Schmooze 'tickets'

Constitutional Politics, Constitutional Law, and the Thirteenth Amendment

Michael Les Benedict — Thu, 24 Feb 2011 11:01:11 PST

Contract, Race, and Freedom of Labor in the Constitutional Law of "Involuntary Servitude"

James G. Pope — Thu, 24 Feb 2011 10:34:54 PST

The Supreme Court has yet to adopt and apply a standard for assessing labor rights claims under the involuntary servitude clause. This article suggests that one may be found in the leading decision of Pollock v. Williams (1944), which contains the Court’s most thorough discussion of the interpretive issues. Under Pollock, a claimed right should be protected if it is necessary to provide workers with the “power below” and employers the “incentive above” to prevent “a harsh overlordship or unwholesome conditions of work.” Although this is not the only conceivable standard, it does fit well with the text, history, and case law of the Amendment. The absence of any racial element, which might appear dishonest in light of the fact that most of the leading cases involved workers of color, nevertheless corresponds to the original meaning and appears to have important advantages from a doctrinal point of view. The article discusses the legal and philosophical justifications of various labor rights in relation to the Pollock standard, including the right to quit, the right to change employers, the right to name the wages for which one is willing to work, and the right to strike.

James Ashley and the Thirteenth Amendment

Rebecca E. Zietlow — Thu, 24 Feb 2011 10:34:53 PST

The Thirteenth Amendment and Constitutional Theory

Earl Maltz — Thu, 24 Feb 2011 08:52:11 PST

The Reconstruction Power

Jack M. Balkin — Thu, 24 Feb 2011 08:44:04 PST

States Rights, Southern Hypocrisy, and the Crisis of the Union

Paul Finkelman — Thu, 24 Feb 2011 08:11:19 PST

Slavery and the Phenomenology of Torture

Sanford Levinson — Thu, 24 Feb 2011 08:05:14 PST

Congressional Authority to Interpret the Thirteenth Amendment

Alexander Tsesis — Thu, 24 Feb 2011 07:55:15 PST

The Enduring Legacy of the Thirteenth Amendment

Robert J. Kaczorowski — Wed, 23 Feb 2011 06:55:50 PST

The Thirteenth Amendment and the Meaning of Familial Bonds

Julie Novkov — Wed, 23 Feb 2011 06:35:01 PST

A Grievance Based Interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment

Lea VanderVelde — Wed, 23 Feb 2011 06:24:53 PST

Liberalism, the Thirteenth Amendment, and the Seeds of Destruction of Reconstruction

Leslie F. Goldstein — Wed, 23 Feb 2011 06:19:52 PST

[Features of conventional scholarly wisdom about the Thirteenth Amendment]

Pamela Brandwein — Tue, 22 Feb 2011 11:08:52 PST

The Slavery and Involuntary Servitude of Immigrant Workers: Two Sides of the Same Coin

Maria L. Ontiveros — Tue, 22 Feb 2011 11:03:17 PST

Getting Right Without Lincoln

Daniel W. Hamilton — Tue, 22 Feb 2011 10:59:52 PST

This short piece is taken from a review of the three important books considered below. This review is part of my current exploration of the historiography of slavery and the Constitution in Civil War legal history.

Brian McGinty, Lincoln and the Court; Stephen C. Neff, Justice in Blue and Gray: A Legal History of the Civil War; Lea VanderVelde, Mrs. Dred Scott: A Life on Slavery’s Frontier

Why Originalism is of so Little Use in Interpreting the Thirteenth Amendment

Henry L. Chambers — Tue, 22 Feb 2011 10:52:53 PST

The 13th Amendment affords two very different visions. One vision limits the 13th Amendment’s scope to ending slavery and involuntary servitude without more. The second expands the 13th Amendment’s scope to include an anti-subordination principle. Proponents of both visions rely on originalism to support their visions. Unfortunately, originalism does not help us reach a clearly correct conclusion regarding the scope of the 13th Amendment.

That is fine, because the core question regarding the interpretation of the 13th Amendment ought to be whether the amendment is constitutionally transformative. That is, does the 13th Amendment announce a constitutional principle that requires that the constitutional meaning of other text not explicitly changed by the amendment be re-interpreted. Determining that requires that the Constitution be read as it existed just before the 13th Amendment was adopted and as it existed just after the 13th Amendment was adopted. This is arguably originalist in orientation with its focus on the effect of the 13th Amendment at the time it was adopted. However, this method’s results may not be originalist at all.

The interpretive method suggested makes the current scope of the 13th Amendment depends not on its original meaning or original intent, but on amendments passed after it. To be clear, the amendments adopted after the 13th Amendment would not change the amendment through implication. They would merely require that the amendment’s interpretation change.

The Thirteenth Amendment, Interest Convergence, and the Badges and Incidents of Slavery

William M. Carter Jr. — Mon, 21 Feb 2011 07:22:23 PST

This article explores the gap between the Thirteenth Amendment's promise and its implementation.

Congressional Authority to Interpret the Thirteenth Amendment: a Response to Professor Tsesis

Jennifer Mason McAward — Mon, 21 Feb 2011 05:53:31 PST

The Impact of the Thirteenth Amendment on the Common Law

David S. Bogen — Mon, 21 Feb 2011 05:53:07 PST

Involuntary Servitude, Public Accommodations Laws, and the Legacy of Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States

Linda C. McClain — Mon, 21 Feb 2011 05:45:40 PST