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Taunya Lovell Banks

University of Maryland School of Law, tbanks@law.umaryland.edu

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Brown at 50: Reconstructing Brown’s Promise

Taunya Lovell Banks*

"[C]ontemporary racial disparities in education are not always due to racial discrimination, most . . . can be traced . . . to current social policies and educational practices or to the vestiges of the dual systems that scarred the American educational landscape."1

I. INTRODUCTION

A few days before the fiftieth anniversary of the United States Supreme Court’s seminal decision in Brown v. Board of Education,2 a state district judge ordered the State of Kansas to stop spending funds for public elementary and secondary schools.3 Five months earlier that same judge ruled that the state school financing system was a “blatant violation of Article 6 of the Kansas Constitution and the Equal Protection Clauses of both the Kansas and the United States Constitutions.”4 According to the judge, the funding system resulted in an inequitable distribution of resources among the state’s school-aged children, “dramatically and adversely impact[ing] the learning and educational performance of the most vulnerable and/or protected Kansas children.”5 The school-aged children disproportionately affected by the state’s funding scheme were poor and non-white, the same children who were Brown’s supposed beneficiaries. Fifty years after Brown, children in Kansas still do not have equal educational opportunities.

When the United States Supreme Court decided Brown, almost all children in twelve southern and border states and the District of Columbia attended racially segregated schools mandated by law—de jure segregation.6 Urban schools in many other states were de facto

* Jacob A. France Professor of Equality Jurisprudence, University of Maryland School of Law. I would like to thank Penelope Andrews for her helpful comments on an earlier version of this essay and my research assistant Hyon Sim, Class of 2006, for his diligence.


4. Id. at *1.

5. Id.

6. See Mary Ann Connell, The Road to United States v. Fordice: What is the Duty of Public Colleges and Universities in Former De Jure States to Desegregate?, 62 MISS L.J. 285, 305-06 (1993). As I have written before, I intentionally use the term black or black American in lieu of the more fashionable term African-American, because I believe the former term is more accurate and inclusive. For a more complete discussion of this point, see Taunya Lovell Banks, Colorism: A Darker Shade of Pale, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1705, 1708 n.12 (2000).
Following the Brown decision, it took several decades of litigation in federal and state courts to achieve a significant degree of racial integration in public schools.8

Fifty years later, after more than a decade of increasing resegregation,9 Professor Robinson and others remind us that school-aged children in the nation’s largest and most diverse cities are most likely to attend highly segregated schools.10 Some education advocates argue that highly segregated public schools—schools where one race constitutes 80 to 100% of the population—are inherently unequal.11 To these advocates, the resegregation of public schools in America seems like a betrayal of Brown’s spirit.

Today the measure of equal education for black children often is the racial composition of the school population rather than the quality of education received.12 This measure of educational equality implies

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8. See generally Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Movement, 80 Va. L. Rev. 7 (1994). Professor Klarman writes: “Across the South as a whole, just over 0.15% of black schoolchildren in 1960 and 1.2% in 1964 were attending school with whites. Only after the 1964 Civil Rights Act threatened to cut off federal educational funding for segregated school districts and the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare in 1966 adopted stringent enforcement guidelines did the integration rate in the South rise to 32% in 1968-1969 and 91.3% in 1972-1973.” Id. at 9-10. Fourteen years after Brown, Robert Carter, the NAACP lawyer who argued the Kansas case before the Supreme Court, wrote: “few in the country, black or white, understood in 1954 that racial segregation was merely a symptom, not the disease; that the real sickness is that our society in all of its manifestations is geared to the maintenance of white superiority.” Robert Carter, The Warren Court and Desegregation, 67 Mich. L. Rev. 237, 247 (1968).

9. Gary Orfield & Chungmei Lee, Brown at 50: King’s Dream or Plessy’s Nightmare?, Harvard Univ. Civil Rights Project 19 (Jan. 2004), available at http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/reseg04/brown50.pdf. In fact, some observers argue that we are experiencing the first stage of a resegregation of America’s public schools. Id. Ten years after Brown only 2.3% of black students in the South attended majority white schools, but by 1988 that number had grown to 43.5%. Id. A decade later (1998), the percent of black children in the South attending majority white schools had dropped more than ten percentage points to 32.7%. Id. at 20. According to Orfield and Lee, “[t]his resegregation is linked to the impact of three Supreme Court decisions between 1991 and 1995. [Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 79 (1995); Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992); Dowell v. Oklahoma City, 498 U.S. 237 (1991).] Limiting school desegregation and authorizing a return to segregated neighborhood schools.” Id. at 18.

10. Mildred Wigfall Robinson, Fulfilling Brown’s Legacy: Bearing the Costs of Realizing Equality, 44 Washburn L.J. 1, 7 (2004); Orfield & Lee, supra note 9, at 34 (87% for black students and 86% for Latino students). Ironically, students in rural communities and small towns and not students in the nation’s largest cities are more likely to attend racially integrated schools.


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that schools without white students are presumptively inferior. Yet
the "belief that black students cannot get a decent education unless
there are white students in the classroom . . . has always been disputed
by some [black]-Americans."13 Increasingly, educational achievement
for children of all races is tied to socio-economic status.14 Since whites
as a group are more affluent than non-whites, race and class tend to
get conflated leaving uninformed people to conclude that racial inte­
gration alone is the measure of equal educational opportunities for
black and other non-white children.15

Legal scholars writing about equal educational opportunities tend
to focus either on ways to achieve racial integration16 or funding
equality.17 Few scholars explore how to structure new theories of edu­
cational equality that acknowledge and squarely address the twin ten­
sions inherent in Brown—racial integration and equal educational
opportunity for all children.18 This country's experience over the past
fifty years illustrates how you can have one without the other.
Achieving both in a racially polarized society like America will be a
real challenge for future lawyers.

Recently the Supreme Court reminded us of why new theories
about educational equality are so urgently needed. In Grutter v. Bol­
linger,19 a bare majority ruled that a public college or university's de­
sire to create a diverse student body is a compelling educational
interest.20 Yet Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, cautioned:
Race-conscious admissions policies must be limited in time. This
requirement reflects that racial classifications, however compelling
their goals, are potentially so dangerous that they may be employed

13. Menand, supra, note 12, at 91. The esteemed black educator Dr. Benjamin Mays speak­
ing in 1974 said, "Black people, while working to implement Brown, should recognize that inte­
gration alone does not provide a quality education, and that much of the substance of quality
education can be provided to Black children in the interim." Bell, Serving Two Masters, supra
note 12, at 487 (citing the writings of several other black scholars).
14. See infra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
15. The discussion of educational equality cannot be limited to black children, Brown's
original parties in interest. Today, Latino children in particular have educational experiences
that mirror those of a disproportionate number of black school-aged children.
16. See generally Sheryl Cashin, The Failures of Integration: How Race and
Class are underminin the American Dream (2004); What Brown v. Board of Educa­
tion Should Have Said: The Nation's Top Legal Experts Rewrite America's
Board of Education Should Have Said]; Paul Gewirtz, Choice in the Transition: School
Desegregation and the Corrective Ideal, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 728 (1986).
17. See generally Bell, Silent Covenants, supra note 12; What Brown v. Board of
Education Should Have Said, supra note 16; Peter Enrich, Leaving Equality Behind: New
18. See generally Ronald R. Edmonds, Effective Education For Minority Pupils: Brown
Confounded or Confirmed, in Shades of Brown: New Perspective on School Desegrega­
tion (Derrick Bell ed., 1980) [hereinafter Shades of Brown] (arguing that desegregation is
useful only if it provides equal and effective education to minority students and that the focus
should be on factors such as class size, teacher experience, per pupil expenditure, et cetera).
20. Id. at 307.
no more broadly than the interest demands. Enshrining a perma-
nent justification for racial preferences would offend this fundamen-
tal equal protection principle . . . . The requirement that all race-
conscious admissions programs have a termination point ‘assure[s]
all citizens that the deviation from the norm of equal treatment of
all racial and ethnic groups is a temporary matter, a measure taken
in the service of the goal of equality itself.’ . . . . We expect that 25
years from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be neces-
sary to further the interest approved today.21

At the same time, members of the Court are quite aware of the
glaring educational inequities in public education that disproportion-
ately impact non-white children.22 Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, con-
curring in Grutter wrote that despite a “strong . . . public[ ] desire for
improved education systems . . . it remains the current reality that many
minority students encounter markedly inadequate and unequal educa-
tional opportunities.”23

Professor Robinson accurately describes why it is difficult to
achieve meaningful school integration, but her recommendation that
better school funding methods be developed as an interim measure to
counteract the unequal education non-white students receive in highly
segregated schools mischaracterizes the problem. Like some scholars
and the lawyers who litigated Brown, Professor Robinson conflates
the twin goals of Brown, integration and equal educational opportuni-
ties. In this response to her lecture, I explain how these goals got
confused and why unlinking and more clearly articulating the ration-
ale for each may ultimately lead to the achievement of both goals.

21. Id. at 342-43 (emphasis added).

22. I intentionally limit my discussion to black Americans and Latinos because the status of
Asian-Americans is more complex. Although Asians are characterized by some as a “model
minority” there is considerable variation in high school graduation rates among Asian ethnic
groups. For example, a high percentage of Asian-Indian, Chinese, Filipino, Japanese, and Ko-
orean are high school graduates (85.4%, 77.6%, 87.4%, 91.4%, 86.4% respectively), whereas a
low percentage of Cambodian, Hmong, Laotian, and Vietnamese graduate from high school
(47.1%, 40.7%, 50.5%, 61.9% respectively). Max Niedzwiecki & T.C. Duong, SOUTHEAST
Oct. 20, 2004). Similar variations are reflected among these groups when comparing the percent-
age with bachelor or higher degrees (Asian-Indian (60.9%), Chinese (46.6%), Filipino (41.7%),
Japanese (40.4%), Korean (43.1%), Cambodian (9.1%), Hmong (7.4%), Laotian (7.6%),
Vietnamese (19.5%)). Id. I also do not specifically address the separate circumstances of
America’s indigenous populations, but believe that my argument for educational equity devel-
oped more fully in this essay also applies to these groups as well.

23. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 346 (emphasis added). Writing for herself, and joined by Justice
Stephen Breyer, Justice Ginsburg continues: “Despite these inequalities, some minority students
are able to meet the high threshold requirements set for admission to the country’s finest under-
graduate and graduate educational institutions. As lower school education in minority commu-
nities improves, an increase in the number of such students may be anticipated. From today’s
vantage point, one may hope, but not firmly forecast, that over the next generation’s span, pro-
gress toward nondiscrimination and genuinely equal opportunity will make it safe to sunset af-
firmative action.” Id.
II. BROWN THE ICON: SOCIAL EQUALITY, THE MEASURE OF FULL CITIZENSHIP

A. Plessy v. Ferguson Reexamined

The Brown decision is a mirror image of Plessy v. Ferguson, and thus the shadow of that Court’s unanimous consensus that blacks are not the social equals of whites still hangs over us. In Plessy, all but one of the Supreme Court Justices agreed that a state law mandating separate train cars for whites and blacks when applied to travel within the state was constitutional. The majority opinion, written by Justice Henry Billings Brown from Massachusetts, said that racial segregation laws were merely legal distinctions that did not “necessarily imply the inferiority of either race to the other.” He distinguished what he characterized as political equality (exclusion from juries) from social equality (separation of the races in schools, theaters, and trains). In essence, riding integrated train coaches was an expression of social equality; blacks were not the social equals of whites; and the Fourteenth Amendment, Justice Brown wrote, only protects legal or political equality.

The lone dissenting Justice, John Marshall Harlan, a former slave-owner from Kentucky, agreed that blacks were not and probably never would be the social equals of whites. Nevertheless he chas-tised the majority for being disingenuous in saying that riding in racially separate train cars constitutes legal equality for black Americans. Justice Harlan believed that separating the races in public spaces like train cars violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause because state laws cannot treat people different

24. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
25. For a discussion of this point in the context of education, see generally A’lelia Robinson Henry, Perpetuating Inequality: Plessy v. Ferguson and the Dilemma of Black Access to Public and Higher Education, 27 J.L. & EDUC. 47, 63-64 (1998), arguing that the spirit of Plessy is being re-evoked in ways that deprives African-Americans access to, and representation in, quality public and higher education, thus further widening the disparity between black and white public and higher educational attainment.
26. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 542-43. And therefore racial segregation laws did not constitute a badge of slavery prohibited by the Thirteenth Amendment. Id. Specifically the Court wrote: “A statute which implies merely a legal distinction between the white and colored races – a distinction which is founded in the color of the two races, and which must always exist so long as white men are distinguished from the other race by color – has no tendency to destroy the legal equality of the two races, or re-establish a state of involuntary servitude.” Id.
27. Id. at 545-46.
28. Id. at 544. If enforced segregation suggests racial inferiority, wrote Justice Brown, it is only because that is the interpretation African-Americans put on the practice! Id. at 551.
29. He wrote, “[t]he white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this country . . . . So, I doubt not, it will continue to be for all time. . . .” Id. at 559.
solely based on race.\textsuperscript{30} Thus, he wrote those now famous words: "There is no caste here. Our Constitution is color-blind."\textsuperscript{31}

Although Justice Harlan never advocated social equality for black Americans, he probably would consider the underlying premise of \textit{Brown}, that public schools cannot be segregated based solely on race, an example of \textit{legal} equality.\textsuperscript{32} In contrast, when Thurgood Marshall was Special Counsel for the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) Legal Defense and Education Fund, he and many other civil rights advocates saw \textit{Brown} as signaling the end of social inequality between whites and non-whites, especially black Americans.\textsuperscript{33} Educational equality between races is an essential component of social equality.

\subsection*{B. The Promise of Brown}

Three years after the United States Supreme Court decided \textit{Plessy v. Ferguson}, it quickly became clear that the "separate but equal" doctrine never would result in educational equality for black Americans. The Court in \textit{Cumming v. Richmond County Board of Education}\textsuperscript{34} ruled that a state is not required under the Constitution to maintain a high school for black children even though it maintains a high school for whites.\textsuperscript{35} Since the Court in \textit{Cumming} failed to detail what constitutes equality in public education for black Americans,\textsuperscript{36} black lawyers began to litigate this issue in a wide range of cases.\textsuperscript{37} The \textit{Brown} decision represents the culmination of an assault on the "separate but equal" doctrine.

By the mid 1930s, NAACP lawyers under the direction of Charles Hamilton initiated a legal campaign to attack application of

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{30} Id. The \textit{Plessy} decision was met by relative silence and apparent indifference in the nation. See Cheryl I. Harris, \textit{The Story of Plessy v. Ferguson: The Death and Resurrection of Racial Formalism, in Constitutional Law Stories}, 181 n.2 (Michael C. Dorf ed., (2004)). In truth \textit{Plessy} was the culmination of a whole series of court cases of that era undermining attempts to secure racial equality for blacks dating back to the 1870s.
\item \textsuperscript{31} \textit{Plessy}, 163 U.S. at 559.
\item \textsuperscript{32} Historian Charles Lofgren cited an editorial that appeared in the New York Times following the \textit{Brown} decision that stated: "the words [Harlan] used in his lonely dissent ... have become in effect ... a part of the law of the land ... [T]here was not one word in Chief Justice Warren's opinion that was inconsistent with the earlier views of Justice Harlan." Editorial, \textit{Justice Harlan Concurring}, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1954 at § 4, at E10, \textit{(quoted in Charles Lofgren, The Plessy Case: A Legal-Historical Interpretation 204 (1987)).}
\item \textsuperscript{33} See infra notes 44 and 63 and accompanying text.
\item \textsuperscript{34} 175 U.S. 528 (1899).
\item \textsuperscript{35} Id. at 545.
\item \textsuperscript{36} Instead the Court wrote: "The education of the people in schools maintained by state taxation is a matter belonging to the respective States, and any interference on the part of the Federal authority with the management of such schools cannot be justified except in the case of a clear and unmistakable disregard of rights secured by the supreme law of the land." Id.
\end{itemize}
the *Plessy* doctrine in the area of education.\(^{38}\) At first the lawyers did not challenge the "separate but equal" doctrine directly. The legal strategy was to accept racial segregation in primary and secondary schools but to demand equalization—genuine equality—in facilities, per pupil expenditures,\(^{39}\) and teacher pay.\(^{40}\)

The lawyers also began litigating a series of cases aimed at white-only state professional schools. On their face, the higher education cases also focused on enforcing the "separate but equal doctrine," arguing that integration was warranted where the state failed to provide comparable facilities for blacks seeking graduate degrees, and the United States Supreme Court agreed.\(^{41}\) The ultimate goal of both the public and professional school cases, however, was the elimination of the "separate but equal" doctrine.\(^{42}\)

Thurgood Marshall and the other NAACP lawyers chose public school segregation cases to challenge the doctrine partly because they and other civil rights advocates believed that "education was the path to social advancement for [black] Americans, and partly because [they] thought that if blacks and whites mixed together as children they would be less susceptible to racial prejudice as adults."\(^{43}\) This


\(^{39}\) Thurgood Marshall did a survey of southern schools in 1948-49 and found widespread disparities. For example, the public school system in Atlanta annually spent $570 per white student compared to $228.05 per black student. Menand, *supra* note 12, at 94.

\(^{40}\) See Morris v. Williams, 149 F.2d 703 (8th Cir. 1945) (holding that the customary discrimination against colored teachers, with respect to salaries, solely on the account of race or color violates the Fourteenth Amendment); Alston v. School Bd. of Norfolk, 112 F.2d 992 (4th Cir. 1940) (issuing an injunction restraining the school board from discriminating on the grounds of race or color in fixing salaries to be paid school teachers); Davis v. Cook, 80 F. Supp. 443 (N.D. Ga. 1948) (holding that salaries, when fixed, may not be discriminatory because of color or race).

\(^{41}\) Starting in the mid 1930s, NAACP lawyers litigated a series of cases directed at state supported professional schools that barred blacks. In 1935 NAACP lawyers successfully tried out their strategy when they represented Donald Murray, who was suing in state court for his admission to the law school at the University of Maryland, alleging that restricting entry to the state's only public law school denied Murray equal protection of the law. Pearson v. Murray, 169 Md. 478 (1936). In a series of cases, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the Maryland Court of Appeals. See, e.g., McLaurin v. Oklahoma, 339 U.S. 637 (1950) (refusal to admit a black applicant to the University of Oklahoma in pursuit of a Doctorate in Education violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because there was no separate facility within the state for black students); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (holding that the separate law schools at the University to Texas were not equal with regard to books, rooms, faculty, staff, accreditation, and certain other intangibles); Sipuel v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Oklahoma, 332 U.S. 631 (1948) (refusal to admit a qualified black applicant to the University of Oklahoma School of Law violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Missouri *ex rel.* Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938) (refusal to admit black applicant to the University of Missouri Law School violated the Equal Protection Clause where no separate facility existed for blacks in the state).


\(^{43}\) Menand, *supra* note 12, at 92 (emphasis added).
second objective, racial integration, we now know, does not automatically result in the first objective, equal educational opportunities.\footnote{Former Harvard Law Professor Derrick Bell wrote that Thurgood Marshall and the lawyers in Brown were serving two masters – their clients, who were the parents of the black school children and wanted equal educational opportunities for their children, and the liberal, primarily white, financial backers of the litigation effort who believed that integration (and assimilation) was the key to equality for black Americans. Bell, \textit{Serving Two Masters}, supra note 12, at 489-90 n.59 (citing Leroy Clark, \textit{The Lawyer and the Civil Rights Movement – Catalytic Agent or Counter-Revolutionary}?, 19 \textit{KAN. L. REV.} 459, 469 (1971)). Robert Carter argued before the United States Supreme Court that equal educational opportunities are cornerstones in preparing one for American citizenship and that “Negro” children were denied that opportunity. “Appellants argued that they and other Negro children similarly situated were placed at a serious disadvantage with respect to their opportunity to develop citizenship skills . . . .” Robert L. Carter, \textit{Brown v. Board of Education (Oral Argument Dec. 9, 1952)}, in \textit{Brown v. Board: The Landmark Oral Argument Before the Supreme Court 13} (Leon Friedman ed., 2004). Furthermore James Nabrit argued before the Court that black citizens who fought in the country’s wars were also fighting for full citizenship for them, and their children: “It would appear to me that in 1952, the Negro should not be viewed as anybody’s burden. He is a citizen. He is performing his duties in peace and in war, and today, on the bloody hills of Korea, he is serving in an unsegregated war. All we ask of this Court is that it say that under the Constitution he is entitled to live and send his children to school in the District of Columbia unsegregated, with the children of his war comrades. That is simple. The Constitution gives him that right.” James M. Nabrit, Jr., \textit{Bolling v. Sharpe (Oral Argument Dec. 10, 1952)}, in \textit{Brown v. Board: The Landmark Oral Argument Before the Supreme Court, supra}, at 142.}

The NAACP’s strategic goal became more apparent during the litigation of \textit{Sweatt v. Painter}.\footnote{Judge Carter wrote that NAACP lawyers actually first made a direct challenge to the “separate but equal” doctrine in their amicus brief in \textit{Westminster School District v. Mendez}, 161 F.2d 774 (9th Cir. 1947) (holding that by enforcing the segregation of school children of Mexican descent against their will and contrary to the laws of California, respondents have violated the federal laws as provided by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution by depriving them of liberty and property without due process of law and by denying to them the equal protection of the laws). Carter, supra note 42, at 1084 n.5.} Buoyed by their success in two earlier cases where the United States Supreme Court ruled that states cannot exclude blacks based on race from the only state graduate or professional school, the NAACP lawyers sued the University of Texas.\footnote{\textit{Sweatt v. Painter}, 339 U.S. 629-31 (1950). Instead of granting the plaintiff the requested relief, the trial judge gave the state six months to create a separate law school for black Texans, dismissing the suit when the state hastily complied. \textit{Id.} at 632. On appeal, the Texas Court of Civil Appeals, at the State Attorney General’s request, reversed and remanded the case “requesting the [trial] court to rule on the question of segregation and . . . for further evidence showing the establishment of a separate but equal law school.” Letter from Thurgood Marshall to William Hastie (Apr. 3, 1947) (on file at Thurgood Marshall Law Library, NAACP Papers, Box III-B-15 at 268, Univ. of Md., Baltimore, Md.). Surprised at the ruling, Thurgood Marshall, in a letter to William Hastie, a prominent black lawyer and Marshall confidant who then was serving as the Governor of the Virgin Islands, wrote: “[t]he interesting thing is that the court refused to rule as a matter of law that segregation was invalid and the Chief Justice made the statement from the bench that it was the appellant’s position that segregation and discrimination were tied up together and could not be separated and that he was not willing to rule that that point was precluded from the case . . . . So, whether we want it or not, we are now faced with the proposition of going into the question of segregation as such.” \textit{Id.} at 268. The letter from Marshall continues: “I think we should do so because even if we don’t take the case far, we at least should experiment on [sic] the type of evidence which we may be able to produce on this question. For example, we want to produce experts such as Charlie Thompson to tes-} The lawsuit sought the admission of a black applicant to the state’s only law school.\footnote{7. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629-31 (1950).} Ultimately the trial judge found the newly estab-
lished black state law school to be “substantially equivalent” to the University of Texas Law School, and the state appellate court affirmed the ruling.\textsuperscript{48} In the petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, Marshall attacked the “separate but equal” doctrine head-on, but the Court declined to address the \textit{Plessy} issue, ruling in \textit{Sweatt}’s favor on a narrower point.\textsuperscript{49}

Instead of striking down the “separate but equal” doctrine, the Court made compliance with the doctrine more difficult. A unanimous Court held that in determining whether racially separate state facilities are equal under the Constitution, it would consider both tangible and intangible factors like the reputation of the school, its faculty, and alumni.\textsuperscript{50} The Court’s further working out of what constitutes equal educational opportunity was cut short by its decision in \textit{Brown}.

By shifting the arguments in \textit{Sweatt} and \textit{Brown} from equalization to desegregation both the NAACP lawyers and the Court in \textit{Brown} assumed that desegregation constituted equalization.\textsuperscript{51} But in fact, the graduate and professional school cases had always been about integration.\textsuperscript{52} The petitioner’s brief in \textit{Brown} shifted the focus to desegregation as the ultimate equalizer rather than equalization itself.\textsuperscript{53}
Thus it is unsurprising that “equal” education in a post-\textit{Brown} world became synonymous with \textit{racially} integrated schools.\footnote{Bell, \textit{Silent Covenant}, supra note 12, at 120.}

\textbf{C. Rereading \textit{Brown}}

In the United States Supreme Court, NAACP lawyers in \textit{Brown} argued strategically that “segregated public schools are not ‘equal’ and cannot be made ‘equal’,”\footnote{\textit{Brown}, 347 U.S. at 488. As the Court noted, in two of the six public school cases involving the “separate but equal doctrine” (\textit{Cumming v. County Board of Education}, 175 U.S. 528 (1899) and \textit{Gong Lum v. Rice}, 275 U.S. 78 (1927)) the validity of the doctrine was not challenged. \textit{Id.} at 491. In the four remaining cases, \textit{McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents}, 339 U.S. 637 (1950), \textit{Sweatt v. Painter}, 339 U.S. 629 (1950), \textit{Sipuel v. Oklahoma}, 332 U.S. 631 (1948), and \textit{Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada}, 305 U.S. 337 (1938), all graduate school cases, the inequality was based on the absence for blacks of specific educational benefits available to similarly qualified whites. \textit{Id.} at 491-92.} and hence black children are denied the equal protection of the law. Using studies by Kenneth and Mamie Clark, black social scientists, Marshall and Robert Carter argued that racially segregated schools stamp black children with a badge of inferiority,\footnote{Id., supra note 55.} a direct counter to the claim of the majority in \textit{Plessy}. The Supreme Court agreed.\footnote{\textit{Id.}, supra note 57.}

The direct attack on segregation rather than equalization adopted by the NAACP lawyers was resisted by some southern local NAACP branches.\footnote{Carter, supra note 42, at 1089. Robert Carter, writing in 1991, said that when in late 1949 and early 1950 he and Marshall wanted to challenge segregation directly, they encountered considerable opposition. But by 1950 Marshall had persuaded the NAACP board to “endorse[ ] a new policy of refusing to take any cases fighting school discrimination except those that attacked segregation per se.” Robert L. Carter, \textit{A Tribute to Thurgood Marshall}, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 33, 39-40 (1991). Several black lawyers from the South connected with the NAACP opposed the change in policy resigning from the National Legal Committee in protests. “They believed that the NAACP should not abandon litigation that sought to equalize educational facilities.” \textit{Id.} One of those lawyers, Oliver Hill from Virginia, was later counsel in \textit{Davis v. County School Board}, one of the five cases in \textit{Brown}. \textit{Id.}} Many parents simply wanted better \textit{black} schools for their children.\footnote{\textit{Id.}, supra note 56.} Reluctant to disregard the \textit{Plessy} doctrine, the lower courts in Kansas, South Carolina, Delaware, and Virginia addressed the equalization issue.\footnote{\textit{Id.}, supra note 58.}
Unresolved is whether the NAACP lawyers should have pushed more specifically for both equalization and the end of de jure segregation, rather than assume that integration would automatically result in equal educational opportunities for black children. In hindsight, it is difficult to predict whether a theory that encompassed both goals as separate but connected rights would have been as readily accepted by the Court and the nation. Nevertheless, the legal strategy of the NAACP lawyers in Brown reflects the naïveté of racial progressives in the 1930s and 1940s. They believed that elimination of the “separate but equal” doctrine would solve the problem of racial discrimination against black Americans. They did not factor in the effect of class differences among whites and blacks on equal educational opportunities.

The district court found no substantial difference in the school physical plants, student transportation, curricula, or teacher qualifications. Id. When the Supreme Court ruled in Sweat v. Painter that both tangible and intangible factors determined whether schools were equal, at least in higher education, the equalization question in the Kansas case would have been whether the Sweat rationale also applied to primary and secondary public schools. But this issue was never raised by either the courts or lawyers in Brown.

In contrast, the South Carolina court found that the black schools were inferior to the white schools and ordered the state to begin immediately to equalize the facilities. Briggs v. Elliott, 98 F. Supp. 529, 537-38 (E.D.S.C. 1951). Similarly in Virginia the federal district court admitted that the facilities were unequal, but sustained the validity of the contested provisions mandating segregation and denied the plaintiffs admission to the white schools during the equalization program. Davis v. County Sch. Bd., 103 F. Supp. 337, 340-41 (E.D. Va. 1952). In Delaware, the Chancellor’s decree ordering desegregation was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Delaware, which intimated, however, that the defendants might be able to obtain a modification of the decree after equalization of the Negro and white schools had been accomplished. Belton v. Gebhart, 87 A.2d 862, 870-71 (1952).

Mark Tushnet wrote in his 1987 book examining the strategy of the NAACP lawyers that there was no single conception of equality, and the NAACP engaged in a process of constructing one out of many possible conceptions of equality. Professor Tushnet believed that sacrificing desegregation for educational equity would have resulted in a better quality of education for black children. TUSHNET, supra note 42, at 158-65 (1987), Judge Carter heartily disagrees with Professor Tushnet on this point. Carter, supra note 42, at 1091 (citing TUSHNET, supra note 42).

Professor Robinson cites Robert Carter’s reflections twenty-five years later. Judge Carter wrote:

while the pre-Brown thesis that equal education and integrated education are synonymous has never had a fair test, its chance of being afforded a just demonstration in the foreseeable future seems quite unlikely. Whether our views about the necessity of school integration were correct is really beside the point. Current public intransigence makes clear that we cannot allow ourselves to become the prisoners of dogma. While integration must remain the long-range goal, we must search for alternatives, because the reality is that hundreds of thousands of black children are attending all black or predominantly black schools in the urban North and South. These schools are woefully inadequate and provide no tools which will enable poor blacks to become a part of the mainstream of the social, economic, and political life of the country.


See Bell, Serving Two Masters, supra note 12, at 489 (“For many civil rights workers, success in obtaining racially balanced schools seems to have become a symbol of the nation’s commitment to equal opportunity—not only in education, but in housing, employment, and other fields where the effects of racial discrimination are still present.”); Robert L. Carter, A Reassessment of Brown v. Board, in SHADES OF BROWN, supra note 18, at 23 (“[T]he basic postulate of our strategy and theory in Brown was that the elimination of enforced segregated education would necessarily result in equal education.”).
III. THE AFTERMATH OF BROWN

"Once you begin the process of segregation, it has its own inertia. It continues on without enforcement."64

A. Generally

The 1954 Brown decision (Brown I) represented a tremendous victory because it signaled the beginning of the end of separate but equal laws, but the celebration was short-lived. Brown II involved the question of how to implement the decision given the different circumstances of the individual cases.65 In Brown II the United States Supreme Court, for the first and only time in more than two hundred years, deferred enforcement of a constitutionally protected right, delaying implementation of Brown I by ordering that school desegregation be carried out "with all deliberate speed."66 As Robert Carter, the lawyer who argued the Kansas case before the Supreme Court reminds us, the dictionary defines "deliberate" as "slow and even; unhurried."67 In other words, concern about white resistance in the South was elevated above the constitutional rights of black Americans.68

All deliberate speed notwithstanding, there still was massive resistance to Brown in the white South lasting for more than a decade.69 It took yet another decade—over twenty years in total—to significantly desegregate public schools in southern and border States.70 During this time, NAACP lawyers continued to press for racial integration, doing nothing to minimize the existing education inequality of

65. The Delaware Supreme Court in Belton v. Gebhart had ordered immediate desegregation of the state schools. Belton, 87 A.2d at 362. By 1955 the Kansas and District of Columbia schools had already initiated desegregation, so less time might have been needed for those schools than for the South Carolina and Virginia school systems. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 299 (1955).
67. Robert Carter, Speech at the University of Maryland (Nov. 2003). Carter wrote: "after more than ten years of waiting for Brown II’s objectives to be attained ‘with all deliberate speed,’ the United States Supreme Court lost patience and began to press for adherence to Brown by requiring that the dual system be dismantled in fact.” Robert L. Carter, A Reassessment of Brown v. Board, in SHADES OF BROWN, supra note 18, at 24. Carter wrote: “it is clear that what the formula required was movement toward compliance on terms that the white South could accept.” Carter, supra note 8, at 243.
68. Reginald Oh writes that there was an important linguistic shift between Brown I and Brown II. The Court in Brown II states that Brown I declared “racial discrimination” unconstitutional. However, the Court in Brown I never mentions the phrase “racial discrimination.” Brown I states only that “segregation” is unconstitutional. Professor Oh argued that this was a significant shift making it more difficult for petitioners to achieve racial desegregation. Reginald Oh, Constructing a Critical Linguistic Analysis of Law (2004) (draft on file with the author).
70. See supra note 8.
all-black schools, leaving a generation of post-\textit{Brown} children poorly educated.\footnote{Michael Klarman wrote: "Blacks were . . . divided over whether to pursue . . . desegregation — a 1955 Gallup poll found that only 53 percent of southern blacks supported \textit{Brown} — given the fierce white resistance to desegregation, dramatic recent improvements in some black schools, the likely dismissals of black teachers after schools desegregated, and the ambivalence of the black community over black children attending predominately white schools." Michael J. Klarman, \textit{From Jim Crow to Civil Rights: The Supreme Court and the Struggle for Racial Equality} 352 (2004).} This condition persists.

Today although public school systems are integrated, most black children in large urban areas attend highly segregated schools.\footnote{Maryland, a border state, ranks fourth among the top ten states in the country. Ironically, only two deep southern states, Mississippi and Alabama, rank among that top ten. Orfield & Lee, supra note 9, at 26. Also included among the top ten states are New York, Illinois, Michigan, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Alabama, and Mississippi. \textit{Id.} Orfield and Lee wrote: desegregation of black students continued to increase in the South until the late 1980s, possibly reflecting the gradual decline in residential segregation levels. Then, beginning in the 1990s, segregation began to increase in spite of evidence from the 2000 Census of further declines in residential segregation during this decade. This resegregation is linked to the impact of three Supreme Court decisions between 1991 and 1995[, Dowell \textit{v.} Okla. City, 498U.S. 237 (1991); Freeman \textit{v.} Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992); Missouri \textit{v.} Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995),] limiting school desegregation and authorizing a return to segregated neighborhood schools. \textit{Id.} at 18.} The lack of racial integration per se, however, is not the most pressing problem. The real problem with today's \textit{de facto} segregation is that black and other non-white "students in highly segregated neighborhood schools are many times more likely to be in schools of concentrated poverty."\footnote{\textit{Id.} at 21.} Studies find a link between concentrated poverty, school opportunities, and achievement levels.\footnote{\textit{Id.}} Harvard sociologists Gary Orfield and Chungmei Lee in their 2004 report, \textit{Brown at 50: King's Dream or Plessy's Nightmare}, conclude that

children in these schools tend to be less healthy, to have weaker preschool experiences, to have only one parent, to move more frequently and have unstable educational experiences, to attend classes taught by less experienced or unqualified teachers, to have friends and classmates with lower levels of achievement, to be in schools with fewer demanding pre-collegiate courses and more remedial courses, and to have higher teacher turnover. Many of these schools are also deteriorated and lack key resources.\footnote{\textit{Id.} at 21-22.}

Integration without equalization does not constitute equal educational opportunity. In some instances equalization, especially during the early school years, may be more important to the achievement of equal educational opportunity than racial integration. Equalization in primary and secondary schools will correct racial imbalances in the pool of highly qualified college applicants. Children in school districts where it is impossible to dismantle highly race-segregated public schools should get the resources necessary for them to excel without
having to rely on the presence of more affluent racially diverse families to generate these resources.

B. The Brown Case on Remand

Derrick Bell writes that NAACP lawyers handling post-*Brown* cases pushed for integration at the expense of equalization and their clients' interests. The outcome of the *Brown* case on remand to the District Court of Kansas reflects the consequences of this decision. Immediately after the 1954 Supreme Court decision, the Kansas court concluded that the Topeka school district had made a good faith effort to end *de jure* segregation. Nevertheless, the court retained jurisdiction over the case until it felt that the district had fully complied with the Supreme Court's mandate. This judicial oversight lasted more than forty years.

Tellingly in 1955 the federal district judge wrote: "[d]esegregation does not mean that there must be intermingling of the races in all school districts. It means only that they may not be prevented from intermingling or going to school together because of race or color." In other words, states could not actively prevent racial integration in public schools, but there was no affirmative duty to create a racially diverse learning environment.

No further judicial action occurred until Linda Brown, now an adult and parent herself, along with other black parents of school aged children intervened in 1979. Their lawyers argued that the *Brown* mandate had not been realized. The primary focus of the interveners was to determine whether the Topeka schools were sufficiently integrated. The school district responded that

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78. *Id.* at 470.
79. *Id.*
83. *Id.* at 1294. The trial judge found that

[the student attendance figures for the 1985-86 school year bear little resemblance to the figures for 1954. None of the former *de jure* black schools was open in 1985. Of the twenty-six elementary schools, only one had a majority black student population. Three had majority minority populations .... Roughly twenty-nine percent of all black elementary students attended these schools. Five elementary schools had student populations over ninety percent white. These schools accounted for approximately twenty-four percent of the white elementary student population. No school had a ninety-five percent white student population .... None of the three high schools ... had a majority minority population in the 1985-86 school year. One high school, Topeka West High School, had a white student population exceeding ninety percent .... It served roughly forty-one percent of all white high school students in the district.

*Id.*
[the] plaintiffs place too much emphasis on the racial balance of students as a measure of a constitutional violation . . . . [F]actors other than student assignment count in the determination of a constitutional violation, and that these factors (e.g., allocation of resources, uniformity of curricula and instruction) indicate the district operates a unitary school system. 84

The district judge, consistent with his earlier statements, ruled that racial imbalance even in previously de jure school systems is unconstitutional only if purposefully maintained, 85 and that was not the case in Topeka. 86

Interestingly, the school district’s asserted measures of equality — uniformity in resource allocation, curriculum, and teachers — sound more like an incomplete application of the Sweatt criteria. 87 Had the federal district judge really applied the Sweatt criteria as part of his analysis, he might have concluded that equal educational opportunity for black children had not been achieved. But the specific issue of equalization did not arise because the school district closed the four de jure black schools and because the court found no evidence to suggest that these school closings were done to avoid racial integration. 88

84. Id. at 1295.
86. Brown, 671 F. Supp. at 1297.
87. In Sweatt, the Court wrote:
[i]the University of Texas Law School, from which petitioner was excluded, was staffed by a faculty of sixteen full-time and three part-time professors, some of whom are nationally recognized authorities in their field. Its student body numbered 850. The library contained over 65,000 volumes. Among the other facilities available to the students were a law review, moot court facilities, scholarship funds, and Order of the Coif affiliation. The school’s alumni occupy the most distinguished positions in the private practice of the law and in the public life of the State.

The law school for Negroes which was to have opened in February, 1947, would have had no independent faculty or library. The teaching was to be carried on by four members of the University of Texas Law School faculty, who were to maintain their offices at the University of Texas while teaching at both institutions. Few of the 10,000 volumes ordered for the library had arrived; nor was there any full-time librarian. The school lacked accreditation. Since the trial of this case, respondents report the opening of a law school at the Texas State University for Negroes. It is apparently on the road to full accreditation. It has a faculty of five full-time professors; a student body of 23; a library of some 16,500 volumes serviced by a full-time staff; a practice court and legal aid association; and one alumnus who has become a member of the Texas bar.

88. The court wrote:
[all] four de jure black schools have been closed. The de jure black school (McKinley) in North Topeka . . . was closed in 1955 and the black children were assigned to Grant or Quincy elementary schools. Grant was closed in 1977. Now all elementary students in North Topeka attend Quincy School. Washington and Buchanan schools were both closed by 1962. Monroe was closed in 1978. The Pierce School was closed in 1959, one year after its attendance zone was annexed into the district. It was an all-black school. When Parkdale was closed in 1978, it had a minority student population of 85.62%. Three schools in central Topeka closed with relatively high minority populations . . . . Three schools with relatively low minority populations have been closed . . . . Three schools were closed when they had minority populations near the district average.

Brown, 671 F. Supp at 1299.
Based on these conclusions, the district judge declared the Brown mandate satisfied.89

Closure of the formerly all-black schools ended the equality inquiry. But their closure did not result in meaningful racial integration or equalization of educational opportunities for the poorest black children. Like most post-Brown courts, the federal judge focused only on the existence of purposeful racial segregation and not on the persistence of unequal educational resources allocated to schools with substantial numbers of black children, a legacy of de jure segregation.

In 1989, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court ruling that Topeka had achieved a unitary system.90 The school district's failure to make significant efforts to eliminate racially identifiable schools effectively permitted continuation of a dual educational system.91 Once again the focus of the court was racial integration, not equalization of educational opportunities. The federal appellate court ruling, however, was vacated by the United States Supreme Court, which ordered the court of appeals to reconsider its decision in light of two recent cases where judicial oversight was removed because the school districts made "good faith" efforts to end racial segregation.92

Upon remand, the Tenth Circuit decided that neither case affected its original ruling and reinstated its order saying "that because Topeka has not fulfilled its affirmative duty in the areas of student and faculty/staff assignments, the district court erred in concluding that the system as a whole had achieved unitary status. The district court must instead formulate an appropriate remedy."93 It took another decade before the federal courts were satisfied.94

Around the same time that the appellate court was considering whether Topeka had achieved a unitary system, another case, Montoy v. State,95 was working its way through the Kansas courts. The focus of Montoy more directly addressed the concerns of black parents who still longed for equal educational opportunities for their children.

89. Id.
91. Id. at 854.
92. Bd. of Educ. v. Brown, 503 U.S. 978 (1992) (citing Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992) (holding that the district court may withdraw its supervision over school desegregation plans in increments and retain judicial supervision only in those areas where the school district is not in compliance—transportation, physical facilities, and school assignments) and Bd. of Educ. of Oklahoma City Pub. Sch. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991) (holding that a court may order the dissolution of a desegregation decree if there has been good-faith compliance in terminating past discrimination)).
IV. MEASURING EDUCATIONAL EQUALITY POST-BROWN

A. Brown Recast: Montoy v. State and Educational Equity

In 1949, at a time when the NAACP's school litigation efforts attacking "separate but equal" were becoming more successful, the State of Kansas committed itself to educational equality.\(^{96}\) In 1966, the State revised Article Six of the Kansas Constitution.\(^{97}\) The revision strengthened Kansas' historic commitment to public education; gave the responsibility for the maintenance of public schools to both the state legislature and the local school boards;\(^{98}\) and required the legislature to "make suitable provision for finance of the educational interests of the state."\(^{99}\) The State's unfulfilled constitutional and statutory promise of educational equity stimulated litigation in the 1960s and early 1970s, which resulted in the enactment of the School District Equalization Act (SDEA).\(^{100}\)

Like most states, the wealth of individual Kansas school districts determined the amount of funding received by public schools. This funding system resulted in wide disparities in per pupil expenditures between school districts.\(^{101}\) Charles Berger wrote that "the blurring of the goals of public education finance between educational equity, taxpayer equity, adequacy, and local control of resources, hampered efforts to achieve a sustainable and conceptually consistent system of finance."\(^{102}\)

The SDEA was "[c]onceived as a way to dissociate educational opportunity and [school] district wealth. . . ."\(^{103}\) Under this act, the State provided each school district with monies for public education, and the districts had to contribute local funds amounting to 1.5% of the district's wealth – assessed valuation and taxable income.\(^{104}\) Dur-


\(^{97}\) Id. at 8.

\(^{98}\) KAN. CONST. art. VI, §§ 1, 2, 5.

\(^{99}\) Id. at § 6.

\(^{100}\) Berger, supra note 96, at 3. School funding measures were considered during three periods when Kansas considered major educational reforms. The first period occurred in the 1960s and was stimulated in part by a lawsuit, Tecumseh v. Throckmorton, 195 Kan. 144 (1965), filed by 148 school districts challenging a 1963 law requiring unification of school districts. The legislature enacted the 1965 School Foundation Act followed by a revamping of Article 6, the Education Article, of the 1966 Kansas Constitution. Id. at 8. A second period of reform occurred in the early 1970s prompted again by a lawsuit, Caldwell v. State, in which a state district court declared the state funding system unconstitutional because it made funding "dependent on [ ] the wealth of the district in which the child resides." Id. at 10-11 (quoting Caldwell, No. 50616 (Kan. Dist. Ct., Aug. 30, 1972)).

\(^{101}\) Id. at 11.

\(^{102}\) Id. at 16.

\(^{103}\) Id. at 13.

\(^{104}\) Id. at 11.
ing the 1970s, two cases unsuccessfully challenged the constitutionality of the SDEA, but by the late 1980s financial inequalities among the school districts worsened. A reappraisal of property state-wide in 1989 significantly reduced the level of funding for education.

In 1991, a Kansas district court consolidated four lawsuits from forty-two school districts challenging the SDEA into Mock v. State. Unlike the earlier cases, the plaintiffs in Mock were not concerned about the constitutionality of the SDEA; rather, they were worried about the shrinking state funds devoted to public education. But Kansas District Court Judge Terry Bullock quickly realized that the plaintiffs’ complaints went to the way public schools were financed. The key question was the nature of the state constitution’s educational mandate and resulting legislative duty which the judge declared to be that “each child . . . receive[s] . . . [an] educational opportunity which is neither greater nor less than that of any other child.” Judge Bullock’s articulation of this legislative duty was grounded in two earlier Kansas Supreme Court cases.

Based on the stated legislative duty, Judge Bullock also concluded that “[e]qual educational opportunity need not mean exact equality of dollar expenditures[,] . . . sometimes equality of opportunity may require unequal expenditures.” The educational opportunity provided, however, must be “suitable,” as determined by the needs of the students. The SDEA formula was constitutionally defective because it did not take these considerations into account.

105. Id. at 15. The first challenge occurred in 1974 when taxpayers, individual students and forty-two school districts, challenged the constitutionality of SDEA in Knowles v. State Board of Education. 219 Kan. 271 (1976). “The district [court] judge allowed time for the legislature to respond before effectuating his order . . . . The 1975 amendments to the SDEA were designed to correct some of the irrationalities . . . found in the 1973 act.” Berger, supra note 96, at 14. The district court dismissed the case as moot, but the state supreme court overruled and remanded the case. Id. Seven years later the district court once again upheld the constitutionality of the SDEA and the parties did not appeal this ruling. Id. at 14 (citing Knowles v. Kansas, 77 CV 251 (Kan. Dist. Ct., Jan. 26, 1981)).

106. Id. at 17.


108. Id.

109. Id. at 18.

110. Id. at 20 (citing Mock, No. 91-CV-1009 (Kan. Dist. Ct., Oct. 14, 1991)).

111. In 1942 the Kansas Supreme Court said that “[t]he general theory of our educational system is that every child in the state, without regard to race, creed, or wealth, shall have the facilities for a free education.” State v. Smith, 127 P.2d 518, 522 (Kan. 1942). In 1982 the state high court said in that “[t]he ultimate State purpose in offering a system of public schools is to provide an environment where quality education can be afforded equally to all.” Provance v. Shawnee Mission Unified Sch. Dist. No. 512, 648 P.2d 710, 716 (Kan. 1982).


113. Id. at 20.
Following the *Mock* decision, the Kansas legislature enacted the 1992 School District Finance and Quality Performance Act (SDFQPA), which mandated a uniform state-wide basic property tax and set a fixed budget for each district based on weighted enrollment.\(^{114}\) Unlike the SDEA, the SDFQPA "start[ed] from a presumption of equal dollar [per pupil] expenditures" but compensated for disparities between districts using six weighing factors.\(^{115}\) Satisfied with the result, Judge Bullock dismissed the case with the parties' mutual consent.\(^{116}\) Nevertheless, the issue of unequal educational opportunity simply would not go away.

More than a decade later, Judge Bullock made similar findings about the SDFQPA in *Montoy v. State*.\(^{117}\) But his ruling went even further, finding the school financing scheme unconstitutional.\(^{118}\) Judge Bullock hoped that the legislature would act quickly to rectify the situation. The Kansas legislature, however, was unwilling and perhaps financially unable to remedy the harm. The Kansas legislature played politics with public education, rejecting bill after bill due to presumed financial costs, burdens, and bi-partisanship.\(^{119}\)

In his December 2003 ruling, Judge Bullock gave the legislature a few more months to repair the state school financing scheme.\(^{120}\) When the 2004 legislative session closed with no changes, the frustrated judge wrote:

> Hundreds of thousands of these children have gone through the Kansas educational system during this period of time. According to the evidence, many thousands of them have been permanently harmed by their inadequate educations and forever consigned to a lesser existence. Further delay will unquestionably harm more of these vulnerable and/or protected of our students.\(^{121}\)

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\(^{115}\) Berger, *supra* note 96, at 29. Those factors were transportation, vocational education, bilingual education, at-risk pupils, low enrollment, and school facilities. *Id.*

\(^{116}\) *Id.* at 28.


\(^{118}\) Judge Bullock wrote that the scheme:

A. [f]ailed to equitably distribute resources among children equally entitled by the Constitution to a suitable education, or in the alternative, to provide a rational basis premised in differing costs for any differential;

B. [f]ailed to supply adequate total resources to provide all Kansas children with a suitable education (as that term was previously defined by both this Court and the Legislature itself); and

C. [d]ramatically and adversely impacted the learning and educational performance of the most vulnerable and/or protected Kansas children. This disparate impact occurred by virtue of underfunding, generally, and selective underfunding of the schools where these vulnerable and/or protected children primarily attend, specifically. Those vulnerable and/or protected children, of course, were and are: the poor, the minorities, the physically and mentally disadvantaged, and those who cannot or nearly cannot yet speak the primary language of America and its schools.

*Id.* at 1.


\(^{120}\) *Id.* at *1.

\(^{121}\) *Id.* at *5.
In essence, students who needed the most funding aid were getting the least and being blatantly neglected by the legislative and executive branches. These failings are quite similar to the complaints advanced by educational advocates like Gary Orfield and others about the current status of non-white children educated nationwide in highly segregated urban public schools.122

In measuring equality, Judge Bullock once again remarked that the equal educational opportunity requirement is not satisfied merely by spending equal amounts of money on each student.123 He wrote: “some children are more expensive to educate than others (especially the poor or at-risk; the physically and mentally disabled; racial minorities; and those who cannot or are limited in their ability to speak English).”124 Yet Judge Bullock’s ruling did not give parents, lawyers, legislators, and educators a clear picture of how to measure educational equality.

B. Integration without Equality: Hobson v. Hansen

Derrick Bell and a few others argue that black American students do not need to attend school with white children to receive a good education.125 Given the racial composition of most large cities in this nation, racial integration, if it means white majority schools, is unattainable. Some of our largest cities have overwhelmingly non-white public school populations.126 In many of these same cities a substantial majority of residents are non-white, so even if white children returned to those public schools, highly segregated schools would still exist.127 Since the United States Supreme Court in Milliken v. Bradley128 restricted transporting students across school district lines to

122. See generally supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
123. See supra text accompanying note 112.
125. BELL, SILENT COVENANTS, supra note 12, at 165-66. “Simply placing black children in ‘white’ schools will seldom suffice.” Bell, Serving Two Masters, supra note 12, at 514. “Desegregation plans can never yield the instructional gains to which black children are entitled. . . . Demographic desegregation must take a backseat to instructional reform or we will remain frustrated by a continuing and widening gap between white and black pupil performance in desegregated schools.” Ronald R. Edmonds, Effective Education For Minority Pupils: Brown Confounded or Confirmed, in SHADES OF BROWN, supra note 18, at 121.

Many advocates of nonpublic schools serving urban black children maintain that Brown’s integrative mandate is essentially assimilative. Black students are sent to white schools where teaching, curricula, and conceptions of merit express the homogeneity of their history. Because little attention is given to multiracial, multicultural, or multiclass issues, black students often feel their school environment is alien to their experience. This institutional closed-mindedness makes inclusion as stigmatizing as exclusion.

126. As of 2000, between 85% and 90% of the students in New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, Miami-Dade, and Houston—the five largest central-city school districts—were minorities. CASHIN, supra note 16, at 219.
127. See Orfield & Lee, supra note 9, at 34 tbl.18.
achieve racial balance, we are faced with determining how to achieve educational equality for poor, predominately non-white public school students. This was the issue facing the federal district court in Hobson v. Hansen.

Thirteen years after Brown, black and poor students sued the Superintendent of Schools and the members of the Board of Education in the District of Columbia to determine whether the District’s public schools were in compliance with the mandate announced by the United States Supreme Court in Bolling v. Sharpe, the companion case to Brown. At the time, black Americans constituted 60% of the city’s population and 90% of the public school population.

J. Skelly Wright, a federal circuit judge sitting as district judge in Hobson, found that “the school administration’s response to the fact and dilemma of segregation has been primarily characterized . . . by indifference and inaction.” Not only had school officials not taken any serious steps to correct de facto segregation, Judge Wright found that post-Brown school policies actually encouraged segregation. Specifically, the court found continuing segregation of school

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129. Id. Further, I am not advocating that racial integration be achieved by bussing students across district lines.
133. Id. at 406.
134. At that time, the law required federal district judges in the District of Columbia to appoint the members of the Board of Education. Consequently, since the school board members were defendants in the case, the local federal judges could not sit because of potential conflicts of interest. Susan Low Bloch & Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Celebrating the 200th Anniversay of the Federal Courts of the District of Columbia, 90 GEO. L.J. 549, 588 n.237 (2002) (citing Arthur Selwyn Miller, A “CAPACITY FOR OUTRAGE”: The Judicial Odyssey of J. Skelly Wright 57 (1984)). Chief Judge Bazelon of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit assigned Judge Wright to the case because of his experience “as district judge superintending school desegregation in New Orleans.” Id. His leadership in enforcing the Brown mandate in New Orleans was a reason President Kennedy appointed Judge Wright to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit bench. “Judge Wright was not a popular figure in the Fifth Circuit, and many in that community were pleased to see him move to Washington.” Id. at 563 n.66 (citing J.W. Peltason, Fifty-Eight Lonely Men: Southern Federal Judges and School Desegregation 221-29 (1971)).
135. Hobson, 269 F. Supp. at 414. The trial judge continued:

School officials have refused to install actual integration as an objective for administration policy, or even to recognize that in the District segregation is a major problem. Over the years they have expressed little interest in and done nothing about locating schools on the borders of white and [black] communities, or busing students from east of the Park into the underutilized schools west of that divide to achieve integration, or building schools in the Park accessible from east and west alike. . . . Many of these ideas, indeed, have apparently never been considered.

Id.
136. Id. at 415-16.
personnel\textsuperscript{137} in the teacher placement policies\textsuperscript{138} and in the placement of principals.\textsuperscript{139}

The court also found glaring inequalities in the distribution of educational resources. It looked at the age of school buildings, their physical condition and educational adequacy; the number of library books, librarians, and the existence and quality of school libraries; the degree of school congestion; the quality of faculty; and considered factors like teacher experience, the use of temporary teachers, textbooks and supplies, and per pupil expenditures.\textsuperscript{140} Judge Wright concluded that school administrators were indifferent about these inequalities.\textsuperscript{141}

As a result, he wrote that where \textit{de facto} segregation exists due to factors beyond the control of school administrators, a "separate but equal" \textit{Plessy}-like rule applies and the District violated this rule.\textsuperscript{142}

Under Judge Wright's reasoning, \textit{de facto} segregation in public schools is especially harmful if it results in unequal educational opportunities for non-white and poor students.

His reasoning seems more an extension of \textit{Sweatt v. Painter} than the implementation of \textit{Brown}, although Robert Carter wrote that "\textit{Brown} surely must require the abandonment of all state educational policies and practices that result in a disparate allocation of public educational resources between blacks and whites."\textsuperscript{143} Clearly the \textit{Sweatt} decision influenced how Judge Wright went about determining

\textsuperscript{137} \textit{Id.} at 425. The judge wrote that a significant if not startling degree of teachers and principals have been assigned to schools where their own race mirrors the racial composition of the schools' student bodies. In a nutshell, white schools are usually paired with white faculties, [black] schools with [black] faculties; and integrated schools have integrated faculties. \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{138} \textit{Id.} at 426.

The Board's policies thus plainly entailed the entrenchment and perpetuation of the teacher segregation of the past with a minimum of change. The court finds that at least a part of today's segregation is attributable to the Board's 1954 failure to shuffle faculties and thereby undo the \textit{de jure} segregation which had theretofore been the rule. \textit{Id.} "In short, defendants have not shown that policies and practices free of racial criteria have been responsible for the patterns of teacher segregation in the District ...." \textit{Id.} at 429.

\textsuperscript{139} \textit{Id.} "Testimony at trial verified that none of the white elementary schools in the Northwest has had a [black] principal at any time since desegregation." \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{140} \textit{Id.} at 431-38. The trial court also examined the student "ability-based" tracking system. The school officials initiated the tracking system as "a response to problems created by the sudden commingling of numerous educationally retarded [black] students with the better educated white students." \textit{Id.} at 442. The trial judge concluded, however, that the system's policy of "ability grouping as presently practiced . . . is a denial of equal educational opportunity to the poor and a majority of the [blacks], a denial that contravenes not only the guarantees of the Fifth Amendment but also the fundamental premise of the track system itself." \textit{Id.} at 443.

\textsuperscript{141} \textit{Id.} at 441-42.


\textsuperscript{143} Robinson, \textit{supra} note 10, at 14 n.67 (quoting Carter, \textit{supra} note 62, at 622).
what constitutes equal educational opportunities.\textsuperscript{144} Even the court’s discussion in \textit{Hobson} of why an integrated education is valued mirrors the Supreme Court’s language in \textit{Sweatt}:

The Court finds that actual integration of students and faculty at a school, by setting the stage for meaningful and continuous exchanges between the races, educates white and Negro students equally in the fundamentals of racial tolerance and understanding.\textsuperscript{145}

The Court in \textit{Sweatt v. Painter} stated:

The law school, the proving ground for legal learning and practice, cannot be effective in isolation from the individuals and institutions with which the law interacts. Few students and no one who has practiced law would choose to study in an academic vacuum, removed from the interplay of ideas and the exchange of views with which the law is concerned.\textsuperscript{146}

Judge Wright’s discussion about the value of racially integrated public schools also is roughly analogous to the justification for integration being advanced today by education scholars like Gary Orfield. In \textit{Hobson}, Judge Wright wrote that

[r]acially and socially homogeneous schools damage the minds and spirit of all children who attend them—the [black], the white, the poor and the affluent—and block the attainment of the broader goals of democratic education, whether the segregation occurs by law or by fact . . . . [Further t]he scholastic achievement of the disadvantaged child, [black] and white, is strongly related to the racial and socioeconomic composition of the student body of his school. A racially and socially integrated school environment increases the scholastic achievement of the disadvantaged child of whatever race.”\textsuperscript{147}

Significantly, in \textit{Hobson} Judge Wright extended the reasoning of \textit{Brown} to encompass educational inequities due to socioeconomic class. Thus it is not simply racial isolation mandated by law that contributes to educational inequities, rather, similar inequities exist where affluent families, particularly white families, are absent from public schools.\textsuperscript{148} Given these conclusions, a simplistic approach would be to

\textsuperscript{144.} The Court in \textit{Sweatt} similarly found that the separate law schools at the University of Texas for blacks and whites were clearly unequal. \textit{See} \textit{Sweatt} \textit{v. Painter}, 339 U.S. 629, 632-33 (1950).
\textsuperscript{145.} \textit{Hobson}, 269 F. Supp. at 419.
\textsuperscript{146.} \textit{Sweatt}, 339 U.S. at 634.
\textsuperscript{147.} \textit{Hobson}, 269 F. Supp. at 406.
\textsuperscript{148.} \textit{Id.} at 410. Judge Wright noted:
Washington’s white families . . . are increasingly few in number; further their residences are heavily concentrated in one area of the city, the area west of Rock Creek Park . . . . The Park is a verdant curtain which draws through the city. It has long been true that virtually every residence west of the Park is white. . . . [E]ast of the Park the city is very heavily Negro. Twenty-seven years ago whites constituted at least a one-third minority in every neighborhood in the city. But the rapid white out-migration from Washington into the Virginia and Maryland suburbs ever since 1948, the year of peak white population, has evidently depleted the supply of whites in many areas.
\textit{Id.}
place poor children in schools with affluent white majorities. But Judge Wright's findings in *Hobson* also illustrate how attending the same school as affluent whites is not always a guarantee of equal educational opportunity.\(^\text{149}\)

Segregation existed within the District's integrated but majority white schools due to the tracking system adopted by the school board shortly after the *Bolling* decision.\(^\text{150}\) Judge Wright, like Professor Robinson, concluded that the tracking system perpetuates the evils of *de jure* racial segregation.\(^\text{151}\) Recently, a sociologist who studied public schools in North Carolina found "[s]ome of the most widespread and harmful sources of racially disparate educational processes and outcomes are racially segregated schools and classrooms segregated by tracking."\(^\text{152}\) She concluded that using socioeconomic diversity in school assignment is "a promising strategy [that] . . . do[es] not employ racial prescriptions or sacrifice excellence on the altar of equality."\(^\text{153}\) But few urban school systems have substantial affluent student populations, a point I address in the next section. Further, her suggestion does not address the evils caused by tracking within racially integrated schools that result from biased assignment criteria and earlier unequal educational opportunities.

V. **Equally Funded and Racially Integrated Education As Reconcilable Goals**

A. **Resegregation and Decline in Educational Quality**

Much post-*Brown* scholarship has been devoted to how meaningful integration was thwarted for two reasons. First, white parents fled the cities for white suburban enclaves fearing that their children would receive an inferior education in racially integrated public schools.\(^\text{154}\) Similarly, white parents in deep southern states with sub-

\(^{149}\) The District of Columbia school system used a four-part tracking system that divided students into "Honors," "College Prep," "General," and "Basic" based ability. *Id.* at 406-07. Judge Wright found that "[o]nly a small number of predominately Negro elementary schools offer the Honors 'Track,' the highest rung in the school system's track system of ability grouping. By contrast, virtually all of the predominately white elementary schools have Honors Tracks." *Id.* at 439. Further he concluded that the aptitude test used to determine a student's track was inappropriate "since these tests do not relate to the Negro and disadvantaged child, track assignment based on such tests relegates Negro and disadvantaged children to the lower tracks from which, because of the reduced curricula and the absence of adequate remedial and compensatory education, as well as continued inappropriate testing, the chance of escape is remote." *Id.* at 407. For a discussion of the use of tracking post-*Brown*, see Angelia Dickens, *Revisiting Brown v. Board of Education: How Tracking Has Resegregated America's Public Schools*, 29 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 469 (1996).

\(^{150}\) *Hobson*, 269 F. Supp. at 442-43.

\(^{151}\) *Id.* at 515. See Professor Robinson's discussion of tracking as means of resegregation.

\(^{152}\) Mickelson, *supra* note 1, at 1481.

\(^{153}\) *Id.*

stantial black minorities placed their children in private segregationist academies leaving virtually all-black public school districts. Second, the Supreme Court refused to read Brown as mandating racial integration across school district lines. Some scholarship also exists describing the decline in the quality of education generally in public schools across the nation and offering suggestions for educational reforms.

Yet the support by black parents in large urban areas for school vouchers surprised many public school proponents. The continuing concern of these parents is not whether their children are attending racially integrated schools, but rather whether their children are receiving a quality education. Education scholar Jeannie Oakes succinctly states the problem:

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155. "In November 1952, South Carolina voters approved a constitutional amendment eliminating the state’s duty to educate all children, thus allowing conversion to a private school system to avoid racial desegregation. The governors of Mississippi and Virginia considered submitting similar proposals in 1953. Following the Supreme Court decision in 1954, states across the south passed tuition grant programs ...." Molly Townes O’Brien, Private School Tuition Vouchers and the Realities of Racial Politics, 64 TENV. L. REV. 359, 385 (1997). "In Prince Edward County, Virginia, where white intransigence had been so strong that the public schools were closed entirely from 1959 to 1964, most white schoolchildren – about 1,000 of them – were attending the private white academy while 1,728 black youngsters went to the public schools," preferring to abandon the public schools rather than desegregate. Richard Kluger, Simple Justice 778 (1977). See generallyNuman V. Bartley, The Rise of Massive Resistance: Race and Politics in the South During the 1950’s 67-81 (1969).

156. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (holding that the white/suburban school districts of Detroit did not have to be included in a desegregation plan unless the white/suburban school districts were actively discriminating against minority students).


158. "In a 1997 survey, sixty-two percent of blacks supported vouchers compared with forty-nine percent of the total population." Thomas C. Berg, Race Relations and Modern Church-State Relations, 43 B.C. L. Rev. 1009, 1024 n.99 (2002) (citing Lowell C. Rose et al., The 29th Annual Phi Delta Kappa Gallup Poll of Public Attitudes Toward the Public Schools 48-49 (1997)). "In another, fifty-seven percent of blacks supported vouchers compared with forty-seven percent of whites." Id. (citing Joseph P. Viteritti, Choosing Equality: School Choice, the Constitution, and Civil Society 5-6 & nn.14-16 (1999) (citing David Bositis, 1997 National Opinion Poll—Children's Issues 7 (Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies 1997))).


159. A 1998 study conducted by Public Agenda and the Public Education Network found that 82% of black parents and 87% of white parents cited raising academic standards as more of a priority than racial integration of public schools. Only 9% of black parents and 5% of white parents cited racial integration as a top priority. Public Agenda, Time to Move On (1998), http://www.publicagenda.org/specials/moveon/moveonld.htm. (last visited Oct. 21, 2004). Individual accounts support these statistics. "Let's focus on what children need and their parents' desire for them," said Kaleem Caire, immediate past president of the Black Alliance for Educational Options. "We think that's more important than desegregation for black children.'" Kim
What happened to educational equality? Perhaps, in the decades following *Brown v. Board of Education* we were naïve enough to think that wanting schools to make things right was enough . . . . In all our searching, we almost entirely overlooked the possibility that what happens within schools might contribute to unequal educational opportunities and outcomes. We neglected to examine the content and processes of school itself for the ways they may contribute to school failure.160

Since most school districts continue to rely disproportionately on property taxes for funding,161 school districts with the least affluent families get less money than those with the most affluent families. Large urban school districts with weak property tax bases cannot provide the same level of funding as more affluent suburban districts. The result is the same type of inequality in educational expenditure experienced by black *de jure* racially segregated schools, a point Professor Robinson addresses.162

Today, faulty state-wide funding formulas are more directly related to unequal educational opportunities than to the lack of racial integration. Yet we know from history that the two issues are related. This is why some civil rights advocates still support putting black children where the money is—with white children.

An important caveat is warranted here, the more recent flight from inner city public schools by middle-class and affluent blacks has not resulted in substantially improved educational opportunities for their children.163 Since school funding is still tied to property taxes, and homes in black neighborhoods are generally assessed at lower rates than comparable homes in white neighborhoods,164 public schools in more affluent black suburban neighborhoods remain under-
funded compared to their white counterparts. Thus we need to un­
couple the two related goals—racial integration and equal funding—
because the old integrationist rationale does not ensure meaningful
educational equality for blacks, Latinos, and poor whites.

Once more, the United States Supreme Court by a bare majority
thwarted early efforts to achieve equity in the funding of education.
The Court in San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez refused, de­
spite dicta in several cases emphasizing the importance of educa­
tion, to recognize public education as a fundamental right for all,
precluding any consideration of whether the Constitution requires all
children to be educated on an equal basis. Notwithstanding the
Rodriguez precedent, I contend that a new battle must be waged for
recognition of education as a fundamental right under the Constitu­
tion. This right would consist of two components, a guarantee of
equality in school financing and a guarantee of a racially, culturally,
and ethnically diverse learning environment. Given the composition
of the current Court, many readers may question the rationality of this
suggestion, but remember the lawyers who successfully litigated the
series of decisions leading to Brown faced similar circumstances.

Another alternative would be a constitutional amendment guar­
anteeing basic education. The South Africa Constitution contains an
affirmative right to basic education. Unlike the United States, the
national government in South Africa has the primary responsibility

165. See, e.g., id. at 145-47.
167. In Brown a unanimous Supreme Court wrote: “[e]ducation is perhaps the most impor­
tant function of state and local governments . . . . In these days, it is doubtful that any child may
reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such
an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made
regard the public schools as a most vital civic institution for the preservation of a democratic
concurring). “The importance of public schools in the preparation of individuals for participa­
tion as citizens, and in the preservation of the values on which our society rests, long has been
the basic tools by which individuals might lead economically productive lives to the benefit of us
all[,] . . . education has a fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of our society. We cannot
ignore the significant social costs borne by our Nation when select groups are denied the means
to absorb the values and skills upon which our social order rests.” Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,
education must be accessible to all individuals regardless of race or ethnicity . . . . Effective
participation by members of all racial and ethnic groups in the civic life of our Nation is essential
if the dream of one Nation, indivisible, is to be realized.” Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 331-
upheld the constitutionality of Texas’ school financing scheme ruling that differences in educa­
tional funding based on wealth does not trigger strict scrutiny review under the Equal Protection
guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment.
169. S. AFR. CONST. ch. II, 29 (1)(a). See generally Alfreda Sellers Diamond, Constitutional
Comparisons and Converging Histories: Historical Development in Equal Educational Opportu­
nity Under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and the New South Africa
for funding public education;\textsuperscript{170} and unlike South Africa the United States Constitution contains no positive rights. To be effective, a constitutional amendment guaranteeing a right to basic education must state and local governments are the primary funding sources for public education in this country, a constitutional amendment should direct the states to provide equal basic public education to all residents. Since a federal constitutional amendment is unlikely in the near future, state courts remain the best arena to push for educational equality.

B. Achieving Equal Funding for Education

Most recent success in achieving some level of financial educational equality has come in state courts where a state constitution guarantees free public education.\textsuperscript{171} Like Judge Bullock in Kansas, a few state judges seem willing to require some form of educational equality and are able to measure what constitutes equality while remaining mindful of financial constraints placed on state legislatures.\textsuperscript{172} Increasing numbers of states are rethinking how to fund public education more equivalently.\textsuperscript{173} Perhaps the time is ripe to develop a strategic plan for raising this issue again in the United States Supreme Court.

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\textsuperscript{172} See Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 23, 91 S.W.3d 472; Columbia Falls, No. BDV-2002-5228, 2004 WL 844055; Abbott, 710 A.2d 450.

\textsuperscript{173} See \textsuperscript{supra note 158}. “In over twenty-four states, parents and coalitions of property-poor school districts have launched challenges to state education financing systems alleging that disparities in expenditure per pupil between low-wealth districts and high-wealth districts violate their state constitution’s equal protection and education clauses. Arkansas, California, Connecti-
A close reading of the plaintiffs’ argument in *San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez* discloses that the harm alleged is based not solely on socio-economic status, but implicitly racialized status as well. The majority opinion by Justice Lewis F. Powell begins:

[This suit attacking the Texas system of financing public education was initiated by Mexican-American parents whose children attend the elementary and secondary schools . . . [as] a class action on behalf of school children throughout the State who are *members of minority groups or who are poor* and reside in school districts having a low property tax base.”]^{174}

Race, in its broadest sense, was the elephant in the courtroom.^{175} The Plaintiffs, characterized as poor and Mexican-American, seemed to be arguing that state educational funding determinations based on wealth not only impair a fundamental right, but also are suspect under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when these decisions disproportionately impact racialized groups. Prior to *Brown*, Texas law only authorized separate schools for whites and blacks.^{176} The state never formally segregated Mexicans or Mexican-Americans in public schools,^{177} even though they experienced discrimination in other areas like public accommodations^{178} and housing.^{179} Further, Texas law classified Mexicans and Mexican-Americans as white,^{180} so the plaintiffs were precluded from alleging race-based discrimination in education.

The three judge district court in a per curiam opinion declared the Texas school financing scheme unconstitutional.^{181} In concluding that education was a fundamental right, the court relied on a recent ruling by the California Supreme Court^{182} and the language of the

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174. *Id.* at 4-5 (emphasis added).


177. This did not mean that individual districts did not discriminate. *Id.* at 574-75 (discussing *Independent School District v. Salvatierra*, 33 S.W.2d 790 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930), allowing a school for Mexicans/Mexican-Americans for linguistic and other reasons).


179. *Id.* at 569 (citing *Clifton v. Puente*, 218 S.W.2d 272 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) (refusing to enforce restrictive covenant)).

180. *Id.* at 575 n.95. (citing language from *Indep. Sch. Dist.*, 33 S.W.2d 790.)


United States Supreme Court in Brown. With the race component effectively thwarted, it is unsurprising that the Supreme Court in Rodriguez, left with only the wealth discrimination claim, ruled in favor of the state.

The narrowly divided Court knew that the states were smarting from Brown mandated federal court interference with local control of public schools. The amicus briefs filed by thirty states, including Kansas, on behalf of the State of Texas reflected these serious federalism concerns. But as the Montoy decision suggests, attitudes have changed in some of these states since the early 1970s.

C. The Value of a Truly Racially Integrated Education

As the previous sections suggest, experts are still divided about whether racially integrated schools are the remedy for educational inequality. This section briefly explores whether there are other reasons to press for racially integrated schools. I have always been troubled by a sentence in Brown that reads: “To separate [black school children] from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.” What the Court did not say, but what seems equally true, is that racially segregated schools harm white children too, especially in a society where they are unlikely to encounter their non-white racial counterparts in everyday life.

183. Rodriguez, 337 F. Supp. at 281, 283. The court also cited Hobson v. Hansen. Id. at 284. The equality claims of the plaintiffs in Rodriguez were rather modest. They asked only for “fiscal neutrality ... that the quality of public education may not be a function of wealth, other than the wealth of the state as a whole.” Id. Justice Thurgood Marshall, dissenting in the United States Supreme Court case, noted that

[the District Court ... postponed decision for some two years in the hope that the Texas Legislature would remedy the gross disparities in treatment inherent in the Texas financing scheme ... only after the legislature failed to act in its 1971 Regular Session ... the District Court, apparently recognizing the lack of hope for self-initiated legislative reform, rendered its decision. The strong vested interest of property-rich districts in the existing property tax scheme poses a substantial barrier to self-initiated legislative reform in educational financing.


186. John Payton argued before the Supreme Court in Gratz v. Bollinger:

Michigan is a very segregated state. ... The University’s entering students come from these settings and have rarely had experiences across racial or ethnic lines. That’s true for our white students. It’s true for our minority students. They’ve not lived together. They’ve not played together. They’ve certainly not gone to school together. The result is often that these students come to college not knowing about individuals of different races and ethnicities. And often not even being aware of the full extent of their lack of knowledge. This gap allows stereotypes to come into existence.

Racial segregation laws and practices harmed all segments of American society, even though whites benefited politically and economically during the period. The harm of racial segregation mandated by law cuts both ways. United States Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, writing for the majority in Grutter, noted how: "numerous studies show that student body diversity promotes [better] learning outcomes, and 'better prepares students for an increasingly diverse workforce and society, and better prepares them as professionals.'"187

The study that most impressed the Court was done by the United States Military which integrated its forces well before Brown.188 Lieutenant General Julius Becton, Jr. and other retired military personnel argued in their amicus brief that, presently, "no alternative exists to limited, race-conscious programs to increase the pool of high quality minority officer candidates and to establish diverse educational settings for officers,"189 and that "[t]he military must both maintain selectivity in admissions and train and educate a racially diverse officer corps to command racially diverse troops."190 Orfield and Lee also remind us that:

[w]hites are becoming minorities in some major parts of the country and may be increasingly willing to admit that they need what can only be learned in desegregated institutions — how to function very effectively in a society where they must understand and work with those of other racial and ethnic backgrounds.191

So, today, unlike America in the 1950s, the courts and others openly admit that integrated educational experiences are in the best interests of whites. This argument needs to be advanced with more force until Americans believe it is true. This may be difficult. Even though the country mouths a belief in racially integrated education, evidence over the past fifty years suggests that many whites still believe in black inferiority and resist placing their children in racially integrated schools when whites are not a substantial majority. Thus, black children who attend integrated high performing public schools remain in the minority, reinforcing in the minds of both black and white students the notion of black intellectual inferiority and black exceptionalism.

While I agree with Professor Robinson that ideally racial integration is a laudable goal, especially in a racially pluralistic democracy like the United States, I still wonder whether the damage black chil-

189. Id. at 9.
190. Id.
191. Orfield & Lee, supra note 9, at 41.
children consigned to de jure racially segregated schools suffered is replicated today when they attend high achieving schools with low non-white populations. As long as blacks and Latinos are seen as intellectually inferior second-class citizens, white Americans will continue to doubt that sustained interactions with non-whites in school settings benefit them. Squarely addressing the equal funding issue that disproportionately impacts black children is one component of an overall program to make black and Latino children more competitive and better educated.\textsuperscript{192} As black and Latino children become more competitive, arguments suggesting perceived intellectual inferiority will be harder to advance.

VI. CONCLUSION: BROWN, FAILED CASE AND ICON RECONCILED

Today the struggle for equality in education is different from the 1954 struggle due in part to the increased presence of Latinos along with African-Americans in educationally substandard public schools.\textsuperscript{193} Fifty years after \textit{Brown}, the vast majority of white school-aged children living in a far more racially diverse America still have little or no contact with non-white students.\textsuperscript{194} Further, the composition of the current United States Supreme Court is radically different.


Robert Carter acknowledged that “[e]qualized funding by itself will not lead to higher achievement in inner-city schools, for at the core quality education comes about by human interaction. We need to change human behavior, and how instruction at inner-city schools is organized.” Carter, \textit{supra} note 66, at 894. He cites as a positive example the reaction of the Kentucky legislature to a state supreme court ruling, \textit{Rose v. Council for Better Education, Inc.}, 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989), declaring the state funding system unconstitutional. In response “the Kentucky state legislature passed legislation not only to equalize funding, but to create an entirely new school system with upgraded teacher quality, new management techniques and expanded preschool programs. The Kentucky Supreme Court was able to provide the legislature with the legitimacy to make these changes that might otherwise have been politically impossible.” \textit{Id.}


from the Court that decided *Brown*. Today we live in a country with a Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, William Rehnquist, “who . . . consistently opposed school desegregation” and an Attorney General, John Ashcroft, who made much of his political career in Missouri attacking the federal courts’ efforts to desegregate …” that state’s schools. Thus, social scientists Orfield and Lee write: “[t]he immediate question is about the possibility of progress in a society with huge minority populations, massive segregation, a court system that has dismantled critically important policy tools, and a public that supports desegregation but has no consensus about how to get it.” Robert Carter states the problem in even starker terms:

The need to ensure equal educational opportunities for African-Americans is even more important now than when [*Brown*] was decided in 1954. In today’s economy, education is a prerequisite simply for opportunity, let alone equal opportunity . . . . [T]he decline in manufacturing and blue-collar jobs, once the mainstay of blacks in segregated communities, has caused many working class blacks to slip into poverty and the poor to become poorer. At the time of [*Brown*] there were at least still hard labor jobs in which a high school diploma was not really a necessity. Now, even factory jobs require skill. Problems with our economy and competitiveness cannot be separated from our education system. This country cannot afford to have a huge segment of our society that is not well-educated, well-skilled, well-trained, and productive.

195. During Rehnquist’s initial confirmation hearing, a memorandum he wrote while a law clerk for Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson about the petitioner’s argument in *Brown* surfaced, the pertinent parts of this memorandum read:

In these cases now before the Court, the Court is, as [Attorney John] Davis suggested, being asked to read its own sociological views into the Constitution. . . . To the argument made by Thurgood, not John Marshall that a majority may not deprive a minority of its constitutional right, the answer must be made that while this is sound in theory, in the long run it is the majority who will determine what the constitutional rights of the minority are. One hundred and fifty years of attempts on the part of this Court to protect minority rights of any kind—whether those of business, slaveholders, or Jehovah’s witnesses—have all met the same fate. One by one the cases establishing such rights have been sloughed off, and crept silently to rest . . . . If this Court, because its members individually are “liberal” and dislike segregation, now chooses to strike it down, it differs from the McReynolds court only in the kinds of litigants it favors and the kinds of special claims it protects . . . . I realize that it is an unpopular and unhumanitarian position, for which I have been excoriated by “liberal” colleagues, but I think *Plessy v. Ferguson* was right and should be re-affirmed. *Nomination of William H. Rehnquist*, 92d Cong., 117 CONG. REC. 45815 (1971) (William Rehnquist’s memorandum to Justice Jackson concerning *Brown*). At the time, Rehnquist denied that the memorandum reflected his personal opinions, a claim countered by Justice Jackson’s longtime secretary, Elsie Douglas. *Sue Davis, Justice Rehnquist and the Constitution* 15 n.14 (1989). More recently Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote a dissenting opinion in *Columbus Board of Education v. Penick*: “the Constitution does not command that school boards not under an affirmative duty to desegregate follow a policy of ‘integration uber alles.’” 443 U.S. 449, 513 (1979).


197. *Id.* at 39. Among the steps they suggest to help address resegregation are housing subsidies to help low income families gain access to middle class schools; increased use of magnet, charter schools and school vouchers to increase the educational choices for all students; and emphasizing to Americans the substantial benefits white children gain from integrated experiences. *Id.* at 40.

Fifty years after *Brown* the ultimate goal for most black American parents remains unchanged—to secure equal educational opportunities for their children. There also is the question of how to measure what constitutes equality in a multi-racial and multi-cultural society with a long history of racial discrimination and white supremacy. Currently we seem to be in a catch-22, because equality is usually measured by the educational opportunities and attainments of middle and upper income white Americans. Perhaps we need to develop alternate measures of equality, at least in public education.

Likewise, diversity in higher education is more than a short-term remedy for past and continuing societal discrimination. The remedial approach ignores the importance of an integrated education to the maintenance of a healthy, racially pluralistic democracy. Further, the remedial diversity rationale does not even acknowledge that black Americans still are not accepted as social equals, full American citizens. Robert Carter, in explaining the continuing educational deficiencies of black students wrote: "[l]ow educational achievement among African-Americans . . . resulted not from educational inferiority of blacks but from racism as evidenced by the structure of school financing, and by the structured expectation in our schools that black children will fail."199 Integration alone will not address this reality.

Despite the somewhat gloomy picture painted in this essay, there still are many reasons to celebrate the 1954 *Brown* decision. First, *Brown* was the product of black lawyers200 who with black and white civil rights activists, successfully fought against legally mandated racial segregation. Second, *Brown* signaled the end of the *Plessy* "separate but equal doctrine." Third, the post-*Brown* era opened educational and economic opportunities not previously available to most black and other non-white Americans. Finally, *Brown* held out the promise of full equality—full citizenship—for black Americans. This last promise unfortunately remains unrealized fifty years later. Fulfilling it must be our focus today and for the near future. But as one scholar reminds us: "[b]ecause discrimination in education is intimately connected to discrimination in other social institutions[,] we cannot expect to alleviate the former without concomitant efforts to eliminate the latter."201

199. *Id.* at 889.
200. Robert Carter argued the case against Kansas; Thurgood Marshall argued the case against South Carolina; Spotswood Robinson, III argued the case against Virginia; Louis Redding and Jack Greenberg argued the case against Delaware; and George C. Hayes and James M. Nabrit, Jr. argued the companion case, *Bolling v. Sharpe*, against the District of Columbia. All but Greenberg were black. Numerous other African-American lawyers aided in crafting the briefs in these cases.
201. Mickelson, *supra* note 1, at 1481.