Occasional Papers/Reprints Series in Contemporary Asian Studies

NUMBER 5 — 1981 (42)

China's Foreign Aid in 1979-80

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School of Law
University of Maryland
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500 West Baltimore Street, Baltimore, Maryland 21201 USA.

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Subscription is US $10.00 for 8 issues (regardless of the price of individual issues) in the United States and Canada and $12.00 for overseas. Check should be addressed to OPRSCAS and sent to Professor Hungdah Chiu.

Price for single copy of this issue: US $2.00
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JOHN FRANKLIN COPPER*

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CHINA'S FOREIGN AID IN 1979-80*

By John Franklin Copper

Introduction

The most salient change in China's foreign aid program during 1979-80 was the fact that China became a net capital borrower, but continued its foreign aid giving in that context. In fact, China became a major recipient of grants and loans during the period, having established a policy of obtaining development funds from almost any source and in almost unlimited amounts. According to the Vice-Chairman of the State Planning Commission, China was preparing to borrow as much as $20 billion by 1985.¹

China's entrance into the game of soliciting aid even evoked some concern from other developing countries that China may cause less funds to be available to other nations, especially from international lending institutions where China is able to borrow in proportion to its population.² This concern prompted the World Bank to try to dispel rumors to the effect that China, as a new borrower and based upon its large population and low per capita income, was entitled to as much as $1 billion of the $12 billion the World Bank has available for the poorest nations.³

Japan and the U.S. were the largest suppliers of capital to China, most of which was granted in the form of low interest loans and deferred credits. Since the interest on the loans was below the rate of inflation and some of the deferred payments were without interest, the grant factor on these transactions was considerable. The same was true of a host of loans China received from international lending institutions. China even obtained credit from some smaller countries.


² Times (London), February 8, 1980, p. 3.

³ India, among other nations, expressed this concern. See Financial Times (London), November 13, 1980, p. 4.


1. Times (London), February 8, 1980, p. 3.

2. India, among other nations, expressed this concern. See Financial Times (London), November 13, 1980, p. 4.

3. Washington Post, June 28, 1980, p. 11. It is worth noting in this context that China claimed $230 as its annual per capita income, while the World Bank estimate was $460. Acceptance of the former figure would give China an additional advantage in borrowing from this institution.

(1)
and some nations that are not considered rich nations, such as Australia and Argentina.4

Because of the emphasis put upon domestic economic development, much less was said about economic assistance to other countries by Chinese leaders or by the media in China. Thus, while China has always been reluctant to announce its aid promises for a variety of reasons, including the fact that it wants to avoid comparisons with aid given by the richer countries and maintain the image of giving aid without strings attached, it has recently become even more reticent in providing details about its aid giving. Hence officially announced bilateral aid in 1979 and 1980 was down from previous years. (See Table 1). In 1979 China provided between $99 and $112 million in aid to other countries that it or the recipient country provided figures on, and this included only two nations. (See Table 2). In 1980 the figure was smaller, or a total of $89.5 million in official aid, with four recipients. (See Table 3). And in the case of only one of the recipients during this two year period was the announcement made in China — an interest free loan to Zimbabwe.

On the other hand, Beijing made public most of its Red Cross and other emergency aid, which exceeded previous years, and, if added to China’s official aid giving, would bring the total of officially announced aid up slightly. Funds China provided to U.N.—affiliated and other international organizations were considerably larger than emergency aid, especially in 1980, and, if added to China’s aid program, would increase the total figure noticeably. Finally, if the costs borne by China for resettling ethnic Chinese among the Indo-Chinese refugees is counted, China’s aid program increases by several fold. Further details on these points are provided in subsequent pages.

In past years, official aid figures tell very little about China’s foreign aid program and during 1979-80 this remained true. Most of China’s aid giving was unannounced and its real aid exceeded by several fold the amount that can be documented in terms of values and conditions or terms. On the other hand, like its official aid giving, China’s real aid also declined appreciably. Two factors explain this drop: (1) the termination of aid to Vietnam and Albania — the

4. In June 1980 Argentina extended China credits totalling $300 million to buy non-traditional goods. The rate of interest was 7½ percent for capital goods and 3½ percent for durable and semi-durable goods, and the repayment period was 8½ and 10 years respectively. For further details see New China News Agency (hereinafter NCNA), June 7, 1980 cited in Foreign Broadcasting Information Service (hereinafter FBIS), June 9, 1980, p. 13.
two largest recipients of Chinese aid in the late 1960s and early 1970s — in 1978, and; (2) the greater concern over domestic economic development and the fact that Chinese leaders perceived that they could better use the funds at home. There may also have been some apprehension over public opinion vis-à-vis China's aid giving in view of the fact that much publicity was being given to domestic economic growth and because China is a poor country.5

Hostile relations with Vietnam and Albania account for the fact that in terms of regions or blocs, China's aid giving during 1979-80 reflected a major shift in direction. Very little aid was given during the period to communist bloc countries. In fact, North Korea was probably the only real recipient of Chinese foreign aid and there is real doubt whether this aid was very significant. Pyongyang obtained petroleum from China at "friendly prices" and China reported that a chemical plant and an oil pump and nozzle plant built with Chinese aid went into operation in North Korea in 1980.6 Suggesting that this aid was not very important, Pyongyang reported that it was receiving much more aid from the Soviet Union and was “dissatisfied” with China's aid.7

In addition to these donations China announced a one time grant of emergency assistance to Yugoslavia.8 Beijing also claimed to have finished a hospital in Afghanistan after the installation of the pro-Soviet communist regime there; and it reported giving food, medicine and other aid to Vietnamese citizens in occupied areas in Vietnam during the war between the two countries in early 1979.9 These latter donations, however, cannot be regarded as genuine foreign aid because they are too small and used only one time grants, and because they cannot be confirmed.

Whereas China's aid to communist nations declined, its aid to insurgent groups increased over previous years — even compared

with the 1960s, when China claimed as a major tenet of its foreign policy support of “wars of national liberation.” The surprising or at least interesting thing about this aid was that it was almost exclusively aimed at countering communist regimes. The situation in Indochina, where China perceived that Vietnam had become a hegemonist power working in conjunction with the Soviet Union, the Kremlin’s invasion of Afghanistan and the threat that posed to South Asia and the Middle East, and China’s continued dispute with the Soviet Union all explain the change in China’s aid giving.

China’s military aid also shows an increase over previous years. Pakistan was the major recipient, receiving increased amounts of arms from China in response to the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan. Egypt also received significant quantities of arms from China during the period. Several other countries received lesser amounts of weapons aid.

In terms of the total number of recipient nations, China’s aid giving was down slightly during 1979-80. In 1979 China rendered assistance of some type that could be documented to 41 nations (See Table 4) and in 1980 to 40 nations. (See Table 5). This compares to 53 recipients in 1978 and 49 in 1977. The lesser number of recipients could well be explained by the fact that China is now saying less about its aid and many smaller projects may have gone unreported by either China or the recipient nation. In addition, new recipients get more attention and say more about aid when it is obtained for the first time: there were no new nations added to China’s list of aid recipients during the period. Yet another factor is the change in attitude by Western nations that no longer see China’s aid activities as a threat or an effort to foster anti-imperialist “wars of national liberation.” Finally, there is considerable evidence that in the context of its own concern about economic development China was simply less willing to extend aid to other countries even when this involved only small expenditures.

Medical and agricultural aid remained popular, although they formed the mainstay of China’s foreign assistance program only in Africa. Roads and water and electricity projects also remained popular kinds of aid in African, Middle Eastern, as well as some Asian countries. While the strategic value of roads is important as perceived by the Chinese leaders, Beijing still regards a physical presence of its workers, technicians and advisors in foreign countries which road work provides more crucial. On the other hand, both medical and agricultural aid as well as project aid in general afforded this presence during 1979-80 more than road construction.
Building construction also remained a popular part of China's aid effort, and because of it China's aid giving also took on a new slant. In some countries where China has constructed buildings in the past as part of its economic aid program, it is now signing contracts for payment. Most noteworthy are several projects in North Yemen, including an agreement with that government on establishing a joint building-engineering corporation. China also signed an agreement establishing a joint venture furniture construction project with North Yemen, and an agreement with the government of Iraq to build several bridges, including one large bridge over the Tigrus River for payment.10

According to a Chinese source, Beijing has signed more than forty construction contracts abroad, mostly with Middle Eastern countries.11

Beijing also reported that the China Construction Corporation, which is the major builder overseas, employs more than 80,000 architects and workers and has experience in more than fifty countries.12 One may conclude from this that China has in at least one respect profited from its foreign aid program and may in the future be expected to utilize more if its expertise gained from foreign aid projects to make profits and attain needed foreign exchange.

This is not, however, to say that China's foreign aid program is not generous or not as generous as it was in the past. Most of China's aid continues to be given in the form of low or non-interest-bearing loans, or in the form of gifts. It is also generous considering China itself is a poor country. On the other hand, as in the past, since Chinese aid is seldom given in foreign currencies and is almost always tied to Chinese products, there is only limited choice in terms of goods or supplies for the recipient when compared to most Western aid programs. Also, repayment continues to be in goods rather than in currency — which in the case of Western economic assistance programs is affected by inflation to the advantage of the recipient; this drastically limits the grant factor of Chinese aid.

During the period under survey China rendered more emergency assistance than has been the practice in the past. In 1979 the total to six recipients was close to one-half million dollars. (See Table 6). In 1980 it totalled more than a million dollars to six recipients. (See Table 7). The explanation for this may be that emergency aid provides more publicity and good will for the amount of the donation,

12. Ibid.
while it is considered humanitarian and is less likely to be questioned by China's population or opponents of Deng Xiaoping's economic modernization program — who can point out the contradiction between the almost singular aim of economic growth and even having a foreign aid program.

In this connection China set a precedent in giving financial assistance to the United Nations and several U.N.-affiliated or other international organizations. While Beijing had given aid funds to the U.N. in the past, it was for the purpose of transferring funds to a specific country where China had no direct contacts or where the international body could do it more effectively. During 1980, China donated a total of over $4.75 million to a number of U.N.-affiliate organizations, and other international bodies. (See Table 8). Again this seems to reflect an effort by Chinese leaders to gain more publicity for the aid they give and to disguise it from their own population to avoid possible political opposition. It may also reflect an effort to gain a bigger voice in the United Nations and to continue to make a bid for leadership of the Third World nations, while China's trade increases with the developed Western nations and while China competes with Third World Countries for loans from the developed countries and international lending agencies. Some of the donations also reflect an effort by Chinese leaders to draw global attention to the refugee problems spawned by the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, both of which Chinese leaders have strongly criticized. In any event, the reader must keep in mind that the amount of aid China has given to the U.N. and other international organizations does not approach the amount it has received from international lending institutions.

Related to the aid China provided to the U.N. during the period under study and its motives behind this aid, is the fact that China has accepted a sizeable number of refugees from Indochina during the last two to three years. Although most were ethnically Chinese who did not have citizenship locally, Beijing sought to underscore the fact that Vietnam was the cause of the refugee problem which created severe financial hardship for China. In mid-1980, a Chinese representative at the United Nations declared that up to that date China had already accepted 260,000 Indochinese refugees and that the Chinese government had paid $580 million for their relief and

13. In 1978 China provided economic aid to Laos through the U.N. This was done for convenience reasons. For further details, see Copper, "China's Foreign Aid in 1978," supra note 5, at 5.
One reason for giving attention to the issue and China's costs relates both to good publicity for China and a bad image for Vietnam as well as an effort to enlist aid from the U.N. and other global organizations for refugee costs — which China succeeded in doing, though by the end of 1980 to-date only in part.

In the following sections China's aid to insurgency movements and its aid to three geographic/political regions — non-Communist Asia, Africa and other areas — are discussed in greater detail. Here some of the special facets of China's aid program as well as Beijing's strategic views and concerns become evident.

**Aid to Insurgency or Guerrilla Groups**

In terms of its costs China probably rendered as much aid to insurgency groups as to nations in any of the geographic/political regions to be discussed below. On the other hand, the value and even the results or the usefulness of this aid is extremely difficult to assess. A good portion of this aid consisted of weapons, though equipment, medicine, food and even military advisors and training were also provided. In at least one case it was reported that China was paying salaries for what amounted to mercenary soldiers.

All of the insurgency forces or liberation groups to receive Chinese assistance were in South or Southeast Asia or Africa. (See Tables 9 and 10). Chinese aid was given in both large and small amounts and to groups with varying purposes, though it is noteworthy that most of China's aid in this category was aimed at countering Soviet supported, or Soviet protege governments. The rest was aimed at supporting black Africa, though in terms of amounts this was much less. Virtually none was aimed at overthrowing pro-Western regimes or colonial powers.

The area where China provided the most extensive support to rebel forces was in Indochina: Kampuchea and Laos. China's purpose was to threaten and attempt to overthrow the governments of these two countries, which are communist but are in the Soviet-Vietnamese camp. The significant quantity of aid that China purveyed to opposition forces in these two countries must be explained in strategic terms: China feels threatened by the Soviet military buildup in Asia and sees the Soviet-Vietnamese alliance and these two nations' growing influence in the region as an effort to contain China as well as deny Beijing a sphere of influence.

Elsewhere in the region China terminated or cut back its support to rebel forces and promised leaders of several non-communist Southeast Asian countries that it would not render assistance to communist insurgency movements there.\textsuperscript{15} Confirming these statements in mid-1979, China specifically stated — and there was no contradictory evidence — that it was no longer providing aid to communist movements in Thailand or Malaysia.\textsuperscript{16} At about the same time, Beijing cut its aid drastically to the Burmese Communist Party, which China has long supported; as of mid-1980 its aid included only certain supplies and no weapons.\textsuperscript{17} Chinese leaders apparently wanted to concentrate their efforts on countering the Soviet-Vietnamese threat and sought to ally with local governments to do this. More specifically, Chinese aid to Pol Pot's forces in Kampuchea and its cutting of assistance to communist insurgency movements in Thailand and Malaysia seemed to be aimed at preventing the Vietnamese-supported Heng Samrin government from winning diplomatic recognition from countries in the region. In short, China wanted to foster doubt concerning the government's control of the country.

The second area of importance where China aided an insurgency movement was in South Asia, namely Afghanistan. Much of China's help, however, was given to Pakistan in the form of direct military assistance. China's aid to Muslim rebels in Afghanistan was not very significant in terms of its amount, value, or effect. The only other area where China was actively supporting insurgency movements or helping wars of national liberation during 1979-80 was in Africa where China provided help to forces led by Robert Mugabe that sought to overthrow the government of Rhodesia (early during the period) and to the Southwest African People's Organization (SWAPO) which was engaged in guerrilla warfare against South Africa.

The most extensive aid given to any insurgency or revolutionary force during the period went to Pol Pot's forces operating in Western Kampuchea and eastern Thailand against the Vietnamese-backed Heng Samrin government and Vietnamese troops stationed in the country. Early in 1979 Thai sources reported that China had fortified

\textsuperscript{15} Derek Davies, "Shadow of the Kremlin," \textit{Far Eastern Economic Review}, August 24, 1979, p. 21.

\textsuperscript{16} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{17} Ibid; John McBeth, "New Force in The Opium Trade," \textit{Far Eastern Economic Review}, July 25, 1980, p. 28. The latter notes that the Burmese Communist Party has been forced to get into the opium selling business because China withdrew its annual grant of $7.48 million.
and manned the island of Khemera Phumin off the coast of Kampuchea, which was a transit point for Chinese weapons and supplies going to Khmer Rouge forces. According to Prince Sihanouk, Deng Xiaoping told him that China was also sending arms and supplies to Pol Pot's forces through Thailand — with the permission of the Thai government — though Bangkok denied this. Significant Chinese aid deliveries to the Khmer Rouge were confirmed by Vietnamese, Soviet and various Western sources. According to a Vietnamese source the amount of Chinese aid going to Pol Pot was "huge"; moreover, it included military advisors — some of whom were captured by the Vietnamese, including a general.

During 1980 China also donated money and supplies to U.N. and other international organizations to aid Kampuchean refugees, apparently for the purpose of sustaining Pol Pot's forces, or to involve global institutions in the conflict. In any case, Vietnam and the Heng Samrin government complained about international aid efforts, which they said augmented Pol Pot's strength. Vietnam lent confirmation to the effectiveness of this aid, and to the contention that Chinese aid was being sent through Thailand, when in June Vietnamese forces crossed the Thai border, after which Phnom Penh described the incursion as a "self-defense effort" intended to protect the sovereignty of Kampuchea. At nearly the same time well-supplied and well-equipped Khmer Rouge troops attacked a train in central Kampuchea, killing 200 Vietnamese troops and civilians, thereby demonstrating their ability to operate throughout much of the country in strength.

According to one source, by late 1980 China had armed from 10 to 15 thousand Khmer guerrillas in Kampuchea (of a total force of 30 thousand), both by planting arms and supplies there before the Vietnamese invasion in early 1979 and through aid deliveries since.

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22. Ibid.

During 1979-1980 indications were that China was having no difficulty sending arms and equipment to Khmer forces and was even able to deliver arms through Laos.\(^{24}\)

On the other hand, while Vietnamese forces were not able to pacify all of the country and were unsuccessful in their efforts to cut off and contain the Khmer Rouge, neither were Pol Pot's forces able to launch a major offensive. Meanwhile, Vietnamese troops were provided with fresh weapons and supplies direct from the Soviet Union via Kampuchea's southern ports.\(^{25}\)

Thus, one of China's biggest aid operations during the period under study must be termed as inconclusive. Beijing was able through its aid efforts to sustain Pol Pot's forces and prevent the total consolidation of Kampuchea by Vietnamese forces. In this way China probably precluded the pro-Vietnam government in Kampuchea from becoming legitimate and recognized. Also, through its aid to Pol Pot China cost Vietnam and the Soviet Union much larger amounts of money to support the other side.\(^{26}\)

This, followed by the Chinese invasion of Vietnam in early 1979, which caused inestimatable damage, has engendered serious economic concern in Vietnam.\(^{27}\)

During 1979, because of an increased Vietnamese and Soviet presence in Laos and virtual control over the Laotian government by those two countries (especially through the presence of an estimated 40,000 Vietnamese soldiers in Laos), relations between Laos and China turned sour. In this context it was reported that China had "mobilized" — viz. armed, equipped and trained — large numbers of Hmong (Meo) and Lu minority people in Laos to fight guerrilla war in the northern part of the country and was even paying some of them a salary of around $30 per month.\(^{28}\)

\(^{24}\) National Review, April 13, 1979, p. 466.


\(^{27}\) The damage caused to the Vietnamese economy by China's invasion in early 1979 is huge by any estimate. According to ABC News (T.V. broadcast seen in Memphis, Tennessee), August 14, 1979, China caused $100 million in damage in Lon Son in one day during the war. During 1980 reports on Vietnam's economic situation were consistently dreary: noting that food rations had been cut, funds were unavailable to repair war damage, black marketing was flourishing, and defections from the military had increased. See for example, Douglas Pike, "Vietnam in 1980: The Gathering Story?" Asian Survey, 21 (1981).

confirmed in official references by the Laotian government to the 
"enemy's fomentation of disturbances" and "international reactionar­
ies who were trying to swallow up the country." In September an 
editorial in a Loatian paper accused China directly of sending 
"traitorous lackeys" into Laos to "sow discord."

Later in the year it was said that China had organized and 
trained a division of 4,000 guerrilla fighters comprised of Laos and 
Meos, which it sent into northern Laos. There was also evidence 
that this was an ongoing policy: late in the year China accepted a 
number of Laotian refugees (as many as 10,000) — but only young men 
— from camps in Thailand for resettlement in China. At about this 
same time a Khmer Rouge radio broadcast declared that a Lao 
Socialist Party had been established in Laos (presumably with 
Chinese help) to fight Vietnamese occupation troops.

In reaction, the Laotian government accused China of massing 
troops on its border, and called on Beijing to end its foreign aid 
program in Laos. (China's official aid to Laos for all practical 
purposes had already been terminated.) The government also moved 
closer to Vietnam and the Soviet Union, while getting increasing 
quantities of aid from the latter.

Beginning in 1980 there were reports of a unifying of right and 
left-wing resistance to the Vietnamese military presence in Laos. In 
mid-year a Khmer Rouge radio broadcast from China announced the 
formation of the Lao National Liberation Front and during the rest of 
the year commented on its "victories." At about this same time 
China's official news agency started publishing reports of insurgency 
in Laos, indicating open and official support for guerrilla groups 
acting against the Laotian government and Vietnamese military 
forces there. In September, Agence France-Presse reported that four 
Lao opposition groups had joined to form the Lao People's National

29. This statement was made by Premier Kaysone. See Asia 1980 Yearbook, p. 220.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid, p. 221.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid, p. 222.
36. Asahi Shinbun (Tokyo), January 20, 1980, cited in Stanley S. Bedlington, 
Liberation front and that the latter’s efforts were being coordinated with those of the Khmer Rouge.  

However, in counterposition to what the above indicates there was no hard evidence that insurgency had become an unmanageable problem in Laos. Also, as already noted the government of Laos received increasing amounts of Soviet aid during the period. Clearly there was no indication that China was going to match the military equipment given by the Soviet Union to government forces. Thus, China appeared to want to support a guerrilla war rather than a conventional war, while tying up the opposition movements in Laos and Kampuchea. Again, as in the case of Kampuchea, it is difficult to assess China’s success so far or forecast future results.

China’s aid to guerrilla forces in Afghanistan is even more difficult to analyze than its aid to insurgency forces in Kampuchea or Laos. One month after the December 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan U.S. officials reported that Chinese leaders were willing to increase their deliveries of small arms to Moslem rebels in Afghanistan. According to this same source China was also supplying weapons to Afghan refugees in Pakistan. Two other sources, however, questioned, or at least played down, China’s arms aid to Afghan rebels. One cited four nations thought to be purveyors of weapons, noting that all had denied it: China, Egypt, Pakistan, and the U.S. The other source said that China was “helping with small arms” — but went on to add that its weapons aid was “not very much.”

Shortly thereafter the Kremlin accused China and Pakistan of sending weapons, in addition to “well trained saboteurs and bandits” into Afghanistan. Soviet charges of Chinese involvement continued and were subsequently taken up by the Afghan government which also accused China of training insurgents. Beijing, however, denied both indictments. Later it was charged that China had established bases in Pakistan to train saboteurs and terrorists for use in Afghanistan, but again Chinese leaders denied such reports.

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44. FBIS, January 11, 1980, p. F8, citing a Reuters broadcast.
By late 1980 less was heard about China's aid to insurgents, apparently meaning that it was not terribly significant, or that China had terminated its help to Afghan rebels — though more likely the former. Chinese leaders probably perceived that its aid alone would have little effect, and, therefore, took a wait-and-see attitude, hoping that the U.S. and some other countries would do more. Beijing may also have perceived that it could be more effective by limiting its direct aid to the Afghan rebels while providing military aid to Pakistan, which as will be seen in the next section, was quite substantial. This tack, from China's point of view, probably guaranteed that it would not be acting alone, and, therefore, that it did not have to worry about retaliation from the Soviet Union or a direct confrontation with the Kremlin. Unlike the situation in Southeast Asia, Afghanistan's small border with China did not provide a supply route for Chinese weapons and supplies and was early on secured by Soviet forces. Also, Beijing probably observed that the situation in Afghanistan had already attracted considerable international attention and was very detrimental to Moscow's global image, thus China's aid was unnecessary and may have been seen to give Moscow an excuse for a presence in Afghanistan.

Elsewhere, China provided assistance to several insurgency groups or movements in Africa, though information is sparse on Beijing's activities there. In early 1979 Chinese Vice-Premier Li Xiannian visited Africa and met with Robert Mugabe, leader of ZANU, the movement to "liberate" Rhodesia. Li reportedly promised Mugabe further arms aid including military advisors. This report is borne out by the fact that after Mugabe came to power relations with China were good and Beijing made a meaningful (large by Chinese standards) promise of economic assistance to his government. (This aid is discussed in a following section.)

During the same visit Li also promised aid to the Southwest African People's Organization (SWAPO), though again no details concerning the size or value of this aid were made available. Chinese leaders ostensibly wanted to maintain to some degree their reputation as a supporter of black Africans while providing an alternative to Soviet aid to SWAPO. Beijing may have chosen to announce this aid to counter charges made by the Kremlin during the year concerning China's trade with South Africa.

47. Ibid.
China also rendered assistance to other African groups as reflected in the presence of an estimated 500 Chinese military advisors on the continent. Clearly not all of these, and probably not even a sizeable majority, were assisting national armies. China wanted to keep its aid to such groups secret in view of its efforts to improve its ties with Western nations and its desire to be seen as a legitimate and law abiding member of the world community.

Aid to Non-Communist Asian Nations

China officially provided economic aid to five non-Communist countries during 1979 and six during 1980. (See Tables 11 and 12). All of these nations had received Chinese assistance before, although Thailand had received only Red Cross emergency assistance on a one time basis in 1978. Although the number of African nations to receive Chinese assistance during the period was much larger, non-Communist nations received bigger donations and as a bloc received more. The strategy behind China’s aid giving in this region seems to relate in part to offsetting India’s influence on the South Asia subcontinent — a constant goal of Chinese foreign policy decision makers. It also related to the conflicts in Southeast Asia, more particularly the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea (though clearly this goes further in explaining China’s aid to insurgency groups), and to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan — especially in China’s military aid to Pakistan.

48. David D. Newsom, "communism in Africa," African Report, January-February 1980, p. 47. The author was formerly U.S. Undersecretary for Political Affairs and this article is based upon his testimony before the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on October 18, 1979, thus the figure cited should be regarded as an official U.S. Department of State estimate.

49. Two more non-Communist Asian countries may be added to the list of recipients of Chinese aid during 1979–80. China reported handing over a hospital built with Chinese aid in Afghanistan in early 1979; however, it is unclear if this was anything more than formalizing an earlier agreement and perhaps attempting to gain some publicity for a project finished months earlier. See New China News Agency, March 6, 1979, cited in China Aktuell, March 1979, p. 7. Afghanistan was not technically a communist country at that time. As noted in the introduction it was also reported that China turned over a hospital to the Afghanistan government in 1980. It was also reported that China had made an agreement with the government of the Philippines to supply that country with 1.2 million tons of petroleum at "friendship prices." See Financial Times (India) July 9, 1979, p. 3. By most accounts this would not be considered economic aid.

50. See Copper, “China’s Foreign Aid in 1978,” supra note 5, Table 4.
Pakistan was the largest recipient of Chinese assistance during the period, the majority of China’s aid to Pakistan consisting of arms and other military aid. Moreover, some of China’s “economic aid” to Pakistan patently had military uses or implications. Early in the year it was reported that construction was underway on the last link of the Chinese-aided Karakoram Highway linking Pakistan with China.\(^\text{51}\) Two months later it was announced that a heavy foundry and forge completed in 1977 had been commissioned.\(^\text{52}\) A few months after this, China reported on work being done on a sports complex, which included a stadium that would seat 50,000 people.\(^\text{53}\)

In August 1980 it was reported that a team of Chinese technical experts was to arrive soon to finalize the construction of electric transmissions lines from Tarbela to Mardan and finish a grid station in the latter city.\(^\text{54}\) The cost of this project was put at $21 million; however, it is uncertain how much of this was Chinese aid, when the grant was actually made, or what conditions attached were.\(^\text{55}\) At about this same time it was reported that Chinese technicians were working on the expansion of a cement plant at Daudkhel.\(^\text{56}\) No further details, however, were provided. A protocol on this project was apparently signed in December, suggesting that the Chinese technicians mentioned above were doing some surveying or conducting a feasibility study.\(^\text{57}\) Mention was also made of a 100 million rupee ($10.1 million) sheet glass plant that was scheduled to go into production in January 1981, for which China was apparently going to provide the machinery.\(^\text{58}\)

During 1980 a Pakistan source summarized China’s aid to Pakistan to date stating that China had provided Pakistan with military and economic assistance worth $378 million in the form of a $250 million interest free loan and four grants.\(^\text{59}\) This source went on to say that the above figures did not include any of the cost of the Karakoram highway and praised both the generosity of Chinese aid.

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55. *Ibid*.
and the fact that China had given Pakistan military assistance in times of need and in an effort to help Pakistan attain self-reliance.\textsuperscript{60} On the other hand, almost no mention was made in China of its assistance, either economic or military, to Pakistan — probably because the leadership feared some protest about such generosity in light of China’s own poverty which was now being publicly admitted. Moreover, little was said in Pakistan about China’s military aid. This may explain why there are much higher estimates of China’s aid to Pakistan: military aid may have been excluded from the above estimate even though it was specifically cited (this is discussed further below).

In the realm of Chinese military assistance to Pakistan there were various reports confirming substantial aid, though its value is difficult to estimate, and it is uncertain how critical that aid was considering Pakistan’s needs. In June, 1979, it was reported that China had established a string of small military bases or posts along the 537-mile Karakorum Highway and along the Afghan border to protect against sabotage.\textsuperscript{61} This same source mentioned that there were up to 3,000 Chinese soldiers in Pakistan.\textsuperscript{62} In May a ceremony was held for a Chinese-aided factory that was said to be “defense-oriented,” though further details on the factory were not supplied.\textsuperscript{63} Two months later another factory was reported completed.\textsuperscript{64} This factory was part of a complex to rebuild tanks and make spare parts.\textsuperscript{65} In November a “heavy rebuild factory” which also manufactures arms and ammunition and which was built with Chinese aid was inaugurated.\textsuperscript{66} No other details were provided.

During 1980, following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, there were reports of vast Chinese military aid to Pakistan, though these reports were also contradicted by other reports of restrictions on Chinese military assistance to Pakistan. In January shortly after the invasion, Foreign Minister Huang Hua

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{60} \textit{Ibid.}
\item \textsuperscript{61} Daily Telegraph (London), June 4, 1979, \textit{cited in the “Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation,” China Quarterly, 78 (1979): 418.}
\item \textsuperscript{62} \textit{Ibid.}
\item \textsuperscript{63} NCNA, May 21, 1979, and AFP May 20, 1979, both \textit{cited in China Aktuell, May 1979, p. 12.}
\item \textsuperscript{64} Karachi Radio, July 8, 1979, \textit{cited in China Aktuell, July 1979, p. 8.}
\item \textsuperscript{65} \textit{Ibid.}
\item \textsuperscript{66} NCNA, November 28, 1979 and Karachi Radio, November 28, 1979, both \textit{cited in China Aktuell, December 1979, p. 10.}
\end{itemize}
visited Islamabad and promised to aid Pakistan against a Soviet threat or Soviet forces in Afghanistan.\(^67\) He said at the time that China would aid Pakistan in "various ways."\(^68\) This was taken by foreign analysts to mean that Huang had offered extensive arms aid to Pakistan.\(^69\) Still another source reported that China to date had provided Pakistan with a total of $2 billion in military assistance over a 13-year period and was now rendering even more arms aid to Pakistan.\(^70\) These reports were offset, however, to some extent by the fact that President Zia traveled to China in mid-year and reportedly was promised weapons — but at increased prices and on a cash and carry basis.\(^71\) This may have reflected the Chinese position that Pakistan also needed to obtain U.S. arms, indicating some displeasure about Pakistan's negative reaction to a U.S. arms offer at the time. Alternatively, Pakistan may have asked for more than China could or perceived it could deliver and for that reason was rebuffed.

Later in the year reports of extensive Chinese military aid to Pakistan again appeared. According to an Indian source, China had agreed to provide Pakistan with jet fighters, ground-to-air missiles and other arms following to an agreement signed earlier in the year.\(^72\) The Indian Defense Ministry subsequently reported that Pakistan was to receive 65 Fantan jet fighters (an improved design of the MIG 19) and a sizeable number of ground-to-air SAM-2 missiles that would be placed around Pakistan's nuclear development facilities and other strategic targets in accordance with a secret agreement made between the two countries when Pakistan's Air Force chief was in Beijing in June.\(^73\) Both Pakistan and China, however, denied the above cited reports. Pakistan also said that statements about Chinese troops and nuclear rockets in Pakistan were “fabrications by foreign media.”\(^74\)

Sri Lanka was the second largest recipient of Chinese foreign aid during the period 1979-80. In August 1979 Prime Minister Premedasa visited Beijing and was offered a 500 million rupee ($32 million)

\(^{67}\) Facts on File, 40, (1980): p. 44.
\(^{68}\) Asia Yearbook 1981, p. 270.
\(^{71}\) Asia Yearbook 1981, p. 218.
\(^{73}\) Asia Bulletin, December 1980, p. 35.
interest-free loan repayable over a period of 20 years.\textsuperscript{75} The loan, like most of China's aid donations during the period, was not announced publicly in China. It was, however, described in Sri Lanka as designated for three projects: a marketing complex in Columbo, water supply facilities, and the development of modern villages.\textsuperscript{76} Prior to this agreement, which was one of the biggest Chinese promises to Sri Lanka in recent years, China had signed a rice-for-rubber deal. Judging from the fact that a number of earlier such agreements with Sri Lanka had contained some advantage to Sri Lanka in terms of prices, and because negotiations were made in the wake of major cyclone damage to Sri Lanka's rice fields, there was ostensibly some grant factor in the deal.\textsuperscript{77} China also provided hydroelectric units for four projects under construction in Sri Lanka in 1979, though this may have constituted aid already promised.\textsuperscript{78}

During 1980 more Chinese technicians arrived in Sri Lanka, presumably to work on projects already negotiated and designed.\textsuperscript{79} This suggests the immediate working out of details so that the aid promised in 1979 could be drawn and used. Little else was said about economic aid in subsequent months, though China also made one agreement to provide military aid to Sri Lanka. This consisted of the gift of two "fast gunboats" to the government of Sri Lanka late in the year to be used for sea surveillance and rescue.\textsuperscript{80}

According to two different sources China provided loans to the Burmese government worth either $67 million or $80 million.\textsuperscript{81} Neither source cited details or provided documentation and nothing was said by either government to confirm a large grant of aid during the year. On the other hand, various other sources confirmed that a significant amount of aid was given and used, at least during the latter half of 1979 and early 1980. For example, in August 1979 an unofficial Burmese source reported that China had provided $7 million worth of equipment for a textile mill project in Burma.\textsuperscript{82} Early

\textsuperscript{76}. \textit{China Aktuell}, August 1979, p. 10. No source is cited.
\textsuperscript{77}. \textit{Asia Research Bulletin}, March 31, 1979, p. 545.
\textsuperscript{82}. Radio Rangoon, August 1, 1979, \textit{cited in China Aktuell}, August 1979, p. 10.
in 1980 China reported that a rubber ball factory started in 1978 in Burma had been completed.\textsuperscript{83} The factory, it said, would manufacture 50,000 balls per year.\textsuperscript{84} In July China announced eight large building projects under construction in Burma, apparently in fulfillment of the aid granted in 1979.\textsuperscript{85}

Later in the year, however, there were reports of China again providing more support for insurgents in Burma and at year's end it was uncertain whether Burma would still be allowed to draw on Chinese aid.\textsuperscript{86} This was typical of China's past aid relationship with Burma — an on-and-off again affair.

In Nepal a textile mill was inaugurated in January 1979, built with Chinese aid at a cost of 180 million rupees.\textsuperscript{87} According to sources in Nepal the mill will employ 400 workers when put into full operation.\textsuperscript{88} A month later a brick factory, started in 1977 and capable of producing 20 million bricks a year, was completed and handed over to the Nepal government.\textsuperscript{89} And in September an 86-meter long bridge, started in 1979, was completed.\textsuperscript{90}

In April a Chinese technical team arrived in Nepal to do survey work for a paper plant.\textsuperscript{91} This was apparently a follow-up of aid promised in 1978.\textsuperscript{92} Late in the year an agreement was made on a paper mill, which was reported to be the first of its kind in Nepal and said to be capable of producing 10 tons of stationery paper per day.\textsuperscript{93} It is uncertain, however, if this was a new agreement or the final arrangements for a deal made earlier. During 1980 Chinese sources mentioned other projects under construction, but failed to give any further information. While there was some delay in road projects during this period, other evidence indicated that China’s aid to Nepal was both significant and useful and that it would continue — keeping

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{84} Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{87} Kathmandu Radio, January 19, 1979, cited in China Aktuell, January 1979, p. 5.
  \item \textsuperscript{88} Kathmandu Radio, December 30, 1978, cited in China Aktuell, January 1979, p. 5.
  \item \textsuperscript{89} NCNA, February 20, 1979, cited in China Aktuell, February 1979, p. 14.
  \item \textsuperscript{90} NCNA, September 21, 1979, cited in China Aktuell, September 1979, p. 12.
  \item \textsuperscript{91} Kathmandu Radio, April 5, 1979, cited in China Aktuell, April 1979, p. 10.
  \item \textsuperscript{92} See Copper, "China's Foreign Aid in 1978," supra notes, at 20–21.
  \item \textsuperscript{93} NCNA, December 27, 1979, cited in China Aktuell, December 1979, p. 10.
\end{itemize}
Nepal from becoming too dependent on India economically or politically.

In February 1980 China signed an agreement with the government of Bangladesh to supply machinery for a composite textile mill that will use 2,500 spindles and 250 looms. In August a Chinese technical team was reported at work on a fertilizer plant for which China had agreed to provide technical assistance, machinery and supervisory service. Two agreements were also signed by the two governments in mid-year when President Ziar Rahman visited China; according to these agreements China will "provide loans to Bangladesh." No details, however, were released on these loans concerning the amount, conditions or time of repayment. Clearly China wishes to maintain friendly ties with the government of Bangladesh and regards a friendly Bangladesh as crucial to balancing India’s influence in South Asia.

According to one source, China promised military aid to Thailand during 1979; however, no confirmation of this could be made and no details were provided by that source. In the context of China’s aid to Pol Pot’s forces in Kampuchea and the threat of Vietnamese forces on the Thai-Kampuchean border this report had some credibility. This was especially so in mid-1980 when, after Vietnamese forces crossed the border into Thailand, China openly promised to help Thailand in the event of continued incursions or a prolonged struggle.

In July 1979 China provided an official donation of aid to the Thai government in the form of a gift of three Chinese-made road sweepers. Much more Chinese aid was provided to Thailand, however, in the form of refugee aid, which has already been cited. In any event, it was clear that China sought close relations with Thailand because of the conflicts in Kampuchea and Laos in view of China’s support of the insurgency movements there. China also sought to support Bangkok’s position on not recognizing the Heng Samrin government in Kampuchea.

Aid to African Nations

During 1979 China granted or delivered aid to 23 African countries; during 1980 twenty-five African nations, received Chinese

assistance (See Tables 13 & 14). Unlike aid given insurgency movements and to non-Communist Asian countries, most of China's help to African countries was in small amounts and much was in the form of medical teams and agricultural projects. Several African countries also received emergency assistance and two or three got arms aid. Compared to the recent past Beijing was clearly less interested in financing large, expensive projects in Africa ostensibly due to the need for capital to finance its own development. Following nearly a decade-long trend Chinese decision makers continued to avoid competition with Western aid and devoted most of their efforts to countering Soviet influence in Africa. In fact, it seemed more and more true that China's aid efforts were aimed at following the lead of the U.S. and other Western countries in terms of dealing with Soviet influence.

During 1980 the only nations to receive aid from China where the amount was cited were in Africa — Kenya, Zimbabwe, and Tanzania and Zambia for the Tanzam Railroad. In the case of the grant to Kenya — China's largest in the area during the two year period — there was some hint of a shift of interest from Tanzania to Kenya as China's favorite in Africa. Aid to Zimbabwe represents an extension of help that China granted to Robert Mugabe during the civil war and an effort to assist him after coming to power, having an edge over the Soviet Union in terms of his friendship. Aid to Tanzania and Zambia represents an effort by China to maintain its largest aid project ever and probably can be seen as a move to ensure that the project does not fall into disuse and result in a loss of face for China's foreign aid program.

In September 1980 Kenya's President visited China and at the time was granted a $50 million interest-free loan to be drawn in the next ten years and to be used in the areas of rice growing and the development of geothermal projects.99 The size of this loan and the fact that Vice-Premier Ji Pengfei had visited Kenya in August, while neglecting to visit Tanzania on this trip, prompted some speculation that China was shifting its emphasis in Africa to Kenya in order to build a strategic anti-Soviet coalition there.100 Since the United States had been offered basing rights in Kenya in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan it may also be seen to represent China's

willingness to follow the U.S. lead in Africa in countering Soviet influence. Beijing may likewise have been motivated in making this loan by the fact that it had already invested considerable aid funds in a multimillion dollar sports complex near Nairobi where the All-Africa Games will be held in 1982. Clearly China will gain considerable publicity for its aid at that time.

China's second largest aid donation in Africa during the period under study and the only aid donation to be announced publically in China was a $26.7 million interest-free loan to Zimbabwe in September 1980. This loan was made in Chinese currency and with provision that it be drawn over the next five years. China's decision to make this donation related to China's long friendship with Robert Mugabe and its support for him and his guerrilla movement, ZANU, for a number of years. On the other hand it was reported that the Soviet Union during 1979 became a major arms suppliers to Zimbabwe; in fact, such supplies were equal to China's. Thus, Beijing's aid may have been an effort to counter Soviet encroachments.

The only other announced aid donation of any size was a $12.8 million grant to Tanzania and Zambia to buy spare parts for the trains running on the Tanzam Railroad. Beijing may have also separately agreed to repair embankments on the railroad in Tanzania and bridges blown up in Zambia during the Rhodesian Civil war. If this is true, the above cited figure underrepresents China's aid to the Tanzam Railroad during this period.

The railroad, completed in 1976, was China's largest aid project anywhere and guaranteed China a base of operations in East Africa. However, building the line mainly for political rather than economic reasons and thus ignoring cost factors, the opening of competing transportation links for the shipment of Zambia's copper to port, conflict in the region, and frequent breakdowns of the Chinese-

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103. Ibid.
104. See author's other works on China's foreign aid for details on previous aid to Mugabe and ZANU. It is noteworthy that China has provided weapons and supplies for several thousand guerrillas under Mugabe's leadership in recent years.
107. See Africa Report, November-December 1980, p. 34, which cites several other sources.
108. See Copper, China's Foreign Aid, pp. 103-08.
designed diesel locomotives have all caused the line to accumulate a large debt — in the range of $26 million by 1980. In providing the above cited aid China appeared to want to bail out the rail line and prevent the loss of prestige that might result from the line not being used or from the purchase of replacement locomotives elsewhere.

China continued to provide military aid to a number of African countries during 1979-80. As noted earlier an estimated 500 Chinese military advisors were in the region during the period. On the other hand, little was said or written about China's arms aid to African nations, probably because Beijing wanted to keep a low profile so as to legitimately portray the Soviet Union as the arms purveyor to the region. Also, since Moscow can provide more and better weapons than China and frequently delivers weapons to nations at odds with nations being helped by China or uses Chinese aid as an excuse for sending military hardware, African nations are hesitant to say anything about obtaining Chinese military assistance.

Nevertheless, in early 1979 the President of Somalia stated that China was giving his country arms as well as other aid. No details, however, were given by Somalia's president. Zaire was also reportedly receiving Chinese military aid, though again no details were made available.

In addition to its official aid and military assistance given during the period 1979–80, China rendered considerable help to a sizeable number of African countries in the form of project aid, agricultural assistance and medical aid. Project aid was the most expensive for China and gave China more visibility in Africa than elsewhere. Agricultural assistance and medical aid, however, gave Beijing a greater physical presence in African countries, certainly relatively to their cost. In all of these areas China had already proven its capabilities. And its aid projects have been and will no doubt continue to be finished as designed and will be useful to the recipient nation. On the other hand, during the period China cut the number of large projects undertaken, probably for a combination of two reasons: they are too costly when seen against China's own needs for development capital at home, and they have not been as successful as smaller projects (witness the Tanzam Railroad). This, however,

110. West German-made locomotives were being considered for replacements for the Chinese-made locomotive. See ibid.
should not be taken as evidence that China is ending or will in the
near future terminate its foreign aid program. China’s foreign aid
giving clearly serves a purpose, and it has witnessed a number of
rises and declines in the past.

In the area of project aid, five to ten new major projects were
agreed upon each year during the period and about the same number
were under construction or completed. (See Tables 15 and 16). This is
a marked decrease in the number of projects promised or started in
the past several years, especially when compared to the more than
twenty projects negotiated or put under construction in 1978. The
most popular kinds of projects were road and bridge construction,
public buildings and dams and other water projects. China also
announced starting work on a textile mill and a farm implements
factory. This generally follows past preferences and reflects a policy
of negotiating the kinds of projects China has been best at in the past.

Cape Verde, Mali, Mauritius, Upper Volta and Zambia were the
most important recipients of new project aid during 1979. Burundi,
Madagascar, Mauritainia, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Tanzania were
the major benefactors of new projects in 1980. This list reflects a
rather even distribution between East and West Africa and between
large and small nations.

Agricultural aid ranked second in terms of costs as a category of
aid projects. Details were available on a half a dozen projects started
or finished during each of the two years under consideration. (See
Tables 17 and 18). The fact that a larger number of projects was
completed than started seems to suggest that China may be
considering phasing out its agricultural aid projects. On the other
hand this probably reflects more the fact that China has cut, and is
still in the process of cutting, its aid program. Moreover, China has
started giving sizeable amounts of famine relief and related kinds of
aid through the United Nations and other global organizations, and
is now giving less publicity to its aid giving. Undoubtedly, some
projects have gone unreported.

In contrast to its project and agricultural aid during 1979–80
China’s medical assistance showed an increase. A slightly larger
number of medical teams — 13 in 1979 and 8 in 1980 — were sent to
African countries than in past years. (See Tables 19 and 20). This
may reflect a perceived need by Chinese leaders for a greater
presence in Africa; but it may also be an effort to cut expenses in aid

113. See Copper, “China’s Foreign Aid in 1978,” supra note 5.
giving since medical aid is much less expensive than other kinds of aid.

China's medical aid teams sent during 1979–80, as in past years, generally consisted of five to twenty people trained as paramedics. Only in the case of Algeria was a large medical team sent, and only in the case of Tanzania were doctors specifically noted among the medical personnel. Finally, only in the case of the Congo was there medical equipment or medicine in any significant value given, except in the case of the hospitals completed in Mauritania and Sierra Leone.

In the case of China's aid to African nations, probably more of China's assistance went unreported during the period than elsewhere because of its unwillingness to document its aid giving, plus the fact that smaller donations were not cited in other sources. In addition, Chinese aid to African nations is less novel and interesting than it has been in past years and is now regarded by only a few observers as a threat to Western interests. Thus a number of aid promises made to African nations in the past few years where follow-up information was unavailable probably suggests that they have simply not been reported. Some may have been delayed, but because of China's reputation in the aid field in Africa and its concern about preserving its leadership role among Third World countries, probably few have been cancelled.

Aid to Nations in Other Regions

China's foreign assistance during 1979–80 to nations other than in the two geographic regions already discussed consisted primarily of aid to nations in Northern Africa and the Middle East. (See Tables 21 and 22.) China gave the most aid to Egypt, primarily in the form of military aid. In the case of several other Middle Eastern countries China's foreign aid program was in the process of being transformed into construction and other aid-type projects for profit. As in the case of its cutting back on its aid giving, this is explained by China's need for investment capital, especially foreign exchange, and the fact that a number of Middle Eastern countries have vast quantities of oil money or are helped by those that do.

Elsewhere, China's aid giving during the period reflected no new interests of importance, with Malta and Guyana the only recipients in Europe or Latin America, other than recipients of emergency aid. This seemed to reflect the fact that Chinese leaders perceive their capabilities as limited and have little or no desire to expand their aid
giving into new regions, especially where they have little or no hope of competing with the Soviet Union. Although Latin American countries are receptive to China’s aid, Beijing apparently views the region as one where only the United States can stave off Soviet intrusions, while it, China, can do very little to help. On the other hand, Beijing did provide some emergency aid to Jamaica and the Dominican Republic as noted in the introduction. It also granted emergency aid to Fiji for the first time and with that donation set a precedent in helping a nation in that part of the world.

In June 1979 Egypt’s President Sadat in a public address made reference to Chinese military assistance. Subsequently he elaborated upon his statement saying that Egypt had received forty Shenyang F-6 jet fighters (Chinese version of the MiG-19), noting that four were already in service. He also revealed that negotiations were in progress for forty or fifty more and that Egypt in return had given China a Soviet MiG-23, which China had been anxious to obtain to facilitate its aircraft manufacturing capabilities. Whether this transaction consisted of a loan or a gift on China’s part is uncertain. Its value is also difficult to estimate. Another source noted that Egypt planned to use the Chinese aircraft at an air base south of Cairo to allow its MiG-21 fleet to be deployed closer to the Libyan border. Still another source mentioned that at least part of the aircraft would be used for training purposes.

In any case, the deal was made in the context of tensions between Egypt and Libya and the conclusion of the Camp David agreements, which was followed by a partial cutoff of military aid by important Arab suppliers. In this transaction China sought to help Egypt diversify its arms sources and to gain some leverage or influence over the situation in the Middle East. Chinese leaders probably perceived that the accords reached between Egypt and Israel provided some hope of stability in the area — to the disadvantage of the Soviet Union, thereby hampering the Kremlin’s efforts to expand its naval presence into the Indian Ocean and on to Southeast Asia. The Chinese delivery of military aid to Egypt may also be seen as related

115. Ibid.
to improving U.S.-China relations and as an effort on the part of Chinese leaders to support U.S. policy in the Middle East.

In addition to military assistance China also provided Egypt with economic aid in the form of technical help in building a fish farm complex of more than seventy separate nurseries that also raise ducks and fruit trees.\textsuperscript{118} The project, which was started in 1979 and is due to be completed in 1982, is being built by a private company with local investors — representing one of the few known cases where China has provided assistance to a private enterprise. On the other hand no details were provided on the size or scope of Chinese help, which may or may not have been very significant.

The next most important country in terms of the amount of aid received from China was North Yemen. Here, however, a sizeable portion of China's projects were paid for, thereby not constituting aid. There were a number of projects undertaken, some in each category and some undesignated or uncertain. In May 1979 Chinese sources mentioned technicians at work on a forty-eight kilometer long road in North Yemen that was started in 1974.\textsuperscript{119} Since this was originally an aid project it seems unlikely that it was renegotiated into a project for which China was to receive payment. At about the same time mention was also made of a foundation laying ceremony for an oil-pressing plant to be built with Chinese aid.\textsuperscript{120} However, no details were provided regarding the conditions of financing or repayment.

At nearly the same time a Chinese survey team arrived in North Yemen to do preliminary surveying and other work for an international conference building that was to be built by China at North Yemen's expense.\textsuperscript{121} A few months later, in August 1979, it was reported that the China Road and Bridge Construction Company had signed four contracts with the government of North Yemen — two to build an airport and heliport and two for roads — involving a total cost of $10 million.\textsuperscript{122} Since the announcement, which came from an official Chinese source, used the word contract it must be assumed that North Yemen paid for this project also.

Two agreements were made, one in May and another in December 1979 that may or may not consist of Chinese aid. In May a

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{119} NCNA, May 4, 1979, \textit{cited in China Aktuell}, May 1979, p. 12.
  \item \textsuperscript{120} NCNA, May 20, 1980, \textit{cited in China Aktuell}, May 1979, p. 12.
  \item \textsuperscript{121} NCNA, March 19, 1979, \textit{cited in FBIS}, March 23, 1979, p. F2.
  \item \textsuperscript{122} NCNA, August (no date indicated), 1979, \textit{cited in China Aktuell}, August 1979, p. 10.
\end{itemize}
cereemony was held on the starting of a cement plant, but insufficient
details were provided to determine if it was an aid project or not.\footnote{123} In
December an agreement was reached on the expansion of a textile
mill, but again sufficient details were lacking to determine the
nature of the agreement.\footnote{124}

In early 1980 China sent fifty-one medical workers to North
Yemen to work in a general hospital, according to a protocol
agreement signed at the time which stated that they would be paid
for their services.\footnote{125} In addition to these medical workers China also
dispatched eleven agrotechnicians and twenty-seven textile techni­
cians, all under contract — presumably meaning that they were to be
paid.\footnote{126} In June the official news agency in China reported that the
China Construction Engineering Corporation and the China Road
and Bridge Engineering Company had signed more than twenty
contracts with the government of North Yemen.\footnote{127} In July and again
in December 1980 mention was made of a radio and television
building and a housing cooperative built by Chinese engineers and
workers in North Yemen, apparently according to agreements signed
earlier.\footnote{128} All of these projects were apparently paid for by North
Yemen.

In August the foundation was laid for a Chinese aided canal
project in Tunisia that, according to details released on the project,
will be 123 kilometers in length and constitutes the main part of the
nation’s water conservancy plan in the northern part of the country
and will help irrigate 20,000 hectares of farmland.\footnote{129} This project was
negotiated in 1978 and was projected to cost $17 million, of which
China was to provide $8 million.\footnote{130} In terms of China’s foreign policy
objectives the project represents an effort to maintain close ties with
a friendly nation in the Middle East.

In November 1979 a sports complex built with Chinese economic
assistance was completed in Syria.\footnote{131} This project was also negotiated
in 1978, though details concerning its cost and conditions of the

\begin{footnotes}
\item 126. \textit{Ibid}.
\item 128. NCNA, July 10, 1980 \textit{cited in China Aktuell}, July 1980, p. 9; NCNA,
\item 129. NCNA, August 15, 1979, \textit{cited in China Aktuell}, August 1979, p. 10.
\item 130. See Copper, "China’s Foreign Aid in 1978," \textit{supra} note 5, at 39-40.
\item 131. NCNA, November 16, 1979, \textit{cited in China Aktuell}, November 1979, p. 11.
\end{footnotes}
agreement were revealed neither at the time the agreement was negotiated nor at the time of completion of the project.132

In South Yemen in July 1979 a Chinese technical group left the country after helping in the operations of a salt works — a project completed with Chinese aid in 1976.133 In December a state-owned fishery built with Chinese aid was handed over to the government, including an ice house, repair shops, offices and storehouses that were part of the project.134 In June 1980 work began on a Chinese-aided highway project 203 kilometers in length which would link up to another Chinese-built highway, all part of a major highway network.135 In view of increasingly closer Soviet-South Yemen relations it appeared in 1979 that Chinese aid operations consisted of merely closing shop; however, the starting of a new project in 1980 seems to suggest something quite different. Chinese leaders appeared to perceive that a presence in South Yemen was still worthwhile or that they might have some chance of maintaining good relations with the government of South Yemen despite the Soviet presence.

In Iraq in mid-1980 a bridge built with Chinese aid (completed in 1979) was opened to traffic, while Chinese technicians completed the approaches.136 China desired a presence in Iraq to help counter the influence of the Soviet Union there, but in view of China's tilt toward Iran in the conflict between Iran and Iraq it appears that Chinese aid to Iraq probably came to an end in 1980.

The only other Middle Eastern country to receive Chinese aid during 1979–80 was the Sudan. In July 1979 it was announced that a Chinese-aid fishery project there had opened.137 No other details were provided. A Chinese medical team was also sent to Sudan in 1979.138 Considering the level of Chinese aid activity in the Sudan in 1978, 1979–80 shows a severe cutting back — though no reason can be suggested other than the fact that China simply had less money and resources to devote to its foreign aid program during the period.

Elsewhere, China continued a major aid project in Malta started several years ago: a large dry dock facility capable of repairing 300,000-ton ships. In July 1979 it was reported that construction was

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134. Ibid.
proceeding apace and that the facility would be finished in a year.\textsuperscript{139} In late 1980 it was revealed that China had signed an agreement on the construction of a breakwater, suggesting that the dry dock had been or was near completion — though there was no announcement to that effect.\textsuperscript{140}

As in the case of non-communist Europe, there was only one Latin American nation to receive foreign aid from China during 1979–80: Guyana. In February 1980 the official Chinese news agency reported that a textile mill was under construction in Guyana using Chinese foreign aid, and later in the year reported that the mill, using 15,000 spindles and over 400 looms, had been completed.\textsuperscript{141} This project was started in 1976 and had received frequent praise from the Guyana government.

\textbf{Conclusions}

China's foreign aid giving during 1979–80 reflects some new directions in Chinese foreign policy as well as some continuations of old trends. In both realms a number of specifics are worth mentioning.

In terms of its size and scope China's foreign aid program declined, though perhaps not as much as might have been expected considering China's policy priorities. The big drop had already been experienced in 1977 and 1978 when China decreased and finally cut completely its aid to its two largest recipients — Vietnam and Albania. The period under study saw no evidence of any plan to reverse this decision; in fact, China was more hostile than ever toward Vietnam and the Chinese invasion of the northern part of Vietnam and continued tension and even fighting on the border after the spring of 1979 may in a sense be seen as an effort to take its aid back, or at least to cost Vietnam for its ungratefulness for past Chinese largess. In the case of Albania, Beijing seemed simply to have no interest in putting relations back on track. Thus, in contrast to its past pattern of aid giving, little aid was given to communist bloc nations during 1979-80. However, this does not represent an abandoning of its interests in the bloc; rather it represents political realities and greater opportunities elsewhere. China continued to

China's Foreign Aid in 1979-80

There was also a significant decline in China's willingness to provide economic help to other countries because of the high priority on its own economic development. Chinese leaders saw greater needs at home and felt less generous abroad. Some of China's new leaders no doubt saw China's aid program, at least the broad and costly program built by Mao, as unnecessary and not worthwhile. On the other hand there was no officially voiced opposition to China's aid program during the two year period, in contrast to some criticism of China's aid giving in 1978. In short, it seems that the problem was more one of finding support or enthusiasm for aid giving among Chinese decision makers when the focus of attention was on China's own development.

Thus, there were no new nations added to Chinese list of aid recipients — except for two or three that received emergency assistance for the first time. Similarly, the number of loans made and projects promised declined significantly. Finally, Beijing showed no interest in any new big projects.

This, however, should not be seen as reflecting a decision to continue to reduce the foreign aid program or to scrap it piecemeal. The number of recipients of Chinese assistance increased in 1978 (though the amount decreased because of dropping aid to Vietnam and Albania); thus it was not unusual for the number of benefactors to decrease during 1979–80. China's aid giving has experienced rather marked cycles of rises and declines in the past. Moreover, past experience shows that China's decisions to give aid depend primarily upon threats or perceived threats to its security and its relations with the superpowers.

Nevertheless, it can probably be argued that China has decided against giving huge amounts of aid to nations that might become client states. It turned out to be a failure in the cases of Vietnam and Albania; both turned against China when they found it expedient or had other reasons to do so. In the case of Tanzania and Zambia where China undertook its largest aid project ever in the mid-1970s — the Tanzam Railroad — and where it also delivered large amounts of project and arms aid, Chinese leaders discovered that the recipients' appetite for aid was much larger than they had guessed and that their receiving aid from Western countries did not really contradict China's objectives in the area. China has apparently also given up supporting other countries financially to the point of their becoming dependent upon Chinese economic help.
Another change in China's aid policy is that of giving greater attention to economic feasibility in aid projects. Beijing has ostensibly learned a lesson in the case of the Tanzam Railroad: if you are going to build a project that is not economically feasible, it requires continued financial support and can become both an economic burden and a costly investment in terms of prestige. Thus Chinese decision makers during 1979-80 gave more attention to whether projects could be finished as designed and whether they would be self-sustaining. Hence there was a preference for smaller projects and the types of projects China already has considerable experience in buildings.

Similarly, China reflected even less concern then in the past—though this was never a central motive for China's aid programs—about fostering socialist economic systems. Aid has as a rule been given on a government to government basis; but its use after that has not been of too much concern to Chinese leaders. During the period under study China probably for the first time—at least the first time where it got widespread attention—rendered aid to a private project. And this may be seen as something other than an isolated case: China seemed to be interested in investing abroad for profit or to gain the same kind of influence in the recipient nation that Western capitalist investment provides.

It is worth repeating that China has also transformed some of its aid projects into projects that render a profit. In this way China has realized profit from its aid program, namely from the experience abroad it has provided and expertise in various kinds of construction. It seems likely that in the near future China will be competing with South Korea, Taiwan and a number of other countries that have made significant profits from overseas construction work.

Following a previous trend of at least a decade China continued to compete very little with Western aid programs and aid giving. The only area where China may be judged to have competed with Western countries during the period was in southern Africa and even here it was not very direct (if at all meaningful competition) and seemed, considering trends and China's policy in the region as a whole, to reflect a convergence of aims, rather than growing competition. This was most noticeably true in the case of China's aid to the government of Zimbabwe.

An examination of China's aid strategy in different regions suggests that, whereas there were different tactics and varying applications of aid, its basis strategy remained intact: to reduce the influence of the Soviet Union abroad. In Southeast Asia China used its aid to sustain guerrilla movements opposed to the Soviet Union.
and Vietnam (viewed by the Chinese as a Soviet protege in the region). Here China may be seen in fact to have resurrected the Maoist concept of supporting "wars of national liberation"—but this time against communist regimes supported by Hanoi and Moscow instead of governments supported by "Western imperialism." In South Asia China continued to seek to maintain a balance of power on the subcontinent to limit India's influence, but this must also be seen in the context of India's alliance and close ties with the Soviet Union. During 1980 Beijing became even more concerned about the region because of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. In Africa China's focus remained on Soviet penetration and the Kremlin's search for bases whereby it could expand its military influence, particularly its naval power, to the Indian Ocean and on. In the Middle East, China continued to try to exploit, on a case by case basis, Soviet problems in the region. Elsewhere in the world there was little or no change: China continued to realize its limitations.

This cannot be translated as China abandoning its efforts to lead Third World nations. In fact, leadership of the Third World should still be seen as an important Chinese foreign policy goal. On the other hand, Chinese leaders more than in the past realize their limits in giving aid and the little promise trade with other developing countries has to offer. Beijing has apparently also taken cognizance of the fact that there is a significant interdependence between Third World countries (including China itself) and the West, and that confrontation is not something China can exploit to its own advantage, particularly in the context of its own development efforts. In this sense, China has clearly become a more status quo-oriented nation.

China has shifted what should be regarded as a fairly significant amount of its aid funds to delivery through the U.N. and other international organizations, whereas in the past China's foreign aid was exclusively bilateral. This can be seen as a new approach to China's leadership of the Third World. It may also offset some fears among poorer countries that China will take a giant portion of the funds available from global lending institutions. Finally it mirrors a greater interest in China's part in becoming a legitimate member of the global community and in using its international influence against its arch-enemy the Soviet Union.

During 1979-80 China gave more military assistance to non-communist nations than in the past. However, it is too early to judge whether this represents a change in policy or even a trend. The needs and the opportunities were there; China responded. China's arms aid
during the period should thus be viewed on a case by case basis. And while China’s military aid increased, it is still small by Soviet or Western standards — and this is unlikely to change. As in the case of economic assistance, China needs arms at home: its arms industry has not grown appreciably, while its own needs, or at least perceived needs, have increased. In short, Chinese leaders probably see selective arms aid as a most effective way of countering global Soviet expansion and it will continue to be an attractive alternative, but only on a situation or opportunity basis.

China’s aid during the period continued to be generous, or at least that is the way it would generally be assessed. Most aid was in the form of non-interest loans with liberal terms of repayment. Also, as a developing country, China has to be seen as charitable merely for having a foreign aid program. On the other hand Beijing continues to ask for repayment in goods and services, thereby offsetting the inflation factor which constitutes a large grant aspect in most Western aid that is repayable in currency rather than goods. And, Chinese aid remains tied to Chinese products, the choices were limited and, in many cases, the quality was lower or inconsistent. Recipient nations, however, still find Chinese aid useful — valued generally for the utility of the projects and the specific needs they fill. On the other hand it no longer evokes an aid giving response by Western nations to counter Chinese influence. This was particularly evident during 1979-80.

In concluding, it is necessary to say something about the future of China’s foreign aid program based upon the two-year period assessed here. The years 1979-80 showed a decline in China’s aid giving and there is no reason to believe judging from its aid program or other information that it will increase appreciably once again in the next few years. Yet there is little cause to conclude that China is phasing out its aid giving. Aid will doubtless continue to be an important instrument of China’s foreign policy, though Beijing will probably in coming years use economic assistance more as a means of influence in and through the U.N. Here Chinese leaders will doubtless experience some of the problems other nations have in this effort: the inefficiency of U.N. and other global aid giving institutions, loss of donor recognition, and the inability to control the use of its aid. Because of this China is likely to also maintain a bilateral foreign aid program, though judging from the last two years it will probably be one consisting of smaller projects and types of aid in which China has experience, with continued emphasis on construction, agricultural and medical aid and emergency assistance. Military
aid will probably continue to be important and may even be increased as long as Sino-Soviet relations remain in their present state.

The fact that Chinese leaders still find aid giving an easy means of gaining some leverage over events and political decisions in other countries makes it important. Similarly, it is a source of good global publicity — which because of China’s new role in the U.N. as a legitimate member of the global community, is now more important than ever. Finally, nothing seems to have changed in that Chinese leaders still need to project an image of morality, if not charity and generosity to the rest of the world.
## TABLE 1

**China's Official Aid Promises by Year**  
(US$ millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Number of Recipients</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pre-1953</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>394.9</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>378</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>112.7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>125.6</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>135.35</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>298.2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>447.2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>344.9</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>124.7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>437.8a</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
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<td>1968</td>
<td>56.5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>1,124.3b</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>421.7</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>922.5</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>140c</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>119.7 – 129.7d</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>121 – 177e</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>99 – 112</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>89.5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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* This included $400 million promised for the Tan-Zam Railroad.

b This included $300 million in aid to Romania which was officially promised, but the amount was not disclosed. The $300 million figure is an estimate.

c This includes $47 million which was a cost overrun on the Tan-Zam Railroad. It also includes an estimated $50 million in new aid to Egypt, announced without exact figures. It does not include $47 million to Chile which was a renegotiated loan originally promised to the Allende regime.

d This includes a $52 million loan to Pakistan and a $52 to $62 million loan to Chile which may have been promised in previous years but was not renewed in 1977.

e This includes a $56 million loan to Mozambique that was renegotiated in 1978.

f Tanzania and Zambia together received a grant for the Tan-Zam Railroad.
TABLE 2

China's Officially Announced Aid in 1979

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recipient</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Purpose/Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burma</td>
<td>$67 to $80 million*</td>
<td>Loan or loans for various projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>Rs 500 million</td>
<td>Interest free loan various projects, repayable in 20 years.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>($32 million)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Two sources give different figures on the amount of China's aid to Burma.

TABLE 3

China's Officially Announced Aid in 1980

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recipient</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Purpose/Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>$50 million</td>
<td>Interest-free loan payable over 10-year period for rice growing and the development of geothermal projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>40 million rmb ($26.7 million)</td>
<td>Interest-free loan for five years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania and Zambia</td>
<td>5.78 million pounds ($12.83 million)</td>
<td>Loan for spare parts for Tan-Zam Railroad</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4

China’s Aid Recipients in 1979 by Region or Bloc

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Africa</th>
<th>Communist Bloc</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>Afghanistan*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Verde</td>
<td>Vietnam**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equatorial Guinea</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Non-Communist Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>Burma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>Nepal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malagasy Republic</td>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>Fiji</td>
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<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>Jamaica</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Malta</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Upper Volta</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaire</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| North Africa and Middle East                |                |
| Egypt                                       |                |
| Morocco                                     |                |
| North Yemen                                 |                |
| South Yemen                                 |                |
| Syria                                       |                |
| Tunisia                                     |                |

* China finished an aid project in Afghanistan after a communist government was installed there.
** China claimed it gave food and medical assistance to Vietnamese in occupied areas after China’s invasion in early 1979.
### TABLE 5

China's Aid Recipients in 1980 by Region or Bloc

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region / Bloc</th>
<th>Africa</th>
<th>Communist Bloc</th>
<th>Non-Communist Asia</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>Guyana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Botswana</td>
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<td>Burma</td>
<td>Malta</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Burundi</td>
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<td>Congo</td>
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<td>Sri Lanka</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Equatorial Guinea</td>
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<td>Thailand</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Ghana</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Guinea</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Guinea Bissau</td>
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<td>Madagascar</td>
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<td>Malagasy Republic</td>
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<td>Mali</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Mauritius</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Niger</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Senegal</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Seychelles</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
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<td>Somalia</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Sudan</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Tanzania</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Zaire</td>
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<td>Zambia</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>North Africa and Middle East</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Algeria</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Egypt</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Iraq</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Morocco</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>North Yemen</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>South Yemen</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE 6

Chinese Disaster or Emergency Aid in 1979

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recipient</th>
<th>Amount of Aid and Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>10,000 rmb ($6,700) to aid hurricane victims¹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiji</td>
<td>5,000 rmb ($3,300) to help cyclone victims²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>10,000 rmb ($6,700) to aid flood victims³</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>20,000 rupees ($2,635) to help cyclone victims⁴</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>200,000 rmb ($133,000) to aid refugee relief⁵</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>300,000 rmb ($200,000) to aid earthquake victims⁶</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 7**

China's Disaster or Emergency Aid in 1980

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recipient</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Purpose/Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>200,000 rmb¹</td>
<td>Given in blankets and tents to aid flood victims in north Iran</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>10,000 rmb²</td>
<td>To aid flood victims</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>300,000 rmb³</td>
<td>Food, blankets and medicine given to help Afghan refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>300 tons of rice and other food⁴</td>
<td>Given to help refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>500,000 rmb⁵</td>
<td>200,000 rmb given in canned food and 300,000 rmb in rice for Kampuchean refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>500,000 rmb⁶</td>
<td>Same as above</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 8

China's Aid to the United Nations and U.N. Affiliate Organizations in 1980

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recipient</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Purpose/Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.N. Common Fund</td>
<td>$2 million$^1</td>
<td>To help stabilize commodity prices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.N. Conference on Aiding Kampuchean People</td>
<td>$1.17 million$^2</td>
<td>Relief supplies for Kampuchean people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food and Agricultural Organization</td>
<td>$100,000$^3</td>
<td>To help famine stricken people in Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food and Agricultural Organization</td>
<td>$300,000</td>
<td>To support Conference on Agrarian Reform and Rural Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food and Agricultural Organization</td>
<td>$200,000</td>
<td>To support seed improvement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.N. High Commissioner on Refugees</td>
<td>$300,000$^4</td>
<td>To help Afghan refugees in Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.N. High Commissioner on Refugees</td>
<td>$400,000$^5</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.N. High Commissioner on Refugees</td>
<td>$300,000$^6</td>
<td>Follow-up on World Conference on Agrarian Reform and Rural Developement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.N. Interim Fund for Science and Technology</td>
<td>$400,000 rmb$' ($267,000)</td>
<td>Part to be paid in U.S. dollars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.N. Trust Fund for Namibia</td>
<td>$20,000$^8</td>
<td>In celebration of International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHINA's FOREIGN AID in 1979-80

U.N. Trust Fund for South Africa
$300,000* In celebration of International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination

World Food Program
$400,000**


TABLE 9

China's Aid to Insurgency Groups or Revolutionary Movements During 1979

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recipient</th>
<th>Kind and/or Amount of Aid</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burmese Communist Party</td>
<td>Medicine and supplies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khmer Rouge</td>
<td>Large quantities of weapons, supplies, medicine, food and even advisors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laotian Rebel Forces</td>
<td>Military training, arms, supplies, salaries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhodesian guerrilla forces led by Robert Mugabe</td>
<td>Arms and advisors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWAPO</td>
<td>Unknown quantity of military aid</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE 10

China's Aid to Insurgency Groups or Revolutionary Movements During 1980

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recipient</th>
<th>Kind and/or Amount of Aid</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burmese Communist Party</td>
<td>Arms, equipments, training and medical supplies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khmer Rouge</td>
<td>Large quantities of small arms, supplies, equipment, medicine and probably food</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebel forces in Afghanistan</td>
<td>Small arms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebel forces in Laos</td>
<td>Military training, weapons and supplies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 11

China's Aid to Non-communist Nations During 1979

- Burma
- Nepal
- Pakistan
- Sri Lanka
- Thailand

TABLE 12

China's Aid To Non-communist Nations During 1980

- Bangladesh
- Burma
- Nepal
- Pakistan
- Sri Lanka
- Thailand
### TABLE 13
China’s Aid to African Nations During 1979

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Benin</th>
<th>Mauritania</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>Mauritius</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Verde</td>
<td>Niger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equatorial Guinea</td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>Tanzania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>Togo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malagasy Republic</td>
<td>Upper Volta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>Zaire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Zambia</td>
</tr>
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</table>

### TABLE 14
China’s Aid to African Nations During 1980

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<th>Niger</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>Seychelles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equatorial Guinea</td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea Bissea</td>
<td>Tanzania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>Zaire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malagasy Republic</td>
<td>Zambia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE 15

China's Project Aid to African Countries in 1979 (excluding agricultural projects)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recipient</th>
<th>Kind of Project</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>Public works projects¹</td>
<td>No other details</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dam²</td>
<td>Under construction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Verde</td>
<td>Parliament building³</td>
<td>Agreement signed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>Hydropower station and transmission lines⁴</td>
<td>Inaugurated: projects started in 1973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Naval yard technicians⁵</td>
<td>Recently sent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equatorial Guinea</td>
<td>Radio technicians⁶</td>
<td>Recently sent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Communication project⁷</td>
<td>Finished and handed over</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>Hydroelectric station⁸</td>
<td>Talks held recently</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malagasy Republic</td>
<td>Hydroelectric station⁹</td>
<td>No details</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>Dams¹⁰</td>
<td>Protocol signed for 3 dams</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Radio transmitter¹¹</td>
<td>For use by Foreign Ministry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Factory¹²</td>
<td>Under construction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>Hydroelectric plant¹³</td>
<td>No details available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>Airport and terminal¹⁴</td>
<td>Agreement signed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>Reservoir project¹⁵</td>
<td>Work in progress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>Stadium¹⁶</td>
<td>Just opened</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>Water project¹⁷</td>
<td>Completed; will be used by 30,000 people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>Coal survey¹⁸</td>
<td>Found 50 million tons of coal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Volta</td>
<td>Stadium¹⁹</td>
<td>Experts arrived to begin construction</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Zaire

People’s Palace
Farm implements,
factory

Work in progress
Finished

Zambia

Textile Mill

Foundation laid

TABLE 16

China's Project Aid to African Countries in 1980
(excluding agricultural projects)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recipient</th>
<th>Kind of Project</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>Sports complex(^1)</td>
<td>Under construction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>Highway(^2)</td>
<td>Ground breaking ceremony held</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>Boat building yard(^3)</td>
<td>Equipment and technicians furnished</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equitorial Guinea</td>
<td>Tele-communications project(^4)</td>
<td>Handed over</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>Bridges(^5)</td>
<td>Work started</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malagasy Republic</td>
<td>Highway(^6)</td>
<td>Under construction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>Dam reconstruction(^7)</td>
<td>Finished and turned over</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>Stadium(^8)</td>
<td>Started; will seat 10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>Wells(^9)</td>
<td>Finished and handed over</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Well drilling project(^10)</td>
<td>Protocol signed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>Cement plant(^11)</td>
<td>Started</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>Dam(^12)</td>
<td>Foundation ceremony held to be 3½ year project to make usable 5,6000 hectares of land</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>Office building(^13)</td>
<td>34 engineers and technicians sent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>Water conservation project(^14)</td>
<td>Under construction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Project Description</td>
<td>Status</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>Building to serve as protocol signed headquarters for Revolutionary Party of Tanzania</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Expansion of farm implements factory</td>
<td>Handed over; raised capacity from 1,000 to 3,700 tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>Road bridge</td>
<td>Work in progress</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources:
### TABLE 17

**China’s Agricultural Aid to African Nations in 1979**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recipient</th>
<th>Kind and/or Amount of Aid</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>Agricultural team completed work(^1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>Experimental rice and vegetable(^2) growing area turned over</td>
<td>20 technicians also trained</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>50 agricultural machines give, incl. 12 tractors and 4 harvesters(^3)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>Agricultural projects completed(^4)</td>
<td>No further details</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rice mill handed over(^5)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>Agricultural projects handed over(^6)</td>
<td>Included wells, irrigation &amp; water conservation projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>Ground breaking ceremony for sugar mill(^7)</td>
<td>Capacity of 400 tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pumping station completed(^8)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources:  
7. NCNA, November 4, 1979 *cited in China Aktuell*, November 1979, p. 11.
## TABLE 18

China's Agricultural Aid to African Countries in 1980

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recipient</th>
<th>Kind and/or Amount of Aid</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>Paddy rice project¹</td>
<td>Finished and turned over</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>Irrigation and rice cultivation projects²</td>
<td>Under construction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>Field improvement project³</td>
<td>Completed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>Reclamation for paddy rice fields⁴</td>
<td>Completed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>Reservoirs and rice mills under construction⁵</td>
<td>Under construction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaire</td>
<td>Agricultural technicians⁶</td>
<td>On the job</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agricultural stations⁷</td>
<td>Covering 25,000 hectares</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 19

China's Medical Aid to African Countries in 1979

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recipient</th>
<th>Kind and/or Amount of Aid</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>Medical team(^1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>Medicine and medical equipment worth 37 million African Francs(^2)</td>
<td>Given free</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equatorial Guinea</td>
<td>Medical team(^3)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>Medical team(^4)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>Medical training program</td>
<td>Mission completed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>Medical team(^5)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>Medical team(^7)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>Health care center opened(^6)</td>
<td>Hospital turned over(^9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>Medical team(^10)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>Hospital turned into polyclinic(^11)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>Agreement to sent 60 doctors(^12)</td>
<td>New medical team arrived(^13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>Medical team(^14)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaire</td>
<td>Medical team(^15)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 20

**China’s Medical Aid to African Countries in 1980**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recipient</th>
<th>Kind and/or Amount of Aid</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>202 medical personel sent(^1)</td>
<td>Incl. medical research work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bostswana</td>
<td>Medical team sent(^2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>Medical team sent(^3)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>Two medical teams sent(^4)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>Medical team sent(^5)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>Medical team sent(^6)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somolia</td>
<td>Medical team sent(^7)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Medical team sent(^8)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources:**
### TABLE 21

**China's Aid to Countries in Other Regions During 1979**

- Dominican Republic
- Egypt
- Jamaica
- Malta
- Morocco
- North Yemen
- South Yemen
- Syria
- Tunisia

### TABLE 22

**China's Aid to Countries in Other Regions During 1980**

- Algeria
- Egypt
- Guyana
- Iraq
- Malta
- Morocco
- North Yemen
- South Yemen
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<th>No.</th>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Copies</th>
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