He said, “The great tragedy of our human world is that many people worked hard all their lives without achieving a minimal human happiness.” He asked, “What spiritualism is there in a civilization which tolerates such a terrible form of human slavery as the rickshaw coolie? Do we seriously believe that there can be any spiritual life left in those poor human beasts of burden who run and toil and sweat under that peculiar bondage of slavery which knews neither the minimum wage nor any limit of working hours?” And, thus, he argued that “there is not much spirituality in a civilization which bound the feet of its women for almost a thousand years without a protest, nor in that other civilizations (India) which long tolerated the practice of suttee or cremation of widows and has maintained the horrible caste-system to this day.”

According to Hu Shih, modern Western civilization is built on the following concepts: (a) The purpose of human life is to search for happiness, (b) thus, poverty is a sin, and (c) thus, illness is a sin. He said, “It is because poverty is a sin that men have to develop natural resources, to encourage production, to improve manufacture, and to improve human heredity. And finally, it is because the purpose of human life is to search for happiness that we want to have a comfortable living, a convenient transportation, a clean city, beautiful arts, a safe society, and good politics.” Therefore, he said, there is no doubt that “modern technology is highly spiritual because it seeks, through

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36. Ibid., p. 40.
human ingenuity and intelligence, to release human energy from the unnecessary hardships of life and provide for it the necessary conditions for the enjoyment of life. Whatever by the use men may make of the resultant comfort and leisure, the relief of suffering and hardship is in itself spiritual."38

Another characteristic of modern Western civilization is science. The spirit of science is to search for truth. It is truth that can release the human being from environmental, cultural, and superstitious sufferings to become a strong, intelligent, and free man. Hu Shih pointed out that “it was science and the new technology which restored to man the sense of self-confidence and created the modern civilization of the West . . . . A whole recognition of the material satisfaction is one of the significant characteristics in modern Western civilization.”39 And “if the priests of the Medieval Age were justly canonized as saints, Galileo, Watt, Stephenson, Morse, Bell, Edison, and Ford certainly deserve to be honored as gods and enshrined with Prometheus and Cadmus. They represent that which is most divine in man, namely, that creative intelligence which provides implements and makes civilization possible.”40

The spirit of science also relies on its skepticism. Science teaches us not to despair of the infinity of knowledge for it is only through piecemeal accumulation of fragmentary information that we can hope to arrive at some knowledge of nature at all. Every piecemeal acquisition is progress, and every little step in advance gives the worker a genuinely spiritual rapture. Hu Shih said, “The most spiritual element in science is its skepticism, its courage to doubt everything and believe nothing without sufficient evidence. This attitude is not merely negative, although on the negative side it has performed very great service in liberating the human mind from slavish subjection to superstition and authority. The attitude of doubt is essentially constructive and creative: it is the only legitimate road to belief; it aims at conquering doubt itself and establishing belief on a new basis. It has not only fought the old belief with the irresistible weapon, ‘Give me evidence,’ but also raised new problems and led to new discoveries by the same insistence on evidence.”41 For Hu Shih, it is this spirit of “creative doubt” which has made progress of science and the greatness of modern Western civilization.

38. Hu, “The Civilizations of the East and the West,” supra note 33, p. 34.
41. Ibid., p. 37.
One significant consequence of the great achievement in science in Western civilization is the emergence of a new religion which Hu Shih called "The Religion of Democracy." He said, "Modern civilization did not begin with religion, but it has resulted in a new religion; it did not much trouble about morals, but it has achieved a new system of morals."\textsuperscript{42} The basic idea of this modern religion is, Hu Shih said, that "we trust man rather than Heaven; we depend on ourselves rather than God; we do not want to imagine what is the Heaven, we want to build a human paradise in this world; we do not want to become an eternal deity, we want to be a happy and healthy man in this world; we do not want to think about religious philosophy, we want to be an intelligent man to improve this world; we will not easily believe God's ability, but we do believe in the capacity of scientific techniques and the future of our human being is not limited; we will not believe the eternity of soul but we will believe the greatness of human character and of human right."\textsuperscript{43} The development of the religion of democracy has its historical significance. The Industrial Revolution opened up the possibility of the emergence of such a religion. Hu said, "With the increase in material enjoyment and the rise of a large middle class, there has been simultaneously an expansion in man's imaginative power and sympathy. And with the restoration of man's confidence in himself as the agent to control his own destinies, there have developed the various types of social consciousness and social virtues. All this leads to the rise of the new religion of democracy, by which I mean to include the individualistic ideals of the eighteenth century and the socialistic ideals of the last hundred years."\textsuperscript{44} The ideals of Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity, which were widely spread in the European continent, he said, "have become the war-cry of the American Revolution, the French revolution, and the revolution of 1848, and have vibrated through all the later revolutions."\textsuperscript{45} The ideals of the religion of democracy have worked themselves into the constitutions of the new republics. They have brought about the downfall of monarchies, empires, and aristocracies. They have given to man equality before the law and freedom of thought, speech, publication, and religious belief. And they have emancipated the women and made universal education a reality. Hu said, "This religion of democracy which not only guarantees one's own liberty . . . but also

\textsuperscript{42} Ibid., p. 37.
\textsuperscript{43} Hu, Collected Essays of Hu Shih, vol. 3, supra note 32, p. 10.
\textsuperscript{44} Ibid., "The Civilizations of the East and the West," supra note 33, p. 38.
\textsuperscript{45} Ibid., p. 38.
endeavors to make it possible for every man and woman to live a free life; which not only succeeds through science and machinery in greatly enhancing the happiness and comfort of the individual, but also seeks through organization and legislation to extend the goods of life to the greatest number—this is the greatest spiritual heritage of the Western civilization.”

Hu Shih made very clear the need of a psychological prerequisite in the process of Chinese modernization. He said, “Today if we are going to try investigate how to solve the problems of Chinese society, we have to reexamine our attitude towards these problems first. . . . We should reexamine ourselves: why did we fail? why is our national salvation movement still a failure today? There are still many people who do not believe our nation and race are sick. . . . Others do not try hard to cure our sickness.”

The self-examination of Chinese traditions, according to Hu Shih, does not only require a new mentality but also a recognition of all the mistakes the Chinese have made. “There were several major events in recent Chinese history such as the Sino-Japan War in 1894, the Russian occupation of Li Hsung Harbor, the Boxer incident, etc., we reacted to these incidents strongly each time, but we have never achieved our goal to save China.”

It is, therefore, the duty of the leaders, especially political leaders, to show what the problems are and how to solve them. Hu Shih said, “Often we do not think seriously what kind of society and nation we want to have, and often we are also not willing to think about the direction which can lead us to reach the destination. Consequently, if somebody says left, we go left; others say right, we go right. If our leaders have great experience in world affairs, and if our leaders lead us with their eyes open, we may be able to reach the destination by following them. However, if they are blind, then we will be in great danger.”

History has told us that Chinese political leaders have failed to direct us to build a better nation. People also have lost their faith too. It is now the responsibility of Chinese modern intellectuals to take over the leadership and to call attention to the mistake made by those political leaders. Hu Shih said, “We must open our eyes to find the right direction. We do not want to follow those blind leaders. . . . Our duty is that we will use our knowledge to observe objectively the true needs of the present-day China in order to decide our goal. We first

46. Ibid., p. 40.
49. Ibid., p. 430.
want to ask what have to be destroyed, which is a negative goal. Then we are going to ask what we want to build, which is our positive goal.”

Hu Shih’s solution to the problem is simple: wholesale westernization.

Hu Shih then called for a wholesale and wholehearted westernization in China. He said:

My own attitude is that we must unreservedly accept this modern civilization of the West because we need it to solve our most pressing problems, the problems of poverty, ignorance, disease and corruption. These are the real enemies we are facing, and none of these can be subjugated by the old civilization. . . . And I am convinced the old traditions will not be lost even when we take an extreme view of the need for modernization, because civilizations are conservative by their nature. By the natural inertia of cultures, the vast majority will take good care of those traditional values. But it behooves the leaders to go as far as they can in order that they may bring the masses to move a few steps farther in the direction of solving the most urgent problems of the nation by means of every instrumentality which this new civilization can offer.

Although the common goal of the Chinese modernizing elite in the period was the same: westernization in China, the methods of achieving this common goal were quite different in various groups of the modernizing elite. Conflicts of opinion rapidly developed over the ideological reconstruction of Chinese life. The doctrines of socialism, anarchism, nationalism, and communism were widely spread among Chinese modernizing elite in the period.

In such an atmosphere, Hu Shih’s advocacy of “wholesale westernization” inevitably received both praise and challenge from Chinese modernizing elite. One of the strong supporters of Hu Shih’s proposal was Professor Chen Hsu-Ching. In his various articles and books, Chen strongly agreed with Hu’s opinion that the future of the Chinese civilization must rely on a thorough westernization. In his “The Future of Chinese Civilization,” Chen indicated two major reasons for a thorough wholesale westernization in China: first, western civilization is indeed more progressive than the Chinese; and second, western modern civilization is the symbol of the modern world, no matter

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50. Ibid., p. 436.

whether the Chinese accept it or not. Chen argued that the duty of human beings was not to preserve but to create civilization. He said, “The past civilization was a creation of our ancestors. But since the time and environment have been changed, we therefore have to create a new civilization to adjust to them. Otherwise, our race will become weaker and finally disappear.” 52 Thus, the adoption of western civilization will not destroy Chinese traditional heritage completely; the latter will retain its position in Chinese history as part of the world civilization.

However, Hu’s proposal for a wholesale westernization faced a great challenge from other modernizing elite. The first came from professor Pan Kuan-tan, a sociologist at Yan Ching university. Pan expressed his agreement with a wholehearted modernization but not with a wholesale westernization. But the main critical challenge came from two other groups among modernizing elite: the moderate liberals, and the leftists. For the moderate liberals, Hu’s idea was too radical; but for the leftists it was too conservative.

The view of the moderate liberals was presented in a widely circulated manifesto, “Reconstruction of Civilization on a Chinese Base,” issued by ten distinguished professors, including Sa Meng-wu, T’ao Hsi-sheng, Ho Ping-sheng, and Huang Wen-hsan on January 10, 1935. The professor declared that they objected both to traditionalism and to blind imitation, and advocated preservation of the tradition with the addition of western learning according to the immediate needs of China. They indicated that in the process of reconstruction everyone should recognize that (1) China is China. She has her own peculiarity, (2) To either praise or criticize traditional Chinese values and institutions is useless. The Chinese must reexamine their own tradition in order to preserve the best of it, (3) To adopt western civilization is necessary; but the adoption should be based on the needs of present-day China, and not accept everything, (4) The reconstruction of civilization on a Chinese base is to help Chinese people to catch up the West and to contribute to the world civilization, and (5) When the Chinese reconstruct themselves to be an integrated nation, then, they can help the world. Therefore, the reconstruction of civilization in China, according to the professors, must be “not to be conservative, and not be blind in following others. Based on Chinese civilization, we use scientific methods with a critical attitude to reexamine the past, to

preserve the present, and to create the future."^53

In short, what these ten professors suggested is a selective assimilation; they want to keep the best part of the traditional heritage and to mix it with the best of western civilization. Such a viewpoint is not new at all in China, according to Hu Shih. He said in his reply to the ten professors, "In their manifesto, the professors expressed their dissatisfaction with earlier attempts by Ch‘ing scholars to combine Chinese classics and Western technology. Although they spoke in a different way, their spirit was the same as Chang Chih-tung in the nineteenth century."^54 The fundamental mistake these professors made, according to Hu Shih, is that they did not realize the nature of cultural change. Hu indicated that the common characteristics of cultural change are (1) Civilization per se is conservative. The civilization of a race has a great conservative nature which can correct the deviant patterns within it on the one hand, while resisting the invasion of foreign civilizations on the other, (2) The contact of two different civilizations will eliminate some parts of a civilization which are not useful any more, (3) In the process of such change, there is no standard criteria which can be taken to decide what part we want to keep and what we want to give away, (4) There is a limit on the process of cultural change. It is completely impossible to destroy the fundamental conservatism in a civilization. Regardless of changes in life, Chinese will still be Chinese. Hu Shih then urged that "Chinese modern leaders should not worry about the crisis of the Chinese base, but about the conservatism of the traditional Chinese civilization. The crisis is not the non-appearance of their characteristics of Chinese political organization, social institutions, and ideological thoughts such as these ten professors worried about; what we should worry now is that there are just too many bad traditions in the Chinese political organization, social institutions, and ideological thoughts. Therefore, we must accept the world civilization of science and technology, and the spirit behind it. We should let this world civilization have free contact with our traditional civilization. The final consequence of such a contact is undoubtedly a Chinese based civilization."^55

According to Hu Shih, the result of the contact of Chinese and Western civilization will not be the complete dismissal of Chinese traditional civilization but the emergence of a new Chinese civilization having modern world characteristics including both Chinese and west-

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ern traits. The difference between Hu Shih and other professors, thus, lay in their method of modernization in China. Since for Hu Shih, reformers should go as far as possible in order to eliminate the inadequacy of traditional civilization; a wholesale westernization is only a beginning; the final stage in a new Chinese civilization having both Chinese and Western characteristics. For the ten professors, the reformers have to be careful not to lose their heads in the process of modernization; everything has to be planned from the beginning. The Chinese must reexamine their tradition in order to preserve the best part of it and to accept the best part of Western civilization in terms of China’s need.

Another criticism of Hu Shih and his followers came from the leftists which included socialists and communists such as Chen Tu-hsiu and Li Ta-chao. Although Hu Shih shared with the leftists the belief that the problem of China can only be solved by a thorough westernization, the ideologies and methods of reform of Hu and the leftists were quite different. Ideologically, Hu Shih emphasized strongly Dewey’s experimentalism and Huxley’s skepticism, while the leftists evoked Marxism and the dialectic method in the analysis of Chinese social and political problems. Hu Shih and his followers were convinced that the problems of China could not be solved altogether, but must be tackled individually. They insisted that there was no single prescription which could cure every kind of disease. Only through education and the proper approach to practical problems can China be modernized. Hu Shih and his followers strongly believed that revolution was not necessary; a gradual reform in every aspect of society in terms of a far-reaching plan was what China needed at the time. In “Our Political Aims,” Hu and his followers said, “We deeply believe that the worst disease of China is that planning is a necessary condition for efficiency; and that even an ordinary plan is better than nothing. . . . We want to have a government of constitution, of publicity, and of planning. . . . In order to reach this aim, we suggest that (1) a peace conference be held between south and north; (2) peace talks must be based on the reestablishment of the Congress; (3) the size of the army be reduced; (4) the number of government officials be reduced; (5) the election system be improved; and (6) a public and well-planned finance be maintained.”

Thus, it is clear what Hu Shih and his followers suggested is not the overthrow of the Chinese government through violence. Rather it is a plan for gradual reform on different levels of the political and

social systems in China at the time. Meanwhile, Hu and his followers thought it was too early for China to have a national democracy; China must practice democracy on a small-scale basis first, i.e., on a local or provincial level, before the development of a national democracy. During this initial stage, Chinese politics must not rely on any political party; it would be best for the country to be without any organized party.

Such a political point of view immediately received criticism from both Chen Tu-hsiu and his communist comrades. In an article, “My Opinion on Contemporary Chinese Political Problems,” Chen accused Hu and Hu’s supporters of not understanding the true factors of Chinese political conflicts. Chen pointed out that the Chinese political conflict was due to the independence of warlords in each province, and the failure to control these warlords by the central government. Therefore, the proposal for a local democracy would create more problems than it solved in this situation. Chen said, “My solution for the present-day Chinese political problems is to organize a strong political party in order to destroy the warlords, to establish an integrated nation, and to guard against the international imperialism. Only through such a method, can China be a true independent nation.”

Similar criticism is also indicated in a manifesto issued by the Chinese communist organization, “The Chinese Communists’ Proposal on the Political Situation.” The communists labeled Hu’s proposal as a compromise between pacifism and capitalism. The communists wanted to have immediate action directed toward the final goal of revolution. The educational process and gradual reform were for them too slow to have any effect.

While Hu Shih and his followers took the student movement in 1925 as a great achievement of the educational and cultural movement, the leftists regarded it as the symbol of the direct political struggle between the government and the people. And while the liberals remained in the academic circle to advocate freedom of thought and expression, the leftists went out on the street to organize workers and students to protect the government’s policy in domestic and foreign affairs.

2. Hu Shih and Chinese Traditional Elite

As has just been discussed, the debate between Hu Shih and the
other modernizing elite was focused mainly on the proper ideological foundation and the methods of modernization in China. The argument between the modernizing and traditional elites was, however, concerned with the role of Confucianism in society in the age of crisis. Hu and the other modernizing elite pointed out clearly the inadequacy of Confucian values and institutions in the process of Chinese modernization; and the Confucian six classics were not capable of educating Chinese youth on the one hand or of creating a new leadership on the other.

Although the traditional elite did not give Hu Shih and the other modernizing elite any serious or fatal challenge on the latter’s search for Chinese modernization, there were some older intellectuals such as Liang Shu-ming, and Ku Hung-ming, who raised the matter of resisting the acceptance of western civilization. Their arguments on maintaining the Chinese tradition were supported later by Liang Chi-ch’ao, a famous scholar and earlier reformer who had changed his attitude after a visit to Europe in 1919, where he saw the collapse of western scientific civilization during and after the World War I. For Liang Chi-ch’ao, the war in Europe was clear evidence of a basic social intellectual malaise in the West which stemmed from its blind worship of science. He said,

Those who praised the omnipotence of science had hoped previously that as soon as science succeeded, the golden age would appear forthwith. Now science is successful indeed; material progress in the West in the last one hundred years has greatly surpassed the achievements of the three thousand years prior to this period. Yet we human beings have not secured happiness; on the contrary, science gives us catastrophes. . . . The Europeans have dreamed a vast dream of omnipotence of science; not they decry its bankruptcy. This is a major turning-point in the world thought.58

Therefore, Liang believed that the Chinese would assume great responsibilities in the reconstruction of world civilization. “Oh, our lovable youths!” said Liang, “Attention! March On! Millions of people on the other shore of the ocean are worrying about the bankruptcy of material civilization, sorrowfully and desperately crying for help, waiting for your aid. Our ancestors in Heaven, the Sage, and the older generations are all earnestly hoping you will carry out their task.

Their spirit is helping you!" But in order to contribute to world civilization, Liang pointed out that Chinese youth must love and respect their own civilization first.

A stronger view of traditionalism came from Liang Shu-ming, a professor of Chinese philosophy. In his book, *Eastern and Western Civilizations and Their Philosophies*, and his article, "The Final Awakening of the Chinese People's Self-Salvation Movement," Liang Shu-ming attempted to develop a new formulation of Confucianism. He tried to show that the Chinese civilization was relevant to the modern world. According to him, Western civilization sought satisfaction from the external world and from other people; the Chinese attitude was one of harmonization and satisfaction through adjustment; and the Indian attitude was escapist. The failure of the western civilization in World War I indicated it would give way to the Chinese, resulting in a higher world civilization which would mold the scientific and material successes of its predecessor to mass intellectual, moral, and ethical nature. On the problem of China, he argued that because China was different from Western nations, it would be wrong to import such Western political systems as democracy and communism. Liang said, "The foundation of a race is its spirit. To give up one's own spirit would result in destroying one's future. The future and the new life are developed on this spiritual basis which can not be imported from outside and be devalued. One should hold its own position to develop its characters."\(^{60}\)

The third influential traditional defendant was Ku Hung-ming. Ku was an European-educated scholar. He had a M.A. degree from a university in England; he had the experience of living in several European nations; and he also knew many European languages. Compared with Liang Chi-chao and Liang Shu-ming, Ku's ideals were even more conservative and critical. Essentially, Ku's defense of traditional Confucian values emerged from his criticism of Western civilization. His argument rarely touched on Western technology. His central focus was the moral aspect of life. According to Ku, Confucian values were immortal while Western civilization would not last for long, the Western political and legal systems were based on the concepts of right and obligation which were not good enough to keep society at peace. Ku characterized the Chinese people as deep, broad, simple, and possessed of a "Divine Duty of Loyalty." The moral emphasis in Confucianism


\(^{60}\) Shu-min Liang, *East-West Civilizations and their Philosophies* (Shanghai: Commercial Books, 1921), p. 100.
made Chinese society peaceful for several thousand years. The essential problem of China's survival today, according to Ku, is not technology but morality. The future of China relies on her moral, not her material development. He then accused the modernizing elite failed to realize such an essential problem in China while begging for the help of the West in attempting to solve China's own problem.

In summary, the Chinese intellectual's view on modernization in China were largely defensive in nature. The modernizing elite promoted modernization in an effort to upgrade China's respectability, while the traditional elite resisted modernization with the aim of the preservation of traditional Confucianism.

IV. FOUR MAJOR DEVELOPMENTAL STAGES

In Chinese usage, the word "modernization" was first referred to as the process of imitation and adoption of the western model of technological development. Later, the extent of modernization was expanded to include the upgradings of the traditional Chinese socio-economic-political system to be compatible with the societal growth in the contemporary era.

Historically, the Chinese modernization process can be divided into four major developmental stages, each with its own distinguished characteristics. They are (I) Involuntary and Defensive Westernization, 1840-1895, (II) Reform and Revolution, 1896-1911, (III) Authority Crisis and Disorganization, 1912-1948, and (IV) Communist vs. Capitalist approaches, 1949 to the present.

(I) Involuntary and Defensive Westernization—the first stage in the Chinese modernization process is distinguished by the involuntary Chinese acceptance of Western technological superiority. The period begins with the Opium War in 1840 and ends with the defeat in the Sino-Japanese War in 1895. In general, modernization was seen in this stage as a cause for destruction and discontent. Several international and domestic events at the time have contributed in making the Chinese awareness of Western superiority and the painful acceptance of Western technology.

In international affairs, we saw the frequent defeats of the Chinese at the hands of Western nations and Japan. During this period, China had wars with almost every major power in the West and with Japan. The treaties signed with foreign nations include the following:

a) 1842 The Treaty of Nanking, signed with English.

b) 1858 The Treaties of Tientsin, signed with English-France allied forces.
c) 1860 The Treaties of Peking, signed with English-France allied forces.

d) 1881 The Treaty of Ili, signed with Russia.

e) 1895 The Sino-Japanese Treaty of Shimonoseki.

After each defeat, China had to grant privileges of trade and concede part of its territory to the winning nations. Moreover, China sustained a great loss of sovereignty by permitting foreign war vessels and commercial ships to navigate rivers in the interior, by the clause allowing consular jurisdiction, by allowing foreign missionaries to buy land in the interior, and by permitting a settlement zone for foreigners in major cities.

At the same time, troubles in China’s extraordinary vast countryside grew in size and became uncontrollable. Suffering from the political corruption of Manchu Court, from foreign interference with their traditional way of life and from natural disasters that frequently occurred during the period, the dissatisfied peasantry joined various underground secret societies in an effort to get protection and started to rebel against the corrupt government. In 1851, the Taiping Rebellion broke out and spread over a large portion of China before it was suppressed in 1864, the Nien Rebellion broke out in 1853 and lasted until 1868, and the Moslem Rebellion broke out in Yunnan and ran its course from 1855 to 1873. Although these long-lasting rebellions did not establish any rival governments to contest the court at Peking, the need for change became apparent.61

China was thus forced to recognize the Western superiority. A group of Chinese ruling elite and intellectuals felt that the only way to save China was to introduce and accept Western technology, especially military technology. Under the leaderships of Tseng Kuo-fan and Li Hung-chang, a number of Westernization programs were installed. The list included the following important accomplishment:

1863 A foreign language school was established.
1865 The Kiangnan Arsenal was established.
1867 The Nanking Arsenal was established.
1870 A machine factory was enlarged at Tientsin.
1871 A foreign-style fort was planned for Taku.
1872 Students were sent to study in America. Officers

were sent to study military science in Germany. The China Merchants Steam Navigation Company was organized.

1875 A plan was made to build steel warships.
1876 A request was made to open a bureau to study foreign sciences in all provinces; also to add a new subject on foreign affairs in the civil service examinations. Students and apprentices from the Foochow shipyard were sent to Germany for advanced training.
1878 The Kaiping coal mine was opened.
1879 A telegraph line was opened from Taku to Tientsin.
1880 A plan for a modern navy was launched, beginning with a program to purchase warships from foreign countries. A naval school was established at Tientsin.
1881 A dockyard was built at Port Arthur. A cotton mill was planned at Shanghai.
1885 A military preparatory school was established. The navy yamen was inaugurated.
1887 Mints were established at Tientsin and Paoting.
1888 The Peiyang Army was organized.
1891 The Lung-chang paper mill was founded at Shanghai.

The above list of Westernization programs is heavily focused on improving Chinese military strength by buying Western warships, by setting a modern communication network, by studying Western military strategy, by developing natural resources, and by learning foreign languages.

At the same time, the traditional sector of Chinese intellectuals was undergoing a stage of self examination and evaluation in a fanatical effort to slow down Western invasion of Chinese culture. The traditionalists claimed Western civilization as being materialistic and lacking spiritual virtue, and thus inferior to Confucian teachings. Traditionalist Feng Kuei-fen said:

The intelligence and wisdom of the Chinese are necessarily superior to those of the various barbarians, only formerly we have not made use of them. . . . If we let Chinese ethics and famous (Confucian) teachings serve as an original foundation and let them be supplemented by the methods used by the various nations for the attainment of prosperity and strength, would it not be the best of all procedures?62

62. Cited in Fairbank and Teng, eds., China's Response to the West, supra note 26, pp. 52-54.
By the end of the period, however, the traditionalists gradually lost their appeal for the preservation and restoration of Confucian order as China lost war after war to every foreign nation they had fought against and faced an immediate total destruction. Mary C. Wright refers this effort of the traditionalists as "the last stand of Chinese Conservatism," by which she suggested thereafter there was no effective formal defense of the Confucian ethic.

As one can see easily, the only purpose of the Westernization programs at this stage was to save China from foreign domination. Military reform programs became the prime target for Westernization, while social and political institutions still remained largely untouched. The ultimate goal of the government-sponsored Westernization programs was to achieve military equality with the West while at the same time maintaining the traditional social and political systems as intact as possible. Gasster points out, "all that they (the Chinese) did . . . they considered means of defense. Each step had to be justified on the grounds that it would help to keep the foreigners out; at the same time, each experiment had to be guaranteed not to impinge upon the essentials of Chinese life." 

In short, what the Chinese leaders really intended to achieve during the period in the first stage was only a limited partial change on the improvement of military technology, not an extended change on the part of social structure.

(II) Reform and Revolution—The second stage in the Chinese modernization process begins with the campaign by K'ang Yu-wei for an extensive reform program on the socio-political institution of China immediately following the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese War in 1895 and ends with the success of the overthrow of the Ch'ing dynasty under the revolutionary leadership of Dr. Sun yat-sen in 1911.

The dream of building a strong new China through the reappraisal of a Confucian revival and a military Westernization was completely destroyed in 1895 after China lost the war to Japan. Most Chinese had never regarded Japan as a strong or superior nation in any respect. The defeat thus was an unbelievable shock to everyone. The feeling of shame and inferiority quickly spread through the whole country, from the scholar-officials at the top of the hierarchy to the common people at the bottom, and from the urban centers to every corner of the countryside throughout China. The inefficiency and in-

adequacy of a partial reform such as a military Westernization program launched during the first stage now became apparent and manifest. People now demanded a radical change and a far-reaching plan covering every aspect of the social, economic, educational, and political systems. Two groups of activists emerged during the period. The first was a group of lower and middle ranking officials under the leadership of K'ang Yu-wei which advocated extensive social and political reforms, while the second group was led by Dr. Sun Yat-sen who saw total revolution as the only way to save China.

K'ang Yu-wei was a reformed Confucian scholar who believed China's problems were rooted deeply in the Confucian Classics which had been misinterpreted and malpracticed until now. K'ang argues the idea of reform was not anti-Confucianism but an integrated part of the true Confucian teaching. He says:

For China, on the great earth, has had a ceaseless succession of sacred emperors and the country has been famous. Her principles, institutions, and culture are the most elevated in the world. . . . Among all countries on earth none is her equal. Only because her customs are unenlightened and because of a dearth of men of ability, she is passively taking aggression and insult. . . . The water in the ocean is bubbling and boiling. In our ears and in our dreams the noise of artillery is roaring. All you gentlemen, how can you avoid the grief of being ruined and (becoming) subject to the rule of a different race? Are we trying to avoid slander? O you closed-door scholars, are some of you to the point of speaking about respecting the emperor and reflecting the barbarians?65

K'ang Yu-wei won the support of a small group of Chinese scholar-officials and was introduced to Emperor Kuang-hsu. On June 16, 1898, K'ang was appointed Probationary Secretary in the Tsungli Yamen to carry out his reform programs. K'ang's proposed reform included the following:

a. Changing the topics for themes in the district, provincial, and metropolitan examinations from the selections from the Four Books to topics on current problems.

b. Establishing a bureau of agriculture, industry, and commerce in Peking.

c. Abolishing the sinecure appointments in the imperial

supervisorate of instruction, office of transmission, court of imperial entertainments, court of state ceremonial, and grand court of revision.

d. Including the test of knowledge and techniques of Western artilleries in the recruitment and training of military personnels.

e. Requiring students in all levels of schools in China to engage in both Chinese and Western studies.

Although K’ang was able to attract the support of the Emperor, the reform lasted only one hundred days as the Emperor was put under house arrest by the Empress Tz’u-hsi who was the real power holder of the time, after an unsuccessful coup d’etat in against the Empress. K’ang was able to escape out of Peking, but five of his top supports were captured and later executed by the Empress. Many of K’ang’s followers went underground and joined the revolutionary movement led by Dr. Sun Yat-sen in working for the overthrow of the Ch’ing dynasty and for building a new China.

Unlike K’ang Yu-wei, Dr. Sun Yat-sen was not a Confucian scholar. He was educated in Hong Kong and Hawaii and trained in Western medicine with a very limited knowledge on the Chinese Classics. In fact, in his early years Dr. Sun was not much of a revolutionary theorist but merely an activist. His program for China’s reconstruction developed more closely than his persistent plotting to overthrow the Manchus. Nevertheless, the failure of K’ang’s reform movement gave Dr. Sun and his revolutionary party a great opportunity to expand its organization and to challenge the Manchu regime militantly. Four major goals of Dr. Sun’s revolution at that time were (a) Drive out the Tartars, (2) Restore China, (3) Establish the Republic, and (4) Equalize land ownership.

Dr. Sun’s revolutionary ideas gradually ripened among the educated class within and without China after K’ang's failure. He was particularly popular among the advanced Chinese students abroad, and his headquarters was located in Japan. From 1906 to 1911, eleven serious attempts were made to overthrow the Manchu regime by military means:

1906 The attempt at P’ing-hsing and Liu-yang, Hunan.
1907 The attempt at Chaochow and Huang-kang, Kwangtung.
1907 The attempt at Huichow in Kwangtung.
1907 The attempt at Anking, Anhwei.
1907 The attempt at Ch’in-chou and Lien-chou in Kwangtung.
1907 The attempt at Chen-nan-kuan, Kwangsi.
1908 The attempt at Anking, Anhwei.
1910 The attempt at Canton.
1910 The attempt to assassinate the regent, Tsai-feng.
1911 The attempt at Huang-hua-kang, Kwangtung.

Although these attempts all resulted in failure, they did plant seeds for later uprisings and the further spread of revolutionary ideas from the Southeastern Coast of China to the interior provinces. A large scale uprising at Wuchang on October 10, 1911 finally turned into a successful revolution for Dr. Sun's party which eventually overthrew the Manchu regime. A republican government was established on January 1, 1912.

(III) Authority Crisis and Disorganization—The third major developmental stage in China's modernization effort covers the entire period of the so-called republican China, from 1912 to 1949, before the takeover of the mainland by the Chinese Communists. The major characteristic of this period was the Chinese search for authority. The intellectuals were considering various ideologies for modernization, the political elites were advocating diverse Western political systems, and the new merchants on the East coast and in the urban centers were advertising for a free capitalist economy in China. Conflicting programs were proposed and put into practice, and the results were chaos and disorganization.66

This period also marked the beginning of the total withdrawal of the traditionalists. No one wanted to return to the old traditional ways without reservation. The question people asked now was what kind of modern system China should adopt—republic or dictatorship, capitalism or socialism, democracy or something else. Various groups fought for their own beliefs and systems, and each had its own version of what China's future ought to be.

Thus, the May Fourth Movement of 1919, the civil war between the Nationalists and the Chinese Communists throughout the most part of this period, and even the fighting among the warlords during the 1920s, can all be seen as incidents of how various groups fight for their own version of China's future. The conflicts we saw in this period were not really a case of the modernizing elite fighting against the

traditionalists, but rather a case of struggles for power between competing modernizing groups. It was, in short, a period of confusion, of searching for authority, and of power consolidation.

Yet, during this period, we also saw a brief period of constructive development moving toward making a better China. In a ten-year period between 1927 and 1937, China enjoyed a temporary unity under one single leadership, Chiang Kai-shek. The improvements included the following:

1) In transportation—The national railway system was extended from 8,000 kilometers to 13,000 kilometers, the highway from 1,000 kilometers to 115,700 kilometers, and three national and regional airlines began to offer commercial air service.

b) In finance and economy—The national banking system was reorganized into an integrated network, inflation was partially under control, and the volumes of export and import trade increased significantly.

c) In agriculture and mining—A Farmer's Bank was established to provide loans for needed rural developments, a natural resource commission was put up to be in charge of industrial development and mining enterprises, and a national industrial planning was first proposed.

d) In education—The number of universities and colleges increased from 70 to 108, middle schools from 954 to 1956, teacher’s schools from 236 to 816, and vocational schools from 149 to 494.

Unfortunately, the effort was interrupted by the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War and World War II. The subsequent civil war between the Chinese Communists and the Nationalists after the War made the continuation of modernization programs impossible.

(IV) Communist vs. Capitalist Approaches—The Chinese Communists victory on the mainland and the Nationalists withdrawal to the island of Taiwan in 1949 marked the beginning of a new era in China's long struggle for modernization. It signified not only the formal separation of two political regimes, but also the differential adoption of a modernization path: the Communist approach on mainland China and the Capitalist approach in Taiwan.

During this period, most of the conflicting elements which we saw in earlier stages have largely been eliminated and each political government has established a firm policy on modernization programming. The results are different.

In Taiwan, the Nationalist government under the leaderships of Chiang Kai-shek and his son, Chiang Ching-kuo, has taken a very active and effective role in planning the island's economic growth and
has successfully built a progressive growing capitalist economy in Tai­
wan over the past 30 years. Between 1953 and 1977, the government
has carried out six successive four-year economic plans through which
Taiwan’s economy has switched from agriculture to an export-orien-
ted industry. The result is a rapidly growing economy characterized
by export expansion, higher national income, the increase of GNP,
and more employment opportunity. Statistically speaking, the foreign
trade volume reached to $23,714 million and 89.1 percent of exports
came from industrial products in 1978; average income per capita
reached $1,722 in 1979; and an annual economic growth rate of 10.5
percent in 1978.

Economist Herman Kahn has singled out Taiwan, along with
South Korea and Japan, as “heroes” of development for they have
lifted themselves from object poverty to middle income levels in less
than a decade. Kahn predicts that Taiwan is now within a decade or
so of becoming fully a mature industrial economy and that it should
soon become a full fledged member of the affluent groups of nations.67
In a report prepared for the World Bank, Fei, Ranis & Kuo also have
a similar high praise for Taiwan. They note that Taiwan’s success is
rare among less developed countries due to its extremely rapid rates of
economic growth, better distribution of income, and lower rate of
unemployment.68

The Chinese Communists seized power from the nationalists in
1949. The strategy for economic development was built upon much
trial and error practice and from Chairman Mao’s experience in his
guerrilla days. Over the thirty year period in Communist China, the
economic policies that served as vehicles for the strategy occurred can
be summarized in seven distinct “waves”:

1) Economic reconstruction and land reforms……… 1949-1952
2) Industrialization, nationalization, and collectivization:
    the first five year plan.............................. 1953-1957
3) The Great Leap Forward ............................ 1958-1959
4) Readjustment and recovery; priority given to
    agriculture.............................................. 1960-1965
6) Balanced growth ........................................ 1970-1977
7) Four Modernizations.................................... 1978

We call the economic policies and growth in Communist China as a

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Publisher, 1979), pp. 329-330.
68. John C.H. Fei, Gustav Ranis and Shirley W.Y. Kuo, *Growth with Equity: The
Taiwan Case* (N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1979).
series of "waves" because of their inconsistency and great fluctuation within and between "waves." During the first and second waves between 1949 and 1957, the Chinese economy experienced a period of rehabilitation and rebuilding with the implementation of the first Five-Year Plan. By the end of this period, agricultural and industrial outputs both had shown increases. But the third wave was a disaster as Mao called for a "Great Leap Forward." Between 1960 and 1965, the Chinese economy bounced back in this period, evidenced by orderly advances in many spheres of the nation. But unfortunately, the optimism quickly faded away with the outbreak of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in 1966; and for the next ten years China was in total chaos. The death of Mao in 1976 marked a new beginning; the new leader Deng Xiao-ping’s call for Four Modernizations has started to show impacts in Chinese life in the 1980s.

There have been considerable disagreements among scholars on the economic situation in Communist China. Some feel that the Communists’ achievement is indeed impressive. Al Imfelt says, "After examining so many elements of China’s model of development in isolation and in various combinations, one can only reassemble the whole and ask, is it working? The answer, obviously, is yes." 69 Alexander Eckstein also has similar observation, he says, "China’s economic performance must be considered as impressive. . . . There is very little doubt that the Chinese economy has been growing quite rapidly." 70

However, such a positive evaluation of the Communists’ economy has been challenged by quite a few scholars who insist the Communists are basically a backward country economically. They argued the so-called economic achievement of the Communists is too small and limited to allow any real appreciation. This is particularly true when one compares the economic achievement of Taiwan with that of the Communists. Furthermore, the social and cultural developments of Taiwan can not be matched by the Communists. 71

Thus, this fourth stage of Chinese modernization is characterized by two competing socio-economic approaches between the Communists and the Republic of China in Taiwan. The result has been different: The Nationalists in Taiwan are much more progressively

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71. E.g., Chu-yuan Cheng, China’s Economic Development (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Publisher, 1983).
advanced in socio-economic than the Communist government of the People’s Republic of China on the mainland.

V. THE “TAIWAN MIRACLE”

In China’s long struggle toward modernization over the past one hundred and forty years, the achievement of Taiwan since 1949 stands out as extraordinary. It has shown to the world that Chinese society can be successfully industrialized and that Confucianism is not all inconducive to industrialization and economic growth. Many Third World nations have tried at modernization since the end of World War II, but only a handful of them have been able to succeed. Taiwan is one of these selected few which have succeeded. In the eyes of those that are still struggling, Taiwan has created a “miracle.” In this section, we will give a detailed discussion of Taiwan’s economic and social modernizations since 1949.

1. Industrialization and Economic Growth

The Nationalist Government’s effort in improving Taiwan’s socio-economic structure could be traced back to the land reform program of 1949, four years prior to the announcement of the First Four-Year Plan for economic development. The first step in the land reform program was to reduce farm rent and to increase the share of tenant farmers in crop yields, providing enough incentive for hard work. The second step, which was launched in 1951, was to sell public land to tenant farmers, followed by a program of compulsory sale of land by landlords in 1953. The general objectives of the land reform program are twofold: the new cultivators were encouraged to work harder because they would benefit from any increase in agricultural output, while the landlords were encouraged to participate in the industrial development of Taiwan through ownership of four large-scale industrial enterprises at the time.

The success of the land reform program laid the foundation for a modern economy in Taiwan. In the first two Four-Year Plans from 1953 to 1960, continuation of agriculture programs was evident: “land-to-the-tiller program” was earnestly carried out, irrigation systems were repaired and expanded, and breeds of animals and strains of seeds were improved. In industry, labor intensive production was encouraged to allow local products to compete with imported consumer goods on the one hand, while raw material supplies and domestic productive capacity were expanded to stabilize commodity price and to improve the country’s balance of payments position. The overall ob-
jective of the economic plannings during this period was to develop industry through agriculture.

The second stage of Taiwan’s economic planning, goals of which were outlined in the Third and Fourth Four-Year Plans, from 1960 to the early 1970’s, saw a rapid expansion in economic activity. Several programs were launched during the period aiming at switching Taiwan’s economy from an agricultural to an industrial base, which included specific plans to encourage investment, renovate the financial institution and system, and increase the pace of modernization. One very important policy was the decision to place emphasis on the development of labor-intensive industries to manufacture products for export. The result was a rapidly growing economy characterized by export expansion, the increase of GNP and national income, and a full employment in Taiwan by the end of the 1960’s.

The fast growth of Taiwan’s economy is not without problems, however. By the early 1970s, it had become clear that although the basis of the economy had gradually shifted from agriculture to industry, the industrial structure itself had undergone little transformation. Major problems included the inability of the infrastructure to accommodate the economy’s increasing demands, the necessity of importing almost all basic materials and intermediate goods, the shortage of labor and rising wage rates, the growing number and efficiency of international competitors, and unbalanced foreign trades.

The need for a basic shift in economic planning was made obvious by the oil crisis of 1973 and the resulting world-wide recession. Like that of many other countries, the economy of Taiwan suffered tremendously because of steeply rising commodity prices and inflation.

In order to meet the twin challenges of an outdated economic structure and spiralling inflation, the government instituted a series of far-ranging projects designed to transform Taiwan into a modern industrialized economy by the mid-1980’s. Long-range plans were developed to promote modern management techniques and to update industrial production methods through the Ten major Development Projects and the Accelerated Rural Development Program.

The Ten major Development Projects, at the cost of $6.7 billion, were aimed at production of energy and efficient transportation network. Six of these projects were concerned with transportation: the Sun Yat-sen national Freeway, railway electrification, the North Link Railway, the Chiang Kai-shek International Airport at Taoyuan, and the construction of harbors at Taichung and Suao. Three projects were designed to develop heavy and chemical industries: an integrated steel mill, Kaohsiung shipyard, and a petrochemical complex. The
tenth was the building of nuclear power plants to develop new sources of energy.

The Accelerated Rural Development Program was aimed at protecting farmers' earnings, modernizing agriculture, increasing farm incomes, and employing farm workers more productively. The program included the following measures:

a. Abolition of the rice-fertilizer barter system.
b. Abolition of the education surtax on farmland.
c. Easing of agricultural credit terms.
d. Improvement of agricultural marketing.
e. Strengthening of the rural infrastructure.
f. Integrated use of improved cultivation techniques.
g. Establishment of specialized agricultural areas.
h. Strengthening of agricultural research and extension.
i. Establishment of new industries in rural areas.
j. Increase in purchase price of rice paid to farmers.

With the completion of the Ten Major Development Projects and the Accelerated Rural Development Program in 1979, the government announced a new Twelve New Development Projects to continue the country's modernization. Again, a heavy emphasis was placed upon transportation as we saw five of the twelve projects all dealing with transportation improvement: around-the-island railroad, three new cross-island highways, Kaohsiung-Pingtung regional traffic improvement, the second and third phases of Taichung Harbor, and widening of the Pingtung-Kaohsiung highways. The other seven projects included two for agriculture, two for industrial plants, and three for socio-cultural developments.

In summary, Taiwan has successfully carried out five Four-Year Plans from 1953 to 1973. The Sixth Four-Year Plan was cut short due to the oil crises and the worldwide recession in 1973. The government instituted a new Six-Year Plan in 1976 which was completed in 1981, and a new Ten-Year Plan was launched in 1982 aiming at transforming Taiwan's economy from labor-intensive industry to high technology.

The results from these economic plannings are remarkably successful in Taiwan. The national economy has shifted from agriculture-oriented to industrial-oriented within a short period of thirty years. When the Nationalist government of the Republic of China moved to Taiwan in 1949,
Taiwan was predominately an agricultural society with a large proportion of its population residing in rural areas. The economic boom of the 1960s and 1970s has changed its economic structure and population distribution dramatically.

In economic structural change, we saw a gradual shift in production from agriculture to industry. As shown in Table 2, industrial product occupied only 13.01 percent of the total net domestic product in 1951, it was increased to 42.72 percent in 1981. As a result, the agriculture population also declined which was reflected in the significant growth of the non-agricultural population from 47.13 percent in 1951 to 71.9 percent in 1981. The transformation of an industrial-oriented economy and the expansion of the non-agricultural population have also made rates of economic growth very impressive. They ranged from 5.5 percent to 13.5 percent annually in Taiwan between 1956 and 1979. Even the current recession of the 1980s failed to drastically slowdown Taiwan’s economic growth as the gross national product and per capita income continued to grow.

Most impressively, however, is Taiwan’s achievement on a more equitable distribution of income during the years of rapid economic growth. Fei, et. al. noted that “Taiwan’s achievement in the years after 1953 are particularly notable: extremely rapid rates of economic growth were accompanied by improvements in the family distribution of income; unemployment, or underemployment, was virtually eliminated by the end of the 1960s.” In Table 3, we found that the income of the lowest fifth of the Taiwan households accounted for 7.71 percent of the nation’s total income in 1964, it increased to 8.89 percent in 1978 on the one hand, and that income of the highest fifth had accounted for 41.07 percent in 1964, but declined to 37.17 percent in 1978. It is apparent that the gap between the poorest fifth and the highest fifth has been narrowed, a more equitable income distribution pattern.

72. Fei, Ranis, and Kuo, Growth with Equity: The Taiwan Case, supra note 68, p. 214.
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<tr>
<td>% of non-agricultural population in total population</td>
<td>47.13</td>
<td>49.96</td>
<td>50.96</td>
<td>55.31</td>
<td>60.26</td>
<td>66.30</td>
<td>67.74</td>
<td>71.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of industrial product in net domestic product</td>
<td>13.01</td>
<td>14.53</td>
<td>16.99</td>
<td>20.34</td>
<td>28.90</td>
<td>32.55</td>
<td>34.32</td>
<td>42.72</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gross national product (Million US$)</td>
<td>2110.5</td>
<td>3230.2</td>
<td>4525.5</td>
<td>7255.0</td>
<td>11979.6</td>
<td>18318.4</td>
<td>24751.6</td>
<td>20576.7</td>
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<td>Per capita income (US$)</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>316</td>
<td>371</td>
<td>520</td>
<td>770</td>
<td>1039</td>
<td>1288</td>
<td>2570</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic growth rate (%)</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>5.50</td>
<td>6.83</td>
<td>9.01</td>
<td>12.90</td>
<td>13.48</td>
<td>8.08</td>
<td>5.04</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3. Distribution of Household Income by Division of Equal Number of Households, 1964-1978

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Five Population Groups*</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Ratio**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>7.71</td>
<td>12.57</td>
<td>16.62</td>
<td>22.03</td>
<td>41.07</td>
<td>5.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>7.09</td>
<td>12.45</td>
<td>16.19</td>
<td>22.01</td>
<td>41.45</td>
<td>5.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>7.84</td>
<td>12.22</td>
<td>16.25</td>
<td>22.32</td>
<td>41.37</td>
<td>5.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>8.44</td>
<td>13.27</td>
<td>17.09</td>
<td>22.51</td>
<td>38.69</td>
<td>4.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>8.60</td>
<td>13.25</td>
<td>17.06</td>
<td>22.48</td>
<td>38.61</td>
<td>4.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>8.84</td>
<td>13.49</td>
<td>16.99</td>
<td>22.05</td>
<td>38.63</td>
<td>4.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>8.91</td>
<td>13.64</td>
<td>17.48</td>
<td>22.71</td>
<td>37.26</td>
<td>4.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>8.89</td>
<td>13.71</td>
<td>17.53</td>
<td>22.07</td>
<td>37.17</td>
<td>4.18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: *the five population groups are referred to their respective income. 1 represents the lowest 20% of the population, while 5 represents the highest 20% of the population in terms of the income.

**Ratio refers to folds of the 5th group to 1st group.

(Source: Executive Yuan, 1979. Table 16, p.45).

2. Social and Political Modernization

Industrialization involves the extended use of an inanimate source of power in the production of economic goods and service. Economic growth in general refers to the increase in the economy's real gross national product or real national income. Judging from the data we presented in the above section, Taiwan has successfully been industrialized and has enjoyed impressive economic growth. In this section, we shall turn our attention to non-economic aspects of Taiwan's modernization. We shall give a detailed assessment of such socio-political changes as urbanization, the emergence of the middle class, educational attainment, health care, political participation and system of social welfare that reflect Taiwan's social and political modernization since 1949.

A. Rapid Urbanization

Demographers and urban sociologists agree that selective migration in some form should be regarded as a necessary phenomenon of all modern, highly specialized societies. Donald Bogue believes, for instance, persons with unique qualifications, training, or work histories need to be located where their activities can be used. He says, "A
certain amount of reshuffling of the population is required to locate the various specialized categories of population where they are of most value and where they can best participate in the social and economic system.\textsuperscript{73} Migration is an integral element of social change process. This is particularly true in developing nations, for the newly expanded economy requires the movement of selected types of persons. New technology and industry are likely to be located in and/or closer to urban centers. It is thus not surprising that internal migration in developing nations tends to move from rural to urban.

In Taiwan, we saw the rapid increase of urban population: in 1952, only 47.6 percent of the population lived in urban places with a population of 50,000 or more; in 1980, the urban population had reached to 70.3 percent of the island's total population. In other words, nearly three quarters of Taiwan's population are now living in urban places. Between 1952 and 1976, the average annual growth rate of Taiwan's population was 3.0 percent, while the rate for growth in urban places was 4.6 percent. Moreover, Taiwan has also witnessed the emergence of two large metropolitan areas with a population of one million or more. Taipei has a population of 2.3 million and Kaohsiung had 1.2 million in 1983.

Wen Lang Li found there seemed to be a high degree of correlation between the degree of industrialization and urbanization in Taiwan. He discovered that the higher the degree of industrialization a locality has, the higher the net migration rate of that locality.\textsuperscript{74} In 1957, Taipei was the only city with a population of 500,000 or more, there were four such cities in 1978, and the population of these four metropolises accounted for 25.4 percent of the total population or 52.6 percent of the island's urban population. Such a crowded urban population in these four metropolises in recent years has forced their residents to start to move to suburbs, a process of suburbanization. Taking the Taipei metropolitan area as an example, Kang-cheng Chen discovered that the distance between the average household and the central city of Taipei has increased significantly during the period between 1962 and 1979, particularly the years after 1970.\textsuperscript{75} Chen's dis-


covery is presented in Figure I.

The concentration of population in urban places have pushed the government to implement policies aiming at improving urban living.

**Figure I** Distance Between the Average Household and the Central City of Taipei, 1962-1979

From 1956 to 1979, for example, the government has invested a total of US$167.7 million in public housing project in urban cities. Statistics also show that the public housing authority has built 75,951 units of apartment-type dwelling. In addition, plans are now underway to develop three satellite "urban towns" nearby the three industrial centers of Taipei, Kao-hsiung, and Tai-chung. The new Ten-year Economic Development Plan (1980-1989) also calls, in addition to economic planning, extensive and far-reaching improvement on the general welfare and livelihood of the people of Taiwan. The Plan asks for accelerating urban planning and development, construction of urban housing, improving the quality of life in urban areas, and intensifying environmental protection measures against pollution and ecological abuses in and around cities. With nearly three quarters of
Taiwan's population now living in urban places, urban planning will undoubtedly receive more and more attention from the government.

B. The Emergence of the Middle Class

Alongside with the process of industrialization and economic development, the occupational structure in Taiwan has shown a dramatical change, reflected in the decline of agricultural-related population and the increase of industrial and professional population. An examination of Taiwan's labor force distribution in 1965 showed 43.9 percent in agricultural-related activities, 21.7 percent in industrial and manufacturing professions, and 34.5 percent in service professions. In 1981, however, agricultural-related activities had declined to 18.8 percent, while industrial and manufacturing professions and service professions increased to 43.7 percent and 37.5 percent respectively. The shift clearly demonstrates that Taiwan has moved from an agricultural society to an industrial and service society.

One of the most significant features of a society undergoing rapid industrialization and economic growth is the emergence of an influential middle class consisting of mainly professionals and white collar workers. Chia-yu Hsu in a discussion on social stratification suggested that the middle class in Taiwan should include three groups of professions: government personnel and the staffs of educational institutions, professionals and technical workers, and administrative and managerial workers. In 1983, these three groups occupied 28.4 percent of the total employed labor force in Taiwan. Hsu observed that members of this middle class are "quick in their thinking, better educated, secured financial sources, and a strong sense of national identity."76 Most of the social scientists in Taiwan today agree that this middle class is most responsible for the success of Taiwan's economic development we see today.77

Industrialization, economic growth, and the expansion of the occupational sphere in Taiwan have all contributed to the emergence of an influential middle class. As a consequence, upward social mobility in Taiwan is attainable and frequent. A study found a great majority of the members of the middle class in Taiwan had a lower class origin. The study also found education is the main source for upward social mobility.78

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76. Chia-yu Hsu, "Social Stratification in Taiwan," China Tribune No. 240, p. 44.
78. Hsian-yun Wang, Social Mobility in Taiwan (Taipei: Academia Sinica, 1982).
Students of modernization and developmental sociology have long recognized the significance of education as an indispensable variable in modernization of non-western societies. They have all pointed out education is both a cause and an effect of modernization in these societies. As a cause, education is indispensable because there are so many complex tasks within an urban industrial setting that require an ability to read and write; and as an effect, education is seen as a source of national pride and an index of societal development. It is generally true that the more education a society's population, the higher its socio-economic development.

In assessing the educational attainment of Taiwan, two sets of measurements are analyzed: rates of illiteracy and growth of school enrollment. Examination of the available data pertaining to these two kinds of measures reveals relative significance of education in Taiwan. In 1962, the rate of illiteracy was 24.8 percent in the population aged 6 years old and over; but in 1982 the rate was decreased to only 9.6 percent. It is also interesting to note that half of those who have educations received at least the secondary education in 1983. As Table 4 shows among those who are educated in 1962, 2.0 percent received college education, 13.7 percent secondary education, 55.3 percent primary education, 4.2 percent self-taught and 24.8 were illiterate; in 1982, the distribution shows 8.0 percent with higher education, 39.2 percent secondary education, 60.9 percent primary education, 2.4 percent self-taught, and 9.6 percent illiterate.

Another change can be seen in the increase of student enrollments in Taiwan during the past twenty years. In 1962, as shown in Table 5, the rates of enrollment in their respective age groups were 84.4 percent for compulsory education, 96.5 percent for primary education, 35.0 percent for secondary education, and 3.9 percent for higher education. But in 1982 the rates had been improved to 99.7 percent for compulsory education, 99.8 percent for primary education, 85.6 percent for secondary education, and 11.4 percent for higher education. The number of schools also shows a significant increase, from 3,095 in 1961 to 5,738 in 1983. During the same period, the number

of full time teachers in all levels of schools also was increased from 71,098 persons to 179,864 persons.

In summary, education in Taiwan during the past twenty years has shown improvement in both quantity and quality. This better educated population has played a significant role in pushing Taiwan toward industrialization and modernization.

D. Health Care

Researchers generally agree that industrialization and the subsequent economic and social development bring improvements in the general health of a population, and that the more a society is industrialized, the more developed its medical and health-care system become. In Taiwan, economic growth, an increase in national wealth, better income distribution, and other social developments have been accompanied by improving health care. This section will give a statistical presentation of the improvements in health and medical-care fa-

---

Table 5. Enrollment Rate in Taiwan, 1962-1982

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Compulsory Education</th>
<th>Primary Education</th>
<th>Secondary Education</th>
<th>Higher Education</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>84.4</td>
<td>96.5</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>83.5</td>
<td>96.8</td>
<td>36.3</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>84.4</td>
<td>97.2</td>
<td>38.4</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
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<td>97.7</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>91.4</td>
<td>98.0</td>
<td>54.1</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>93.8</td>
<td>98.1</td>
<td>61.5</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>94.8</td>
<td>98.5</td>
<td>63.3</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>97.5</td>
<td>99.4</td>
<td>74.1</td>
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</tr>
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<td>1978</td>
<td>99.1</td>
<td>99.6</td>
<td>76.3</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>99.5</td>
<td>99.7</td>
<td>80.3</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>99.7</td>
<td>99.8</td>
<td>85.6</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: the enrollment rates here are the percentage of the enrolled students in their respective age groups. For compulsory education, the comparative age group is aged 6-14; for primary education, aged 6-11; for secondary education, aged 12-17; and for higher education, aged 18-24.

(Source: The Executive Yuan, 1983. Table 31, pp. 70-71.)

The number of public and private hospitals and clinics has steadily increased in Taiwan. The data for the period between 1961 and 1980 on public hospitals and clinics operated by central and local governments reflect a slow but steady increase. As shown in Table 6, the 1,089 public hospitals and clinics in 1961 were increased to 1,295 in 1980. Although the data for private hospitals and clinics before 1970 were unavailable, Table 6 does show a rapid increase in the 1970s, from 6,338 units in 1971 to 9,993 in 1980. A comparison between public and private hospitals and clinics during the 1970s indicates a faster growth in the private sector. Taking 1971 as the base year for comparison, the index for public hospitals and clinics in 1980 was 108, while the index for private hospitals and clinics in 1980 was 157.7. A similar growth trend can also be seen in the increase of hospital beds. The number of hospital beds per 10,000 population has increased from 3.70 in 1961 to 22.41 in 1980. The expansion of hospital beds is attrib-
utable to the growth in the private sector of health and medical facilities, as discussed earlier.

Table 6  Health and Medical Facilities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Public Number</th>
<th>Index</th>
<th>Private Number</th>
<th>Index</th>
</tr>
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<td>90.8</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1,093</td>
<td>91.2</td>
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<td>—</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>1,100</td>
<td>91.7</td>
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</tr>
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<td>1971</td>
<td>1,199</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>6,338</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>1,201</td>
<td>100.2</td>
<td>6,378</td>
<td>100.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>1,201</td>
<td>100.2</td>
<td>6,758</td>
<td>106.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1,201</td>
<td>100.2</td>
<td>7,492</td>
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<td>100.4</td>
<td>8,470</td>
<td>133.6</td>
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<td>101.4</td>
<td>8,563</td>
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<td>1,208</td>
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<td>8,840</td>
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<td>9,140</td>
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<td>9,618</td>
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<td>1980</td>
<td>1,295</td>
<td>108.0</td>
<td>9,993</td>
<td>157.7</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Source: Executive Yuan, Social Indicators of the Republic of China, 1982. Taipei: The Executive Yuan, Table 37, pp. 82-83.

The total number of medical and para-medical personnel during the past 20 years has also shown increase, from 12,678 in 1961 to 42,417 in 1980, a net increase of 29,739, which include increases of 6,764 physicians, 1,105 dentists, 10,071 nurses, 5,824 pharmacists, and 5,375 other medical-related specialists. A detailed analysis of medical and paramedical personnel growth reveals the increase occurred largely among specialists other than physicians and dentists. As shown in Table 7, although physicians constituted more than half of
the medical professionals in the early 1960s, they have steadily declined as a percentage of the medical pool ever since. In 1980, physicians accounted for only 31.4 percent of the total medical and paramedical personnel, which reflected a decline of 20.5 percent during the past 20 years. The percentage of dentists experienced a similar decline, from 6.3 percent in 1961 to 4.5 percent in 1980. Nurses and pharmacists, however, have both enjoyed a significant increase. In 1961, nurses constituted 12.5 percent and pharmacists 7.5 percent of the total medical and para-medical professionals, but the percentages in 1980 showed 27.5 percent for nurses and 16.0 percent for pharmacists. The expansion within the medical and paramedical professions in Taiwan has thus been largely in the two specialities of trained nurses and pharmacists.

The steady expansions of both health and medical-care facilities and staffs have provided better health care for the general population of Taiwan. The number of physicians per 10,000 population increased from 6.0 in 1961 to 7.5 in 1980, dentists from 0.7 to 1.2, pharmacists from 0.9 to 6.8, and nurses from 1.5 to 6.6. At the same time, the number of hospital beds per 10,000 population also increased, from 2.70 in 1961 to 22.4 in 1980. Statistics also show that in 1961 government health-related expenditures total US$1,076,877, a figure increased to US$196,778,000 in 1982.

As a result of the expansion of medical and health-care services, the health conditions of the general population in Taiwan have been improved over the years. One indicator of such an improvement is the decline of mortality rates. During the period between 1962 and 1982, as shown in Table 8, the crude death rates declined from 6.3 per 1,000 population to 4.8 per 1,000 population; the mortality rates for newborn children declined from 31.4 to 8.1; and the maternal mortality rates from 8.8 to 1.9 per 1,000. Meanwhile, the average life expectancy has been extended from 62.3 years for men and 57.8 for women to 70.2 years for men and 75.1 years for women during the same period.

Table 7. Medical and Para-Medical Personnel Structure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Physicians</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Dentists</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Nurses</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Pharmacists</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>%</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>12,678</td>
<td>6,574</td>
<td>51.9</td>
<td>804</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>1,588</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>951</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>2,761</td>
<td>21.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>12,686</td>
<td>6,591</td>
<td>52.0</td>
<td>814</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>1,595</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>1,003</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>2,683</td>
<td>21.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>13,002</td>
<td>6,543</td>
<td>50.3</td>
<td>808</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>1,798</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>1,043</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>2,810</td>
<td>21.7</td>
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<td>6,649</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>816</td>
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<td>1,852</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>1,110</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>2,855</td>
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<td>1,611</td>
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<td>49.8</td>
<td>791</td>
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<td>2,055</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>1,364</td>
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</tr>
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<td>49.0</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>2,440</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>1,515</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>3,312</td>
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<td>7,551</td>
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<td>815</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>2,682</td>
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<td>1,586</td>
<td>9.3</td>
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<td>760</td>
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<td>19.0</td>
<td>1,661</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>4,433</td>
<td>25.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>18,992</td>
<td>7,552</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>819</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>3,646</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>2,289</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>4,716</td>
<td>24.8</td>
</tr>
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<td>7,841</td>
<td>43.0</td>
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<td>997</td>
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<td>1974</td>
<td>22,457</td>
<td>9,316</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>1,050</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>4,243</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>4,141</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>3,707</td>
<td>16.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>26,597</td>
<td>10,723</td>
<td>40.3</td>
<td>1,219</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>4,919</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>5,038</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>4,698</td>
<td>17.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>32,008</td>
<td>11,361</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>1,366</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>8,560</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>5,466</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>5,255</td>
<td>16.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>34,743</td>
<td>12,097</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>1,539</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>9,182</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>5,878</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>6,047</td>
<td>17.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>36,191</td>
<td>12,485</td>
<td>34.5</td>
<td>1,581</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>9,749</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>6,238</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>6,138</td>
<td>17.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>39,614</td>
<td>13,169</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>1,773</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>11,256</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>6,761</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>6,655</td>
<td>16.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>42,417</td>
<td>13,338</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>1,909</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>11,659</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>6,775</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>8,736</td>
<td>20.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In summary, increases in national wealth and personal income have contributed to an expansion of medical and health-care service which, in turn, has provided better health and a longer life expectancy for the population in Taiwan.

E. Political Participation

It is generally believed that economic growth in most of developing societies can not succeed without an effective political administration to coordinate its developmental programming. Taiwan has enjoyed a remarkable degree of political stability during the past thirty years that have been conducive to attracting foreign investments, policy consistency and predictability, and domestic capital formation. Moreover, political stability brings confidence to people in the society and encourages the emergence of nationalism through which the improvement of the way of life, both socially and culturally, becomes

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part of a nation's pride. Political stability has been achieved through an extended political participation from the masses.

One indicator of such an extended political participation is the higher rate of voting in each election in Taiwan. Table 9 clearly demonstrates a consistent higher rate of voting participation, ranging from seventy-three percent to eighty percent in county and city council elections and from sixty-nine percent to eighty percent in mayoral elections.

Table 9. Voter Participation in Taiwan, 1950-1982

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Provincial Assembly*</th>
<th>City-County Council**</th>
<th>Magistrates &amp; Mayors***</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>80.7</td>
<td>79.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>74.4</td>
<td>79.7</td>
<td>74.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>78.2</td>
<td>78.9</td>
<td>78.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>72.5</td>
<td>78.3</td>
<td>72.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>69.3</td>
<td>73.8</td>
<td>69.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>74.3</td>
<td>76.8</td>
<td>74.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>70.3</td>
<td>78.0</td>
<td>70.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>80.4</td>
<td>73.3</td>
<td>80.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>71.9</td>
<td>80.5</td>
<td>71.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>75.4</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
*The first election for provincial assembly was held in 1951. The election has been held in every five years since 1962.
**The first election for city and county council was held in 1950. There have been 10 elections since then.
***The first election for magistrates and majors was held in 1950 and the last one held in 1981.

(Source: The Executive Yuan, Social Indicators of the Republic of China, 1982. Table 68, pp. 156-157)

Moreover, the Nationalist government in Taiwan has also held several special elections to increase the membership share of the Taiwanese in the National Assembly, Legislative Yuan, and Control Yuan. Since the first special election of 1969, the National Assembly has added 76 new members to its total delegates, the legislative Yuan has added 98 new members, and the Control Yuan has added 32. Although the great majority of the membership in these three legisla-
tive branches of the Nationalist government still are the "old guards," those who were elected to their seats prior to the Chinese Communists victory on the Mainland in 1949, the special elections have opened a new door for larger participation from the residents of Taiwan. More importantly, a recent study has found this newly elected group of legislators has played an extraordinary role in Taiwan's political process. 83

F. Social Welfare

As society becomes more affluent with the cumulation of national wealth, the Nationalist government in Taiwan is able to pay more attention to social welfare for the less privileged population. One indicator of such a concern is the increase of the government's spending on social welfare throughout the years. Table 10 shows social welfare spending by the government in 1962 was NT$1,116.9 million and was increased to NT$52,143 million in 1981. The increase of social welfare spending is consistent with the growth in Taiwan's Gross National Product volumes. In 1962, social welfare spending was approximately 1.5 percent of GNP and 7.2 percent of the total government expenditures; it was increased to 3.9 percent and 11.8 percent respectively in 1981.

Table 10. Gross National Product, Government Expenditures, & Social Welfare Spending in Taiwan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>GNP (million NTS)*</th>
<th>Government Expenditures (million NTS)*</th>
<th>Social Welfare Spending (million NTS)*</th>
<th>I (%)**</th>
<th>II (%)***</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>76,652</td>
<td>15,414.0</td>
<td>1,116.9</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>86,710</td>
<td>16,456.8</td>
<td>1,259.6</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>101,492</td>
<td>18,485.5</td>
<td>1,495.4</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>111,895</td>
<td>22,391.3</td>
<td>1,699.1</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>125,343</td>
<td>23,836.0</td>
<td>1,123.8</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>144,839</td>
<td>30,726.8</td>
<td>2,197.8</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>168,695</td>
<td>33,002.0</td>
<td>2,581.3</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>195,693</td>
<td>41,868.9</td>
<td>3,724.5</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>225,283</td>
<td>49,152.6</td>
<td>4,712.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>262,125</td>
<td>54,829.1</td>
<td>5,682.9</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>314,369</td>
<td>63,667.7</td>
<td>8,101.8</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>407,419</td>
<td>79,835.9</td>
<td>8,663.7</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>544,847</td>
<td>89,982.0</td>
<td>9,719.9</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>581,150</td>
<td>126,435.5</td>
<td>12,657.4</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>696,101</td>
<td>149,821.6</td>
<td>16,940.3</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>811,819</td>
<td>191,472.7</td>
<td>20,428.1</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>967,938</td>
<td>227,341.2</td>
<td>24,489.1</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>1,164,473</td>
<td>265,749.3</td>
<td>29,706.7</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>1,440,778</td>
<td>344,598.5</td>
<td>38,223.8</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>1,703,713</td>
<td>433,415.8</td>
<td>51,143.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: At current prices.

**I = social welfare spending/GNP × 100.

***II = social welfare spending/government expenditures × 100.

(Sources: Data on GNP and government expenditures are taken from National Income of the Republic of China, 1981. Data on social welfare spending are calculated from the Yearbook of the Ministry of Finance, 1981.)

Two major social insurance programs have been implemented in Taiwan: the Government Employees' Insurance and the Labor Insurance Scheme. Both insurance programs include coverages for retirement and medical expenses. In addition, the government also provides free medical treatment and care for the needy, poor, and the disabled.

At the same time, the Nationalist government has also gone through the legislative process of establishing goals and procedures for the management of social welfare programs. Between 1970 and 1981, four major pieces of welfare legislations were passed: they are the Welfare Law for Children in 1973, the Welfare Law for the Aged in 1980, the Welfare for the Disabled in 1980, and the Social Assistance...
A basic labor wage act was just passed last year to protect minimum wage for workers. Awareness of social welfare has also increased in recent years among the public, especially the intellectuals. An examination of popular and professional magazines and journals in Taiwan between 1969 and 1981 shows that the number of articles and essays on topics related to social welfare published was increased from 29 to 161 during the period. In summary, Taiwan has successfully made progress in both economical and social modernizations. It is a classic example of macro-development by design, characterized by a mixture of state planning and private free capitalist economy. The state established an overall guideline and objective, while the private capitalist sectors put them into practice. The cooperation between private industrialists and the state has shifted Taiwan from a underdeveloped nation to a developed nation in a span of only thirty years. The success of Taiwan then provides an excellent model for the People's Republic of China on the Mainland in its current campaign on the Four Modernizations.

VI. HISTORICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF CHINA'S MODERNIZATION

The modernization process of China during the past 140 years has distinguished itself in several important ways that differ from both its own traditional reform movements in the earlier dynasties and modernization of Japan and other developing nations. The frustration and agony of China's inability to modernize itself to join the rank of the advanced and modernized in early years has been replaced by a sense of self-respect and dignity. As Taiwan has successfully created a "miracle," the goal of the Chinese final modernization is thus unmistakenly attainable. Let us identify the unique characteristics of China's past process of modernization.

(1) *It is a process of Westernization.* As has been mentioned, modernization is the process of change toward those types of social, economic, and political system that have developed in Western Europe and North America from the seventeenth century to the nineteenth and have then spread to other European countries to the South American, Asian, and African countries. In the non-Western societies, therefore, it is a process of what Kautsky has called "coming from
It is precisely this process of change toward those Western types of social, economic, and political systems that China has been deeply embraced in the past 140 years. The new systems are essentially foreign to China and thus lack support from the traditional sector of the society.

Although scholars have argued that modernization and Westernization are not the same process, to people of the developing societies the two terms are synonyms. This is particularly true in the case of China. The initial call for modernization in nineteenth century China was in response to Western dominance. The Chinese had always seen themselves as the center of the world before the arrival of Western civilization. Pye says, "the Chinese understandably developed a deep sense of cultural superiority. Others might be rude and militarily vicious, but the Chinese had no reason to doubt, in spite of some unfortunate experiences, that they were culturally the center of the world, the Middle Kingdom, as they called themselves. Although during the last thousand years of the imperial order all or part of China was ruled by alien conquerors, the Chinese persisted in feeling supremely self-assured."86

The Chinese strongly believed that their history has shown Chinese civilization is so superior that it can absorb any foreign element in the process of "sinification," becoming Chinese. Thus, even when China failed to contain Westerners and lost almost every war at the hands of the Westerners in the second half of the nineteenth century, the Chinese still were reluctant to accept the fact that the West was superior. The self-awareness movement, as has been mentioned, was aimed at preserving and restoring Chinese culture while supplementing it with Western "materials." But when China lost its war to Japan, a country that had been China's inferior younger brother for several centuries, it was the most demoralizing blow to the Chinese superiority complex. The only reason the Japanese defeated China, the Chinese leaders believed, was Japan's total Westernization. After this defeat, the question was no longer whether China should adopt Western culture or not, but how to Westernize. The necessity for an extensive Westernization involving military as well as socio-cultural change gradually became apparent. From 1895 to 1910 they founded schools in which Western languages, mathematics, and science were

taught; they studied international law, established a Western-style foreign office, and began to engage in Western-style diplomacy; they built arsenals and shipyards in which they could manufacture modern weapons and introduced new concepts into military training; they sent students abroad; and they began to think about adopting western methods of transportation and communication. After the 1911 republican revolution, they even established an American-style republican-democratic government. In the period under the Nationalist rule, from 1912 to 1949, western-trained intellectuals consisted of the majority of Chinese new leadership. In mainland China, the isolation from the advanced Western nations since 1949 has been blamed for its subsequent backward underdevelopment. “To catch up to the West” has been the ultimate goal in the Chinese effort toward modernization from the very beginning.

(2). It is an extensive and far-reaching process of change. The second major characteristic of the Chinese modernization process lies in its extensive scope of involvement and far-reaching consequence of impact. Although stability and integration had been two of the most distinguished traits of traditional Chinese social structure, China did experience ups and downs from time to time throughout its long history. Not only were there political revolutions overthrowing the old dynasty in favor of establishing a new dynasty, but also several large-scale reform movements were organized in various dynasties aiming at changing parts of the existing social-economic institutions. But not any of these movements and revolutions in the earlier history of China can match the extensiveness in scope and result to that of the modernization attempt during the past 140 years.

Political revolutions, social reforms, and other types of change in traditional China were aimed at a partial change within the existing social structure, and their main purposes were not for a total destruction of the systems involved, but for what Eisenstadt has called “accommodable change.”

Eisenstadt argued that processes of accommodable change were connected with the social condition that made possible the continuous fundamental harmony in traditional Chinese society. Conflicts among different political groups were often regulated through the existing norms and activities of the major political and regulative institutions of the society.

Modernization, on the contrary, is for a total change. It affected every aspect of the Chinese social structure; the traditional political system, Confucian ideology, moral value, religious belief, educational
system, and economic activity were all under attacks from the new systems of ideals coming along with modernization. Whether one likes it or not, China will change in the direction of greater modernization or more precisely Westernization.

Chinese intellectuals and political leaders were convinced that a complete overhaul of the existing social structure was necessary and that the inevitable solution was Westernization.

They indicated that the age of resistance to Western civilization had been passed; the Chinese now should go straight ahead to a wholesale Westernization and a wholehearted modernization.

As the call for modernization became the supreme goal of the Chinese leadership, family institution was gradually changed. The political system was shifted from traditional monarchy to, first, republican-democracy, then to Communism. Confucianism and folk belief are now being labelled as backward and superstitious and foreign education became the highest symbol of achievement. Various competing systems of Western culture dominated the new China in the period between 1912-1949. In short, almost every aspect of Chinese life has been under the influence of Western culture as a result of the attempt to modernize during the past 140 years.

(3). It is a revolution from the top. Although students of modernization in Western societies have generally stressed the necessity of the development of a modern attitude in the general population as a prerequisite for the modernization of a society, many researchers on the modernization in non-Western societies have found that perhaps the most important factor in these societies is the political leadership, and that the political style of the leaders in a society not only affects the type and function of political structure but also the tempo and destination of the society's economic and social transformation. Morse said:

If modernization is a super problem—as it is—it can be resolved only if the group in power recognizes the problem and correctly apprehends its nature, if it then creates the kinds of organizational structures required to mobilize the requisite inputs and compliances, and if it gives suitable guidance to the search for solution to the various subproblems of economic development, reinstitutionalization, and the like.87

The basic assumption here is that modernization will be easier if the power structure is controlled by a radical centralized modernizing

87. Morse, Modernization by Design, supra note 79, p. 375.
elite, dedicated to changing basic institutions in order to create what, in their view and that of their supporters, will be a more just and progressive social order.

The Chinese modernization experience offers a good example of the modernization initiated and directed by the political leadership. As we mentioned earlier, China was forced into Westernization as the result of Western dominance in the nineteenth century; the initiation of all the programs was from the top layer of the society, the leadership. The great majority of the general population was not seriously affected by the Western threat at that time. As a matter of fact, not until the Communist revolution did the change finally reach villages and countryside.

China did have a group of political and social leaders dedicated to modernization in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. But what made China fail in achieving a quick strike on modernization was the lack of a strong center of political leadership in planning and coordinating the various modernization programs that were put into practice in a hurry. Dr. Hu Shih pointed out "the difference between Japanese success and Chinese failure is mainly that Japan did not lose its social center; their works were continuous and accumulative under that center, and every effort was tied to its central political organization, i.e., the Emperor. In China, we did not have any center; everything we did often disappeared after changes in political administration. Policy, organization and leadership were all changed. Everything had to start again from the very beginning. Nothing could be designed for a long term perspective."

Modern Chinese history showed frequent changes in national administration because it was entirely built upon the charisma of the leaderships that were unstable, short-lived, and troublesome in character. For example, during the seventeen years of the Pei-yang regime (1912-1928), there were seven different presidents and two vice presidents of the republic, there were also thirty-three terms of national cabinet in which twenty-nine different people served as premiers and/or acting premiers. From 1928 to 1949, there were fifteen different presidents and vice presidents of the Executive Yuan (the cabinet) in the nationalist government. The lack of continuity shown in national politics thus made a long term modernization programming impossible.

The need for the stability of political leadership continues to play a crucial role in the fourth stage after 1949. This factor, perhaps,

more than anything else, can be accounted for the developmental gap between Taiwan and Mainland China. Political stability and an integrated leadership in Taiwan have enabled Taiwan to effectively implement its socio-economic modernization plans since 1949; while in Mainland China, constant power struggle has made it impossible for any programming continuity. The political leaders' vision on China's future, the ability of political leadership to commit itself for a long-ranged developmental change, the strategy and planning the political leaders employed in developing China, and the cohesiveness of power structure have proved to be vital in the Chinese efforts toward modernization.

(4) Confucianism and Modernization. The different developmental success between Taiwan and Mainland China in the post-1949 modernization efforts also reflects the role the traditional Confucian ethic played. In Taiwan, Confucian tradition is effectively mixed with modernity; while in Mainland China, the destruction of Confucianism has greatly undermined its efforts toward modernization. Evidence from such Confucian oriented states as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore have pointed to the fact that Confucianism is after all not an obstruction to economic growth and modernization. 89

Max Weber may be correct in blaming Confucianism for the lack of creativity and aggressiveness in pushing traditional China into developing a technological breakthrough and a capital economy. What Weber fails to see, however, is the great potentiality of dynamic flexibility in traditional Confucian ethic that had enabled China to make necessary adjustment. The focus of Confucianism lies in its stress on the achievement of perfection in human role relationships, rather than the search for individual salvation or self-realization. Since an individual's position in the society is determined by his role relations with others, whenever those role relations change, individuals must change accordingly. Viewing from this perspective, society as a unit of the whole universe must also change if other units have been changed. China may not be a great creator in technological innovation due to its stress on conformity and integration, but China is without any doubt a great adapter in making necessary changes for societal survival and

growth. Modernization might have been started in the West in the seventieth century, but Chinese civilization is quick to make necessary accommodable change as a latecomer.

But dynamic flexibility is not the only Confucian characteristics that is compatible with economic growth and modernization. There are other salient features in Confucianism that are conducive to the recent development of the nations under the Confucian influence in Asia. Table 11 gives a concise comparison on the compatibility between Confucian ethic and the modern system of development.

As presented in the above Confucianism is not really totally incompatible to modernization. Factors that are necessary for the development of modernization are found to be very integral parts of Confucian ethics. Confucianism is a secular system of norms and values that has provided socio-political stability and integration for over two thousand years, the suppression of those Confucian ethics which are favorable to modernization at the turn of the century was responsible for China's inability to deal with foreign challenge. The Communists' suppression of traditional Confucianism in the People's Republic of China in the post-1949 era has also undermined Mainland China's efforts toward modernization. The historical process of Chinese modernization during the past one hundred and forty years can, therefore, be seen as a process of the struggle between the suppression and the reappraisal of Confucianism in modern context. The realization of Confucianism has not only made Taiwan a modernized society, but also moved Japan, South Korea, and Singapore to economic prosperity.

VII. TOWARD A SYNTHETICAL THEORY

1. Two General Modernization Theories

So far, we have examined in great detail the process of China's modernization and the existing interpretations of that process. Now, we shall shift our attention to the construction of a higher level abstraction of a synthetical theory that could provide a better explanation of Chinese modernization and that could be empirically tested with a certain degree of historical truth.

In developing such a theory, we must keep in mind that the Chinese experience of modernization is not occurred and operated in a vacuum, i.e., in an isolated environment with no external contacts. Rather, the whole process has been part of a world experience. China started its modernization as a response to external pressure and it has continually been affected by external factors throughout its course of
**Table 11. Confucianism and Modernization***

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ideological Features in Confucianism</th>
<th>Conduciveness to Modernization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Stress harmony, see conflict as constructive and complementary to cooperation and unity.</td>
<td>Unit cooperation among production, marketing, and consumption is needed in modern economy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Secularism.</td>
<td>Rationalization.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Emphasis on political stability</td>
<td>For continuity in economic programming.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Encourage political leadership in guiding mass behavior.</td>
<td>Political legitimacy for socio-economic change from the top.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Value universalistic education</td>
<td>Education is a pre-requisite for economic development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Encourage free mobility</td>
<td>Free shifting labor power.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Flexibility in role playing</td>
<td>Adaptability and crisis management.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The compatibility between Confucianism and modernization listed here is not meant to apply to the early modernized societies such as European and North American societies, it is aimed at the group of "late-comers" which did not start its modernization efforts until the end of the War World II, especially the Asian societies.*
development. Theories of modernization and national development in other parts of the world thus could be used for the construction of a theory for China.

In general, modernization and national development theories can be categorized into two competing schools of thought: convergence theory vs dependency theory. Convergence theory in essence suggested that internal factors such as value, culture, and social structure of a given society will determine the course of modernization and that all societies will tend to move toward a western type of new social structure.

The chief feature of the dependency theory is its insistence that it is not internal characteristics of particular countries so much as the structure of the international system—particularly in its economic aspects—that is the key variables to be studied in order to understand the form that development has taken in non-western industrializing countries. The theory argues the sovereign states of the developing countries have long been dependent for an evolving mixture of technology, financing, markets, and basic impacts on the international economic system dominated by the capitalist power. These less developed countries may be called “hooked” for they cannot exist without their dependence. 90 Wallerstein declares that “in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries there has been only one world system in existence, the capital world economy.” 91

The great merit of the dependency theory is that it makes us aware how intense and complex the interactions between the developed and underdeveloped countries were. But as Smith has put it so adequately the theory “is biased and ideological, distorting evidence.” 92 Smith feels the theory deprive local histories of their integrity and specificity, making local actors little more than the pawns of outside forces. He says, “The error of this approach is . . . that it refuses to grant the part any autonomy, any specificity, any particularity independent of its memberships on the whole. Such writing is tyrannical.” 93

In comparison between the convergence theory and dependency theory, one can find the strength of the convergence theory lies in its

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93. Ibid., p. 258.
emphasis on those internal variables such as institutional arrangements, cultural values, and demographic characteristics that have contributed in the modernization of a society. In contrast, the dependency theory places a great weight on the external variables and the interconnections between the developed and underdeveloped countries.

2. A Synthetical View

There are a few empirical questions that have to be examined if one is to understand fully the problems and process of Chinese modernization. Those questions can be grouped under these three headings: (1) The problems of impetus, (2) the responses to the impetus, and (3) the structural change in society.

(1) The problems of impetus: In any study of the process of modernization, the first empirical question that must be asked is “Why change occurred?” In the case of China, the questions related to the causes of change in China may include:

a. If the traditional social structure had remained almost unchanged for several thousand years why did rapid change occur during the past 140 years?
b. Is there any reason or factor behind such a change? What kind of impetus to change emerged during this period?
c. Is the traditional Chinese social structure functionally incompatible with the modern development, as some theories seemed to suggest?
d. Is there any significant change in China in the value system or individual attitude toward social stability and integration in this period.
e. Is the impetus to change the result of internal or external pressure?
f. What was the role of the West during this period of change?

(2) The responses to the impetus: once there is an impetus to change, the question of how to respond becomes very important. Some societies simply ignore the potential for change, others respond

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slowly and conservatively, while still others respond with a very vigorous program. In the case of China's modernization process, the following three empirical questions are most important:

a. What was China's initial response to change for modernization?

b. What was the attitude of the elite in the society toward the threat for change?

c. When change became inevitable, how did China deal with the emerging problems?

(3) The structural change in society: Here, we must look into the problem of structural conductiveness and inconduciveness toward change. More specifically, we must look into every major social institution—economic, political, religious, educational, and communication, etc.—to see what part they played either for or against change, their positions in the whole social system, and their interactions with other social structures. Finally, we must also look into the conflicts between the traditional and the new social systems and determine what impact they had on the advance of the process of modernization. From these perspectives, the following empirical questions must therefore be asked in the study of China's modernization:

a. How many key traditional social systems have been abolished in favor of modern western models?

b. How did these new western models work in transitional China?

c. What are the consequences of such changes on the integration and stability of the society?

The above questions on Chinese modernization cannot be answered by either convergence theory or dependency theory alone. A synthesis is thus needed. As mentioned earlier, convergence theory is strong in examining internal changes in the course of Chinese modernization development. Taking from such a theoretical perspective, we will find:

(1) In the traditional Chinese value system, there was a lack of impetus for progressive change. The emphasis on harmony and integration in the main streams of the traditional Chinese ideology has created a highly stable and tradition-oriented society in China before the turn of the present century.

(2) The traditional social and political structures built upon such a tradition-oriented value system was able to keep the society stable for several thousand years without serious challenge or disorganization because traditional China was, to a certain degree, geo-
graphically isolated from other great civilizations and culturally superior than its own neighboring societies.

(3) Modernization in China is basically a process of Westernization ever since it started in the mid-nineteenth century. Many of the major social institutions have gradually been changed in favor of a Western mode of social structure. In education, political, economical, and ideological spheres, we have noticed the shift from tradition to Western modernity.

(4) The lack of aggressiveness and the stress on harmony on Confucian ethics have greatly undermined the Chinese ability to take initiative for technological and socio-political breakthrough in the early stage of modernization. Yet, the secular and normative nature of the Confucianism have nevertheless made it flexible in making necessary accommodation to adopt and accept Western superior culture and to resurface its compatible features that are conducive to economic growth and modernization in the post-1949 era.

Dependency theory, as has been discussed, seems to be best in explaining the external factors that have undercut the Chinese modernization effort. Taking from such a theoretical perspective, we have to pay attention to the facts that:

(1) Contacts with the West in the nineteenth century seemed to explore the shortcomings of the Chinese social system and, thus, resulted in a stage of disorganization and possible collapse because the West obviously had a superior technology than China at the time. Increasing contact between the West and China made the revision and reform of the tradition-oriented Chinese social system inevitable and even necessary.

(2) China's location in the world political economy dominated by the Western capitalist nations must be considered of prime importance in China's failure to develop industrial capitalism during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. China was quite strongly incorporated as economic and political satellites of the Western capitalist powers and thus lacked the autonomy to develop needed industry while at the same time thwarted its ability to industrialize.

(3) The lack of a strong centralized political organization in modern China in coping with problems of change has created an uncertain and ambiguous situation in which a smooth transformation from tradition to modernity became impossible. There was no well-defined goal by which the members of the society could sincerely follow. Everybody fought only for his own particular interest, nothing else. As a result, no continuity could be possibly achieved in China's modernization programming during the period.
A synthetical view of the Chinese modernization therefore must take into account the following variables:

(I) **Internal Factors:**
1. Demographic factors (e.g., population size and composition).
2. Geographical location (e.g., its relations with the neighboring states).
3. Domestic politics (e.g., the elite integration, the attitudes toward modernization of the elite).
4. Value system (e.g., Confucianism, stability and integration-oriented ideology, religious beliefs).

(II) **External Factors:**
5. International political-economic order (e.g., China's position in the international world order).
6. Resources allocation and distribution (e.g., China vs. the developed countries).
7. Foreign capital investment (e.g., foreign loans).

An analysis of any of the above variables will not only provide us an analytical frame of reference in understanding the past process of China's modernization, it will also help us in making a prediction of the future course and final goal of China's modernization effort. The road toward modernization has been long and painful in the experience of Chinese people, it is about time we give this experience a thorough and systematic investigation.

Based upon the above discussion, the following propositions have been developed with the hope that they would be tested empirically in the future:

**PROPOSITION I:** The large population size China has and the isolated geographical location China is located have created an equilibrium-oriented society in traditional China in which stability, integration, and maintaining status quo are the predominate value, which in turn then condemn any radical progressive socio-cultural change.
PROPOSITION II: Confucianism is both conservative and progressive. As a conservative ideology in an equilibrium-oriented China, Confucianism functioned as a system-maintenance mechanism in upholding status quo; As a progressive ideology, however, it provided a much needed legitimation to political and economic leadership in their pursuit of radical and progressive change in China.

PROPOSITION III: Elite integration is a necessary condition in the success of China’s modernization effort. The more integrated the political elite at the policy making group is, the more likely the success of modernization programming and its implementation.

PROPOSITION IV: The effective adoption of western mode of production, technology, and system of management is a necessary condition to China’s economic industrialization. The more the political and economic elite are aware of China’s position in the international world order, the more likely the success of China’s economic industrialization and its subsequent socio-political modernization.

PROPOSITION V: The more China is modernizing itself, the more it will share with other modernized societies similar economic, political, and socio-cultural features. Along the way, a process of sinification of these features will also be taken place.

VIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS

After nearly one and half century since China started its efforts toward modernization in the mid-19th century, success finally seems within reach for all Chinese. Taiwan has enjoyed a remarkable socio-economic “miracle” during the past thirty years, while the recent “pragmatic” approach advocated by Mainland China under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping has brought a new hope and an improved way of life. Although Taiwan and Mainland China are still fall apart in every aspect, a new process of convergence is now taking place that both sides of the Taiwan Strait will converge socio-economically. It is evident that the more Mainland China pushes its Four Moderniza-
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