


44. J 89/2: J-97-137 C
**TAIWAN COMMUNIQUE AND SEPARATION OF
POWERS**

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEPARATION OF POWERS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-SEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
ON
TAIWAN COMMUNIQUE AND SEPARATION OF POWERS

SEPTEMBER 17 AND 27, 1982

Serial No. J-97-137

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary



U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

11-450 O

WASHINGTON : 1983

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An Analysis of Certain Problems of the U.S.-China
Joint Communiqué on U.S. Arm Sales to Taiwan (August 17, 1982)
and the Need to Clarify the U.S. Position on Certain Vital Issues

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1. Discrepancies between the Chinese and the English Texts

There are two important discrepancies in the English and Chinese texts of the Communiqué, as indicated in the following:

<u>English text</u>	<u>Chinese text if translated into English</u>	<u>Explanation</u>
(Para. 1) it [the U.S.] <u>acknowledged</u> the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China.	it [the U.S.] <u>recognized</u> the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China. (See Appendix 3.)	The Chinese translated the word "acknowledge" into <u>Chengren</u> (Cheng-jen in Wade-Giles) which, if translated into English, would mean "recognize."

Note: In the Joint Communiqué on Establishing Diplomatic Relations issued on January 1, 1979, the Chinese side resorted to this same translation. This is the second time the U.S. State Department failed to challenge the Chinese manipulation of the translation.

(Para. 4) The Message to Compatriots in Taiwan issued by China on January 1, 1979 promulgated a <u>fundamental policy</u> of striving for peaceful reunification of the Motherland.	The Message to Compatriots in Taiwan issued by China on January 1, 1979 promulgated a <u>major policy</u> [or <u>guideline</u>] of striving for peaceful reunification of the Motherland. (See Appendix 1.)	Tazheng fangzhen, according to a PRC dictionary, should be translated into "major policy." ¹ Fangzhen can also be translated into "guideline." ²
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Note:
1. Hanyin cihui shouce (Handbook on Chinese-English Terms), Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1970, p. 176.
2. Id., p. 262.

Explanation:
In the context of the Chinese language, the term "Tazheng fangzhen" (major policy) does not have the meaning of "fundamental," which contains the connotation of unchanging and long-term," attributed to it by Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs John H. Holdbridge in his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on August 18, 1982.

(Para. 6) Having in mind the foregoing statements of both sides	<u>Considering</u> the foregoing statements of both sides	The Chinese translated the phrase "having in mind" ¹ into Kaolu (K'ao-lu in Wade-Giles), ² which if translated into English, would only mean "consider," thus undercutting the linkage between paragraph 6 (reduction of arms sales to Taiwan and others) and the previous paragraphs on China's peaceful intention to Taiwan.
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(See Appendix 4)

* S.J.D. (Harvard) and author, co-author, or editor of the following books on China and international law and the Taiwan question: The People's Republic of China and the Law of Treaties (Harvard University Press, 1972), (Co-editor) Law in Chinese Foreign Policy (Oceana, 1972) China and the Taiwan Question: Documents and Analysis (Praeger 1973), (Co-author) People's China and International Law: A Documentary Study (2 vols., Princeton University Press 1974, awarded a certificate of merit by the American Society of International Law in 1976), China and the Taiwan Issue (Praeger, 1979) and Agreements of the People's Republic of China, A Calendar of Events, 1966-1980 (Praeger, 1981).

Note:

1. See A New English-Chinese Dictionary, Hong Kong Branch of (Peking) Joint Publishing Co., 1975, p. 816 where it indicates that "having something in mind" should be translated into Jidei moushi (Chi-tei mou-shih in Wade-Giles), i.e., remember a certain thing.
2. Kao Lu should be translated into consider, see The Pinyin Chinese-English Dictionary, The Commercial Press, Beijing (Peking) and Hong Kong, 1979, p. 385.

Explanation:

Assistant Secretary of State Holdridge attached great importance to the sentence "Having in mind" in his testimony before Senate Foreign Relations Committee's hearing on August 17, 1982. He said: "Our future actions concerning arms sales to Taiwan are premised on a continuation of China's peaceful policy toward a resolution of its differences with Taiwan. This is indicated by the words at the beginning of Para. 6 that 'Having in mind the foregoing statements by both sides, the United States Government states" The Chinese translation undercuts the linkage between paragraph 6 and paragraph 4 (Chinese peaceful intention toward Taiwan) by changing the phrase "having in mind" into "considering."

2. Discrepancies between the U.S. and the Chinese Interpretation of the Communiqué

The Chinese Government and officials' statements issued on August 17, 1982 or later contradict some points of the U.S. interpretation of the Communiqué on certain vital issues pertaining to the Taiwan question, as indicated in the following:

Communiqué

(Para. 4) The Nine-Point proposal put forward by China on September 30, 1981 represented a further major effort under this fundamental [major in Chinese text] policy to strive for a peaceful solution to the Taiwan question.

U.S. Interpretation

We attach great significance to the Chinese statement in the communiqué regarding China's "fundamental" policy; and it is clear from our statements that our future actions will be conducted with this peaceful policy fully in mind. (President Reagan's statement on Issuance of Communiqué.)

Chinese Interpretation

On this [Taiwan] issue, which is purely China's internal affair, no misinterpretation or foreign interference is permissible (Chinese statement of August 17, 1982). In an interview with CBS, Chai Zemin said: "In 1979 we issued the message to compatriots in Taiwan and then in 1981 we put forward a nine-point proposal for the peaceful settlement of the Taiwan problem. These fully demonstrate our sincerity. However, we are not to make any commitment to any country on the peaceful settlement of the Taiwan problem. We consider the Taiwan problem to be China's internal affair. It is up to us to decide how to solve this problem."

(See Appendix 3.)

1. China Daily (Beijing), August 27, 1982, p. 1. This newspaper is an official English newspaper published by the PRC. See Appendix 2.

Communiqué

(Para. 6) . . . it [the U.S.] intends to reduce gradually its sales of arms to Taiwan, leading over a period of time to a final resolution.

U.S. Interpretation

We did not agree to set a date certain for ending arms sales to Taiwan and the statements of future U.S. arms sales policy embodied in the Communiqué do not provide either a time frame for reductions of U.S. arms sales or for their termination. (Holdridge testimony)

Chinese Interpretation

The final resolution referred to [in the Communiqué] certainly implies that U.S. arms sales to Taiwan must be completely terminated over a period of time. (Chinese Government Statement)

(Communique and Taiwan Relations Act)

Regarding future U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, our policy, set forth clearly in the communique, is fully consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act. (Reagan Statement)

(Communique and Taiwan Relations Act)

The "Taiwan Relations Act" seriously contravenes the principles embodied in the Joint Communique on the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries, and the Chinese Government has consistently been opposed to it. All interpretations designed to link the present Joint Communique to the "Taiwan Relations Act" are in violation of the spirit and substance of this communique and are thus unacceptable. (Chinese Government Statement)

3. U.S. Oral Pledges to Taiwan (Republic of China)

It was reported by Chinese Nationalist sources that on August 17, 1982, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs John H. Holdridge made the following oral pledges to the Representative of the Coordination Council for North American Affairs (CCNAA, the "unofficial" organ of the Republic of China in the U.S.):

1. The United States did not in the Joint Communique agree to set a date certain for ending arms sales to Taiwan. Statements of future U.S. arms sales policy embodied in the Joint Communique do not provide either a time frame for reduction of U.S. arms sales or for their termination.
2. The United States will continue to make appropriate arms sales to Taiwan based on its assessment of Taiwan's defense needs.
3. The United States attaches great importance to Peking's statement in the Joint Communique that it has a fundamental policy to seek peaceful resolution of the Taiwan problem. Future U.S. government actions concerning arms sales to Taiwan are premised on a continuation of China's peaceful policy toward a resolution of its differences with Taiwan.
4. The Reagan Administration has no reason at the present time to think that the Chinese in Peking will change this fundamental policy. If it should change, the United States would, of course, re-examine its position.
5. The U.S. position on the resolution of the Taiwan issue has consistently been that it is a matter for the Chinese themselves to work out. The sole and abiding concern of the United States is that any resolution be peaceful. "We see no mediation role for the U.S., nor will we attempt to exert pressure on Taiwan to enter into negotiation with the PRC."
6. There has been no change in the U.S. long-standing position on the issue of sovereignty over Taiwan. The Joint Communique issued today simply cited the relevant sentences in the 1979 Joint Communique on the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and the PRC. "We don't take any particular stand of our own with respect to it."
7. There is no truth in recent press reports that the Reagan Administration would seek to revise the Taiwan Relations Act. "We have no plans to seek any revisions."
8. The Joint Communique issued today does not require the United States to have prior consultations with Peking in the future on each arms sale case to Taiwan.
9. "We hope and expect that the Joint Communique will enhance the confidence of the people of Taiwan whose well being and prosperity continue to be of the utmost importance to the United States. From the President down, we have acted in a way which seeks to enhance the future security and prosperity of the people on Taiwan."

The above oral pledges to Taiwan were neither mentioned in Holdridge's testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on August 18, 1982, nor reported in any reputable Western publication, so their validity and value are highly questionable.

4. The Need to Take Certain Executive Actions to Clarify the U.S. Position on Certain Vital Issues.

As explained before, there are different interpretations on certain vital issues covered in the U.S.-China joint communique issued on August 17, 1982. Based on U.S. experience in dealing with the PRC, it is important to clarify the U.S. position now in order to avoid future misunderstanding with the PRC. Here, I will briefly summarize a single case to show the importance of making everything crystal clear in dealing with the PRC.

Sino-American Agreed Announcement on Repatriation of Civilians, September 10, 1955.

In this agreement, the PRC "recognizes that Americans in the People's Republic of China who desire to return to the United States are entitled to do so." According to the U.S. view, as explained in a statement issued by the Department of State on December 15, 1955, "This declaration is simple, clear, and positive. It says that any United States citizen has the right to leave China . . . No distinction is made as between those in prison and those out of prison." The PRC, however, insisted that, for those Americans imprisoned in China, "only when they have completed their sentences or when China has adopted measures to release them before the completion of their sentences [could] the question of their exercising the right to return . . . arise." As a result, several Americans continued to be imprisoned in China. The last one, Daniel Kelly, was not released until January, 1979, after U.S. normalization of relations with China.

Also, in the course of implementing this agreement, when the PRC provided a name list of about 100 Americans (in and out of Chinese prison) to the United States, it immediately demanded that the U.S. provide a name list of all Chinese in the U.S. (about 200,000 at that time), despite the fact that the preparatory work did not indicate that the U.S. ever agreed to this arrangement. (See Hungdah Chiu, The People's Republic of China and the Law of Treaties, Harvard University Press, 1972, pp. 82-84 and the sources cited therein.)

In view of the above explanation, it seems desirable that appropriate measures should be taken to make the official U.S. position on the Taiwan issue as clear as that explained in the related documents issued in connection with the joint communique of August 17, 1982. With this in mind, it is suggested that an executive order should be issued to integrate the communique with the related documents and statements issued as one package in the following manner:

- (1) The Executive Order should emphasize that the joint communique, from the U.S. point of view, should be read in conjunction with President Reagan's statement, Assistant Secretary of State Holdridge's testimony and the U.S. oral pledge (which should be put into appropriate written form) to Taiwan.
- (2) Paragraph 6 of the Joint Communique stated that the United States "arms sales to Taiwan will not exceed, either in qualitative or in quantitative terms, the level of those supplied in recent years since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and China." This policy, if carried out, will obsolete Taiwan's defense capability in 5 to 10 years as the PRC continues to modernize its military forces. Both President Reagan's statement and Assistant Secretary Holdridge's testimony did not respond to this vital issue concerning Taiwan's security. However, it was reported by Time that "Administration officials insist that this language allows more advanced weapons to be sold to Taiwan if China upgrades its own armaments." (Time, August 30, 1982, p. 21) If this is true, then it is important to include this understanding in the executive order to avoid any future misunderstandings. Moreover, according to Senator Goldwater, he was assured by responsible Administration officials that the phrase "level of those [arms] supplied in recent years" was meant to refer to the \$830 million U.S. dollar value of arms supplied by U.S. to Taiwan in 1980, subject to adjustment of future inflation. In other words, the maximum amount of arms Taiwan could purchase in any year from the U.S. is not to exceed \$830 million U.S. dollars in its 1980 value. This understanding is of crucial importance to Taiwan, otherwise, with the continued devaluation of U.S. dollars, in less than 5 to 10 years Taiwan would not be able to buy any meaningful amount of arms from the U.S. In view of this, this understanding should also be included in the proposed executive order.
- (3) As there are important discrepancies between the Chinese text and the English text of the communique, it appears desirable to make it clear that the U.S. only adheres to the English text.

Appendix 1

HANYIN CIHUI SHOUCI (Handbook on Chinese-English

Terms), Beijing: Foreign Languages Press,

1970

汉英词汇手册

外文出版社薛文编

北京(37)字街24号

外文印刷厂印装

新华书店北京发行所发行

各地新华书店经售

1970年12月(64开)第1版

1970年12月北京第1次印刷

书号9050·内1定价3.05元

176 da 大

for them to develop their talents to the full...
大原则下面 subject to the major premise of...

Da-z

大灾难 catastrophe / disaster / calamity

大战犯 arch war criminal

大长无产阶级革命派的志气, 大灭资产阶级的威风
heighten greatly the militancy (moral) of the pro-
letarian revolutionaries and deal serious blows to
the arrogance of the bourgeoisie大长...志气, 大灭...威风 fortify the high resolve of...
and deflate the arrogance of... in a big way大张旗鼓 with a great fanfare / with a flourish / flags
and drums in array / do it in a big way / by great
publicity / with a big display of flags and drums /
on a grand scale大张旗鼓地, 雷厉风行地 a large-scale, all-out and sweep-
ing struggle

→ 大政方针 major policies

大众化 popularize / popularization / transform...

along the popular line / Many comrades like to talk
about "a mass style" / So whoever talks glibly about
"transformation to a mass style"...大搞其“乌龟壳” feverishly construct their "tortoise-
shells"大抓狼抓活思想 make the greatest effort to grasp
living ideas

262 fang 方房妨防

of orientation

方向对头 correct orientation (direction) among

方向盘 steering gear / steering wheel

方兴未艾 rising / in the ascendant / on the upgrade

小方向 secondary direction

→ 方针 guiding line / policy / orientation of our national
culture / guiding principles / common course of the
fraternal Parties

Appendix 2

THE CHINA DAILY, 2, Jintai Xilu, Beijing
People's Republic of China

August 27, 1982, p. 1.

Taiwan issue still exists, envoy says

WASHINGTON (Xinhua) — The publication of the Sino-US Joint Communiqué on the US arms sales to Taiwan is only "the first step" towards the settlement of this issue — the question ahead is an honest and thorough implementation of all the principles and commitments embodied in the Joint Communiqué, Chai Zemin, Chinese ambassador to the United States, said Wednesday.

In an interview with CBS, the American TV network, Chai Zemin said, "The publication of the Joint Communiqué between China and the United States is a good thing, but that does not mean the entire issue has been totally solved. The reaching of agreement in the communiqué is only the first step towards the resolution of this issue. The question ahead is how to carry out all the principles and commitments embodied in the Joint Communiqué honestly, and thoroughly."

The Chinese ambassador stressed, "Only with the thorough implementation of these principles and commitments will Sino-US relations develop smoothly, which would be conducive to world peace and stability."

Questioned about the ways of solving the Taiwan problem, Chai

Zemin said, "In 1979 we issued the message to compatriots in Taiwan and then in 1981 we put forward a nine-point proposal for the peaceful settlement of the Taiwan problem. These fully demonstrate our sincerity. However, we are not to make any commitment to any country on the peaceful settlement of the Taiwan problem. We consider the Taiwan problem to be China's internal affair. It is up to us to decide how to solve this problem."

Appendix 3

UNITED STATES-CHINA JOINT COMMUNIQUE
OF AUGUST 17, 1982

1. In the Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations on January 1, 1979, issued by the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the People's Republic of China, the United States of America recognized the Government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal government of China, and it acknowledged the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China. Within that context, the two sides agreed that the people of the United States would continue to maintain cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan. On this basis, relations between the United States and China were normalized.

中华人民共和国和美利坚合众国联合公报

(一九八二年八月十七日)

一、在中华人民共和国政府和美利坚合众国政府发表的一九七九年一月一日建立外交关系的联合公报中，美利坚合众国承认中华人民共和国政府是中国的唯一合法政府，并承认中国的立场，即只有一个中国，台湾是中国的一部分。在此范围内，双方同意，美国人民将同台湾人民继续保持文化、商务和其他非官方关系。在此基础上，中美两国关系实现了正常化。

4. The Chinese government reiterates that the question of Taiwan is China's internal affair. The Message to Compatriots in Taiwan issued by China on January 1, 1979 promulgated a fundamental policy of striving for peaceful reunification of the Motherland. The Nine-Point Proposal put forward by China on September 30, 1981 represented a further major effort under this fundamental policy to strive for a peaceful solution to the Taiwan question.

四、中国政府重申，台湾问题是中国的内政。一九七九年一月一日中国发表的告台湾同胞书宣布了争取和平统一祖国的大政方针。一九八一年九月三十日中国提出的九点方针是按照这一大政方针争取和平解决台湾问题的进一步重大努力。

6. Having in mind the foregoing statements of both sides, the United States Government states that it does not seek to carry out a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan, that its arms sales to Taiwan will not exceed, either in qualitative or in quantitative terms, the level of those supplied in recent years since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and China, and that it intends to reduce gradually its sales of arms to Taiwan, leading over a period of time to a final resolution. In so stating, the United States acknowledges China's consistent position regarding the thorough settlement of this issue.

六、考虑到双方的上述声明，美国政府声明，它不寻求执行一项长期向台湾出售武器的政策，它向台湾出售的武器在性能和数量上将不超过中美建交后几年供应的水平，它准备逐步减少它对台湾的武器出售，并经过一段时期导致最后的解决。在作这样的声明时，美国承认中国关于彻底解决这一问题的立场。

The Commercial Press
Beijing · Hong Kong
and
Pitman Advanced Publishing Program
San Francisco · London · Melbourne

1979

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也與平常的問句是：Is he still of the same ¹ mind? 他是否還是老樣子? 或 out of one's ² mind 嗎? 對不對，正在，就在，*bring* (或 *call*) on 一使他來，*bring* (或 *change*) one's ³ 改換生活，*give one's* ⁴ 給與，*give one's* ⁵ 給予，*give one's* ⁶ 給予，*give one's* ⁷ 給予，*give one's* ⁸ 給予，*give one's* ⁹ 給予，*give one's* ¹⁰ 給予，*give one's* ¹¹ 給予，*give one's* ¹² 給予，*give one's* ¹³ 給予，*give one's* ¹⁴ 給予，*give one's* ¹⁵ 給予，*give one's* ¹⁶ 給予，*give one's* ¹⁷ 給予，*give one's* ¹⁸ 給予，*give one's* ¹⁹ 給予，*give one's* ²⁰ 給予，*give one's* ²¹ 給予，*give one's* ²² 給予，*give one's* ²³ 給予，*give one's* ²⁴ 給予，*give one's* ²⁵ 給予，*give one's* ²⁶ 給予，*give one's* ²⁷ 給予，*give one's* ²⁸ 給予，*give one's* ²⁹ 給予，*give one's* ³⁰ 給予，*give one's* ³¹ 給予，*give one's* ³² 給予，*give one's* ³³ 給予，*give one's* ³⁴ 給予，*give one's* ³⁵ 給予，*give one's* ³⁶ 給予，*give one's* ³⁷ 給予，*give one's* ³⁸ 給予，*give one's* ³⁹ 給予，*give one's* ⁴⁰ 給予，*give one's* ⁴¹ 給予，*give one's* ⁴² 給予，*give one's* ⁴³ 給予，*give one's* ⁴⁴ 給予，*give one's* ⁴⁵ 給予，*give one's* ⁴⁶ 給予，*give one's* ⁴⁷ 給予，*give one's* ⁴⁸ 給予，*give one's* ⁴⁹ 給予，*give one's* ⁵⁰ 給予，*give one's* ⁵¹ 給予，*give one's* ⁵² 給予，*give one's* ⁵³ 給予，*give one's* ⁵⁴ 給予，*give one's* ⁵⁵ 給予，*give one's* ⁵⁶ 給予，*give one's* ⁵⁷ 給予，*give one's* ⁵⁸ 給予，*give one's* ⁵⁹ 給予，*give one's* ⁶⁰ 給予，*give one's* ⁶¹ 給予，*give one's* ⁶² 給予，*give one's* ⁶³ 給予，*give one's* ⁶⁴ 給予，*give one's* ⁶⁵ 給予，*give one's* ⁶⁶ 給予，*give one's* ⁶⁷ 給予，*give one's* ⁶⁸ 給予，*give one's* ⁶⁹ 給予，*give one's* ⁷⁰ 給予，*give one's* ⁷¹ 給予，*give one's* ⁷² 給予，*give one's* ⁷³ 給予，*give one's* ⁷⁴ 給予，*give one's* ⁷⁵ 給予，*give one's* ⁷⁶ 給予，*give one's* ⁷⁷ 給予，*give one's* ⁷⁸ 給予，*give one's* ⁷⁹ 給予，*give one's* ⁸⁰ 給予，*give one's* ⁸¹ 給予，*give one's* ⁸² 給予，*give one's* ⁸³ 給予，*give one's* ⁸⁴ 給予，*give one's* ⁸⁵ 給予，*give one's* ⁸⁶ 給予，*give one's* ⁸⁷ 給予，*give one's* ⁸⁸ 給予，*give one's* ⁸⁹ 給予，*give one's* ⁹⁰ 給予，*give one's* ⁹¹ 給予，*give one's* ⁹² 給予，*give one's* ⁹³ 給予，*give one's* ⁹⁴ 給予，*give one's* ⁹⁵ 給予，*give one's* ⁹⁶ 給予，*give one's* ⁹⁷ 給予，*give one's* ⁹⁸ 給予，*give one's* ⁹⁹ 給予，*give one's* ¹⁰⁰ 給予，*give one's* ¹⁰¹ 給予，*give one's* ¹⁰² 給予，*give one's* ¹⁰³ 給予，*give one's* ¹⁰⁴ 給予，*give one's* ¹⁰⁵ 給予，*give one's* ¹⁰⁶ 給予，*give one's* ¹⁰⁷ 給予，*give one's* ¹⁰⁸ 給予，*give one's* ¹⁰⁹ 給予，*give one's* ¹¹⁰ 給予，*give one's* ¹¹¹ 給予，*give one's* ¹¹² 給予，*give one's* ¹¹³ 給予，*give one's* ¹¹⁴ 給予，*give one's* ¹¹⁵ 給予，*give one's* ¹¹⁶ 給予，*give one's* ¹¹⁷ 給予，*give one's* ¹¹⁸ 給予，*give one's* ¹¹⁹ 給予，*give one's* ¹²⁰ 給予，*give one's* ¹²¹ 給予，*give one's* ¹²² 給予，*give one's* ¹²³ 給予，*give one's* ¹²⁴ 給予，*give one's* ¹²⁵ 給予，*give one's* ¹²⁶ 給予，*give one's* ¹²⁷ 給予，*give one's* ¹²⁸ 給予，*give one's* ¹²⁹ 給予，*give one's* ¹³⁰ 給予，*give one's* ¹³¹ 給予，*give one's* ¹³² 給予，*give one's* ¹³³ 給予，*give one's* ¹³⁴ 給予，*give one's* ¹³⁵ 給予，*give one's* ¹³⁶ 給予，*give one's* ¹³⁷ 給予，*give one's* ¹³⁸ 給予，*give one's* ¹³⁹ 給予，*give one's* ¹⁴⁰ 給予，*give one's* ¹⁴¹ 給予，*give one's* ¹⁴² 給予，*give one's* ¹⁴³ 給予，*give one's* ¹⁴⁴ 給予，*give one's* ¹⁴⁵ 給予，*give one's* ¹⁴⁶ 給予，*give one's* ¹⁴⁷ 給予，*give one's* ¹⁴⁸ 給予，*give one's* ¹⁴⁹ 給予，*give one's* ¹⁵⁰ 給予，*give one's* ¹⁵¹ 給予，*give one's* ¹⁵² 給予，*give one's* ¹⁵³ 給予，*give one's* ¹⁵⁴ 給予，*give one's* ¹⁵⁵ 給予，*give one's* ¹⁵⁶ 給予，*give one's* ¹⁵⁷ 給予，*give one's* ¹⁵⁸ 給予，*give one's* ¹⁵⁹ 給予，*give one's* ¹⁶⁰ 給予，*give one's* ¹⁶¹ 給予，*give one's* ¹⁶² 給予，*give one's* ¹⁶³ 給予，*give one's* ¹⁶⁴ 給予，*give one's* ¹⁶⁵ 給予，*give one's* ¹⁶⁶ 給予，*give one's* ¹⁶⁷ 給予，*give one's* ¹⁶⁸ 給予，*give one's* ¹⁶⁹ 給予，*give one's* ¹⁷⁰ 給予，*give one's* ¹⁷¹ 給予，*give one's* ¹⁷² 給予，*give one's* ¹⁷³ 給予，*give one's* ¹⁷⁴ 給予，*give one's* ¹⁷⁵ 給予，*give one's* ¹⁷⁶ 給予，*give one's* ¹⁷⁷ 給予，*give one's* ¹⁷⁸ 給予，*give one's* ¹⁷⁹ 給予，*give one's* ¹⁸⁰ 給予，*give one's* ¹⁸¹ 給予，*give one's* ¹⁸² 給予，*give one's* ¹⁸³ 給予，*give one's* ¹⁸⁴ 給予，*give one's* ¹⁸⁵ 給予，*give one's* ¹⁸⁶ 給予，*give one's* ¹⁸⁷ 給予，*give one's* ¹⁸⁸ 給予，*give one's* ¹⁸⁹ 給予，*give one's* ¹⁹⁰ 給予，*give one's* ¹⁹¹ 給予，*give one's* ¹⁹² 給予，*give one's* ¹⁹³ 給予，*give one's* ¹⁹⁴ 給予，*give one's* ¹⁹⁵ 給予，*give one's* ¹⁹⁶ 給予，*give one's* ¹⁹⁷ 給予，*give one's* ¹

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kōo—kōo

edge of a kang
 【炕沿】 kǎngyán the edge of a kang
 【炕沿】 kǎngyán a small, short-legged table for use on a kang; kang table

钪 kǎng (化) scandium (Sc)

kōo

尻 kōo [古书用语] buttocks; bottom

kōo

考 kǎo ① give or take an examination, test or quiz: 我考你。I'll give you a quiz. 或 Let me quiz you. 你的数学考得怎么样? How did you do in the maths test (或 quiz)? ② sit for (或 take) an examination/ ~上大学 be admitted to a university ③ check; inspect ④ study; investigate; verify: 待~ remain to be verified ⑤ one's deceased father

【考査】 kǎochá examine; check: ~学生成绩 check students' work

【考査】 kǎochá ① inspect; make an on-the-spot investigation: ~水利工程 investigate water conservancy projects/ 出国 go abroad on a tour of investigation ② observe and study: 应当在长期的群众斗争中, ~和识别干部, 挑选和培养接班人。It is essential to test and judge cadres and choose and train successors in the long course of mass struggle. ③ ~团 observation (或 investigation) group/ ~组 study group

【考场】 kǎochǎng examination hall or room

【考订】 kǎodìng examine and correct; do textual research

【考古】 kǎogǔ ① engage in archaeological studies ② archaeology ③ ~学 archaeology/ ~学家 archaeologist

【考査】 kǎohé examine; check; assess (sb.'s proficiency): 定~ routine check/ ~干部 check on cadres/ 技术~制度 业已建立。A system to assess technical proficiency has been established. ④ ~飞行 check-out flight; check flight

【考覈】 kǎojiū ① observe and study; investigate: 这个问题很复杂。We need to go into the matter seriously. 或 This problem merits serious attention. ② fastidious; particular: 穿衣服不必过于~。One need not be too particular about dress. ③ exquisite; fine: 这本画册装订得很~。This album is beautifully bound.

【考校】 kǎojiào textual criticism; textual research

【考卷】 kǎojiǎn examination paper

【考虑】 kǎoliú think over; consider: 让我~一下再答复你。Let me think it over before I give you an answer. 这方面的情况你~了吗? Have you taken this aspect of the matter into account?/ 计划~不周。The plan has not been carefully thought out./ 不~个人得失 disregard personal gains and losses/ 给予同情的~ give sympathetic consideration to

【考勤】 kǎoqín check on work attendance ④ ~牌 attendance record

【考取】 kǎoqǔ pass an entrance examination; be admitted to school or college (after an examination)

【考生】 kǎoshēng candidate for an entrance examination; examinee

【考试】 kǎoshì examination; test

【考题】 kǎotí examination questions; examination paper: 出~ set an examination paper; set examination questions

【考问】 kǎowèn examine orally; question

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B

project/ 河流开发~ a river development programme/ 有~地进行 proceed in a planned way ② map out; plan: ~好了再动手干。Map it out before you start./ 我们~下周出发。We plan to leave next week.

③ ~供应 planned supply/ ~经济 planned economy/ ~生产 planned production/ ~生育 family planning; birth control

【计算】 jìsuan reckon by the piece ④ ~工资 piece rate wage/ ~工作 piecework

【计较】 jìjiào ① haggle over; fuss about: ~小事 be too particular about trifles/ 绝不~个人得失。He gives no thought to personal gains or losses. ② argue; dispute: 我不跟你~, 等你气平了再说。I won't argue with you now. Let's talk it over when you've calmed down. ③ think over; plan: 先安排一周的活儿, 以后再作~。We'll arrange a week's work first and think about the rest afterwards.

【计量】 jìliàng measure; calculate; estimate: 不可~ estimate ④ ~学 metrology

【计谋】 jìmóu scheme; stratagem

【计日程功】 jì rì chéng gōng estimate exactly how much time is needed to complete a project; have the completion of a project well in sight

【计时】 jìshí reckon by time ④ ~工资 payment by the hour; time wage/ ~工作 timework

【计数】 jìshù count

【计数】 jìshù ① counter: 盖革~ Geiger counter/ 闪烁~ scintillation counter

【计算】 jìsuàn ① count; compute; calculate: ~出输入数 count the number of people present/ ~产值 calculate the output value ② consideration; planning: 做事不能没个~。We shouldn't do anything without a plan. ③ ~尺 slide rule

【计算机】 jìsuànjī computer; calculating machine: 机械~ mechanical computer/ 电子~ electronic computer/ 模拟~ analogue computer/ 微型~ microcomputer/ 数字控制~ digital control computer/ 自动数字跟踪分析~ automatic digital tracking analyser computer/ 自动程序控制~ automatic sequence-controlled calculator/ 超高速巨型~ giant ultra-high-speed computer

④ ~程序设计 computer programming/ ~存储器 computer storage/ ~代码 computer code/ ~软设备 computer software/ ~硬设备 computer hardware/ ~装置 computer installation

【计议】 jìyì deliberate; talk over; consult: 从长~ take one's time in coming to a decision; think sth. over carefully/ 二人~已定。The two of them settled on a scheme.

记 jì ① remember; bear in mind; commit to memory: ~错了 remember wrongly/ ~不清 cannot recall exactly: remember only vaguely/ 死~硬背 learn by rote/ 党的故事~在心 bear in mind the Party's teachings/ 我们要~住这个教训。We must keep this lesson in mind. ② write (或 jot, take) down; record: ~在笔记本上 write it down in a notebook/ 把结果~下来 record the results/ ~下电话号码 jot down the telephone number ③ notes; record: 游~ travel notes/ 大事~ a chronicle of events ④ mark; sign: 路~儿 secret mark ⑤ birthmark: 他左腿有块~。There is a birthmark on his left leg. ⑥ (方)~量: ~一耳光 a slap in the face

【记仇】 jìchóu bear grudges; harbour bitter resentment: 他~不~。He's not the sort of person to bear a grudge.

【记得】 jìde remember: ~他的模样儿 remember what he looked like/ 我完全记不得了。I simply don't remember it./ 你~住这些数字吗? Can you carry all these figures in your head?