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THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA:
PARTY POWERS AND GROUP POLITICS
FROM THE THIRD PLENUM TO THE
TWELFTH PARTY CONGRESS

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THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA: PARTY POWERS AND GROUP POLITICS FROM THE THIRD PLENUM TO THE TWELFTH PARTY CONGRESS

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I. INTRODUCTION

In recent years, more China scholars have looked to factions in analyzing the elites, the national policy-making, and the overall pattern of Chinese political behavior. The sudden spurt of interest in Chinese political groups has been in part influenced by the excellent pioneer works of William Whitson and Andrew J. Nathan. 1 Political events in China since the 1960s have also brought about growing awareness that group analysis can indeed broaden our knowledge of China's complex political process. During the Cultural Revolution of 1966-1976, party institutions were in virtual paralysis, while overall institutionalized policy-making and implementation processes were eclipsed in a state of dysfunction or even chaos. Politics involving the succession to Mao Zedong induced various political groups to juggle for power in an apparent effort to protect their stakes in the outcome.

A survey of recent scholarly writings reveals widespread acknowledgement of the existence of political groups. These writings cover the period from approximately 1969 (the 9th party congress) to 1981, and vary in reference to time span and arenas of politics and policy classification. The following summaries represent a spectrum of existing scholarly classifications of political groups in China:

<table>
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<td>Military fundamentalists: Qi Benyu, Guan Feng Radical conservatives: Mao Zedong Eclectic modernizers: Zhou</td>
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* I want to thank Professors Michel Oksenberg, Ramon Myers, and Pi-chao Chen for their valuable comments on the draft of this article.


Enlai, Deng Xiaoping
Westernized Chinese: (few in hiding)

Ken Lieberthal\(^3\) - I
Peking group: Zhou, Li Xiannian
Shanghai group: Zhang, Yao Wenyuan, et al.
Military group: PLA commanders, Chen Xilian

II
Westernizers: Zhou, Deng
Eclectics: Mao, Hua
Radicals: “Gang of Four”

Ting Wang\(^4\)
Bureaucratic clique: Li, Yu Qiuli
Jiang Qing clique

Harry Harding\(^5\)
Military faction: Lin Biao, Fourth Field Army
Moderate faction: Zhou, Deng
Leftist faction: Zhang Chunqiao, Jiang Qing, et al.

Lucian Pye\(^6\)
Whatever faction: Hua Guofeng, et al.
Opposition faction: Ye Jianying
Restoration faction: Deng, Hu Yaobang

Tony Saich\(^7\)
Practice faction: Deng, Hu
Whatever faction: Hua, Wang Dongxing

Dorothy J. Solinger\(^8\)
Adjusters: Chen Yun, Yao Yilin
Reformers: Zhao Ziyang,


8. Dorothy J. Solinger, “The Fifth National People’s Congress and the Process of
A number of these writings (e.g., Oksenberg, Saich, Lieberthal, Solinger) specify the particular political or policy arena of their categorization of groups, while others speak more generally. Some writers, like Harding and Lieberthal, confine their references to the period which begins prior to the death of Mao and concludes with the subsequent arrest of the Gang of Four in the fall of 1976. Most writers deal with the 1970s, particularly the years since 1977.

The adoption of group labels, as evident above, attests to the lack of uniformity in group categorization. Thus, several key political actors have been placed in apparently contradictory groupings. For instance, Lieberthal refers to Mao and Hua as eclectics, and Zhou and Deng are classified as westernizers. Oksenberg, on the other hand, describes Zhou and Deng as eclectic modernizers, but depicts westernized Chinese as "few and hiding." Fontana associates Zhao and Chen Yun with Deng, while Solinger assigns Chen and Zhao to different groupings. Part of the reason for such scholarly inconsistency may be explained by the fact that data on informal groups is meager and extremely unreliable. As John Bryan Starr asserts, "Since personal relations are, almost by definition, not open to public scrutiny, the identification of cliques and their memberships becomes particularly problematic." 11 In addition to the problems in identifying group membership as well as in delineating

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11. John Bryan Starr, "From the 10th Party Congress to the Premiership of Hua
their functional boundaries and institutional bases, the scholarly community remains unable to identify membership of Chinese political groups beyond a handful of individuals active on the national level.

What causes the formation of political groups, in both national and local scenes, remains an unsettled issue. Before reliable empirical data become more available, any attempt to theorize about Chinese group phenomena would remain hypothetical at best. In all likelihood, a multiplicity of factors (i.e., the perspectives of policy orientation, cultural characteristics, informal social relationships, institutional affiliation, territorial affinity and perceived self-interest) will probably continue to determine the formation of groups. One could also argue that the dominance of group behaviors in recent Chinese politics simply reflects the state of China’s political development at a time when the institutionalization of political life remains infantile, subject to the impacts of cyclically volatile political currents. Pye’s ambitious theory that asserts factionalism is a manifestation of Chinese psycho-cultural behaviors, and that bureaucratic interests are less likely in China than in most places with different political systems to become “pivotal points of political conflicts and alliances” is insightful heuristically; however, its validity in explaining the peculiarity of Chinese political style has not been fully tested.12

In spite of the difficulties of precisely identifying membership in various political groups, adopting a group approach to the analysis of Chinese political events during the period from the 11th Central Committee (CC) Third Plenum (December 1978) to the 12th Party Congress (September 1982) remains useful. As subsequent discussion will reveal, conflicts between political groups in ideology, policy, and power bases are characteristic of China’s elite politics during that period.

The Third Plenum is now officially proclaimed to be the turning point of the post-Mao Zedong era, characterized by the emergence of a new leadership committed to a course of development fundamentally different from the past.13 Given all of the sequence of

12. Pye, supra note 6, p. 82.
events that followed, the PRC’s official claim is well founded. In retrospect the years since mid-1978 have indeed witnessed the steady rise of a powerful elite group surrounding Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yun, Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, at the expense of those associated with Maosim, the Gang of Four, and Lin Biao. The process of power transfer began in the Third Plenum and was practically completed by the time the 12th Party Congress was held.

This essay seeks to analyze: 1) the evolution of the new power alignment evident since the Third Plenum; 2) the network of power bases of this leadership group; 3) the strategy adopted in the apparent struggle for powers between these newly emerged power elites and their opponents; and 4) changes in policy and institutions, particularly in the Party, that were part of the struggle and that helped shape the sequence of developments in the PRC’s political system. It should be pointed out that events since 1978 had their twists and turns: there were occasional setbacks for the finally dominant Dengist group. Even today there remain questions concerning the extent to which this group can control China’s political situation without encountering further political turmoil ahead. However, the general pattern of political development in the last five years strongly suggests that Deng’s principal opponents will have little chance of altering the current power alignment and policy direction in the foreseeable future.

Group Politics Since the Third Plenum

The Deng-Hu group had virtually dominated the centers of PRC’s national power by the time the 12th Party Congress was held in September 1982. They controlled the gateways to the arenas of power in the Party, the government, and the military. The process by which they acquired such power can be clarified by tracing the sequence of political events since the 11th CC’s Third Plenum.

The 11th CC held seven plenary sessions. Several Central Work Conferences were also convened. The Third Plenum and the Central Work Conference preceding it—both held in December 1978—were the critical meetings most responsible for altering direction of CCP line, institutional development, and leadership changes. In addition, the Fourth Plenum (September 1979), Fifth Plenum (February 1980), Sixth Plenum (June 1981) and the Central Work Conferences in April 1979, December 1980, an December 1981, also brought about important decisions and changes that elaborated, enriched, modified, or implemented the emerging new line. The ultimate result was a wholesale change of leaders and policy line as well
as adoption of the new Party Constitution at the 12th Party Congress. In line with the sequence of these political developments a new PRC constitution was adopted on December 4, 1982 by the Fifth National People's Congress.

Events Prior to the Third Plenum

The Third Plenum of the 11th CC was the turning point for the reemerging political fortunes of Deng, Hu, Chen Yun, and their rehabilitated cadres. The CC officially made the decisions to endorse their views, thus strengthening their formal authority. To paraphrase Lowell Dittmar's words, the informal network of Deng's political base was translated more effectively into positions of formal power. But it would be wrong to assume that the Third Plenum decisions were reached in an atmosphere of a free-for-all democratic contest; nor should one assume that the plenary session resembled anything like a great parliamentary debate. On the contrary, decisions might have been made almost in their entirety in the Central Work Conference prior to the plenum session.

For two years before the conference and plenum were held, the central leadership had been preoccupied with the issues of the Gang of Four and the implementation of the earlier version of the Four Modernizations initiated by Zhou Enlai and later enunciated by Hua Guofeng. Those who were responsible for the arrest of the Gang of Four and their proteges were anxious to reconstruct a national leadership surrounding Hua, Ye, and Li Xiannian. Differences on policy matters and power considerations among them and those already rehabilitated did not surface to become politically divisive. Their common denominator lay in concerted efforts against the Gang of Four forces and radical policies. However, by 1977, 77 members of the CC, presumably the Gang's radical followers, were purged or suspended.

The situation began to change once Deng was rehabilitated for the second time in the spring of 1977. Deng's rehabilitation was


15. Fifty-one of them belonged to the worker-peasant backgrounds, while fourteen were described as civilian cadres and twelve as PLA officers. See Fontana, supra note 10, p. 249.

16. Kenneth Lieberthal argues that Hua and Deng struck a deal in writing, according to which Deng admitted personal errors and promised to support Hua as the national leader. See his "Modernization and Succession Politics in China," supra note 3, p. 246.
subsequently made official at the Third Plenum of the 10th CC in July that year. Several of Deng's close associates who had been purged with him for the second time following the 1976 Tienanmen Incident also reappeared. They included, for example, Hu Yaobang, Hu Qiaomu and Xi Zhongxun. Immediately upon their return to active political life, they began to rebuild political bases. Their aggressive efforts soon yielded results. The initial targets were to control the Party center while simultaneously nurturing support in the provinces to undermine the institutional and territorial bases of Hua, Wang Dongxing, and others. The process of competition for pivotal offices can be described simply as a power struggle.

Deng may have been consulted in Hua's preparation for the "Draft Outline of the Ten Year Plan for the National Economy," which the then Premier Hua officially presented to the First Session of the Fifth NPC (Feb. 26-March 5) in 1978. But his principal concerns at this time did not involve economic policy issues. He appeared to be more preoccupied with penetrating the ranks of the PLA (he was Chief of General Staff and Vice-Chairman of the Military Commission), controlling the Party center, manipulating the change of leaders in the provinces and military regions, and preparing an ideological rationale for launching his political and policy offensives. In short, he and his associates focused on building bases for expanding their political powers.

Upon rehabilitation, Hu Yaobang immediately turned his attention to capturing the Party's bureaucratic headquarters, the most important of which were the CC's General Office (Zhongyang bangongting), the Organization Department, and the Propaganda Department. Control of these Party units would be a critical step toward a faster rehabilitation of the purged cadres, who would be likely supporters. Such steps would subsequently facilitate the return of Deng-Hu's friends and followers to important Party posts in the provinces and municipalities. They would then be able to shape the direction of Party-controlled public communications. If the rehabilitated cadres could be placed in influential positions in the cities, the provinces, and the various production and services units, they would inevitably join the Deng force to form a network of support for Deng's leadership and policy lines. The Party's central bureaucratic offices were thus crucial instruments needed for the capture and restoration of the Party powers.

But these Party units were closely guarded by Hua and Wang Dongxing. Since the Central Secretariat was abolished during the Cultural Revolution, the CC General Office had taken over many of
the Secretariat functions. Wang Dongxing had been hand-picked by Mao to replace Yang Shangkun as the office director. In 1969 when the Ninth Party Congress did away with the Central Cultural Revolution Group, the General Office’s authority expanded. It controlled sensitive personnel archives and handled confidential communications and high-level documents. Under Wang’s control the office established three sections to review cases of high-level officials in the Party, government, and PLA who had been purged. As subsequent events have revealed, they blocked the rehabilitation of many purged cadres.

The initial penetration into the office came when Hu Yaobang was appointed Deputy Director of the General Office at the Tenth CC’s Third Plenum, serving ostensibly under Wang Dongxing. In October 1977 he replaced the radical Guo Yufeng to become Head of Organization Department. Acting in that capacity, Hu reportedly corrected many “erroneous cases” and recommended the rehabilitation of the “victims.” Major rehabilitation cases announced at the 11th CC’s Third Plenum may have been handled by him. Hu’s later appointment in December that year as Vice-President of the Central Party School (Hua was President and Wang the First Vice-President) also put him in an apparent collision course with Hua and Wang. In spite of such initial efforts, the Hua-Wang force retained the upper hand in the balance of powers in these units. The Propaganda Department was still headed by Zhang Pinghua, a Hua protege who had previously served as the First Party Secretary of Hunan. Deng’s man Zhu Muzhi was brought in as a number two to counter Zhang’s authority. As the battle line in group rivalries was being drawn in the Party’s bureaucratic headquarters, Hu Qiaomu took over the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in 1978. He revitalized that institution and used it as a base to develop economic theories and to train cadres specialized in them. From the Academy he prepared, for Deng’s use, some important ideological documents and theories on socialist economy which were to become immensely important later on. In July 1978 he published the important essay, “Act in Accordance with Economic Laws, Step Up the Four Modernizations,” in which he proposed market socialism in order to expand economic productive capacity at a higher level of efficiency and productivity.

17. Shu-shin Wang, supra note 9, p. 807.
18. Luo Bing, “Fanshipai shi shi ji” (An account of the Whateverist Faction’s loss of power base), Zheng Ming, No. 16 (February 1979), pp. 5-8.
The essay had immediate impact on the Third Plenum when the issues related to socialist modernization were being discussed.

Taking advantage of the growing number of rehabilitated victims of the Cultural Revolution, the Deng-Hu group quickly manipulated their appointments to the provincial and local leadership positions. By 1979, Guangdong alone witnessed the return of over 40,000 such people to basic level cadre positions. Initially many were reinstalled in the revolutionary committees, schools, and enterprises. Gradually they stepped into the more pivotal positions in the Party. In 1978 their impact began to reach many provincial and municipal level Party Committees. During 1977-78, provincial Party committees reportedly had been reorganized in Guangdong, Shanxi, Henan, Heilongjiang, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Ningxia, Liaoning, Hunan, Hubei, Tibet, Guangxi, Guizhou, Shanghai, Tianjin and Beijing. Changes of military commanders and political commissars also took place in several regions and districts. Thus by the time the Central Work Conference was convened in late 1978, supporters of Deng and Hu had controlled or formed a formidable power bloc in at least half of China's military regions, military districts, provincial and municipal revolutionary committees, and Party committees, severely undermining the power bases of the central political force centered around Hua, Ye and Li. They were clearly on the verge of crippling whatever powers were left in the hands of the previous supporters of the Gang of Four. Deng's proteges were rapidly consolidating Party and/or military powers in the critical locations of Guangdong (Xi Zhongxun), Hubei (Chen Pixian), Henan (Duan Junyi), Shanghai (Su Zhenhua, Peng Chong), Beijing (Qin Jiwei), Tianjin (Chen Weida), Shaanxi (Ma Wenrui), Sichuan (Zhao Ziyang) and Liaoning (Ren Zhongyi). When leading cadres of the Party, PLA, and government headquarters, and of the military regions, provinces and municipalities were all summoned for the work conference, it did not come as a surprise that majority sentiments leaned toward the support of emerging powerful political force centered around the personality of Deng Xiaoping.

THE THIRD PLENUM

At the Third Plenum (December 18-23, 1978) Hua Guofeng

presented a Politburo decision to stop the on-going mass campaigns against Lin Biao and the Gang of Four, and to shift the Party and national focus on the modernization plan. It was duly endorsed in the opening minutes of the session. He urged the Party to stress from then on the notion of collective leadership and put less emphasis on the individual cult. This was probably a response to the rumored criticism directed against him in the preceding work conference. The plenum discussed the importance of implementing Mao’s more conservative speeches—“On the Ten Major Relations,” “On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People,” and “The 60-Point Method of Work”—which had been sidetracked since 1958 in favor of the Chairman’s more radical directives. These three documents were to become the segment of Mao Zedong Thought which the Deng-Hu group would be willing to live with.

The plenum accomplished three important tasks. It elected members to the Politburo, the Central Committee, and the Central Commission for Inspecting Discipline. It approved a number of policy decisions and set forth the new ideological tone desired by the Deng-Hu group. It reversed verdicts on most of the Party’s important political cases since the Great Leap Forward. All of these decisions have had profound consequences in regard to the political development that followed. They realigned the central and later, provincial-regional power distribution, shifted the direction of party lines, and laid the policy foundation for institutional changes. Outcomes of the plenum are spelled out as follows:

A. Elections: Four important allies of Deng—Chen Yun, Deng Yingchao, Hu Yaobang, and Wang Zhen—were added to the Politburo. Chen Yun also joined its Standing Committee, and became a Vice-Chairman of the Party. Nine rehabilitated cadres—Huang Kecheng, Song Renqiong, Hu Qiaomu, Xi Zhongxun, Wang Renzhong, Chen Zhaidao, Han Kuang, and Zhu Hui—became new members of the Central Committee. In the subsequent years, most of these people were to play crucial roles in expanding the power bases of Deng-Hu leadership.

In addition, Hu Yaobang was appointed to the newly restored post of the CC Secretary General (bishuzhang)—the same title Deng held during 1954-56 prior to assuming the more powerful title of General Secretary (zong shujii) in 1956. Hu subsequently used that

position to salvage the CC General Office from Wang Dongxing's control and to rebuild the Party central bureaucracy by reviving the Central Secretariat. As Secretary General he also directed the Party center's daily work, particularly in regard with personnel changes, quickened the pace of rehabilitating Cultural Revolution victims, and controlled the agenda of Party meetings. In retrospect, Deng clearly wanted Hu to be the pivotal man in rebuilding the Party apparatus, and to use that as the principal political base to control Party powers.

B. Party Lines and Policy Decisions: PRC leaders and media today have made frequent reference to the Third Plenum Lines, implying that the Party lines advocated by Deng and others were officially put forward at the Third Plenum. Jurgen Domes defines “Line [in the PRC politics as] a set of basic policies in all major areas of political decision-making, i.e., a comprehensive platform developed on the basis of long-term strategies as well as intermediate range tactical considerations.” He identifies the following five realms of line application: 1) ideological principles; 2) international politics; 3) economic development; 4) social development; 5) education and culture. The Third Plenum did not deal with all of these topics. On the most important question of ideological principles, there was no definitive resolution. Given the scanty evidence available, policy lines were discussed in the plenum, but only some areas of discussion resulted in concrete resolution.

In the discussion of major political questions arising from PRC history, Deng apparently introduced the notion that these questions must be settled in accordance with the principle which Mao Zedong sometimes advocated, e.g., “Seeking Truth from Facts and Correcting Mistakes Whenever Discovered.” Statements by the CC afterward only went so far as to say that the plenum “puts a high evaluation on the discussion of whether practice is the sole criterion for testing truth.” The wordings suggest that this Dengist ideological canon was not officially adopted in resolution form. Such an ambiguous statement reveals the existence of substantial opposition in the plenum.

24. Ibid.
The session did adopt the "Regulations on the Work in the Rural People's Communes" in order to reform agricultural practice in the commune system and to increase production. It also discussed the draft copy of the document on "Some Questions Concerning the Acceleration of Agricultural Development." It approved higher purchase prices for grain and other agricultural produce. Prices in farm machinery, chemical fertilizer, insecticides, plastics, etc. were also reduced in order to cut down agricultural costs. The State Council was instructed to adopt an implementation plan according to these changes. It was decided that these two documents were to be forwarded to provinces and municipalities for study and implementation on trial basis. Questions with regard to raising agricultural production seemed to involve a great deal of detailed discussion.

C. Reversal of verdicts in past political cases: Under the influence of Deng and Chen Yun, the plenum officially repudiated charges against the victims of many previous purges. In particular, it corrected the April 5, 1976 "Tiananmen Incidents," calling them "revolutionary actions." It referred to the cases involving Peng Dehuai, Tao Zhu, Bo Yibo and Yang Shangkun as "erroneous conclusions." It called for rehabilitating victims of these "false charges" and "frame-ups." In spite of Hua's opening statement that mass campaigns against the Gang of Four be stopped, the session nonetheless endorsed thorough investigation of the individuals and incidents associated with the Gang of Four "conspiracy to usurp Party and state powers." In short, the CC officially legitimized the rehabilitation policy put forward by the Deng-Chen group. The other major victims of Mao not mentioned in the statement were Liu Shaoqi, Peng Zhen, and Lu Dingyi. Liu's case was not settled until the Fifth Plenum in February 1980. Controversy within the high Party circle over the Liu case apparently was too profound to be settled at this time.

But Peng Zhen was rehabilitated on December 23, the day after the plenum was ended. Many others including Lu Dingyi followed suit. Many rehabilitated cadres soon resumed important assignments, strengthening political bases of Deng and his close associates at the Party center. Realignment of powers at the provincial level proceeded so rapidly that by 1980, twenty-five out of the twenty-nine provincial First Party Secretaries fell into the hands of rehabilitated
cadres. Once those who previously suffered political disgrace staged their comeback behind the bandwagon of Deng-Hu power machine, the politics of revenge and restoration quickly took their toll against the beneficiaries of the Cultural Revolution.

In 1979, the power base of Wang Dongxing crumbled to pieces. Yao Yilin, a noted protege of Chen Yun replaced Wang as Director of the CC General Office. Feng Wenbin, a senior colleague of Hu Yaobang in the CYL during the early 1950s, became its Vice-Director, effectively terminating control of the office by Wang and his proteges, Li Xin and Zhang Yaochu. Hu Yaobang himself took over Zhang Pinghua's position as Head of the CC Propaganda Department and immediately reshuffled the key positions at Hongqi (Red Flag). Meanwhile, Hu Qiaomu replaced Hua as Director of the Committee on Mao Zedong Work, a critical position which oversees the selection and evaluation of Mao's writings for party consumption. The General Office's functions which dealt with personnel files of the purged senior cadres were turned over to the Organization Department. Wang Dongxing's "8341" Garrison Troop, responsible for the security of Zhongnanhai (where top leaders live and work), was put under the direct command of General Yang Dezhi, a Deng confident, in the headquarters of the PLA Chief of General Staff. These moves assured Deng-Hu's virtual control over the Party central bureaucracy at the expense of Hua and Wang. The policy of rehabilitation and major personnel changes at the Third Plenum thus had profound implications for the rivalry of powers between Deng-Hu and Hua-Wang.

MAJOR PARTY DECISIONS BETWEEN THE THIRD PLENUM AND THE TWELFTH PARTY CONGRESS

In spite of the apparent political victories at the Third Plenum, the emerging leadership of Deng, Hu, Zhao, and Chen went through a series of twists and turns, subject to minor periodic setbacks between 1979 and 1981. Nonetheless, the overall political currents clearly moved in a direction that favored their leadership and policy positions. They did, however, meet challenges and resistance. Neither would one argue that internal policy differences did not exist within the Deng group. They did, and perhaps still do. But politics in those years were gradually cast in the form of Deng's group versus

29. Luo Bing, supra note 18, p. 8.
those who prospered during the turbulent years 1966-76. The most salient character of such political tension existed between Deng's group and the "Whateverists" who subscribed to the doctrine, "Whatever policies Mao had made should be resolutely defended, whatever instructions Mao had given should be steadily abided by."30 Before we discuss this issue in further detail, let us first review the major events which transpired in the CC Plena and Central Work Conferences as follows:

**CENTRAL WORK CONFERENCE—APRIL 1979**

The conference focused on problems derived from the ambitious economic modernization packages put together by Hua, Li Xiannian, Yu Qiuli and other top economic planners associated with the "Petroleum Clique." It adopted the famous "Eight-Character" economic policy for the coming three years, that is, readjustment, reform, consolidation, and standards improvement. Among other actions, it also set forth the new guidelines to broaden the scope of autonomy for enterprise management, to permit retention of profits by enterprise units, to restrict the acquisition of new and large equipment, to practice democratic and scientific management, and to establish responsibility systems for factory managers, chief engineers and administrative leaders.

**THE FOURTH PLENUM, SEPTEMBER 1979**

It discussed and endorsed a speech draft to be delivered by Ye Jianying on October 1 in commemoration of the PRC's Thirtieth Anniversary celebration. The highlight of the speech stressed the theme that without Mao Zedong Thought there would have been no new China; but Maoist thought was not a product of Mao's personal wisdom alone, rather that of the CCP's collective wisdom.31 It was an apparent effort to de-apothesize Mao and Maoism.

In addition, it formally adopted the "Decisions on Some Questions Concerning the Acceleration of Agricultural Development," first discussed in the Third Plenum. It added twelve rehabilitated leaders to the CC roster. They included Yang Shangkun, Peng Zhen, Bo Yibo, Zhou Yang, Lu Dingyi, Jiang Nanxiang. Wang

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30. This position was first articulated in publication by the Commentator of *Renmin Ribao*, February 7, 1977, p. 1. The daily paper's editorial staff was under the control of Wang Dongxing at that time.

Dongxing reportedly was compelled to make a self-criticism, a clear signal of the decline of his political influence.

THE FIFTH PLENUM, FEBRUARY 1980

This was an enlarged session, attended also by scores of second echelon leaders who were not CC members. The session lasted for one week, an unusual length for a plenum. It discussed the draft of the proposed new Party Constitution. Six major resolutions were passed at the plenum. They were:

1. Elevation of Zhao Ziyang to the Politburo Standing Committee.
2. Restoration of the CC Central Secretariat; election of Hu Yaobang as the General Secretary and ten others as Secretaries.
3. Ousting of Wang Dongxing, Wu De, Ji Dengkui and Chen Xilien from the Politburo.
4. Rehabilitation of Liu Shaoqi, describing Liu’s case the most serious frame-up mistake of the PRC history.
5. Adoption of the “Guiding Principles for Inner-Party Political Life,” in an effort to restore the Party norms which prevailed at the time of the Eighth Party Congress in 1956.
6. Erasure from the Constitution of citizen’s four rights to “speak out freely, air one’s views fully, hold great debates, and write big-character posters.”

CENTRAL WORK CONFERENCE, DECEMBER 1980

The agenda apparently discussed the following six issues:

1. The demotion of Hua Guofeng and other personnel changes to be followed. Reportedly Deng criticized Hua for his personality cult, preventing Deng and Chen Yun from being rehabilitated in 1977, insistence on “Two Whatevers,” resisting the principle of “Seek[ing] Truth from Facts,” and mistakes in economic modernization plan. It was decided that Hua relinquished his positions as Chairman of both the Party and the Military Commission. Hu Yaobang and Deng Xiaoping would replace him in these two positions. Hua would be demoted to the Party Vice-Chairman.
2. The revised draft of the Party Constitution.
3. The draft of a proposed new PRC Constitution especially with reference to the issue of restoring the office of PRC President, a position Liu Shaoqi held when he was purged.

4. The proposed "Decisions Regarding the Party's Several Historical Questions Since the Funding of the PRC."

5. The newly proposed economic readjustment plan, which reimposed administrative controls, centralization and unification, and increasing governmental intervention in the economy.\(^{33}\)

6. The date and agenda for the 12th Party Congress.

THE SIXTH PLENUM, JUNE, 1981

The session was relatively short, from June 27 to June 29. But the preparatory meetings prior to that were long, lasting eleven days. Apparently, many of the debates and substantive discussions took place in the preparatory meetings. The principal actions were:

1. Passing the "Decisions Regarding the Party's Several Historical Questions Since the Founding of the PRC." The document makes a conclusive evaluation of Mao's role in the PRC history.

2. Officially demoting Hua to Vice-Chairman; Hu was elected Party Chairman, Deng was made Military Commission Chairman, and Zhao was elevated to Party Vice-Chairman. Ranking of the Politburo Standing Committee was set in the order of Hu, Ye, Deng, Zhao, Li Xiannian, Chen Yun, and Hua. Hu Yaobang continued on as the CC General Secretary.

3. Election of Xu Zhongxun as Secretary of the Central Secretariat.

The Twelfth Party Congress

The Twelfth Party Congress was held in Peking from September 1 to September 11, with 1,545 delegates and 145 alternates attending. In the opening speech Deng Xiaoping declared this to be the most important meeting held since the Seventh Party Congress in 1945, thereby totally downgrading the rest of the Congresses held since the founding of the People's Republic.\(^{34}\) In the speech, Deng set forth four basic tasks for the nation: 1) to restructure the administration and the economic set-up in order to make the ranks of cadres more revolutionary, of a younger average age, better educated, and more professionally competent; 2) to build a socialist spiritual civilization; 3) to strike at criminal activities in economic and other areas that undermine socialism; and 4) to rectify the Party style of

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33. For more details on this plan, see Solinger, *supra* note 8, p. 1240.
work and consolidate the Party organization on the basis of a careful study of the new Party Constitution.

The Congress listened to Hu Yaobang's lengthy political report which contained some 34,000 words. This was the longest political report ever delivered at the Party Congress in the PRC history. Gordon Bennett and Lowell Dittmer have suggested that steady reduction in length of the political report prior to 1982 signaled the possible decline of the Party Congress as a forum for decision-making and discussion of major issues. By this yardstick, the Twelfth Congress could represent a reversal of the previous trend, and could indicate that the Party Congress is being reinvigorated as an important forum. However, its unwieldy number of delegates would prevent it from becoming an effective decision-making body. The party machine controlled by Deng and Hu had every reason to dramatize the importance of this Party Congress. It represented an important milestone in the rise to power of the Deng-Hu leadership and the major policies they favor. It also ended a long process of atrocious political struggles, and began a new era.

The Congress adopted a new Party Constitution with a total of fifty lengthy articles in ten chapters, almost as long as the 1956 Constitution. As Bennett has pointed out elsewhere, the Party Constitutions adopted at the Ninth and Tenth Congresses were much shorter than the 1956 Constitution, and gave only slight attention to matters concerning central and local Party organizations. By comparison, the new Constitution devotes seven of its ten long chapters to elaborate in detail the scope and structure of activities for the Party organizations. Such an effort adds additional testimony to the new leadership's emphasis on Party rebuilding. The task of Party rebuilding gathered momentum at the Eleventh CC's Fifth Plenum in February 1979 when the Central Secretariat was restored; it is now officially reinstated in the Constitution. The Party chairmanship was abolished in favor of a collective leadership formula.

The Congress also elected 348 members (210 regulars, 135 alter-

35. Compared with Liu Shaoqi's 31,000 words in 1956 (Eighth), Lin Biao's 16,000 words in 1969 (Ninth), Wang Hongwen's 6,500 words in 1973 (Tenth), and Hua Guofeng's 4,300 words in 1977 (Eleventh). For reference see Gordon A. Bennett, China's Eighth, Ninth and Tenth Congresses, Constitutions and Central Committees: An Institutional Overview and Comparison, University of Texas, Austin: Center for Asian Studies, Occasional Paper Series, Number 1, 1974, p. 5.


nates) to the Central Committee, 1972 to the Central Advisory Commission (CAC), and 132 to the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI). The CAC provides honorific positions to the aging cadres whose active political lives have apparently come to an end. Their appointments to the CAC may be regarded as a facesaving measure in order to retire them with grace. There is little evidence that their alleged "advisory" functions amount to significant factors in the governing of China.

The CCDI is expected to be more active than the CAC as the Party enters a nationwide campaign to tighten discipline and to crack down on the rapidly growing number of cases of economic corruption. Chen Yun and General Huang Kecheng, purged in connection with the Peng Dehuai case in 1959, were appointed the First Secretary and the Second Secretary respectively. But Wang Heshou—the Permanent Secretary—is expected to run the commission's daily operations. The CCDI's predecessor—Central Control Commission—was abolished at the Ninth Congress (1969) and later restored at the Eleventh Congress (1977). Its current institutional arrangement will enable it to exercise functional supervision over a nation-wide network of provincial Commissions on Inspecting Discipline. How the CCDI implements its important assignments in conjunction with the powerful Central Secretariat, provincial Party Secretaries, and the public security forces remains somewhat unclear.

THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE

The Twelfth Central Committee held its first plenary session on September 12-13 immediately following the closing of the Congress. In addition to the approval of the newly elected CAC and CCDI members, the committee exercised the most important duty of electing its General Secretary, Chairman and Vice-chairman of the Military Commission, and members of the Central Secretariat, the ruling Politburo and the Politburo Standing Committee. The fact that the First Plenum was brief suggests the election results had all been predetermined, most likely by such powerful figures as Deng Xiaoping, Hu Yaobang, Chen Yun, Zhao Ziyang, and a few others in mutual consultation.

Only a limited number of the Eleventh CC members were re-elected. The figures we have indicate 137 or 39 percent of the 333 original members from the Eleventh Party Congress survived.
Table A

*Survival Rate of Politburo and Central Committee Members*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party Congress*</th>
<th>Survival Rate (in %)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politburo (total)</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standing Committee of Politburo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alternates</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Death Adjusted)</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Committee</td>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regulars</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alternates</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Death: Liu Bocheng, Su Zhenhua
** Purged or demoted: Hua Guofeng, Wang Dongxing, Xu Shiyou, Chen Yonggui, Geng Biao, Ji Dengkui, Wu De, Chen Xilian, Peng Chong, Seypidin

*** Deceased were Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, Dong Piwu and Kang Sheng.

Sources:

a. Figures on the 8th-10th Party Congresses are from Bennett, *supra* note 35, pp.23-25.

b. This author's own calculation.


d. Information from Xu Xing, "Ping Zhonggong di shier qu dahui" (On the CCP 12th Party Congress) Zheng Ming, No. 60 (October 1982), pp. 48-50.
As Table A shows, this survival rate was lower than those of the Ninth CC and even the Tenth CC, and only slightly higher than the Ninth CC which followed the extensive purges during the peak period of the Cultural Revolution. This suggests the rise of the Deng group to political eminence may have entailed widespread purges, mostly in the forms of demotion or forced retirement.

**THE POLITBURO**

Turnover in the Politburo was also substantial. As Table A indicates, only twelve or 52 percent of the original twenty-three members elected in the First Plenum of the Eleventh CC survived. Taking into account two deceased members—Su Zhenhua and Liu Bocheng—the survival rate remains only 57 percent. This compares unfavorably with the survival rate of 64 percent (or 73 percent) between the Ninth and the Tenth Central Committee’s First Plenary sessions, but significantly higher than the 35 percent between the Eighth and the Ninth due to the impact of the Cultural Revolution.

The fact that the Politburo members’ survival rate was higher than those of the CC poses the possibility that while some senior leaders remain in the Politburo, their proteges in the second echelon were demoted or forced out of office altogether. Furthermore, if one traces the evolution of turnover in the Politburo between the Eleventh CC’s Third Plenum and the Twelfth CC’s First Plenum, recent changes in the Politburo composition may not seem nearly as significant. As Table B shows, four members, Chen Yun, Deng Yingchao, Hu Yaobang, and Wang Zhen were added to the ruling body at the Third Plenum, while Zhao Ziyang and Peng Zhen subsequently joined it at the Fourth Plenum in 1979. Conversely, the “little gang of four”—Wang Dongxing, Ji Dengkui, Wu De and Chen Xilian—were removed at the Fifth Plenum (1980). Chen Yonggui, the famous Dazhai leader, lost his post at the Sixth Plenum (1981). Change in the Politburo appears to follow the pattern of adding new members (Third and Fifth Plenums) with the subsequent removals (Fourth and Sixth Plenums) of the current members whose power and status had become weaker.

The current Politburo is packed with members of the rehabilitated old guard, all of whom are Deng’s confidants. Hua Guofeng was ousted, and allowed to remain in the Central Committee perhaps only as a face-saving gesture. After all, it was Hua who co-engineered the arrest of the Gang of Four in 1976. Among the noted supporters of Hua, only Ye Jianying, General Li Desheng (Shenyang Military Region) and Ni Zhifu (the youthful Director of All-
China Federation of Trade Unions) survived. However, in March 1983 Ye announced he would not seek re-election to the upcoming National People's Congress, scheduled to meet in mid-1983. Given his age (85) and poor physical condition, his days in political life are numbered. Li and Ni may have already switched sides to support the Deng-Hu leadership. 38

Among the previous Politburo members, Geng Biao, Peng Chong and Wang Renzhong were demoted to the CC membership. 39 Observers in Hong Kong speculate that Geng and Peng may have moved too close to Hua's position in recent years, while Wang's removal was allegedly connected with his mishandling of the Bai Hua case in his capacity as Director of the CC Propaganda Department.

Members of the current Politburo average seventy-three years of age. It is a body comprised almost completely of national level office-holders. Only two—Li Desheng and Qin Jiwei (Commander of Beijing Military Region)—are from the Military Region. Several of its members—Ye, Ulanhu, Nie Rongzhen, and Xu Xiangqian—have in fact become politically inactive. Even Li Xiannian was stripped of his functional duties in the State Council, before being elected to the newly-restored position of the President of the Republic. The composition of the current Politburo therefore leaves room for the possibility of more substitution in the next CC Plenary session. The weeding-out process desired by Deng and his associates may thus continue for a little while longer. In short, the vast majority of the Politburo members appears to be closely allied with Deng, Hu, and Chen Yun. All of them hold concurrent leadership positions in the Central Secretariat, Military Commission, and the State Council.

38. See Li Desheng, "Zhixu qingchu zho di xuxiang yingxiang, nuli kaichuang budui jianshe di xin jumen" (continue to eradicate the influence of leftist thinking, strive for a new situation in the reconstruction of military forces). *Renmin Ribao*, April 13, 1983, p. 5. In the article, Li called for turning the PLA into a strong "Modern art regularized revolutionary military force." He also urged the eradication of influence on the PLA of the leftist errors. The strongest indication of his crossover to support Deng was his praise of Deng's "remarkable achievements" in purging the leftist and rightist influence after he assumed the position as chairman of the Military Commission.

39. Hai Feng, "Zhonggong xuanchuan buzhang yi ren mu ho" (Behind the change of CCP Propaganda Head), *Zheng Ming*, No. 55 (May 1982), pp. 16-17; and Luo Bing, "Zhonggong wenwu gaogan di fuchen" (The ups and downs of PRC high officials), *Zheng Ming*, No. 62 (December 1982), pp. 7-11. Peng Chong is also charged for his allegedly "corrupt" life-style — indulging in materialistic luxuries. The arrest of his son on charges of economic crimes may also have affected him. See *Zhongguo Shibao* [China Times (New York)], April 2, 1983, p. 8.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Standing Committee:</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Provincial Origin</th>
<th>Party Secretariat</th>
<th>State Council</th>
<th>PLA</th>
<th>NPC</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hu Yaobang(^a)</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>Hunan</td>
<td>General Secretary</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ye Jianying</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>Guangdong</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deng Xiaoping</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>Sichuan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhao Ziyang(^b)</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>Henan</td>
<td>Premier</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Li Xiannian</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>Hubei</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chen Yun(^a)</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>Jiangsu</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regular Members: (In order of Surname Strokes)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wan Li(^c)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xi Zhongxun(^c)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wang Zhen(^a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wei Guoqing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ulanfu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fang Yi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Li Desheng</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table B**

*POLITBURO*

(CCP 12th Party Congress)
## Table B (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Standing Committee:</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Party Secretariat</th>
<th>State Council</th>
<th>PLA</th>
<th>NPC</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deng Yingchao\textsuperscript{a}</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>Henan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Vice Chairman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yang Shangkun\textsuperscript{c}</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>Sichuan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Permanent Vice-Chm. Military Comm.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yang Dezhi\textsuperscript{c}</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>Hunan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Vice Chairman Sect.-Gen.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yu Qiuli</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>Jiangxi</td>
<td>Secretary</td>
<td>State Councillor</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Song Renqiong\textsuperscript{c}</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>Hunan</td>
<td>Organization Department Head Secretary</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hu Qiaomu\textsuperscript{c}</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>Jiangsu</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Party ideology and party member education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nie Rongzhen</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>Sichuan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Vice Chm. Mil. Com.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ni Zhifu</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>Shanghai</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Dir. All-China Federation of Trade Unions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xu Xiangqian</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>Shaanxi</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Vice-Chm. Mil. Com.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peng Zhen\textsuperscript{b}</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>Shaanxi</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Vice Chairman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liao Chengzhi\textsuperscript{c}</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>Guangdong</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Dir. Overseas Chinese Affairs Off.</td>
</tr>
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</table>

**Alternate Members:** (In order of votes)
Table B (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Standing Committee:</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Province/Origin</th>
<th>Party Secretariat</th>
<th>State Council</th>
<th>PLA</th>
<th>NPC</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yao Yilin</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>Anhui</td>
<td>Secretary</td>
<td>Vice-Premier; State Planning Commission</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qin Jiwei</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>Hubei</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chen Muhua</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>Zhejiang</td>
<td></td>
<td>State Council-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>lor; Economic</td>
<td>Relations with Foreign Countries</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Average age 73 (Woman)

a. Membership since the 3rd plenum, 1978
b. Membership since the 4th plenum, 1979
c. New members, the 12th Party Congress, 1982. Liao has passed away. At this writing his replacement in the Politburo is not known.

Sources:
- Hierarchies of the People’s Republic of China. (Hong Kong: Union Research Institute, 1975).
- Renmin Ribao, September 13, 1982. Ting Wang, supra note 4, pp. 1-17.
- Zheng ming, Hong Kong: supra note Table A.
- Xu Xing, No. 60, supra note Table A; Hai Feng, No. 55, supra note 39, pp. 13-29; Luo Bing, No. 62, supra note 39; “Zhonggong san zhong chuanhui juanji” (A special edition on the CCP third plenum), No 15 (January 1979), pp. 17-30; Luo Bing, “Fanshipai shi shi ji” (An account of the Whateverist Faction’s loss of power base), No. 16 (February 1979), pp. 5-8; Du Feng, “Wang Dongxing wei shi mo hui xiatai” (What caused the downfall of Wang Dongxing), No. 30 (April 1980), pp. 34-40; Luo Bing, “Yu Qiuli zhong yu xiaoqian” (Yu Qiuli's authorities are finally cut down). No. 33 (July 1980), pp. 7-9; Luo Bing, “Hu Yaobang shi li pengzhang yu Deng Hu tixi” (Expansion of Hu Yaobang’s power bases and the Deng-Hu system), No. 59 (September 1982), pp. 9-13; and Luo Bing, “Deng Xiaoping xiang junzhong zuo wang kaidao” (Deng Xiaoping is purging the military’s leftist leaders), no. 61 (November 1982), pp. 7-12.
CENTRAL SECRETARIAT

Restoration of the Central Secretariat at the Eleventh CC's Fifth Plenum is one of the most important institutional developments since the Third Plenum. It was abolished during the Cultural Revolution at the order of Mao. During 1956-66 when Deng was General Secretary, the Secretariat grew powerful enough for Mao to feel threatened by it. Many of its functions were then turned over to the CC General Office and the Central Cultural Revolution Group (Zhongyang Wenge Xiaozu) under the control of the Gang of Four.

Restoring the Secretariat was an important step toward re-institutionalizing the Party powers. The new Party Constitution stipulates that “[T]he Secretariat attends to the day-to-day work of the Central Committee under the direction of the Political Bureau and its Standing Committee” (Article 21). The constitutional delegation of authorities thus is general and brief, leaving considerable room for its expansion of activities. Since 1980 the Secretariat has done just that. These activities will be discussed below.

The Fifth Plenum elected eleven persons to the Secretariat, with Hu Yaobang as the General Secretary. Others elected were: Wan Li, Wang Renzhong, Song Renqiong, Fang Yi, Gu Mu, Yu Qiuli, Yang Dezhi, Hu Qiaomu, Yao Yilin, and Peng Chong. Xi Zhongxun was added to the roster at the Eleventh CC's Sixth Plenum (1981). The twelfth CC elected, in addition to Hu Yaobang, nine secretaries—Wan Li, Xi Zhongxun, Deng Liqun, Yang Yong, Yu Qiuli, Gu Mu, Chen Pixian, Hu Qili, and Yao Yilin, and two alternates (Qiao Shi and Hao Jianxiu). As Table C indicates, their average age was sixty-four, considerably younger and perhaps better educated (Deng Liqun and Hu Qili are reported to be graduates of Beijing University) than the Politburo members as a whole. Four of the previous secretaries—Wan, Song, Hu Qiaomu and Yang Dezhi—were promoted to the Politburo in 1982, partly as a result of reassigning their major areas of responsibility while making room for other upcoming confidants of Hu Yaobang. Wang Renzhong and Peng Chong were ousted from the secretariat perhaps because of the same reasons which accounted for their removal from the Politburo.

The additions of Deng Liqun, the late Yang Yong, Chen Pixian, Hu Qili, Qiao Shi and Hao Jianxiu to the roster are significant in at least two respects. They are relatively young (average sixty-one years of age) and better educated, thus fulfilling the current policy objective in recruiting younger cadres and leaders. They are known to be proteges of Deng Xiaoping, Hu Yaobang or Zhao Ziyang.
Their appointments were highlighted in a biographic sketch in Renmin Ribao (4/13/82, p. 3) and in Beijing Review (September 20, 1982, pp. 22-24). Hu Qili and Chen Pixian, who is the only provincial Party Secretary to be member of either the Politburo or the Central Secretariat, laid a foundation for their careers in the Communist Youth League (CYL) of which Hu Yaobang was the First Party Secretary in the 1950s. It will be only a matter of time before these new members of the Secretariat join the Politburo roster.

Table C

CENTRAL SECRETARIAT
(CCP 12th Party Congress)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>General Secretary:</th>
<th>67</th>
<th>Hunan</th>
<th>Politburo Standing Committee</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hu Yaobang</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Secretaries:</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wan Li</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>Shandong</td>
<td>Vice-Premier; Politburo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xi Zhongxun</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>Shaanxi</td>
<td>NPC Vice-Chairman; Politburo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deng Liqun*</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>Hunan</td>
<td>Head of CC Propaganda Department Director, Secretariat Research Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yang Yong*</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>Hunan</td>
<td>PLA Deputy Chief of General Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yu Quli</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>Jiangxi</td>
<td>Director, PLA General Political Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gu Mu</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>Shandong</td>
<td>State Councillor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chen Pixian*</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>Fujian</td>
<td>1st Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hu Qili*</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>Shaanxi</td>
<td>Hubei Party Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yao Yilin*</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>Anhui</td>
<td>Director, General Office, Central Committee</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alternates:</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Qiao Shi*</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>Zhejiang</td>
<td>Head of International Liaison Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hao Jianxiu*</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>Shandong</td>
<td>Minister of Textile Industries</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* New Members. Yang Yong has passed away. As of this writing his replacement is unknown.

Sources:

MILITARY LEADERS IN THE PARTY

Institutionally speaking, the PRC political system maintains three hierarchies of power structure—the Party, the PLA, and the government. Leading members of each hierarchy hold positions in the Politburo and in the Central Committee. Because of the CCP's experience in the protracted revolutionary wars prior to 1949, military commanders have had a substantial share in the membership of both the CC and Politburo. As Table D indicates, during 1956-1977, the percentage of active military professionals in both bodies fluctuated between 28.5 percent in the Tenth CC (1973) and 52.2 percent in the Eleventh CC Politburo (1977). In spite of the overall rise of military power during the peak period of the Cultural Revolution, an increase in their representation in both was only marginal. During these twenty-one years, military representation in the CC was quite steady, staying within a relatively narrow range of 30 percent to 44 percent. On the other hand, the percentage of military commanders who occupied the post of Provincial First Secretary shows a remarkable fluctuation, rising from seven percent in 1965 to 72 percent in 1971. Such a dramatic increase reflected the virtual collapse of the Party structure in the face of disruption by the Red Guards and the radicals. By 1977 the percentage illustrated a dramatic dive—indicating the trend since the 1971 Lin Biao affair—toward the revival of civilian control over the Party machinery at the provincial level.
Table D

Military Representation in Party Posts

A. National: 8th CC 11th plenum 9th CC 10th CC 11th CC 3rd Plenum 4th plenum 6th plenum 12th CC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Politburo:</th>
<th>Central Committee (Regular members)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>41.2% (7/17)</td>
<td>31% (30/97)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>40.0% (8/20)</td>
<td>(8/20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>47.6% (10/21)</td>
<td>44% (75/170)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>28.6% (6/21)</td>
<td>32% (63/195)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>52.2% (12/23)</td>
<td>30% (61/201)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>44.4% (12/27)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>42.9% (11/28)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>52.2% (12/23)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>37.5% (9/24)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>25.9% (7/27)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>19.5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B. Provincial First Secretaries:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Military</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources:

Figures for the 1956-1981 period are from Shin Chugoku Nenkan (New China Yearbook), Tokyo, Japan, 1982, pp. 103.
As the following chart indicates, since the Eleventh Party Congress, military representation in all three categories again entered a period of steady decline. In the first session, active military officers made up approximately only 19.5 percent (or 41) of the 210 CC full members, and 25.9 percent (or 7) of the twenty-seven Politburo members. By 1981 there were only two provincial First Party Secretaries of military orientation left.

There are several important reasons accounting for the decline of military influence in Party affairs:

1) Civilian Party-state cadres who were purged during the Cultural Revolution have been rehabilitated. By the end of 1980, for instance twenty-five of the twenty-nine provincial First Secretary posts were taken over by the rehabilitated cadres.41

2) The policy pursued by the Deng-Hu leadership has aimed at undermining the power bases of influential military commanders in an apparent effort to eliminate possible sources of challenge to the new Party authorities. Deng Xiaoping has effectively utilized his powers as Chief of General Staff and Vice-Chairman of the Military Commission (1977-1980). Later as Chairman of Military Commission (1981—) he rigorously

pushed for widespread change of commanders. Since 1979, ten of the eleven PLA Regional Commanders have been removed (only Li Desheng keeps his Shenyang post), while twenty-two of the twenty-eight Provincial Military District Commanders changed hands.\textsuperscript{42}

3) Deng's military modernization programs encounter fierce opposition from many military leaders. A crackdown against the dissidents is deemed necessary in order to implement these programs. According to one writer, his programs include: reasserting Party and government control over the military forces; restricting the PLA to an essentially military role; professionalizing military ranks and eliminating the overaged, unskilled and unqualified; and modernizing the defense only as a function of economic modernization as a whole.\textsuperscript{43} In addition, many PLA officers apparently resented cutbacks in the defense budget, the low priority given to national defense, the one-child campaign, and the rural policy to reorganize grassroot agricultural economy.\textsuperscript{44} Deng-Hu's determination to downgrade Mao and Maoism has also met with resistance.\textsuperscript{45} Opposition and resistance from the PLA officers necessitated the Party Center's retaliatory actions.

In the final analysis, those PLA officers who subscribe to the Party leadership and the current national policy measures are the only ones likely to survive in office. At this juncture it appears highly unlikely that the military leaders will contemplate a political comeback. Their territorial bases have been severely weakened, and their voices at the Party's decision-making level substantially curtailed.


\textsuperscript{45} Luo Bing, "The Ups and Downs," \textit{supra} note 39.
FUNCTIONAL SYSTEM OF THE POWER ELITES

The Twelfth Party Congress was orchestrated by Deng, Hu, Zhao, and Chen Yun. This was evident from the very beginning when Deng made the opening speech and Hu delivered a lengthy political report. Both emphasized basically the same themes, which had been evolving since the Third Plenum. The day before the Congress opened its sessions, Zhao Ziyang was elected Secretary General of the Congress by the thirty-one member Presidium Standing Committee; while Deng and Hu’s confidants—Hu Qiaomu, Xi Zhongxun, Yang Shangkun, Deng Liqun, and Hu Qili—were elected Vice-Secretary Generals. Deng’s other protege, Song Renqiong, who heads the CC Organization Department, served as Director of the Congress Membership Committee. In short, the Congress was a triumphant occasion for the rehabilitated power elite.

The fact that elderly leaders such as Ye Jianying did not retire to the CAC can be interpreted as a minor setback for Deng’s widely circulated policy to retire them. On the other hand, the presence of such senior statesmen as Ye, Chen Yun, Li Xiannian, Nie Rongzhan, Xu Xiangqian, and Deng Yingchao (Madame Zhou Enlai) in the Politburo at least adds some validity to the facade of unity of leadership. The truth of the matter is that none of them have been very active in functional responsibility. Their health is deteriorating. On the surface, Ye, Nie and Xu remain as Vice-Chairman of the Military Commission while Deng Yingchao and Chen Yun carry concurrent titles as NPC Vice-Chairman and CCDI First Secretary respectively. These titles and responsibilities are more honorific than substantive politically.

The exercise of political powers now rests with the Dengist oligarchy which consists of the following individuals:
| Party Bureaucracy: | Hu Yaobang | Politburo Standing Committee member and CC General Secretary |
| Song Renqiong | Politburo member and Head of the CC Organization Department |
| Wang Zhen | Politburo member and President of the Central Party School |
| Hu Qiaomu | Politburo member, Party Secretary, and top ideologist |
| Hu Qili | Party Secretary and Director of the CC General Office Center |
| Deng Liqun | Party Secretary and Head of the CC Propaganda Department |
| PLA: | Deng Xiaoping | Politburo Standing Committee member, Chairman of Military Commission and of the CAC; the only true generalist leader, and the only one with the title of chairman (Zhuxi). |
| Yang Shangkun | Politburo member, Permanent Vice-Chairman and Secretary General of Military Commission assisting Deng to control the Commission affairs |
| Yang Dezhi | Politburo member and Chief of General Staff |
| Qin Jiwei | Politburo alternate and Commander of the strategically critical Beijing Military Region |
| State Bureaucracy: | Zhao Ziyang | Politburo Standing Committee member and Premier |
| Wan Li | Politburo member, Party Secretary, Vice-Premier in charge of agricultural policy |
| Yao Yilin | Politburo alternate, Party Secretary, Vice-Premier, and Director of State Planning Commission |
| Fang Yi | Politburo member, State Councillor, and Director of State Scientific and Technological Commission |
| National People's Congress* | Peng Zhen | Politburo member and NPC ranking Vice Chairman (probably next Chairman) |
Career patterns of these people in recent years lend support to the view that they have formed a grand coalition, with a varying degree of interpersonal bonds. As a political group they appear to be firmly in control of the upper layers of PRC's institutional hierarchies. Outsiders can never fully comprehend the internal workings of this interlocking power network. Available information about it, drawn from published statements and career experiences of the network members, provide strong evidence for surmising that they are strong personalities with a broad policy consensus. Practically all of these men were purged during the Cultural Revolution. None of them have been cited as supporters of the Gang of Four, Lin Biao, or Hua; neither have they been known for being sympathetic with the Maoist radical policies. All of them have major functional jurisdiction while maintaining direct access to the highest decision-making organs. The only powerful figures who remain functionally active but not included in this interlocking network are Li Xiannian, Yu Qiuli and Li Desheng. As a senior statesmen, Li Xiannian remains influential without actual functional assignments. Yu is widely recognized as the leading figure of the Petroleum Clique. His appointment last fall to replace Wei Guoqing as Director of the PLA's General Political Department is something of a mystery to many observers, including this author. Li Desheng has continued to survive since the late 1960s, despite all the political odds against him, and has remained as the commanding officer of the strategic Shenyang Military Region. One can only speculate that he has probably struck a compromise with Deng. Even if this is true, it would be a folly to include him in the inner circle with Deng, Hu and Zhao.

Within this functional network of the Dengist power elite, those connected with the Party bureaucracy deserve more attention. As the Party moves ahead to reassert its authority and to rebuild its bureaucratic network of power, the Central Secretariat may grow fur-
ther in importance. Hu Yaobang is clearly using the Secretariat to establish his power base. Because he controls the Party's bureaucratic center, more of his trusted friends and ex-colleagues in the CYL may be given important future assignments in the provinces and cities.\textsuperscript{46}

\textbf{THE ESSENCE OF GROUP POLITICS}

Chinese politics at the levels of both policy-making and implementation have demonstrated a strong propensity toward group conflicts.\textsuperscript{47} Group tension permeated the political arena particularly when ideology and policy disputes intensified and institutional functions weakened. The virtual destruction of the Party and the partial paralysis of state institutions during the Cultural Revolution introduced a political process whereby rules of the game were constrained very little by the institutional norms and procedures. The question of group politics being \textit{sui generis} to the Chinese because of their social and cultural characteristics remains moot. Scholarly interest in group analysis of Chinese politics—be it in factions or cliques or other group phenomena—is strongly influenced by the historical pattern of Chinese political conflicts since 1958. One may also argue that the nature of PRC group politics has characteristics closely linked to its developmental stage. When institutional development becomes stronger and is eventually established, one suspects the level of informal group conflicts would wither, subside, or at least be replaced partially by more institutionally based group behaviors.

From 1978 to 1982, the PRC's institutional development continued to suffer from the legacy of the Cultural Revolution. Party rebuilding and the reform of state administration clearly had started at the national and provincial levels. But the efforts to achieve more efficient and differentiated institutional governing structures had been obstructed by Deng's opponents. Institutional development itself in fact became an issue in group conflicts.

\textsuperscript{46} Those who are being identified as sharing with Hu Yaobang the Chinese Youth League career backgrounds and are considered personally close to him include: Wu Xueqian (Foreign Minister), Xiang Nan (Fujian First Party Secretary), Hu Qili (Mayor of Tienjin), Feng Wenbin (Vice President of Central Party School), Liang Buting (Qinghai First Party Secretary), Hu Keshi (Associate Dean of National Academy of Sciences), Li Chang (Executive President, Presidium of National Academy of Sciences), and Yu Weijing (publisher of \textit{Beijing Daily}). See Luo Bing "Hu Yaobang shili" \textit{supra} note Table B.

\textsuperscript{47} In general, groups are not institutionalized organizations; neither do they have clear boundaries or internal rules which can be observed. Their importance varies in time, and fluctuates according to conflict arena.
In the period under study, one can identify at least three levels in the intensity of group conflict which corresponded to different areas of debate. The highest level involved ideological disputes over Mao and Maoism, which were intertwined with personal striving for power and influence. The second level was characterized by conflict over military modernization and the PLA’s role in politics; the third by policy differences regarding economic modernization—its overall thrust, developmental strategy, and sectoral rankings in priority. The intensity of conflict at each level varied, but it corresponded with the descending order of the three levels above. Every major participant in the national politics of that time conceivably possessed views on each of the issues of these three areas of conflict. Many of these men probably perceived the ultimate resolution of the conflict as being intimately linked to the progress of their own careers. As Michel Oksenberg would argue, the issues and choices these conflicts of view and interest pose “determine the parameters and the opportunities for the exercise of power.”

Available evidence indicates the existence of two principal adversary groups in each conflict arena. Participants only marginally involved in each arena would play supportive roles or simply choose to be cast as bystanders. The overriding factors which shaped the formation of political groups were most likely to include: ideological perspective, policy preference, position and power, common college ties in the past or present, a shared institutional base, and shared personal stakes during the Cultural Revolution. Combinations of any of these factors resulted in mutual reinforcement, providing a basis for grouping.

A. Conflicts over Mao, Maoism and Political Powers

Once the Gang of Four and their principal allies were arrested, PRC politics immediately turned to the fundamental issues of Mao and Maoism. Many leaders who owed their political fortunes to Mao during the Cultural Revolution had remained loyal to him and insisted that Mao’s deeds and thought be inequivocally followed. They included such prominent figures as Hua Guofeng, Wang Dongxing (Mao’s ex-bodyguard), Chen Xilian (Commander of Beijing Military Region), Wu De (Mayor of Beijing), Ji Dengkui and Chen Yonggui (both identified as leaders in agricultural field). The regime’s continuing adherence to Mao and Maoism would have le-

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48. Oksenberg, “The Chinese Political Spectrum,” supra note 2, p. 3. Oksenberg did not discuss these three levels of conflict. Rather, he was attempting to link Chinese politics with such major issues as China’s distinct path of development.
COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA

gitimized the powerful positions they then occupied. On the other hand, Deng Xiaoping, Hu Yaobang, Chen Yun, Yang Shangkun, Xi Zhongxun, and Yang Dezhi, for instance, followed the precept that Mao did make serious mistakes in his later life, and that canonizing his thought was unacceptable. Instead, they invented the slogan that “practice is the sole criterion to test truth.” Applying this yardstick, theory must be rested against reality; as reality changes, theory must be modified. The validity of Maoist theories must be continually scrutinized—not worshiped. In fact, all of these men had suffered immensely, largely because of the alleged mistakes made in the name of Mao and Maoism, particularly during the Cultural Revolution. Their return to active political life required some diminution of the authority of Mao Zedong.

The battle line was thus drawn between these two groups. In a broader sense, all political beneficiaries of the Cultural Revolution had good reason to side with Hua’s group. By the same token, all victims of the Cultural Revolution would have the natural inclination to back the Dengist position. But only a selective number of the elite strata were in the forefront of this tension-ridden confrontation. From the standpoint of Deng and his comrades-in-arms, the neo-Maoists who had played a part in their political misfortunes must be identified as the principal targets for political struggle. From the Third Plenum to the Fifth Plenum, the Dengist group thus focused its efforts on attacking the power bases of these neo-Maoists. Deng-Hu’s control over the central Party bureaucracy, the disbanding of Wang Dongxing’s “8341” Garrison Troop, the dismissals of Chen Xilian and Wu De from their Beijing posts, and the subsequent ousting of Wang, Chen, Wu, Ji, and Chen Yonggui from the Politburo effectively crippled the power bases of this group. The CC’s official reversal of past verdicts on the Tiananmen Incidents, the Peng Dehuai case, and later on the Liu Shaoqi case completely cleared the way for the Dengist group’s return to legitimacy and the tens of thousands of cadres implicated in these cases return to active political life and career responsibility.

B. Conflicts Over Military Modernization and the PLA’s Political Role

Broadly speaking, the conflicts over military modernization and the PLA’s political role affected a wide spectrum of the political and military elite. But the heart of these controversies had mainly involved conflict between some active military officers and the Deng-Hu leadership. It would be misleading to portray the military of-
Officers as a homogeneous group. They are not. In fact, some of the military officers, e.g., the late Yang Yong, Yang Dezhi, Yang Shangkun, Zhang Aiping (Defense Minister), and Qin Jiwei, belonged to the Deng-Hu camp. Many of Deng’s military opponents had supported his rehabilitation, opposed the radical excesses of the Gang of Four, and did not participate directly in the struggle between Deng and the “Whateverists.” Still, they remained loyal to Mao and Maoism. The Dengist military modernization plan was viewed as the antithesis of the Maoist military doctrine.

The Party’s decision to pursue modernization since the Third Plenum has thus brought about opposition even from those who had previously supported Deng. The PLA as a whole has not fared well in the priority list of the Four Modernizations. In fact from 1979 to 1981, the percentage of the military budget in relation to the total budget shrunk from 17.48 percent to 16.74 percent. As early as 1975, the Party had instructed the PLA to withdraw from the political arena, and to concentrate its efforts on defense and military training. The PLA’s share in the Party’s decision-making declined steadily since the Eleventh Party Congress. At the Twelfth Party Congress, the percentage of PLA members elected to the CC shrunk to 19.5 percent; and among the CC alternates, its share was a meager 15 percent. Members of the old guard with a weak orientation toward modern military warfare have been sent “upstairs” to occupy honorific positions in the Central Advisory Commission. Of the Commission’s 172 members, about one-third are from the military ranks. All five components of the PRC military modernization as enumerated by Thomas Robinson adversely affected the career interests of such old guard members. The programs included:

1. Component modernization: training, education, organization, command, control, communication;
2. Manpower modernization: size and composition of armed forces, age, structure of leadership, etc.;
3. Material component: physical supports to the armed forces, including steady flow of well-trained recruits, logistic base, and abilities to feed, house, and clothe the military;

4. Doctrinal modernization: in both strategy and tactics;

Deng's modernization plans have a practical effect on all of these five components. Thus conflicts over each component between Deng's reformist policies and the military diehards favoring a status quo became inevitable. For instance, the Dengists advocate better military education and modern warfare training for the officer corps. They want to trim the size of the four million-plus PLA, perhaps by as much as a 10 percent reduction in the next five years. A system of age limits for each rank-level of the military hierarchy has been gradually adopted in much the same way as those of the Party and state cadres. Forced retirements of the old guard may have reached 10-15 percent of the entire officer corps last year alone. While senior officers are being pensioned off fast, new recruits have been hampered by the rural economic policy and the one-child campaign. Soldiers' prestige, status, and privileges are suffering. The Party center is now exerting more control over the PLA personnel and propaganda policies. It is only logical that many officers are irritated; many perceived their vital interests being threatened seriously.

But the PLA objections to changing military doctrine and overall ideological thrust are also profound. Following the removal of the commanders implicated in the Lin Biao affair and the Gang of Four affair, supporters of Hua's leadership became the principal targets of purge. This process ended about the time of the Sixth Plenum. The Deng-Hu leadership then turned against many of its previous supporters, such as Wei Guoqing, Xu Shiyou, and their proteges. The PLA political department's "Mismanagement" of the Bai Hua case triggered another round of purges culminating in the 1982 dismissal of its Director, Wei Guoqing, his staff and five Regional Commanders. According to Leo Lee, initial reluctance of the Party to reprint the PLA article (in the People's Daily, for instance) criticizing Bai Hua's film-script, "Unrequited Love", signaled a rift...
between the Party and the military; this in turn “angered some high-
echelon generals who brought more pressure to bear on Hu
Yaobang.” Wei and his subordinates in the headquarters of the
PLA Political Department were reportedly harboring a neo-Maoist
line; so were the ex-Minister of Defense Geng Biao and Politburo
member Xu Shiyou. Wei and Xu are said to have provided Deng
with last-ditch protection in Guangdong when Deng was ousted in
1976-77.

C. Economic Modernization and the Conflict with the Petroleum
Clique

The third arena of group conflict has taken place in the field of
economic modernization. The policy rift appears to be polarized be­
tween the reformist group of Chen Yun, Zhao Ziyang, Wan Li, and
Yao Yilin, and the Petroleum Clique, centered on Yu Qiuli, Gu Mu,
Kang Shien and Song Zhenming. Sometimes Deng and Hu's posi­
tions are not clear-cut, but lean toward the reformists in general pol­
icy thrust.

In addition to Yu, Gu, Kang and Song, the Petroleum Clique
reportedly also included Tang Ke, Yang Yibang, and Lin Hujia. All of
them were associates of Yu Qiuli in the Petroleum Ministry
when he was Minister in the 1950s and early 1960s. Through the
years, they formed a close-knit college friendship. During the Cul­
tural Revolution they carried out Maoist economic policies which
stressed mass mobilization techniques in the production process.
Their political fortunes were at least partly related to the success of
the Daqing oil field. Overall they tended to favor centralization,
with emphasis on heavy industries and agricultural mechanization.
Jurgen Domes suggests that the Petroleum Clique greatly influenced
Hua's modernization concept. The Draft Outline of the Ten Year
Plan for the National Economy, which Hua presented to the first
session of the Fifth NPC (February 26-March 5, 1978), incorporated
many of the Petroleum Clique's ideas. As a group they were power­
ful in the State Council during Hua's premiership, particularly from
1977 to 1980. In fact, from 1978 to 1980 all three major Commiss­
ions of the State Council—State Planning, State Economics, and

56. Lee, Ibid., p. 102.
57. Tang Ke was Minister of Metallurgical Industry when he signed the agreement to
build the Bao Shan steel complex with the Japanese. Yang Yibang was Vice Minister of
Petroleum Ministry. Lin Hujia was Minister of Agriculture and Mayor of Tianjin and
Beijing.
State Capital Construction—were headed by Yu Qiuli, Kang Shien and Gu Mu respectively.

The return to power of Chen Yun and the rise of Zhao Ziyang immediately posed a challenge to the Petroleum Clique's hold of the State Council's economic and energy bureaucracies. By 1980, the Draft Outline's Capital Construction Program had run into serious trouble. The oil rig incident in Bohai Gulf on November 25, 1979, became a convenient issue for the attacking of the Petroleum Clique. In September 1980 at the third session of the Fifth NPC, Petroleum Minister Song Zhenming was fired, Vice Premier Yu Qiuli lost his position as Commissioner of the State Planning Commission, and Vice Premier Kang Shien was recorded as having received minor Party discipline. Minister Tang Ke's alleged mishandling of the Baoshan steel complex project encountered serious criticism within the high circle. Mayor Li Hujia of Beijing was also under heavy fire for bringing in pollution-causing heavy industrial plants to the city. He was later removed in early 1981.

Fundamentally, the debate over the priorities of China's economic modernization pitted the group of Zhao, Chen, Yao and Wan Li against the Petroleum Clique. The latter is said to have obtained Li Xiannian's backing. Li and the Petroleum Clique favored heavy industry, capital industry, structural centralization in economic administration, and mass mobilization. Chen and Zhao on the other hand were committed to market principles, light industry, consumerism, and drastic reform of the rural agricultural policy. But their differences went beyond economic policy and structure. There was apparent rivalry between these groups in controlling the State Council's economic planning machinery. Because Zhao, Chen, Yao and Wan Li had been strong political allies of Deng and Hu, they enjoyed considerable advantage in the rivalry. By 1980-81, the distribution of political power at the Party center had become such that the Zhao-Chen group replaced the Petroleum Clique in capturing the government economic planning and implementation bureaucracies.

But the policy dispute over economic development has not generated the same degree of political antagonism as in the two other areas of conflict. Yu Qiuli's appointment as Director of the PLA Political Department and continuing publicity accrued to Li Xian-

59. Chen Yun's return to power in December 1978 may have contributed considerably to the major shift of economic policy away from emphasis on high accumulation and heavy industry, and toward adoption of market mechanisms. See Oksenberg and Bush, supra note 13, p. 9.
nian's activities in the official media are clear evidence that the Petroleum Clique remains influential in the national politics.

In short, the group conflicts in PRC's elite politics manifested different levels of intensity, as the preceding analyses have indicated. There was obvious overlapping of group members; but in each conflict arena, at least two principal antagonistic groups can be identified. Whether these groups existed as factions, cliques, or in some other form can be the subject of endless debate. Whether these groups have been formed on the basis of one set or another of social, cultural, economic, and institutional characteristics is not particularly important in the context of this discussion. Given the fact that many group members have reached retirement age, the future of Chinese group politics is likely to change. When the principal adversaries are eliminated, what previously appeared to be internal differences may suddenly be seen as new factors in the escalation of group conflicts. Indeed, as Oksenberg and Bush have indicated, "Chen Yun, Deng Xiaoping, and their particular supporters may have important differences among themselves." In light of this, it would be extremely hazardous at this point to predict the likelihood of emerging power relationships—for instance, among Hu Yaobang, Zhao Ziyang, Yu Quli, Li Desheng, Yao Yilin, Yang Shangkun, Xi Zhongxun, Yang Dezhi, and Qin Jiwei—once Deng and Chen Yun pass away.

PARTY REBUILDING

The CCP's party rebuilding began in the early 1970s; it gathered momentum soon after the 3rd plenum was over. The guiding principle was to differentiate the Party from the government in their pursuit of structural and functional developments. Hu Yaobang's political report at the 12th Party Congress stressed the Party's principal role in exercising "political and ideological leadership in matters of principle and policy and in the selection, allocation, assessment and supervision of cadres." Five categories of people are excluded from leading posts in the Party and government administrative structures. They include those rising to prominence by "rebellion;" those seriously factionalist in their ideas; those indulging in beating, smashing, and looting; those opposing the CC's 3rd plenum line; and those seriously violating the law and discipline. The implications

60. Oksenberg and Bush, supra note 13, p. 10.
62. Ibid., p. 36.
are obvious. Cadres who acquired positions during the "rebellious and faction-ridden" period of the Cultural Revolution will be removed. Radicals opposing Deng-Hu's new Party line will be weeded out. Those who are suspected of engaging in disruptive and corrupt activities will be ousted to ensure party discipline. On the other hand, the Party cadre policy emphasizes the recruitment and promotion of those who are revolutionaryized (meaning those who have accepted the Deng-Hu policy lines), who are younger, and who possess specialized skills and higher educational level. In short, the policy is to rebuild a party with a group of cadres who are professionally competent, and devoted to the policy of modernization as interpreted by the Deng-Hu leadership. These newly-instituted criteria should be regarded as only necessary but not sufficient criteria for recruitment and promotion as applied in the Chinese political context. These criteria could at times become the convenient yardsticks for eliminating Deng-Hu's political opponents. Older cadres with little education or specialized skills and who are suspect because of their earlier support of the Gang of Four and the Whateverists will be purged under this formula.

Wholesale change and the reorientation of cadres has invited widespread resistance. Many feel threatened by the Party policy, although others are likely to benefit from it. A People's Daily editorial noted that only 58.7 percent of the 20 million cadres (including non-party members) possess a high school level education. About 11 million of them (55 percent) fall under the range of 36-55 years old, the principal age category set by the Party for recruiting or retaining cadres for the factory, college, county, municipality, and provincial levels. Insufficient education of the cadres poses a serious problem for the PRC's modernization drive. Of the 450,000 leading cadres above the level of vice magistrates, 310,000 or 69 percent are under 55 years old. In other words, about 31 percent of the leading cadres at this level or above are potential targets for weeding out. In general, as much as 45 percent of the second-echelon cadres may be targeted for substitution. The overall thrust of current cadre policy is the commitment to building more rigorous administrative teams. Speaking at the cadres conference on January 16, 1980, Deng Xiaoping emphasized that local, as well as county, leaders in the production and service units, including Party secretaries, must be recruited.

64. Song Renqiong, Hongqi, No. 407 (October 1, 1983), p. 12.
65. Renmin Ribao, February 23, 1983, p. 1. Figures were given by Song Renqiong at the Party Schools Work Conference which was convened on February 22.
from the age category between 36 and 44, and possess specialized knowledge. Those who had graduated from colleges during 1961-66 fit into this category and were particularly singled out for recruitment because of their ages and education backgrounds.

The problems associated with the cadres' inadequate background in education, skill, and age are all too real. The CCP faces yet another serious issue related to the Party members' ineptness and ideological flux. Of the current 39 million members, 40.6 percent reportedly had joined the Party during the Cultural Revolution, 45.4 percent before 1966, and 14 percent since 1976; and only 15.8 percent of all of them possess at least high school education. One Western reporter detected a pervasive leftist tendency among Party members and cadres, manifested in the form of "obstructive nihilism which seeks to avoid responsibility and put up passive resistance to the Deng leadership's reformist policies." Poor attitude and passive work style are now targeted for eradication in the Party's current rectification campaign, which has intensified since 1980. A more worrisome phenomenon is the widespread existence of the "Crisis of Three Faiths," meaning the loss of confidence in the Party, Socialism, and the Four Modernizations. Many Chinese youth, even the students of elite universities who have better career prospects, profess to have such an attitudinal tendency. A survey of Beijing University students in 1981 found that "crisis of faith" rated the most serious of three problems identified by the students. Another poll conducted at Fudan University, Shanghai, revealed that only thirty percent of the respondents retain strong faith in communism or socialism, while 25 percent believe in "nothing at all," a sign of nihilism and alienation, one scholar concludes.

Clearly there is no easy answer to these deep-seated problems. The Deng-Hu leadership apparently envisions that the success of modernization programs as well as of Party-rebuilding and the restoration of the Party powers are primary steps toward their ultimate solutions. During the period of 1978-83, this leadership appears to

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have mapped a strategy of Party-rebuilding that started at the very top, and which must gradually filter down to the grassroots.

The initial effort brought about confrontation between the Deng-Hu leadership and the Whateverists in late 1978 over the control of the Party's bureaucratic center. As discussed earlier in this article, this involved the struggle to gain control of the CC General Office, the Organization Department, the Propaganda Department, the Central Party School, and the Politburo. By the time the CC's 5th plenum was held in 1980, this initial phase had practically been completed. The Central Secretariat headed by Hu Yaobang was restored, and Hua's principal allies in the Politburo—Wang Dongxing, Wu De, Chen Xilian and Ji Dengkui—were ousted. Wholesale changes of the CC members, First Party Secretaries and Party Committees of the provinces and municipalities, which began at the 3rd plenum, picked up momentum following the 5th plenum. By April 1983, the work was virtually finished. Progress of personal changes appeared to have kept pace with the stages of Deng-Hu's success in capturing the Party center. At the 3rd plenum, nine rehabilitated cadres were added to the CC roster and twelve more at the 4th plenum. Of the 333 original CC members from the 11th Party Congress, only 137 or 33 percent survived in the 12th CC. Changes of provincial level First Party Secretaries began in 1979. By the end of 1980, 25 of the 29 First Secretaries were rehabilitated cadres. From November 1982 to April 1983, all provincial secretaries and/or Party committees were reorganized. Their members were reduced as part of a national campaign to trim the office holders. Intelligentsia—college professors, engineers, etc.—joined the roster in growing numbers. Average ages in the Party committees were approximately four to five years younger than before.

The Party reform is now also pursued through a more broadly based rectification campaign. Its concrete programs include establishing classes for regular job training (pei xun), rotating study (lun xun) on ideology, Party lines, and membership requirements, and part-time studies at night through correspondence and radio broadcast courses. Practices varied according to provinces and cities. Major purposes are to upgrade job skills and overall knowledge, and to foster ideological indoctrination of cadres and Party members. In October, 1982, a decision was made that henceforth the staff in the

71. The newly "elected" secretaries and committee members appear to be solidly behind the Deng-Hu leadership and their overall policies. See the Pro-PRC Shidai Bao (San Francisco), Editorial, May 7, 1983, p. 1.

central Party government bureaucracies would be required to un­
dergo 6 months of full-time re-education once every 3 years. All 
cadres in the central staff must achieve a level of educational and 
professional proficiency equivalent to high school graduates. Pro­
vincial Party schools have been restored; provincial Party organiza­
tions also offer a variety of educational and reorientation programs 
to improve the cadres' skills and professional knowledge.73 The CC 
Organization Department also dispatches teams to investigate Party 
work in the factory, in provincial and municipal units.74 Ad hoc 
programs in selective locations are set up to offer rotating studies. In 
1980 alone, 32 million Party members reportedly attended the rotat­
ing studies to become familiar with the 3rd plenum lines and the 
draft of proposed Party Constitution.75 Similar programs were re­
peated in 1981. In July-August, 1982, 449,000 Party members or 
68.8 percent of the total within the jurisdiction of Beijing Party or­
ganization participated in such programs.76 The remaining members 
were expected to follow suit in September. The CCP central autho­
rities are apparently ready to stage a nationwide membership rectifi­
cation campaign. In the process, a substantial number of Party 
members recruited during the Cultural Revolution are expected to 
be expelled.

Among all of these training or reorientation programs, those 
rung by the Party schools are considered to be most important insofar 
as upgrading the qualifications of cadres are concerned. Such pro­
grams in the Party schools serve a form of what Harry Harding de­
scribes as “regularized internal remedialism,” aimed at cadre indoctrination.77 The Central Party School, shut down in 1966, was 
re-opened in 1977. Within two years, most provincial Party schools 
were restored.

The Central Party School is run by Wang Zhen (President), 
Jiang Nanxiang (First Vice-President) and Feng Wenpin (Vice­
President). All three have close ties with the Deng-Hu leadership. 
From 1977 to 1982, 17,883 cadres attended the Party school pro­
grams. In Fall 1982, 1,300 cadres enrolled in the main campus of the school while an additional 3,600 central cadres studied in two branch campuses. The school offers rotating studies and classes for studying communist theories.

The rotating studies class offers a two year curriculum for leading cadres in provincial and prefecture governments. Entrance examinations are required, but applicants must possess college degrees and high school diplomas respectively. Both must have five years' work experience. Age limits are 45 for the provincial cadres and 40 for those from the prefecture. They study Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought (55 percent of study time), science, and specialized subjects.

The theory class is designed to turn out teachers for provincial Party schools and to train career Party ideologists in managing the propaganda organs above the county level. This is also a two-year curriculum. Possession of a college degree or an equivalent educational level plus three years of work experience is required for eligibility for the entrance examinations. The age limit is 35. In addition to the Central Party School, there are over 8,100 Party and other schools. During 1979-81, over 200,000 leading cadres at county level and above had received a variety of training through rotating studies. Hu Yaobang had said that a pervasive rectification aimed at the Party rank-and-file members will commence in the second half of 1983. In six years after the Party's rebuilding efforts began, the CCP has evidently recovered from its pre-1958 form. Without a doubt, the Party once again asserts itself as the true locus of political powers in the PRC regime.

The System in Transition

From the preceding analyses, the power transfer in the post-Mao era has evidently moved from the hands of Hua Guofeng, Ye Jianying, Wang Dongxing, and Li Xiannian to those of Deng Xiaoping, Hu Yaobang, Zhao Ziyang and Chen Yun, and was virtually complete by the 12th Party Congress. This process took about four years, from approximately mid-1978 to September 1982. Members of the power elite closely identified with the later years of Mao and

Maoism were discredited, and many were eliminated from active political life. Maoist ideological line, policies and institutions have been mostly modified or discarded. The value of Mao Zedong as a revolutionary charismatic leader in legitimizing the regime’s authorities has lost his validity. The transformation of China has clearly entered the post-mobilization phase. As one examines the new directions of policy and institutional developments, one is struck by the extent to which the PRC’s political system has been undergoing rapid change.

The following statements are conclusions based on the information utilized in this study.

1. Re-establishing institutionalized one-party rule: The CCP Party organization has been rebuilt. The process of reestablishing institutional hierarchies, norms and procedures had mostly been achieved by 1982. The Party center is now controlled by the rehabilitated senior cadres associated with the Deng-Hu group. Radical Hua and his close associates also have been edged out. Younger and better educated cadres with functional skills are also on the rise, particularly at the levels of provincial, municipal and county Party organs. Party powers become once again the dominant factor in the PRC’s political process. Power elites at the top form a functional system whereby each key leader in the Politburo and the Central Secretariat is given a functional area of responsibility. In spite of Deng’s overall dominant position, collective leadership has been adopted as operational rule. Conscious efforts are made to separate the Party from government—in structure, function and personnel. Available evidence, however, points to continuing fusion of membership and authorities between the two institutional spheres with the Party in commanding position. The assertion of powers by the CCP over other institutional domains is in fact growing.

2. In the wake of growing Party power and the stress on building a modern, professionalized military, the PLA’s political power has been severely curtailed. PLA top brass who refuse to accept the new political order are removed. Members of the old guard lacking knowledge, skill, and interest in modernizing the armed forces are being pensioned off. Military representation in the Party—the Politburo, the Central Committee, and provincial Party organs—has been scaled down considerably. Using the five Field Army systems

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83. Oksenberg and Bush’s study also conclude that the Party “would retain its monopoly of power and be revitalized in order to perform well its distinctive role”. See Oksenberg and Bush, supra note 13, p. 10.
or Military Regions for the purpose of establishing the PLA leader’s power bases may be a thing of the past. If the current trend persists, military intervention in the PRC politics may be gradually coming to an end.

3. The current party policy in stressing education, skill and over-all professional competence as criteria for promotion and recruitment could give rise to a “dual executive” system in administration and management.84 This would direct China’s leadership style toward the Soviet model. Increasingly, cadres must be both “red” and “expert”.

4. Formation of political groups, as evident since the mid-1970s, involve a multiplicity of factors. Group conflicts cut across power, ideological, and policy considerations. As far as the post-3rd plenum period is concerned, the most salient characteristics in group politics have been the struggles between the victims and beneficiaries of the Cultural Revolution. This suggests the conflict process entails a strong character of revenge politics. To be sure, within the Dengist grand coalition, there exists a variety of policy oriented groups. For the moment the stakes for their continuing unity remain high. Thus internal dissension may assert itself only if Deng passes away in the near future.

5. In the PRC political system, ideology—Maoist ideology in particular—as the basis for the regime’s legitimacy has severely eroded.85 The dictum of “Seek Truths and Facts” contributes immensely toward the process of ideological erosion. Such erosion interacts broadly with the evidently popular outcry over the “Crisis of Three Faiths.” Even students of the elite universities, such as Beida and Fudan, whose career prospects actually seem more promising than most others under the current recruitment policy have expressed the same sentiments. The PRC’s legitimacy, if indeed that needs to be justified, would probably depend more on the progress of the Four Modernizations. Democratic elections and permission for more spontaneous group activity would help; but at this stage of China’s political development, such expectations are premature. In view of the evolving overall political characteristics, the PRC system

would probably fit well in H. Gordon Skilling's description of a Consultative Authoritarianism, whereby the Party leadership monopolizes decisions and refuses to tolerate any spontaneous group activity.86

6. This study does not focus its analyses on the state institutional development. It should be pointed out, however, that institutional developments during the 1978-82 period also extended to the reform of state structures and personnel policy. Research results elsewhere and in the PRC's official reports indicate a continuing process of retrenchment in the government bureaucracy. By 1982 such a process appeared to be completed at the central government level. One writer recently suggested that the reformist objectives are to achieve structural differentiation and institutionalization in order to make governance more effective.87 Such institutional reforms have been initiated at the provincial and local government levels, but the overall process may be more time-consuming. By the end of 1982, for instance, only 69 of the nation's 2,000 counties and cities have established separate township governments in replacing the existing commune collective structures.88 The decision to reform the rural communes had been adopted four years earlier. Resistance to such institutional changes are evidently strong and widespread. Nonetheless, under the current leadership and policy direction, significant changes in institution will most likely continue.


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<td>Wang Zhen</td>
<td>王震</td>
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<td>Fang Yi</td>
<td>方毅</td>
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<td>邓小平</td>
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<td>Deng Yingchao</td>
<td>邓颖超</td>
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<td>Ye Jianying</td>
<td>叶剑英</td>
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<td>李先念</td>
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<td>Yang Shangkun</td>
<td>杨尚昆</td>
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<td>Yang Dezhi</td>
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Yao Yilin
Qin Jiwei
Chen Muhua

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Hu Yaobang

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Deng Liqun
Yang Yong*
Yu Qiuli
Gu Mu
Chen Pixian

* Dead.
Communist Party of China

Hu Qili
Yao Yilin

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