# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authors</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Editors'</td>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Books</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. China, People's Republic of (Mainland)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chang, Chen and Lin, eds.</td>
<td>Catalog of Chinese Underground Literature (1982)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Salem</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chang, Chen and Lin, eds.</td>
<td>Pai Hua's Cinematic Script: Unrequited Love (1981)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Salem</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Salem</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R. Sutter</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K. Chen</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Salem</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hsiung and Kim, eds.</td>
<td>China in the Global Community (1980)</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R. Sutter</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R. Sutter</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M. Lindsay</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What They Say: A Collection of Current Underground Publications</td>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M. Lindsay</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R. Sutter</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2. China, People's Republic of (Mainland) and China, Republic of (Taiwan)


3. China, Republic of (Taiwan)


Faurot, ed., *Chinese Fiction from Taiwan: Critical Perspectives* (1980) ............................... 26


U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Oversight of the Taiwan Relations Act I* (Nov. 1979) ...... 35

U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Oversight of the Taiwan Relations Act II* (May 1980) ...... 35

U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Taiwan: One Year After United States-China Normalization* (June 1980) .......................................................... 35

4. Japan and the United States

Imai and Rowen, *Review of Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Proliferation: Japanese and American Views*. 43

L. Weiss
5. Other Areas


Hsiung and Chai, eds., *Asia and U.S. Foreign Policy* ................................................................. 56

Kuan, ed., *European Economic Community and Asia* (1982) .......................................................... 59

van der Kroef, *Kampuchea: The Endless Tug of War* ................................................................. 60

Whitlam, *A Pacific Community* .......................................................... 63

R. Barnett
EDITORS' INTRODUCTION

Unmistakably, East Asia has become, within the last few years, an area of increasing significance and concern for the global community. The current foreign policy of the United States, for example, reflects a major reorientation that has characterized U.S. strategic policy considerations since its recognition of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in December 1978. U.S.-PRC bilateral relations, however, do not describe fully the myriad interests that have staked claims in the region nor do they explain their complexities.

The intricate combinations of factors that have influenced the initiation and development of relations in the East Asia region are in large part characterized by a single phenomenon — experimentalism. For example, the PRC continues to experiment with domestic policies that will help her achieve her Four Modernizations by the year 2000. As the United States reduces arms sales to Taiwan, some scholars feel that the Republic of China may be compelled to consider other strategic options, including trade relations with the Soviet Union. The United States is also reformulating its foreign policy vis-a-vis Indochina. Various considerations are being examined in a number of East Asian countries regarding a solution to the obstinate Kampuchean crisis and to the continued Soviet-American military rivalry in the region. From within these countries are reports on social development and changing economic policies. In short, in a largely underdeveloped and strategically significant area, each of the powers who maintains interests there proceeds cautiously and tenuously, with policies and programs sufficiently flexible to be able to be recast as demands dictate.

This volume of book reviews is designed to present many of the political, economic, social and military issues and options that will help to clarify the numerous developments that have occurred within and without East Asia in the recent past. Some of the books offered here are for general reference; others are somewhat more narrowly-focused and may appeal more to the reader with a specific interest in the topic. All are enlightening.

David Salem
Roy Werner
Lyushen Shen
1. China, People's Republic of (Mainland)


This two-volume collection contains 35 different "wall posters" and "people's publications" from Mainland China. The editors, who are from the Republic of China on Taiwan, have compiled this collection in order, as they stated, to preserve "'underground literatures' special historical value." It is their hope that, through such underground literature, the Mainland Chinese people's avenue for free expression may be thus preserved.

Each entry appears in both English and Chinese translation, and includes an introductory editorial comment on the particular publication or wall poster, with occasional reference to the fate of the underground publishers. The initial editorial comments are relatively interesting, although one must admit that the Catalog contains numerous typographical errors in English translation, undoubtedly because the original documents appeared in Mandarin. After each editorial comment, there is a chronological listing of the title of the publication, along with its type (i.e., wall poster, handbill, or journal), issue number, author (where available), date, and place.

The occasional anti-Communist slant to the introductory, editorial comments is probably the result of the suppression which appeared to accompany the Mainland's constitutional amendment eliminating the well-known Four Bigs (right to free speech, right to full airing of views, right to hold great debates, and the right to write wall posters) from the 1978 Constitution. Because reference to such underground literature appears so infrequently in scattered Western publications, the most valuable application of this collection is as a research tool to those who seek a handy guide to the handbills, wall posters, and "people's publications" of the Mainland.

David Salem
Pai Hua is the pen-name for Ch'en You-hua-hua, born in Honan Province in central China in 1930. At the age of seventeen, he organized the "People's Arts and Literature Society" and began to publish a magazine called The People, in which his first writings appeared. As a propagandist for the Red Army in the 1950s, he published a number of poems, a collection of short stories, and a movie script. Becoming increasingly disillusioned with communist rule, Pai Hua spoke out as boldly as freedom of expression would allow him; nevertheless, he was labeled a "rightist" as part of China's "Hundred Flowers" campaign and was condemned to reform through labor.

Although released in 1961, he was labeled a "reactionary" during the Cultural Revolution and was sent to prison. Upon Mao's death in 1976, Teng Hsiao-p'ing and Hua Kuo-feng instituted a program of rehabilitation of previously persecuted and incarcerated Chinese. Among them was Pai Hua. After his release and "rehabilitation," Pai Hua became a scriptwriter for the Drama Troupe of the Wuhan Military Area Command Headquarters. He produced two cinematic works: Dawn Light and Unrequited Love, the latter of which is reproduced as the subject of this book.

According to the editors, the original version of Unrequited Love was completed in 1979 and appeared in both a Mainland and a Hong Kong publication (p. 3). The work, originally written for the stage, was adapted for the screen by Pai Hua and P'eng Ning. The story revolves around an artist, Ling Ch'en-kuang—a character said to reflect the experiences of Pai Hua—who, after an initial attraction to Chinese communist theories of class struggle, grows disillusioned with social conditions and "joins in a protest movement to combat 'hunger, civil war and persecution.'" Shortly thereafter, he goes abroad and becomes a successful painter. However, patriotic sentiment after the 1949 Communist takeover of the Mainland compels Ch'en-kuang to return, where he is subjected to political persecution and is forced to become a fugitive, living in the wilderness. He dies a lonely and despondent man, alienated from his country by things he seems not to understand. Until his demise, he is haunted by a single question: "You love our country [China]. Through bitter frustration you go on loving her . . . But . . . does this country love you?" (p. 83).

The topic of the screenplay—or, perhaps more appropriately,
the manner in which it was addressed—caused a furor in Chinese Communist Party circles. The Liberation Army Daily, the official PLA mouthpiece, censured Pai Hua and accused him of writing a script that violated the Four Basic Principles. It is alleged that a private viewing of the film prompted Teng Hsiao-p'ing to issue Party Central Committee Document No. 7, "which prohibits the writing and publication of all 'literature of exposure' of the type exemplified by Unrequited Love and demands that any such works be subjected to mass attacks" (p. 4).

From a literary standpoint, the story is presented in a mildly interesting way. There is strong use of metaphor and fairly colorful use of language. The book contains an English translation and the original Chinese version. The script is replete with stage and camera directions, which detracts somewhat from the flow of the story, but since the significance of the story lies more in its content than its artistic flair (at least for the Western reader), little is lost. The editors have also included an editorial on the Liberation Daily article mentioned above, a transcription of a Communist Chinese radio broadcast censuring Pai Hua and his script, and an address by Pai Hua to the "Fourth Writer's Congress," delivered before the controversy over his script developed.

David Salem


In the thirty-three years since the Communists came to power on the Mainland, education has undergone significant changes. These changes are partly the result of shifting patterns of priorities in ideological doctrine. The author of this volume examines the "vicissitudes of contemporary Chinese education from the standpoint of shifts and swings between two contrasting models of education" (p. vii). As Mr. Chen views it, education on the Mainland has, since 1949, served the Communist goals of revolution and development. Thus, the educational process that emerges at a particular moment in
Chinese history depends largely on the relative emphasis Chinese leaders give those goals. When revolution is given primary emphasis, education is used to produce "political activists and ideological zealots" (p. vii) whose goal is to help establish a new proletarian society. When development is given primary emphasis, education is used to produce individuals whose acquired skills will further the defined goals of production, modernization, and national reconstruction.

As a result of these perceptions, Mr. Chen developed two models of education, the revolutionary and the academic, to correspond to the Chinese emphasis on the broader doctrines of revolution and development, respectively. The changes in education over the last thirty-plus years are then studied as recurring shifts between two models resulting from concomitant shifts in the twin systemic goals.

Here, unquestionably, is a worthy book. The reader is spared the dry presentation that might ordinarily result from the discussion of such a subject through the author's skillful use of language, thoughtful analysis, clear organization, and colorful approach. The first chapter defines and distinguishes the characteristics of the educational models employed by the author. The next six chapters address the development of education on the Mainland through the first two decades of Communist rule, with emphasis on the early task of education to produce "new men," the importance of the Soviet experience as a model for the Mainland, the role of Chinese intellectuals in the educational program, and the predominance of the revolutionary model of education within the Chinese system.

Chapter 8 addresses educational issues involved in the contest between the revolutionary and academic models. The final three chapters examine the post-Mao shift in the educational program from a revolutionary model to a quasi-academic model (including an excellent comparative table on p. 222) and draw some sensible conclusions about the present and recommendations for the future. In fact, what may be the book's most effective observation is served up to the reader as understatement: "the basic policies of education are determined by the Communist Party" (p. 235). In the hands of the cadres of the Party rests the future development of Chinese education, and despite a new recognition of the professional status of educators on the Mainland and a higher tolerance for criticism of the system, educational enrichment for many may still be a long way off. Nevertheless, Mr. Chen's work provides an in-depth analysis of three decades of education in China and convinces us of the possibil-
ity of “a model of education inspired by high vision and guided by a realistic assessment of the current scene” (p. 236).

David Salem


It has become increasingly clear to students of contemporary Chinese affairs that changes in Chinese foreign policy at the turn of the 1960s represented the most significant shift in the foreign policy of the People’s Republic and laid the foundation for the outward-looking, pro-Western policy we see today. It was during this period that Chinese leaders realigned their relationships with the Soviet Union and the United States, beginning the process of Sino-American reconciliation and the development of an overall foreign policy strategy directed against the USSR as the main enemy. Peking also moved away from its previous close identification with international revolutionary movements and began stressing instead China’s desire to foster closer, more conventional relations with governments of differing political leanings. China’s recent interest in building economic and political relations with Japan and other developed countries of the West also originated at this time.

Several major studies have attempted to explain these changes in Chinese policy from differing perspectives. Some scholars have stressed Chinese concerns with the threat posed by Soviet forces along the Sino-Soviet border. [See, for example, Harold Hinton, Bear at the Gate: Chinese Policy Making Under Soviet Pressure (Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Re-
search; and Stanford, Ca.: Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, 1971.) Others have underlined Peking's interest in a secure strategic environment in the East Asian region. [See, for example, A. Doak Barnett, China and the Major Powers in East Asia (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1977).] Still others have emphasized the impact of Chinese domestic factional politics on the course of PRC foreign policy. [See, Thomas Gottlieb, Chinese Foreign Policy Factionalism and the Origins of the Strategic Triangle (Santa Monica, Ca.: Rand Corporation, November 1977).]

Two of the books under review here also deal with this formative period in Chinese foreign policy and offer important insights into the strategy and behavior of the PRC. Richard Wich's book is a major study of Sino-Soviet relations during the period 1968-1970. It sees the border crisis between the two communist powers as the cause of major systemic changes that have dominated international relations ever since—e.g., the emergence of China as a major actor on the international scene, the development of Sino-Soviet hostility as the basic feature of Asian international politics, and the beginnings of the cooperative relationship between the United States and China. Wich tries to play down the historical and geopolitical origins of Sino-Soviet hostility, stressing instead that the development of the dispute owed much more to the various political decisions made by Chinese and Soviet leaders as they dealt with one another within the context of an evolving international environment dominated by the post-war bipolar system. Wich accordingly comes to the conclusion that the border crisis was essentially a political affair, noting that history and geography did not in themselves account for the policies followed by the PRC and USSR leaders during the border crisis, or for the uses the leaders made of the border issue as an instrument in the Sino-Soviet rivalry. He adds that the crisis between Peking and Moscow in the late 1960s was the logical result of conflicting perceptions of the Chinese and Soviet regimes of their interests in the matrix of the bi-polar international system. And, he makes a strong argument that the border crisis was primarily a Chinese initiative—an argument which serves as a corrective to earlier accounts that have tended to overemphasize Soviet military pressure and threats to China, especially during 1963.

Wich also stresses the useful methodological point that China scholars should strive to understand more deeply what he calls the "signaling process" that occurs in media statements and other public pronouncements of China, the USSR and other communist countries. This is an important means to understand policy change in
these countries, he maintains. Indeed, analysts too often have been
content to judge such communist statements on their face value, or
have offered assessments based on crude calculations of the number
of times certain phrases have appeared in a particular country's pub­
ic statements. Wich rightly urges that serious students must go fur­
ther in their search to understand such statements. In particular,
they must grasp the political context in which the pronouncements
occur in order to fathom their meaning—a process that takes years
of painstaking work and thoughtful reflection that only a few spe­
cialists, like Richard Wich, have been prepared to do.

Greg O'Leary is another scholar who has devoted years to the
careful analysis of Chinese foreign policy pronouncements as a
means to understand Chinese foreign policy behavior. In fact, no
other major book on Chinese foreign policy offers such a detailed
analysis of Chinese foreign policy statements dealing with the period
covering the first half of the 1970s. This is the great strength of
O'Leary's work. He carefully analyzes the leadership debate that led
up to China's new foreign policy approach in the 1970s, and then
goes on to assess in detail Peking's altered approaches toward the
United States and the Soviet Union; toward the countries of the de­
veloped world; and toward developing third world countries.

Like Richard Wich, O'Leary takes issue with earlier assess­
ments that have focused heavily on China's fear of the Soviet threat
as the major cause of change in Chinese foreign policy during this
time. But, unlike Wich, O'Leary does not advocate trying to inter­
pret Chinese foreign policy pronouncements beyond their face value.
In contrast to most other specialists in the field, O'Leary views such
pronouncements as true reflections of Chinese thinking, rather than
as evidence of new rationales for Chinese foreign policy behavior or
as "political signals" that should be interpreted in a broader interna­
tional context. Thus, for example, many analysts have interpreted
Chinese media assessments of U.S. domestic difficulties and growing
international "weaknesses" during the late 1960s and early 1970s as
reflecting in part an ideological rationale that served to justify
China's lowered concern over the threat from the United States and
its gradual move toward closer ties with this former enemy. In con­
trast, O'Leary strongly maintains that this new media line truly re­
lected Chinese leadership thinking, concluding that the reason
China moved closer to the United States was because the United
States was considered to be getting weaker.

O'Leary is strongly critical of analysts who try to read other
meanings into Chinese statements. He is able to sustain this ap-
approach in large part because his analysis deliberately makes little effort to link Chinese statements with actual activities in Chinese foreign policy. As a result, the analysis in his book has a one-dimensional quality which is not nearly as satisfying as Wich's complicated and thoughtful assessment.

It should be added that while the information and insights in both the Wich and O'Leary books provide a gold mine of useful material for specialists in Chinese foreign policy, they can become a mine-field for the sometimes inattentive general reader. Wich has a highly polished literary style, but his long sentences and complicated sentence structure are sometimes difficult to follow. His arguments are beautifully logical, but they require a careful eye for detail and a full appreciation of the meanings of words in order to grasp their full significance. (The reader may find that rereading certain key passages will be required at several points in order to appreciate the author's intent.)

O'Leary's writing is less complicated, but his arguments are encumbered by a large amount of supporting detail and seemingly extraneous information. Several parts of the book have the look of a Ph.D. dissertation that has not been adequately revised for publication as a book. O'Leary is also not shy about letting the reader know what he thinks of the work of most of his colleagues. His book is larded with overly long analyses of the alleged shortcomings in the writings of other scholars in the field—analyses which to this reader detract from the flow of the book and give O'Leary's work a somewhat polemical quality.

Meanwhile, Kenneth Chern's book examines the history of American policy-making regarding China during 1945. This important subject has been dealt with by many prominent scholars, but Chern manages to bring out important new information and interpretations, especially concerning the role of Congress in China policy at this juncture. Taking issue with earlier assessments that have dated widespread American concern about post-war China to the failure of the Marshall mission in 1946 and the convening of a Republican-dominated Congress in 1947, Chern argues that a vigorous China debate actually occurred in 1945, and was a critical turning point in U.S. China policy and a determinant of the Sino-American animosity which erupted later.

Chern shows that the 1945 debate centered on issues of Sino-Russian-American relations in the fluid post-war order of East Asia. While the debate first affected the State Department, he notes how the controversy became public after the defeat of Japan, when U.S.
marines were dispatched to aid the foundering regime of Chiang Kai-shek. The debate is seen as intensified in November 1945, when Patrick Hurley resigned as ambassador to China and in the process openly attacked the State Department for harboring pro-communist sympathizers.

The subsequent Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings—the main forum for the debate and the focal point of the book—failed to clarify America’s options in China before the Cold War narrowed her range of choices. Arguing that the Senate played a crucial role in the foreign relations process by helping shape the dialogue which culminated in the hearings and by influencing both the general public and the policy-making elite which sought domestic support, Chern focuses particular attention on four leading Senators who addressed the issue. On one side were supporters of Ambassador Hurley like Senator Styles Bridges, who challenged the loyalty of U.S. diplomats who had counseled a pragmatic U.S. connection with the Chinese communists. Less preoccupied with loyalty, but just as anti-communist and outspokenly supportive of Chiang Kai-shek, were many moderate conservatives like Arthur Vandenberg, the Senate chief Republican foreign policy spokesman.

Among supporters of the Administration’s policies were such leaders as Senator Tom Connally, the chairman of the committee. He backed Washington’s stated goal of a Nationalist-Communist coalition and tried to dampen criticism from all quarters in order to maximize U.S. leverage on both Chinese factions for a compromise solution. Of course, criticism of Administration policy did not only come from conservatives, as the example of Senator Elbert Thomas demonstrated. He feared an American commitment to the waning Nationalist government would provoke a confrontation with the Soviet Union which he saw as totally adverse to American interests.

Chern weaves the new information he has gathered on these Senators’ views together with already known data about U.S. policy toward China to demonstrate the confusion and dissension that lay behind U.S. policy at this important juncture. His presentation is a model of crisp writing, clear organization and careful analysis.

Chern is particularly on the mark when he asserts at the outset that the example of 1945 is relevant to U.S. policy toward China today. Once again policy makers in Washington confront a newly fluid situation in East Asia dominated by considerations of Chinese-Soviet-American relations. Once again influential American leaders have quite different views as to the proper course for the United States regarding: the development of strategic and other relations
with China; questions of how those ties would affect U.S. interests in Asia; and issues concerning the impact of U.S.-China ties on American interests vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.

Up to this point, it appears that U.S. policy makers have not done enough to avoid repeating the pitfalls that were seen in past China policy. Many American leaders in the Congress and opinion leaders in the country have reflected a good deal of uncertainty and disagreement as the U.S. administrations have moved ahead steadily in developing a closer military, political and economic relationship with China, presumably for the sake of an ill-defined anti-Soviet cause. Many Americans who follow events in East Asia remain uneasy because they see this policy developing without a clear perception of what America's ultimate goals should be regarding both China and the Soviet Union. The need for consensus building on the handling and objectives of U.S.-China policy—a major lesson in Chern's analysis of 1945—should provide food for thought for U.S. leaders today.

Robert Sutter, Ph.D.
Congressional Research Service


After several years of meticulous work, Hungdah Chiu, Professor of Law at the University of Maryland School of Law, completed this volume on the PRC's agreements. This book is the second publication on such a subject—a follow-up volume to *Agreements of the People's Republic of China 1949-1967, A Calendar* (compiled jointly by Douglas Johnston and Hungdah Chiu). Although it is a "calendar of events" from 1966-1980 without the texts of agreements, its virtually complete inclusion provides us with a very useful tool to the study of the PRC's international legal system. It also adds depth and breadth to our understanding of Chinese foreign relations during the covered period.

The compilation of this calendar follows a certain format. All
Selected Books

entries are listed chronologically by date of signature or issuance. In sequence, each entry is given a number for each calendar year. The chronological order of entries is followed by the agreements' effective date, place of signature or issuance, subject matter, and sources. For the convenience of cross-reference, agreements are also listed in a separate section under "agreements by partners."

Bilateral agreements occupy most of the space of this book (pp. 3-210). These agreements include joint communiques, joint statements, treaties, agreements, protocols, accords, contracts, exchanges of notes, exchanges of letters, minutes, plans, and others. The calendar of multilateral treaties runs from pages 213 to 221, covering mostly international agreements or treaties (conventions) between the PRC and international organizations. The total number of agreements, as designated by Chiu, is 1942 (bilateral 1893, multilateral 49)*. A breakdown is arranged by this reviewer as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Bilateral</th>
<th>Multilateral</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>128</td>
<td></td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>68</td>
<td></td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>74</td>
<td></td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>57</td>
<td></td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>110</td>
<td></td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 1893 49 1942

The above figure indicates one significant point: the trend of the conclusion of both bilateral and multilateral agreements increased considerably from 1970 onward; it corresponds to the new diplomatic situation of the PRC in which Peking has been playing an increasingly active role in international politics.

There are 127 countries that have concluded agreements with the PRC, running from Afghanistan to Zimbabwe (p. 249). Once

* Note: The number does not include the "questionable" agreements.
again, a breakdown of seven selected nations of the 127 is arranged below:

Korea (N.) .......................................... 98
Vietnam (N. & S., up to 1978) ...................... 97
Japan ............................................... 96
Rumania ............................................ 65
Albania (up to 1977) ................................ 60
U. S. A. (from 1972) ................................ 53
U. S. S. R. ........................................... 35

The breakdown warrants a few important notes: (1) Asian countries, such as Korea, Vietnam, and Japan, concluded the highest number of agreements with the PRC for ideological and/or geographical reasons; (2) communist nations reached more agreements than the non-communist ones; but (3) the United States has increased rapidly its agreements in 9 (1972-80) of the last 15 years covered (1966-80). If we combine Japanese and U.S. agreements together, we will see a definite trend of increasing cooperation between the PRC and the two most industrialized countries. It shows the new direction of China's domestic developments and foreign relations.

In terms of the nature of agreements, Chiu divided them into ten categories. They are: political, boundary problems, economic, culture, science and technology, agriculture and forest, fishery, health and sanitation, postal and telecommunication, and communication and transportation (pp. 227-228). In sub-categories, the author gives many more items, such as diplomatic relations, state visits, military aid, economic aid, trade, railways, payments, navigation, loans, technical assistance and cooperation, textile factories, shipping, water conservation, power station construction, petroleum development, cultural exchanges, radio and television cooperation, medical teams, public health work, animal diseases, air routes, travel and tourism, and many others.

In several aspects, the book provides information which is otherwise difficult to obtain. These include agreements on soil construction for Afghanistan, credit granted to the PRC by Argentina, the building of experimental state farms for Botswana, the establishment of satellite communications service with Greece, supply of military equipment to Kampuchea, and so forth.

Since this is a calendar of events, it does not need to offer interpretation or analysis of the treaties or agreements. Its compilation of
nearly 2,000 agreements justifies its value as a very useful research and teaching reference for students in the China field.

King C. Chen
Rutgers University

HUNGDAH CHIU, *Socialist Legalism: Reform and Continuity in Post-Mao People's Republic of China* (Published by the University of Maryland School of Law, No. 1-1982 (46)), 35 pp., $2.00.

The years 1978-79 are the beginning of a rather remarkable chapter in socialist legal development on Mainland China (PRC). The promulgation of the 1978 PRC Constitution, the restoration of the Ministry of Justice, the revival of the people's procuratorates, the enactment of major criminal legislation, the renewed interest in the defense lawyer system, and the call for independence of judicial functions from Chinese Communist Party (CCP) directives all represent a major restructuring of the Chinese legal system.

Professor Chiu, who teaches law at the University of Maryland Law School, presents the changes in China's legal system like few other scholars are able to. Having lived and studied in Taiwan and the United States, he is capable of presenting fuller and more enriching works. His empathy and insight into Chinese legal and extra-legal affairs are further increased by his understanding of the complicated Chinese language, an ability all the more important for examining Mainland China's legal development, since many of its recently-released legal publications are not translated.

This article is based on a paper delivered at the Tenth Sino-American Conference on Mainland China in 1981. In essence, it is a concise comparative study, examining and analyzing the basic structure and major trappings of the PRC's legal system shortly before (i.e., after Mao's death in 1976) and after the 1978-79 legal reform period. There is a great deal of emphasis on the more discernible shortcomings of the legal system before 1979, which is aptly underscored with reference to sixteen Chinese characters that set forth CCP proposed law reform policies—*Youfà keyì* (there must be laws
for people to follow), *Youfa biyi* (these laws must be observed), *Zhifa biyan* (law enforcement must be strict), and *Weifa bijiu* (law breakers must be dealt with). Professor Chiu addressed each of these policies and offered examples of the failings of the law under these concepts. In addition to structural and organizational problems in the PRC legal system before 1979, there were numerous repressive judicial practices, including torture and extreme cruelty in executing the death sentence. It was not surprising, therefore, that the PRC sought to institute reform practices.

The next section of the author's presentation tackles the major reforms and the limits of those reforms. Professor Chiu examined some of the criminal legislation enacted by the PRC and exposed some of the weaknesses and ambiguities in the provisions of these codes, including the retention in the Criminal Law of the controversial analogy principle of the 1951 Counterrevolutionary Act. He also discussed the non-existence of the principle of the presumption of innocence in PRC criminal law. Moreover, he noted reforms in the defense lawyer system and conveyed the focus of the sharp debate that arose over the merits of the policy of Party review of legal decisions.

The most important segment of the article may be that section that deals with the application of the newly-enacted codes and reforms to the case of dissident Wei Jingsheng and to the trial of the Gang of Four and Lin Biao Clique, which, to conform to the scope of this paper, are addressed from procedural aspects only.

The two trials offer the reader the chance to see just how far the PRC was willing to implement its new legal reforms, and Professor Chiu was obviously intent on conveying that. In effect, so many provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code were ignored or modified for application in these two cases, that the reader will undoubtedly conclude that the legal reforms were more for international display than for internal regulation. Yet, this would not be entirely correct, and Professor Chiu points this out. The law, as perceived by the CCP, must, first and foremost, serve the needs of socialism. As such, "no principle, however normatively stated in the constitution or law, is permitted to conflict with the policy needs of the Communist Party" (p. 23).

The end result is that the PRC's recent legal reforms are a mixed blessing. Although unquestionably beneficial to the maintenance of a stable environment for the PRC's modernization program, the laws have been inconsistently applied and continue to clash with fundamental communist values. There is a shortage of
legal personnel and continuing social disorder caused by high unemployment. There is a great deal of political uncertainty. But, there appears to be a PRC commitment to the establishment of a sound legal order, and Professor Chiu suggests that its political stake in legal reform will keep the PRC from abandoning this commitment.

This paper is extremely well-organized, meticulously researched, and carefully presented. Anyone writing on Chinese legal affairs will have to read it.

*David Salem*


The book edited by James Hsiung and Samuel Kim addresses more contemporary issues in Chinese foreign policy. Its essays are comprehensive and cover important topics; the book should have something of value for everyone with an interest in current Chinese foreign policy. Among highlights for this reviewer were Steven Levine's well-written and thoughtful essay on China's policy toward the Soviet Union and the United States, Kim Woodard's summation of some of his recent extensive research on China's energy potential and its impact on world affairs, and Nai-Ruenn Chen's straight-forward and well-balanced assessment of China's recent foreign trade policy and performance.

Those with an interest in Maoist ideology and its influence on China's world view will certainly benefit greatly from Samuel Kim's thoroughly grounded essay. China policy toward the Third World, its behavior in the UN General Assembly, and its approaches toward arms control and the Law of the Sea are ably addressed in the articles by Bruce Larkin, William Feeney, Shao-chuan Leng and Hungdah Chiu, respectively. Samuel Kim strives to weave together most of the themes of the book in his concluding essay, offering an assessment and possible scenarios for China's role in the global community.

An interesting source of controversy in the book is contained in
James Hsiung's introductory essay, which complains about the current state of analysis of Chinese foreign policy. He says that much of the literature is largely "sinocentric and ideographic, uncommunicative with the body of theory, methodology, and findings that have developed in the broader fields of comparative foreign policy and international relations."

His suggested remedies seem to make sense. In fact, it is hard to imagine a serious scholar of Chinese foreign policy failing to take the maxims into account. Thus, he suggests that scholars avoid "ad hoc explanations that either do not mesh among themselves or contribute little to our overall knowledge." He asks that scholars place specific events in Chinese foreign behavior in a larger context of China's policy process; relate China's bilateral and regional relations to larger global settings; and consider China both as the initiator of international events and as a recipient of international pressures.

Unfortunately, these efforts may not be sufficient to bridge the communication gap Hsiung sees between the study of Chinese foreign policy and broader fields of comparative politics and international relations. This is chiefly because specialists in Chinese foreign policy face an ongoing problem that can be equated to the old adage that you can't run until you learn how to walk. Thus, before we can strive to assess Chinese foreign policy in broad terms, we must first acknowledge that we are dealing with a basically closed society as far as foreign policy decision-making is concerned; that the evidence we have to assess Chinese decision-making is relatively scarce; and that we must use that evidence judiciously, carefully verifying data and building case studies that enhance our knowledge and understanding of the policy and process in Chinese foreign affairs.

This task takes time. We require many more solidly researched case studies that give important insights into Chinese foreign policy behavior. In short, some observers would judge Professor Hsiung's call to be premature. We still have a lot more work to do in getting our facts straight and in building our case studies before we can venture forward with meaningful, broader generalities about Chinese foreign policy behavior.

Robert Sutter, Ph.D.
Congressional Research Service


Both these books reproduce selections from the very large number of wall posters and printed or duplicated publications that appeared during the period of liberalization in the PRC from October 1978 to March 1979. The amount of material was so great that only one document, the Manifesto of the Thaw Society, appears in both selections.

What They Say is the smaller book. Of its 258 total pages, 95 pages are photographs of original wall posters or publications. These photographs are valuable as an authentication of the English text but many of them are very hard to read. Two of the longer documents which appear are, “It could happen in the year 2000,” and “A wall poster to Hua and Teng.” The former depicts an imaginary future, making the point that history could repeat itself unless a development of democracy and the rule of law produces radical changes in the Communist regime. The latter describes a large number of grievances arising from abuses of power by officials that the Hua-Teng leadership has refused to redress. What They Say also gives some documents from the earlier and shorter period of liberalization in 1957.

The Fifth Modernization gives a larger selection. Wei Jingsheng, the most famous critic, is represented by one long piece of 23 pages and two shorter ones, the last being a horrifying account of conditions in the Qincheng prison. This larger selection, added to the pieces in What They Say, shows interesting differences among the critics. Some seem to regard democracy and human rights as possible within an otherwise unchanged Communist regime; others obviously admire the United States and other Western democracies; and still others criticize the Chinese Communist regime in terms of Marx’s idealization of the Paris Commune, reproduced by Lenin in State and Revolution.

Many of the documents show that the “bamboo curtain” had not been impermeable to the inflow of knowledge that was almost certainly unwelcome to the Communist authorities. Since 1949, official publicity had painted a very dark picture of conditions in the
United States, but nearly all the references to the United States in the documents are favorable. Others show awareness that economic progress in Taiwan has been much greater than in the PRC. The official attempts to isolate citizens of the PRC from knowledge of the outside world may actually have been counter-productive. The documents show almost no awareness of the serious defects in the societies of the United States, Japan, or Western Europe.

Though some critics argue that Marxism needs revision, many accept some dubious pacts of simplified Marxism. Several documents denounce the evils of Communist rule as the continuance or revival of feudalism. This classification of traditional China as feudal comes from the simplified Marxist view that all societies develop through the same stages. One can argue that feudalism started to develop in China during periods when the central government had become very weak, but the centralized bureaucratic state that existed whenever a dynasty was strong was very different from feudalism. None of the documents recognizes that it is possible for a ruling and exploiting class to base its power, not on private ownership of the means of production, but on control of the apparatus of the state.

Document 29 in *The Fifth Modernization*, "The Cultural Revolution and Class Struggle," argues that, "class struggle ceases to exist in China after 1956" (when agriculture had been collectivized and industry and trade nationalized).

Two more perspicacious analyses are those in Document 14 of *The Fifth Modernization*, "Democracy of Bureaucracy" by Liu Min and in an editorial from the Exploration magazine edition of March 25, 1979 entitled, "Do we want Democracy or a New Dictatorship" (reproduced in *What They Say*). Liu Min says, "The Soviet Union ruined its proletarian revolutionary cause mainly because it did not abolish in time the 'system of posting according to grades.'" He argues that, when all appointments are made from above, the people inevitably lose all control. However, he does not go on to argue that an organization with a monopoly on making appointments can become a new ruling class. Moreover, he has a highly idealized view of Yugoslavia which he praises for establishing "a democratic system modeled after the Paris Commune." The editorial from Exploration pointed out that founders of Chinese dynasties have won the empire by promises to serve the people but have later turned against them. This prompted the following statement:

Our historical experience tells us we must set limits to the confidence we place in any man. Any man who tries to win the unlimited confidence of the people is, without excep-
tion, an ambitious man. . . . We cannot believe that any man will, of his own accord, serve the interests of others. Even less can we believe that any man will spontaneously sacrifice his own interests to those of others. We can only trust representatives who are under our supervision and responsible to us. And these representatives must be delegated by us and not thrust upon us . . . .

It was natural that a few months of free discussion were not enough to produce an adequate theoretical basis for the reform of a Communist regime but the regime that suppressed the critics also had no adequate theoretical basis for attaining its objectives. So long as the leaders remain determined to maintain socialism, the dictatorship of the proletariat, the leadership of the Communist Party, and Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse-tung Thought, they can only make limited improvements in the performance of the Chinese economy and face much greater limitations on their ability to win popular support.

The developments during the winter of 1978-79, of which these documents form a part, refuted those Western "China experts" who had argued that the Chinese were satisfied with Communist rule and did not want human rights or democracy because they were not to be found in the Chinese tradition.

It is largely true that human rights and democracy were not parts of the Chinese tradition. Sir John Barrow, who was a member of the Macartney mission in 1793, said of the Chinese people: "Contented in having no voice in the government, it has never occurred to them that they have any rights; and they certainly enjoy none but what are liable to be trampled on, whenever the sovereign, or any of his representatives, from interest, malice or caprice, think fit to exercise the power that is within their grasp." In a footnote he recounts that the French revolutionaries had tried to spread their doctrines in Asia through translations of Tom Paine's *Rights of Man* but found it impossible to produce a translation into Chinese. This story may well be true. The modern term for "rights" (quan-li) may not have existed in the 1790s so even the title of Tom Paine's book would have required a defining essay. Again, less than seventy years ago, Chen Duxiu did not use the modern term "minzhu" for democracy, rather, he used characters giving the approximate sound of the foreign word which were meaningless if read as Chinese.

It is also true that people will tolerate a great deal of unpleasantness if they do not know that anything better is possible. However, it is clearly fallacious to argue that the Chinese will not want
human rights and democracy once they become aware that it is possible to have types of society that provide them. The developments of 1978-79 must have spread much awareness.

By reproducing numerous documents, both these books raise significant issues for China scholars, and reflect the strong sense of suppression and naiveté that currently permeates Chinese society.

Michael Lindsay
2. China, People's Republic of (Mainland) and China, Republic of (Taiwan)


An exchange of policy statements in late February, 1937, designed in part to unify the Chinese Communists and Chinese Nationalists on the Mainland in order to combat effectively Japanese aggression, marked the beginning of KMT-CCP wartime detente (see p. 9). With clarity and precision, John C. Kuan traced the history of negotiations between the Nationalists (KMT) and the Communists (CCP) during World War II, and examined the American and Soviet policies toward China that prevailed during the KMT-CCP wartime relationship. The study is punctuated with quotes from Mao Tse-tung, Chiang Kai-shek, and others, which underlie the basis for, and establish the elements of, KMT-CCP detente.

The book is divided into four chapters: general background, military negotiations, political negotiations, and the mediation efforts of U.S. Personal Representative Patrick Hurley, who was sent to China in 1944-1945 to try to achieve a united KMT-CCP command (p. 95). Each is handled competently, and the footnotes at the end of the chapters suggest a great deal of research. Unfortunately, the book suffers from the absence of solid introductory and concluding chapters, which might illuminate for the reader the importance and/or current relevance of this study and tie in all the data and information presented. Nevertheless, Mr. Kuan made a serious effort to bring into focus the actions and ambitions of each side. His work is particularly recommended for those whose specialty in Chinese relations focuses on policy developments in the 1937-1945 period.

*David Salem*
ALAN P. L. LIU, Social Change on Mainland China and Taiwan, 1949-1980. (Published by the University of Maryland School of Law, No. 3-1982 (48)) 55 pp., $3.00.

In what is one of the very few scholarly comparative studies of social change on Taiwan and Mainland China, Alan P. L. Liu's article analyzes the basic paths of, and differences in, social development of the PRC and the ROC. Mr. Liu's article is compelling not only because its focus is on an area of study heretofore given little scholarly attention, but also because the presentation is clear, concise, organized, and enlightening.

After a brief introduction justifying the utility of such a study, Mr. Liu first analyzed and contrasted the most fundamental aspects of social change on Taiwan and the Mainland and identifies the specific tactical policies underlying the socio-economic programs of the two countries. He then proceeded to contrast seven specific areas of social change: occupational composition, education, social stratification and social mobility, the status of women, public health, media of communication, and social consensus and integration.

In each instance, Mr. Liu punctuated his description with recent data, including the occasional use of tables, to illustrate the differences between the two societies. The discrepancies in social development between the ROC and the PRC give the reader some insight into the relatively superior position occupied by the ROC in terms of social growth. However, lest the reader get the false impression that the author is biased in favor of the social development of Taiwan, Mr. Liu offered some frank comments on ROC social change. For example, although economic and social modernization arguably erodes traditional male domination of the female, and although women in Taiwan "have scored impressive achievements in education" (P. 35), the author pointed out that women's access to political power in Taiwan is based on "tokenism." As a result, the reader is left with a strong sense of Mr. Liu's scholarly accuracy and objectivity.

If there is a flaw in this otherwise excellent study, it is the fact that the author did not strongly address the ramifications of differing methods and rates of social change in Taiwan and Mainland China on the widely publicized campaign for "reunification." Surely, the potential—or lack of potential—compatibility of the socio-economic foundations of these two countries would provide very interesting grist for the mill of "China specialists" in the West and "reunification" advocates everywhere. In truth, though, Mr. Liu has not failed
to broach the subject, since the data provide adequate material for
the reader to draw his own conclusions.

In conclusion, the empirical data which the author compiled for
this study offer an interesting and insightful basis for comparison of
Taiwan and the Mainland and provide strong evidence for the study
of a less popular aspect of Chinese development.

David Salem

WEI LIANG-TSAI, *Peking Versus Taipei in Africa 1960-1978*
(Taipei: The Asia and World Institute, 1982) No. 25, 457 pp.,
Bibliography, Index, $12.00.

Studies in contemporary Chinese politics often draw the reader
into the vortex of the dynamic and volatile interplay of relationships
among the United States, the Soviet Union, Southeast Asia, and Eu­
rope. Most scholarly contributions have not addressed Chinese-Af­
rican relations to any great extent, although apparently with good
reason, since China has not had official or unofficial relations with
Africa until very recently. Wei Liang-Tsai, in a clear, balanced,
well-written, and thoroughly researched work, has built the founda­
tion for future scholarly research into Chinese-African relations and
established the framework for a workable and understandable exam­
ination of competitive relationships between the People's Republic
of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC) in Africa.

In analyzing these competitive relationships, the author focuses
on, *inter alia*, the origins of PRC-ROC competition in Africa, the
long-range and short-range goals of Peking and Taipei, the advan­
tages and disadvantages of their competition, the tactics they em­
ployed, and the response of the African nations.

PRC-ROC competition in Africa had modest beginnings. As
the author stated, "Serious Chinese interest in Africa, by either the
PRC or ROC, can be dated from the 1955 Afro-Asian conference at
Bandung, Indonesia, in which the PRC participated and the ROC
did not" (p. 6). Although Africa did not seem to develop as an arena
for PRC-ROC rivalry until the 1960s, the quote is significant for its
rather concise summation of the substance of the ROC's African pol-
icy: a reactive strategy designed to counter the PRC's intensified diplomatic offensive and the increase in independent African countries (see p. 288).

Once the competitive fire was lit, both the ROC and the PRC established numerous goals. For both, trade relations were important. For each, Africa was in a pivotal position to resolve the "Chinese representation" problem in the United Nations (from the 1960s to 1971). For the PRC, Africa was a region ripe for Communist ideological indoctrination. For the ROC, Africa was vulnerable; Africans needed to be warned away from Communism. There is excellent and abundant examination of these issues, as well as the relative strengths and weaknesses of each Asian competitor's positions. Chapters II and VIII also identify and explain major tactical categories used by the ROC and the PRC in implementing their respective African policies, including negotiations for diplomatic recognition, information and propaganda, exchange programs, conferences, and covert activities.

Wei Liang-Tsai's logical and systematic approach to the PRC-ROC rivalry in Africa in the period from 1960-1978 serves two important purposes: it elucidates the nature of PRC-ROC competition and it contributes to an understanding of the response of African nations, particularly to Peking's overtures. His chapters form a coherent whole and his book is worth reading.

*David Salem*
3. China, Republic of (Taiwan)


Despite what may appear as an obvious propensity to extol a work one has helped compose (I was Executive Editor of this volume), I need not apologize for commending this volume to the dilettante, student, practitioner, or scholar. The *Yearbook* stands on its own merit, because of both its coverage and the reputation and scholarship of its contributors.

Professor Hungdah Chiu, the Editor-in-Chief of this new publication, described the *Yearbook* as a vehicle to provide otherwise unpublished information on the Republic of China (ROC) and as a forum for scholarly discussion on international legal aspects which touch the ROC. This volume generally covers the period from January 1, 1979 to December 31, 1980, although there are some later references as well. It is divided into ten major areas, including coverage of international law concepts as they apply to, and are perceived by, the ROC in such areas as trade, investment, and human rights. Book reviews and a bibliography of recent academic articles on international law and affairs published in the ROC are also found herein. In addition, there are lists of official and unofficial agreements concluded by the ROC, ROC missions abroad, and foreign missions in the ROC.

There are several outstanding articles included in this volume, all of which are typified by the intellectual sophistication, timeliness, research aptitude, and lucidity that mark David Simon's exposition on legal developments in U.S.-ROC trade from 1979-1981 (p. 97). His focus is on the principal trade law cases at the administrative level involving the ROC during the period under examination. Despite a strong legal emphasis, what emerges from his description and analysis of these cases—as they apply U.S. anti-dumping and countervailing duties law, “escape clause” provisions of the Trade Act of 1974, and the law of unfair competition—is evidence of the tension and complexity generated by international and domestic issues involved in the derecognition of Taiwan (see particularly the *Mushrooms* case discussion, pp. 107-11).

One need not agree wholly with authors’ interpretations to find the *Yearbook* articles useful: they are all innovative and insightful.
enough to provoke thoughtful discussion and encourage scholarly repartee. The book reviews and article summaries are brief and to the point.

In short, the *Yearbook* is an encyclopedic treasure of data and scholarly discussion on problems encompassing international law and affairs and the Republic of China. It is illuminating and stimulating and should be considered an essential addition to the library of all those interested in contemporary Chinese studies.

*David Salem*

JEANNETTE L. FAUROT (ed.), *Chinese Fiction from Taiwan: Critical Perspectives*. (Bloomington: Indiana University, 1980.) 272 pp., Glossary of Chinese Names and Terms, Index, $17.50.

For two decades Chinese authors on Taiwan have produced a steady flow of creative writing characterized by honesty, verve and experimentation perhaps unequalled in Chinese literature since the time of the May Fourth Movement over six decades ago. Only recently has the English language reading public been afforded access to some of these stories in the anthologies provided by Ch'i Pang-yüan, et al. [*An Anthology of Contemporary Chinese Literature—Taiwan: 1949-1974* (Vol. 2. Taipei: National Institute for Compilation and Translation, 1975)] and Joseph S. M. Lau, *Chinese Stories from Taiwan: 1960-1970* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976). This volume makes a contribution to our appreciation of Chinese fiction emanating from Taiwan.

This volume supplements those anthologies with critical commentaries and analytic summaries of the short stories, novellas, novels, and poetry of some of contemporary Taiwan's most notable authors. Howard Goldblatt (pp. 110-133) provides a discrete summary of the rural stories of Hwang Chun-ming, one of the principal practitioners of *hsiang-t'ü* or "regional literature"—stories devoted to accounts of lives of ordinary persons and the customs of Taiwan. For his part, Jing Wang (pp. 43-70) attempts a brief account of the evolution of this specific body of literature. Others offer sensitive
discussions of particular themes that seem to characterize the Chinese fiction from Taiwan. Cyril Birch (pp. 71-85), for example, deftly captures the images of suffering that surface in the fiction of Chu Hsi-ning, Wang Chen-ho and Hwang Chun-ming. Lucien Miller (pp. 86-109) offers an interpretation of the short stories of Ch'en Ying-chen by employing insights offered by the French existentialist philosopher Gabriel Marcel.

All the essays are worth reading. They provide some appreciation of the complexity and richness of some of the finest Chinese literary products of our time. What they cannot afford, of course, is a sense of the style and impact of the works themselves. In the case of the works of Chen Jo-hsi that disability is in part offset by the availability in translation of the Execution of Mayor Yin and Other Stories from the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (Translated by Nancy Ing and Howard Goldblatt. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978). The translation of some of Chen's works, coupled with the moving essay by Kai-yu Hsu (pp. 206-233) in the present collection, permit the English language reader to begin to comprehend the depth and integrity of Chinese fiction produced by the writers of Taiwan.

The collection, however, suffers from disabilities that seem endemic to literary criticism and literary analysis in general. Some authors occasionally allow glib generalizations to escape. We are told in one place, for instance, that there is a "middle-class mentality" on Taiwan that is "basically apolitical," and that there are Taiwanese "masses" that "are in no mood to confront political reality" (p. 9)—when we know that the Chinese literature produced in Taiwan is liberally stocked with critical political works like those of Hsiu Fu-kuan's Ju-chia cheng-chih ssu-hsiang yu min-chu tsu-yu jen-ch'uan (The Political Thought of the Confucian School and Democracy, Freedom and Human Rights, Taipei: Pa-shih nien-tai chu-pan-she, 1979), K'ang Ning-hsiang's Wen-cheng liu-nien (Six Years of Concern with Government, Taipei: Ch'ang-ch'iao chu-pan-she, 1978), and Hsieh Cheng-i's Tang-nei yu Tang-wai (Inside and Outside the Kuomintang, Taipei: Min'ch'uan t'ung-hsun-she, 1980). It would be difficult to establish as fact that the Chinese on Taiwan, either possessed of "middle-class mentality" or as "masses," are any more politically apathetic than the populations of North America, Europe, Asia, or Africa.

Similarly, it is difficult to credit the suggestion that the "slaughter" of "numerous Taiwanese" by the Nationalist government during the February 28th rebellion in 1948 was sufficient to "cut short"
the "re-burgeoning of native literature" (p. 33) in the fifties. That the poverty and widespread illiteracy that characterized the war-ravaged island during that period might have had some influence can hardly be dismissed. Equally implausible is the notion—invoked to explain the appearance and reappearance of the theme of the "prodigal son" so common to Taiwanese fiction—that all mankind is animated by an irrepressible "desire to 'return'" to childhood environs (p. 36). When such a notion is coupled with the conviction that in "each person [is] hidden . . . the impulse to search for the 'womb' . . . ," (p. 36) we are left with an acute sense of cognitive discomfort. Psychoanalytic contrivances are hardly convincing in science—and significantly less convincing in literary criticism.

 Literary critics often feel compelled to offer "explanations" of literary efforts. Often, such explanations are put together out of shapeless and unsupported generalizations about human psychology, political reality, and socio-economic circumstances. We are all aware, for example, that Taiwan has been "undergoing change," and that change has brought dislocation and tension in its trail. We also know that Taiwan suffers from "social evils" and "corruption." But knowing all that, we are not one whit closer to understanding how such information explains the production of a literary work of art. Still less does it explain the specific productivity of the Chinese on Taiwan.

 If social change, social evils and corruption could explain either the content or frequency of artistic production then we would expect to be inundated by literary works from Uganda, Kampuchea and Egypt. The fact remains that artistic creativity is very difficult to explain in any comprehensive sense, and the kinds of generalizations we have considered do very little to help.

 Happily, only few of the authors in the Faurot collection pretend to "explain" the appearance of so much talent on Taiwan. Rather, we are assisted in enjoying their products without the burden of sociological, psychoanalytic or Marxist "interpretations."

 Fiction is just that—fiction. Should fiction convey any truths, those "truths" are intuitive insights. They are the result of empathic identification with the characters who people, and the events which shape, short stories, novellas and novels. Writers fashion characters and allude to events that portray some aspect of life in their environments. In a way, good writers offer us case studies of lives lived or of lives that might have been lived. In that sense, works of fiction have all the virtues and vices of case studies—with the added disability that nothing said in fictional accounts can be taken to be literally
true. Given such critical disclaimers, the writers of fiction can hardly qualify as “social pathologists” (see Robert Yi Yang’s essay on the satire of Wang Chen-ho) capable of either diagnosing the ills of their society, or recommending remedial therapy. Writers of fiction can engage our interest, invoke in us some form of intuitive understanding, and move us to concern ourselves with any number of problems. But there is no clear sense to the suggestion that the writers of fiction, in and of themselves, might be capable of employing “the pen as a scalpel to lay open the cancers of society” (p. 2). Even social scientists would hardly pretend to that competence.

Fortunately, most of the discussion in the Faurot volume avoids getting embroiled in such pretensions. For the most part, the contributors afford us competent and insightful assessments of a remarkably large number of Chinese authors who have lived the major part of their lives, and who have been, by and large, educated in Taiwan. The real puzzlement about the abundance of creative writing emanating from Taiwan turns not on how such writing should be understood, but rather on why there has been such an abundance at all. It would be hard to imagine any literary critic anticipating such a development in a society suffering not only protracted crisis and inextricably involved in the tensions of massive economic development, but burdened, presumably, by a “repressive” political regime as well (cf. pp. 46f.).

Actually, Western academics have only recently begun to take the intellectual and creative life of the Chinese on Taiwan seriously. What they are discovering, along with the authors of the collection we are here considering, is that that life is intrinsically interesting and manifestly rich. Faurot’s book contributes to that new appreciation and is a welcome addition.

Robert W. Barnett
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
(Published by the University of Maryland School of Law, No. 4-1982(49)), 39 pp., $2.50.

Michael Frost's article traced the development of U.S. policy initiatives toward Taiwan under the Carter Administration in the wake of derecognition in 1978-1979. The first part of Mr. Frost's study examined executive branch (read: "Carter Administration") behavior during the period leading up to U.S. recognition of the People's Republic of China, with particular emphasis on the perceived shortcomings of the Carter strategy. There is a brief comparison of the military forces of the ROC and the PRC, and this is followed by the second major part of the study: an analysis of U.S. Congressional response to the derecognition of the ROC. Mr. Frost concluded his paper with a short case study parallel of previous U.S. policy toward Korea and with a number of conclusions and recommendations for future U.S.-ROC policy.

By illuminating internal U.S. policy calculations and objectives, Mr. Frost made clear the myriad considerations the Carter Administration and the Congress contemplated in the process of normalizing relations with the PRC. The author pointed out, for example, that the Carter Administration's haste to recognize the PRC was prompted by the President's urgent desire to play the "China card," but his calculation not only failed to assess the political implications of derecognizing Taiwan, but also failed to anticipate the negative reaction of our allies to normalization and of Congress to the secrecy and unilateral executive decision-making involved in negotiating the U.S.-PRC Joint Communique. There is also a brief discussion on the ambiguous wording of the Communique, an issue that has been the subject of numerous editorials and may appear all too familiar to the reader.

Despite Mr. Frost's insightful glimpse into various miscalculations and debates in the White House and on Capitol Hill, I perceive two major shortcomings in his paper. First, I feel that the author's own calculations and conclusions are somewhat superficial and incomplete. Mr. Frost is convinced that the PRC is duplicitous in its relations with the United States vis-a-vis Taiwan and that the result of normalization has not only threatened Taiwan's own security but has jeopardized U.S. relations with its allies in other areas of the world. Though undoubtedly true to some degree, the author tends to over-generalize, giving the reader the sense that the substance of nu-
merous issues was glossed over in favor of conclusory statements that do not adequately develop the full scope of such issues. His support for Congressssional tempering of Carter initiatives occasionally rings like political back-slapping rather than scholarly criticism, designed to preserve Taiwan's Congressional support on Capitol Hill.

That leads to my second criticism: the author's apparent anxiety to portray the negative implications of U.S.-PRC rapprochement. U.S. derecognition has undoubtedly engendered strong economic, political, military, and legal issues, the resolution of some of which ought to favor continued support for Taiwan. But, to adequately understand U.S. policy with respect to the PRC and the ROC, one must have a fuller complement of facts than Mr. Frost chooses to present.

Although Mr. Frost's paper may be somewhat weak in objectivity, it is intense in presentation. By giving the reader a strong sense of U.S. mistakes in the U.S.-PRC normalization process, the author has conveyed the problems they have created for Taiwan and the United States.

David Salem


The development of the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan has earned Taiwan the respect of many countries of the Free World and the envy of many countries of the Communist world. In just over thirty years, the ROC has accomplished a rapid economic growth that may be unmatched by any other country at any other time. Taiwan's economic growth and industrialization has resulted in a per capita income that was well over $2000 in 1980. Moreover, the Taiwanese may be unique for their ability to combine growth with equity—distributing the burdens and benefits of its modernization and development on what may be a more even basis than any other country developing at the same pace.
The development of a modern, internationally-competitive economy requires relatively stable, sophisticated, and successful political and social conditions. One need only review the comments of leading Communist Chinese leaders on the eve of the promulgation of several major legal codes in 1979: the successful execution of the Four Modernizations Program (i.e., economic, social and military development) required a peaceful and stable environment. In this sense, they, as well as many other, acknowledge and respect the "Taiwan model." *The Taiwan Experience* is an effort to present to the reader—in somewhat of a subjective, non-critical format—the facts and reasons behind the relatively successful story of the ROC's development. I do not wish to make this book read as a glowing, subjective, positive, and therefore unacceptable, account of the strides the ROC has made in the thirty years since its government has relocated on Taiwan. Granted, even James Hsiung, the general editor, noted that the book "does not purport to present all points of view" (p. 3), but "it contains enough diversity and constructive criticisms to justify . . . its claim to being a balanced representation" (p. 3). There is enough negativism advanced by critics of the ROC to justify his comment and enough truth in his statement to commend the book.

*The Taiwan Experience* is divided into eight sections, covering just about every aspect of Taiwan's development since 1950—cultural values, education, social conditions, law and justice, domestic politics, economic development, foreign relations, and security and defense capabilities. Each section begins with an introductory editorial comment by the contributing editor(s), and is followed by excerpted reproductions from other published sources. Continuity between sources or time periods within a particular subject area is also provided for by the contributing editor(s) in the form of commentary; the sections on law and justice, foreign relations, and security and defense capabilities use this quite effectively. The commentary identifies the issues, sets the time frame, and outlines the context in which the issues are presented. In truth, these editorial commentaries are sufficiently comprehensive and instructive to be read independently of the other sources, although the fullest understanding requires the reading of both.

The original writings and reproductions are occasionally uneven, though it appeared this was more the case within a particular topic rather than across subject areas. If there is a criticism of the format of this book—and this is probably true of most books which include excerpted reproductions from different time periods—it is
that the excerpts are simply reproduced without modifications in certain factual data or verb tenses. Thus, certain documentary material appears, citing data and using verb tenses that leave the reader with the impression he may be reading current material when, in fact, he is not. Nevertheless, each reproduction is cited to its original source and publication data, and if the book is read carefully—or where the commentary provides the necessary explanation—all the material can be put in its chronological perspective. The eight sections, though they document ROC development in individual areas, read together to give the reader an insightful look into the interdependence and overlap of factors that have contributed to the overall growth of the island.

When I completed the book, I was struck by two things: first, the ROC has orchestrated an industrious program of development that has succeeded despite adversity and that stands as a testament to its social, economic, legal, cultural, and political cohesion; second, that there is still room for improvement. That I was left with the latter impression is a tribute to the fairly balanced presentation of the book, though it is undoubtedly more positive than others I have read. In my estimation, The Taiwan Experience 1950-1980 is a very acceptable volume of information and deserves a wide audience.

David Salem


The era of Sun Yat-sen (1866-1925), the man regarded as the founding father of the Republic of China (ROC), is unique in the annals of Chinese history. The political philosophies of Dr. Sun Yat-sen have continuing significance for the further ideological, economic, political, social, and even military development of the ROC. Part of the reason for Dr. Sun's political success was his progressive philosophical constructs—an "innovative synthesis of Western and Chinese elements within [a] system of . . . action-oriented political
philosophy” (p. 13)—which have an influence in the ROC’s growth even today.

This volume attempts to elucidate Sun Yat-sen’s illustrious political career and explain various aspects of his philosophies and their application to concrete problems in China’s revolutionary politics. This volume also describes the origins and early history of Republican China, so that the reader may better assimilate Dr. Sun’s political strategies in light of the political environment of his time.

The book combines presentations of speakers made at the First European Sun Yat-sen Symposium, held in Austria in 1979, with three papers written expressly for this publication. There are 17 presentations in all. The volume is divided into three sections. The first is an overview of China’s 19th century, pre-revolutionary history and Dr. Sun’s political career, including an enlightening biographical sketch of Sun Yat-sen by Gottfried-Karl Kinderman, the volume’s editor. The second section addresses many of the aspects of Dr. Sun’s political philosophy. The final section describes chronologically Sun Yat-sen’s strategies for handling problems of China’s revolutionary politics. There is also a bibliography on Chinese and Western language literature on Sun Yat-sen.

This volume contains well-documented, sophisticated material which, considering the styles and backgrounds of the contributors, is surprisingly well-balanced. There are a few pages of photographs and charts designed to bring the reader a clear image of Dr. Sun, the man, and Dr. Sun, the revolutionary. In large part, the book succeeds in conveying the various dimensions of Sun Yat-sen’s life and in presenting the philosophies that continue to be an effective force in Republican Chinese development. About the only complaint I have is purely peripheral—this book is designated as Volume One and there appears to be no indication of what set of topics or books this volume is part of.

David Salem
Selected Books


(All three are published by the U.S. Gov't. Printing Office, Wash., D.C.)

In December 1978, Jimmy Carter extended diplomatic recognition to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and simultaneously “derecognized” Taiwan, bringing about the greatest change in U.S.-China relations in a generation. This event was expected to impair America’s relations with Taiwan and to influence adversely Taiwan’s domestic stability, economic growth, and security. The process of decision—a unilateral action of the administration that appeared to be an overreaction to PRC pressures—also caused concern in Congress, and influenced the drafting of the Taiwan Relations Act (P.L. 96-8). In this act, Congress specified the instrumentalities to be employed to conduct quasi-diplomatic relations with Taiwan—the American Institute in Taiwan and its counterpart, the Coordination Council for North American Affairs; it provided that treaties and agreements, excepting the Mutual Defense Treaty, would remain in effect; and it assigned oversight for implementation of the act to Congressional foreign relations committees.

The publications reviewed here present some of the committee deliberations over the first year that the act has been in effect. They establish that there has been no immediate, dramatic reversal in Taiwan’s fortunes following normalization. In a survey of current political, economical, and military problems, they suggest that Taiwan’s future course is uncertain. The publications are hearings and reports and do not, for the most part, represent new academic research on the topic of normalization. Nonetheless, they are useful materials for those interested in the changing pattern of U.S. relations in East Asia.
Oversight of the Taiwan Relations Act

Two hearings present observations on the implementation of the Taiwan Relations Act. The first hearing (15 November 1979) was held in response to the administration's termination of the air transport agreement between Taiwan and the United States. Senator John Glenn, then chairman of the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, administered a verbal wrist-slapping to Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher, because the administration had not consulted with Congress in advance of cancelling the agreement and because the administration had pledged in previous hearings on the Act that "all international agreements will remain in force except for the Mutual Defense Treaty and related agreements." This theme—inadequate executive branch consultation with Congress and the imbalance in Presidential-Congressional power regarding relations with Taiwan—also emerged in the comments of Robert Parker, President of the American Chamber of Commerce in Taiwan, and William Morell, President of the USA-ROC Economic Council. Their primary concern, however, was protection of American business interests in Taiwan and the need to establish conditions, by means of agreements or arrangements, under which normal commercial relations could be conducted.

The report also summarizes existing legal relationships between the United States and Taiwan. In the opinion of the State Department, five agreements required modification—those pertaining to scientific cooperation, air transport, textiles, nuclear non-proliferation, and reduction in tariff and non-tariff barriers. An additional twenty-nine agreements, concerning active programs in education, fisheries, investment, postal affairs, and the like, would, in the words of Christopher, "continue in force following provisions of the Taiwan Relations Act." The final statement, by international law specialist Victor Li, places the aviation agreement in the broader context of changing legal relationships and contracts, and briefly compares the American to the Japanese formula for handling relations with Taiwan.

A second hearing (14 May 1980) was held to evaluate the implementation of the Taiwan Relations Act. This record is comprised of statements and reports by officials of the General Accounting Office (GAO) and the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), which assess the first year of the new relationship. The GAO found some substance to the fear of Congress that PRC reactions influenced U.S. decisions; it suggested that the State Department might have over-reacted in its avoidance of the appearance of any official contact with
Taiwan, but admitted that this was an area of judgment, not fact. Further, the GAO report confirmed the administration's lack of consultation with Congress, called for by members of the Senate and House foreign relations committees during consideration of the Taiwan Relations Act; but it also referred to the sensitivity of the issue and the limited number of U.S. officials deciding it.

Officials of AIT reported some initial problems with their accommodations and communications systems that were the result of the new non-official relationship, but there were few other complaints of an administrative nature. Economic relations during the first year period proceeded smoothly, and AIT officers were able to encourage increased Taiwan purchases of American goods. The dull nature of this report and the GAO report is evidence of the smoothness of the transition.

The hearing appendix contains statements critical of the human rights record of the Taiwan government by Peter Cheng, Stephen Dial (of the International Human Rights Law Group), and Richard Kagan. They criticize the government's postponement of elections originally scheduled for December 1978; suppression of new, liberal journals; alleged repression of dissent; and the severe sentencing of defendants in the Kaohsiung incident of 10 December 1979. The committee record contains no response to, or analysis of, these criticisms and concerns.

In summary, two hearings of the most concerned Congressional subcommittee show more success in the implementation of derecognition than failure. The chief concerns are over inadequate consultation of the executive with Congress, hardly a new matter, and PRC influence over U.S. decisions. The issues of weapons sales to Taiwan and human rights are given less attention; in fact, the human rights dimension seems to have been added as an afterthought. Overall, one is struck by the general satisfaction with the modalities and initial outcomes of quasi-official relations with Taiwan.

A First Year Review of Normalization

The third committee report is the record of a workshop (6-7 March 1980) on “Taiwan: One Year after United States-China Normalization.” At this symposium, twelve non-governmental specialists on China and Taiwan treated the political, economic, and security situation on Taiwan after enactment of the Taiwan Relations Act.

Ralph Clough, Parris Chang, Steven Levine, and Hungdah Chiu discussed Taiwan's political stability. Although disagreeing at
several points, these specialists mentioned similar causes and conditions of Taiwan’s political development. A series of factors, the specialists note, explain the political stability Taiwan has enjoyed from 1949 to the present. The Chiang family (Chiang Kai-shek and his son Chiang Ching-kuo, who assumed the premiership in 1972 and presidency in 1978) has provided continuous and, in the case of the younger Chiang particularly, highly skilled political leadership. An integral part of their strategy of rule has been the obedient military which, in the early years, assisted in socioeconomic development, and a powerful internal security branch which has controlled insurgency and suppressed political dissent under the terms of martial law.

Taiwan’s economic growth has provided the essential conditions for political effectiveness. The specialists referred to Taiwan’s high GNP ($1,400 per capita in 1979), and high annual growth rate which ensure that she will enter the small class of developed nations by 1990. Economic rewards have been distributed relatively fairly, and the mixed economy has facilitated governmental responsiveness to changes in conditions of trade and provided an outlet for private initiative and ambition. The government’s investment in education has resulted in a literate population with opportunities for upward mobility. Education also permits thousands of young Chinese to move outside Taiwan, reducing pressure for changes within.

The government has given citizens some opportunities for participation, and this has increased their commitment to the state and also allowed them to express ritually their dissatisfactions with government policies. Local level elections are relatively freely conducted; the press, on local issues, has been essentially unhampered; and there have been increasing opportunities for the underrepresented Taiwanese to take positions of influence in the government and military. And the United States has been Taiwan’s international guarantor on those occasions when Taiwan’s security was actually threatened.

The specialists were generally pessimistic about the prospects for continued stability, but none thought invasion was imminent. Beijing’s call for reunification, exchanges of visits, and related united front tactics have been destabilizing, for they lessen the apparent threat to Taiwan and make her rationale for martial law and her large military force suspect. Global economic trends, particularly the eventuality of a slowdown affecting the trade on which Taiwan is so dependent, are a second destabilizing factor.

However, the specialists agreed that domestic political factors
were most likely to cause instability. They were unanimous about the root source of discontent—that mainlanders, who comprise less than 15 percent of the population, control key positions in economic policymaking, in the military, internal security, party, and foreign affairs. Notwithstanding some opening of these higher-level positions to Taiwanese, the majority does not fully share power at a time when the legitimacy of minority control has been most seriously challenged.

The specialists pointed out several manifestations of discontent, remarking on the continuing problem of managing dissent in a system which provides insufficient opportunities for democratic participation. Opinion was divided on the significance of the Chungli riots of 1977 and the 1979 Kaohsiung incident; but to most of the specialists, future disturbances, in the absence of the legitimacy and international support the government once enjoyed, might be catalysts for violent and open mass opposition.

All commentators referred to the question of succession and its potentially destabilizing consequences. President Chiang Ching-kuo, at 71 and in less than perfect health, has no obvious successor, and the mechanisms of rule still seem too fragile and dependent on personalities to survive instability at the helm. The prognoses of these political specialists thus were not sanguine.

Specialists on Taiwan's economy and East Asian economic relations painted a rosier picture of the consequences of normalization for Taiwan. Dwight Perkins, Jan Prybyla, and Julian Weiss summarized their observations in prepared statements. All applauded the record of Taiwan's mixed economy, including the average annual increase in GNP from 1952 to 1978 of 8.4 percent. Perkins, noting that Taiwan's population is only 2 percent of China's, indicated that her foreign trade is slightly larger and her economic performance will likely remain competitive in the future. He found a firm basis for future complementary trade policies, were political relationships to change.

The economists discussed three problems in Taiwan's future economic development. Taiwan remains excessively dependent on foreign trade, and on single countries in this trade, sending the United States 40 percent of her exports and receiving 40 percent of her imports from Japan. Thus, Taiwan is very susceptible to international economic disruptions and recessions or slowdowns in the United States and Japan. Second and related to this factor, Taiwan has a small domestic market, and it cannot adjust to long periods of interruption in her international market activities. Third, Taiwan is
highly deficient in energy resources, importing all of her oil (and 60 percent from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia alone). Further development of hydroelectric resources and planned construction of nuclear power facilities by 1985 may reduce this dependence, but present energy availability limits growth.

Counterbalancing these problems, however, are several notable assets: a large financial reserve (over $7 billion in 1980); significant foreign investment and continued interest of investors; access to international banking capital; and labor peace because of the relatively equitable distribution of economic rewards and stable political conditions. These factors give Taiwan excellent prospects for future economic growth and stability. Prybyla commented that derecognition has had a "zero effect" on the Taiwan economy, and the other economists agree with this assessment, at least for the short run.

The final set of papers and comments at the workshop concerned Taiwan's security. James Hsiung, Ying-mao Kau, James Lilley, and Allen Whiting presented views in this policy area. Like the other specialists whose views are reported here, they linked Taiwan's future security to both economic growth and domestic stability. They also felt that Taiwan's security was dependent on the military balance in the Taiwan Strait, and that currently and, in Whiting's words, for "the next 5 to 7 years," this balance did not seem likely to change.

Yet the specialists thought Taiwan's long-term prospects were uncertain. One area of uncertainty is the military capability of both China and Taiwan. Currently, China is unable to stage an invasion across the Taiwan Strait; for her to develop such a capability would require a substantial reallocation of resources from the current modernization campaign to weapons development. Taiwan's capability is a product of both her untested military (the ranks of which are composed of Taiwanese) and her ability to purchase weapons, particularly advanced aircraft, from the United States and other powers. Obviously, U.S. arms sales policy influences the military capability of both sides.

Another area of uncertainty reported upon by specialists concerns the interests, intentions, and ambitions of the powers in East Asia. China's intention to integrate the province of Taiwan continues to be influenced by domestic conditions and the status of relations with the Soviet Union and, to a lesser extent, Vietnam. The Soviet Union, apart from considering Taiwan as a factor in its fragile relationship with China, has an independent interest in strategic properties in East Asia that Taiwan can provide. The American
people have a sense of moral commitment to Taiwan and, as several specialists noted, under the Taiwan Relations Act the United States may have undertaken more significant guarantees than under the formal treaty system. Most uncertain of all are Taiwan's interests and intentions. The specialists differ regarding Taiwan's likelihood of employing a high risk strategy to secure its future—whether to develop nuclear weapons, to seek a relationship with the Soviet Union, or to declare its independence. Any of these strategic options would change dramatically the relations of power of all nations in East Asia.

Observations

The hearings and workshop transcripts give the reader a useful and worthwhile review of recent thought about Taiwan's polity, economy, and security. However, some observations are in order with respect to the quality of the publications reviewed. First, there is an unevenness of analysis and discussion, which partly reflects the varied cast of specialists called upon to testify. Several commentators have not studied these issues thoroughly, are not experts on Taiwan's development, and rely more on impressions drawn from occasional visits and reading than careful and systematic investigation of the data.

Second, there are numerous gaps in the materials presented. One example is the inattention (except inferentially) to patterns of factional alignment in Taiwan's elite, which will influence the succession, the rate and manner of liberalization, and general human rights policies of the government. A second example is the inattention to Taiwan's developing relationships with European states and with Japan. As we learned from Taiwan's purchase of submarines in the Netherlands, Taiwan is not limited to one-stop weapons shopping in the United States.

These shortcomings are to be expected perhaps, given the nature of the Congressional hearings process and the occasional parochialism of the Washington information circuit. Another weaknesses of the collection, however, is bothersome—the lack of attention to both cumulative and beneficial impacts on Taiwan of U.S.-China normalization. For example, in reviewing the workshop transcript, we are left with these segmented conclusions: Taiwan's domestic polity is presumptively unstable, her economy resilient, and her security uncertain. Although a few specialists suggested the interdependence of these factors, no one tied the loose strands together or indicated the probable ways in which the complex equation
that is Taiwan's security might vary by one single change (as, for example, through a succession struggle) or through a series of small changes that appear unimportant when considered individually.

Although generally useful as a review of the implementation of Congressional legislation, this collection is also disappointing, for it does not examine possible beneficial impacts on China, Taiwan, and the United States. Clearly, China has benefitted from U.S. recognition, shown in the recent discussion of Secretary of State Haig with China’s leaders concerning weapons sales. The United States also has benefitted it seems. But, indeed, the greatest immediate beneficiary may have been Taiwan, which has gained a maneuverability in foreign and domestic policy which it formerly lacked.

Professor Gerald McBeath
Chairman, Political Science Department
University of Alaska, Fairbanks
4. Japan and the United States


The Israeli attack on Iraq’s Osirak reactor is the latest in a series of events in recent years that have served to raise the visibility of the problem of proliferation of nuclear weapons capability. There are at present 5 states with known substantial nuclear weapons programs, the United States, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, France, and China. In addition, India exploded a nuclear device (“peaceful nuclear explosion”) in 1974 and is reported possibly to be preparing for others; Israel is reported to have stockpiled a small number of nuclear weapons; Pakistan is moving toward matching the Indian achievement of 1974; Iraq’s nuclear program seemed designed to provide a clear weapons option to its leaders; and, Libya’s Qaddafi was known to be seeking to purchase nuclear weapons. At least 20 other nations have the industrial infrastructure to produce nuclear weapons. Feasibility studies for nuclear weapons programs have been carried out by a number of nations who thus far have eschewed taking the next step.

Debate over the issue of nonproliferation did not really become a substantial public affair in the United States until the 1976 Presidential election campaign, when Jimmy Carter, sensing rising Congressional interest in the subject, make it a central feature of his foreign policy platform.

The Congress, following its own timetable for action in this area, and pursuing its own version of a nonproliferation policy, moved legislation through various committees in both Houses, and after lengthy negotiations with the executive branch, enacted the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978, (NNPA), which complemented and undergirded the Carter policy, and provided wide flexibility for Executive Branch action in dealing with specific cases (flexibility, it should be added, that has been exercised uniformly in the direction of softening the policy).

The U.S. internal debate on nonproliferation became an international affair after the April announcement and subsequent passage of the NNPA. The nuclear bureaucracies worldwide, and particularly in Europe and Japan, were outraged by what they saw as a 180 degree turn in U.S. policy that could ultimately threaten public sup-
port for their programs inside their own countries, and raised the spectre of active U.S. interference with their plans to introduce large-scale use of plutonium (a weapons material as well as a fuel) in existing reactors, as well as to introduce, as rapidly as possible, the breeder reactor (that uses plutonium as a fuel and can produce more plutonium than it uses). This outrage was matched by similar opposition from the U.S. nuclear industry which made common cause with foreign nuclear interests in fighting the Carter policy.

While there have been many international debates on the non-proliferation issue in recent years, it is a truism that the best ones do not take place within international fora. Instead, they occur when two keep but opposing observers of the scene, knowledgeable about the inner workings of governments and the international non-proliferation regime, and armed with a sense of history, present their arguments and counterarguments unconstrained by the obfuscating burden of holding official positions involving the implementation of policy.

The book under review is precisely just such a debate, presented by two of the most eminent and thoughtful persons in the field of nonproliferation policy. The book, which is recommended to anyone with more than a passing interest in the subject, arose out of a series of discussions between Imai and Rowen when they were involved as consultants in fashioning the 1977 U.S.-Japan agreement on the operation of the Tokai-Mura pilot scale reprocessing facility.

Although the debate is cast in general terms, each author is aware of the special benefits that his position on the issue holds for his own country. In Rowen's case, it is national security for the United States via the ability to maintain indefinitely a nuclear arsenal while limiting the number of other such arsenals around the world. In Imai's case, it is the freedom for Japan to undertake commercial operation of any aspect of the nuclear fuel cycle without external interference.

The issue of nonproliferation is tied up first and foremost with the issue of national security in its broadest sense. Nations that feel their economic and political positions in the world community are secure are unlikely to seek nuclear weapons, and especially so if it is their perception that having such weapons may actually erode their security. A decision by a given nation to obtain nuclear weapons raises the probability of decisions by rivals to do the same, or at least to put themselves in a position to do so quickly if tensions rise further. Thus, the American bomb has led to a Soviet bomb, to a Chinese bomb, to an Indian bomb, to a possible Pakistani bomb, and so
forth. Security in its narrow sense is not, of course, the whole answer. The leadership positions in the international community by weapon states have provided an incentive for other nations to consider the bomb as a way of enhancing security through enhanced prestige. The British and French bomb programs were motivated, in part, by such considerations, and this is an element in the case of India and Pakistan as well.

The slowdown in the rate of adding overt members to the nuclear club can be attributed, in part, to the realization on the part of nations that overt construction of nuclear weapons is at best of only marginal benefit to security, and may detract from it through the start of a new proliferation chain. That is the good news. The bad news is that some of these countries may never feel secure unless they feel they can mount a nuclear weapons production program on relatively short notice. These countries are the “hedge” countries. And the worst news is that the world’s energy situation and the lack of truly effective safeguarding institutions provide for the “hedge” countries to meet their objectives under the guise of a nuclear power program.

The structure of each author’s contribution to the debate is interesting for what it reveals about his respective major focal points on the nonproliferation issue. Imai, who feels that U.S. policy makers are largely unfamiliar with the history of nuclear policy in the United States and abroad, begins naturally enough with a chapter on the history of nonproliferation. Rowen, for his part, begins with an analysis of the inadequacies of the international nonproliferation regime including the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards system.

Both authors agree that the present system, while valuable, is only of limited usefulness in preventing proliferation, but proceed from there to differing views on the question of how best to limit the spread of sensitive technology and materials. Rowen believes that there is no compelling reason at present for any country to make a commitment to plutonium as a fuel and offers some economic analysis, data on uranium reserves, and a brief discussion on future reactor improvements to back up his position. He suggests some institutional arrangements for alleviating the desire of states to build their own nuclear facilities, including the “carrot” of fuel cycle centers located in weapons states and the “stick” of stigmatizing indigenous development of large research reactors that can be used for plutonium production. Above all, he believes that “alliance ties and nuclear guarantees provide important incentives for nonnuclear
states to stay that way.” That belief causes Rowen to deride Article VI of the NPT which calls for nuclear disarmament by the weapon states. In his view, “the probability of total nuclear disarmament in the world is virtually non-existent.” To this gloomy assessment of the future of vertical nonproliferation, Imai provides a complementary statement on horizontal nonproliferation when he writes, “Absolutely no proliferation at any cost is an absolutely unachievable goal, a bankrupt national or international policy objective.” In Imai’s view, the position that vertical proliferation is practicable but horizontal proliferation is not “can be justified only if the world accepts the notion that God has made a special arrangement on behalf of the United States . . . .” He goes on to say that downplaying the usefulness of nuclear weapons is a more important contribution to non-proliferation than is the extension of nuclear umbrellas.

Imai rejects universal rules designed to limit the use of plutonium. Instead, his basic suggestion for dealing with (horizontal) nonproliferation is to impose, upon the currently accepted discriminatory structure of the NPT (in which weapon states and non-weapon states are treated differently), additional discrimination based upon the state of industrial development. Thus, a non-weapon state would not be entitled (“qualified”) to acquire full fuel cycle nuclear technology unless it was capable of building a nuclear industry of a scale equivalent to 50 billion watts of nuclear generated electricity. Imai would have the suppliers refuse aid to “unqualified” countries to obtain sensitive technologies. On the subject of safeguards, Imai would move safeguards philosophy away from the detection of diversion of a single explosive device worth of nuclear material to a broader view of whether “unusual” activities or operations are occurring (this is in keeping with continuing Japanese concerns about the intrusiveness of IAEA safeguards), and would have safeguards agreements provide for sanctions for violators.

The discussion by each man of the other’s views (in separate chapters at the end of each author’s contribution) underlines the basic dilemma faced not only by the United States and Japan but by the entire world. How can one ultimately reconcile the desire of nations to acquire new technology that is perceived to contribute to their energy security with the desire of other interested nations not to have their national security reduced by virtue of the military potential of the new technology? The international nonproliferation regime, which was ostensibly designed to resolve this question, has been shown in recent weeks to be far from accomplishing this goal. One might recall that the Acheson-Lilienthal report in 1945 pre-
dicted that any system short of international ownership and management of dangerous nuclear activities would ultimately fail to prevent proliferation. Imai would characterize the Acheson-Lilienthal position as utopian, but his alternative proposals, which he believes reflect realism, ultimately rely for their efficacy on faith in the rationality of human decisions concerning the making and using of weapons. That would not seem to bode well for the future of mankind.

In keeping with the current uncertainty regarding future worldwide energy demand, and electricity demand in particular, the debate between Imai and Rowen does not go into the future of nuclear power in great detail. Predictably, Imai focuses on the attractiveness of nuclear energy as a substitute for oil supplies that Japan's economic life currently depends upon, while Rowen focuses on the economics of advanced nuclear technology like the breeder and suggests that the economics of going beyond the present once-through fuel cycle (in which reprocessing is deferred) is not likely to be favorable until well into the 21st century. The impact of public attitudes toward nuclear power and the role this may play in the nonproliferation debate are touched on only obliquely in the book and deserve more attention. Because the public perceives nuclear technology in a different light than other technologies that may be used or misused for military purposes, it is not inconceivable that the aftermath of the use of nuclear weapons anywhere in the world in future armed conflict (assuming the conflict is limited and the world survives) could bring a sufficient revulsion toward nuclear energy to halt its continued development and deployment. Therefore, Rowen's arguments against premature commitments to plutonium or the breeder may, in addition to their other virtues, also be seen as arguments in favor of a conservative position on risk in order to assure the continuing use of the light water reactor. In like fashion, the demands of the Third World for advanced nuclear technology, which, if granted, could be seen as violating the spirit of Article I of the NPT, are ultimately threatening to the very enterprise whose benefits are being sought. Imai's proposals for dealing with this problem by technology denial based on level of industrialization ignore the difficulties that all discriminatory policies suffer from; to wit, perceived inequality. Moreover, his counter to Rowen's claim that the industrialized countries can defer the use of plutonium and the breeder for some decades is weak, considering the continuing depression in the uranium markets.

In looking toward the future, Rowen examines four paths that worldwide nuclear policies might take. Among them is the path of
“muddling along”, which appears to have gained considerable currency recently in some circles in Washington and the academic community (it is usually referred to euphemistically as “managing the destabilizing effects of proliferation”). It may well be possible to continue to drift or muddle through for some time. However, in light of recent events, it surely requires an incredible sense of optimism to believe that the world can be spared a future disaster made possible by the spread of nuclear technology without considerable strengthening, tightening, and even restructuring of the present international nonproliferation regime.

Dr. Leonard Weiss
Committee on Governmental Operations, U.S. Senate


In recent years, the literature on U.S.-Japanese relations has increasingly turned to a series of case studies focused on the confrontations and differences between the two countries. These studies have drawn upon contemporary literature and interviews with American and Japanese participants in intergovernmental negotiations in order to analyze the origins and reasons for the confrontations. Their objective is to develop a more modulated relationship between the United States and Japan in the future. This review covers two such studies. The first study, relating principally to the U.S.-Japanese security relationship is Tokyo and Washington, Dilemmas of a Mature Alliance by Frederick L. ShIELS; and the second, focusing on the economic relationship, is U.S.-Japanese Economic Relations: Cooperation, Competition and Confrontation, edited by Diane Tasca. Both books are ambitious in their scope and both make a further contribu-
tion to the literature on U.S.-Japanese relations, although of a somewhat more limited nature than intended by the authors.

Dr. Shiels' book, *Tokyo and Washington*, is an effort to look at the U.S.-Japanese relationship from the perspective of recent general literature on foreign policy decision-making. The intent of the book is to place the Japanese-American experience in the larger framework of alliance politics. The early chapters of the book deal with the principles and problems of alliance politics in a broad and general framework and then to look more closely at the specifics of the U.S.-Japanese experience. Additionally, the early chapters try to analyze institutional and other factors influencing foreign policy decision-makers in both countries. The comparative analysis of forces influencing decision in Japan and the United States is particularly illuminating in demonstrating the contrast between the two countries. It addresses the influence of a variety of institutions and groups ranging from the President-Prime Minister level to Congress, the bureaucracy and special interest groups. Shiels focuses particularly on the interplay between the bureaucracy and the top executives in both countries. He points out that there has been a devolution of power in foreign policy from the executives to the bureaucracy, but at critical decision points the executive has seized the reins of control. This generalization applies much more to the United States than to Japan and there is an effort to differentiate the process of decision-making between both countries while at the same time trying to set out certain general principles governing both countries.

In the last half of the Shiels book, the discussion is devoted more specifically to U.S.-Japanese relations from World War II to the present. While dealing with some of the principal economic issues and forces at play, the focus of the Shiels book is on the security relationship; in particular, the book deals with the critical decision points of Security Treaty revision and the return of Okinawa. It then proceeds to look at the dilemmas of Japanese defense in the 1970s, concluding with a chapter on the Carter Administration.

Inevitably, the Sheils book deals with the problem of low defense expenditures on the part of Japan and the issue of whether Japan will, at some point, greatly expand its defense effort. His own predictions for the 1980s call for a moderate increase in the defense expenditures, although at one point Shiels provides a rationalization for an independent Japanese nuclear deterrent on somewhat spurious grounds. One of the more interesting aspects of the book is a retrospective look at some of the predictions for the 1970s ex-
pounded by scholars of the 1960s who expected a rapid growth of Japanese defense capabilities. Shiels usefully points out that these predictions remained, for the most part, unfulfilled. Finally, Shiels makes the very valid point that misconceptions in both Japan and the United States have led to misunderstanding. He urges a much improved communications structure to avoid such misconceptions in the future, but concludes, nevertheless, there will remain differences between the two countries which will lead to hard bargaining between the two.

The volume, *U.S.-Japanese Economic Relations*, edited by Diane Tasca, consists of a series of essays written by American and Japanese with considerable knowledge and experience in the field. Like any volume of this nature, the essays are not of even quality, but there are several particularly outstanding contributions by Japanese authors who demonstrate considerable insight into the American economy and the sources of U.S.-Japanese economic confrontation. The volume necessarily focuses on the confrontational aspects of the economic relationship and, in the process, tends to underemphasize the positive aspects of the relationship, particularly the increasing trade and economic intercourse between the two nations.

The Tasca volume begins with a comprehensive and sound review of the economic relationship by Mr. Naitoh of the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry. The first group of essays following the overview focuses on the confrontational aspects of the relationship with contributions from both Americans and Japanese. The viewpoints tend to differ among the Americans and the Japanese, with both offering optimistic and pessimistic views for the future.

The second group of essays looks at the different structures of the two economies, contrasting the consensual structure in Japan with the more individualistic pattern in the United States. In the final sections of the volume, there are essays devoted to the question of policy initiatives for improving U.S.-Japanese economic relations. The Japanese contributor recommends looking to freer market operations for Japan's economy, while the American, Irving Friedman, attempts to place the economic relationship in the framework of the broader alliance ties between the two countries. Mr. Friedman emphasizes that trade differences are relatively minor compared to the benefits flowing from the total alliance relationship and urges a diminution of bilateralism in the economic sector.

Both the Shiels and Tasca volumes provide useful insights into
the sources of confrontation between the United States and Japan, focusing by force on different aspects of the confrontation. Both, however, suffer from several problems. First, both books are fairly superficial in their analyses, since they are trying to cover a very broad landscape with relatively brief volumes. Second, both books tend to overgeneralize from a narrow range of contemporary experiences which thereby does not present the complete story. For example, the Shiels book overstates the differences in the Sato-Johnson communique language on Okinawa, due to limited sources of information. Third, both volumes, by focusing on confrontation, tend to underestimate the strength and breadth of the U.S.-Japanese relationship, although they pay lip service to this factor. The U.S.-Japanese relationship has not only endured, but has become stronger over the years, despite the broad differences in the structures of the two societies and despite the problems that have arisen both in security and economic areas. The survivability of the alliance relationship tends to be ignored when one focuses on confrontational aspects. Although it is valuable to look at these aspects of confrontation to avoid possible future differences, it is equally valuable to highlight the broad area of common interest that has kept the two countries closely united over the past 35 years. Both books would have benefitted from devoting more attention to the ties that bind the countries with secondary emphasis on sources of confrontation.

*Hon. Richard L. Sneider*
Former U.S. Ambassador to
the Republic of Korea,
U.S. Embassy, Tokyo
5. Other Areas

HUNGDAH CHIU AND ROBERT DOWNEN (ed.s), *Multi-System Nations and International Law: The International Status of Germany, Korea and China (Proceedings of a Regional Conference of American Society of International Law)* (Published by the University of Maryland School of Law, No. 8-1981(45)), 203 pp., Appendixes, Index, $5.00.

One of the more current, controversial issues circulating through the ranks of leading international legal scholars is the subject of multi-system nations, the political partition and division of single nation-states. In order to more fully develop the issue for a greater audience and disseminate the presentations of leading international law and political science specialists, conference papers delivered at the 1981 Conference on Multi-System Nations and International Law were published in this single volume. The subject of multi-system nations (divided-nations) had heretofore been given, curiously enough, scant scholarly attention. The survey and evaluation of the international status of multi-system nations—with particular emphasis on the cases of Germany, Korea and China—make this volume a welcome addition to international scholars worldwide.

This volume is a collection of ten major papers presented at the Conference. Ray E. Johnston, a political science professor at Wayne State University, led off by presenting a general, conceptual framework for the existence and understanding of the multi-system nation concept. He proceeded with a somewhat contentious application of his principles to the Republic of China on Taiwan (ROC). Professor Johnston's paper is followed by a critique offered by Professor Hungdah Chiu, who confronts Johnston's assertions of Chinese historical and legal claims to Taiwan.

The second article is that of Professor Hungdah Chiu, who addressed the international legal principle of recognition, which he justifiably felt had really evolved into a question of policy, not law. He noted that international legal rules regarding multi-system nations had not been adequately developed. He also paid particular attention to the Chinese case, concluding that the People's Republic of China (PRC) ought to tolerate Taiwan's acquisition of international legal status (p. 52). Professor Chiu's article included an appendix on nations formally recognizing the ROC and an appendix on PRC statements regarding the use of force for the "liberation" of Taiwan. The statements in the latter appendix may have been enervated,
however, by the recently-released U.S.-PRC Joint Communique, which appears to recognize only peaceful reunification efforts.

Professor Yung Wei offered a comparative political science study of multi-system nations, examining basic approaches to the divided-nations concept; comparing similarities and differences of multi-system nations; identifying major factors conducive to, or obstructive of, reunification; and, concluding that divided-nations would not reunify in the near future. Yung Wei’s article included a flow-chart and chronological chart on the unification and division of China, and tables on comparative data of multi-system nations in China, Korea, and Germany.

Swan Sik Ko, whose article follows Yung Wei’s, discussed the concept of multi-system nations and the more specific aspects of Germany, Korea, and China. However, his paper focused mainly on the Netherland’s practice with respect to multi-system nations, including an examination of multilateral and bilateral arrangements with the three major systems. There was also an analysis of the Netherland’s 1981 submarine sale to Taiwan. Professor Hungdah Chiu’s comments on Dr. Ko’s conclusion that the sale was contrary to international law poked holes in Dr. Ko’s analysis.

Professor Gottfried-Karl Kinderman’s paper composed most of Chapter V (chapters coincide with papers). In it, he examined the German multi-system model and its possible application to China. Professor Jürgen Domes’s comments on Kinderman’s article reflected general agreement with the points raised.

“Divided Nations and International Law: The Case of the Two Koreas” is Professor Nam-Yearl Chai’s article. It traced the genesis of the partition of Korea, the extension of de facto and de jure recognition to the separate regimes, and, like Professor Chiu’s article, the politicization of the legal concept of recognition. There is also a legal analysis of unification proposals, including the one-nation, one-state, two-government proposal and the suggestion of admission of both Koreas simultaneously into the United Nations. Dr. Seung Hwan Kim and Dr. Se Jin Kim both offered their opinions on Chai’s article, although—in truth—their commentaries read more like separate expositions on the subject of Korea than like critiques of Chai’s presentation. Seung Hwan Kim appeared less optimistic than Chai, concluding that reunification was unlikely in the foreseeable future. Se Jin Kim suggested his own analysis of the Korean situation: an examination of the geopolitical environment of Northeast Asia; an investigation of inter-Korean relations in historical perspective; and,
a consideration of legal norms and political and moral imperatives of each side (p. 138).

A rather thorough and scholarly analysis of Taiwan's international status is presented by Ralph Clough in Chapter VII. He examined the "one-China" principle that each side continues to insist upon under different schemes. He also probed Taiwan's dramatic economic development in the 1970s and reviewed its efforts to forge ahead, despite derecognition, as a separate political entity. Mr. Clough included an annex of offices in Taiwan of countries not maintaining diplomatic relations with the island.

Professor Aleth Manin's study of Taiwan as a divided nation and the application of principles of international law to it is interesting, but somewhat repetitive, although there is a good analysis of the ad hoc organizations that were created to replace formal diplomatic missions in Taiwan.

The last paper presented, that of Professor Morton Kaplan in Chapter IX, dealt with the policy of recognition from a political science perspective and offered his recommendation for the U.S. normative policy of recognition of the ROC. He also made an interesting comparison of the unification of China to the issue of Puerto Rico and the United States.

Chapter X is a significant part of this volume, because it is an overall evaluation of the presentations and the Conference by four leading specialists. The evaluation is strong because it is general; it ties in all the elements of the multi-system nation issue without addressing the specifics that are more appropriately broached in the individual presentations. The evaluation is followed by a number of relevant appendices, the Conference program, biographies of the contributors, and an index.

All in all, the volume is a neat and complete scholarly package of information. It is filled with facts and recommendations about a major topic of international concern. Though occasionally redundant and somewhat uneven in style and sophistication, the individual articles are elucidating. Their message, however, appears pessimistic—no real resolution of the multi-system nation issue in the reasonably foreseeable future. Why? Well, the contributors point out that the issue of divided-nations is really part of the larger superpower conflict. For all the discussion, attention, and advice offered the international community for resolution of multi-system na-
tion problems, there is still no solution to the global instability and distrust that occasion them. That, in effect, is the real issue.

David Salem


Steven Dorr's Scholar's Guide to Washington, D.C. for Middle Eastern Studies is the seventh in a series of reference works to scholarly resources in the Washington, D.C. area sponsored by the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. This volume is intended for use as a reference aid in locating and using the resources of the nation's capital for research in the field of Middle East studies. By enumerating, describing, and exploring the myriad collections and organizations in Washington, D.C. which are sources for Middle East research, just about any serious scholar of that region will have all the necessary research possibilities at his fingertips.

The book is undoubtedly an ambitious undertaking. Its topical coverage concentrates on the disciplines of the social sciences and humanities, though there are references to the fields of science and technology where they are considered relevant. The Guide's geographic scope includes Egypt, Israel, Turkey, Armenia, Sudan, Cyprus, and all the eastern Arab states. The time frame of the book stretches from the ancient Mesopotamian and Egyptian empires to the present.

The volume is divided into two main sections. The first covers Washington area Middle East research collections, including the holdings of libraries, archives, museums, galleries, and data banks. Each entry is numbered and listed in alphabetical order by chapter. Addresses, telephone numbers, hours of operation, conditions of access (including availability of reproduction facilities and restrictions on access to information), and sizes, descriptions and evaluations of the collections are included.

The second section covers the activities of Washington based organizations, including: U.S. government agencies, embassies, re-
search centers, universities, international organizations, and private, professional and cultural associations. Again, each entry provides addresses, telephone numbers, hours of operation, conditions of access, functions of the particular organization and its materials and products.

The *Guide* also contains six appendices, listing: Judaic library collections, housing and transportation services for out-of-town scholars, bookstores, estimates of Middle Eastern holdings of Washington, D.C. area library collections, standard entry formats for listings in the *Guide*, and federal government holidays. A bibliography and four useful indices are also provided.

In short, this volume contains just about everything the Middle East research scholar would need to know in order to locate and utilize Washington's research resources; the only possible addition to the volume might have been a general outline map of the Washington, D.C. area for use in locating addresses. Nevertheless, Mr. Dorr is to be commended for organizing this compendium of organizations and collections, for it is not only comprehensive but is also easy to follow. Perhaps only research scholars know how difficult a task it is to combine the two.

*David Salem*


Sometimes, perceptions of U.S. foreign policy are astonishingly myopic—a myopia, incidentally, which even U.S. policy-makers are not immune from. Relations with other countries may be viewed in a vacuum; in essence, complex configurations are reduced to bilateralism. Occasionally, comprehensive, long-range, in-depth foreign policy planning is simply non-existent; the dynamism of the international community may not support long-run forecasts. Other times, such planning is the result of impulse; a firm grasp of a complex situation may require too great an expense and too much time. U.S. foreign policy toward Asia has exhibited these characteristics within
the recent past, although the strategic importance of Asia continues to grow at a pace that warrants a significant degree of foreign policy reassessment and planning. *Asia and U.S. Foreign Policy* is an absolutely vital addition to scholarly international publications, because of its examination, assessment, and evaluation of U.S. foreign policy toward Asia and its rational recommendations for the future, all of which are developed in the context of combinations of factors confronted by the United States in policy formulation and implementation.

As the editors pointed out, the Asian policy of the United States requires this country to manage four types of relationships—triangular U.S.-USSR-PRC relations, relations with traditional U.S. allies in the region, relations with ASEAN and other nations, and relations with Indochina—the configurations and strength of which depend to a large extent on U.S. relations with the Soviet Union (p. 3). Since both Soviet and American interests are global, U.S. interests in Asia cannot be divorced from its global concerns. As a result, neither Asia in isolation nor traditional geographical divisions of Asia should be considered the focal point of U.S. concern; rather, “Asia should be taken as a coherent whole, as part of the global strategic map of U.S. foreign policy” (p. 3). Asia, by the way is, for the purposes of this book, rather broadly defined: it includes China, Taiwan, Indochina, Japan, Korea, the ASEAN nations, India and the Indian Ocean, Southwest Asia, and the Soviet Union.

Despite what may appear to be, at first blush, too industrious an undertaking, this book succeeds in meeting the challenge of addressing U.S.-Asian relations in the context of global interests. In large part, part of this success is due to the organization of the book. Chapter One, written by Peter Berton, provides a methodological construct for the study of Asia and U.S. foreign policy. He traces, from a broad historical perspective, U.S. foreign policy since World War II and the developments in international politics that have shaped and directed U.S. policy in the 1970s. Berton’s greatest contribution is his analysis of general foreign policy factors and his conclusion that U.S. relations with a given country or region cannot be adequately handled on a bilateral, state-to-state, or regional basis (p. 21). His focus is on “contextual analysis” (p. 15): an examination of transregional, subnational, transnational, and non-state actors (examples include: NATO, intelligence communities, multinational corporations and the PLO, respectively), which interact as inputs in the formulation of foreign policy. By setting up the methodology, Berton not only educates the reader, but also provides a conceptual
framework for understanding, interpreting, and even adding to the information provided in chapters 2-11.

At the other end of the book—Chapter 12—James C. Hsiung creates a model of U.S. foreign policy that, based on observations made in previous chapters, incorporates Asia as both a "unit" and a "factor" in U.S. foreign policy. He calls his model the "model of changing scenarios and strategies" (p. 231) and notes that it is, and will be, shaped by such key factors as economic and commercial interests, libertarian and human rights concerns, domestic attributes, Realpolitik, and geostrategic desiderata (see p. 232 for a full listing). Hsiung examines some of the factors that have hindered U.S. policy, including a lack of coordinated planning, local nationalism, and the danger of escalation of superpower competition. His clarion call for balanced preplanning in setting strategic objectives and formulating and implementing policy directives ought to be heeded by U.S. policy-makers. In fact, they might well be advised to strongly consider Hsiung's call for realism in foreign policy (p. 241) and to understand that the world indeed looks different from Tokyo than it does from Washington (p. 241).

Chapters 2-11 cover various aspects of the broadly-defined Asia area. There are sections on Japan, Korea, Indochina, ASEAN, the Soviet Union, China and Taiwan, all ably written by leading specialists in that particular aspect of Asian studies. I was particularly impressed with A. Gregor's and M. Chang's chapter on Taiwan (Chapter 7), because of its frank and articulate approach to Taiwanese options in the face of U.S. derecognition. In addition, I was struck by John Emmerson's rather prescient observation in his chapter on Japan and U.S. foreign policy (Chapter 2) that the next U.S.-Japanese crisis "may well be one over computers and integrated circuits" (p. 28).

This book succeeds not only because of its organization, but also because of its consistency in intellectual sophistication, a task made difficult because of the divergent backgrounds of the contributors. If I find fault at all with this book, it is the result of my own weariness of the over-use of political science jargon—in this case relating to foreign policy—which tends toward pretentiousness, obscurantism, and confusion. There are liberal sprinklings in this book: "unprincipled peace," "zero-sum game," "crucial crossroads," "tyranny of the weak," "disengagement-neutralization plan," "equidistant diplomacy," "common convergent policy consensus," "abstentionism," "self-enlightened guarantee of peace," "contextual analysis," "swing strategy," "regional relativism," and the like. Yet,
in defense of this volume, the less well-known jargon is always explained and there is never the feeling that any author is needlessly indulging in its use.

Unquestionably, this book does an exceptionally good job of analyzing the broad context of the Asian policy of the United States. Each contribution is extremely thorough, scholarly, well-documented, insightful, and terse. Certain chapters may leave one with a sense of foreboding, but this is really the result of the dynamism of the foreign policy process and the occasional shoot-from-the-hip approach that the United States has used in establishing its Asian policy. That this book provides us with such a wealth of information, so many critical and perspicacious examinations and such thoughtful conclusions is sufficient testimony to its value as food for thought for current and future foreign policy decision-making.

David Salem

JOHN C. KUAN, ed., European Economic Community and Asia (Taipei: The Asia and World Institute, 1982) No. 24, 268 pp., $8.00.

This volume is based on papers presented at an international conference held in Taipei in the spring of 1981. Asia is, economically speaking, an amalgam of developed nations, newly-industrialized countries (NICs), and developing countries, whose raw materials and manpower make it an appealing and lucrative market. The European Economic Community has profited from its trade relationship with Asia, but the complexities of bilateral and multilateral economic and political relationships, the recession, and the increasing protectionist posture of sovereign nations have raised new concerns for the future of the EEC-Asian relations.

The Community sought to counter these problems in its relations with industrialized nations through such policies as “restructuring” in the steel industry (see p. 3), including investment credits and minimum price standards, and “self-limitation” arrangements in other areas (see p. 5). Cooperation agreements, as well as the Lome-II Convention have been used to inject vitality into economic rela-
tions between the EEC and developing nations. However, a full understanding of EEC-Asian relations requires a broader perspective on economic, political, security, and legal policies that influence the strength and extent of those relations. That, in essence, is the purpose of this book.

This volume is divided into five sections: EEC external relations and policies, political and security aspects of EEC-Asian relations; economic and legal aspects of EEC-Asian relations; EEC-Republic of China (ROC) relations; and, prospects for future EEC-Asian cooperative arrangements. The individual papers in each area were presented by rather reputable scholars and the material is current and informative. Supporting tables and data are used to illustrate and emphasize, particularly in the sections dealing with economic and legal aspects of EEC-Asia relations and ROC-EEC relations. There is a stylistic range in the individual papers which reflects the divergent backgrounds of the authors, but creates a degree of unevenness among the presentations which the reader may find distracting. Furthermore, there are not a few typographical errors, at least some of which ought to have been caught by the editors.

Nevertheless, the book need not alway impress the reader for how it says something in order to be valuable for what it says. To this extent, *European Economic Community and Asia* provides a wealth of information on a significant aspect of international economic relations and is undoubtedly a useful book.

*David Salem*

---

**JUSTUS M. VAN DER KROEF,** *Kampuchea: The Endless Tug of War* (Published by the University of Maryland School of Law, No. 2-1982(47)), 51 pp., $2.50.

The politically troubled and unstable area of southeast Asia has spurred rapid changes in policy directives and encouraged new diplomatic initiatives within the international community. As such, the area is a virtual cornucopia of alternative approaches, diverse and often contradictory solutions, and numerous political accommodations that so often whet the appetites of scholars, researchers, and interna-
Kampuchea is a prime example. Following the Vietnamese (SRV) invasion in 1978, Kampuchea has had two major competing governments: “Democratic Kampuchea” (DK) backed by the PRC and the United States and currently recognized by the UN General Assembly as the legitimate Cambodian representative; and the “People’s Republic of Kampuchea” (PRK) backed by Vietnam and the Soviet Union. The nature and implications of the Kampuchean problem and the issues it has engendered among ASEAN members and the major world powers are addressed by Justus M. van der Kroef in Kampuchea: The Endless Tug of War.

Within the framework of a relatively brief paper on a complex subject, Mr. van der Kroef touched on four major aspects of the Kampuchean question: 1) the official position of and “unofficial” internal divisions within ASEAN vis-a-vis the Kampuchean problem; 2) the policies of the major powers, particularly the United States, Soviet Union, and People’s Republic of China with respect to Kampuchea; 3) the prospects of contending factions in Kampuchea; and, 4) potential alternative solutions to the Kampuchean problem.

With respect to the ASEAN posture toward the Kampuchean problem, Mr. van der Kroef focused mainly on the rift that developed between Vietnam and ASEAN over how to approach the Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea, how to appease the major powers involved in the dispute (particularly the PRC, whose client, “Democratic Kampuchea,” appeared to be compromised by proposed, alternative ASEAN solutions), and how to find a common ground among ASEAN members for insuring a peaceful solution to the conflict.

Justus van der Kroef’s treatment of the policies of the major powers vis-a-vis Kampuchea may be the strongest part of his paper, for it effectively reveals the intricate interrelationships of policy, politics and principles among the powers involved. The PRC’s official position, for example, is an amalgam of international legal principles (including the protection of Kampuchean sovereignty and the perpetration of aggression by the SRV), political accusations (including a claim that the SRV presence in Kampuchea is part of a broad Soviet strategy of “regional hegemonism”) and publicized self-restraint (including a vociferous denial of a “Chinese threat” to the area).

The section on contending factions in Kampuchea is succinctly presented and offers the reader insight into the claimants to Kampuchean leadership and the consequences for Kampuchea of factional divisiveness. Still, one has to wonder where Mr. van der
Kroef obtained the kind of information that permits him to state unequivocally that "most Kampucheans" consider "the Vietnamese-controlled Heng Samrin regime . . . preferable to the 'Democratic Kampuchea' underground remnant of Khieu Sampan and Pol Pot" (p. 28). While he justified his statement with reference to excessive internal Sampan-Pot violence during the mid-1970s, there is no reference to claimed SRV human rights violations or to alleged use of bacteriological agents against insurgents within Kampuchea, thus tainting his conclusion.

Justus van der Kroef concluded his paper by suggesting four options and scenarios for a possible solution to the Kampuchean problem: 1) continuance of the status quo; 2) intensified Sino-Soviet conflict through Indochinese proxies; 3) a "Third Alternative" for Kampuchea (i.e., an anti-Vietnamese united front arrangement that would presumably put a government other than those of the DK or PRK in power); and, 4) a new initiative toward Vietnam.

Continuance of the status quo was perceived by Mr. van der Kroef as the equivalent of long-term PRK-DK conflict, the process of which might suit the various interests of numerous larger powers, but would not benefit the battle-weary Kampucheans. Intensified Sino-Soviet conflict through Indochinese proxies would strain ASEAN and endanger U.S. security interests. The "Third Alternative" concept has been bandied about and modified by different proponents to such an extent that the proposal today appears to be the equivalent of an endorsement of the "status quo." On his final option, Mr. van der Kroef noted that U.S. policy toward Kampuchea has been determined largely by the U.S. desire for rapprochement with the PRC, the result of which has been difficult to gauge. He suggested that the only way to break the Kampuchean "deadlock" might be for the United States to move in the direction of rapprochement with the SRV. The only aspect of the "new initiative toward Vietnam" approach not broached by the author, which diminishes the force of his suggested option, is the likely Soviet response to U.S. overtures toward Hanoi and to U.S. initiatives to settle the fighting that is currently costing the Soviets dearly in economic and military assistance.

Finding the proper leverage for solving the Kampuchean problem is a difficult task and Justice van der Kroef effectively presents to the reader the complexities, subtleties and ambiguities of the conflict. His insight into the issues involved in resolving the Kampuchean question is illuminating and his suggestions are challenging. The title is aptly chosen, the length of the article is appropriate, and sup-
porting references are sufficient. The reader will find Justus M. van der Kroef's paper an enlightening presentation and worthwhile reading.

David Salem


Edward Gough Whitlam was Prime Minister of Australia from December 1972 to late autumn 1975. For part of that time he was concurrently Foreign Minister. A member of the Bar, a Queen's Counsel, a flight lieutenant in the Royal Australian Air Force, a member of the Australian Parliament, and a leader of the Labor Party, both while in and out of the government, Whitlam has been an inveterate reader and traveller. *A Pacific Community* puts in book form a series of lectures he delivered in 1979 as Visiting Professor of Australian Studies at Harvard, occupying a Chair which was endowed by the Australian Government while he was Prime Minister. Whitlam brought to his lectures the disciplines and enthusiasms of a lawyer, an historian, a versatile and skilled negotiator, an economic planner, a political tactician, and a moral visionary. His supporters and adversaries on the Australian scene have characterized him as Australia's outstanding political intellectual, giving that term both favorable and scornful connotation. The catholicity of Whitlam's interests and the strength of his convictions explain the merit and the deficiencies of this short and somewhat unsystematic book.

Its chapters deal with resources of the Pacific, Western Pacific trade, the politics of the Western Pacific, and Australia and Japan. A prologue complains that Washington tends to exaggerate the importance of China and the Soviet Union at the expense of Japan and other countries of the Western Pacific. Still, it is upon China and the Soviet Union that Whitlam, himself, first focuses—and quite properly—as he gives an overview of resource potentials of the Pacific Region as a whole.

Nowhere in the book does Whitlam define the term “commu-
nity.” If that term is merely to mean developing interdependencies, then the book clearly describes their proliferation and diversity. If the term is intended to suggest the evolution of some structures, he also draws attention to many functioning organizations and procedures that have evolved over the past decade or two. If, however, the title of the book is read with a stress on the singular article, then the reader is justified in regretting that Whitlam has not argued for or against creation of that single Pacific Community institution. Some guesswork is required to come up with answers to specific questions frequently raised about a singular community. This reader’s judgment of the answers to these questions are as follows:

Are new institutions a necessary precondition for expanding mutually beneficial interdependencies among countries of the Region? Whitlam would say no. Should membership in new institutions intended to facilitate and give greater order to existing and potential interdependencies be open to all or confined to so-called “market economies”? Whitlam would say, emphatically, that it should be open to all.

Would new institutions likely help in easing North-South tensions? Whitlam would say that ASEAN should make that decision.

Does creating new institutions help or complicate resolution of problems arising from division of Korea, China, and Vietnam? Whitlam would evade this question, but argue that it was important to keep lines of communication open with both North and South Korea, both Peking and Taipei, and with Hanoi, Vientiane, and Phnom Penh.

Could new Pacific Community institutions separate concern with economic and cultural relations from political and military balances? Whitlam, surprisingly, avoids dealing with this question.

Yet, these were some of the questions that were on the minds of Senator Glenn and Congressman Wolff in their hearings on the Pacific Basin concept, Prime Minister Ohira’s task force on the Pacific Basin Cooperation Concept, and members of the Canberra seminar. They all offered varying, and often contradictory, answers; but Whitlam expects his readers to make their own guesses as he goes about saying what he has to say about other matters.

His comment on these other matters has, despite a certain discontinuity, thrust and relevance—glimpses of history, optimism about the future, revelation of an insider’s knowledge of negotiation,
regret over past misjudgments, and, here and there, hints of bygone feuds with adversaries both in Australia and Washington.

For example, Whitlam tells us about an early connection between the United States and Australia related, it so happens, to oil:

The first whales were caught off the Australian coast in 1791 from a convict transport under Eber Bunker, who had been born in Plymouth, Massachusetts, in 1761 and had gone to London after America's War of National Liberation. He has been called the "father of Australian whaling," Australia's first export industry.

Lawyer and historian come together as Whitlam writes about Antarctica:

The Law of the Sea also has implications for Antarctica. There is on such strategic conflict between nations in the Antarctic as there has been for more than three decades between NATO and the Soviet Union in the Arctic. In 1909, British explorers claimed possession of tracts of Antarctica and, between 1911 and 1914, an Australian expedition laid claim to further discoveries. The Australian Antarctic Territory, comprising former British and Australian claims, was proclaimed in 1936. It covers an area of 2.5 million square miles, almost half the land surface of Antarctica, and is five-sixths the size of the Australian continent. Other claimants to Antarctic territory include New Zealand, as an heir of Britain, Chile and Argentina, as heirs of Spain—John Paul II is now called on to interpret the arbitration of Alexander VI—and Norway and France, as discoverers in their own right. The United States and the Soviet Union have refused to recognize any declarations of sovereignty, claiming that there can be no sovereignty where there has been no occupation and settlement. In 1958, the International Geophysical Year, the Soviet Union permanently established a number of scientific bases in territory claimed by Australia. Realizing she could not make them go away, Australia announced she would let them stay, since she believed in free scientific development in Antarctica and the banning of all military activity in the region. The British and New Zealand governments, in similar situations, generously and simultaneously concurred.

Whitlam is fascinated by the resources of the sea, as economist,
strategist, lawyer, and moralist. Where his imagination carries him is suggested here:

In the eyes of the Law of the Sea the developing countries have achieved parity with the most developed. A minnow-state can have as large a marine zone as a leviathan. Tonga, an extensive archipelago, can approach Japan in importance. Outside its own waters, every nation is likely to be caught in another nation's nets.

As historian, negotiator, and strategist, Whitlam offers several judgments:

Viet Nam's victory in her war of independence was the denouement of the effort by the United States, with one significant ally, Australia, throughout the 1950s and 1960s to control the politics of the Western Pacific by isolating and boycotting China.

Viet Nam is now united, as one assumes that her people always desired. There was no cultural or historical basis for believing that Viet Nam should be divided. There had been no division for at least a thousand years.

Tremendous ingenuity has been misplaced over three decades in suggesting that there could be a two-China policy. There never could be, because neither of the rival governments themselves would accept it.

Just as the United States failed to face facts by normalizing relations with Communist China at the outset and then found in the Korean War an excuse for not doing so, so now the United States is using the invasion of Kampuchea as an excuse for not normalizing relations with Viet Nam as she should have done years earlier.

I regard it as singularly unlikely that Viet Nam, having fought the Americans successfully for twenty years, the French successfully for eighty years, and the Chinese successfully for many centuries in order to ensure her identity and independence, would now compromise herself by accepting foreign bases.

Particularly interesting to an American reader is Australia's great interest in the Pacific Islands, Antarctica, and the Law of the Sea; and the fact that, despite its relative affluence within the Region, Australia thinks of itself as a developing country.

To read Whitlam's earnest and informative *A Pacific Community* is to become acquainted with the insatiable curiosity, optimism,
and concern for the underprivileged of a man who has much more to say than can be found in this small book.

Robert W. Barnett
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Occasional Papers/Reprints Series in Contemporary Asian Studies

500 West Baltimore Street
Baltimore, MD. 21201
U.S.A.
(301) 528-3870

1977 Series

No. 1 - 1977
ISSN 0730-0107
ISBN 0-942182-00-6
Chinese Attitude Toward Continental Shelf and Its Implication on Delimiting Seabed in Southeast Asia (Hungdah Chiu) 32 pp. $1.00

No. 2 - 1977
ISSN 0730-0107
ISBN 0-942182-01-4
Income Distribution in the Process of Economic Growth of the Republic of China (Yuan-Li Wu) 45 pp. $1.00

No. 3 - 1977
ISSN 0730-0107
ISBN 0-942182-02-2
The Indonesian Maoists: Doctrines and Perspectives (Justus M. van der Kroef) 31 pp. $1.00

No. 4 - 1977
ISSN 0730-0107
ISBN 0-942182-03-0
Taiwan's Foreign Policy in the 1970s: A Case Study Adaptation and Viability (Thomas J. Bellows) 22 pp. $1.00

No. 5 - 1977
ISSN 0730-0107
ISBN 0-942182-04-9
Asian Political Scientists in North America: Professional and Ethnic Problems (Edited by Chun-tu Hsueh) 148 pp. Index $3.00

No. 6 - 1977
ISSN 0730-0107
The Sino-Japanese Fisheries Agreement of 1975: A Comparison with Other North Pacific Fisheries Agreements (Song Yook Hong) 80 pp. $2.00

No. 7 - 1977
ISSN 0730-0107
Foreign Trade Contracts Between West German Companies and the People's Republic of China: A Case Study (Robert Heuser) 22 pp. $1.00
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Pages</th>
<th>Price</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>Reflections on Crime and Punishment in China, with Appended Sentencing Documents</td>
<td>Randle Edwards, Translation of Documents by Randle Edwards and Hungdah Chiu</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>$1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>Chinese Arts and Literature: A Survey of Recent Trends</td>
<td>Wai-lim Yip</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>$3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>Legal Aspects of U.S.-Republic of China Trade and Investment — Proceedings of a Regional Conference of the American Society of International Law</td>
<td>Hungdah Chiu and David Simon</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>$5.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**1978 Series**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Pages</th>
<th>Price</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>Indian Ocean Politics: An Asian-African Perspective</td>
<td>K.P. Misra</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>$1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>The Societal Objectives of Wealth, Growth, Stability, and Equity in Taiwan</td>
<td>Jan S. Prybyla</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>$1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
No. 5 - 1978 (17)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-942182-16-2
The Role of Law in the People’s Republic of China as Reflecting Mao Tse-Tung’s Influence (Shao-Chuan Leng) 18 pp.  $1.00

No. 6 - 1978 (18)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-942182-17-0
Criminal Punishment in Mainland China: A Study of Some Yunnan Province Documents (Hungdah Chiu) 35 pp.  $1.00

A Guide to the Study of Japanese Law (Lawrence W. Beer and Hidenori Tomatsu) 45 pp.  $2.00

No. 8 - 1978 (20)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-942182-19-7
The Pueblo, EC-121, and Mayaguez Incidents: Some Continuities and Changes (Robert Simmons) 40 pp.  $2.00

No. 9 - 1978 (21)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-942182-20-0
Two Korea’s Unification Policy and Strategy (Yong Soon Yim) 82 pp.  $2.00
Index

1979 Series

No. 1 - 1979 (22)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-942182-21-9
Asian Immigrants and Their Status in the U.S. (Edited by Hungdah Chiu) 54 pp.  $2.00

No. 2 - 1979 (23)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-942182-22-7
Social Disorder in Peking After the 1976 Earthquake Revealed by a Chinese Legal Documents (Hungdah Chiu) 20 pp.  $2.00

The Dragon and the Eagle — A Study of U.S.-People’s Republic of China Relations in Civil Air Transport (Jack C. Young) 65 pp.  $3.00

No. 4 - 1979 (25)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-942182-24-3
Chinese Women Writers Today (Edited by Wai-lim Yip and William Tay) 108 pp.  $3.00

No. 5 - 1979 (26)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-942182-25-1
Certain Legal Aspects of Recognizing the People’s Republic of China (Hungdah Chiu) 49 pp.  $2.00

No. 6 - 1979 (27)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-942182-26-X
China’s Nationalization of Foreign Firms: The Politics of Hostage Capitalism, 1949-1957 (Thomas N. Thompson) 80 pp. Index  $3.00
No. 7 - 1979 (28)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-942182-27-8
U.S. Status of Force Agreement with Asian Countries: Selected Studies
(Charles Cochran and Hungdah Chiu) 130 pp. Index  $2.50

No. 8 - 1979 (29)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-942182-28-6
China's Foreign Aid in 1978 (John F. Copper) 45 pp.  $2.00

1980 Series

No. 1 - 1980 (30)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-942182-29-4
The Chinese Connection and Normalization (Edited by Hungdah Chiu
and Karen Murphy) 200 pp. Index  $5.00

No. 2 - 1980 (31)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-942182-30-8
(James C. Hsiung) 17 pp.  $1.00

No. 3 - 1980 (32)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-942182-31-6
Policy, Proliferation and the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty: U.S. Strategies
and South Asian Prospects (Joanne Finegan) 61 pp.  $2.50

No. 4 - 1980 (33)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-942182-32-4
A Comparative Study of Judicial Review Under Nationalist Chinese and
American Constitutional Law (Jyh-pin Fa) 200 pp. Index  $3.50

No. 5 - 1980 (34)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-942182-33-2
Certain Problems in Recent Law Reform in the People's Republic of
China (Hungdah Chiu) 34 pp.  $1.50

No. 6 - 1980 (35)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-942182-34-0
China's New Criminal & Criminal Procedure Codes (Hungdah Chiu) 16
pp.  $1.00

China's Foreign Relations: Selected Studies (Edited by F. Gilbert Chan
& Ka-che Yip) 115 pp.  $3.00

No. 8 - 1980 (37)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-942182-36-7
Annual Review of Selected Books on Contemporary Asian Studies
(1979-1980) (Edited by John F. Copper) 45 pp.  $2.00
1981 Series

Structural Changes in the Organization and Operation of China’s Criminal Justice System (Hungdah Chiu) 31 pp.  $1.50

Readjustment and Reform in the Chinese Economy (Jan S. Prybyla) 58 pp.  $1.00

No. 3 - 1981 (40)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-942182-39-1
Symposium on the Trial of Gang of Four and Its Implication in China (Edited by James C. Hsiung) 118 pp.  $2.50

No. 4 - 1981 (41)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-942182-40-5
China and the Law of the Sea Conference (Hungdah Chiu) 30 pp.  $2.00

No. 5 - 1981 (42)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-942182-41-3
China’s Foreign Aid in 1979-80 (John Franklin Copper) 54 pp.  $2.00

No. 6 - 1981 (43)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-942182-42-1
Chinese Regionalism: Yesterday and Today (Franz Michael) 35 pp.  $2.00

Elite Conflict in the Post-Mao China (Parris H. Chang) 30 pp.  $2.00

No. 8 - 1981 (45)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-942182-44-8
Proceedings of Conference on Multi-system Nations and International Law: International Status of Germany, Korea, and China (Edited by Hungdah Chiu and Robert Downen) 203 pp. Index  $5.00

1982 Series

Socialist Legalism: Reform and Continuity in Post-Mao People’s Republic of China (Hungdah Chiu) 35 pp.  $2.00

No. 2 - 1982 (47)  ISSN 0730-0107  ISBN 0-942182-46-4
Kampuchea, The Endless Tug of War (Justus M. Van der Kroef) 51 pp.  $2.50

Social Change on Mainland China and Taiwan, 1949-1980 (Alan P.L. Liu) 55 pp.  $3.00
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>ISSN</th>
<th>ISBN</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Pages</th>
<th>Price</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>0730-0107</td>
<td>0-942182-49-9</td>
<td>Constitutional Revolution in Japanese Law, Society and Politics</td>
<td>Lawrence W. Beer</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>$2.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ORDER FORM
To Occasional Papers/Reprints Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, University of Maryland School of Law, 500 West Baltimore Street, Baltimore, Maryland 21201, U.S.A.

Check One:

☐ Please Send:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Copies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

☐ Please start my subscription of the OPRSCAS:
Starting issue ________
Subscription price is U.S. $10.00 for 8 issues (regardless of the price of individual issues in the U.S. and Canada and $12.00 for overseas.)

My check of U.S. $ _________ is enclosed ______ copy(s) of invoice/receipt required. (Institution/library may request billing before making payment) (Make check payable to OPRSCAS)

Please send book to:
Name/Corp./Library:
Address: (Please include zip code)