MEDIA-COVERAGE ON TAIWAN IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

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MEDIA-COVERAGE ON TAIWAN IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA —  
A COMPARISON BETWEEN PUBLIC AND INTERNAL MEDIA

Jörg-M. Rudolph*

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Appendix 1 Concordance of “Cankao Xiaoxi” version and “Daily Telegraph” original of “The Two Characters of

* M.A. in Sinology (Free University of Berlin). Mr. Rudolph was an editor and translator in Peking with a Chinese propaganda unit for foreign countries in 1980-1982. He is currently working on a doctoral dissertation entitled “The Challenge of Taiwan/History and Background of Peking’s Taiwan Policy, 1949-1983.”
Appendix 2 Cankao Ziliao, October 10, 1981 (afternoon edition) Our Nine-Point-Proposal Causes Heavy Attacks on the Taiwan Authorities
PREFACE

Since the present study is, as far as I know, the first analysis and comparison of the PRC's media coverage on Taiwan - between public and a special kind of internal material - it seems necessary to give a more or less personal explanation about how it came into being. All the more so, as the idea to do this research developed during my two-years employment in Peking from 1980 to 1982.

In June 1982, the Chinese government expelled an American sinologist who had been working in Peking as a teacher allegedly for having collected some so-called "neibu", i.e. internal material, on the PRC economy. Though the main reason for this rather rude action by Peking may not have been Miss Lisa Wichser's "spying around" but a warning to the American government not to go further in their rapprochement with the KMT on Taiwan, the case still shows Peking's sensitivity as far as the vast heap of "internal" material published daily, weekly and monthly is concerned, most of which is not even necessarily of value to foreign "secret agents".

Considering the mystery-mongering in every respect in Peking offices, any foreign scientist doing field research in China sooner or later finds himself confronted with the alternative of either becoming a little more curious or giving up all hope of finding out anything and content himself with copying the hollow words of the CPC's official papers. In view of these alternatives I dare to say that every serious scientist would decide for curiosity, a human as much as a scientific decision that has nothing to do with "spying". This, in any case, is my personal view.

The Communist government in Peking, of course, would be undoubtedly of a different opinion as far as the present study is concerned, all the more so as its findings are anything but proof or even a hint at Peking's seriousness (behind all the marvellously worded promises) with respect to Taiwan and the future life of the 18 million inhabitants of that small island 100 miles off China's east-coast. Yet, alas, the present author is the last to be held responsible for that!

During the seventies when the Western world indulged in the "China Fever", i.e. PRC fever, Taiwan was nearly forgotten. It was during those years, however, that the island definitely became a serious challenge to the legitimacy of the Communist rulers in Peking, a challenge that sooner or later will have to be cleared away by the CPC. If there is anything like an irony of history this certainly is one.
The "liberation of Taiwan", or "the re-unification of the motherland", as it is called today (words have changed but not the meaning), is one of the amazingly few constant political slogans proclaimed on the Chinese mainland for the last thirty-four years. It has survived, unhampered, all political movements, even the Cultural Revolution and its aftermaths. However, in CPC history there have been changes insofar as the Taiwan-issue is concerned, at least if we compare the party's stand after 1949 with that before 1943 when the Cairo Declaration claimed the island of Taiwan be returned to China after the defeat of the Japanese.

Though somewhat difficult to find, there is substantial proof that before 1943 the Chinese Communists not only did not regard Taiwan as a substantial question for their revolution, but even planned to grant independence to the island after the Communist victory. Since 1949, however, it has become a crude sacrilege for anyone (even a foreigner) to propose anything similar to that to Peking.

As substantial parts of the present study unwillingly have to address grave Peking-made distortions of facts about Taiwan, it seems appropriate to start with the most striking example of the issue that I have found so far.

In 1936, Mao Tse-tung was interviewed by the American journalist Edgar Snow. During this interview Mao touched also the question of Taiwan's future as follows:

Snow: Is it the immediate task of the Chinese people to regain all territories lost to Japanese imperialism, or only to drive Japan from north China, and all Chinese territory above the Great Wall?

Mao: It is the immediate task of China to regain all our lost territories, not merely to defend our sovereignty below the Great Wall. This means that Manchuria must be regained. We do not, however, include Korea, formerly a Chinese colony, but when we have re-established the independence of the lost territories of China, and if the Koreans wish to break away from the chains of Japanese imperialism, we will extend them our enthusiastic help in their struggle for independence. The same thing applies to Formosa. As for Inner Mongolia . . . we will struggle to drive Japan from there and help Inner Mongolia to establish an autonomous state.

This passage is quite famous and is known to many who work
on the PRC's "Taiwan-issue". What is probably not known is the fact that a re-translation of the respective Chinese version of the Mao-Snow interviews, published in Peking in 1979 (Mao Zedong 1936 Nian Tong Sinuo [Snow] De Tanhua, Peking, People's Press, 1979, p. 113), reads as follows:

Mao: It is the immediate task of China to regain all lost territories, not merely to defend our sovereignty below the Great Wall. This means that Manchuria must be regained. The same thing applies to Taiwan. As for Inner Mongolia . . . we will struggle to drive Japan from there and help Inner Mongolia to establish an autonomous state. If we have regained the lost territories of China, and if the Koreans wish to break away the chains of Japanese imperialism, we will extend them our enthusiastic help in their struggle for independence.

Thus, it appears: An Orwellian-like distortion of historical fact, carefully designed and carried out in one of the numerous offices of a Peking-based Ministry of Truth. Communist historiography always has to fit into the Party's present needs. In this respect there surely is no reason to get excited. If, however, the starting point of Peking's Taiwan policy is already a bare forgery, what are we to expect from the PRC's media coverage of Taiwan? I think that the present study will provide sufficient material to answer this question.

For assistance in publishing the German version of the present study I am especially indebted to Professor Dr. Kuo Heng-yü of the East Asian Institute (Ostasiatisches Seminar) of the Free University of Berlin for his support of the project. Furthermore, I want to thank Dr. Thomas Scharping of the Federal Institute for Eastern Science and International Studies (Bundesinstitut für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien), Cologne, for his efforts in the publication of the German version at his institute in December 1982.

Finally, I wish to express my deepest gratitude to my wife Ingrid for translating the manuscript into English, and for going over the passages I added and changed for the English edition.

Berlin (West) in May 1983

Jörg-M. Rudolph
1. SCOPE AND PURPOSE

Early on the morning of September 30, 1981, the eve of the PRC's National Day, the Central People's Broadcasting Station in Peking announced an "important report" to be issued at noon of the same day. The report was to be an interview with Ye Jianying, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, on the "Policy for the return of Taiwan to the motherland and peaceful re-unification."1

For more than thirty years now the Communist government in Peking has wanted to govern the island of Taiwan. Until the late 1970's in official terminology the aim was to "liberate" Taiwan by overthrowing the Chiang Kai-shek-"bandits." Yet times have changed and so have the terms: After the "Proclamation to the Compatriots of Taiwan" of January 1, 1979 and even more so since Ye Jianying's above statement, the formula now reads: "peaceful re-unification".

Are these new moderate words worth more than the paper they are written on, especially if one considers the fact that the CPC has as yet refused to make a statement declaring that it will never use force against Taiwan? From Peking's point of view the solution of the "Taiwan-issue" is entirely an internal affair of China, where no other country has a right to interfere - in other words, the "liberation" of Taiwan has not been accomplished yet and thus can be put on the agenda again at any time.2

The object of the present study is not to make an assessment of the seriousness of Peking's last Taiwan-proposal. Undertaking anything like that would be an idle task, for Ye Jianying's peaceful

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2. On Dec. 25, 1981 the Japanese "Sankei Shimbun" reported that its Peking-based correspondent had learned from an interview with Liao Chengzhi, Vice-Chairman of the National People's Congress and actually at the highest responsibility on the Taiwan-issue, that the Central Committee of the CPC had decided to give up the idea of a "liberation of Taiwan by the use of arms." As early as four years ago the Kuomintang had received a draft of the Nine-Point-Proposal. According to the Japanese correspondent, Liao had repeatedly mentioned contacts between the CPC and the KMT and is supposed to have said that "it does not conform with the facts to say there were no contacts." Liao Chengzhi, the report continues, was the first one to "clearly state" that the Party had "decided" to refrain from "armed liberation." In the same issue of the "Sankei Shimbun" we find a report from Taipei (Taipei in Wade-Giles, because the PRC now uses Pinyin system, so in this paper it will use Taipei) stating that the spokesman of the Executive Yuan, Song Jinyu, had responded to the news saying that Liao Chengzhi did not represent the CPC. He continued: "We will not again let the Communists take us in," and there were "no contacts" between the CPC and the Kuomintang.
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statement can be followed up by a harsh statement from the army’s supreme command at any time. The purpose of the study is rather to depict one important aspect of the Taiwan problem: What do the citizens of the PRC know about the Kuomintang island off their east coast? Or rather, what are they allowed to know; what are they supposed to know? How does Peking’s propaganda on the Taiwan-issue work inside the country?

On this question, too, Communist Propaganda works on different levels. First of all, there are the public media, newspapers, magazines, etc. that are sold in newsstands and book stores, the programs on TV and radio. They conform with the immediate day-to-day political purposes of the government. Based on the newspaper coverage during the last years and some recently published books on or dealing with Taiwan, the study will discuss this propaganda level.

In the second part, “Cankao Xiaoxi” - to be translated as “Reference-News” - will be presented. For analytical reasons it is not included in the first category of public media although actually a part of it. As a daily newspaper “Cankao Xiaoxi” (CX) publishes reprints of articles from foreign as well as Hong Kong and Taiwan newspapers, magazines, and press agencies, edited, translated and sometimes abbreviated by the Xinhua News Agency. The fact that “Cankao Xiaoxi” publishes foreign press reports without comments in a Communist country like China has won it a certain mysterious reputation abroad—the question whether the Chinese are allowed to read Western newspapers at all has been discussed widely. The fact that it is not on sale to the public has certainly added to its fame. Anyone who wants to subscribe to it has to show a “letter of recommendation” from his work unit—i.e. actually from his local CPC branch. Yet, a circulation of 7.5 million copies of the paper testifies that it is not very difficult to obtain. In fact, CX has double the circulation of the “Renmin Ribao” (People’s Daily), the official CPC newspaper - so that it is clearly the most widely read newspaper in mainland China today. Based on the CX news coverage on Taiwan in August 1981 the issue of whether this semi-public newspaper is working against the official propaganda of the PRC government will also be discussed.

In the third part a news bulletin of a different character will be studied. Though to some extent comparable with the two other news media presented above, it is something entirely distinct as far as its contents are concerned: “Cankao Ziliao” - “Reference Materials”. Here the object of investigation will also be the news on Taiwan published in August 1981.
Issued twice a day (morning and afternoon) with an average of 70 to 80 pages, the first two pages of "Cankao Ziliao" (CZ) are reserved for a table of contents consisting of separate headings for different topics: first the news of the day, then news items concerning "Asia/Oceania," "West Asia/Africa," "North America," "Views on China/Foreign Relations," "International Organizations/International Conferences," "Western Europe," "Soviet Union/Eastern Europe," "Taiwan/Hong Kong/Macao," "International Communist Movement," "Science and Technology," and "Sports." Like the CX, its little brother, the CZ publishes news from foreign press agencies and foreign as well as Hong Kong, Taiwan, etc. newsreports, editorials, and so on. On important issues Xinhua correspondents abroad also release summaries or short reports in this paper. A translation of one of the reports, concerning Taiwanese reactions to the "Nine-Point-Proposal", is given in the appendix.

Being a so-called "neibu", i.e. "internal" publication, the CZ is only available to people on a certain level of the official state bureaucracy, roughly from head officials upwards and those working in the few units under the Central Committee in Peking. It is devised as reference material for decision makers. It seems as if the control of the readership has been loosened lately. For instance, now teachers, too, have access to it - that is if they are willing to undergo a complicated application procedure and do not mind becoming politically conspicuous.

Another absolutely infallible sign of the exclusiveness of the CZ is the fact that it is printed in extremely big letters. This provides a hint of one of the great weaknesses of China's gerontocratic leadership: it has bad eyesight. The CZ owes its other name: "Big Cankao" to its big print.

2. THE PICTURE OF TAIWAN—AS PRESENTED IN THE PUBLIC MEDIA

On July 18, 1981, Deng Xiaoping said in an interview with Cha Liangyong, editor of the Hong Kong monthly, "Ming Pao":

After the sixth Plenary Session of the XI. Central Committee we have three big tasks to fulfill. First, on the international level, we have to continue our opposition against hegemonism and strive for the preservation of world peace. Secondly, we have to accomplish Taiwan's return to the motherland and fulfill the great task of the re-unification of the motherland. Thirdly, we have to carry out well the eco-
nomic construction. 3

Here, the most powerful leader of the PRC today ranks the Taiwan issue second after the preservation of world peace and opposition against hegemonism before the "Four Modernizations." In December of that year he repeated this order of tasks in an interview with Yugoslavian journalists.

When screening Chinese propaganda on how many words they use on news about Taiwan the island would certainly not rate among the first three topics. Taiwan is relatively scarcely dealt with by the newspapers and other media except for special occasions like Ye Jianying's statement. In asking for publications on Taiwan in mainland bookstores one will be shown few books, and then only a couple of old editions that have been on sale for ages.

Yet, it has not always been like that. A survey of newspaper articles of the 1950's and 1960's shows that there were bountiful numbers of reports on "exposures" of "atrocities" by the "Chiang-Clique" (or "bandits") committed against the "compatriots of Taiwan." Regularly, myriads of Taiwan reconnaissance planes were reported shot down by the "heroic PLA units" at the "frontline of Fujian." Other frequent topics were the "ever increasing decay" of Taiwan's economy and the "pauperization" of farmers and workers on the Kuomintang island.

In the course of the 1970s the news of Taiwan planes allegedly shot down and other reports on combat ceased. At the same time no more terrifying visions of life in Taiwan were published. Instead, mainlanders were confronted with news about "compatriots from Taiwan" who visited the PRC as members of sports teams or as prominent individuals. Although these compatriots did not directly come from Taiwan, but from the USA, Japan or other countries, they were enthusiastically welcomed by the media and their visit taken as proof for the "Taiwan compatriots" great love for the motherland.

Shortly after the opening of diplomatic relations between Peking and Washington and two weeks before the "Proclamation to the compatriots of Taiwan" the "People's Daily" of December 17, 1978 used the term "ruling clique" for the Kuomintang for the last time. Ever since Ye Jianying and CPC Chairman Hu Yaobang talked of "Jiang lao xiansheng"—Mr. Chiang Kai-shek—the term "Taiwan authorities" has had the official seal of approval.

Little wonder, the shift in Peking's propaganda was a process

3. 'Ming Pao' (monthly), No. 189, Hong Kong, 1981, p. 3.
that was not easy to carry out smoothly. The force of habit is a terrible one, as Lenin once said, and so we can trace down some relapses into the former propaganda patterns even after the official shift of 1979. On January 23, 1982, the “Fujian Daily”, for example, published a report on a “group sent to convey greetings and appreciation” to the “three front-line armies” in Fujian province on the occasion of the spring festival. Yet, according to the official terminology of that time there was no longer a “front-line” in Fujian province.

In December 1981, “Beijing Wanbao” (Peking Evening News) obviously made a grave mistake. On December 12, 1981 this widely read daily started to publish a serialized novel entitled “In Imminent Peril” (Qian Jun Yi Fa) which dealt with the atrocities committed by the KMT secret service in 1930 in Shanghai and the heroic struggle of the CPC against the KMT reactionaries. After three sequels, however, the “Peking Evening News” announced on December 15: “Respectfully informing the readers, publication of the serialized novel “In Imminent Peril” will be stopped from today.” It seems that the story did not fit into the relaxed propaganda atmosphere following Ye Jiangying’s Nine-Point-Proposal.

Another revealing and heretofore uncorrected mistake was made by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. In December 1981 the Academy published the “Who’s Who of Foreigners Coming to China in Modern Times” (Jindai Lai Hua Waiguo Renming Cidian). The foreword of the book is dated October 29, 1978, and it may be assumed that during the ensuing three years until publication some polishing had to be carried out. It seems, however, that the editors overlooked one entry that does not conform with present-day CPC policy towards the KMT issue: Claire Lee Chennault (1890-1958) is described as follows: “Actually he was the wirepuller of the Chiang bandits (sic!) roping in the US ‘China lobby’”. This sounds quite out of place in view of the fact that in 1980 Deng Xiaoping received Chennault’s widow, Anna, in Peking. On the other hand, the Academy editors described Edward Hunter, who wrote the book Brain-Washing in Red China: the Calculated Destruction of Men’s Mind (1951) and is obviously not a friend of the Chinese Communists, in neutral fashion without any political comment or judgment.

Anyway, the proclamation “We will liberate Taiwan by all means” that had been used for thirty years has been widely substituted by the more moderate formula of the “return of Taiwan into the arms of the motherland.” Some key words have changed - to
such a degree that many Chinese start grinning when they hear about "Mr. Chiang Kai-shek" - and they do not grin very often where politics are concerned.

True enough, the news coverage on Taiwan is not very elaborate, but this does not mean that there is no news at all. The question now is: What picture of Taiwan is being conveyed by the PRC propaganda on the mainland? What are the favorite topics in this respect?

(a) Books

Two books were published on Taiwan after the "Proclamation to the Taiwan compatriots" that dealt exclusively with the present social, economic and geographic conditions of the island. "Taiwan Today", a booklet of 112 pages, came out in 1979. In the "Introductory Note" we read the purpose of the book:

The present book . . . wants to give us furthermore an introduction to the use of new materials in the industrial and agricultural production of Taiwan, to the life of the people and other aspects and conditions in order to enable the reader to acquire a relatively correct understanding of the province of Taiwan that has been artificially isolated for thirty years. The book is worth being read by everybody.

No matter what this "relatively correct understanding" is supposed to be, according to the present author's experience during his two-year stay in the PRC it is a fact that those three aspects are the ones that the people of the mainland are most of all interested in, especially the "life of the people". The section of the book, "Problems of Taiwan's Economy," will be discussed as an example to illustrate our point. 4

"Generation by generation", the section starts, "the compatriots of all nationalities from Taiwan have worked industriously, . . . thereby continuously promoting and developing society and economy." For "the last few years" there has been "relatively rapid development" after earlier interference by colonialism and imperialism. One "very grave cause and condition" for this is, according to the author, its "dependency on foreign capital."

The last statement is the most pivotal of the whole section, for the author returns to it whenever he wants to relativize or negate any

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4. Li Zan, Jinri Taiwan (Taiwan Today), Peking 1979.
5. Ibid., p. 65-68.
of his observations on positive developments of the Taiwan economy.

One of the forms of foreign capital, he continues, is joint ventures (heying): "De facto, foreign capital controls very many branches of Taiwan's heavy industry"; foreign companies "can influence the life of the 17 million people"; "Taiwan has already become the assembly center for American, Japanese, and European companies"; admittedly Taiwan's trade with the USA shows "a relatively high surplus", "but" it is due to the export of goods produced with American capital. "That means", the author concludes, "that the advantages of Taiwan's trade surplus with America are also limited." Some examples for import restrictions of "capitalist states" are cited (for pineapple and bananas) by which "Taiwan's fruitgrowers were inflicted with huge losses." 

Finally, all the little reservations are combined in one major general criticism: Agricultural development is being "hampered" by the policy of the Taiwan authorities. As a consequence "Taiwan's agriculture, especially grain production has not only not developed but on the contrary dropped", a process continuing "without interruption for the last couple of years." Furthermore, "small-scale farming" "is not favorable for agricultural mechanization." The fact that when the book came out Taiwan's agriculture had already been mechanized by 70 percent is not stated.

The section on Taiwan's economic problems concludes with a proposal that Peking has in store for all of Taiwan's present and future problems:

When Taiwan and the motherland are re-united, the large amounts of petroleum can meet the demands of Taiwan and the products of Taiwan's industry and agriculture can be sold on the nearby market of the motherland. It would not be necessary to worry about a new capitalist world economic crisis or other influences and threats from world competition."
The section on Taiwan’s “Foreign Trade” follows the same patterns. After first having stated the trade volume, here, too, Taiwan’s “relatively great dependency” on capitalist countries and their crises is pointed out. According to the author this is true especially for the oil supply by which Taiwan’s industry and trade can be influenced directly because of the “turbulent situation in the Middle East.”

What can be seen here is that Peking’s presentation and argumentation with respect to Taiwan has changed visibly: Formerly offensive and uncompromising, Peking’s propaganda has become more cautious, more defensive. Compared with what the mainland reader had heard about Taiwan before, “Taiwan Today” provides some new facts and even figures that contradict totally what up to then had been officially propagated on the mainland about the Kuomintang island. Yet the promise in the introduction that the reader will acquire an “understanding” of the life of his “compatriots” is not kept. There are no figures on incomes and other facets of the life-style in Taiwan, something that the “compatriots on the mainland” would be really interested in, nor are there comparisons of statistics between Taiwan and the Motherland.

Because of the bizarre political situation in this part of Asia and in particular the relation between the CPC and the KMT in the last section of the booklet, “The hearts of the people longing to get back,” can quote a KMT campaign supporting its own argumentation that the population of Taiwan wants to return into the arms of the motherland.

One-and-a-half years after “Taiwan Today”, in October 1981, another book on Taiwan appeared: “Atlas of Taiwan Province” (Taiwan sheng dituce), published by the Cartographic Press and the “Broadcasting Division for Taiwan of the Central People’s Broadcasting Station.” The book is divided into two parts. The first part, comprising 69 pages, consists of a comprehensive variety of maps (starting with maps on history, population, resources and communications to maps of major cities); explanatory notes are included in the second part giving a survey of the island’s history, geology, geography, economy and tourist scenery spots.

At the end of the first section, entitled “A Short History of Taiwan,” we read:

14. Ibid., p. 64.
15. Ibid., p. 65.
16. Ibid., p. 86ff.
On August 15, 1945 Japan surrendered unconditionally and our country reestablished its sovereignty over Taiwan. On October 25 of the same year the Chinese government officially took over Taiwan.  

With these few words the authors wipe out the last thirty years of history - obviously in line with Hu Yaobang's speech on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the 1911 revolution when he addressed the KMT: "Let bygones be bygones!" It certainly is not by chance that on the 28 pages of the text in the atlas Taiwan is treated like any other province under Peking's jurisdiction, e.g. Sichuan. The final "Words of the editor" consequently continue along this line and culminate in the following remark:

If you take this 'Atlas of Taiwan Province' on your trip to Taiwan you can use it as a guide.

In the whole section the Kuomintang is not mentioned once, there is no criticism of the situation in Taiwan nor are there any reservations about it. The areas of economy, agriculture, industry and foreign trade are dealt with in a matter-of-fact way and without the usual grim criticism. While in "Taiwan Today," Taiwan's "dependency on the capitalist countries and their crises" was still stressed, the atlas talks about an "ever increasing dependency on [the] outside" when describing Taiwan's strategy of processing labor-intensive goods for export. As for the level of agricultural mechanization we read:

The number of agricultural machinery amounts to 300,000 units in the whole province, about 80 percent of the total area (is cultivated) mechanically.

In the section "foreign trade" no dependency at all is mentioned while the section on "Postal System and Telecommunication" reveals that there is one telephone per seven inhabitants - an exorbitant number for mainlanders.

This book, though still not conveying any substantial impressions of the life-style of the population in spite of its colored pictures of Taiwanese beauty spots, does mark a double change in the PRC. First of all, Peking, too, wants foreign capital to invest on the main-

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19. Taiwan sheng dituce, supra note 17, p. 11 (text).
land - thus it can no longer criticize Taiwan for doing the same. Second, it shows the shift in Peking's Taiwan propaganda.

It is hard to say if this trend will continue - as difficult to predict as whether the intention of "peaceful reunification" will hold. Possibly, Liao Chengzhi, vice chairman of the National People's Congress, who, for a long time, was engaged in propaganda first for the "liberation" and now for the "return" of Taiwan, wanted to slow down this kind of positivism. In an interview with the monthly "Liao Wang" in October 1981 he stated:

At present there are some confused views of people believing that Taiwan's economy has made tremendous progress. Actually when considering the average income per capita Shanghai has already come close to Taiwan. Taiwan is a small island . . . . It is mostly dependent on foreign capital. Basically, agriculture is not in order, is mostly dependent on sugar and bananas . . . . In the long run the processing and assembling industry is not reliable. Certainly the standard of living of the people in the mainland will in the future surpass that of Taiwan.22

On December 20, 1981 the "Peking Daily" continued on the propaganda line that Liao Chengzhi had started by quoting the Taiwanese professor Ma Bi, who had been editor of the monthly "Political Forum" (Zhengzhi Pinglun) in Taiwan and who, after his "return to the motherland," had visited the Peking steel-works:

In Taiwan I once visited the Taiwan steel-works. It cannot be compared with that of the capital [Peking]. The press will have to make good propaganda on the unbelievably developed technology of the capital steel-works so that the population of Taiwan know all about it.

One day later, on December 21, 1981, the CPC "People's Daily" published an article on the restrictive press policy of the KMT: "Let's talk about Taiwan's 'ban of papers' ":

Not only books, magazines and other publications are strictly under the control of the Taiwan authorities. The control is even more severe with newspapers that are read daily and therefore relatively influential. Since 1952 the Taiwan authorities have not allowed any new papers to be issued . . .

22. 'Liao Wang', No. 8/1981, p. 3; extracts of this interview can also be found in the English-language paper 'China Daily' of December 3, 1981.
No doubt PRC propaganda has never stopped criticizing the situation in Taiwan, it has only modified its criticism. One thing should be noted, however: In his statement Liao Chengzhi reacted to and opposed the view that is held by many people on the mainland in spite of all information blockades that living conditions in Taiwan are "better." Maybe his statement was a response to the "Taiwan-Fever" that was rampant in Peking at that time. Therefore the "Peking Daily" used a "voice from Taiwan" to prove that there is something on the mainland that is better than the corresponding facility on Taiwan while the "People's Daily," for the first time after months of silence, published a lengthy critical article on internal conditions in Taiwan.

(b) Press Reporting

Books on Taiwan are rare in the PRC and the two cited above are exceptions - there are not many others. But the press, especially the daily press, with its "great influence" according to the "People's Daily," carries more information on Taiwan.

The "Renmin Ribao" or "People's Daily," is the most important news medium in this respect. About once a week in 1980 and 1981 it published summaries of news items or short articles on economic and social conditions on the KMT island. In order to be able to compare the news coverage on Taiwan of this paper with the one of "Cankao Xiaoxi" and "Cankao Ziliao" the present author made a survey of the respective news items concentrating on the month of August 1981.

Besides being the quantitatively most elaborate source of information, the "People's Daily," as the official organ of the CPC, is also the most authoritative. In the month the present survey was done one third of page three was reserved for reports on Taiwan four separate times. Thus, Taiwan was formally dealt with exactly like any other Chinese province without any special headlines at the top of the page. Only by looking more closely will the reader discover differences.

Emotions of sadness about the separation of Taiwan from the motherland and the longing for re-unification were the prevailing themes of the "People's Daily" Taiwan coverage during August 1981. On August 9, for example, a letter allegedly written by a Taiwanese pilot who had been born on the mainland was published. Signing himself "Wei Gong" (for the common cause) the pilot deplored the fact that he could visit his "native country only on the map." It is certainly hard to prove that this letter had anything to do
With the landing of the Taiwanese pilot Huang Zhizheng on the mainland the day before, but whether intended or not, the timing was excellent.

On August 21, the "People's Daily" published an article on the painter Xi Jinde who had died in Taiwan on August 3. From this article we learn that he had been a great patriot. The day before he died he said on his deathbed: "I think so much of my relatives in my native province of Sichuan." Here for once the "Taiwan authorities" are praised for having taken good care of Xi Jinde. The KMT "Minister of Education" (quotation marks by "People's Daily," ) had visited him in the hospital and after his death there were laudatory articles in Taiwan newspapers. On August 28, we eventually find an anonymous article on the Taiwan page signed XXX and entitled: "Feelings of hate for having been separated for decades - great longing to see the relatives again." This is supposed to be a "letter to those at home" written by a "disabled soldier" of Taiwan who had "recently given it to someone who travelled to the mainland."

These more or less emotional articles on the people's desire for re-unification of China are the accessories for two other more directly practical-political reports: one, a summarized reprint of an article from 'Lianhe Bao' (United Daily) written by a professor of Taiwan University, "Establish unpolitical contacts with the mainland", the other a summary of a 'Tiantian Ribao' commentary from Hongkong entitled: "If trade with Eastern Europe then all the more with the mainland," written upon Taiwan's decision to take up trade with Eastern European countries.

The purpose of the above news coverage on Taiwan is obviously to prove that Peking's dogma holds that China's "re-unification" is on the one hand an "historical current that cannot be stopped," and on the other hand the "desire" of the "compatriots of Taiwan."

Proceeding to more specific news about Taiwan itself, e.g., its social and economic developments, we can classify them into two categories: news items published without comments, e.g., articles with topics like "Feeling the pulse in traditional Chinese medicine" and "its theoretical basis" or a short portrait of Zhou Taiying, a famous Taiwan woman soccer player. In this category we also find reports on newly discovered raw material deposits and on an exhi-

23. Quoted from Renmin Ribao (People's Daily), August 9, 1981.
bition of calligraphy and paintings in Taipei.  

Up to 1980 reports of this kind were not published at all on the mainland; the fact that they are appearing now is another sign of a certain change in Peking's Taiwan-propaganda. Why are they now presented to the mainland readership? Precisely because they are necessary to increase the credibility of the articles in the second category of news on Taiwan: reports on the social and economic conditions of Taiwan. By means of inconspicuous news items the mainland reader is made to believe that all news on Taiwan is objectively presented, that both good and bad aspects of the island are covered - even if articles on the latter are clearly the majority. The pattern is simple: Taiwan's economy is on the decline, its political system is characterized by arbitrary rule and suppression, social life by immorality and alienation.

On August 9, for instance, we find the following articles in the "People's Daily": "Increase of illegitimate births in Taiwan" becoming a "serious social problem" and "Taiwan [in the eighties] confronted with four fundamental problems" (shortage of energy and resources, world-wide recession, protectionism in world trade). On August 14 there appeared: "Problems of social welfare in Taipei" (money shortage, unequal distribution) and an article noting that the fact that the death of a member of the Legislative Council of Taiwan was only noticed after three days should be taken as proof of the poor inter-personal relationships in Taiwan. Other examples are: "Many Taiwan upper middle school graduates unemployed" and "Ruins of the 'Oceanic Academy' of Taiwan severely damaged", (i.e., poor conservation of historic relics).

On August 21, we read: "Soldiers and officers of the KMT army highly dissatisfied with the rule of the secret service"; soldiers who think of their "home on the mainland" are suppressed so that many young people rather mutilate themselves than join the army. Then there is an article based on a "Dongfang Ribao" report from Hong Kong: "The 'Rainbow-Society' - a secret agency of Taiwan in the USA". When investigating the death of Chen Wencheng, a Taiwanese mathematician, a "gigantic secret service organization" was traced to the USA. Founded two years earlier it surveyed university students and scientists. Another heading: "88 percent of the electrical wire produced in Taiwan does not meet standard requirements"; "Again price increases for postage, water, etc. in Taiwan"; "Holes in the ceiling of Zhonghua gymnasium in Taipei a handicap  

for sports competitions” and “Old Taiwan artist dies tragic death under car”. And finally on August 28: “The desolate state of the economy to be studied”; “New Taiwan Dollar devalued”; “Foreign trade banks in Taiwan: Usury in hidden form”; “Trade deficit 1981: 10.2 billion New Taiwan Dollars” and “Increase of tuition and other fees”.

Yet there is one view shared by both Kuomintang and CPC regardless of all other contradictions: They both adhere to the principle of China’s unity; to both Taiwan is a Chinese province. Referring to this common stand, Ye Jiangying said in his statement: “We hope that the Kuomintang authorities adhere to their view that there is only one China and oppose all conceptions of ‘two Chinas’, . . . .”28 In the “Proclamation to the Compatriots of Taiwan” this point, too, is stressed.

Therefore Peking pays close attention to any sign of erosion in the political system of the Kuomintang, however minimal. As the old stratum of Kuomintang leaders gradually dies out for purely biological reasons and gives way to a young generation that is not so closely connected with the mainland the danger of a modification or even the abolition of the above common principle looms ahead. Hence, Ye Jianying issued his Nine-Point-Proposal at a time when the old Kuomintang with Jiang Jingguo (Chiang Ching-kuo in Wade-Giles, the latter transliteration will be used hereinafter) as their representative was still in power, hoping that its response is more favorable than that of its eventual successors.

As matters stand today a one-sided declaration of independence of Taiwan which is the objective of an increasing force on the island would result in very strong reactions from Peking and create high tensions in the region, possibly even leading to a military solution of the problem by Peking. At least this is what the Hong Kong magazine “Zhongguo Ren” predicted in its June issue of 1980. How does the “People’s Daily” react to certain developments in Taiwan which might point into this direction?

On August 9 and—in a more detailed account—on August 28 the paper rendered a report on “Repeated disturbances in the Legislative Council of Taiwan” to have taken place on July 10 and 20. The “Kuomintang authorities were alarmed” and considered taking “party disciplinary measures.” On August 28 “People’s Daily” wrote:

On July 10 the Legislative Council of Taiwan began to

hold a closed session. A decision on the tax level for sweets was on schedule. On this problem the views of the old and new members of the Council differed: The old members were in favor of leaving the tax on sweets at 15 percent, while a number of members of the Kuomintang that eventually totalled twenty first demanded its abolition and later a tax decrease to 10 percent. An argument started between the two sides. Ni Wenya, 'chairman of the Legislative Council', insisted that a vote be held - as a result 32 representatives left the hall under protest so that the session was interrupted.

... On the morning of July 20 the 'Legislative Council' wanted - in accordance with the needs of the KMT authorities - to carry out the legislative procedure for the 'Draft of the law for marketing agricultural products' and wanted to open the session. Yet, more than 20 members of the council had not shown up... In order to arrive at the legally necessary quorum the chairman ordered... that other people should register for the missing members of the council - and declared the session open. An increasing number of representatives, however, accused those that had registered as substitutes and demanded that the 'chairman of the secretariat of the Legislative Council' be removed. As a result the session was postponed but the vote could still not take place as the number of people present was not sufficient.

The "People's Daily" continues by explaining that the Taiwan newspapers saw the cause for the conflict in the following: First of all, the old members of the Council had an unlimited term of office while the new ones had to stand for re-election every three years - a problem leading to much discontent on the side of the latter. Second, the new members felt "discriminated" against by the old ones and third, there were "ideological contradictions" between the new and the old members of the Council. The article concludes that the authorities are "highly alarmed" because of the "struggle" in the Council while the "Lianhe Bao" predicted an increase of such "conflicts" in the future.

When reading this report one can on the one hand sense the fear by which "People's Daily" is overcome when confronted with a representative political body where conflicts and arguments are fought out openly. On the other hand it is striking that the official organ of the CPC gives a detailed description of the event without proceeding
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to the core of the problem: What are the "ideological contradictions" between the new and the old members of the Council? What are the political ideas of the new representatives that are so different from those of the old? Instead, "People's Daily" conveys a vague impression of prevailing contradictions in a political body where arbitrariness is the rule.

Yet, Peking's terminology before the "Proclamation to the Compatriots of Taiwan" always talked of the "fascist suppression" by the KMT in such a context. Then, the terminology changed and the change in vocabulary was striking. For the first time on December 31, 1979 the new atmosphere was noticeable when "People's Daily" reported on the so-called "Gaoxiong Incident" that had taken place two weeks earlier in the south of Taiwan. The article was entitled: "Taiwan authorities are sending a great number of military police to suppress the masses" - a rather moderate statement from Peking's point of view.

Another aspect of Peking's Taiwan propaganda is revealed by the coverage of the above "Gaoxiong Incident." In its very first report on the incident "People's Daily" wrote on December 31, 1979:

After the incident had taken place the Taiwan authorities did everything they could - including the use of the media - to libel the Gaoxiong Incident as having been organized by the 'Movement for the Independence of Taiwan' . . . . Political observers here have pointed out that the Chinese government and the people on the mainland have always cared about their compatriots of Taiwan and sympathize with and support their patriotic strubble.

Cautiously, the "People's Daily" tried here to present the "Gaoxiong Incident" as some sort of "patriotic struggle" than was being suppressed by the KMT. Peking's long silence on the issue was, however, a sign of its own difficulty in assessing the objectives of the activists. At last, a Xinhua News Agency release at the end of April 1980 declared them to be "patriotic compatriots," fighting for democracy.29

Like the reports on the "Incidents in the Legislative Council," Peking's propaganda on the "Gaoxiong Incident" did not give details on the programmatic objectives of these forces. Peking even claims that the true reason for the streetfighting in Gaoxiong was the demonstrators' desire to do something for the re-unification of

China. Hence, Peking explicitly sided with the demonstrators. It is rather doubtful whether the latter would have asked for support from Peking even if they had been able to. The same applies to KMT support for mainland dissidents like Wei Jingsheng and others. (see below in the chapter on "Cankao Ziliao.") As far as Peking’s propaganda in the Gaoxiong case is concerned it is based on the fact that the forces involved are opposing the Kuomintang and not the CPC - thus suppression by Taipei can be "exposed" while Peking itself steers clear of trouble. With nothing but fair words the CPC is in the game for a united front with the "Compatriots of Taiwan."

(c) Conclusion

All things considered, the official image of Taiwan as presented by the public media in the PRC can so far be summarized as follows:

1) Considering the significance of the Taiwan issue for the CPC today, news coverage on Taiwan is amazingly meager;
2) Peking’s propaganda does all in its power to prevent the people on the mainland from getting a detailed picture of living conditions in Taiwan. The readers of public newspapers or magazines on the mainland never get to see any photographs of everyday life, etc. on Taiwan - rather contrary to the verbal assurance of Peking that it "cares" about the compatriots there.

An example for this can be found in the January 1982 issue of the internal monthly “Translating and Editing Reference” (Bianyi Cankao) published by the Foreign Languages Press in Peking. Although an internal magazine it has a rather wide circulation in intellectual circles. It publishes translations of interesting political, scientific, cultural articles and features of foreign press media. The translation work is done by the members of the different language sections of the Foreign Languages Press, to acquire a public reputation and to earn some extra money. In January 1982, the “Bianyi Cankao” published some black and white photographs showing scenes of everyday-life in Taiwan, for example, a street in Taipei. Unusual as this was, however, more important was the editor's note on the top of the page, saying that these photographs were "internal material," "not to be used for publication;"

3) Compared with the 1950s and 1960s a trend toward a
superficial objectivization of the picture of Taiwan can be observed in the last decade. Emotional statements of individuals emphasizing the “unity of China,” propaganda against unemployment in Taiwan, examples of disturbed inter-personal relationships and other “capitalist” features of Taiwan society have taken the place of the formerly published bloody stories of KMT atrocities. Only lately news on unpolitical items have found their way into Pecking’s most important propaganda medium, the “People’s Daily.”

4) While verbally supporting the forces opposing the Kuomintang, the official propaganda of Peking never analyzes or presents the programmatical basis for the increasing contradictions between the old Kuomintang and the newly emerging political forces on the island;

5) As the PRC public media do not offer a minimum of substantial information on Taiwan, not to speak of a discussion on how the reunification of China is to be handled practically, we may assume that either the CPC leadership does not have such a plan or—more likely—is not interested in discussing it publicly. As the eventual “re-unification” will to say the least be a very complicated process, Peking’s intentional silence in the matter should give ground to the greatest suspicion over the seemingly moderate proclamations to the “compatriots of Taiwan” issued by the Chinese Communists.

3. THE IMAGE OF TAIWAN AS PRESENTED IN ‘CANKAO XIAOXI’

Right on top of the cover page of “Cankao Xiaoxi” under the letter head there is the following remark: “Internal reading material, deposit carefully” (Neibu kanwu zhu yi baocun). Yet the circulation of the paper seems to contradict the editorial classification: at 7.5 million copies a day it has more than double the circulation of “People’s Daily.” “Cankao Xiaoxi” (CX) is the paper with the highest circulation not only in the PRC but world-wide. How can—under these circumstances—anything published in this paper remain “internal”? Probably not even those responsible in Peking will have the answer to this question.

Before an article appears in CX—as in the case of any other news media—it has to go through the process of censorship to be politically sterilized according to the principles of the “dictatorship
of the proletariat.” And yet there is something about CX that is different from other PRC papers, something that makes its readers believe that its reports are more realistic - a fact that CX editors exploit for their own propagandistic purposes: Eight out of ten CX reports taken from foreign news media comment positively on CPC policies. The other two articles deal with problems that are also discussed in the ordinary papers. According to the Hong Kong monthly, “Zheng Ming,” CX is one of Peking’s most important means of influencing developments in the country.30

In August 1981 CX published a total of 65 press items on Taiwan, starting with a news flash to a one-page feature entitled “Questions and solutions for this year’s foreign geography examination at the secondary schools” of Taiwan.31

The reprints appeared with an average delay of 22 days after their first release, the most current needing only two days and the others up to a couple of months. For analytical reasons it is necessary to categorize the different press items in order to arrive at an assessment of their value in terms of their topics. Three categories should suffice:

— Politics (including domestic and foreign politics and the situation in Taiwan);
— Economy (domestic and export economy)
— Miscellaneous

For the August 1981 issues of CX we get the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number of items</th>
<th>Delay of days (average)</th>
<th>Proportion of total news</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Politics</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economy</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

What we can see from the above table is that political news on Taiwan is the most current - delayed by an average of 9 days. News on economic questions on the other hand takes one-and-a-half months before it reaches CX readers.

Hence, it would be exaggerating to say that CX coverage on Taiwan is up-to-date. Besides, current coverage of political news

31. Cankao Xiaoxi, August 15, 1981, without indication of date or source of original publication.
during the month of August 1981 was due to a special event: on August 8, Huang Zhizheng, a KMT air force major, landed his F-5F plane in Fujian, an event covered by 13 of the 37 items in this category, i.e. 35 percent and all 13 items were published with very little delay, only three days after they had first been released.\(^\text{32}\)

(a) Politics

A big hit for Peking's propaganda, the defector Huang Zhizheng gave Taibei a hard nut to crack. And it actually did not score many points - due to its rather exasperated, contradictory and quite obviously unfounded efforts to produce an explanation (at least this was the impression one got when watching interviews with Huang on mainland TV). This was a landmark case for CX: How can one exploit the KMT's weakness for one's own propagandistic purposes? The answer: by proving Peking's truthfulness through external sources. Thus, on the one hand, CX reprints on the Huang case emphasized the value of his defection for Peking's propaganda ("great success", UPI of September 11)\(^\text{33}\) and the ultra-modern equipment of his plane.\(^\text{34}\) On the other hand, they commented on Peking's cool reaction for not playing up the affair.\(^\text{35}\) Taibei, however, was criticized for being implausible in its propaganda. Hence, e.g., a 'Dongfang Ribao' commentary of August 21 was published in CX entitled "Great Chaos in Taiwan's Propaganda" in which it was pointed out that those responsible in Taibei had quite recently failed on other occasions, too. The case of Chen Wencheng is an example. He was a mathematician who, according to Taibei authorities, died in an accident. Peking maintained that he was killed by the KMT police because he was engaged in political activities against the KMT in the USA.

Consequently, in CX coverage of this affair Peking is the clear winner, although only impartial sources are cited. To fully win this round Peking used a little trick, though. At a press conference with Huang in Peking, an aspect of the whole affair that is rather embarrassing for the PRC became evident. Huang was quoted as saying that he "did not meet any obstacles" while looking for a landing site in Fujian. CX of August 25 published an AP article and a UPI re-

\(^{32}\) Cankao Xiaoxi, August 23, 1981.
\(^{33}\) See ibid., August 13, 1981.
port on the press conference. With these few words Huang indicated the rather alarming state of the PRC's southern defence: in broad daylight an enemy airplane was able to enter mainland airspace, look around for a landing site and eventually land without the local PLA units even taking notice of it. This is all the more embarrassing since those units have nothing else to do but watch out that nothing of this sort happens. A grave fiasco indeed for the PLA—and a fact that certainly detracts from Peking's splendid victory. This is reason enough for CX to ignore this aspect or at least merely hint at it—revealing by this the limits of its own news coverage. This is especially clear if CX is compared with "Cankao Ziliao," a real internal paper, that is not available to the general public: in its morning edition of August 21, CZ printed not only a more detailed report of Huang's press conference on three-and-a-half pages—but also printed it four days earlier than the report in CX. CZ even reprinted an AP report of August 20 which it entitled: "Foreign military observers believe that the unnoticed entry of a plane of the Chiang-gang (sic!) into mainland airspace is unusual."

During the month of August 1981 CX published a total of ten articles on Taiwan's internal development with an average lag of twenty days. The following AP report from Washington, however, appeared only six days after its first release: "American newspapers believe that Chen Wencheng may have been killed by Taiwan police" (CX of August 12). As late as August 28 a "Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung" feature of July 3 got into CX: "Some Taiwanese believe the Kuomintang capable of secretly bargaining with Peking over the island."

A survey of sources and main titles on the topic follows:
### Media-Coverage On Taiwan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>CX Issue</th>
<th>Original Source and Date</th>
<th>Title/Contents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Aug 3</td>
<td>Zili Wanbao (Taiwan), Jul 15</td>
<td>Taiwanese think general corruption one of the serious phenomena</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Aug 3</td>
<td>Huang He (Taiwan), July, 1981</td>
<td>People embittered about the social atmosphere in Taiwan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Aug 3</td>
<td>Washington Post, Jul 28</td>
<td>Chen Wencheng's death leads to a wide-spread feeling of insecurity among the Taiwanese living in the USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Aug 12</td>
<td>UPI, Aug 4</td>
<td>Amnesty International demands release of the sentenced participants in the Gaoxiong Incident by the Taiwanese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Aug 12</td>
<td>AP, Aug 6</td>
<td>American paper believes that Chen Wencheng was killed by Taiwan police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Aug 12</td>
<td>Zhong Bao (Hongk.), Jul 27</td>
<td>Taiwan changes its terminology for the CPC (no longer “fei,” bandits)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Aug 12</td>
<td>Lianhe Bao (Taiw.), Jul 13</td>
<td>Quarrel in closed session of the Legislative Yuan, 20 representatives leave room under protest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Aug 14</td>
<td>Ming Pao (Hongk.), Jul 3</td>
<td>Taiwan's military strength</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Aug 28</td>
<td>Lianhe Bao (Taiw.), Aug 17</td>
<td>More car robberies every year (in Taiwan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Aug 28</td>
<td>Frankfurter Allg. Zeitung (West-Germany), Jul 3</td>
<td>Some Taiwanese believe the Kuomintang capable of secretly bargaining with Peking over the island</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At first glance the above table shows that most of the respective articles on Taiwan stress negative aspects of conditions on the island: corruption, embitterment, quarrel, robbery. Simply by quoting Taiwanese sources CX editors want to increase the credibility of this kind of selection.

If we look at the UPI report on the Amnesty International demand for the release of the participants of the Gaoxiong Incident one reads, for example, that the prisoners had been forced to confess under torture, and that the conditions in the prisons were degrading. Finally, the report quotes responsible Taiwanese as saying the Amnesty International report was an “interference in internal affairs of a state” which it was “not willing to tolerate.” This lengthy report, reprinted with a lag of only eight days, is of course published in CX to confirm to mainland readers that there is suppression under KMT rule. Yet it is an ambiguous affair for Peking: it certainly does not treat its own opponents more leniently. It does not shirk from admonishing foreign journalists for publishing reports of dissidents out
of mainland prisons, like Washington Post correspondent Weisskopf in November 1981 when he had published excerpts of a report that dissident Liu Qing had written in a labor camp.36

Symptomatic for Peking's Taiwan propaganda and the role of CX is the reprint of a “Frankfurter Allgemeine” feature of July 3: “West-German Correspondent Wagner on his impressions after his visit to Taiwan.” The introduction to the article by CX editors stated:

Kuomintang ‘personages’ admit ‘the small island's dependency' 'on the great powers'; Taiwan isolated in international bodies; politicians do not believe that Taiwan is able to reconquer the mainland; Reagan’s China policy watched with concern.”

As a matter of fact the above summary actually corresponded with the “Frankfurter Allgemeine” feature as it was presented by CX. However, decisive parts of the original were left out. CX editors abriged the article by about 50 percent and it is worthwhile looking at the missing phrases.

In the original version of the “Frankfurter Allgemeine” article we read:

In its rivalry with Peking Taipeh does have a trump-card, however, that will do for quite a while: its economic success which in the last ten years had made the island an attractive trade partner for an increasing number of industrial nations—even some Communist ones. During the last decade its gross national product increased by about ten percent per year, in 1980 by 6.6 percent; according to official statistics the average income amounts to 2,100 Dollars—the highest in Asia after Japan, Hong Kong, and Singapore. Unemployment is low. Inflation, however, was at 20 percent last year; and for the first time in many years Taiwan had a trade deficit in the first months of this year. High costs for energy . . . and wage increases lower the chances for labor-intensive Taiwanese products in world market competition.

True enough, Taibei's “trump card” against Peking, its “economic success,” and even the “wage increases” were reprinted by CX editors. The underlined passage in the above quotation, how-

36. For longer excerpts from the dissident's report see Qishi Niandai (The Seventies), Hong Kong, No. 10/1981.
ever, was completely omitted. Other phrases that are also missing deal with Taiwan's economic development being a "model for backward societies" (actually claimed by the PRC), data on the mainland airforce, and the correspondent's question as to why the KMT would not have Peking's "People's Daily" on sale in Taibei as the paper was so "boring" that readers would very soon put it aside or "learn something about the difficulties of the people on the other side of Taiwan Strait that have been overcome for quite a while in Taiwan;" furthermore the phrase: "Massacres of Taiwanese intellectuals committed by mainlanders in 1947 are not forgotten" - alluding to contradictions between mainland immigrants of 1949 and the native Taiwanese population.

It is not difficult to analyze why those passages have been left out: The fact that the average annual income in Taiwan amounts to 2,100 dollars and that unemployment is low could provoke the impression among mainland readers that it would be better if the mainland returned to the "arms of Taiwan" than vice versa. Another good reason for leaving out the above phrases is that other public PRC media publish only negative reports on Taiwan. CX could not possibly publish a totally different picture especially when taking into account its wide-spread circulation. If, for example, the "People's Daily" of August 14 reports: "Many Taiwanese higher middle school graduates unemployed," CX cannot say, two weeks later: "Unemployment is low." This would certainly not increase reader's trust in Peking's public media.

Therefore, CX editors cannot go further in their news coverage than the party paper - at least as far as news on the living standards of the "compatriots of Taiwan" are concerned, the taboo on the Chinese mainland. Therefore, in order to make foreign reports compatible with the official propaganda CX leaves out passages and phrases without indicating so. Thus an article can easily be adapted without leaving a trace that it had been edited.

(b) A Daily-Telegraph-Affair—made in China 1981

If it appears that the PRC's Taiwan coverage does not include statistical data on living conditions in Taiwan a CX reprint of November 29, 1981 seems to contradict that statement. CX editors gave to the "Daily Telegraph" report of November 11, 1981 the title: "A Peking based correspondent experienced life in Taiwan." Originally the heading read: "The Two Characters of China", subtitled "Graham Earnshaw, Peking correspondent, has a taste of life in Nationalist Taiwan." This alteration of the heading was not indicated by CX
editors; on the contrary, by printing it in quotation marks it looked as if it was the original title. It was indeed not.

As shown above for the “Frankfurter Allgemeine” reprint, CX editors introduced the “Daily Telegraph” reprint, too, by means of a three-line summary which read as follows:

The article makes a comparison between the mainland and Taiwan, and points out that the mainland did better than Taiwan in three respects. It says, conditions on the mainland are not as bad as Taiwan says, and the conditions on Taiwan are not as good as some people on the mainland think they are.

If, however, CX readers now expected a comparison between Taiwan and the mainland, they were deeply disappointed. Had the original “Daily Telegraph” report actually provided details on the living conditions of the PRC and Taiwan, the CX reprint did not. (For a detailed review see Appendix I.) Here we will limit ourselves to three aspects:

1) The original article had covered 250 lines—the CX reprint only 100. Without the slightest indicating CX editors shortened the original by 60 percent.
2) What did the censors leave out? Generally speaking, they left out everything that was negative for the PRC (and that has not been publicly admitted by the CPC) and everything that is positive for Taiwan. Instead they published everything that is negative for Taiwan: pollution, prostitution, women’s discrimination, and the incredibility of official KMT propaganda.

Erased was, for instance, the following statement:

Modern Chinese history has been in some ways like an elaborate experiment to test which system is more efficient, socialism or capitalism.

Of course, it would be a sacrilege for Communist propaganda to admit or even to consider that there is anything superior to the socialist system, hence, the heretic phrase is deleted.

Another example:
The 17 million Chinese on Taiwan have almost everything the one billion Chinese on the mainland want - reasonable housing, high wages, televisions, nice clothes, no rationing, no political campaigns, and the freedom to choose their own jobs and where they wish to live. The Communist
mainland, meanwhile, is still struggling to provide many of the basic necessities of life.

Surely, this must be one of the "comparisons" that was promised by CX editors. However, they must have decided that this statement did not fit into Peking's propaganda picture, as many others of Earnshaw's statements. Only 10 out of 89 lines of the first original "Daily Telegraph" column were reprinted by CX. The CX version started with the following quotation:

For 32 years, China has been a divided country, with the mainland and Taiwan developing their drastically different systems in almost laboratory-like isolation," immediately followed by:

The Nationalist party swears that it will one day lead the faithful back to the mainland in victory, but few people on Taiwan still believe it" ("lead the faithful" is not translated).

The information left out between the two paragraphs is substantial: Mr. Earnshaw wrote about a "KMT of today" that "is different from that one which lost the civil war in the 1940's," a party that since 1949 has "presided over one of the true economic miracles of the post-war era."

Instead, CX reprinted Mr. Earnshaw's statement about the lack of faith on Taiwan in the KMT's plans to recover the mainland. It left out, however, what followed:

The Communist party still claims it is leading China towards a socialist utopia. But once again [as in the case of the KMT] few among the disillusioned masses still believe it is possible."

We could go on like that for a while still, but suggest that interested readers check Appendix I for more details. Instead, let us move on to the third aspect: intentionally incorrect translations.

It seems that for CX editors some of the reprinted paragraphs, though generally in line with and of use for Peking's propaganda, still have to be "polished"—i.e., translated incorrectly.

When Mr. Earnshaw, for instance, describes air-pollution in Taipei caused by "thousands of motorcycles," he continues that this "is a warning that progress has its drawbacks." Progress, in connection with the KMT-island, is unacceptable for the CPC. Air-pollution, however, in connection with Taiwan, is always welcome. The
solution: CX editors transform “progress” into “malpractice”, “abuse” (biduan).

In comparison to the Taiwanese motorcycles the “Daily Telegraph” report mentioned the bicycles on the mainland which are described as “a more primitive form of transport.” CX altered “primitive” to read “simple”, “uncomplicated” (jiandan). When Earnshaw talks about the prospects of solutions for the PRC’s “pressing economic problems”, he cautiously predicts they will come into effect “over the next couple of decades.” CX editors know better: they change it to “20 years” (ershi nian), which fits perfectly into the official propaganda pattern. Last but not least, where the report states that “in almost everything of course the average person on Taiwan is better off than his cousin on the mainland” CX editors changed “in almost everything” into “in some respects” (yixie fangmian), thus mitigating the statement.

When talking about intentionally incorrect translations we can refer once more to the “Frankfurter Allgemeine” article mentioned above to illustrate. The original German title read: “Mancher Taiwanese traut der Kuomintang zu, insgeheim mit Peking um die Insel zu feilschen.” The English translation would be: “Some Taiwanese believe the Kuomintang capable of secretly bargaining with Peking over the island.” The expression in question is the German “traut . . . zu”, in English “to believe . . . capable of.” CX editors, however, translated the form into “zhiwang.” According to A Chinese-English Dictionary, Peking 1978, “zhiwang” means “to look to”, “to count on”, or even “to hope.” If the CX title were to be retranslated into English it would read: “Some Taiwanese hope the Kuomintang is bargaining with Peking over the island.”

There is enough reason to believe that this incorrect translation was done intentionally because the original title implies that there are at least “some people” in Taiwan who do not want the KMT to talk with Peking. That, however, is the exact opposite of Peking’s propagandistic claims that the people of Taiwan “long for the reunification of the motherland.”

Without going further into details on the “Daily Telegraph” reprint in CX we can draw at least two conclusions:

1) At the end of November 1981, i.e. two months after the proclamation of the Nine-Point-Proposal that sounds so liberal, Peking is still not in the least willing to let the people on mainland China know anything relevant or substantial about life on the island of Taiwan. On the contrary,
Peking's propaganda aims at misleading opinions by means of incorrect citations of foreign press reports. 

2) It seems that the reason why CX is classified as "internal material" lies in the fact that it is to be kept safe from foreigners, especially from foreign correspondents and diplomats in Peking. What if, for instance, Earnshaw would be able to read the garbled version of his "Daily Telegraph" report? The result would be embarrassment for Peking to say the least. Another possible reason for keeping CX from the eyes of foreigners could be the deliberate reprint of international copyright-material - without any compensation whatsoever.

(c) Taiwan's Foreign Relations

Also included in CX news coverage in the "politics" category is news on Taiwan's international relations. Actually, from Peking's point of view, Taiwan is not supposed to have any international relations at all. As they do exist, however, they are a controversial point between the CPC and KMT. As matters stand today, Taibei is, at least politically, on the defensive on this question. All the more the rare successes are celebrated. Meanwhile Peking holds the respective third party involved in such relations responsible, criticizes it, protests, and threatens to degrade diplomatic relations with it where they exist, or even does so (as in the case of the Netherlands).

Each success for Taibei means a failure for Peking and vice versa. CX news coverage on this question is shown in the following table:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>CX Issue</th>
<th>Original Source and Date</th>
<th>Title/Contents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Aug 2</td>
<td>ZYPA¹, Jul 29</td>
<td>Anna Chennault (Chen Xiangmei) leaves Hong Kong for Taiwan to participate at the conference of the &quot;World League Against Communism.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Aug 3</td>
<td>ZYPA¹, Jul 31</td>
<td>Taiwan authorities emphasize their point of view in the question of their sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Aug 3</td>
<td>ZYPA¹, Jul 31</td>
<td>Taiwan authorities spokesman accuses West of selling arms to Peking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Aug 20</td>
<td>Zhongyang Ribao (Taiwan), Aug 14</td>
<td>Haiti to establish embassy in Taipei</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Aug 20</td>
<td>Zhongguo Ribao (Taiwan), Aug 16</td>
<td>Diplomatic relations established between Taiwan and San Vincente</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Aug 20</td>
<td>CX report, no foreign source given</td>
<td>Australian Chamber of Commerce to open office for industry and trade in Taipei</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Aug 24</td>
<td>AFP, Aug 22</td>
<td>Chairman of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee holds press conference in Taipei</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Aug 24</td>
<td>Reuter, Aug 22</td>
<td>Reagan administration considers selling FX planes to Taiwan (news flash)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Aug 25</td>
<td>Zhongguo Shibao (Taiwan), Aug 16</td>
<td>General He Yingqin for closer relations between Taiwan and India</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹Central News Agency of Taiwan (Zhongyang Press Agency)

 Appearing on the average only four days after their original publication CX news on Taiwan in the above table is by far the most up-to-date. When taking a closer look we see why: reports of this kind have to be published immediately, or not at all.

 Except for items No. 2 and 3 the reports of the above survey deal with developments that run counter to Peking's Taiwan policy. This is especially true for American arms sales to Taiwan (items No. 7 and 8). In one of the reports the Chairman of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee declared at a press conference in Taipei that he supported sales of modern equipment to Taiwan. He also did not fail to call Taiwan the "Republic of China" and Chiang Ching-kuo its "President." He continued that he believed that decisions on the question of arms sales would be made in early 1982 and added that in "relations between the USA and the PRC" the PRC had no "power of veto." Right below this report we find a Reuter news flash: "Reagan Administration considers selling FX planes to Taiwan."
Unlike “People’s Daily,” where we find only very outstanding American views in favor of arms sales (or commentaries from Xinhua News Agency), CX readers also get information on inner-American discussions of this question as well as commentaries from Taiwan.

Therefore, CX news coverage on this topic is much more elaborate and substantial than that of other mainland press media. This does, however, apply not only to the question of arms sales to Taiwan or other questions of international relations—but can also be found in the case of Huang Zhizheng. It is—aside from Taiwanese affairs—also true for all day-to-day world developments and events: e.g., the assassination of Egyptian President Sadat, the declaration of martial law in Poland, etc. Certainly, CX’s high circulation is due to the way it unapologetically publishes foreign news reports: the more objective the less the PRC is involved.

The following three CX reports do not fall within any of the above categories but will, for the sake of completeness be treated as political items: “Biography of Chiang Ching-kuo published,”37 “Chiang Ching-kuo underwent operation on his left eye,”38 and “Taiwan holds ‘Conference on mainland problems’ in Tokyo.”39

(d) Economy

In the “economy” category, in August 1981 14 reports appeared with an average lag of 45 days. However, if one disregards three reports that were reprinted extremely late, this lag drops to three weeks, a little more than that for political reports.

The following contains a survey on the reports in this category:

### Contemporary Asian Studies Series

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>CX Issue</th>
<th>Original Source and Date</th>
<th>Title/Contents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Aug 1</td>
<td>Christian Science Monitor (USA), Apr 30</td>
<td>Taiwan’s “Export-Processing-Zone” in Gaoxiong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Aug 7</td>
<td>ZYPA¹, Aug 3</td>
<td>Europe starts competing with USA over the Taiwanese market</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Aug 12</td>
<td>Zhongguo Shibao (Taiwan), Aug 2</td>
<td>Six measures by which Taiwan wants to deal with its present foreign trade difficulties (news flash)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Aug 12</td>
<td>Jingji Ribao (Taiwan), Aug 2</td>
<td>Ten big Japanese trading companies buy 250 million US dollars worth of goods in Taiwan in the first half of 1981. (News flash)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Aug 12</td>
<td>ZYPA¹, Jul 30</td>
<td>Taiwan-USA trade volume reaches 5.9 billion US dollars in the first half of 1981. (News flash)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Aug 12</td>
<td>Jingji Ribao (Taiwan), Aug 1</td>
<td>Taiwan to hold discussions on trade and industry in five European countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Aug 22</td>
<td>Asia Trade (Hongk.), 8/81</td>
<td>Asia’s ten most “promising” ports (among them Taizhong)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Aug 24</td>
<td>Zhongyang Ribao (Taiwan), March 5, 6</td>
<td>Jiang Shuojie, Director of the Economic Institute of Taiwan on the course to be taken in economic policy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Aug 25</td>
<td>Jingji Ribao (Taiwan), Aug 14</td>
<td>Economic relations between Taiwan and India may be upgraded.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Aug 25</td>
<td>Zili Wanbao (Taiwan), Mar 10</td>
<td>Commentary on Jiang Shuojie (cf. item No. 8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Aug 27</td>
<td>Zhongguo Shibao (Taiwan), Aug 14</td>
<td>Increasing conflicts (in Taiwan) between labor and capital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Aug 27</td>
<td>Gongshang Shibao (Taiwan), Aug 1</td>
<td>No boom of Taiwan’s economy expected for the next three months. (Study of the Taiwanese Society for Economical Construction - Jingjian hui)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Aug 27</td>
<td>Taiwan Shibao, Aug 12</td>
<td>Taiwan’s economy in depression - authorities at a loss (title by CX)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Aug 28</td>
<td>Zhongyang Ribao (Taiwan), Aug 13</td>
<td>Background and results of the devaluation of the New Taiwan Dollar</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹Central News Agency of Taiwan (Zhongyang News Agency)

At first glance the above survey seems to show quite a balanced coverage of Taiwan’s economy: its problems as well as its achievements.

Probably the most interesting report for CX readers and also the most positive one in the above survey is a “Christian Science Monitor” report on “Taiwan’s Export-Processing-Zone in Gaoxiong” (item No. 1) pointing out the benefits of such facilities for Taiwan: advanced technologies were introduced and export products tagged “Made in Taiwan” increased the country’s reputation on the world market. Because of its Export-Processing-Zone (EPZ) Gaoxiong
Media-Coverage on Taiwan

held rank ten among the world's biggest ports. Besides providing more data on the EPZ the report also quotes a "World Bank expert" as saying: "Countries where EPZ's are employed can very quickly enter the 20th century." The article continues: "Since 1973, the average income in this area has increased by about one third, compelling labor-intensive companies to become capital-intensive and increase automation and workers' training." EPZ also had positive influences on supplying industries.

By the introduction of an Export-Processing-Zone Taiwan has already completed what according to PRC plans is to be the result of the Special Economic Zones (Jingji tequ) in Shenzhen, Swatow, and Amoy. Officially propagated since 1980, they are a form of cooperation with foreign private capital investors.

Items No. 2, 4, 5, 6, and 9 in the above survey report positively on Taiwan's economy or reveal what those responsible in Taipei think about the island's future foreign trade relations. Item No. 2 was first published in a US Trade Ministry magazine and then reprinted by the Taiwanese News Agency. According to the article Taipei was consciously promoting competition between the USA and Europe over the Taiwan market in order to prevent possible trade restrictions against products from the island and to show to the European governments that improved political relations with Taipei pay off economically. According to report No. 4 US-Taiwan trade increased by 8.6 percent in the first half of 1981. Finally, report No. 6 shows how Taiwan promotes publicity for its economic advantages abroad: Starting in September 1981 in Frankfurt, West Germany, panels on Taiwan trade and foreign investment were planned.

Report No. 9 deals with a rather delicate question for the PRC: India's attempt to play - to some extent- the "Taiwan card" which became obvious on October 10, 1981, Taiwan's National Day, when 205 members of the Indian parliament sent a message of congratulation to Chiang Ching-kuo, declaring: "For the sake of promoting peace in the world and in a free Asia and for the sake of security and prosperity we sincerely hope that the friendship between our two peoples and republics will continue forever and become stronger in the years to come." In the CX reprint of the "Jingji Ribao" article we read that although official relations between Taiwan and India did not exist opportunities for cooperation were increasing. "Since the deterioration of India's relations with the bandits" [Peking], exchange with Taiwan had increased but official trade missions had

40. AFP from New Delhi, October 10, 1981.
not yet been established. In this CX edition we also find an August 16 report from "Zhongguo Shibao" of Taiwan stating that on the occasion of the 34th anniversary of India's independence KMT general He Yingqin had advocated closer relations between Taiwan and India as well as the establishment of official relations. A trade mission of India was to open in Taiwan by the end of the year.

The other CX reprints on Taiwan's economy deal with its present economic problems: Jiang Shuojie's speech (item No. 8) and the "Zili Wanbao" commentary are part of a public debate on the most efficient policy for keeping inflation low.

By and large, CX news and commentaries on Taiwan's general economic situation seem to be much more balanced and inconspicuous than those on politics. For the time being, Peking is obviously much more relaxed in admitting that others are more advanced economically (not superior, though). Hence, propaganda on the horrible effects of capitalist society in general and that of Taiwan in particular that still are part of Peking's daily press output serve as necessary counterpoints to the meanwhile admittedly higher standards of living in those defamed countries. On the other hand, reports like the one on Taiwan's EPZ in Gaoxiong may serve as a kind of teaching material for developments on the mainland.

(e) Miscellaneous

As to the "Miscellaneous" category interpretive patterns cannot be found. And it would certainly be overinterpretive to look for a propagandist scheme behind every single CX report.

For the sake of completeness the following table gives a survey on this last category:
MEDIA-COVERAGE ON TAIWAN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>CX Issue</th>
<th>Original Source and Date</th>
<th>Title/Contents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Aug 8</td>
<td>Jingji Ribao (Taiwan), Jul 5</td>
<td>Why is the quality of West German industrial products so high? (On the role of “Stiftung Warentest”)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Aug 9</td>
<td>Dahua Wanbao (Taiwan), Jul 26</td>
<td>On the author of ‘Shuihu Zhuan’ (half-page feature)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Aug 10</td>
<td>Zhongyang Ribao, Aug 8</td>
<td>Taiwan congratulates Mrs. Sun Ke on her 90th birthday (1,000 guests attended, among them Sun Suqing from the USA; Chiang Ching-kuo conveys his congratulations)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Aug 10</td>
<td>Xianggang Shibao (Hongk.), Aug 8</td>
<td>Precious antiques in the Palace-Museum in Taipei</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Aug 19</td>
<td>Jingji Ribao (Taiwan), Aug 1</td>
<td>Civil world aviation confronted with problems (recession of business, increasing oil prices and air-ticket price decrease)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Aug 19</td>
<td>Sankei Shimbun (Japan), Aug 4</td>
<td>Severe action against KMT agents on the mainland (After entry and exit had been relaxed Taiwan intensified espionage on the mainland. Peking adopted more severe measures)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Aug 21</td>
<td>Jingji Ribao (Taiwan), Aug 6</td>
<td>Japan cannot keep up system of life-long employment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Aug 23</td>
<td>ibid., Jul 16</td>
<td>On the usefulness of saw-dust for growing mushrooms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Aug 24</td>
<td>Zhongyang Ribao (Taiwan), Aug 22</td>
<td>Taiwanese passenger plane crashed (on the flight from Taipei to Gaoxiong); 110 presumed dead</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Aug 25</td>
<td>Zhongyang Press Agency (Taiwan), Jul 20</td>
<td>Taiwan’s personal data card-index to be readjusted to Chinese-language electronics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Aug 25</td>
<td>Zili Wanbao, Aug 3</td>
<td>Pneumatic dispatch system installed in the hospital of Jilong (saves times for delivery of clinical records)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Aug 25</td>
<td>Xinsheng Bao (Taiwan), Aug 27</td>
<td>New variety of soya beans grown in Taiwan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Aug 27</td>
<td>Jingji Ribao (Taiwan), Jul 2</td>
<td>Taiwan produces fully automized electronic typewriter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Aug 29</td>
<td>Jingji Ribao (Taiwan), Aug 8</td>
<td>Problems of manager succession in American companies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Items No. 1, 5, 7, and 14 were included in this survey because they were taken from Taiwanese sources. They are of course only indirectly connected with the subject of the present study.

(f) Conclusions

When reprinting foreign news reports CX usually does not alter the original terminology. Therefore we find terms like: “Pragmatic Deng-faction” or “Maoists” that would be impossible for any other mainland public media. Even the KMT expression “fei,” bandits, for the CPC sometimes appears in CX. This is only bewildering, however, if one’s ideas about news coverage in Communist countries are too simplistic.
All things considered, as far as CX’s news coverage in August 1981 on Taiwan is concerned—admittedly the most sensitive part of the paper—we can conclude that it is neither very balanced nor very realistic:

1) The scope of CX reports on Taiwan undoubtedly far exceeds those of the "People’s Daily." Further analysis reveals however a striking imbalance with regard to news that is unfavorable to Peking. The case of the defected KMT airforce major Huang Zhicheng is an example: embarrassing details were left out or not covered. The same applies to reports on the social conditions of the people of Taiwan: the picture that CX conveys is a negative one—and yet it is based on reports from the Taiwanese press! News items are selected to fit Peking’s propaganda purposes, and if necessary articles are abridged to fit;

2) Paragraph (1) above does not entirely apply to CX reports on Taiwan’s economy. By and large they have a certain informative value which is however curtailed by the fact that CX editors do not give data and figures on Taiwan’s economic development from which the reader on the mainland would be able to get a realistic picture. CX reports are limited to certain areas of practical interest like the Taiwanese equivalents of the PRC Special Economic Zones such as the Export Processing Zone of Gaoxiong.

3) Reports on Taiwan’s international relations are more detailed and substantial. In this respect CX clearly goes beyond other mainland news media coverage. The reason for this can be found in the fact that in this respect Peking is certainly on the offensive against Taiwan - and setbacks like US arms sales to Taiwan would not lead to problems of legitimacy back home as would be the case if too many details on Taiwan’s economic successes or rising standard of living were published.

4. THE INTERNAL PICTURE OF TAIWAN—AS PRESENTED BY “CANKAO ZILIAO”

On September 10, 1981 Reuter News Agency released a commentary on a conference of Peking’s “workers in the field of art and culture” held shortly before in the Chinese capital. The conference was staged to give those present the opportunity to express their support for the latest CPC campaign against “bourgeois liberalism,” which allegedly had reemerged among the country’s writers. The
Reuter report quoted the PRC's most prominent living "worker in the field of culture," Cao Yu, as saying that today the struggle against bourgeois liberalism was "more important than the struggle against leftist (deviations)." The correspondent added that only in June of the same year Cao Yu had assured him that he was "glad" the Bai Hua campaign was over: a rather embarrassing exposure for this—officially—greatest living writer in the PRC.

On September 4, 1981 the Wall Street Journal published an article entitled "Chinese Deficiency-Economy and the Increase of Bribery and Corruption." Here we read that some Chinese officials "demand to sleep with foreign women," before cooperating in business matters. This is a grave accusation against CPC cadres who "fear neither hardship nor death" and give those of their countrymen who want to marry foreigners such a hard time - not to talk of their official sermonizing against extra- and pre-marital sex.

On September 18 of the same year the "Svenska Dagblat" wrote under the heading: "Taiwan - A Thriving Paradise:"

Two dreams tie the CPC mainland to the little capitalist province of Taiwan: One is the dream of prosperity, the other the dream of reunion. As far as the goal of catching up with the USA in the next twenty years is concerned, however, it is an illusion in the case of Peking; but only an arithmetical problem in the case of Taiwan.

And on September 22, 1981 the Asian Wall Street Journal published an article entitled: "Taiwan - a model for Third World economy:"

In 1952, the eve of Taiwan's first four-year-plan, the actual average income per capita was 50 US dollars in Taiwan and 40 US dollars in China. By 1980 the per capita income calculated for the respective populations had surpassed 2,000 US dollars in Taiwan while in China it still amounted to only 250 US dollars.

Do citizens of the PRC get to read such reports? Yes - provided they have climbed a certain number of steps on the hierarchical ladder. The above four reports and quotations have been retranslated from "Cankao Ziliao." They appeared with very little time lag in this reference material for cadres: on September 11 (morning edition), on September 12 (afternoon edition), on September 28 (morning edition) and on September 22 (morning edition), respectively.

Without doubt any decision-maker must be informed at all times on developments in his field of action. This is especially true
for those responsible for making propaganda. They must have an overall picture of the events and developments on which they have to comment.

This is exactly the editorial design of "Cankao Ciliao" (CZ). From its outer appearance one can already see that it is not an ordinary newspaper. The "Big Cankao" is reserved for foreign press items - supplemented on special occasions by reports from Xinhua correspondents abroad that are probably written on request. On October 12, 1981, for example, a Xinhua correspondent cabled a report from Moscow on that day's evening news (23 hours) on Soviet television. It was a rather unusual broadcast: a film on the troop parade in Taibei on the KMT National Day (October 10) - together with the remark that Taiwan's economy was far surpassing that of the mainland.41 Under the heading "Taiwan authorities under heavy attack after our 9-point-proposal" CZ had already published on October 9 a report by one of its correspondents on Taiwanese and overseas Chinese responses to Peking's latest move on the question of the reunion of the country (for a translation of this report see the Appendix). A more detailed report was cabled on October 742 by the Xinhua News Agency Hong Kong branch, in which the responses to each of the nine proposals were listed separately.

During the month of August 1981 CX published altogether about 172 reprints - articles, commentaries, analyses, etc.- on Taiwan, either in its "Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macao" column or in the daily news section. With an average lag of 12 days (based on 164 sources for which dates of first publication were available) CZ reports appear twice as soon as those of its little brother "Cankao Xiaoxi." When disregarding five reports that were published with a considerable delay (an average of 144 days) the average lag drops to only 7 days.

The graph below shows the relation between the number of press items and their time lag:

---

41. Cankao Ziliao, October 13, 1981, morning edition. The Japanese "Sankei Shimbun" of October 14, 1981 also published a report on this news broadcast pointing out that it signified a "new low in Soviet-Chinese relations." It had been the first time since the break-off with Peking that Soviet propaganda had reported on the "Taiwanese situation."

The graph is based on 137 CZ news items for which sources and dates of first release were available. The average delay was 8 days. It is obvious that CZ editors are interested in providing current news coverage on Taiwan. In the following table the total of 137 news items is split up into groups according to their time lag:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Delay (days)</th>
<th>Number of news items</th>
<th>Proportion of total news</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 - 3</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>35 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 - 6</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>18 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 - 9</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 - 12</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>16 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 - 15</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 - 28</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>13 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>100 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From the above table we can see that the number of news items published with a delay of only three days is the highest and stands out considerably against the next category of 4 - 6 days. Thus, this first group represents more than one third of the total news coverage.
on Taiwan—a clear indication that CZ editors attach great importance to publishing current news.

For 149 of the above 172 CZ news items on Taiwan the source can be identified. The following table shows where CZ editors take their news from:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Source Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Zhongyang Press Agency</td>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Jingji Ribao</td>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Zhongguo Shibao</td>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Zhongyang Ribao</td>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Lianhe Bao</td>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Zili Wanbao</td>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Gongshang Ribao</td>
<td>(Hong Kong)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Taiwan Xinsheng Bao</td>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Xinhua News Agency</td>
<td>(PRC, special reports for CZ)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Reuter</td>
<td>(GB)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Taiwan Ribao</td>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>AFP</td>
<td>(France)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>AP</td>
<td>(USA)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Xianggang Shibao</td>
<td>(Hong Kong)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Ju Quo</td>
<td>(Taiwan)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>(?) Ribao</td>
<td>(Hong Kong)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Business Daily</td>
<td>(USA)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Cheng Bao</td>
<td>(Hong Kong)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Zhong Bao</td>
<td>(Hong Kong)</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Caijing Ribao</td>
<td>(Hong Kong)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Xin Wanbao</td>
<td>(Hong Kong)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Da Gong Bao</td>
<td>(Hong Kong)</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Xin Bao</td>
<td>(Hong Kong)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Taiwan Shibao</td>
<td>(Taiwan)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Dahua Wanbao</td>
<td>(Taiwan)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Da Shidai</td>
<td>(Taiwan)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Bashi Niandai</td>
<td>(Taiwan)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Washington Post</td>
<td>(USA)</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Baltimore Sun</td>
<td>(USA)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>New York Times</td>
<td>(USA)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Frankfurter Allgemeine</td>
<td>(FRG)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total:</td>
<td></td>
<td>149</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

According to the above table 119 news items or 80.4 percent are reprints from Taiwanese sources, 14 or 9.5 percent from Hong Kong, the rest are foreign news agency reports and articles from foreign publications or Xinhua News Agency commentaries.

(a) Taiwan's Propaganda War Against Peking

News that are a part of the war of propaganda between Taiwan and the mainland make up the majority of CZ's most up-to-date reprints. The greater part of these, again, is on a special August 1981 topic: the argument between the mainland and Taiwan over the
Taiwanese film "If I Were for Real" (Jiaru wo shi zhende). Written on the mainland by Sha Yexin in 1979—during the so-called 'Peking Spring'—the drama on which the film is based was banned in the PRC after the first couple of performances. The main character of the play is a young man who pretends to be the son of a high-ranking cadre—whereupon all doors for social advancement are opened to him.

To heat up the whole controversy even more the Taiwanese film company "Yong Sheng" not only used this drama by a mainland author for its own propagandistic purposes of exposing the Communist Nomenklatura and their privileges but also transferred the author's royalties to the Taiwan Press Bureau to be held "in trust" until the mainland was "liberated" or the author had "escaped into freedom." On August 21 CZ documentation of the controversy started with a Taibei Zhongyang Press Agency release (of August 19) rejecting the mainland author's copyright protests as follows: In the first place, Peking does not recognize the copyright at all; second, Peking had banned the drama; and third Taiwanese publications were also reprinted on the mainland without authorization. The film, the report closes, would be shown at the International Film Festival at Chicago.

Another report on this topic can be found in the same CZ issue: "Taiwanese newspaper: It is absurd that the author of "If I Were for Real" comes up with the copyright question."

On August 24 CZ published an August 21 "Zhong Bao" commentary from Hong Kong: "On Sha Yexin's statement." Criticizing the screening of the drama in Taiwan, the paper believed that PRC authorities could use it as a pretext for taking action against Sha, who was among other writers accused of "bourgeois liberalism."

Finally, on August 26, CZ published a "Xin Wanbao" report from Hong Kong of the day before saying that the Hong Kong authorities had banned the film in the colony because it did not serve "the interests of Hong Kong." According to an August 28 Zhongyang Press Agency release, reprinted in CZ one day later, the film had been declared "educationally outstanding" in Taiwan for its vivid description of living-conditions and the social system on the mainland. Referring again to Peking's "Copyright protests," the Agency reprint stressed that the author's royalties were deposited.

With some satisfaction, certainly, on August 30 CZ published a "Zhongguo Shibao" report of the day before on sluggish ticket sales

for the film “If I Were for Real”: it was no longer being shown. The earnings did not even cover the money spent on advertising.

When, on the other hand, we compare the CZ and the CX coverage of this controversy we see the difference between the two. All the “masses” of CX readers learn about the whole affair is that the film was banned by the Hong Kong authorities because it did not serve their interests (report of August 29). Without the necessary background CX readers will not be able to understand what this is all about - the only conclusion they can draw is that obviously the arm of the Communist Censureship Office reaches as far as Hong Kong. This is exactly the impression that CX editors want them to have. The more privileged CZ readers, however, get news on still another Taiwanese propaganda film: “The Coldest Winter in Peking” (Huang Tian Hou Tu). Dealing with the hardships of Chinese intellectuals during the Cultural Revolution the film was shown in Taiwan in late 1980. In Spring 1981 the Hong Kong authorities banned it, too, for the same reasons for which they later banned “If I Were for Real.” CZ’s August 28 issue focused on the film “The Coldest Winter in Peking.” To begin with there was an August 26 report by the Taiwanese Zhongyang Press Agency: “Under Communist Pressure” the film was not shown at the International Film Festival at Montreal. Then there was an August 23 “Gongshang Ribao” report from Hong Kong: “The Coldest Winter in Peking” had been shown in Tokyo and Chicago with great success; and finally CZ reprints an August 26 report by “Zili Wanbao”: The film was to be broadcast by all three Taiwan TV stations followed by a discussion by “anti-Communist personages.” To make sure that it did not drop a news item before it was finally settled CZ reprinted (on December 25, 1981) a Zhongyang report of December 23 saying that “The Coldest Winter in Peking” was now being shown in Paris, too. One day later, another Zhongyang report appeared in CZ, this time on the film “If I Were for Real”; it had been elected the best Taiwanese film for 1981.44

Naturally, periodic CPC criticism of mainland writers are a welcome topic for Taiwan’s propaganda. Taibei’s efforts in this direction are also documented by CZ.

In August 1981 CPC leaders resumed their political campaign against the writer Bai Hua and others, this time under the heading of the struggle “against bourgeois liberalism.”

The afternoon edition of the August 21 issue of CZ published a

44. Zhongyang Press Agency (Taiwan), December 22, 1981.
"Xianggang Shibao" ("Taiwan-controlled", CZ editor's note) commentary of August 14 on a "People's Daily" article of July 28 according to which "party leadership" was to be re-enforced in the field of culture. In fact, this was the actual - though not official - reopening of the Bai Hua campaign, if we are to believe the Hong Kong monthly "Zheng Ming." As for the "Xianggang Shibao" commentary: polemizing against "those intellectual gentlemen" who thought that the people on the mainland enjoyed "quite a lot of freedom" the author showed that they were wrong, especially since their arguments based on the "cancellation" of the Bai Hua campaign had proved misconceived. Indeed, the campaign was not cancelled.

From the August 21 CZ afternoon issue we learn: "Zhongyang Press Agency reports: 'Zhou Yinglong (Chairman of the Central KMT Committee on Cultural Work) attacks CPC for criticizing the workers in culture and art.'" Besides summarizing Zhou Yinglong's speech CZ quoted a poem by Bai Hua that had been part of the speech:

As we are comrades, brothers-in-arms, compatriots,
There is no reason to set traps for me;
As you intend to put me in chains there is no reason to smile;
As you sharpen your knife behind my back, there is no reason to embrace me.
You stuck a seal over my mouth,
We have stuffed our brains with questionmarks,
Ha! True comrades, brothers-in-arms, compatriots,
Why should we not shine on each other like the stars.

In his speech Zhou had used the poem to show Bai Hua's "de-

46. When this commentary was reprinted in Cankao Ziliao on August 28, 1981, the regular readers of this publication knew already that the Party had decided to take up the campaign against the unruly writer again. For on August 13, the bulletin had reprinted on its first page (a sure indication that this foreign news report is correct) an AP-report of August 10 announcing in full detail the renewed wave of criticism by citing a "Chinese informant" and saying that 100 writers, mostly on the local level, were to be criticized, that the cultural paper "Wenyi Bao" was to fire the starting shot with a lengthy criticism of the film "The Man and the Sun" (Title of the draft: Unrequited Love, author: Bai Hua), that the 'People's Daily' was to reprint this criticism, etc. The reprint included also the AP correspondent's conclusion: "In the field of culture one goes from one extreme to another."
47. Zhongyang Press Agency (Taiwan), August 19, 1981.
jection” and “anti-Communist feelings” and call on Taiwan’s artists to support their anti-Communist colleagues on the mainland.

The Taiwan authorities are probably not interested mainly in supporting mainland dissidents but rather in making propagandistic use of the growing tensions between mainland dissidents and the ruling CPC. So there is little ground for the KMT to claim Bai Hua as a follower. The question is whether or not mutual accusations by KMT and CPC can be used by either to persecute their respective oppositions. Will not CPC cadres use Taiwan’s propaganda for accusing mainland dissidents of counterrevolutionary conspiracy? After all, when criticizing Bai Hua on April 19, 1981 the PRC army paper attacked the writer for his film script “Unrequited Love,” from which the army paper got the impression that he wanted to say that the “Communist Party is not as good as the Kuomintang”.

Attacks for having “connections with the KMT” or being a “KMT secret agent” have always been used in the “class struggles” in the “New China.” Even when, in 1976, after the overthrow of the “Gang of Four,” Zhang Chunqiao was first imprisoned, he was charged with exactly that offense. Moreover, such euphemisms were extensively utilized during the Cultural Revolution. Does that mean that CZ published the above speech to improve CPC cadres’ performance in the impending conflict? And is it by accident or negligence that on August 25 the same report again appeared in CZ (afternoon edition)? It is hard to believe that it was by accident—with only three days in between. Maybe CZ editors wanted to make sure that at the appropriate levels as many responsible cadres as possible got the message—without having to print it in red letters.

A report of a Hong Kong paper of August 19 dealt with a similar question: When giving lectures on music in Hong Kong Hou Dejian, a composer from Taiwan wrote a “Song for Wei Jingsheng”. The article cited the first stanza of the song and quoted Hou as saying that Wei Jingsheng and the others who are persecuted on the mainland are “China’s hope.”

Eventually, a “Lianhe Bao” article of August 12 appeared in the CZ afternoon edition of August 26 under the CZ title: “‘Lianhe Bao’ attacks us for starting a new purge in the field of culture’ and says that the resumption of criticism ‘has created a new terroristic atmosphere.’” Based on an AP report of August 10 (see note 46) the

“Lianhe Bao” report reviewed the different stages of Peking’s new drive (“Beiping - Peking - plans great purge in August”) as well as the development of mainland literary opposition (“The point of view of the writers and the literary opposition”). Under the section heading: “The main reasons for the purge in literature and art” we read that many of the dramas that are being criticized “expose the privileges of the CPC cadres who use their offices for their own purposes.” Furthermore many dramas showed the “dark sides” of life on the mainland - as a result of which many people have developed their “doubts” of the socialist system. The article adds that a number of authors were using the topic of “Humanity” to reveal “how the people are being trampled upon.” The article concludes that “the great purge might meet with obstacles” because literary opposition had had such an influence on the younger generation that they were “alert” and served no longer as “a willing tool of the Party”. Many sympathized with oppositional writers and thus protected them.

Why does CZ reprint articles like that? Certainly responsible cadres on different levels are meant to become familiar with the enemy’s responses to important CPC measures. This is precisely one of the ultimate purposes of CZ. We could therefore content ourselves with this finding, within the scope of the present study. We might, however, enter the field of speculation and conclude that CZ also furnishes responsible CPC cadres with internal, non-public material for silencing opponents, especially as the above “Lianhe Bao” report shared CPC leaders’ assessment of the situation. Yet, this is mere speculation.

Another kind of reprint on anti-Communist activities appears in CZ: Reports on conferences of organizations like the “Anti-Communist World Federation” and speeches of leading KMT personalities. Rather unusual for mainland readers is the terminology used in them: e.g., “Communist bandits” (for the CPC), “slavery of over 900 million compatriots” or “Communist tyranny”. Rejections of all kinds of “Communist united front conspiracies” can be found in those reprints as well as proclamations by Taiwan officials abroad for ideological offensives against the mainland. CZ coverage of this field of Taiwan’s propaganda is probably almost total. In its morning edition of August 25, for instance, CZ published a report by the Zhongyang Press Agency of August 22, that the “Voice of the Free China,” Taiwan’s foreign station, had expanded its European broadcast. CZ even reprinted the respective frequency bands.

Articles like the one taken from the March 81 edition of the
Taiwan monthly "Bashi Niandai" (not KMT controlled): "On no condition write an official history of the republic," are of rather practical value to the responsible propaganda units in Peking, all the more so as "Bashi Niandai" is a monthly run by political forces in opposition to the ruling KMT. According to that "Bashi Niandai" reprint many Chinese historians were alarmed by Peking's announcement that it would publish a history of the Republic of China. Historians outside Peking now wanted Taibei to open its archives for a Taiwanese study in republican history. Yet in Taiwan there was, as "Bashi Niandia" pointed out, not enough material for a competition with Peking. Therefore it was better to try to work out certain decisive points to "attack in order to defend oneself".

As early as August 15 the CZ afternoon edition had brought up the issue: Taibei did not want to lose this round in the field of historiography against Peking. CZ editors' heading of the reprint reads as follows: "Taiwan authorities want to be the first to publish 'material on the history of the war of resistance' / Strive for expanding their influence". According to the reprint from Taiwan, Peking's plan to publish the "History of the Republic of China" was a challenge to Taibei. Alarmed, the author noted that Peking's efforts would be documented in foreign publications. The same CZ edition published the following report: "Taiwan authorities intensify shooting of the film 'Xinhai 10/10' [A film on the revolution of 1911 when China's last dynasty was overthrown], to counteract us". The article said that the Taiwanese film was to be shown abroad against the mainland movie "Historical storm—The Xinhai Revolution in Guangdong".

Here we have another example of a parallel between the CPC and the KMT: both sides combine historical research with their own propaganda; hence, impartiality is not to be expected. By publishing the above reports and articles CZ showed what Taibei's problems were: it was not even in a position to write its own history, the history of the Republic of China, because of a lack of material. This is important evidence for those responsible in Peking for reporting on Taiwan's weaknesses, ammunition for another propagandistic offensive to isolate the KMT.

Before the 70th anniversary of the Revolution of 1911 on October 10, 1981, CZ coverage of the event was elaborate. On August 28, for example, a "Bashi Niandai" article that almost one year earlier had appeared in Taiwan was reprinted over almost five pages. Orig-

inally it had been a publication of a Chinese overseas students newspaper in USA entitled: "Some crucial points in the history of the Republic." This article, too, dealt with Peking's and Taibei's different historical interpretations and their efforts to prove that their own point of view was correct.

Noteworthy in this connection is also the CZ reprint of reports on the "Forum on the history of the development of the Republic of China" held in Taibei at the end of August 1981, the coverage of which was prompt and comprehensive. 50

Reports on direct Taiwan-mainland relations also belong to this category: e.g., the editorial reprint of the July 27 "Zili Wanbao" in which "nothing wrong" was found in meetings of mainlanders and Taiwanese at sports events. 51 On the contrary, the paper thought such occasions should be encouraged. In the CZ afternoon edition of August 30 a very detailed report of the Hong Kong "Gongshang Ribao" of August 28 on the Shanghai-Taibei Bridge competition in Hong Kong appeared. In addition CZ published a press review by Xinhua's Hong Kong branch on responses to the event in the colony press.

The news of Taiwan's TV broadcasts on mainland scenic spots 52 was documented by CZ as well as the case of those 25 Taiwanese fishermen who were sentenced for having traded with colleagues from the mainland. 53 Another example was a report by the American "Commerce Daily" (retranslated from Chinese: Shangye Ribao) of August 26 on the drastic decrease of the (inofficial) trade between Taiwan and the mainland and its possible causes. 54

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50. CZ also documented a 10-page report by Anna Chennault on "Chinese-American relations after World War II," ending with Mrs. Chennault's warning that Taibei should not play up the US arms sales affair too much and should under no circumstances try to put the Reagan administration under pressure. Reagan's foreign policy was aimed at the preservation of the balance of forces and containment.


54. Apparently, Cankao Ziliao takes up the topic of "trade between Taiwan and the mainland" whenever there are relevant foreign news reports in this field. On August 27, for instance, its morning edition published a Hong Kong "Xin Bao" article of August 20: "In the Second Half of 1981 trade between Taiwan and the mainland will decrease." This was to be caused by restrictions of Taibei and "official bureaus in Guangdong". After the release of the "Proclamation to the Taiwan Compatriots" mainland companies had ordered many goods from Taiwan, especially chemical fibres, electrical appliances, TV-sets and textiles. This trade had at times been so vigorous that it had caused difficulties in deliveries and price increases. According to Hong Kong statistics, in the first half
News covering contacts between Taiwan and the USA makes up the majority of CZ reprints on Taiwan's foreign relations, with a special emphasis on the US "Taiwan Relations Act" by which Reagan's Taiwan policy as well as possible arms sales to Taiwan are outlined. Except for being more up-to-date and reflecting a greater range of news agency reports (including the Taiwanese press) CZ coverage in this field does not show any relevant differences from CX; therefore it is not necessary to go into further detail here. A Zhongyang News Agency release of August 8 on a West-German professor from Bonn donating antiques from the Song Dynasty to Taipei's Palace Museum was also reprinted by CX.

A Taiwan "Jingji Ribao" article of August 18, however, did not appear in CX: "Taiwan and Nigeria sign a treaty on the establishment and strengthening of economic as well as trade relations". Details are given on the development of trade between the two partners: between 1978 and 1980 the volume of trade had quadrupled, amounting to 462 million US dollars in 1980. Also part of the agreement were technological and other exchanges. This news item was certainly a blow to Peking's claim of being the best friend and supporter of Third World countries - reason enough not to have printed it in CX.

(b) Economy

As in CX, news on Taiwan's economy makes up about one quarter of CZ's Taiwan coverage. A comparison of the two papers in August 1981 showed that news coverage in this category by and large corresponded as far as contents were concerned. CZ news items usually appeared later and in more abridged form in CX.

Eighteen out of a total of 41 CZ news items on Taiwan's economy dealt with the island's present economic problems like inflation, recession, e.g. in the building trade. On August 31, CZ published a seven-and-a-half page survey of Taiwanese economic newspaper articles on the "Stimulation of capital investment." Five out of nine CZ news reprints on foreign trade also appeared in CX; the small reference bulletin dropped, however, a speech by the director of Taiwan's Chamber of Commerce in which he indicated that the "con-
cept of a Pacific Economic Community” was developing and Taiwan had to “take part in it.” Not published by CX was also a Zhongyang Press Agency report of July 31 on the closing of a conference of Taiwan and South-Korea on economic cooperation, on Taiwan’s four-year-plan, investment planned in fishery, and on the objectives of the agricultural policy for the coming four years.

By using different sources for the coverage of topics in this category CZ editors apparently tried to provide their readers with more background material and generally more details—as a result of which reports in this category were not as up-to-date as in others.

When studying Peking’s official Taiwan coverage above we concluded that ordinary people on the Chinese mainland never got to see facts and figures or photographs on the living conditions and standard of living on the KMT island. Thus, even if a somewhat diffuse “higher standard of living” is officially admitted by Peking of Taiwan, mainlanders still cannot make very much of it for lack of substantial information.

CPC cadres at the appropriate levels, of course, know more about it. On August 17 CZ provided its readers with details on the living conditions of Taiwan’s farmers (from a “Zhongyang Ribao” editorial, KMT party paper, of August 5): 38 percent of the farmers have a washing machine, 89 percent a refrigerator, 24 percent a telephone, 11, 20 and 16 times the figures of 1959, respectively. The figures cited for agricultural mechanization are equally impressive especially if compared with the mainland. It would be embarrassing for the CPC - to say the least— if word of this got around on the mainland, hence, this article did not appear in CX.

Neither did a report on overseas Chinese investment in Taiwan amounting to 190 million US dollars in the first seven months of 1981 find itself published in CX. The source, a Taiwan paper for commerce, considered this figure satisfactory as a sign for the “good climate for investment” on the island. Reserved for higher cadres

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was also a two-and-a-half page reprint on the 9th conference of the "World Financial Association of Overseas Chinese" where ways and means for stimulating investment of overseas Chinese in Taiwan and the expansion of Taiwan's economic and trade relations were discussed. Topics like these, dealing with Taiwan's high prestige among overseas Chinese trade circles compared to the mainland's low performance in this respect are of course taboo for the general public in the PRC.

(c) Taiwan's Internal Affairs

The study of Peking's public media and CX coverage of Taiwan has disclosed that the Taiwan picture presented to the majority of the people on the mainland is rather diffuse and consists mainly of propagandistic patterns. Far from being realistic and impartial it is the follow-up of Peking's blood and atrocity propaganda of the 1950s and 1960s.

CZ Taiwan coverage for the month of August 1981 can be divided into four different groups of topics:

1) The crash of a Taiwan airliner on August 22 on the way from Taibei to Gaoxiong (more than 100 dead);
2) The KMT and its problems;
3) The case of Chen Wencheng, a Taiwanese mathematician who was found dead on the campus of Taiwan University after he had returned from the USA. (Peking's version: he was killed by KMT secret agents because of oppositional political activity in the USA; Taibei version: an accident);
4) Military questions.

In the airliner-crash of August 22, detailed CZ documentation of the crash—even CX reporting was rather elaborate: half a page of its September 3 edition—appeared. It was certainly not only due to the heavy losses among the passengers. Obviously, CZ editors were mainly interested in Taiwanese and Japanese reactions (there were also Japanese among the dead) to the fact that the crash had been caused by gross negligence of the airline. Political consequences ensued that could not be foreseen at first: thus, for once CX published a Zhongyang Press Agency report on the crash as early as August 24, two days earlier than CZ, which is usually the first to cover current events. Having waited for more background information CZ editors started almost full coverage of the event when more than 100 relatives of crash victims assembled and demanded that both the direc-
tor of Taiwan Airlines and the Minister of Communication step down: the case had gathered political momentum. Reserving five pages of its August 31 edition to the event, CZ published: a "Zhong­guo Shibao" report of August 25 on the gathering of the relatives; a short commentary of the same newspaper (also of August 25) supporting the demand for the resignation of the Minister of Communication; another report by the same source according to which the Minister of Communication had rejected the resignation of the director of China Airlines; a Zhongyang News Agency report of August 23 on Sun Yunxuan, Chairman of the Executive Council of Taiwan and second next to Chiang Ching-kuo, demanding investigation of the causes for the crash; an AFP report of August 23; and, finally an August 25 Zhongyang News Agency report once again.

This comprehensive coverage can be explained by the political dimension that the crash soon acquired: after investigations had revealed the real causes for the crash relatives of the victims formed an opposition against the government. This opposition was also backed by some of the press media. Watching with interest signs of a growing destablization of the KMT government in Taiwan, Peking is always on the alert in cases where the Nationalist government is being criticized.

As for the KMT's inner-party problems, the coverage of KMT inner-party affairs is a must for a news reference magazine like CZ. Besides reprinting metically reports on appearances, messages, speeches and the state of health of Taiwan's President Chiang Ching-kuo and other high officials CZ published in its morning edition of August 26 a "Cheng Bao" article from Hong Kong of August 22 on Chiang's alleged reflections over a possible successor. Furthermore, CZ reprinted a six-page article of the Taiwan monthly "Ju Qiao" of May 1981 (with a time lag of three months) which it entitled: "Exposure of the ugly performance and the heavy struggle at the elections for the KMT Central Committee."63 It dealt with the XIIth KMT party congress at the end of March 1981 and the pressure groups that were operating behind the scenes.

Four times in August 1981 CZ devoted its attention to the case of the mathematician Chen Wencheng. The first instance was when the Department of Public Prosecution of Taiwan came out with the official investigation report on Chen's death. Then the report was reprinted in full length in the August 6 CZ morning edition. On August 24 a "Lianhe Bao" report of August 16 was found in CZ

according to which Chen's relatives had received the report; this news item was supplemented by a "Zhongyang Ribao" commentary of August 18: "No proof that Chen Wencheng was murdered."

In August 1981 the Hong Kong branch of Xinhua News Agency, which seems to be responsible for CZ's Taiwan coverage, wrote two special reports on Taiwan's military. Published on August 23 (afternoon edition) and August 27 (morning edition) respectively, they covered a total of four-and-a-half pages, quite a lot of material. The first article: "Taiwan authorities have increased military spending and armament in the last years" - dealt with Taibei's arms production and the development of military spending; section headings read as follows: "Continued increase of military budget," "Taiwan buys 800 million US dollars worth of arms in the USA," and "Increased purchase of arms in Europe." The second report entitled: "Taiwan authorities push military production ahead by all means" introduced new weapons systems employed by the KMT army. At the same time the fact was stressed that Taiwan invests 690 million US dollars per annum into the development of weaponry.

Doubtlessly, neither of the two special reports was professionally qualified enough to satisfy military experts, but they were sufficient as general information for decisionmakers who were not directly involved with the military on certain developments in this quite sensitive enemy terrain. They can furthermore serve as supplementary material for the topic of "US arms sales to Taiwan" - but none of them appears in CX.

By and large, CZ coverage of Taiwan's internal political developments is realistic and comprehensive. Throwing light on actual conditions, CZ reporting can be called distorting only in view of the fact that it leaves out the ordinary, small, everyday details of life on the island. And that is not the task of CZ after all.

Perhaps this can best be shown by CZ coverage of the Chen Wencheng case in the month of August 1981. While the entire background of the case remains dubious, there are indications that Taiwan's secret service literally had a hand in the alleged "fall of the professor from a building of Taida." Consequently, Peking's public media elaborated the topic for a long time, published reports on the case in newspapers over and again together with letters of protest from all kinds of Taiwan associations on the mainland. CX delivered suitable reports from abroad. CZ, however, merely reprinted opinions from Taiwan including the report of the Public Prosecutor: it published the propagandistic raw material - and that is what it is designed for.
If we take a closer look at CZ documentation of the case of the defector Huang Zhizheng, a Taiwan airforce major, we see that it is much more detailed than that of CX. Besides citing Taiwanese sources CZ also published the first announcement of the supreme command of the Taiwan Airforce on Huang's flight as well as a UPI report of August 14 based on an interview with Huang's mother who appeared to be convinced that her son was forced to stay on the mainland.

Apart from the grave basic differences between the "Small" and the "Big Cankao," which were already pointed out in the CX section of the present study, CZ did not with respect to Huang's flight publish anything new as compared with CX coverage.

(d) Conclusion

Special features of CZ as compared with other PRC publications can be summarized as follows:

1) As a real "internal" high cadres medium, CZ is not subject to narrow propagandistic objectives: this is especially true for its Taiwan coverage. It would indeed be rather devastating to its basic purpose if CZ editors became victims of the official CPC propaganda instead of providing material for it.

2) The objective of CZ's Taiwan coverage is the presentation of those sectors of Taiwan's political and economic development that authorities in Peking are most interested in. There is no room for stopgaps from the miscellaneous field like those that can be found in the "People's Daily" or in CX.

3) Besides providing background material CZ editors also point out where authorities in Peking can possibly take promising propagandistic action against Taipei. In the present study this can be most clearly seen from the controversy over the "History of the Republic," in which CZ published news items on the weaknesses of Taiwan's propaganda and action. In the case of Chen Wencheng, CZ supplied material for Peking's commentators.

4) Finally, CZ provides material on the ground of which

64. Zhongguo Shibao (Taiwan), August 11, 1981 cited in Cankao Ziliao, August 12, 1981.
under certain circumstances mainland dissidents can be persecuted.

5. PROBLEMS OF CPC LEGITIMACY—TAIWAN: A CHALLENGE

The initial purpose of the present study is to find out what citizens of the PRC are allowed or supposed to learn about the KMT island off their east coast. This purpose presupposes that there is someone or some institution who can block or divert this flux of information.

He, she or they are in charge of directing information: the propagandistic Taiwan news in “People’s Daily” and CX, and the more substantial reference material for high cadres.

Why is that so? Why does there have to be an institution for sorting out negative or meaningless news items for presentation to the “masses”? Why reserve substantial information to the responsible high cadres?

The question seems to be simple, an answer idle. Yet by going deeper into the matter light can be thrown on Peking’s general attitude towards Taibei behind the fine words of the 9-Point-Proposal.

Like all parties exercising totalitarian rule the CPC finds itself in an unsolvable dilemma: On the one hand there is the claim of being simply the most “progressive” political force. That claim is based on Marxist-Leninist ideology that it is able to understand the course of world-history and thus direct and plan economy effectively to develop continuously without waste. Though being only theoretic it is taken as the absolute truth for all practical matters and anyone opposing it is a counter-revolutionary. On the other hand, conditions in the PRC are the straight contradiction to the above claim: political and economic inefficiency and waste are the rule, as are abuses of privileges and profiteering.

Every political rule has to legitimize itself. Referring to Karl Marx’s “Manifest of the Communist Party,” CPC legitimacy is based on its alleged capability to “understand the course of world-history.” Yet as claim and reality diverge the basis for this legitimacy gradually dissolves.

For many years CPC leaders were busy celebrating their “liberation of China” and trying to solve the problems that they could not be held responsible for: hence, during that period the above contradictions did not become virulent. In 1953 China’s economy was declared reconstructed and the first Five-Year-Plan was issued. Now
the CPC was fully operational. Consequently, after a couple of years, the first problems and home-made disasters came up, thereby increasing the pressure for legitimation. In the course of more than two decades of internal political struggle, the Minister of Defence, Peng Dehuai, then the President of the State, Liu Shaoqi; then in turn Mao's heir-apparent, Lin Biao; the “Gang of Four,” and finally Mao, the master, himself, together with many other politicians and party people were overthrown or had more or less fallen into disgrace. By the early eighties the CPC entered into a phase of “self-criticism,” and even self-humiliation. How could the party dare to undertake such swift changes without the danger of being wiped out? The reason can only be found in the fact that there is no organized opposition to it in today's PRC.

If CPC leaders now claim that "only though the CPC can China get ahead," this is true insofar as there is no other organized political force in China beside the CPC, with one exception: The KMT in Taiwan, which, after all, is also genuinely Chinese.

Therefore, Taiwan is not just one of the many problems CPC leaders in Zhongnanhai are confronted with but it is one of basic importance: it is a challenge to their rule, a vivid provocation for their own legitimacy.

For decades the two parties fought against each other without mercy. Massacres, "campaigns of encirclement and extermination," and the civil war followed one another, culminating in CPC victory on the mainland. This is the root of today's KMT-CPC relations.

The more than two decades of KMT rule have left their mark on China. Beaten by the victorious CPC, Chiang Kai-shek in 1949 had to retreat to the island where he had to grapple with the native population before he actually could settle down. Although ruthlessly condemned in the mainland public for more than twenty years, Chiang Kai-shek, the key-figure of the modern KMT, is in some respect (though not to the extent as Taibei's official propaganda claims) still alive in the PRC, even among the PRC's younger generation. The present author remembers an incident in the fall of 1980 during a trip to Kuling on the famous Lushan when the Chinese in his company became all excited over the fact that Chiang Kai-shek's former summer-residence was in that town. After looking around for half a day they were able to find the well-preserved and untouched stone villa and arranged - through the back-door and of course secretly - a visit to the compound, undoubtedly more for themselves than for the foreigners in their company.

At that time, the Kuling cinema showed a Chinese documentary
film on the CPC's struggle and living conditions during the 1940s in the town of Yan'an. I still remember a young Chinese couple next to me, the girl fast asleep, when all of a sudden scenes of the Chungqing negotiations were on the screen and Chiang Kai-shek appeared for a second or two. The young man beside me got all excited, tried to awake his girl shouting breathlessly: "Jiang Jieshi! Jiang Jieshi!" (Chiang Kai-shek! Chiang Kai-shek!). Certainly, this excitement was caused by nothing less than admiration for the late KMT leader, as much as Taibei would like it to be that way. One thing, however, is clear: The KMT and Chiang are not wiped out of the minds of the mainland people, as much as the CPC has made efforts to that end.

"Our troops at China's east coast salute the New Year. This year Taiwan will be liberated, people from all walks of life in Taiwan are thirsting for liberation," we read in a "People's Daily" coverpage report of January 7, 1950. The year 1950 went by, however, without the liberation of Taiwan; instead, the Korean War started and the 7th US fleet was stationed in the Taiwan-Strait. In the following decade the CPC tried to paint the worst possible picture of life on the KMT island. When, however, Mao Zedong died in 1976 the mainland itself was, in CPC terms, "at the brink of disaster" after several years of "fascist rule" (a CPC definition). Turning to the former "capitalist" and "imperialist" enemies the post-Mao leadership released plans for economic developments on a sheer fantastic scale: e.g., full mechanization of China's agriculture by the mid-eighties. Meanwhile, a fresh crew of party and state leaders manages the shambles of those dreams.

After the "victory" of 1976 — the glory of which has faded in the meantime — CPC propaganda has made a remarkable turn. From that moment on reports on the USA, Western Europe, and Japan came out presenting the good sides of those countries. Almost unbelievably for the Chinese public, the jobless in capitalist countries rose from the gutter where they had been banned by Peking's propaganda and actually "had a glass of milk every morning for breakfast" - a fact so unbelievable for mainlanders that in 1980 a foreigner working in a foreign languages propaganda unit was once asked by a Chinese colleague if that was really true.

On the other hand, public media started to elaborate on China's own "deficiencies" almost to the point of total self-humiliation. Maybe the party leadership thought that this kind of "exposure" would incite the "masses" to start building up China enthusiastically once again like they had done after 1949. Maybe they even thought that some of the "American glamor" would shine on Deng Xiaoping
and his party after he seemed to have found such good friends in the USA. However this may be, CPC party leaders had certainly not intended to provoke a threat to their own legitimacy—as it later happened. For what were they to be afraid of? Those highly industrialized countries are far away and out of reach for the Chinese people.

Hong Kong is already a dangerous place, but it is, after all, a British colony. Taiwan, however, is an entirely different question. It is also China, governed by Chinese, and has, most of all, developed remarkably in the last decade or so, a progress that people on the mainland might easily attribute to KMT leadership. Every success, as the CPC has been preaching for more than thirty years now, falls back on the party in power. Consequently, CPC leaders feel the threat to their own legitimacy if people on the mainland were to get all the details of life in Taiwan—all the more so as there is an organized political alternative to the CPC on the island.

This is the fundamental dilemma behind Peking’s desire for the “reunification of the motherland.” Without special precautions this reunification could be disastrous for the CPC. One very important finding of the present study is therefore, that precautions have been taken in Peking.

They form the background of Peking’s news coverage on Taiwan and they are the reason why it is like it is: Information for the few, hollow propaganda for the “many.”
APPENDIX I

Concordance of “Cankao Xiaoxi” version and “Daily Telegraph” original of “The two characters of China”, published on November 29, 1981 and November 11, respectively. Mistranslations are underlined.

The two characters of China

ONE of the few things that the Communist Chinese in Peking and the Nationalist Chinese in Taiwan can agree about is that there is only one China. But anyone visiting the two places could be forgiven for disagreeing.

For 32 years, China has been a divided country, with the mainland and Taiwan developing their drastically different systems in almost laboratory-like isolation. Modern Chinese history has been in some ways like an elaborate experiment to test which system is more efficient, socialism or capitalism.

On the face of it, the generally laissez-faire economic policies of Taiwan have won hands down. The Nationalist party may have lost the mainland in 1949, but it has since presided over one of the true economic miracles of the post-war era.

The 17 million Chinese on Taiwan have almost everything the one billion Chinese on the mainland want — reasonable housing, high wages, televisions, nice clothes, no rationing, no political
campaigns, and the freedom to choose their own jobs and where they wish to live. The Communist mainland, meanwhile, is still struggling to provide many of the basic necessities of life.

But the problem is not quite that simple. Taiwan is not mainland China, and the factors that have made the island so prosperous would never have worked to the same degree in the country as a whole.

* * *

It is a tantalizing question. What would China be like today if Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek had won in 1949 instead of fleeing defeated to Taiwan in the face of Mao Tse-tung's Communist armies? There is, of course, no way of knowing. But the Nationalist party of today is different from the one which lost the civil war in the 1940s. The old party was divided, ineffectual, riddled with corruption and had quite obviously lost the "mandate of heaven." Had that party maintained control of all China, there is no guarantee that they would have done any better than the Communists have done.

The Nationalists were given a second chance in Taiwan after 1949, thanks largely to massive American aid, and they appeared to learn from some of their previous mistakes. But politically, there is little to choose between the two parties, enemies and rivals for more than 50 years.

Both are run by old men ex-bounding purposes which have become increasingly irrelevant. The Nationalist party swears that it will one day lead the faithful back to the mainland in victory, but few people on Taiwan still believe it. The Communist party still claims it is leading China towards a socialist utopia. But once again few among the disillusioned masses still believe it is possible.

Both parties seem incapable of allowing any real political opposition to exist and exercise heavy censorship over news coverage, books and films. Both keep a close watch on their citizens for signs of political deviation.

China's so-called "democracy
movement,” which surprised the world in 1979 with its free-thinking, reformist ideas expressed mainly in posters stuck on the vanished “Democracy Wall,” has been ruthlessly suppressed, and many of its leading members are in jail. Taiwan’s independent “Formosa Magazine,” which also in 1979 called for reform of the Nationalist party, more democracy and something approaching Taiwan independence, was similarly suppressed by the Taiwan authorities, and many of its leading members are likewise languishing in prison.

But there is one important difference: the Communist party considers it has the right to regulate virtually every part of a person’s life, while the Nationalist party generally stays off the backs of its people. The difference is immediately noticeable and very welcome. On my third night in Taipei, for instance, I had dinner in the home of a Chinese friend I had met two days previously. The idea of such a thing happening on the Chinese mainland is almost inconceivable.

On some days, the air pollution in central Taipei is so bad it is like being in the middle of a sandstorm. The thousands of motor cycles, buses and cars which fill the city’s roads and pump filth into the atmosphere are both a symbol of Taiwan’s economic achievements and a warning that progress has its drawbacks.

Just as Taiwan runs on the motorbike, China travels at a more sedate pace by bicycle. It is a more primitive form of transport and, in the winter, suicide, but if every one of Peking’s three-million-odd cyclists acquired a motorbike, the city would have to be evacuated.

GRAHAM EARNSHAW, Peking correspondent, has a taste of life in Nationalist Taiwan
MEDIA-COVERAGE ON TAIWAN

In sharp contrast to the grimy, grey gloom of the mainland cities, the streets of Taipei are alive with flashing neon lights, endless streams of traffic, thousands of shops, restaurants, coffee bars and beauty salons, symbols of the success of decadent bourgeois values.

But perhaps—just perhaps—the Taipei of today could become the model for the mainland cities of tomorrow. The economic policies of the Communists are changing, allowing for more and more individual initiative.

First, the peasants were allowed to sell produce at free markets for their own personal profit; then street hawkers were allowed to resume their trade after a break of 15 years. Now, small privately owned businesses are springing up in China’s cities.

If this newly resurrected private sector on the mainland is allowed to develop on a large scale, then many of China’s pressing economic problems, including unemployment and shortages of consumer goods, could perhaps be solved over the next couple of decades.

After long consideration of the differences between “the two Chinas” (a forbidden phrase), I came up with only three aspects where the people on the mainland are doing better than the Taiwanese.

First, life in Communist China has less of the tension and strain so common in capitalist society. There’s no great need to worry, or even to try very hard. It is the Government’s responsibility, not yours, to find you a job, and once you’re on the payroll you can virtually never be sacked.

Second, the gap between rich and poor is not as great as it is in Taiwan, although supporters of capitalism would of course argue that the gap is necessary to provide an incentive to increase production and efficiency.

And last, women are treated much more equally on the mainland than in Taiwan. On both sides, women are still very much the victims of age-old prejudices, but at least in Communist China there is a theoretical recognition of the problem.

I met a woman in Taipei who publishes a successful economic
She founded a magazine. The staff is composed entirely of women because none of the men she approached were willing to work under her. She tries to keep the all-female staff a secret so as not to affect the magazine's credibility.

Prostitution is also a massive industry in Taiwan — not a healthy sign for any society and a far cry from the mainland where the Communists sternly deal with any cases that come to light.

The immigration girl at Taipei airport looked in astonishment at my passport with all its visa stamps for the People's Republic of China. “Do you live in Red China?” she asked. “What is it like?” Everywhere I went, the questions were the same: what is it like on the mainland? Which is better, here or there?

The pat answer is that it is not as bad on the mainland as the Nationalists say it is, nor are things on Taiwan as good as many people on the mainland imagine.

In almost everything of course the average person on Taiwan is better off than his cousin on the mainland, but it is not altogether fair to make a direct comparison. Mainland China is so huge, and its problems so vast and complex, while Taiwan is so small and manageable.

The Communist party, and particularly Chairman Mao, have made some appalling mistakes during their 32 years in power, and it is easy to criticise the Communists for the way they dominate the lives of their subjects, but would it be possible to run a country of one billion people any other way?

It is nice to think that it would.
APPENDIX II

Cankao Ziliao, October 10, 1981 (afternoon edition)

Our Nine-Point-Proposal Causes Heavy Attacks on the Taiwan Authorities

Report from our own correspondent. Our announcement of the nine-point general and specific policy towards Taiwan caused heavy attacks on the Taiwan authorities. On October 1, all Taiwan newspapers published our great announcement in prominent position on their front-pages, using headlines like “Song Chuyu rejects Ye Jianying’s united-front scheme” etc. Under headings like “Ye Jianying publishes united-front nine-point scheme” etc. they divulged the basic contents of the nine-point policy. During the session of the Legislative Yuan on October 2, questions related to the re-unification of the motherland became the contents of inquiries. Learned people abroad, intimate with the Chiang-Party, demanded one after the other that the Taiwan authorities present counter-measures and the Chiang-party’s “Central Daily News”, too, published articles, explaining why it is impossible to practice the “three communications” with us. According to reports of the Taibei based correspondent of the Japanese “Asahi Shimbun”, these days people in Taiwan are centering on our Nine-Point-Proposal and Taiwan’s counter-measures, “just unfolding a lively discussion”. As seen from the news reporting of different sides, the Taiwan authorities are in a passive, awkward position, immersing themselves in dealing with it.

Reiterated Refusals to Talk, Scheming to Hold the Ground. After Ye Jianying’s speech had been broadcast at noon of September 30, the spokesman of the Taiwan authorities said at first that he could not make a statement before having carefully studied the contents of the proposal. Nine hours later, the same evening, Song Chuyu, head of the Information Office of the Executive Yuan appeared personally to make a speech. Foreign news agencies hold that Song’s speech was not a concrete and detailed response to the proposal, and that it did not go beyond the tunes of the past, rejecting our proposals. Next came a speech by Sun Yunxuan in the Legislative Yuan on October 2, attacking us, that “although the Nine-Point-Proposal seems to be fairly concrete, indeed it does not touch the core of the question” and claiming, that the re-unification of the country “is not a Party-Party question”, and that “the existence of the country can only be decided by the constitutional procedure”. In spite of that the speeches of Song and Sun already make clear the refusal of our pro-
posal, both of them did not directly use the expressions “refuse” and “absolutely not to talk”.

Seven days had passed when, on October 7, Chiang Ching-kuo entered the arena officially, declaring formally at the meeting of the Chiang-Party Standing Committee that “there is simply no such thing as a so-called ‘cooperation’ between the two parties”, “we will absolutely not negotiate with the ‘communist bandits’”, and he said something of “persisting in the confidence and determination to recover the mainland”, of “carrying out the three principles of the people, re-uniting China, courageously and firmly fighting to the end”. From the discrepancy between the former and later positions of the Taiwan authorities it can be seen that their refusal to hold peace talks presently is definite. But also, in view of the favorable comments the Nine Points received abroad and at home, there seem to be misgivings. And if Chiang Ching-kuo did not make clear his position, that might lead to conjectures and consequences in Taiwan and abroad, thus creating confusion and producing unfavorable results for the Taiwan authorities. It seems the Taiwan authorities’ worry and concern for security lies here.

The Senior-Faction and the Public Figures Stall and do not Speak, Some Small Parties and Learned People Demand New Counter-Moves. Presently only Chiang Ching-kuo, Sun Yunxuan and other persons in power have shown their position. The Kuomintang seniors and public figures have not commented on our proposal publicly. The head of the “Planning Committee for the Recovery of the Mainland”, Xue Yue, preached only generally “to highten the vigilance, and strengthen unity” when he, addressing that Committee, mentioned our proposal. When Chen Lifu spoke before the “National Assembly Constitution Symposium” on (October) 5, he declared generally that we have to “abolish Communism” and did not mention our Nine-Point-Proposal.

At the same time the Taiwan authorities organized a handful of people of the Youth Party, the Social Democratic Party, people of Taiwanese origin, and certain scholars to appear personally, express opposition against our proposal and support the speeches of the Taiwan authorities. When these people spoke out, however, besides attacking us and praising the Kuomintang, they also revealed objections against the inflexible stand of the Taiwan authorities. They hold that the present state of affairs is that “the united front propaganda of the Chinese Communists abroad and at home fills the air” and Taiwan’s “present propaganda is still not sufficient”; Tai-
wan "has to adopt immediately effective measures"; "give detailed political explanations" (the Chairman of the Youth Party, Li Huang, the Member of the Legislative Yuan, Rao Yingqi etc.); Taiwan "has to point out internationally counter-measures of marked persuasion", and it "cannot give the impression to people that it does not want re-unification" (Chiu Hungdah, Professor at the University of Maryland, USA); and that Taiwan "has to strengthen the propaganda and the national diplomacy" (Jin Shaoxian, Member of the Social Democratic Party and the Legislative Yuan). Some said that our Nine-Point-Proposal "is a very devastating united-front move", Taiwan "cannot ignore it", but "has to put forward a 'comparative proposal' " (Parris Chang, Professor at the Pennslyvania State University) and "cannot only block off, only shout slogans [but] it has to study and draft immediately promising and defending practical measures" (Zhang Yufa, Research Fellow at the Central Research Institute on the Modern History of Taiwan). According to a report by the Taipei based correspondent of the Japanese "Asahi Shimbun" there are among the Taiwanese public figures people who think that the Taiwan authorities "too, have to explain their position openly and above-board" and "make clear that they are not looking for war."

Worrying About a Break in Taiwan's 'Psychological Defense', Afraid of becoming more Isolated Internationally. At the same time the Taiwanese papers attacked us, they cried out in alarm that our Nine-Points are "an extremely formidable trick," "a plan, advantageous for advance and retreat," that may "twist and bend, at home and abroad, the image" of Taiwan as well as "poison and bewitch the Chinese people at home and abroad" and "block the mouth of the American Government and public" ("China Times", "United Daily"). The spokesman of the Taiwanese Embassy in Costa Rica put it point-blank, saying: "Peace talks can be compared to a political bomb". A "Central Daily News" article by Xiang Naiguang on October 3, revealed more of the Taiwan authorities' fear of being thrown into confusion. This article stated that, implementing the "three communications", in spite of "being able to increase some conveniences for the people on both shores, is nevertheless equivalent to stepping into the Chinese Communists' united-front trap", that will "shake the anti-Communist position, confuse the ideological distinction", and "if the ideological and psychological dyke is opened it will be very difficult to prevent a further enlargement". Thus, there will be "endless disasters".
During the last couple of days the Taiwan authorities have attacked us time and again for "using united-front propaganda to split up the compatriots at home and abroad", and repeatedly have preached that "the compatriots at home and abroad heighten their vigilance and strengthen unity" (speech of Sun Yunxuan on October 2). In addition the "General Federation of Overseas Chinese" came forward with the statement "we hope all Overseas Chinese will heighten their vigilance and not be misled by the Chinese Communists' united-front schemes".

Referring to foreign propaganda, Sun Yunxuan attacked us in a speech on October 2, for trying "to create a false impression of peace internationally" as to further isolate Taiwan, and declared twice that "I hope the international friends will not be puzzled and betrayed by the Chinese Communists." The Taiwanese "China Times" and others attacked us for wanting to destroy US-Taiwan relations, saying that "it is more appropriate to say" that our Nine-Point-Proposal "pursues international goals," "is made for the American government and public to see", and from this propagate, that "American policy will not allow other people to interfere".

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