ASIAN AMERICAN ASSEMBLY POSITION PAPER: I. A REVIEW OF U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS
Occasional Papers/Reprints Series in Contemporary Asian Studies

General Editor: Hungdah Chiu
Executive Editor: David Simon
Assistant Editor: William L. Helfand
Manager: Kennedy Armstrong Brooks

Editorial Advisory Board
Professor Robert A. Scalapino, University of California at Berkeley
Professor Martin Wilbur, Columbia University
Professor Gaston J. Sigur, George Washington University
Professor Shao-chuan Leng, University of Virginia
Professor Lawrence W. Beer, University of Colorado
Professor James Hsiung, New York University
Dr. Robert Heuser, Max-Planck-Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law at Heidelberg
Professor K. P. Misra, Jawaharlal Nehru University, India
Professor J. S. Prybyla, The Pennsylvania State University

Published with the cooperation of the Maryland International Law Society.

All contributions (in English only) and communications should be sent to
Professor Hungdah Chiu, University of Maryland School of Law,
500 West Baltimore Street, Baltimore, Maryland 21201 USA.

All publications in this series reflect only the views of the authors.

While the editor accepts responsibility for the selection of materials to be published, the individual author is responsible for statements of facts and expressions of opinion contained therein.

Subscription is US $10.00 for 10 issues (regardless of the price of individual issues) in the United States and Canada and $12.00 for overseas. Check should be addressed to OPRSCAS and sent to Professor Hungdah Chiu.

Price for single copy of this issue: US $1.00

# ASIAN AMERICAN ASSEMBLY POSITION PAPER I

A REVIEW OF U.S. — CHINA RELATIONS

(Abstracts)

## CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Foreword</td>
<td>Henry Luce III</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preface</td>
<td>Winberg Chai</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Manchus and the Yankees</td>
<td>T. K. Tong</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relations with Republic of China</td>
<td>Richard H. Yang</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relations with People's Republic of China</td>
<td>Y. C. Chang</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy Options</td>
<td>James C. Hsiung</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commentary I</td>
<td>Hungdah Chiu</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commentary II</td>
<td>Ying-mao Kau</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commentary III</td>
<td>King C. Chen</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commentary IV</td>
<td>Teh-kuang Chang</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Advisory Council of the Asian American Assembly</td>
<td></td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
FOREWORD

The formation of The Asian American Assembly for Policy Research has been a welcome event to me for a number of reasons. First, because a knowledge of Asia among Americans continues to be inadequate, despite the long history of U.S. relations and initiatives with that continent. American perceptions of Asia have tended to be distorted by the cycles of history, fired-up at one moment by involvement in Asian wars, and then receding at another into the mists of isolationist reaction. Meanwhile, an expert elite of non-Asian Americans tends to impose views that can be precious, recondite and self-serving. The growing presence in the academic establishment of scholars of Asian origin is a resource which can elevate the validity of research and opinion in this process. And the Assembly can contribute to giving that resource a voice.

Second, as the number of Asian immigrants to the U.S. accelerates, it has been becoming more and more important that they be assimilated into the fabric of American society. Before they form major interest groups which seek special advantage to overcome perceived discriminations, and thus add to a proliferating fragmentation of the American nation, they must be helped to understand their American surroundings, and thus to achieve Americanhood. The intellectual leadership among them has a role to play in this process, and the Assembly can help to focus on that role.

Third, there has not been any commonality among Asian-Americans to begin with. Japanese, Chinese, Koreans, Filipinos, Indians and the others see themselves as much distinct from each other as they do from other Americans. So the Assembly has a role in bringing them together, and in providing them with an opportunity to address common problems and to share common goals.

I was pleased to accept Professor Winberg Chai's invitation to be chairman of the Assembly's advisory council because a non-Asian American component of such an undertaking is obviously indicated and because of my own identification with the values I have mentioned. The Henry Luce Foundation, Inc., of which I am president, fosters American knowledge of Asia through its Scholars Program, which gives young Americans of high potential a year's experience in Asia, and through its Asian Studies Program, which supports scholarly work in Asian-American interactions at major university graduate centers. In
the field of recent Asian immigrants, China Institute in America, of which I am chairman, conducts bilingual vocational training programs.

The papers in the present volume (abstracts) are those which were submitted to the Assembly's conference in New York in April, 1977. They bring to bear new insights to that major question of U.S. foreign policy — relations with China. While their authors share a commonality of their Chinese ethnicity, they are also broadly representative of the various approaches to the issues involved. Together, they form a body of thought which helpfully contributes to this complex subject.

I look forward to the publication of additional reports on other subjects from the Assembly's conferences.

Henry Luce III
Preface

The foundation of the Asian American Assembly was begun in 1972 when the City College of New York received an initial grant of $25,000 from the Field Foundation of New York to help the Department of Asian Studies in developing a “viable City College-run community service program for Chinatown.” One year later, President Robert E. Marshak provided an additional $6,000 from the City College Fund to expand the college-run community service program. In 1976, the City College received a second $25,000 grant from the Field Foundation to continue community related projects, including the establishment of the Asian American Assembly for Policy Research. In Spring, 1977, additional contributions were made to the Asian American Assembly from the City College Fund.

The goals of the Asian American Assembly are threefold: First, the identification and recommendation for solutions to the major problems confronting Asian Americans. Second, research and publications by national panels appointed by the Assembly to generate a permanent body of information that may be useful as resource materials. Finally, the Assembly should provide a forum of scholars, community leaders and business executives on a regular basis — persons who can bring together both theoretical discipline and practical experience in the Asian American community.

During 1976, the City College’s Asian American Assembly in cooperation with the Department of Asian Studies has sponsored five seminars, two major workshops and one regional conference. Approximately one hundred specialists in education, social work and community leaders have participated in these workshops and conferences. Community organizations represented including the following:

Chinatown Health and Service Center
Chinatown Improvement Council
Chinatown Manpower Project
Chinatown Planning Council
Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association
Immigrant Social Services
Project Ahead
Two Bridges Neighborhood Council, etc.

During 1977, the Asian American Assembly has convened a national conference on April 29–30 on five main subjects: (1)
Bilingual and Bicultural Education for Chinese Americans; (2) Teaching English to Chinese Speakers; (3) Social Services and Immigration Policies for Asian Americans; (4) Problems of Immigrant Youth; and (5) A Review of United States-China Relations. More than fifty papers will be published by the Assembly when funds become available.

The Assembly is fortunate to have the participation of more than one hundred distinguished leaders from fourteen states and Washington, D.C. in business, education and community affairs to formulate the first National Advisory Council (1977-1978). Under the leadership of Mr. Henry Luce III and Judge William Marutani of Philadelphia, the National Advisory Council includes chairmen of several large corporations as well as owners of small businesses, university administrators as well as chair professors from thirty colleges and universities, and leaders from eighteen diversified community organizations such as, China Institute in America, Japan Society, as well as Jewish Community Council of New York. We are also grateful to Prof. Harry H. L. Kitano, UCLA, Prof. Jang H. Koo, University of Alaska at Fairbanks, and Prof. William T. Liu, Director of Asian American Mental Health Research Center at Chicago to serve as vice-chairmen and to guide the activities of the Assembly in the years ahead.

The views expressed in the position papers on U.S.-China relations (abstracts) are those of the authors and not those of the Asian American Assembly or of the City College Fund or of the Field Foundation, which as educational institutions take no official position.

Winberg Chai
Chairman

New York City
THE MANCHUS AND THE YANKEES: HISTORIOGRAPHY AND HISTORIANS

(Abstract)

T. K. Tong*

Having concluded a short review of the Sino-American relations during the Manchu period, this writer still wonders how much truth he has learned from the voluminous monographs which he has consulted. With the exception of a handful of recent titles by the younger academicians from the Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, in Taipei, few of the Chinese-language treatises covering this subject are worth serious exploration. Sentimentalism and lack of research facilities in old China have handicapped the Chinese scholarship in diplomatic studies. To professional bibliographers, therefore, it seems that exhaustive research on China's foreign relations of the early period has been a monopoly of English-speaking authors. The voluminous publications by the Harvard University Press alone certainly finds no parity in China on either side of the Taiwan Street.

The chefs-d'oeuvre of the Western works on Chinese diplomacy, however, are by no means immune from bias. The most serious of all is their inexorable approach to specific historical events which has remained unchanged for ages. Linial writers were merely searching for additional facts and coining new terms to help prove the concepts that their forerunners had formulated generations back.

From the middle of the last century, for instance, few conventional writers were willing to accept the fact that the principal cause of the Opium War was the narcotics trade. To them, the Opium War was only a logical consequence of the Manchu anticommercialism. Regardless of whatever commodities were being traded, say opium or rice, an armed conflict between China and the West was inevitable.

This Opium-War-not-for-opium approach has been continued by notable authors up to the present. But the latest development in China has made thoughtful readers skeptical of the orthodox wisdom. To compare Emperor Tao-kuang with Chairman Mao Tse-tung, no historian may be able to state that the former was more “anticommercial” than the latter. Yet when the latter closed all the treaty-ports to Western traders and imposed numerous

* Professor of Asian Studies at The City College of New York.
“anticommercial” regulations on both the opium and the rice trade, no foreign gunboats ever showed up in his deserted harbors. It might be true, therefore, that the Opium War was not fought for opium as the American War of Independence was not fought for tea, but the principal cause of the Opium War was evidently not Tao-kuang’s anticommercialism; rather it was his incapability to regulate his commerce by keeping the foreign gunboats away from the Chinese territorial waters. The Americans were not involved in the early conflict with the Manchus. It was simply because the Yankee “Expansionists” were not yet able to cross the Pacific as they did successfully during the Spanish War.

“Antiforeignism” was another term specifically coined by the conventional authors to characterize the Chinese foreign relations of the early period. Although the word has not been accepted by the etymologists, it appears in almost every English-language monograph relating to modern China. But the stories revealed by these authors indicated only that Chinese antiforeignism was in no way more serious than the foreign antiforeignism in China during the corresponding periods. John Hay’s Open Door was in fact designed to combat the latter rather than the former. So were the policies formulated by Presidents Roosevelt and Taft prior to the outbreak of the First World War. Chinese antiforeignism, including the boycott against American goods at the beginning of this century, actually played a miniscule role in Sino-Western relations, if it was not a pure legend.

The Boxer Rebellion, which was no more than a spontaneous anti-Christian mass movement, has been frequently cited by Western authors as an outstanding example of senseless antiforeignism in nineteenth century China. Here again, a recent religious tournament performed by the Rev. Sun Myung Moon and his Unification Church has rendered the conventional anti-Boxer argument a meaningless statement. If the American parents could find any justification today to “de-program” their youthful Moonies, their Chinese counterpart were certainly more justified to do the same in a Confucian society some hundred years ago. In fact, the painful dislocation that the young Moonies have caused to their parental society is in no way to compare with the damage that the Christian missions had done to the society of China.

Moreover, few of the Western writers have ever attempted to compare the Chinese antiforeignism with the anti-Chinese movement in America during the same period. As the Manchu-American relations have constituted a unique piece of history, the
two incidents were actually the two sides of one coin. The short­
lived Boxer Rebellion did not seem to deserve more attention than
the Exclusionist Movement which has been totally neglected by
nearly all eminent diplomatic historians on this side of the
Pacific. Even for those who tend to treat the anti-Chinese racism
in America as an independent subject, they never hesitated to
apply the conventional Opium-War-not-for-opium approach to
their study of the “bitter strength.” The Chinese-exclusion
movement was not directed against the Chinese workers, as one
recent writer has argued. It was provoked by the Chinese
unadaptability to the American way of life.

To read only the Western-language publications covering the
Sino-American relations, therefore, one cannot but believe that for
any wrong-doing on either side of the Pacific Ocean, only John
Chinaman was to be blamed. Leading writers in America are
rather firm in defending this century-old conclusion though some
also began to question their inherited wisdom. To them it seems to
be as true as the law of gravity, whereas untrained writers on the
other side of the ocean could only present their arguments with
some immured research which are always coupled with
unnecessary sentimentalism. As a matter of fact, neither side was
immune from bigotry though masqueraded academicism is
definitely more malicious to the search of truth.

“It is better to know nothing than to know what ain’t so,” to
quote a saying from Josh Billings. When the diplomats are
talking about normalization of Sino-American diplomatic rela­
tions, would it be a good time for scholars on both sides to think of
a normalization movement in academic circles?
RELATIONS WITH THE
REPUBLIC OF CHINA

(Abstracts)
Richard H. Yang*

The United States (US) is the first modern Republic of the West, and the Republic of China (ROC) the first republic of the East. Founded by Dr. Sun Yat-sen in 1912, the ROC has been a well established cultural identity and longstanding vital political entity for sixty-six years, not a political or cultural fiction as some critics would like us to believe. Relations between the US and ROC have gone through many crucial changes during the past six and a half decades (1912-1977), they have always remained friends and allies throughout war and peace. This is the China which has been recognized by the US since 1928. This recognition has its historical roots deeply seated in goodwill and mutual interests which had existed long before that date. Also, this is the China which now offers the only democratic alternative and cultural aspiration for millions of Chinese throughout the world.

The roots of US-ROC relations have been seriously challenged and the survival of the ROC threatened by some who seek to place those relations and survival in serious jeopardy, ever since the Nixon Administration dramatically altered the course of United States policy toward China in 1972; now that policy is under critical review by the Carter Administration.

The Carter Administration's advocacy of a moral principle in foreign affairs raises serious questions regarding the extent to which America practices segmented morality — taking a high moral tone with some countries, while making capricious exception for others? Inasmuch as the survival of the ROC is a matter of serious concern to most Chinese Americans, therefore, they have a legitimate interest to see whether the Carter Administration will live up to its own commitment to link preservation of human rights with foreign affairs, and whether the US is permissively allowing the Chinese Communists to have a free ride on the human rights-foreign affairs principle. Thus, this paper attempts to review the historic relations and analyze the policy options under the various American administrations. Emphasis is placed on the political, military, economic and cultural factors of questioning the wisdom of derecognition of the

* Professor of Chinese Studies at Washington University (St. Louis).
Government of the ROC, and that of recognition of the Peking regime.

I. US-ROC RELATIONS IN 1912-1927

On October 18, 1911, eight days after the successful revolution of the Chinese Nationalists at Wuchang, Sun Yat-sen asked Secretary of State Knox for a private meeting, but failed. Knox also rejected American envoy Homer Lea’s plea for America to be first to recognize Sun’s government, shortly after Sun became the first President of Provisional Government at Nanking. Two months later, Charles Tenny unofficially approached Sun and maintained that the US desired to remain “neutrality throughout the present struggle in China,” but the Wilson Administration, upon William J. Bryan’s recommendation, chose to recognize the Government of Yuan Shih-kai in 1913, and the ensuing warlord governments in Peking after Yuan. Disappointed with foreign indifference and frustrated with the lack of unity at home, Sun was forced to seek support of the Soviet Union. In 1925, Sun died without seeing the fulfillment of his lifelong aspiration for a unified modern Chinese republic under democracy, independence and prosperity. Despite that he was a great democrat with a genuine appreciation for American democracy, Sun was unable in his lifetime to gain American support or recognition for his Provisional Government at Nanking in 1912 and his Revolutionary Government at Canton in 1917.

On the international front, the US was preoccupied with European affairs, but had displayed a policy prejudicial to Japan over the Sino-Japanese disputes. The Wilson Administration declared the famous Fourteen Points on the one hand, but legitimatized the Japanese special interests in China by signing the Ishii-Lansing Agreement in 1917. Faced with Japan’s insatiable ambition and growing military might, Secretary Hughes made a great effort at the Washington Conference to revive the moribund open door policy through the Nine-Power Treaty demanding Japan, along with other signatory powers, to respect the “sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China” by withdrawing the Japanese troops from Shantung.

During the same period, the May Fourth Movement, the rise of Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the KMT-CCP detente, the death of Sun Yat-sen, the KMT-CCP schism, May Thirtieth Incident, and the KMT’s Northern Expedition Campaign had all
contributed to China's political awareness and determination to striving for national independence and international respectability. However, the US-ROC relations still remained relatively unimportant to the over-all foreign policy of the US.

II. US-ROC RELATIONS IN 1928-1936

During this period, relations between the two nations were generally improved but still somewhat shadowed by America's reluctance to challenge Japan's grand strategy on China. Following the KMT's successful Northern Expedition Campaign, the US signed a protocol in March 1928 and formally recognized the Nationalist Government of the ROC.

In order to effectuate her grand strategy against China, Japan chose to defy the Kellogg-Briand Pact (1929) which outlawed war as an instrument of diplomacy, and launched an invasion against Manchuria on September 18, 1931. The infamy of the Mukden Incident aggravated US-Japan relations and became the prelude to the eight-year War of Resistance in 1937; and to Pearl Harbor in 1941. In response to the Chinese Government's appeal, Secretary Stimson declared the famous Non-recognition Doctrine which constitutes a long-standing and formidable challenge to the legality of international conquest by force. Meanwhile, the League of Nations approved the Lytton Report and passed an economic sanction against Japan.

But Japan's reaction to Stimson's non-recognition doctrine was the installation of puppet Manchuko with Henry Pu Yi as its emperor in 1932. In defiance to the League's Resolution, Japan withdrew from the League and continued to step up its military attack. In 1934, the Japanese Foreign Minister Koki Hirota proclaimed the Japanese “Monroe Doctrine” for East Asia. It was followed by another Amau Statement, arrogating to Japan “the entire burden of responsibility for the preservation of peace in the Far East as her 'divine mission.'”

In facing the Japanese military conquest of China in the name of the so-called “Co-Prosperity Sphere,” the United States was handicapped by domestic economic crisis and contained by its own powerful opposition of the isolationists through a series of Neutrality Acts. Moreover, Hull’s own stress on “Europe first” in foreign policy had in fact delayed US confrontation with Japan in the Far East. President Roosevelt's Quarantine Speech had no teeth, and the American Government’s moral outrage was no deterrent. Japan’s rampant aggression went unchallenged. In the
meantime, the Chinese Government worked hard for consolidating its political strength at home and endeavored to abolish all of the unequal treaties throughout the strenuous decade. In July, the US was first among the foreign powers to sign a new Sino-American Tariff Treaty abrogating America's special privilege in the management of customs administration of China.

III. US-ROC RELATIONS IN 1937-1945

The Sino-American relations in 1928-1936 was impaired by a series of US impotent and redundant proclamation of moralistic platitude. It was equally true during the first four years of China's eight-year War of Resistance 1937-1945 that the United States Government would provide little material help except for expressing its sincere sympathy for China's predicament and war sufferings. It was the Russians who provided China's sorely needed war supplies in the beginning of the war, while American merchants still sold shiploads of steel scrap to the Japanese aggressors.

In summary, during the first four years of China's resistance, her perserverance had won a moral and diplomatic victory and the Chinese Government of the ROC under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek refused to negotiate the Japanese peace overtures. Because of China's refusal to surrender, Japan was forced into an expensive but hopeless war of attrition. This singular contribution of the ROC to the entire war effort among its allies should neither be conveniently forgotten nor expediently obliterated. It was very crucial, however, for the Government of the ROC to secure the US moral support during the initial phase of China's struggle and the US Government did exactly just that.

As the war entered 1941, Japan expanded its invasion in Indo-China and the Southeast Asia, the crisis quickened. In April 1941, the US Government rejected the so-called "World Peace Plan" proposed by Japan calling for the demilitarization British and American naval forces in the Pacific, US withdrawal to Hawaii as well as inclusion of Australia and New Zealand into the Co-Prosperity Sphere. Instead, the US Government offered Japan a modus vivendi, provided that Japan halted her further advances in Indo-China, and recognized the National Government of the ROC at Chungking. But the Japanese Imperial Conference had already made the decision on September 6 to prepare for war against the United States.

In the wake of the Pearl Harbour attack on December 7, 1941, China and the United States formally declared war on Japan. The
war against Japan was no longer China's sole burden. During the second four-year war phase, the following aspects merit special attention: (1) China's role in the China-Burma-India Theatre was compromised under the Anglo-American pursuit of a "Europe first and Asia second" war strategy. China was a full partner in the war, but a secondary ally in the alliance. The America's overriding aim in the Pacific War Theatre was to "keep China in the war, and so to strengthen her that she might exact a constantly growing price from the Japanese invader." In the end, China did play a fair share in both fighting the war and defeating the Japanese. It must be remembered that it was under the government of the ROC that China stood up and will never be bullied again! (2) the tragic episode of Stilwell had acerbated and marred US-ROC relations for many years. According to John Davis, "He (Stilwell) was removed because Chiang could not accept a foreigner taking command of all Chinese forces. It was inevitable and an entirely unrealistic concept." To this date, the ROC Government is still paying a terrible price for the bitter lesson; (3) the US had enjoyed the full advantages of extraterritoriality and related rights in China for more than four decades (1901-1943). It was the Chinese people and the government who had earned respect and recognition among nations for their war efforts through a protracted War of Resistance. In demonstrating the US goodwill to "correct an historic mistake" and to show additional proof that the US wanted China not only as a "partner in waging war" but also as a "partner of peace," the US signed a treaty in relinquishing US extraterritoriality in 1943; (4) the US recognized that to keep the ROC in the war was indispensable to ultimate allied victory, and that it was logical for the US to build up China's world status early so that China would be able to play an important world role to fill the power gap left by Japan during the post-war period so as to maintain the political stability in the Pacific region vis-a-vis the rising influence in Asia. As a result, China was invited to sign the Declaration of Four Nations on General Security in 1943 and to participate in the Cairo Conference in the same year. Despite those efforts to help China to gain great power status, paradoxically, the United States unwittingly compromised her Samaritan diplomacy by concluding a secret agreement with the Russians at Yalta on February 11, 1945, and deliberately kept China uninformed of it for several months.

The ignominious Yalta Agreement is a classical example of an act by the US Government, irrespective of its rhetoric
plausibility of moralistic diplomacy, chose to defend its own national interest, i.e., to invite the Russians to enter the war against Japan, to shorten the war and save American lives, at the expense of China. It is paradoxical for the US to help China to drive out one aggressor on the one hand, but force China to accept another aggressor on the other hand. The Yalta Agreement had deprived the ROC’s real opportunity of replacing Japan as a major stabilizing power in the Far East, because it led to the Communist take-over of China. Instead of rectifying the historic blunder, the US Government is now going to legitimatize the communist regime at the expense of the ROC under a specious pretext and wishful logic that the Peking-Moscow schism proved communism to be no longer monolithic and that pragmatism must take precedence of all policy considerations. In retrospect, the self-serving and casuistic contention of US infallibility in the Yalta tragedy in connection with US-ROC relations must be challenged.

IV. US-ROC RELATIONS 1946-1950

For more than sixty years since 1895, China has been confronted with the dual threat of Russian and Japanese aggression in rotation. After the Japanese surrender in 1945, a new Russian aggression intensified. Although the ROC had emerged from the victory a nominal great power, in fact she had been plagued by civil strifes, morbid bureaucracy, economic crises, social disorder, political disunity and the Communist rebellion. Under the circumstances, the ROC Government was unable to devote itself to the post-war reconstruction. The Chinese Communists expanded their forces during the war and after, and were ready to challenge the Government by force; they were portrayed by many Americans as agrarian reformers and a new dynamic democratic force of a new China to be reckoned with. The KMT-CCP struggle was viewed as civil war, not as part of Stalin’s grand strategy of contrived conquest of China.

Rational dialogues on the US policy toward China are rare. Apprehension, acrimony and sometimes hostility existing among many American and Chinese leaders had turned the US-ROC relations into the darkest era in 1946-1949. Many US leaders legislated their own pathological predilections and substituted it for national policy in the name of objective national interests. The complexity and intricacy of the eventful post-war US-ROC relations almost defy any sensible simplification in a short time. I can only use the following important cases to summarize the
development of US-ROC relations during this landmark phase of Chinese modern history.

(1) **The Impact of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1945 upon the US-ROC Relations:** The Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1945 which was the direct result of the Yalta Agreement imposed on the ROC, has brutalized China’s national honor for years. As a college student who witnessed the grassroot indignation toward the Yalta Agreement and the Sino-Soviet Treaty, I took part in many massive student demonstration protesting the Soviet aggression and the US connivance. To this day, regardless of their political persuasions, most Chinese would agree that the Yalta tragedy did put the credibility of American Samaritan Diplomacy in serious jeopardy. No thinking Chinese of my generation would seriously consider that the United States can be a reliable or potentially credible ally at a time of crisis. Credibility gap resulted from the Yalta Infamy of the United States has become a big boulder standing in the way of improving the US-ROC relations for years to come.

(2) **The Debacle of the Marshall Mission:** Immediately after the war ended in 1945, the ROC was faced with two options of regrettable necessities, either securing the US cooperation or the Russian aid, to go about her post-war reconstruction. Each of such options would potentially impair and compromise China’s self-reliance effort to a certain degree. But, in order to minimize the latent trauma inflicted upon China by either of these options, the ROC chose to cooperate with the US. At the outset, the Marshall was beset with insoluble complexity of entangled political, military and economic problems. On December 15, 1945, in the midst of a deepening Chinese crisis and intensifying military hostilities, President issued a China policy statement calling for a “strong, united, and democratic China” as of utmost importance to world peace, so that China would be able to discharge responsibilities for post-war domestic reconstruction as well as for maintaining international stability and world peace. General Marshall was instructed by the President “to bring to bear the influence of the US to the end that unification of China by peaceful and democratic methods.” After thirteen months of futile effort and bitter frustration, Marshall failed his mission and resigned. In facing the expanded Communist military attack, the United States, now with Marshall as the new Secretary of State, would preside over a new disengaged policy toward the beleaguered Government of the ROC.
Segmented Bipartisan Foreign Policy toward China: The China crisis culminated in the 80th Congress when a divided government between a Republican-controlled Congress and a Democratic-occupied White House carried on its foreign policy toward China along the segmented bipartisanship. Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg, architect of the segmented bipartisan foreign policy, strongly advocated China's freedom of choice to remain as a democratic republic, and openly disassociated from the Administration's China policy on coalition government, but did not challenge the Administration's hands-off policy toward China and agreed to exclude the US policy China from his bipartisanship in foreign affairs. Thus, Vandenberg's segmented bipartisanship toward China became a tragic policy by default. His full bipartisan commitment to support the Marshall Plan may have saved Western Europe from a Soviet take-over, but his segmented bipartisan foreign policy certainly did invalidate the US Samaritan diplomacy of preventing the Communist take-over of China. At the critical moment of fighting for its survival in 1949, the ROC Government was dealt with several fatal blows. The most important is the release of the White Paper on US Policy toward China. The loss of China was attributed by the Americans to the ROC's lacking of "will to resist."

As things stood prior to the outbreak of the Korean War, the Truman Administration excluded Taiwan and Korea from the first line of US defense in the Western Pacific. Secretary Dean Acheson reaffirmed the US hand-off China policy and warned the new Asian nations that they must have the "will to fight communism" themselves before the US could offer them economic aid and advice. Ironically, in 1977, twenty-eight years after the China debacle, the ROC is now again faced with perhaps the most critical challenge and test of the US commitment to the Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954. At this time, if the Carter Administration chooses to abandon the ROC through derecognition, the ROC should not be blamed for lacking of the "will to fight for its own survival". No amount of casuistic paralogism and specious rationalization will change the fact that the Carter Administration simply did forsake the ROC for the sake of playing the power politics of using Peking against Moscow at the expense of the ROC.
V. US-ROC RELATIONS FROM THE KOREAN WAR TO THE FORD ADMINISTRATION 1950-1976

(1) The Truman Administration: Two days after the outbreak of the Korean War, President Truman altered his hands-off China policy dramatically by ordering the Seventh Fleet to patrol the Taiwan Straits in order to prevent the Chinese Communists from attacking Taiwan. The Korean War not only altered the US policy in Asia in general, but also turned a new leaf on US-ROC relations for the next two decades. For the first time, the US containment policy began to apply in restraining the Chinese Communists. By dismissing General MacArthur, the US warned the ROC that they should not entertain any false hope of expecting the US to help them to regain the Chinese mainland via the Korean War. Meantime, the US gradually resumed limited military and economic aids afterward. The Truman Administration was committed to support the ROC seat at the United Nations and backed the ROC's complaint in the UN against Soviet aid to the Chinese Communists and the Russians' violation of the 1945 Sino-Soviet Treaty of Alliance.

(2) The Eisenhower Administration: The Eisenhower Administration with John Foster Dulles as the Secretary of State marked considerable changes in the US-ROC relations: A. appointment of a new U.S. ambassador to the ROC; B. strong defense of the ROC against the Chinese Communists attack on Taiwan; C. signing of the Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty in 1954 as sign of considering the ROC as a crucial part of the US global collective security defense chain; D. support of the ROC’s UN seat and reaffirmation of non-recognition of the Chinese Communist regime in Peking; E. nascent concept of Two-China policy as advanced by the Colon Report in November 1959 and the Rockefeller Panel Report in 1960, with indication that the Eisenhower Administration would readjust its present policies if the situation “in the Far East were so to change in its basic elements as to call for a radically different evaluation of the threat Chinese Communist policies pose to the US;” F. initiation of the Washington-Peking bilateral talk: the focal point of such talks was to ascertain the principle of renouncement of force in settling Peking-Taipei dispute. In summary, the pattern of US-ROC relations based on the de facto Two-China Policy was sanctioned by the US-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty. The US would not tolerate military attacks by either the ROC or the Chinese Communists against each other.
(3) The Kennedy Administration: At first, the Kennedy Administration vowed to switch from the Dulles' brinkmanship of massive retaliation in foreign policy to the New Frontier policy of flexible response and advocated a break in the impasse of the US-ROC policy. Despite its assurances of "defending Formosa whatever the risk, and whatever the costs," the Administration kept its options open should the Chinese Communists modify their policies. Clearly, the normalization between Washington and Peking was no longer blocked by the opposition of the ROC, but rather by the increasing Communist belligerent attitude. During the short period of the Kennedy Administration, one still can identify some of the positive developments in US-ROC relations: A. re-emphasis on the strategic importance of Taiwan as crucial to US security in the Western Pacific; B. considering the Chinese representation question in the UN as "important substantive question;" C. US continued support for the defense of the offshore islands held by the ROC; D. in view of the Peking-Moscow schism, the Kennedy Administration set another important pattern in dealing with the Chinese Communists, i.e., the Chinese Communists must change and reciprocate. The change of US policy toward Peking was contingent upon such a reciprocal change by the Peking regime. But Peking did little to reciprocate. Besides, the Chinese Communists' cartoon caricature of Kennedy as "ken-ni-ti" ("bite muddy ground", derogatory transliteration of Kennedy's name in Chinese), and their uncharacteristic jubilation over the Kennedy's assassination certainly did not win the Peking regime many friends.

(4) The Johnson Administration: President Johnson developed a two-track policy toward the ROC on Taiwan and the PRC on the mainland. As for the former, his administration was to follow the principles laid down by previous administrations after 1949, namely, a continued recognition of the ROC, support of the ROC seat at the UN, and a firm commitment to the US-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty obligations. On the other hand, a new policy toward Peking was formulated, i.e., "containment without isolation" and a "new open door policy." In the historical sense, President Johnson was the last American President to defend the containment policy, and Dean Rusk the last Secretary of State to execute that policy. Assistant Secretary Roger Hilsman, Jr. signaled a basic change in the Johnson Administration's policy toward Peking by telling the Commonwealth Club of San Francisco: "US defense of Formosa is a matter of basic principle," and "no basic improvement in US-Chinese relations is possible
until Communist China accepts that fact.” However, Hilsman declared officially a Two-China policy by saying: “The US is determined to keep the door open to the possibility of change in Communist China and will not slam it shut against any developments which might advance our national good, serve the free world, and benefit the people of China.” Furthermore, Dean Rusk outlined new policy guidelines in dealing with Peking: First, to assure Peking publicly and candidly that the US did not intend to attack mainland China; second, not to assume the existence of “unending and inevitable state of hostility” between Washington and Peking; third, to gradually expand the categories of American travel, cultural exchanges, trade, mail and other communications; fourth, to hold diplomatic discussions with Peking on the critical problems of disarmament and nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. Obviously, the Johnson Administration was impressed with the gains in nuclear weaponry by Peking in the midst of truculent Cultural Revolution and increasingly acrimonious Peking-Moscow schism. It was difficult indeed for the ROC and a good portion of the American people to appreciate the logic and moral justification for considering a Two-China policy. Logic and morality aside, ally or no ally, the Johnson Administration stood ready in 1969 to accommodate and reciprocate whatever and whenever Peking was willing to cooperate. Unfortunately, treaty or no treaty obligation, the ROC was helplessly and anxiously kept waiting on the sideline.

(5) The Nixon-Ford Administrations: The ROC Government was keenly aware of the full significance of the gradual change in US policy, but took comfort in assuming that if the dramatic change of policy did not take place under Democratic Administrations, it will be unlikely that the Republican Administration will make any radical change. But the ROC’s optimistic assumption turned out to be premature and complacent when Nixon made the historic and dramatic visit to Peking in 1972. The Nixon trip sent a shock wave throughout the world and had a devastating impact upon the people and government of the ROC. In fact, as early as October 1967, Nixon wrote in Foreign Affairs calling for a flexible policy toward Peking. In his first State of the Union Message, President Nixon advocated “an era of negotiation” in substitution for “an era of confrontation.” Between 1969 and 1971, Nixon made several overtures to Peking through various channels. Trade and travel restrictions were eased, the Nixon Doctrine principally aiming at Peking was proclaimed. The leaders of the ROC visited the US in 1970 urging the Nixon
Administration not to put its Two-China policy into immediate effect. But no matter, the Nixon Administration went ahead with its Two-China policy. In a banquet to honor the visiting Romanian Chief of State, Nixon referred for the first time to the “People’s Republic of China,” and stated in September, 1970 “If there is anything I want to do before I die, it is to go to China.” In December, Nixon told the press conference: “Looking long toward the future we must have some communications and eventually relations with Communist China.” The carefully orchestrated “ping-pong diplomacy” in 1971 was a prelude to the happenings of a chain of events. Following the secret talk between Henry Kissinger and Chou En-lai in Peking from July 9 to 11, 1971, President Nixon announced on July 15 that he had accepted the Chinese Communists’ invitation for a visit to Peking. US-ROC relations strained considerably after the Nixon announcement. On August 2, 1971, Secretary Rogers officially endorsed a dual Chinese representation at the UN. On October 25, 1971, the China question was voted on in the General Assembly, Henry Kissinger’s ostentatious presence in Peking sent a clear message to the world. The ROC had no choice but protected its national honor by walking out of the UN. On February 27, 1972, the Nixon-Chou Shanghai Communique was issued after Nixon’s visit came to an end. The Communique covered a wide range of bilateral question. The focal point still rested on the Taiwan question. Each side reaffirmed its respective position on Taiwan. The US acknowledged all Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Straits maintain there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China. Peking insisted that Taiwan is a province of China and that settlement of Taiwan question is a matter of China’s internal affair. The US stated that it was merely concerned with a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves, and that its ultimate objective US withdrawal and progressive reduction of military installation on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminished. Thus, the objective of normalization was agreed upon, but definite schedule for effectuation was not set. In 1973, Washington and Peking had exchanged Liaison Offices. By setting a diplomatic and historic precedent in stationing one legal embassy at Taipei, the ROC, and a de facto mission in Peking, the US officially instituted a formula of its own, quite different from the German formula or Japanese model. Despite all official assurances that nothing was done “at the expense of the old friends,” the US was very careful not to offend Peking, President Nixon and Kissinger were inaccessible to the ROC diplomats.
In the wake of the Nixon Administration's somersault policy on China, a diplomatic avalanche followed. More than 60 nations recognized the Government of the ROC before Nixon's trip, but that figure has steadily come down to reach 23 in 1977. But the ROC took the Nixon shock and diplomatic setbacks in a sober stride. She quietly and effectively withstood the diplomatic isolation, international boycott and economic hardship from 1972 to 1975.

During the Ford Administration, no substantive progress was made toward normalization after Ford's trip to Peking in 1975. The Administration ruefully discovered that Teng who held talks with Ford, was again disgraced shortly after Chou En-lai died in January 1976. Mao's invitation of Nixon to visit with him after Nixon's resignation from the Presidency certainly did not do either one any good, particularly during an election year in 1976. After Mao died in September 1976, a new political power struggle erupted. On the contrary, when the ROC lost its leader, Chiang Kai-shek in April 1975, there was no leadership crisis but a peaceful and institutional transition of power. Being perplexed and vexed with the capricious power struggles on the mainland, the Ford Administration quickly realized that indiscretion in dealing with Peking in the midst of political turmoil and leadership instability will neither serve the best interests of the United States, nor save the US from policy embarrassment later on. As a result, except for following the Nixon-Kissinger basic policy on China, President Ford's policy was a holding action and waited for an election victory to effectuate whatever the new policy as planned. But, Ford lost the election as well as an opportunity to implement his new policy toward China.

V. RE-EXAMINATION OF THE CHINA POLICY OPTIONS UNDER THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION, 1977

As of April 30, 1977, President Carter has been in office less than four months. The President is primarily occupied with domestic issues and other key foreign problems concerning the SALT II talks with the Soviet Union, and the Middle East crisis. Despite the President's initial statement on the China question that the US would continue to proceed with the normalization on the basis of the Shanghai Communique and that the security of the ROC on Taiwan must be guaranteed, nevertheless, the whole question requires more time for careful review and re-evaluation. Ever since President Carter injected the human rights issue into
the foreign policy of his Administration, normalization with Peking could be complicated by increasing criticism of the President’s subtle silence on the brutal violation of the Chinese people's human rights under the Chinese Communist slavocracy, or by Peking's own insistence on no written pledge of non-belligerency toward settlement of the Taiwan question. With regard to the future of US-ROC relations, suggestions abound but options are limited. For example: 1. continued support for the ROC: Taiwan is strategically vital to the US defense perimeter in the Western Pacific. Those who disputed Taiwan’s strategic importance to the US security in the Far East, are either understating their political perception or over-exaggerating their prejudicial preference; 2. derecognition of the ROC and recognition of Peking as the sole legitimate government of China: By doing so, the US has to give in to Peking’s three preconditions, severance of U.S. diplomatic relations with the ROC, abrogation of the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty and the removal of US troops and bases from the ROC. The difficulty with this option is that the US itself is scuttling her written pledge to the ROC, how can the US expect the shrewd Chinese Communists to make a new pledge in writing and to keep it in deed? Besides, it is utterly unfair and immoral for the US to betray its own commitment to individual liberty and democratic value by acting as a political mortician for the Chinese Communists' liberation of Taiwan by proxy? 3. Open-end policy: This is also called Two-China policy. Like others, it carries with it certain deficiencies. But at least, the US still holds on to its own initiative and independent freedom of policy making option. Recently, suggestions were made in some quarters that a possible military cooperation between Peking and Washington should be probed further. Despite the Peking-Moscow schism, neither Peking nor Moscow chose to abrogate the Sino-Russo Mutual Defense Treaty of 1950, why should American military aid become the Chinese Communists’ welfare at the expense of its allies? And why should the ROC be put in double jeopardy?

In the process of policy evaluation, it is important to take the following three aspects into considerations: First, Peking has set the preemptive and non-negotiable conditions for normalization between Washington and Peking. In seeking to place their negotiating opponents on the defensive from the outset, the Chinese Communists have always insisted that their negotiation agenda be considered as a set of conclusions; second, US-Peking negotiations for normalization are not merely bilateral undertakings, the entire security and peace in the East Asia region is
involved. Above all, it is the creditability of the United States as treaty partner under challenge; third, the people and the government of the ROC have rejuvenated in the past three decades since 1949. They have done nothing at all to compel the United States to abrogate the Mutual Defense Treaty and to derecognize them. If the Carter Administration chooses to accept the Chinese Communists’ preconditions as the price for normalization for the sheer sake of normalization with Peking, then the US Government can no longer disavow responsibility for abandoning the people and the government of the ROC. It is unconscionable for the United States to legitimize the Chinese Communists’ birth right to claim that all Chinese must live under the Communist system against their volition. The United States has no moral obligation to “liberate the ROC” and destroy the sixteen million people’s freedom of existence for Peking by proxy. The Carter Administration’s China policy must not be arbitrary, inhumane or Machiavellian. It must not be assumed that the ROC will disappear after derecognition and that the US has no responsibility for destabilizing the security and power equilibrium in the Pacific region.

VI. CONCLUSIONS

US-ROC relations have been long and good. As a loyal and self-reliant ally in war and in peace, the ROC has proved its political integrity, economic viability, cultural sublimity and its will of survival to its own people and to the world. It was the United States which has insisted on that China must be democratic. After three decades of nation building effort, the ROC on Taiwan has become a huge reservoir of unusual talents and human resources. It has become the seed plant of China’s hope for democracy, and the symbol of cultural mecca of millions of overseas Chinese throughout the world. The ROC is the most acknowledged member of international community who is peaceful, constructive and capable of receiving and sharing much scientific and cultural knowledge among nations.

During the 200 years of US history, no single mutual defense treaty has been unilaterally or arbitrarily nullified for the sake of the adversary who has long sought to destroy the very signatory party of such mutual defense pact purported to protect. The people and government of the ROC have stated repeatedly that they are grateful to the people and government of the United States for their generous support given to them, but the US must exercise no
diplomatic moral relativism or selective human rights standards. It is about time for the US to treat the ROC as her own ally instead of treating her as "helpless pawns" in the world of Machiavellian power politics. The US must stop her patronizing attitude and condescending arrogance toward her ally, the ROC. No amount of casuistic rhetorics and pragmatic palliatives will prove that the China question can be effectively and realistically resolved by the US' unilateral concession and permissive condonation toward Peking. The United States may not adopt an anti-communist policy, but the Carter Administration should never adopt a pro-communist policy by sacrificing the legitimate freedom of survival of her ally. No secret deals should be made to Peking at the expense of the ROC. Besides, during the period of detente, the President's war powers have been considerably weakened by the passage of the War Powers Act of 1973 and the National Emergencies Act of 1976. I submit that the American Presidency cannot afford to be further constrained by the abrogation of the most trust-worthy US-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954, should the Chinese Communists make a feigned non-belligerent pledge as an inducement for US recognition, and then resort to military attack on the ROC.
RELATIONS WITH THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

(Abstract)

Y. C. CHANG*

Since Richard Nixon reopened the door to China in 1972, there has been a great deal of expectation regarding the improvement of relations with the PRC. Yet, in the public discussion of the issue’s pros and cons, both its proponents and opponents have assumed cavalier, parochial attitudes, despite the gravity of the matter. As a result, complex questions have been oversimplified to the point of distortion, and casual impressions given as irrefutable facts. To clarify some of the confusion now permeating official and academic circles, as well as the general public, it is essential to scrutinize some of the crucial misconceptions.

MEANING OF THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE

The Shanghai Communique is invariably cited in any discussion on Sino-American rapprochement, yet “so many people talk about it without reading it.” Some China scholars advocate normalization because they think it is “promised” in the Shanghai Communique, when in fact, only the hope that “new prospects” would be opened up was expressed. Actually, the communiqué is a statement of disagreements — all relating to the Republic of China. The United States declared that it

acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves.

The Chinese Communists reaffirmed:

The Taiwan question is the crucial question obstructing the normalization of relations between China and the United States; the Government of the People’s Republic of China is the sole legal government of China; Taiwan is a province of China which has long been returned to the motherland; the liberation of Taiwan is China’s internal affair in which no other country has the right to interfere; and all U.S. forces and military installations must be withdrawn from Taiwan.

* Associate Professor of Political Science at University of Delaware.
Furthermore, proponents of normalization have even less reason for regarding the Shanghai Communique as a sacrosanct agreement. The State Department has repeatedly denied its legal as well as moral binding force upon either the Ford or subsequent administrations. Walter McConaughy put it aptly that "as a rule," a communique "is just a bland document consisting of platitudes and hardly remembered even by the signers or the drafters two days afterwards."

NORMALIZATION AS A MEANS OF INFLUENCING CHINESE INTERNAL POLITICS

A CIA analyst, among others, has urged normalization in order to influence the internal politics of China by strengthening the position of one factional group over another. He fails to realize that the United States has little reliable data about foreign policy cleavages among Chinese leaders to "play upon their differences." Communist Chinese sources have amply demonstrated that their leaders may differ on tactics to accomplish the goal of Sino-American detente, but not on the goal itself, which, if realized, would pay off handsomely. The Nationalist government would be dealt a mortal blow, its alliance with the United States broken, and the United States could be exploited as a shield against the Soviet Union. The Chinese leadership, regardless of which faction dominates, will not easily give up such a grand strategy as long as there is a reasonable hope of success.

NORMALIZATION TO PREVENT A SINO-SOVET RE-ALLIANCE

The prediction that Peking, after the death of Mao, would again lean toward the Soviet Union has so far been proven groundless. A careful study of the origins of the Sino-Soviet dispute shows that the improvement of relations between the two countries, even if possible, would be "limited" at best, since what has undermined their relationship is more than a personality clash between Mao and Soviet leaders, or their ideological differences regarding the correct interpretation of Marxism-Leninism. Rather, it is the deep-rooted, complicated boundary controversy. On territorial questions, the Soviet Union has stood adamant and inflexible, not only with the People's Republic, but also with Japan on negotiations concerning the Kuriles. Until a compromise requiring substantial concessions by both can be reached, any chance for a genuine rapprochement between Peking and Moscow seems slim indeed.
Peking, however, has a more valid reason to worry about the American pursuit of detente with the Soviet Union. It has openly complained that the United States does not comprehend the true nature of the "new czars," and on occasion has provocatively intimated that the United States is no longer a superpower worthy of contention. A major reason for inviting James Schlesinger to the PRC, during which he was taken on an unprecedented tour of the regions bordering the Soviet Union, was undoubtedly the desire of the PRC to show support for his tough policies towards Moscow. The Chinese Communists are also not totally unaware of the fact that the United States can and may use Peking as one form of "leverage" over the Soviet Union, and Peking is jittery about such a sellout. Under these circumstances, the practicality of the United States in pursuing policies of detente simultaneously with two antagonists is questionable, no matter how attractive the objective may be in the abstract. In the short run, the United States may be able to play one against the other, but in the long run, it must make a choice, because in pleasing one, the United States will inevitably offend the other.

NORMALIZATION AND THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA

In the Shanghai Communique, the United States "reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves," but such an outcome seems very unlikely. For the People's Republic, Taiwan is a question of principle on which, like similar problems with India and the Soviet Union, they cannot compromise. They have never ceased to state publicly that "we shall liberate Taiwan, by force if necessary." For the Nationalists, any talk about "reunification" with the mainland would invite internal rebellion among the 16.6 million inhabitants, mainlanders and Taiwanese alike, who overwhelmingly oppose such a move on understandable grounds such as, among others, the relative prosperity and freedom in comparison with the prevailing conditions on the mainland.

Some advocates of Sino-American rapprochement have urged normalization before "peaceful settlement," which would entail derecognition of the Republic of China and annulment of the Mutual Defense Treaty. They fail to take into account some of the desperate measures to which Taiwan might resort for the sake of self-preservation. First, the ROC, denied American protection, must explore every avenue to strengthen its defense, including the possibility of "going nuclear." Having been excluded from the
International Atomic Energy Agency membership in 1972, the ROC has, nevertheless, observed the provisions of the non-proliferation treaty, and denied any intention to develop nuclear weapons, but whether or not the Republic of China or South Korea will develop nuclear weapons, as one commentator observed, will, to a large extent, depend on American actions since they are dependent on U.S. security guarantees. If trust in the U.S. security guarantee erodes, the pressure to acquire nuclear weapons is likely to increase.

Second, the ROC may be forced to seek rapprochement with the Soviet Union. Several sources have already revealed that in 1973, the Soviet Union sent Victor Louis to Taiwan to negotiate the lease of naval facilities in the Pescadores, but he was flatly refused by Chiang Kai-shek. Soviet interest in naval bases in the China Sea extends as far back as 1958, when Khrushchev first approached Mao Tse-tung about the possibility of leasing Chinese ports and was embarrassingly rebuffed. Given Russia’s present policy of expansion into the Indian Ocean, Taiwan’s air and naval bases presently occupied by the Americans are extremely attractive indeed.

U.S. CREDIBILITY AS AN ALLY

To derecognize the Republic of China and annul the Mutual Defense Treaty would immediately jeopardize American credibility as an ally. For decades, the French have wondered if the United States would risk the destruction of New York in order to save Paris and, after the Vietnam fiasco, many members of NATO have begun to harbor similar doubts. In Asia, the “Nixon shock” prompted the Japanese to recognize the PRC hurriedly, and other countries, including previously staunch anti-Communist governments, quickly followed suit as soon as they saw the handwriting on the wall. Even South Korea has conducted secret negotiations with Peking in Hong Kong, for no one wants to be left holding the bag.

In the immediate future, the United States needs the cooperation and support of Japan in maintaining order and stability in the Pacific region. American withdrawal from Vietnam has already “raised serious doubts in Japan . . . as to the credibility of the American guarantee,” and the Japanese have been alarmed by “the occasional refusal of Congress in recent years to appropriate adequate funds to back up American
commitments abroad." Ohira, the pro-Peking foreign minister who was instrumental in Japan's hasty recognition of the People's Republic, and other Japanese leaders candidly told Senator Mike Mansfield in July 1976 that Japan regretted rushing into recognition, that Japan's economic and cultural ties with the ROC, after the former's recognition of Peking, were mainly possible because of the American defense guarantee of Taiwan, and finally, that the United States should move cautiously in normalizing relations. If America ignores this advice, Fakuda, the present premier whose pro-Taiwan sympathies are well known, may be deeply annoyed. What the Japanese would do if they no longer trusted the American guarantee is anybody's guess: They would certainly strengthen their offensive as well as defensive military capability; they might develop closer relations with the Soviet Union, which they have hesitated to offend, as seen by their refusal to sign the Sino-Japanese friendship treaty because of its "anti-hegemony" clause; or they might even acquire nuclear weapons. The United States, and particularly the People's Republic, would not like to see these things happen.

The United States one day might also need the support of other Asian countries in dealing with the PRC — a possibility, however remote, that no pragmatist should completely rule out, and Americans might find few willing to undertake the risk of offending Peking. The United States has acted like a big brother in the past, willing and able to persuade, cajole, and pressure Asian countries to forego the pursuit of their national interests for the benefit of all. Without such mediation, Asia could easily become a powder keg, with far-reaching consequences. When American dominance in Asia is undermined, so is the stability of Asia.

INTERNATIONAL MORALITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS

In many parts of the world, the United States is respected and admired no less for its moral commitment to high idealistic aspirations — "national self-determination," fair play, and decency in the relations among countries — than for its military and economic might. In derecognizing the Republic of China and annulling the Mutual Defense Treaty, the United States will be hard put to find a moral justification for the desertion of a dependable long-time ally and the precedent of breaking a treaty for the sake of expediency. To ignore the aspirations of 16 million people in Taiwan and force their "integration" with the Chinese Communists is equally indefensible. After all, less than a year
ago, Ford expressed the indignation of all Americans when Canada knuckled under the pressure of the PRC and disallowed the participation of ROC athletes in the Olympic games. Upon taking office, President Carter has, so far, actively carried out his earlier promise to campaign for human rights everywhere in the world. It would be incomprehensible if he chose to disregard the genuine wishes of the people in Taiwan, as well as those Chinese Americans who have business interests, investments, or relatives on that island. He should insist that the People's Republic respect and observe “human rights,” before U.S. recognition takes place, as he did in the case of Cuba recently. The more blatant oppressive practices of the Peking regime aside, there have been too many reports that Peking has refused to grant either entry visas to Chinese Americans to visit their families on the mainland or exit permits to allow their emigration to the United States.

Indeed, the policy of normalizing relations with Peking at any cost is both irreversible and fraught with grave consequences. If the American people know all the relevant facts, they would most probably oppose such a radical change in American foreign policy. Not unlike other American citizens, Chinese Americans would also like to see the United States get the better of the bargain with Peking, or at least, not again be shortchanged, as has happened so often in Asia in the past.
POLICY OPTIONS

(Abstracts)

JAMES C. HSIUNG*

We accept the premise that "normalization" is a set policy and that the Shanghai communique of 1972 is the guiding spirit for it. We also note, however, the sentiments of the majority of the American public as revealed in a Gallup poll in late 1975: While 65 percent of those polled favored "establishing diplomatic relations with mainland China," 70 percent favored "continuing relations with Nationalist China" (Taiwan).

A sensible China policy for the future, we are persuaded, should not be conceived merely as an appendage to our "normalization" policy. It should embody a critical review of the full spectrum of U.S. foreign policy interests in ways that will avoid some basic flaws and misconceptions in the Kissingerian legacy. We should not, for example, pretend that a once-for-all solution can be found to all our outstanding foreign policy issues, the China question being one of them. There is no cut-and-dry answer to the Taiwan question. Even Peking today accepts the stark reality that the Taiwan issue will have to follow, not precede, the establishment of diplomatic relations with Washington. We should take a step-by-step approach in this regard and leave the final settlement of Taiwan's future to the vagaries of history and, as we stated in the Shanghai communique, to the Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait.

We should, furthermore, avoid the folly of not consulting our major allies when crucial decisions are made. A continued U.S.-Japan partnership will strengthen our hands in dealing with China and the Soviet Union. We should not discount lightly Japan's opposition to our duplicating the so-called "Japanese formula" and the reasons behind it. Japan could switch her recognition to Peking and maintain "unofficial" relations with Taiwan, only because she had no defense commitment to the island and, more important, because she could count on continued U.S. back-up for the defenses of South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan. Without the U.S. commitment, stability and security in the region would be in jeopardy.

Another lesson from the Kissingerian failures is that we should not expect, by any action on our part, to alter basic Chinese or Soviet policy. China, besides, is not expected

* Professor of Political Science at New York University.
drastically to change its relatively limited foreign trade capacity in the foreseeable future, any more than its self-reliant policy. Peking's trade with the United States in 1976 was only $350 million, or one-thirteenth of U.S. trade with Taiwan. Total Chinese foreign trade volume has remained around $15 billion a year, as compared to the U.S.'s $200 billion.

For these and other reasons, we should not base our China policy too heavily on an over-optimistic estimate of what we shall gain from the establishment of full diplomatic relations with China. There is no reason to expect that compromising on Taiwan in a manner that will please Peking will offer enough inducement to change the latter's basic policy toward us or the Soviets. If it is in Peking's interest to cultivate better relations with the U.S. because of its own fear of the Soviet Union, it needs no inducement from us to carry out that policy. Our "normalization" policy, therefore, should not be solely premised on any real or imagined immediate gains for us, but on what is good for long-term U.S. interests and what is appropriate in terms of our principles and moral conviction.

The People's Republic, on the other hand, may actually benefit more from full diplomatic relations than we do, at least in the short run. As quid pro quo, we should require Peking to pledge to cooperate in the limitation of strategic armaments and to undertake not to disrupt peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. If some measure of even-handedness is to be maintained regarding Peking and Moscow, we should likewise express our concern that the Chinese respect human rights at home.

To a large extent, a sound China policy for the future and the stability of the Asia-Pacific basin will depend upon the specific terms we shall accept for "normalization" and the (domestic) measures we shall take in regard to Taiwan. The People's Republic has insisted on three conditions for "normalization": diplomatic recognition, abolition of our security treaty with Taiwan, and withdrawal of U.S. troops from the island. Each of these, we believe, must be answered forcefully and unequivocally. We suggest the following responses:

First, diplomatic recognition of Peking will mean withdrawal of recognition from Taiwan, or derecognition. We should state ahead of time, therefore, that switching official recognition to Peking will not foreclose our accepting Taiwan as a continuing "friendly de facto entity," so far as U.S. internal laws are concerned, until such time as a permanent solution is found by the "Chinese themselves." Giving Taiwan this intermediate status
will not close out future options but will for the immediate future free us from possible domestic legal hindrances to the continuance of certain rights and privileges essential for Taiwan’s security and stability. These include arms sales, extension of OPIC insurance for private U.S. investments in the island, most-favored-nation (MFN) tariff treatment, immigration quota, etc.

Second, our mutual security treaty with Taiwan will, as already noted, most probably lapse when we switch recognition. We should declare that the lapse will not ipso facto vitiate the U.S. commitment to the security of the people in Taiwan. Although a Congressional resolution might be an alternative route, the form the statement of intent will take can be a Presidential declaration — and this may very well be known as the Carter Doctrine in the future — that our continued security concerns and good will for the Taiwan people do not vanish after our recognition of Peking. We must maintain our credibility as an ally in the eyes of friends when seeking better relations with our adversaries.

Third, on the question of troop withdrawals from Taiwan, we can tie our pledge to complete the withdrawals to an explicit commitment by Peking to refrain from the use or threat of force in the Taiwan area and to seek a peaceful settlement with the island’s people themselves.

Treaties with the Republic of China (Taiwan) will fall in a limbo when we switch recognition. There will also be ambiguity surrounding Taiwan’s continued eligibility for certain benefits under U.S. laws affecting arms sales, military assistance, etc. To resolve these problems, the government may enumerate which of the treaties or legislations, insofar as the latter apply to our relations with Taiwan, are affected by the derecognition. Alternatively, Washington may simply declare that “unless otherwise explicitly stipulated” all existing treaties and legislations shall continue to apply to Taiwan as before, and then list the ones that the government wishes to modify or terminate. Where legislative action is required, a simple formula can be used in a blanket Congressional resolution that reads like this:

Whereas the United States is determined to normalize its relations with the People's Republic of China and recognize the latter as the sole legal government of China; and

Whereas the United States adhere to the spirit and letter of the Shanghai Communiqué signed between the two countries on February 27, 1972; and
Whereas it is the wish of the United States to maintain peace and security in the Taiwan area until such time when the island’s future is definitively resolved: Therefore be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress Assembled,

(a) That the United States, for domestic legal and judicial purposes, shall, upon recognizing the People’s Republic of China, continue to treat the Republic of China on Taiwan as a friendly political entity as though it enjoyed de facto recognition, at least until a peaceful settlement of the island’s future has been reached by the people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait; and

(b) That as a friendly entity as such, the Republic of China (Taiwan) shall continue to enjoy the privileges, rights, and conveniences or courtesies as it has enjoyed, and is currently enjoying, prior to the United States recognition of the People’s Republic of China, pursuant to bilateral treaties, domestic legislations, and executive decrees and regulations, except as modified, altered, terminated and/or amended as follows: . . . .

As to the specific formula for continuing U.S. relations with the island after derecognition, we have noted the inadequacy of the “Japanese formula.” The “two Germanies” formula may be ideal for Taiwan, but it will probably not be acceptable to Peking. Another way will be to reduce our relations with Taiwan to the consular level. But this will leave the United States ill-equipped to handle the kind of relations we should maintain, let alone to cope with any deterioration in the power balance that might destabilize the region.

To assure us the greatest possible flexibility, the best possible formula — and this we can call the “American formula in reverse” — will be to switch our Embassy and Liaison Office between Taipei and Peking, continuing, though, the consular relations as they currently exist between the United States and the Republic of China (Taiwan). Since this formula does not foreclose any future settlement of the Taiwan question, and since the Liaison Office arrangement is currently in use between Washington and Peking, we see no compelling reason why Peking cannot be persuaded to accept this “American formula” (or, for that matter, “Chinese formula”) in reverse, if we insist.
If we cannot help the 16 million people in Taiwan live out their aspirations, the least we can do is to avoid creating a condition where they do not even have a choice but to be forcibly taken over by Peking. United States trade with East Asia in the 1970's already exceeded our transactions with the traditional European allies. America's jobs, currency, and raw materials will depend more than ever before upon economic ties with the Pacific basin. Our interests in a stable Taiwan must be viewed in this larger context and must not be compromised out of our eagerness to recognize Peking.

Looking into the 1980's, our China policy should not fail to appreciate our growing interdependence as a nation with our Asian-Pacific partners, and to recognize that the latter's security and stability is crucial to our own interests. As the importance of the Asia-Pacific community grows, as it certainly will, we believe that any sensible policy must place the China question (including Taiwan) within that larger community context. As Asian-Americans we think we have a particular perspective to bring to the public's discourses on U.S. foreign policy.
COMMENTARY I

Hungdah Chiu*

Being the only lawyer among the panelists, my comments will be primarily on the legal aspects of U.S.-China Relations. However, because law, morality and politics are practically inseparable, my comments will unavoidably touch on some moral and political aspects of the relations. Because of the limitation of time, my comments will focus on the Shanghai Communiqué and the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) three conditions for establishing diplomatic relations with the United States.

On February 27, 1972, when President Nixon concluded his visit to the PRC, a joint communiqué was issued at Shanghai in which both countries, while still disagreeing on many issues, stated that “progress toward the normalization of relations between China and the United States is in the interests of all countries.” Since then, many pro-PRC elements in the U.S. have been arguing for speedy normalization of U.S. relations with the PRC under the latter’s three conditions, namely, that the U.S. abrogate its security treaty with the Republic of China (ROC), remove all troops from Taiwan, and sever diplomatic relations with the ROC. These pro-PRC advocates have even argued that in the Shanghai Communiqué the U.S. has already pledged to take these steps. Is that true? I have some doubts.

So far as the relations between the ROC and the U.S. are concerned, the Shanghai Communiqué is a document of both clarity and ambiguity: clarity, because the PRC and the U.S. both maintain that all U.S. forces should ultimately be withdrawn from Taiwan; ambiguity, because the two sides have not agreed on how the Taiwan question should be settled. The PRC insists that the “liberation of Taiwan is China’s internal affair in which no other country has the right to interfere.” On the other hand, the U.S. “affirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves.” These statements are both silent as to ROC-US diplomatic relations and as to the US-ROC security treaty.

President Nixon explained the U.S. position before he went to the PRC as follows:

In my address announcing my trip to Peking, and since then, I have emphasized that our new dialogue with the PRC

* Professor of Law at University of Maryland Law School (Baltimore).

This position was affirmed by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger at a press conference held on February 27, 1972 after the issuance of the Shanghai Communique. The pertinent colloquy is as follows:

Q. Why did not the United States Government reaffirm its treaty commitment to Taiwan, as the President and you have done on numerous occasions?

Dr. Kissinger: . . . Let me . . . state in response to this and any related question — and let me do it once and not repeat it: We stated our basic position with respect to this issue in the President’s world report [of February 9, 1972] in which we say that this treaty will be maintained. Nothing has changed in that position . . . . the position of the world report stands and has been unaltered. (“President Nixon’s Visit to the PRC — News Conference of Dr. Kissinger and Mr. Green,” (Shanghai, February 27, 1972), in Department of State Bulletin, Vol. LXVI, No. 1708 (March 20, 1972), p. 428).

On the question of Taiwan, the U.S. declared in the Communique:

The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and Taiwan is a part of China. The United States government does not challenge that position. (Emphasis added)

It must be pointed out that anyone with an elementary knowledge of international law should know that the phrase, "does not challenge" is not equivalent to a recognition of the Chinese claim. This interpretation is also confirmed by a high official of the U.S. government. Soon after the issuance of the Shanghai Communique, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian Affairs Marshall Green denied that the communique represented any change in the position held by the U.S. since 1950

Moreover, the term "China" mentioned in the Communique has a different meaning to people on either side of the Taiwan Strait. To the people of Taiwan, the term "China" means the Republic of China, i.e., a country whose social system is based on individual freedom and private enterprise. There has not been the slightest evidence that the people of Taiwan want to be a part of China if the term "China" means the People's Republic of China, that is, a country whose social system is based on totalitarianism and collectivism. If the policy makers in the U.S. and the PRC had the moral courage to accept the challenge of an internationally supervised plebiscite or poll conducted in Taiwan, I can assure you that the great majority of the people there would reject any proposal to make them a part of the PRC. Thus, even in accordance with the Shanghai Communique there remains absolutely no legal, moral, or political basis for the U.S. "not to challenge" the PRC's claim to Taiwan; the Communique does not imply, either in law or in its plain meaning, a U.S. acquiescence in the PRC's claims to Taiwan.

In view of the above analysis, under the Shanghai Communique there is no legal or political basis under which the U.S. would be obliged to accept the three conditions of the PRC in normalizing relations. Some pro-PRC elements have argued that there was a tacit, implicit pledge in the Shanghai Communique or by President Nixon or Secretary of State Kissinger to accept the three conditions. Even so, then, this raises two very serious questions: (1) Has the U.S. government clearly explained this point to the American people and American allies? (2) Does the U.S. President or the Secretary of State have the constitutional authority to commit the U.S. to such a secret agreement? In other words, would such an agreement be binding? Needless to say, the answer to these questions must be negative.

Moreover, in 1975, the U.S. State Department publicly declared that any explicit commitment made by the President toward a foreign country has no legally binding force. The Department indicated that it does not even keep records of exactly how many commitments are made by American Presidents or of their terms. (See "A President's word not legally binding." The Sun [Baltimore], July 9, 1975, p. A2). If an explicit commitment made by a President alone is not legally binding, how can a secret declaration of intention or agreement, if any, made by any U.S.
President, have any political or legal meaning at all in the eyes of the American people?

With respect to the U.S. Security Treaty with the ROC, we should recall that a ratified treaty, according to the Constitution of the U.S., is part of the “supreme law of the land.” According to the U.S. Constitution, a President, before he enters on the execution of his office, must “solemnly swear” that he “will to the best of [his] ability, preserve, protect and defend, the Constitution of the United States.” Now, some pro-PRC elements urge the President of the United States to abrogate this treaty at the demand of a foreign country, by passing by Executive fiat the will of the people expressed through the Senate’s ratification process. Isn’t that absurd?

The racial aspect of the question of accepting the PRC’s three conditions for establishing diplomatic relations should not be overlooked. The great majority of Senators and Congressmen of Asian origin and the black caucus in the Congress have indicated their opposition to termination of diplomatic relations and the security treaty with the ROC as the price for normalizing relations with the PRC. On the other hand, the U.S. government officials and scholars consulted by the government who have advocated the acceptance of the PRC’s three conditions are almost all white. In formulating their policy suggestion to U.S. government, they have excluded the participation of Asian-American political and academic leaders who have strong cultural, trade, emotional and family ties with the people of Taiwan. This exclusion of the participation of Asian-Americans in the decision-making process concerning a question of their vital concern is evidenced by the lack of Asian-Americans among the State Department’s high officials dealing with East Asia, the State Department’s policy panel on China, and the membership of the National Security Council.

On the other hand, the white immigrants from the three Baltic states have exerted strong influence on the U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union. Despite the fact that these three non-existent states were annexed by the Soviet Union almost four decades ago, the United States has continued to grant them recognition and has maintained diplomatic relations with their legations here.

In my view, the real situation facing the U.S. in its China policy today is that there are, in fact, two Chinese governments, each controlling large territories and governing effectively. Because the PRC is a reality and a world power, it is certainly in
the interest of the U.S. to normalize relations with her. But in pursuing that course, it is equally important to face the reality of the Republic of China on Taiwan and its 16 million people.

The Republic of China on Taiwan is closely linked with the U.S. in political, economic and cultural ties. It has a steadily expanding gross national product, now at the level of about $17 billion annually. The per capital income of $800.00 in 1976 is about four times than that of the PRC. Its present annual foreign trade of about $15 billion is more than that of the PRC. In 1976, the ROC-US trade reached the record level of $4.8 billion, which was about 13 times that of the PRC-US trade in the same year. Moreover, more than 200,000 U.S. tourists visited the ROC in 1976, compared with less than 5,000 who visited the PRC in that year. The ROC has also strong ties in all aspects with many Asian-Americans in this country.

In view of this situation, the only realistic, moral and legal policy of the U.S. toward China is to recognize each Chinese government — the PRC and the ROC — as the government of the territory it controls. At the same time, the U.S. should also make it clear that it will not object to the unification of China if it can be achieved by peaceful means. There is nothing in the Shanghai Communiqué which would legally prevent the U.S. from taking such a policy toward the two Chinas, and this is the only policy which is consistent with principles of international law, justice, and respect for human rights and self-determination — all principles this great democracy has cherished since the founding of this republic two hundred years ago.
COMMENTARY II
YING-MAO KAU*

The panel organizers and the paper writers should be congratulated on the excellent choice of topics and themes for our panel and on the superb presentation of the papers before us today. The three background papers lay out chronologically the historical and political contexts of the evolution of Sino-American relations for the past century or so; and the position paper articulates systematically and imaginatively the major problems, issues and policy options that confront our China policy in the years ahead.

I am very pleased to note that all the papers have stressed the complexities and intricacies of the temporal and spatial contexts of changing U.S.-China relations in each historical period. Throughout the presentation the panel has lucidly underscored the methodological assumption that before we raise the policy question, “Where do we go from here?” we have to know, “How did we get here in the first place?” The papers demonstrate uniformly a strong sense of intellectual realism and integrity. They all share the view that in making foreign policy no nation can afford to forsake the moral obligations which it has accumulated over time or ignore troublesome conditions as if they simply did not exist. The papers remind us that the success of a foreign policy depends primarily on meticulous analysis of objective conditions and dispassionate reasoning and planning, and not on its political rhetoric or ideological attractiveness. For many Asian-Americans, the issue of US-PRC normalization and the problem of Taiwan can easily evoke deep ideological and partisan emotions. It should be noted, however, that the papers before us today demonstrate an impressive level of objectivity and scholarship.

As I find little disagreements with the historical analyses of various periods which are presented with impeccable competence by Professors Tang, Yang, and Chang, my comments will be confined primarily to the policy matters discussed by Professor Hsiung. I am particularly impressed by the argument that our policy toward the Asia-Pacific region in general and toward the PRC in particular should be designed to achieve, among other things, (1) further consolidation and development of our leadership role and of the credibility of our policy in Asia, (2) the

* Professor of Political Science at Brown University.
preservation and maintenance of the peace, stability and prosperity of the region, (3) the strengthening of our political and economic ties with our major ally, Japan, and (4) the completion of our normalization with the PRC with a guarantee that the Taiwan issue should be settled peacefully. While agreeing with the thrust of these analyses and arguments, I wish to raise three specific points for further discussion: one concerns the future strategy of the U.S. in Asia, and the others are related to the question of normalization and Taiwan.

First, in recent years the legacy of Kissinger's diplomacy, as Professor Hsiung correctly pointed out, has led many Americans to believe that a fundamental transformation of the international system has taken place in the 1970s: cold-war containment and confrontation between the East and the West have come to an end, and a new era of detente and cooperation has begun. The bipolarized world of the post-World War II years has been replaced by a new order based on a triangular balance of power. Hence, it is argued, the old strategic concepts, such as alliance and containment, which were stressed in the past to deal with the expansion of Communist influence, are now obsolete and should be discarded.

Surely, the basic alignments of world politics have changed substantially between the fifties and the seventies. But is it true that the traditional strategic concepts of our foreign policy have all become inoperative? The answer clearly depends on a number of factors: for instance, on the extent to which the basic nature and process of East-West rivalry has been altered, and on the extent to which the major Communist powers have begun to share our new perception and new optimism, and have shown us clear evidence of their willingness and commitment to cooperate in creating a new world order. I am not sure that the answer to these questions can be entirely positive. Nor am I sure that in the arena of foreign policy and world politics one should dichotomize strategic concepts such as confrontation and cooperation, or containment and detente as mutually exclusive categories in policy formulation. The conduct of world politics, in my judgment, is simply too complex and dynamic to fit into any of these neat, clear-cut formulas.

I think, therefore, that any unilateral reorientation toward detente and goodwill on our part in Asia without due regard for the long-range objectives and short-term tactics of our adversaries would be, to say the least, unrealistic and naive. Such a move may even run the risk of miscalculation and misunderstanding, and
U.S.—China Relations

may precipitate opportunistic actions which would undermine the existing stability and balance of power in Asia. History has amply testified that effective diplomacy ought to be flexible and reasonable, yet realistic and firm.

Second, I wish to raise the question as to how high a priority the PRC seems to give to the goal of liberating Taiwan on its foreign policy agenda? Do they rank it No. 1 or No. 2 in priority? Is it the case that Peking has assigned the Taiwan issue a priority below that of the Sino-Soviet conflict and the threat of "social imperialism" all over the world? Citing Keng Piao's statement of last fall that "Even if Sino-American relations were normalized, it would still be impossible to liberate Taiwan," Professor Hsiung concludes that Peking appears to be willing to accept the separation of the normalization issue from that of Taiwan. In other words, the PRC is believed to be interested in completing the process of normalization with the U.S. on the basis of the Shanghai Communique (specified in terms of the "three basic conditions"), while allowing the Taiwan problem to be settled separately and "peacefully" at an undetermined future date. Is this indeed the real intention of Peking? Or is it more likely, as suggested by Professor Chang, that Peking is pursuing a "two-phase" tactic with regard to Taiwan: namely, to disengage the U.S. politically and militarily from Taiwan first, and than to press on the Taiwan question at a time and under a condition of Peking's own choosing?

If we take Keng Piao's words at their face value, considering them sincere and trustworthy, as some specialists would argue, how can we reconcile Keng's moderate words with the militant statement made by Li Hsien-nien just last month, in which he asserted that the Taiwan problem could not be resolved without a fight. Worse still, how are we going to handle the even greater uncertainties as to who will be in charge in Peking in the years to come, and what policy lines with regard to Taiwan they may pursue?

The conclusion seems clear: if we are serious about our commitment to a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question and to the security and aspirations of the sixteen million people on the island, the U.S. can not rely solely on informal understandings and pledges from the leaders in China who happen to be in power at this time. There is no substitute, in my opinion, for a formal and concrete arrangement which will involve all the three parties concerned. Informalities and ambiguities can only lead to misunderstanding and miscalculation with disastrous consequences.
Finally, I am rather surprised to see that none of the papers today has touched on the subject of Taiwan's military capability to defend itself in the event of a decision by China to liberate Taiwan by force following U.S. military disengagement from the island. As we know, with American military and technical assistance in the past three decades Taiwan has developed fairly efficient military forces with some sophisticated modern weapons. Time does not allow me here to discuss the special characteristics (strengths as well as weaknesses) of the armed forces on Taiwan. However, military specialists seem to be unanimous in their opinion that its strengths notwithstanding, Taiwan's military forces alone could not sustain a prolonged armed assault from China. Some would even go further to argue that psychological warfare by China coupled with the threat of force alone would be sufficient to seriously disrupt the trade-oriented, capital-intensive economy of Taiwan, and effectively undermine the island's social-political stability in a relatively short period of time.

In recent months, the so-called "Vietnamese formula" for resolving the Taiwan problem seems to be gaining increasing acceptance in certain quarters. The formula stresses in essence the building up of Taiwan's military strength and stockpile of necessary arms supplies prior to American derecognition and withdrawal from Taiwan with the hope that Taiwan would be able to maintain its own security vis-à-vis the PRC. In view of the peculiar economic and military conditions on Taiwan as well as the extraordinary strength that the PRC is capable of mobilizing if it chooses to do so, the pitfalls of such a formula are obvious. Overestimation of Taiwan's military and economic capabilities at this juncture is bound to result in a gross miscalculation with disastrous consequences for Taiwan in the future. In order to keep good our promise to protect the security and aspirations of the sixteen million people of Taiwan, it is eminently more sensible for us to take the trouble now to work out an unambiguous policy and course of action which can guarantee the objective of *peaceful settlement* that we have set out to achieve. We as a nation should not allow ourselves to indulge in temporary expediency and self-deception which in the long run may trap us in a worse dilemma and greater trouble.
I enjoyed reading these four papers, particularly Professor James Hsiung's, which is well deliberated and carefully phrased. Within the time limit, I will briefly discuss first the historical background of U.S.-China relationships and then turn to policy considerations.

Beginning from Anson Burlingame's diplomatic service for China in 1867 as elaborated in Professor Tong's paper, the U.S. has been more friendly to China than have been other big powers. Although the United States and China mutually made mistakes in the past century, the two countries generally remained friendly to each other. But when we broaden our perspective of Sino-American relations, we see Russia after Japan watch the situation closely for any possible gains from China that have directly or indirectly discredited the U.S. relationship with China. Several historical events bear out this observation, such as Russia's thinly disguised rejection of the Open Door Policy, Soviet aid to China in 1937-39 to deter Japan from advancing rapidly to northwestern China, the unjustifiable Yalta secret agreement, and Stalin's assistance to the PRC in the Korean war against the United States. In sum, from friendship to hostility between China and the United States, the Soviet factor, whether behind the scenes or not, has played an important role in the changing courses of development.

The "reopening" of China in 1972 involved once again the Soviet Union. It is no longer a secret that the Peking leaders turned about face to the United States for assistance in opposition to the U.S.S.R. This is a dramatic and effective strategy. In our search for a new U.S.-China relationship today, we should bear in mind this historical and strategic background.

In several statements by President Carter and other officials in the past year, the present Administration has set forth a few basic principles for developing new relationships with the People's Republic of China; they are normalization of U.S. relations with the PRC, maintenance of peace and stability in Asia, and preservation of freedom and security of Taiwan. To develop such new relationships, the United States, as President Carter declared at the United Nations on March 17, 1977, will act in "the spirit of the Shanghai Communique."

What is the "spirit" of the Shanghai Communique? There has been no official definition of it, nor is there an established public

* Professor of Political Science at Rutgers University.
consensus. Unlike "the Bandung Spirit" of 1955 which is generally understood to mean "peace, good will, conciliation, anti-colonialism, and unity of Asian and African nations," the "spirit of the Shanghai Communique" is vague in its meaning and not at all specific.

If we leave the "spirit" aside and examine the Shanghai Communique itself, we find that it is a document of clarity and ambiguity. It contains one agreement (clarity) and three non-agreements (ambiguities) which take the form of unilateral declarations or non-declarations by either side. The one agreement (the only one) is on the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military installations from Taiwan. The three non-agreements are complicated. The first is the U.S. reaffirmation of its interest in "peaceful settlement" of Taiwan, while China declares that the settlement of Taiwan is "China's internal affair in which no other country has the right to interfere." In the second, the United States does not "challenge" China's unilaterally declared position on her opposition to "two Chinas," "one China, one Taiwan," "one China, two governments," and other devices. This is neither an agreement nor a disagreement. As regards the third non-agreement, there is no mention, let alone agreement, of the U.S.-Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty. On this third point, one may well ask: Was Peking's later proposal for the abrogation of the Mutual Defense Treaty, as one of the three Chinese conditions for normalization, made in the "spirit" of the Shanghai Communique?

Both the Shanghai Communique and President Carter's statements have expressed continuing U.S. interest in peaceful settlement of Taiwan and of disputes in Asia. It is a lofty principle and we must uphold it. Moreover, Peking, through Keng Piao's secret speech on August 24, 1976, expressed its intention to separate the issue of U.S. diplomatic recognition from the future settlement of Taiwan. An open statement by Deputy Premier Li Hsien-nien in March 1977 also indicated that Taiwan was not a priority issue for China and that China had many other more urgent things to do, such as further development of relations with the U.S., national defense, and modernization plans. If Peking's intention and priority here are real, then the PRC is going to "normalize" relations with Washington in the near future and to "settle" the Taiwan issue at a later time. Furthermore, we Asian-Americans understand well that American public opinions play a very significant role in formulating United States foreign policy. In October 1975, a Gallup poll showed that while 61 percent favored U.S. diplomatic relations with the PRC, at the same time
70 percent favored the continuation of formal relations with Taiwan. Could the U.S. government ignore such a clear expression of American public opinions?

For the above reasons, we see that "normalization" is not as simple as "an invitation to dinner." It is a complex process; many principles and interests should be observed, and many problems should be dealt with. If a new American China policy, under the name of the "American formula" or "Asian-American formula," to be more fashionable on today's occasion, is to be developed and applied in accordance with the aforesaid three American principles, the United States should either obtain Peking's agreement on, or declare its determination to uphold, the following five items of interest:

1. Improvement of relationships with Peking to formal diplomatic recognition, but no date should be set.
2. Peaceful settlement of Taiwan by the Chinese themselves.
3. Prior to a peaceful settlement, Taiwan continues to be a friendly political entity to the United States with diplomatic delegation in Washington and America's diplomatic mission in Taipei.
4. The continuation of U.S. commitment to the defense of Taiwan pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty until a peaceful settlement is implemented.
5. Human rights of the 16 million people on Taiwan should be respected. They should not be handed over to any regime against their will and rights. The Jeffersonian concept of the "general will of the people" must be upheld.

This package of normalization is mostly in disagreement with Professor Hsiung's proposal. But the issue here is not agreement or disagreement among the panelists, rather it is whether Peking will accept it. Judging by Peking's public attitude toward the issue, I see little likelihood that Peking will readily do so. But, if we ponder the issue further, there is a possibility that Peking may consider it hard and may eventually accept it in principle. The reason is twofold. First, this package is an American (not anyone else's) proposal, and it is a matter of negotiation principle and a game strategy that the U.S. should lay down its own conditions as bargaining chips. Why should the U.S. offer all its chips to Peking without bargaining or negotiations? Second, Peking has the unpublicized intention of separating the Taiwan issue from U.S. diplomatic recognition, as discussed earlier, and has adopted a
give-and-take strategy as disclosed by Keng Piao (to take advantage of improved relations with the U.S. against the Soviet Union, and to give in on certain issues including Taiwan). After all, Peking, in accepting this package in principle, still has the right to declare its position on Taiwan or its disagreements with the United States as it did in the Shanghai Communique.

I believe that peaceful settlement between the PRC and Taiwan should be a major and firm interest of America’s new China policy. As a matter of fact, the United States has repeatedly declared its importance. The United States must insist on its implementation so as to ensure the maintenance of peace and stability in Asia. If there are any important principles in accord with the “spirit” of the Shanghai Communique, this is definitely one of them.

My conviction of a “peaceful settlement” goes much deeper than the search for a solution to the Taiwan problem. Although it may be out of proportion to discuss it here in detail today, I will briefly mention my main ideas. In historical perspective, China has experienced hundreds of wars and armed conflicts in the dynastic cycles of division and reunification. These wars have helped bring China a glorious history and civilization and countless great heroes, but also untold human tragedies and impoverishment. The history of modern China, so clear and familiar to all of us, is an epitome of such glorious-tragic records. Political leaders in modern times (whether warlords or armed revolutionaries) have known only how to scramble for power and how to wage wars; little economic reconstruction was introduced, little social innovation was initiated, and almost no scientific and technological progress was made to improve the quality of the life of the people. Worse still, wars created opportunities for foreign powers to exploit and divide China, particularly for the neighbors in the east and in the north. Strongly determined to eliminate all wars in the future, Dr. Sun Yat-sen introduced a parliamentary system into China with the hope that the Chinese could settle all their differences and disputes by nonviolent means in meeting chambers rather than on the battlefield. Sun did not succeed in this lofty yet difficult task because he lacked the power to enforce it. But we must continue to campaign for nonviolent settlement of all Chinese affairs. The Taiwan issue today is a good case to set a precedent for it.

To set such a precedent, the United States should offer its help, and only the U.S. can help. The American commitment to Taiwan since 1954 should be used as a leverage for the
achievement of a nonviolent settlement. The power of enforcement is in American hands. Moreover, dealing with the Soviet Union is in both American and Chinese interests. If the U.S. can develop with China a common interest in coping with Russia, Washington may have the necessary leverage to enforce such a peaceful settlement. Any bloodshed between the Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait will not serve the interests of the U.S. or China, but it may serve those of the U.S.S.R.

What would happen if the U.S. leverage fails to work? Since the U.S. commitment to Taiwan is merely symbolic and risks no war, we must be patient. The United States should not give up this leverage and task; it should continue to honor its commitment to Taiwan until such a time when both Peking and Taipei come to a peaceful solution.
COMMENTARY IV

TEH-KUANG CHANG*

For the national interest of the United States, the "normalization" of relations with the People's Republic of China is not simply a matter of extending diplomatic recognition to the Peking regime, but a step-by-step process of settlement of existing disputes between these two nations. For American diplomatic strategy, it would be wise to keep the options open rather than to consider raising the Liaison Office in Peking and downgrading the Embassy in Taipei.

As the leader of the free world, and with the capability of a super-power, the U.S. diplomacy on "normalization" should be based on a concrete reciprocity rather than one-sided concessions from the U.S. Thus the American strategy should include a series of countermeasures for the purpose of promoting world peace, preserving the regional security of Asia as well as protecting the national interest of the U.S.

1. On World Peace: The People's Republic of China is a nuclear power, but it has neither signed the Treaty of Nuclear Test-Ban, nor the Treaty of Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. It has the largest army in the world; however, it did not join the disarmament negotiations such as the SALT talks. If the "normalization" is an approach for world peace, to bind the PRC to a disarmament negotiation table should be a priority issue for any negotiation for diplomatic relations.

2. On the regional security of Asia: The "Shanghai Communique" of February 28, 1972, set up the terms for the withdrawal of American military personnel from Taiwan as international tensions diminished. At that time, it was made on the assumption that Community China would influence a peaceful settlement of Viet Nam. However, South Vietnam was conquered by North Vietnam by war rather than by peaceful settlement as the U.S. expected. The U.S. has kept its promise to withdraw its military personnel from Taiwan, even though the international tension in Asia has not been diminished. North Korea still threatens a possible attack on South Korea, and the Communists remain fighting on the border of Thailand and Malaysia. Thus the U.S. should seek a guarantee from Communist China for a peaceful settlement of the Korean problem and to refrain from supporting the Communist guerillas in Southeast Asia. This is not only an

* Professor of Political Science at Ball State University (Muncie, Indiana).
approach for stability and security in Asia, but also for the facilitation of the U.S. withdrawal of troops from Korea.

3. On the U.S. Alliance: Communist China's formulas for "normalization" of relations with the U.S.A. includes three conditions: (1) the severance of diplomatic relations with the Republic of China, (2) the abolition of the Embassy of the Republic of China in Washington and the American Embassy in Taipei, (3) and the abrogation of the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty between the Republic of China and the U.S.A. These provisions are not mentioned in the "Shanghai Communique." Thus the U.S. has not only a sound basis to defend its position against Communist demands, but also could adopt counter-measures by demanding the abolition of the 1950 Treaty of Alliance between the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union.

The 1954 Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty is a defensive one and does not specify the enemy target. However, the 1950 People's Republic of China and Soviet Union Alliance Treaty is an offensive one and specifies Japan and its allies, the U.S.A. by implication, as the potential enemy. Thus, the U.S. has more reason to ask the People's Republic of China to abrogate the provocative Sino-Soviet treaty of 1950 as a pre-requisite for "normalization" of relations rather than the 1954 Sino-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty.

4. On Diplomatic Relations: In the "Shanghai Communique," the United States has indicated that it would not challenge the "One China Concept" which is a common position of the Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan strait.

The United States desires to promote the diplomatic relationship with China to a "normal" level until the conditions of China become stabilized. However, the situation of China has not reached a "normal" condition, either the unification of the mainland and Taiwan or the unity of the political factions on the mainland itself. The United States has sufficient reasons to defend its position, because the American recognition of the National Government of Nanking was delayed to 1928, that is, until China was legally unified. If a new political change is finalized, such as the unification of the mainland and Taiwan, the United States will make any necessary adjustment of diplomatic relations with China. Today the United States has maintained the status quo until a new situation emerges, rather than prejudice the power-holders of China. The United States should clearly indicate that it is impartial in the internal political change rather than interfere with the domestic affairs of China. Thus, the United
States has maintained only one embassy in the territory of China rather than initiate any substitute agency of a diplomatic nature. It is the People's Republic of China that suggested the set-up of "Liaison Office" in Peking and Washington. The "Liaison Office" can handle more affairs than an embassy can. The ambassador from the People's Republic of China can see the American President and the Secretary of State directly. Therefore, the "normalization" of relationship can be carried on even without an embassy. However, the achievement of the "Liaison Office" is very limited. This is not a problem of institution, but the problem of function. Thus, the problem is how to develop the better relationship through the "Liaison Office" rather than to elevate it to an embassy without making any progress in this relationship.

5. On the Peaceful Settlement of the Taiwan Problem: In the "Shanghai Communique" the United States insisted on a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan problem. The Chinese Communists understand the U.S. position even though they express a desire for "liberation of Taiwan." The "peaceful settlement" of the Taiwan problem is a basic policy of the United States for the maintenance of peace and security in Asia. However, in the summer of 1976 while he was in power, Chang Chun-Chiao (now one of the "Gang of Four") with his capacity as a Vice-premier, told Senator Scott (R.-Pa.) that a military solution of the Taiwan problem was possible. Li Shien-Nien, current vice-premier, told Mr. Hamilton, the London Times correspondent that the problem of Taiwan could not be settled without a war. Chi Teng-Kuei, another current vice-premier, told Yomiuri Shombun correspondent (May 15, 1977) that the Communist China would take over Taiwan by force if necessary. This is certainly contrary to the U.S. position which was expressed in the "Shanghai Communique." Should the United States make a concession under such a threat or stand firm in defending its position to prevent a possible war over Taiwan?

6. On the Principles of American Diplomacy: In dealing with the People's Republic of China on "normalization," it is necessary to bear in mind the basic principle of American foreign policy, such as "morality," "democracy," and "human rights." Although the United States would not challenge the "One China" concept which is a position adopted by the Chinese of both sides of the Taiwan Straits, the United States should insist on the principle of "democracy" for the people in Taiwan to decide whether or not they are willing to join the mainland under Communist rule. Especially, the "human rights" become an issue in U.S.-Soviet
relations, it is unwise to make an exemption of Communist China simply because they have a stricter control over their people.

7. On the Anti-American Propaganda: The “normalization” of relations should be approached for “friendship” rather than for “animosity.” Since the admission of Communist China into the U.N., the United States no longer condemns Communist China as “aggressors” which was adopted by the U.N. resolution during the period of the Korean War. However, by contrast the Chinese Communists continuously denounce the United States as “imperialists.” The campaign of hatred of U.S. and the anti-American propaganda should be ended in order to establish an atmosphere of normalization of “friendly” relationship.

8. On the treatment of American representatives in Peking: While Communist China has set a limitation on the range of American travel outside of Peking, the United States also set a limitation on the Communist diplomats’ travel outside of Washington. However, President Carter has recently abolished such limitation so that the Communist Chinese representatives could travel outside Washington. Especially the Chinese Communists can meet the people freely. The United States should ask for reciprocal treatment from Peking by allowing the Americans to travel outside Peking and meet the people freely. Otherwise it makes no sense to consider raising the status of the Liaison Office.

9. On the Control of Narcotics Traffic: Since international narcotics traffic has become a serious problem, the United States should lose no chance to seek an agreement with a nation which produces opium and exports narcotics to the United States. According to Gara Hamburger, an Austrian correspondent, Chou En-lai told Nasser in 1965 that the Chinese Communists tried their best to supply the best opium to the American soldiers in Viet Nam. Congressman John R. Raxtrick stated on December 2, 1973, that Red Chinese “friends” were sending a big amount of opium to the United States. Thus, the United States should take the opportunity during the process of “normalization” of relationships to seek an agreement from Peking to stop the exportation of opium from China to the United States.

10. On Internal Subversion Activities: The basic position of Communist China is to continue world Communism even though the diplomatic tactics have been changed. In order to prevent the Chinese Communists’ strategy of expansion of Communism in the United States by infiltration and subversion, the United States should seek an agreement from the Peoples’ Republic of China.
This would be not only in general terms of non-intervention of domestic but also, more specifically, prohibit infiltration or subversion in any form as supported by any methods by any groups or individuals who endanger the democracy of the United States. One should bear in mind the experience of the United States' recognition of the Soviet Union in 1933. The United States always trusted the Soviet Union's words of promise rather than its deeds. Thus, the Soviet Union has a record of violation of agreement and treaties since the United States recognized the Kremlin. While the old red giant is out of control by the diplomacy of recognition, the United States should use this experience to deal with the new red giant in the "normalization" of relationships.

The United States should make clear that it will proceed to the normalization; however, the final goal of diplomatic recognition can only be achieved with the fulfillment of all prerequisites. The United States should declare that the United States will recognize without prejudice any national government of China so long as China is unified. Meanwhile, the U.S. has no choice but to continue the relationship status quo with a government which has already maintained diplomatic relations. The United States should keep its alternatives open rather than shift diplomatic recognition from one area to another simply under international pressure, but in doing so it jeopardizes its basic policy of morality, legality and democracy.
THE ASIAN AMERICAN ASSEMBLY FOR POLICY RESEARCH, CCNY, New York 10031

Prof. Winberg Chai, Chairman

THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COUNCIL, 1977-1978

Mr. Henry Luce III, New York City, Chairman
Judge William M. Marutani, Philadelphia, Co-Chairman
Prof. Harry H. L. Kitano, Los Angeles, Vice-Chairman
Prof. Jang H. Koo, Fairbanks, Alaska, Vice-Chairman
Prof. William T. Liu, Chicago, Vice-Chairman

MEMBERS

Prof. Federico Aquino-Bermudez, CCNY
Mr. Bharat Bhargarva, Philadelphia National Bank (tentative)
Dr. Ch'u Chai, New York City
MRS. Carolyn Everett Chai, Environmental Commission, Pequannock, NJ
Prof. Aloysius Chang, Washington State U. at Pullman
Ms. Diana Chang, PEN, New York City
Prof. Eugenio Chang-Rodriguez, Queens College
Prof. Teh-Kuang Chang, Ball State U. (Indiana)
Prof. Y. C. Chang, U. of Delaware
Prof. George Po-Chung Chen, Augusta College (Georgia)
Prof. King C. Chen, Rutgers U.
Dr. Theodore H. E. Chen, Los Angeles
Mr. William L. Y. Chen, New York City
Prof. David H. Cheng, CCNY
Prof. Tao Cheng, Trenton State College
Dr. Anna Chenault, Washington, D.C.
Prof. C. P. Cheung, Calif. State at L.A.
Mr. Harry Chin, NYC
Prof. Julia Ching, Yale U.
Prof. Hungdah Chiu, U. of Maryland Law School
Ms. Norma Chu, educator, NYC
Mr. Stanley Chu, educator, NYC
Mr. Augustine Chua, Immigrant Social Service, NYC
Dr. Priscilla Chung, Asian American Council of Greater Philadelphia
Mr. Allen B. Cohen, Chinatown Planning Council, NYC
Prof. F. Hilary Conroy, U. of Pennsylvania
DR. CHARLES E. EISENHART, President, Adirondack College
— SUNY
MR. ROBERT W. FAIRBURN, Fairburn Associates, Phoenix
MISS JESSICA FEINGOLD, The Jewish Theological Seminary of America
PROF. FUMIKO IKEDA FEINGOLD, CCNY
PROF. THOMAS WILSON GETHING, U. of Hawaii at Manoa
PROF. IRVING GREENBERG, CCNY
DR. FELIKS GROSS, The Polish Institute of Arts and Sciences in America, NYC
MRS. CYNTHIA HO, educator, NYC
MR. MALCOLM HOENLEIN, Jewish Community Relations Council of New York
MRS. JOSEPHINE M. HONG, Chinese Women’s Benevolent Association, NYC
PROF. CHAO-MIN HSIEH, U. of Pittsburgh
PROF. JAMES C. HSIUNG, NYU
PROF. KING-YI HSU, Andrews U. (Mich.)
MR. F. RICHARD HSU, China Institute in America, NYC
PROF. KAI-LOO HUANG, Moravian College (Pa.)
PROF. JOHN L. JANG, La Verne College (Ca.)
MR. GERALD JANN, JADE MAGAZINE, Los Angeles
PROF. LEONARD JEFFRIES, JR., CCNY
REV. MARK JUNG, Transfiguration Church, NYC
PROF. DIANA KAO, CCNY
PROF. Y. M. KAU, Brown U.
PROF. ILPYONG J. KIM, U. of Connecticut
DR. RICHARD S. KRAMER, educator, NYC
MR. STANLEY KREUTZER, Board of Ethics, City Hall, NYC
DR. PETER KU, Howard Community College, Maryland
DR. P. M. KU, Southwest Research Institute, San Antonio
DR. Y. H. KU, Philadelphia
PROF. NANCY DUKE LAY, CCNY
MR. DAVID W. LEE, The State Education Department, NY
DR. T. KONG LEE, Chancellor, Lincoln U., San Francisco, Sacramento, San Jose
PROF. TA-LING LEE, South Connecticut State College
PROF. SHAO-CHUAN LENG, U. of Virginia
DR. HANG-SHENG LIN, Institute of Pacific Studies, Petaluma, Ca.
PROF. J. B. LIU, U. of Arizona
U.S.—CHINA RELATIONS

PROF. K. W. LIU, CCNY
MS. FAY LOO, educator, NYC
MR. DAVID MACEACHRON, Japan Society, Inc., NYC
MS. MAO CHUN-FAN, NYC
MR. MAX R. MENSCH, Borck and Mensch, NYC
PROF. VISHWANATH MORE, Johnston College (Ca.)
MR. WARD MOREHOUSE, Council on International and Public Affairs, NYC
PROF. ROGER K. ODEN, Governors State U., Illinois
PROF. SE JEUNG OH, CCNY
DR. CHOON-HO PARK, Howard U.
MR. ARTHUR H. ROSEN, National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, NYC
MR. EMIL OXFELD, President, American Civil Liberties Union, N.J.
PROF. MICHAEL RYWKIN, CCNY
PROF. BUNJI SAKITA, CCNY
PROF. EVA E. SANDIS, Fordham U.
PROF. CONRAD SCHIROKAUER, CCNY
MR. MITCHELL B. SCHULICH, Seward Park High School, NYC
DR. OTIS H. SHAO, Occidental College
PROF. OSBORNE E. SCOTT, CCNY
REV. DR. CHANG SHENG-YEN, The Buddhist Association of the United States
DR. PAUL K. T. SIH, St. John’s U.
PROF. BETTY LEE SUNG, CCNY
REV. PAUL SZTO, Queens Christian Reformed Church, Jamaica
MR. THOMAS TAM, Chinatown Health Clinic, NYC
PROF. CHESTER C. TAN, NYU
PROF. U AUNG THEIN, Columbia
PROF. T. K. TONG, CCNY
MS. LILA TSAI, Board of Education, NYC
MR. C. Y. TUNG (honorary) New York City and Hong Kong
PROF. TIMOTHY TUNG, CCNY
PROF. WILLIAM L. TUNG, Queens College
PROF. BAIDYA N. WARMA, CCNY
MR. CHARLES P. WANG, Chinatown Planning Council, NYC
PROF. GEORGE C. WANG, Calif. State at Dominguez Hills
MR. GEORGE T. C. WANG, New York City
MR. THOMAS K. WANG, Chinatown Service Center, NYC
DR. MARY I. WATANABE, Pacific/Asian Coalition, Philadelphia
REV. FRANKLIN J. WOO, National Council of the Churches of Christ
MR. ALFRED Y. WU, Los Angeles and Las Vegas
MRS. JULIA L. WU, Los Angeles
MS. LORETTA WU, Organization of Chinese Americans, NYC
PROF. PEI-YI WU, Queens College and Columbia U.
PROF. YUAN-LI WU, U. of San Francisco and Hoover Institution
PROF. RICHARD H. YANG, Washington U. at St. Louis
REV. PHILIP YANG, True Light Lutheran Church, NYC
PROF. JOHN YOUNG, Seton Hall U.
PROF. LUNG-CHANG YOUNG, Hobart & William Smith Colleges
MR. N. T. YUNG, Bridge Magazine, NYC
DEAN FREDERICK T. C. YU, Columbia U.